Watch Annette’s story

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Whatever you want to create, share, or sell, we’ll help you do it right here.

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Free to start, with room to grow.

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Blogs and Personal Sites Business Sites and Online Stores

Blogger

$3

per month, billed yearly

Best for Bloggers Brand your blog with a custom .blog domain name, and remove all WordPress.com advertising. Receive additional storage space and email support.

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Personal

$5

per month, billed yearly

Best for Personal Use Boost your website with a custom domain name, and remove all WordPress.com advertising. Get access to high‑quality email and live chat support.

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$25

per month, billed yearly

Best for Small Businesses Power your business website with unlimited premium and business theme templates, Google Analytics support, unlimited storage, and the ability to remove WordPress.com branding.

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eCommerce

$45

per month, billed yearly

Best for Online Stores Sell products or services with this powerful, all‑in‑one online store experience. This plan includes premium integrations and is extendable, so it’ll grow with you as your business grows.

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  • Remove WordPress.com Ads
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  • Site Monetization
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  • Get Personalized Help
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  • Upload Plugins
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Start with eCommerce

WordPress.com Free

A free WordPress.com site includes a WordPress.com subdomain, community support, dozens of free themes, basic design customization, and more. Start with Free ›

What can you do on WordPress.com?

WordPress.com gives you everything you need to create anything you want. It’s flexible, secure, and powerful, just like you want your business to be.

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Everyone has a point of view. Make your mark online with the world’s greatest blogging tool, and join a community millions strong that’s waiting to hear what you have to say.
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Thousands of themes means there’s a layout that’s just right for you, while storage and design options ensure you can upload anything you need to and give your work the stage it deserves.
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Our 24/7 support is powered by actual people. We call them Happiness Engineers.

From configuring settings to publishing pages to helping you pick the perfect design, they’re all ears, all smiles, and all human. Happiness Engineers also work all around the world—and around the clock, so there’s always someone there when you need them.

Start your website
MORE THAN 300 Humans
AVAILABLE 24/7 Instantly

You’re in good company.

People all over the world are doing all sorts of amazing things on WordPress.

Watch Annette’s story

An innovative New York City hair salon.

I looked into what other bloggers whom I admired were using, and the Cadillac of platforms is WordPress.com, hands down. The themes are breathtaking — even the free ones! — and all of the supporting infrastructure and information is top shelf.
Alexis Kanda-Olmstead
alexiskanda-olmstead.com
WordPress.com works really well with Google for a great SEO ranking. I can also embed YouTube videos, Google Maps, and other content easily and without any coding ability.
Quintin Lake
theperimeter.uk

You can. You will. We’ll help.

Invent the world’s greatest cat food, save a rainforest, start a needlepoint club. Whatever it is, it’s going to need a website — that’s where we come in.

Start your website
#####EOF##### WordPress.com vs WordPress.org Hosting Options

Create a site with WordPress.

Build your site with the software trusted by 33% of the internet.

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Choose WordPress.com for the fastest, easiest way to start your website.

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Choose a custom WordPress installation for the ultimate control over your website.

Pick from thousands of community themes and plugins and manage your own security and software updates on your preferred hosting provider. Choose optional dedicated WordPress hosting for increased performance.

Designed and built to run WordPress like a dream. Exclusive technology gives you the proven performance, reliability, and functionality you need.

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Sites optimized for peak performance, automatic security and backups, up to 20x daily traffic scaling, experts on call to help round the clock.

Start with DreamHost

Out of all of the hosts in the world we've chosen to recommend Bluehost and DreamHost as the two we think are best. If you sign up with one of our recommended partners we have a commercial affiliate relationship with them.

People love WordPress.com logo.

WordPress.com works really well with Google for a great SEO ranking. I can also embed YouTube videos, Google Maps, and other content easily and without any coding ability.
Quintin Lake
theperimeter.uk
It’s been a great privilege and a life-changing experience. I’m grateful to WordPress.com for providing an affordable and user-friendly platform for individuals to launch projects and be heard in this way.
Ann Morgan
ayearofreadingtheworld.com

Need help deciding?

Learn more about each option to choose the one that’s best for you.

WordPress.com

Total simplicity — we take care of everything.

  • Build a site in minutes. We host your site, register your domain, and offer built-in plugins including automated software updates and security.

  • Choose from hundreds of beautiful designs and customize them for your business site, blog, or portfolio. If you purchased a WordPress theme elsewhere? No problem: the WordPress.com Business plan lets you install any theme you’d like.

  • Reach a wider audience and find new readers. Sync your content to Facebook and Twitter and connecting with millions of people using WordPress.com.

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Start with WordPress.com

WordPress.org

More control — you install and host your site.

  • Find a host, install plugins, and get your hands dirty. We can help with services like Jetpack for security and backups.

  • Have complete control over your design and code. Install and customize any WordPress theme you want or build your own with PHP and CSS.

  • Extend your site with plugins. Choose from thousands of community plugins to add features like spam protection, custom galleries, in-depth analytics, and more.

  • Find help from the wider WordPress community through support forums.

Start with Bluehost

#####EOF##### Create an eCommerce Website with WordPress.com

Everything you need for a powerful, profitable site.

Create an eCommerce website with WordPress.com

Get Started with eCommerce

WordPress.com offers a full range of eCommerce options, from one-click payment buttons to a fully customizable online store.

Start taking payments in seconds

Whether you want to sell baked goods to your neighbors or accept donations for a local organization, WordPress.com makes taking payments a breeze. Our Simple Payments button allows you to take credit or debit card payments from any page with minimal setup.

Create an online store

WordPress.com gives you all the tools you need to publish content and sell products from the same platform. Create a powerful online store and install more plugins to help you customize products, attract customers, and increase your sales.

Sell anything, anywhere

Try the most flexible WordPress eCommerce solution on the market, powering more stores than any other platform. Sell everything from physical goods to memberships to subscription boxes, and deliver it up the street or across an ocean.

With WordPress.com eCommerce, you have the freedom to create a beautiful store that meets your needs. The only limit is your imagination.

Choose your starting point

Quick and easy payments

$8 per month, billed yearly /month, billed yearly
Best for Bloggers

Build a powerful website with the ability to accept payments or donations with Simple Payments. Also includes advanced design tools, lots of space for media files, and the ability to further monetize your site with ads. Get started with WordPress.com Premium.

Start with Premium

Multi-purpose business site

$25 per month, billed yearly /month, billed yearly
Best for Small Businesses

Add an online store to your business website with the ability to sell and ship physical products. Also includes installation of custom plugins and themes, real-time concierge support, Google Analytics, and unlimited storage. Get started with WordPress.com Business.

Start with Business

eCommerce experience

$45 per month, billed yearly /month, billed yearly
Best for Dedicated eCommerce

Sell products or services with this powerful, all‑in‑one online store experience. This plan includes premium integrations and is extendable, so it’ll grow with you as your business grows.

Start with eCommerce
#####EOF##### The WordPress.com Blog

The WordPress.com Blog

The WordPress.com Blog

Three New WordPress.com Color Schemes

We’ve launched three new color schemes to customize your WordPress.com dashboard!

April 3, 2019 / 17

Caroline Moore

WordPress.com’s Parent Company Announces Happy Tools, a New Suite of Products for the Future of Work

Happy Schedule, our first offering, will help distributed teams manage employee schedules and customer support.

April 1, 2019 / 0

Matt Wondra

Electric Literature Moves to WordPress — Here’s How an Indie Publisher Thrives on the Open Web

Lessons from 10 years of publishing essays and fiction.

March 25, 2019 / 4

Mark Armstrong

Gender Balance is a Business Issue

On gender balance, diversity, and inclusion at Automattic.

March 8, 2019 / 11

Deborah Beckett

Join WordPress.com for an International Women’s Day Livestream Panel

On International Women’s Day this Friday, WordPress.com parent company Automattic is hosting four outstanding women tech leaders for a livestreamed conversation about professional advancement, technology, and mutual support as we strive for equity in the workplace. It’s happening Friday, March 8 at 6 pm UTC / 1 pm ET / …

March 7, 2019 / 1

Niesha Sweet

Free Domain Privacy Protection

Every domain registered through WordPress.com includes privacy protection at no extra charge.

March 6, 2019 / 4

Andrija Vucinic

Introducing Six New Business-Oriented Themes

Elevate your business website with one of our six new free themes! Calm, sophisticated, friendly, professional, elegant, modern — find the style that’s just right for you.

February 7, 2019 / 23

Laurel Fulford

Announcing Newspack by WordPress.com — A New Publishing Solution for News Organizations

We’re teaming up with Google, Lenfest, Civil funder ConsenSys, and Knight to develop a next-generation publishing platform.

January 14, 2019 / 0

Mark Armstrong

Customize Your WordPress.com Dashboard

We’re happy to announce new improvements to your WordPress.com dashboard for a more accessible and customized experience. From your desktop, you can now customize your dashboard by choosing one of our two new color schemes, Classic Bright for a fresh modern feel and Classic Blue as the standard you’ve known …

January 8, 2019 / 115

Courtney Burton Doker

Introducing the 2019 ‘Anything Is Possible’ List

WordPress.com’s inaugural New Year’s list celebrates the people and organizations who are using the web to make the world a better place.

January 3, 2019 / 32

Mark Armstrong

New Theme: Twenty Nineteen

Meet Twenty Nineteen, the brand new WordPress default theme.

December 19, 2018 / 47

Chris Runnells

Search
Read our other blogs:

Want to start a blogging habit or set up a business website?
Get step-by-step guidance from WordPress.com pros, right in your inbox. Our email courses are free to all and there are no prerequisites.

Visit Blogging University

Create your new blog or website for free

Get Started

#####EOF##### Features to help you publish anything, anywhere

Features to help you publish anything, anywhere.

  • Choose a plan that works for you
  • Customize as much or as little as you want
  • Get help when you need it
  • Tell your story
Get Started

Get Started

  1. Create a robust website

    … or a blog, or a combination of both. Personal blog, portfolio, business site — it’s up to you.

  2. Plans for any budget

    Start for free. Upgrade for advanced customization, security, and SEO tools. Or stay free!

  3. Custom domains

    Add a custom domain to carve out your own space on the web, and manage it right from WordPress.com.

You’re in good company

Over 30% of the web runs on WordPress. WordPress.com is home to everyone from brand new bloggers and entrepreneurs, to major brands like TIME, TED, and Spotify.

Realize your vision

Dozens of themes

Choose from hundreds of customizable themes, with new additions weekly.

Mobile-friendly

Create a mobile-friendly site with a click, or choose from a selection of responsive themes that look great everywhere.

Fast, friendly support

Get expert help — our team of Happiness Engineers is standing by.

Help when you want it

Support is available 24/7 via email and our community forums. For folks with a paid plan, Happiness Engineers are available via live chat for real-time assistance.

Tell your story

Write without worry

Our editor is fast, intuitive, and saves your work every few seconds, so you never miss a word.

Upload or embed media

Drag-and-drop images into posts and pages. Create designer-worthy photo galleries. Embed audio, video, and more.

Mobile and desktop apps

Update your site from anywhere with mobile and desktop apps for iOS, Android, Mac, Windows, and Linux systems.

Own your content

Whatever you create on WordPress.com is yours to keep. Export your content at any time — wherever life takes you, your content follows.

Find your fans

  1. Built-in social sharing

    Automatically send new posts to Twitter, Facebook, and more, and add social tools to help readers share.

  2. In-depth stats

    Learn more about your visitors — where they’re from, what they read, when they visit — with rich stats.

  3. Search engine optimized

    Make it easy for new fans to find you with built-in sitemaps and other SEO tools. All you have to do is publish.

The biggest community of online publishers

WordPress.com has millions of users. The WordPress.com Reader helps them find you — and lets you find fascinating new reads.

Create a feature-rich blog or website today

Get Started
#####EOF##### Go WordPress
Go Own Your Passion. Boost Your Business.

How to Track Site Visits Using UTM Codes

Whether you launch a social media campaign or refresh your site with new content, using UTM codes can provide valuable campaign performance data.

Making Your E-Commerce Website More Mobile-Responsive

Ready to get selling online? You’ll need to make sure your e-commerce website is responsive to different devices, or risk losing customers.

How to Check Keyword Ranking for Your Content

Trying to evaluate your content’s SEO performance? Learn how to check keyword ranking and make adjustments that can help you boost your site traffic.

Advertising Using Social Media: Sponsored Posts and Social Ads 101

Advertising using social media can boost organic marketing efforts, generate website visits, and help target potential new customers. Learn how to start.

Create a Nonprofit Mission Statement That Inspires

If creating your nonprofit mission statement is still on your to-do list, follow these tips for creating a concise, impactful statement.

3 Paywall Examples and How to Use Them

What are paywalls and how can you use them to monetize your content? Here are three paywall examples as well as the best scenarios for each.

Create a Paywall With WordPress.com

Looking for ways to monetize your site? Try creating a paywall with WordPress.com.

Online Bookings: Tips and Plugins for Your WordPress.com Site

How can online bookings help your business? Here’s what you need to know, and a few easy ways to add online bookings to your WordPress.com site.

Boost Content on Social Media in 3 Steps

The ability to boost content on social media is a great way to meet your marketing goals, without having to create an ad strategy.

CSS Cheat Sheets to Eliminate the Mystery of Web Design

CSS cheat sheets are incredible resources for making your website look exactly the way you want it, without paying for a designer or an expensive theme.

Go by WordPress.com

Welcome to Go by WordPress.com, where experts share their knowledge on building and growing a successful web presence.

Explore by category:

Thousands of small businesses, online stores, and professionals of all stripes call WordPress.com home.

Whether you’re looking to promote your business or share your story, we have a plan that’s right for you.

Get Started Today

Create your new blog or website for free

Get Started

#####EOF##### WordPress.com Apps - Desktop Apps

A desktop app that gives WordPress a permanent home in your dock.

A desktop app that gives WordPress a permanent home in your taskbar.

You'll need a WordPress.com login. Get one here.

Features

A control panel for all your WordPress sites

Focus

Focus on your content

Write and design with no other browser tabs to distract you. Switch easily between managing your WordPress sites and your favorite desktop apps.
Speed

Speed is a feature

The desktop app builds upon the already fast WordPress.com by bundling the entire site as a local copy. You get near-instant page-loads and less waiting around.
Responsive

Not one size fits all

The WordPress.com desktop app will scale to any size. Do you need a small window on the side to keep your eye on notifications, or do want to expand to a truly full screen for a zen writing experience? Take your pick.
#####EOF##### WordPress.com
#####EOF##### The WordPress.com Blog

Three New WordPress.com Color Schemes

We’ve launched three new color schemes to customize your WordPress.com dashboard!

April 3, 2019 / 17

Caroline Moore

WordPress.com’s Parent Company Announces Happy Tools, a New Suite of Products for the Future of Work

Happy Schedule, our first offering, will help distributed teams manage employee schedules and customer support.

April 1, 2019 / 0

Matt Wondra

Electric Literature Moves to WordPress — Here’s How an Indie Publisher Thrives on the Open Web

Lessons from 10 years of publishing essays and fiction.

March 25, 2019 / 4

Mark Armstrong

Gender Balance is a Business Issue

On gender balance, diversity, and inclusion at Automattic.

March 8, 2019 / 11

Deborah Beckett

Join WordPress.com for an International Women’s Day Livestream Panel

On International Women’s Day this Friday, WordPress.com parent company Automattic is hosting four outstanding women tech leaders for a livestreamed conversation about professional advancement, technology, and mutual support as we strive for equity in the workplace. It’s happening Friday, March 8 at 6 pm UTC / 1 pm ET / …

March 7, 2019 / 1

Niesha Sweet

Free Domain Privacy Protection

Every domain registered through WordPress.com includes privacy protection at no extra charge.

March 6, 2019 / 4

Andrija Vucinic

Introducing Six New Business-Oriented Themes

Elevate your business website with one of our six new free themes! Calm, sophisticated, friendly, professional, elegant, modern — find the style that’s just right for you.

February 7, 2019 / 23

Laurel Fulford

Announcing Newspack by WordPress.com — A New Publishing Solution for News Organizations

We’re teaming up with Google, Lenfest, Civil funder ConsenSys, and Knight to develop a next-generation publishing platform.

January 14, 2019 / 0

Mark Armstrong

Customize Your WordPress.com Dashboard

We’re happy to announce new improvements to your WordPress.com dashboard for a more accessible and customized experience. From your desktop, you can now customize your dashboard by choosing one of our two new color schemes, Classic Bright for a fresh modern feel and Classic Blue as the standard you’ve known …

January 8, 2019 / 115

Courtney Burton Doker

Introducing the 2019 ‘Anything Is Possible’ List

WordPress.com’s inaugural New Year’s list celebrates the people and organizations who are using the web to make the world a better place.

January 3, 2019 / 32

Mark Armstrong

New Theme: Twenty Nineteen

Meet Twenty Nineteen, the brand new WordPress default theme.

December 19, 2018 / 47

Chris Runnells

Search
Read our other blogs:

Want to start a blogging habit or set up a business website?
Get step-by-step guidance from WordPress.com pros, right in your inbox. Our email courses are free to all and there are no prerequisites.

Visit Blogging University

Create your new blog or website for free

Get Started

#####EOF##### WordPress.com
#####EOF##### Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP – Our best-in-class enterprise WordPress hosting platform, expert consulting and support, and diverse partner ecosystem free you to focus on your business objectives.

Your enterprise content platform shouldn’t be a drag on time, resources, and sanity.

We free you to publish.
That’s our mission.

Managed WordPress Hosting

VIP is a fully managed WordPress cloud platform for unparalleled scale, security, flexibility, and performance.

Explore our platform

Implementation and Support

End-to-end guidance and hands-on support, from project consideration through launch and every day thereafter.

Check out our approach
Enterprise WordPress hosting

Build Your Digital Experiences

Solutions at the ready. See how WordPress powers mission critical enterprise media and marketing systems.

Explore use cases

We support your applications as if they were our own.

We review every line of code and closely vet technical integrations. Our clients tell us that the standards we introduce bring confidence and creative freedom to their developers, trust to leadership, and efficiency and order to their pipelines.

Hachette bookcase and showroom

Hachette Book Group (HBG) turned to VIP and featured partner Alley to fulfill a vision to support digital marketing for thousands of titles, authors, and imprints on one central platform, with WordPress at the center.

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— Ryan Pugatch, HBG
print cover of Variety magazine

The media powerhouse behind 22 brands including Variety, Deadline, and WWD maximizes code reuse and efficiency on VIP, building an ever-growing code library, tool set, and playbook across their publications.

“Working with WordPress.com VIP allows our team to focus on building awesome stuff”

— David Parsons, USA Today
USA Today logo

Abril's digital transformation brought dozens of publishing brands under a common theme and infrastructure with VIP, gaining speed and efficiency and freeing them up to reshape resources company-wide.

View all case studies

You’re in good company.

We have the pleasure of working with clients representing the best of the best in media, marketing, and more.

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Top-notch enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and guidance. Ready models, processes, and plugins to deliver your business goals. Deep, extensible capabilities. Diverse technology partnerships. Vast developer ecosystem.

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Freedom from licensing, huge ecosystem of developers and services, a long history of usage at scale, and much more.

View our integrations

Partners

The best WordPress design and development agencies on the planet, covering a wide range of specialties.

See agency partners

Freedom

Expert code review, managed hosting, proactive advice, and everything you need to focus on your business objectives.

Explore our services

Highly available and robust APIs

Connect WordPress to all kinds of systems and processes, including mobile apps and decoupled front ends. The possibilities are endless.

Backwards compatibility and forward flexibility

Free your pipeline from maintenance updates and releases, and never worry again about what version you’re running.

The power of open source

Avoid vendor lock-in, enjoy the transparency of a public roadmap, take advantage of the knowledge base in the enterprise user community, and join a massive ecosystem.

Total cost of ownership

Savings from licensing fees, flat-rate traffic pricing, included code review, and our managed hosting and support services all reduce CapEx and OpEx burdens when compared with other solutions.

A different kind of partnership

Do business at human scale, with a team of people who won’t disappear after the contract is signed, and who are personally invested in your success. We’re proud to be considered pioneers of an open, globally distributed, agile way of working.

Freedom to focus

Whether you're seeking end-to-end guidance or just rock-solid WordPress hosting and support, we've got you covered. Put your resources against their highest value efforts. Leave the upgrades, performance, security, and scale to us.

Ready to get started?

Drop us a note.

No matter where you are in the planning process, we’re happy to help, and we’re actual humans here on the other side of the form. 👋 We’re here to discuss your challenges and plans, evaluate your existing resources or a potential partner, or even make some initial recommendations. And, of course, we’re here to help any time you’re in the market for some robust WordPress awesomeness.

#####EOF##### Features to help you publish anything, anywhere

Features to help you publish anything, anywhere.

  • Choose a plan that works for you
  • Customize as much or as little as you want
  • Get help when you need it
  • Tell your story
Get Started

Get Started

  1. Create a robust website

    … or a blog, or a combination of both. Personal blog, portfolio, business site — it’s up to you.

  2. Plans for any budget

    Start for free. Upgrade for advanced customization, security, and SEO tools. Or stay free!

  3. Custom domains

    Add a custom domain to carve out your own space on the web, and manage it right from WordPress.com.

You’re in good company

Over 30% of the web runs on WordPress. WordPress.com is home to everyone from brand new bloggers and entrepreneurs, to major brands like TIME, TED, and Spotify.

Realize your vision

Dozens of themes

Choose from hundreds of customizable themes, with new additions weekly.

Mobile-friendly

Create a mobile-friendly site with a click, or choose from a selection of responsive themes that look great everywhere.

Fast, friendly support

Get expert help — our team of Happiness Engineers is standing by.

Help when you want it

Support is available 24/7 via email and our community forums. For folks with a paid plan, Happiness Engineers are available via live chat for real-time assistance.

Tell your story

Write without worry

Our editor is fast, intuitive, and saves your work every few seconds, so you never miss a word.

Upload or embed media

Drag-and-drop images into posts and pages. Create designer-worthy photo galleries. Embed audio, video, and more.

Mobile and desktop apps

Update your site from anywhere with mobile and desktop apps for iOS, Android, Mac, Windows, and Linux systems.

Own your content

Whatever you create on WordPress.com is yours to keep. Export your content at any time — wherever life takes you, your content follows.

Find your fans

  1. Built-in social sharing

    Automatically send new posts to Twitter, Facebook, and more, and add social tools to help readers share.

  2. In-depth stats

    Learn more about your visitors — where they’re from, what they read, when they visit — with rich stats.

  3. Search engine optimized

    Make it easy for new fans to find you with built-in sitemaps and other SEO tools. All you have to do is publish.

The biggest community of online publishers

WordPress.com has millions of users. The WordPress.com Reader helps them find you — and lets you find fascinating new reads.

Create a feature-rich blog or website today

Get Started
#####EOF##### Russia Military Analysis – A blog on the Russian military

Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

Michael Kofman4 Comments

Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

—————————————————————————————————————————————–

The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

 

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Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

VDV praciting loading

Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

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VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system

Michael Kofman6 Comments

I’ve recently put out an article on Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system in the well known Russian journal The New Times, under the title “ЧТО ВСЕ-ТАКИ ПУТИН ПОДАРИЛ РОССИЯНАМ НА НОВЫЙ ГОД,” but for those interested, please find the unedited English version below, which hopefully covers the subject in some depth.

Earlier in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced at his annual address to the federal assembly that a Russian hypersonic boost-glide system, named Avangard, would start entering serial production. Subsequently on December 26th, 2018 Russian officials claimed that they had successfully conducted a test from the Dombarovsky missile site, to the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 3,760 miles away. Russia’s president proudly announced that the system as a wonderful ‘New Year’s gift’ to Russia. According to Putin’s statement, the hypersonic glide vehicle is able to conduct intensive maneuvers at speeds in excess of Mach 20, which would render it “invulnerable” to any existing or prospective missile defenses. In this article I will briefly explore the logic behind Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, recent claims of technological accomplishment, and the strategic implications of deploying such weapon systems.

Despite rather questionable public statements about the technical characteristics of this weapon system, a number of which appear inconsistent, it is clear that Russian military science has made considerable advancements along one of the most sophisticated axis of weapons research. While claims pertaining to the readiness of this system to enter serial production, and operational service, are probably exaggerated, the more important questions are conceptual. More than likely Russia will be able to deploy a hypersonic boost glide system in the 2020s, perhaps alongside other hypersonic weapons projects, but the promise of this technology was always at the tactical-operational level of war, not strategic. This was never considered a ‘game changer’ as a system for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. If anything, Russia has invested a substantial amount of money, and years of research, in overdoing its strengths. Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of ‘Russian national achievement’ for domestic audiences, it’s unclear if this weapon system truly answers Russia’s strategic challenges in the coming decades. The question is not whether it works, or when it will work, but does it even matter?

Hypersonic boost glide weapons function by using a multi-stage ballistic missile as the boost phase, throwing a vehicle into near earth orbit, which then descends and begins gliding at hypersonic speeds along the edge of the atmosphere. As the vehicle descends back to earth, it pulls upwards, and begins skimming the atmosphere in a ‘glide’ phase, before diving downwards onto its target at the terminal phase. Russia has spent years developing this technology under a project referenced as Object 4202, which married a series of  experimental hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Yu-71, with a liquid fueled ICBM УР-100УНТТХ (NATO designation SS-19 mod 2 Stiletto). This system builds on the Soviet Union’s extensive research into hypersonic weapons programs , including work on a hypersonic-boost aircraft named «Спираль», a modified S-200V surface-to-air missile under the project name Холод, and hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as Kh-80 and Kh-90 GELA (гиперзвуковой экспериментальный летательный аппарат).

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Kh-90 GELA
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Kholod
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Spiral

Although claimed successes in testing may have come as a surprise in 2018, in truth Russian officials have been announcing tests of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle, using the УР-100УНТТХ missile, as far back as the strategic nuclear forces exercise in 2004. Hence, this particular system has been in publicly acknowledged development for at least 14 years, and the glide vehicle itself for quite a few years beforehand. The booster, УР-100 (SS-19), is a 105 ton liquid fueled silo-based missile, which together with the boost glide vehicle payload proved too long for a standard silo. Hence this system is being tested in a modified R-36M2 silo (SS-18 Satan), and although it is being developed with the УР-100, it is meant for the much heavier liquid fueled missile currently in testing, RS-28 Sarmat. While the question of boost method may seem a technicality, the boosting mechanism is actually quite deterministic of the strategic role this weapon can play, as I will discuss a bit later in this article.

However, the principal challenges with this system have little to do with the decades established technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or boosting objects into near earth orbit. Hypersonic boost glide vehicles, if successful, represent a major breakthrough in material sciences, as the object must be able to withstand incredibly high temperatures with the payload and guidance system intact. Although impossible to verify, Russian announcements can often be categorized as ‘true lies,’ impressive sounding figures that have some factual basis, but are inevitably inaccurate. The proposition that the vehicle can reach mach 27 is likely true only during the brief return phase, when it is falling back to earth like a rock from near earth orbit, prior to beginning its hypersonic glide at the edges of the atmosphere. The vehicle itself will have considerably different speeds during the pull-up, glide, and dive to target phase, while having to endure incredible temperatures.

Below are a few graphical illustrations available on the web

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In U.S. testing of an analogous system in 2011, Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2), the vehicle was able to sustain glide at mach 20 speeds for three minutes, enduring a temperature of 3500 Fahrenheit. These figures track with Russian statements on temperatures experienced, but the actual speeds and altitudes at which the Russian vehicle is able to glide, and whether the systems actually survive this experience, remain a mystery. Although Russia’s defense sector seems to have made progress on this weapon system, claims that it is ready for serial production, or operational deployment in the near future, should be treated with educated skepticism. Ironically, the most significant potential breakthrough is in material sciences, not in building a seemingly scary strategic weapon.

Yet the rationale for Avangard seems less than straightforward when compared to other Russian hypersonic weapons programs, including the Tsirkon 3M22 scramjet hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic missile. Those are operational depth systems able to deliver meaningful conventional or nuclear payloads to shape the military balance in a theater of military operations. They can offset U.S. conventional superiority, and pose genuine challenges in conventional warfare. What does Avangard do for Russia that existing silo-based, road-mobile, air-launched, and submarine launched missiles cannot?

supposed image of the vehicle (draped on the right)

The Avangard system is best seen as one element in an expensive Russian strategy to develop technological hedges for a security environment perhaps 20-30 years from now where the United States might deploy a cost effective missile defense system, making a percentage of Russia’s nuclear deterrent vulnerable to interception. To be clear, there is no missile defense system now, or on the horizon, able to intercept Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Modern ICBMs can come with multiple reentry vehicles and numerous penetration aids or false targets, creating a complex ‘threat cloud’ that would make interception an improbable business. Nonetheless, ever since the Bush administration chose in 2002 to exit the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russian leadership has been concerned that the United States could eventually devalue the deterrence provided by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

Russia’s General Staff worries that a vast arsenal of long range conventional cruise missiles, paired with a semi-viable missile defense, would pose major challenges for their calculations to ensure the ability of Russian nuclear forces to deliver ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tailored’ damage in the coming decades. The 1972 ABM Treaty was not just a cornerstone of Cold War arms control, but fundamental to Russian military thinking on strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability at the strategic level. Ever since June 1941, Soviet, and subsequently Russian, military thought has been wracked by the possibility of a disarming first strike, and the need to position Russian forces along a strategy of ‘counter-surprise.’

However, unlike other expensive strategic projects, such as the Poseidon nuclear powered torpedo, Avangard does not contribute to a survivable second strike. Thus there are a few ways to interpret the actual purpose of this weapon. The first is as a retaliatory-meeting strike system to attack high-value targets, i.e. civilian targets with political or economic significance, which will provide some insurance for a counter value strike. The second is that it is a first strike weapon against hard to penetrate targets. Since Avangard is silo based, designed for heavier liquid fueled ICBMs, in the event of strategic attack the boosting missile would not be survivable. It must be fired either first, or in a “launch under attack” scenario, when Russia has confirmed a U.S. launch, but the missiles have not yet impacted.

Avangard may be designed to give Russia’s RVSN the ability to penetrate hard targets, getting around missile defenses, and leveraging greater accuracy to take out well-hardened facilities. That said, from a nuclear warfighting standpoint, this makes Avangard a somewhat specialized, but expensive strategic nuclear weapon. Given how few of these systems Russia is likely to be able to afford, the weapon may offer some targeting advantages, but at a high price relative to the benefits. Another possibility is that this is not a system to get around future missile defenses, but a first strike system to be used specifically against missile defenses, clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even if more accurate and survivable in flight, Avangard is a questionable investment when compared to the numerous road-mobile ICBM systems Russia fields today, including Topol-M and Rs-24 Yars (but then the logic for Russia’s SSBN program is also somewhat circumspect).

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Perhaps in the future, Avangard will be deployed on a road-mobile launcher, but as conceived, this system adds little to Russia’s existing large strategic nuclear arsenal. An expensive insurance policy that in no way alters the strategic nuclear balance either today or tomorrow, which is why the reaction in Washington has been so muted. If anything, the United States should thank Russia for investing money in such super weapons, instead of buying large quantities of conventional precision guided munitions.

Moscow has sought to leverage Avangard and similar novel systems to sell the notion of a qualitative arms race to Washington, D.C., hoping to establish a bilateral agenda for summits. Yet while the world is genuinely witnessing a renewed period of nuclear modernization, with qualitatively new or novel weapon systems in development, there is no arms race in progress. The major nuclear powers of today are pursuing distinctly divergent strategies, concepts, and requirements behind their nuclear weapons programs, rather than racing which each other for superiority. This is why Avangard, if completed and deployed, is unlikely to alter strategic military balance or elicit any meaningful response from Washington, D.C.

Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future?

Michael KofmanLeave a comment

Following the November 25th Kerch Strait naval skirmish, in which Russia seized three Ukrainian boats,  Ukrainian leadership has issued warnings of a Russian buildup near Ukraine’s borders. These began in early December and have led to a media echo chamber of concerns that a Russian attack on Ukraine is imminent, in part bolstered by press releases from ISW. Actual evidence of Russian preparations for offensive operations, force movements indicating an unexpected buildup, or an imminent attack, is hard to come by. In this somewhat longer post I want to explore the existing evidence, what little there is, and examine a few conflict scenarios that may be within the realm of possibility in coming months.

Unfortunately this simmering conflict is subject to frequent false alarms, while actual points of escalation are rarely predicted, as was the case on November 25th. It is relatively easy to take a week’s worth of Russian troop movements, equipment deployments, drills, and MoD announcements, compile them together into a bullet point list of nefarious activities, and then declare them ‘data points’ indicating preparations for an invasion. As of today it seems Ukraine will not be extending the 30 day state of martial law, which casts some doubt on the urgency and immediacy of the anticipated Russian threat as presented earlier this month by Ukrainian authorities.

The more problematic element in all of this has been senior official Russian statements, which suggest a change in Moscow’s stance on dealing with Ukraine is afoot. Sergey Lavrov, Maria Zakharova, and Sergey Naryshkin, have issued statements expecting a possible Ukrainian ‘provocation’ and or ‘attack’ which could be interpreted as indications and warnings of Moscow preparing the information space, i.e. setting expectations of renewed violence in the coming weeks. However, they may also be a poor Russian attempt at getting Washington, D.C. to restrain Ukraine, or otherwise influence Ukrainian decision making to Russian benefit.

The Russian narrative offers cause for concern, because it is a form of signaling not dissimilar from official statements in the run up to the Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008. That said, it is likely some officials in Moscow believed Ukraine would try to use martial law as a cover for a military operation in the Donbas, especially given their experience with Saakashvili in 2008. Although real evidence is scant, I’ll try to unpack the different stories, and the likelihood of an upcoming Russian military operation against Ukraine.

Bottom line up front: Almost every year there is a sizable artillery duel that takes place after the holiday truce (clashes likely to resume between orthodox Christmas on January 7 and perhaps the old new year on January 14th), and so a notable escalation in violence is likely in January, but there is no evidence of Russian preparations for a major assault in Ukraine, certainly not in Crimea.  It is possible, but highly improbable. Most of the information available reflects planned modernization, expected force structure changes, and troop movements on the Russian side not indicative of unusual activity or preparations for an assault. However, as covered years ago on this blog, the long term force posture and structure changes to create three divisions along Ukraine’s borders, return earlier displaced brigades, and a focus on modernizing equipment in the Southern MD, mean that capacity and capability is there to engage in a high intensity conventional conflict with Ukraine at any time. Ukrainian leadership has used evidence from these long term trends to create the sense of an imminent tactical threat, but that is not the case, and they likely know it.

Expectations of an attack are based on three disparate sets of information, if we can charitably call them that, which are seemingly being woven together by various outlets, blogs, and sites like ISW who warn of Russian preparations for an imminent attack. The first is an alleged increase in Russian hardware in the Rostov region of the Southern Military District. The second is a series of disparate troop movements in Crimea, which in and of themselves do not speak to anything, but some believe are indications of a Russian operation against Ukraine’s Kherson region, presumably to seize the Crimea-Dnepr fresh water canal. The third involves statements by Russia’s MFA, Sergey Naryshkin, and others, that indicate Russian preparations for a conflict in the near future.

Issue #1 The Russian tank build up in the east and frightening Google photos of lots of tanks

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Poroshenko on Sky News earlier this month with google satellite imagery

 

Ukraine’s chief of general staff, Victor Muzhneko, stated that there is an increase in Russian tanks near the Ukrainian border, having grown from 93 to 250 within two weeks from mid-September. This information was spread by a Ukrainian run English-language blog run by Dylan Malyasov, which is a defense news amalgamator. The problem is that these are mostly T-62 variants (M/MV), which have long been retired from the Russian military, and are not in service with Russian trained separatist forces either. This tank last saw service during the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, and was considered obsolete decades ago. There is no Russian unit that fields T-62 tanks today, or T-64 tanks for that matter. The Russian armed forces use this tank for target practice during major military exercises, as was the case in recently held Vostok 2018.

Separatist forces use T-64BV and T-72B1 variants, which are different main battle tanks, but can perform the same missions and are comparable in their performance characteristics. The T-62 is a completely different design, using different caliber ammunition, sights, fire control, and so on – so it is not possible for someone trained on a T-72 to just jump into this tank and ‘invade Ukraine.’ At this point the same can be said of T-64BVs being supplied to the two separatist corps, doubtfully anyone in line Russian units is current and certified to operate either T-62s, or T-64s. Russian forces use more modern T-72BA or B3 variants almost exclusively, with select units fielding T-80Us or T-80BVM.

Here is a quick slide of T-72B3 use by Russian forces in Ukraine 2014, T-64BV manned by separatists, and a T-62M

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Below we can see the alleged tank build up near Ukraine’s borders. Note the rest of the vehicle park at the base, and the contingent, remains the same after the arrival of these tanks, which suggests that they are here for storage and not a force addition.

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August 16 – clearing for tanks
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September 23 most of the tanks have arrived
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September 30 – about 250 tanks there

The main force currently being supplied with refurbished Russian T-62M tanks is the Syrian Army, particularly the 5th Corps. These tanks are coming out of Russian reserve storehouses with T-62s and BMP infantry fighting vehicles. During Vostok 2018 there was news of T-62s being activated and shipped east, but in reality several batches of these vehicles were loaded and shipped West in October. Ukraine’s alleged tank build up is almost certainly a series of old T-62s taken out of the Central Tank Reserve Base in Ulan Ude, which were tracked through social media (you can get a more detailed story on the T-62 shipment from DFR Lab) as arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, which is where Muzhenko’s photos are from. Subsequently these tanks tend to show up at the port of Novorossiysk for shipment to Syria via the ‘Syrian Express.’

Storage base in Ulan-Ude, before September and after September of this year. A number of tanks have moved from the lot, indicating that some of the vehicles likely came from this base.

T-62M tanks heading west from Central Military District and same ones arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, some are likely destined for Syria.

The recently arrived tanks near Ukraine’s borders are most likely being stored in Rostov region near the port for shipment, or may be used in training, but the story that Russia is planning to invade Ukraine with ancient tanks that they themselves don’t use and don’t train on stretches the imagination beyond the realm of the possible. It is equally possible that these tanks are there to establish a new reserve structure. Russia has been lacking mobilization force structure, and at best has developed a territorial battalion type reserve system for infrastructure defense. Operational reserve capacity comes out of active units which force generate units from active servicemen rather than mobilize reservists. Therefore one possible explanation is that these older vehicles are designed to park equipment for some nascent reserve force structure.

What’s frustrating is that Ukraine’s military leadership doubtlessly knows all of this, which makes it hard to understand why Muzhenko would use google earth satellite images of old T-62 tanks to push this story in the media. Any military analyst who studies the Russian armed forces could likely tell you this information. Yet Petro Poroshenko went on Sky News with these very same images of Russian tanks, as though they were legitimate evidence of Russian preparations for an invasion.

My personal interpretation of the Ukrainian claims is that this is an information campaign to justify and defend Poroshenko’s controversial decision to institute martial law in advance of Presidential elections, where his chances of winning are quite tenuous. This is a cynical, but optimistic view, because the alternative suggests that Ukraine’s armed forces don’t know much about the Russian military, and use dated google earth images to hunt down old T-62 tanks that are neither here or there to anything. Ukrainian force posture doesn’t suggest that they themselves expect a Russian offensive either, and the temporary state of martial law has ended as scheduled, so this seems to be mostly a large information wave with little substance to substantiate it.

However, the Russian Rostov region is seeing a steady build up of forces as part of the formation of the 150th division in the reestablished 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern MD). This will prove a decade long process. Other units that have been announced as far back as early 2015, include the 144th MR Division and 3rd MR Division in 20th Combined Arms Army (Western MD), some shifting of brigades, and steady addition or maneuver regiments to only partially filled divisions in 1st Tank Guards Army headquartered in Moscow. The 144th Division is somewhat lagging here in formation. The 150th division is a 2×2 motor rifle and tank regiment configuration (+2 supporting regiments), which is almost filled now in its maneuver regiments. Supposedly the last motor rifle regiment is being formed as of this month. There are also interesting force structure changes afoot in the Russian VDV, creating much larger air mobile formations, which were partially covered during experiments in Vostok-2018 exercises.

Issue #2 Russian build up in Crimea for an invasion of Kherson

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The dried up canal on the Russian side of the Crimean border

There is another concern out there, based on sighting of Russian troop movements near the Crimean border with Kherson, that Russia might conduct an offensive operation from Crimea. At least this is ISW’s thesis on the basis of a few troop trucks, some APCs, and artillery being moved towards the border – which is not at all uncommon. Basically, we have a story of an overturned Russian truck as part of a military convoy on the way to the border, with a field kitchen. What’s naturally missing from this equation is a concentration of armor, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, large volumes of ammunition, etc. moved about on flatbed trucks, i.e. there is no evidence of the sort of hardware one would expect in support of an offensive operation or the formation of battalion tactical groups near Ukraine’s borders in Crimea. The Army Corps in Crimea has a dearth of maneuver elements, so units would have to cross into the peninsula via bridge from the rest of the Southern Military District (presumably 58th Army), concentrate, and deploy – which nobody is seeing happen. More than likely Russian troop movements are indicators of preparations for an artillery duel – exchanges of indirect fire that typically escalate in January/February.

Partly responsible for the confusion are two planned force additions to Crimea. First we have the formation of the 171st independent air assault battalion in Crimea, which was announced December 2, 2017. This battalion is technically part of the 7th VDV Air assault division, but will create a permanently based unit in Crimea with air mobility, and add to the ‘elite infantry’ stationed there which can serve as a rapid reaction force. However, VDV units have been rotating through Crimea for years now, so this is less of a force increase and more institutionalizing that which has already been taking place.

171th VDV Regiment
171st Independent Battalion receiving its honorary title, establishing it in Crimea

The second tidbit of information regards the deployment of a 4th S-400 battalion to Dzhankoi in Crimea, which likely completes the rearmament of the 18th and 12th air defense regiments based there (31st air defense division within the 4th Air and Air Defense Army of the Southern Military District). The first S-400 battalion was deployed January 2017 in Feodosia, the second January 2018 in Sevastopol, and a third in September 2018 in Yevpatoria. The S-400 replaces the older S-300 systems deployed to Crimea, and is part of a general wave of modernization which prioritized the Southern Military District. Alongside S-400 deployments one can find Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters, and Su-34 bombers steadily replacing Su-24s and older Su-27s in the Russian Aerospace Forces and naval aviation units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

S-400 in Crimea.jpg
The 2nd Russian S-400 battalion set deployed to Crimea early this year

There is cause for concern that long term Russia may need to resolve the fresh water crisis in Crimea, but no way to know how this situation will play out in the coming year. In May 2014 Ukraine blocked off the water supply from the Crimea-Dnepr canal that links the Dnepr river to the peninsula. Although Russia was able to quickly build an ‘energy bridge’ to supply power, and Kerch strait bridge officially opened May 2018 to commercial traffic, the water problem remains a potential cause of conflict (Jane’s here briefly summarizes the issue: Ukraine supplied 86% of Crimea’s water, and this summer there was an acute water shortage in about 20% of the peninsula). The fresh water issue is problematic, but I’ve found it to be overly spun as the next “land bridge to Crimea” narrative. The only sort of offensive military operation that makes sense is a thrust to the Dnepr river, which seizes the entire canal, and the southern half of Ukraine’s Kherson region. There is no way to take part of the canal since it is easily blocked at any point south of the river itself. In scope, this is about a 65-70km push, which is equivalent to depth of territory seized in the Donbas region. Kherson may be relatively easy to cut off, but it would require a substantial number of forces to effect this kind of operation and earn Russia an entire new host of problems.

Kherson map.JPG
Basic map with the path of the Dnepr-Crimea canal indicated
Kherson vector
~65km from the Crimean border to the Dnepr river to get to the starting point of the canal (beyond which it cannot be blocked)

Taking Kherson, like taking most any other Ukrainian region, is well within the realm of Russian military capability, but it would mean inheriting a new region which is also dependent on other parts of Ukraine. One of the obvious challenges Russia has faced in taking pieces of Ukraine is that it may seem easy to to dismember a country on a map, but in reality a state is full of integrated pieces that depend on each other for electricity, water, road networks, trade, supply of food, etc. Resolving the fresh water problem in Crimea by taking another region that would itself bring new supply challenges, and while it could probably be done relatively quickly, it would also require a substantial force build up and subsequent deployment. There are no ‘separatist’ or other volunteer battalions ready to take over internal security, man block posts, and create an entirely new line of control with Ukrainian forces. Also, there is the small matter than absent a ‘Kherson People’s Republic’ movement, there are no proxy forces behind which Russia can mask its invasion, and so this would have to be an overt, outright, and bloody business from the very start.

Russia could build up forces in Crimea relatively quickly, combining an air mobile airborne operation with a ground assault, but there would be indications and warnings. Unlike in February-March 2014, the West has a lot of technical and human resources now focused on the Russian problem set. Ground force movements, airborne unit shifts, forward deployment of several battalion tactical groups in Crimea, etc. These are regularly recorded by people, spotters, social media, and traditional news. Right now there is no evidence of such troop movements, though one should not discount a military solution to the water issue in 2019, but the entire scenario remains in the realm of low probability events.

Issue #3 Russian warnings and threats

Finally, Russian press statements by Lavrov, Naryshkin, Maria Zakharova are perhaps the most alarming, since they indicate a readiness of Russian forces to see through an escalation with Ukraine in the coming weeks or months. This of course brings us into the realm of political analysis and out of the world of military analysis. These warnings indicate the expectation of a conflict, with Russia positioning Ukraine as a the provocateur, something that’s become rote in Russian political statements. The messaging is probably not meant for domestic audiences, or Ukrainian audiences, but for the West, which Russian elites believe can heavily influence Ukrainian decision making. As such, they represent a pattern of thinking reminiscent of the run up to the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, reflecting the Russian perception that they can threaten the potential risk of escalation in order to get the United States to lean on what Moscow sees as Washington’s client state.

Russians do see Poroshenko as a provocateur, expecting him to “pull something” in the run up to the election, and engage in military posturing. Like many policymakers in the West, they are subscribers to diversionary war theory, which has little empirical basis, but is very much in vogue with political decision makers. Moscow thinks that Poroshenko needs Western attention on Ukraine, and the cheapest way Ukraine can achieve that is with a narrative that draws attention to the ongoing ‘Russian threat.’ Hence warnings of imminent danger tend to crop up every fall around November-December time. Putting aside the likelihood that Russia itself will execute some of the more dire plans discussed above, there is little incentive for Russia to launch any attack during the election as it would only benefit Poroshenko’s cause, in every scenario. That doesn’t mean it wont happen, because bounded rationality leads to outcomes akin to November 25th, i.e. one should not ignore the likely outcome of a chain of events that results in a conflict spiral between these two actors, but there is no sign that Russia intends to intervene in Ukrainian politics via overt military means.

There is a strong possibility of miscalculation, with January 2019 being different than previous artillery duels and skirmishes that have followed the last major operation in February-March 2015 (Battle of Debaltseve). Ukrainian forces have been slowly gaining ground in the ‘grey zone’ that exists between the two sides respective positions along the line of control in the Donbas. These steady gains are often referenced as the ‘creeping offensive’ to retake lost territory, leading to artillery duels with Russian backed separatists. Separatist units are organized and supported with logistics, technical capabilities like EW, air defense, and other equipment, by a contingent of Russian regulars in Ukraine stationed further behind the line of control. The daily exchanges of indirect fire often flare up after the holiday truce in January, particularly when one side decides to creep into the no man’s land between them, and shift the battle lines.

Russian controlled separatists have also played this game with Ukrainian forces for several years now, making small shifts in the line over the years. It’s what keeps this a hot war rather than a frozen conflict. However, there is a sense that Russia is spoiling for a fight – just one person’s opinion. Russian public statements are designed to paint them as the reasonable party seeking to deter potential Ukrainian adventurism, but in truth, it feels like Moscow is looking to bloody Ukraine at the first available opportunity.

It could be vengeance for Ukraine gaining autocephaly, splitting from the Russian orthodox church, or it could be that Moscow wants to show that it is unconstrained and feels free to use the military toolkit. The November 25th naval skirmish with the Russian FSB border guard service demonstrated that when pressed to make decisions in the moment, the Russian leadership turned what could have been a minor incident into a serious clash, overt, heavy handed, with disproportionate use of force. This is at best personal inference, but it is unlikely that Russia is planning an offensive operation to seize Kherson. It is more probable that Moscow is spoiling for a fight with Ukraine, with the intent of handing Ukraine and by proxy, the United States, a small but politically consequential military defeat.

 

 

The Kerch strait naval skirmish

Michael Kofman7 Comments

After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

towing command ship

On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

Don ramming.jpg

Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

original

Another shot

Izumrud

Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

blocked strait.jpg

After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

damaged Berdyansk.jpg

Ships parked at Kerch

parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

Some thoughts –

The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

Michael Kofman3 Comments

On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

PD-50 sinking.jpg

Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

PD-50 on a good day

PD-50 dry dock

According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

That looks like it may be the crane

Crane.jpg

A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

This is PD-50 now

PD-50 gone

The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

Assessing Vostok-2018

Michael KofmanLeave a comment

I’d like to close out coverage of Vostok 2018 with a brief summary and analysis of the exercise, which was written for Oxford’s CCW Russia Brief, Issue 3. I strongly recommend the issue briefs from Oxford’s changing character of war program, which feature some of the best experts on the Russian armed forces in the field.

Russia’s annual strategic exercises offer an important window into the evolution of the Russian armed forces, their ability to mobilize, deploy, and command large groupings of forces, together with the latest capabilities. The recently held Vostok-2018 (September 11-17), which as the name suggests focused on the Russian Eastern Military District, offered an important deviation from the typically held command-staff strategic exercise which the Russian General Staff organises every September. In a standard exercise, an operational-strategic command (OSK) takes in forces from other districts and fields them in a particular strategic direction, organizing a hypothetical fight together with the General Staff in the theatre of military operations (TVD). But in 2018, Vostok was changed into strategic manoeuvers. Under this framework two military districts, Central and Eastern, divided into opposing forces to conduct manoeuvers in different strategic directions. China’s official involvement in the annual exercises, which is a first, made the event politically significant in Sino-Russian relations, and a mutually agreed upon political signal send by both sides to international observers.

Unlike previous such exercises, Vostok-2010 and 2014, this event represents more of an “in-progress report” for the Russian armed forces. When he was first appointed Chief of General Staff in late 2012, Valery Gerasimov was dismayed with the Russian armed forces inability to move across the country and effectively engage in drills or training events at ranges distant from their home garrisons. The recently reformed military had become a permanent standing force, but it had little experience or credibility in being able to deploy to Russia’s borders in the event of conflict and successfully engage an adversary. The high tempo of snap readiness checks, drills, joint exercises, together with modernization investments under the State Armament Program, were meant to turn the Russian armed forces into a combat credible force, able to effectively deter large scale conventional conflict. Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than the Russian Far East, a vast region that is sparsely populated and lacks much transportation infrastructure.

Vostok-2018 was also as an opportunity for political signalling, featuring a large review of forces and photo opportunities similar to that of Zapad-1981. Russian pronouncements that the exercise would feature 297,000 soldiers – which would have been fully a third of the entire Russian military – was meant to underscore the state’s resilience and undiminished military potential in the face of political and economic pressure from the United States.

In reality, the exercise was rather smaller, probably not exceeding 50,000 participants (this is a guesstimate, use at your own risk) in the actual exercises, with most of the major events taking place at the Tsugol training range. The official numbers given likely represent the total forces on paper from the Central and Eastern Military Districts: often the Russian General Staff will count an entire brigade or division as having participated even when their contribution is only one unit. A large number of units were raised on alert on August 20th, in advance of the exercise, but few had any connection to the actual events. Official statements by Russian commanders also suggest that the exercise was much smaller in reality: Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), stated that 7,000 troops participated at Tsugol from his district. Together with aviation and airborne units sent, it is unlikely that the CMD’s involvement exceeded 15,000-20,000 soldiers.

The reason for dramatically inflated figures for every Vostok exercise is straightforward: Moscow is unconcerned that announcing fantastical figures would engender a security dilemma in the region. Moreover, political agreements governing military exercises in Europe such as the Vienna Document have no jurisdiction east of the Ural mountains. As such, the Russian leadership can count unit participation however it likes, without stoking NATO fears. At the same time, including China in the exercise was a prudent measure to alleviate any inherent suspicions Beijing might have that these strategic manoeuvers were aimed at them, or a manifestation of Russian security apprehensions. Since most of the exercise events took place in Zabaykalsky Krai, a land-locked region bordering China and Mongolia, this was an important precaution. Moscow’s effort at engaging the Chinese military is quite clever, intended to foster greater partnership, engendering stronger military ties, while at the same time demonstrating to their strategic partners the capability of the Russian armed forces in an effort to bolster coercive credibility.

Vostok featured elements of both contact and non-contact warfare, from a series of attack, defence and flanking manoeuvers by battalion tactical groups, to blunting massed aerospace attacks, and effecting precision strikes against critical infrastructure at operational depths. Going into the exercise Valery Gerasimov said he wanted to see non-standard solutions practiced, code for the Chief of General Staff not wishing to see Russian units arrive at ranges to execute pre-rehearsed manoeuvers, i.e. put on a five-day bit of military theatre for him and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu. It remains unclear whether or not he got what he wanted, but Shoigu indicated this type of exercise might be held every five years, pegged to implementation of the State Armament Program, the implication being that strategic manoeuvers would be used as a form of in-process review and reflection on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

Although every strategic exercise is designed to be a stress test for the Russian armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, Vostok had four principal areas of focus: logistics, mobilization, command and control, and tactical innovation. Emphasis was placed on the logistics, combat service support, and combat engineer components of the Russian armed forces. Command and control of forces in combined arms manoeuver, along with integration with other services remains a prominent feature, as does experimentation with the force structure itself. The Russian military continues to work on integrating recon-strike and recon-fire contours, connecting targeting in real time from drones, soldiers or aircraft, with artillery fires at the tactical level or strike assets distributed among the services. There was also a mobilization component aimed at taking in reservists to help fill out combat service support units and integrating civilian authorities into the exercise under the model that ‘everyone fights’.

Vostok was spread across five combined arms ranges, four air and air defence ranges, and several coastal regions in the Russian Far East. Ground force exercises featured large attacks with artillery and MLRS systems with targeting and battle damage assessments done via drone systems. River fording, bridging, masking of units with smoke and aerosol were all parts of the exercise to simulate the logistical difficulty of getting to the battlefield while under fire. Engineers also setup false targets, inflatable dummy units, practicing various forms of deception on the battlefield. The strategic nuclear component of the exercise involved flights by Tu-95MS bombers, which cut through the U.S. air defence identification zone, earning a free F-22 fighter escort before returning to fire cruise missiles at target ranges in Russia.

Efforts at innovation could be seen in the attempt by the airborne forces to create a new type of air assault detachment, together with an airmobile reserve based on heavy transport helicopters and light vehicles. Colonel General Andrei Serduykov, commander of Russia’s airborne forces, was trying new things this year by assembling battalions from three independent air assault brigades to practice large scale heli-borne attacks, some involved as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two large transport Mi-26 helicopters in the action. The Russian airborne also conducted a sizable parachute drop, using 25 transports to deliver 700 soldiers and 51 BMD infantry fighting vehicles, while specialized light utility units were brought in as a ready reserve for the action. Russia’s Northern Fleet similarly brought a new force mix, including naval infantry and specialized units from its Arctic brigade, some of which conducted a raid in depth across as much as 270km of terrain.

China’s participation included some 3,200 soldiers mounted on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs and self-propelled artillery, together with 6 aircraft and 24 helicopters. Interactions between Russian and Chinese forces at the tactical level, assuming any serious collaboration even took place, seemed of lower import than the utility of this event as a form of political signalling. China’s Minister of Defence, Wei Fenghe, highlighted the importance of Sino-Russian cooperation at the operational and strategic level, while Shoigu announced that they had agreed to hold exercises regularly in the future. In a subsequent interview, Shoigu referred to the Chinese participants as allies. While it is difficult to interpret Vostok, or any other exercise, as a proof of a budding Sino-Russian entente, it is clear the two countries seek to demonstrate that they do not see each other as a threat.

While Western policymakers typically describe alliance formation as some sort of state-level dating, where relationships are formed based on trust, common values, similar political systems and so on, in reality this has little semblance to the history of how powers actually form alliances. Alliance formation behaviour takes place as a form of balancing behaviour in response to threats, therefore the only logical catalyst for a Sino-Russian entente is the threat posed by the United States, and the extent to which the two countries see their respective challenges as worth the risk and liability of closer cooperation. Having identified both countries as great power competitors in the National Defense Strategy, and practical measures to intensify the confrontation in economic and military domains, Washington has taken important steps to further enhance cooperation between its disparate adversaries.

Vostok-2018 strategic manoeuvers illustrate that while much progress remains to be made in improving the capability and capacity of the Russian armed forces, the military as a whole is increasingly greater than the sum of its parts, and certainly much improved from its relatively raw state in 2012-2013. Meanwhile Russian policy has become rather more deft in managing their ‘strategic partnership’ with China, seeking to leverage military events as part of a boarder effort to slowly and incrementally pull the latter into a balancing entente against the United States.

 

Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

Michael Kofman2 Comments

Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

time to go home.jpg

Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

exercise table

 

Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

BTR-82As.jpg

Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

Egvekinot.JPG

naval infantry 2.JPG

Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

Vostok 2018 Days 5-6 (September 15-16)

Michael KofmanLeave a comment

Vostok 2018 Days 5 and 6

The weekend was relatively quiet. Comparably few activities took place as the forces involved were either taking a break, or perhaps there was a media blackout compared to the information flowing about the first several days. For a brief period the MoD main website was down, which was unusual. However, other news sources which typically cover the exercises reflected a dearth of information for September 15-16. I’ve decided to group the events of both days into one post here. The main exercises over the weekend included another series of bombing raids by Russian aerospace forces, a motor rifle battalion assault at Tsugol, complex river crossing exercises supported by engineer and CBRN troops, and two naval exercises held by the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-22M3s conducted another series of air raids at a training range in Zabaikal, practicing bombing runs against various targets simulating an enemy air base. It reads like this was another unguided bombing exercise, dropping FAB-500s and 250s. The precision guided munitions tend to be reserved for Syria, so they tend not to waste them on exercises. Ten air crews were involved in the event, though unclear if they all had their own individual platforms, i.e. 10 bombers, or were rotated through a smaller number of aircraft.

Tu-22M3.JPG

Meanwhile Russian Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters took on the role of incoming enemy fighters. They approached the integrated air defenses setup by Eastern MD, and not did not respond to ground control requests for identification. Mig-31BM and Su-35s fighters were scrambled to intercept, simulating air combat at different ranges, including short range dog fighting. The Su-30SMs were defeated by Eastern MD’s air superiority fighters.

Eastern MD – There was another motor rifle and armored assault at Tsugol, with T-62s setup as targets representing the opposing force. Several companies of T-72B1 tanks, in conjunction with BMP-2s conducted an attack across the range.

Motor rifle and armored assault.JPG

Meanwhile Russian military police units, mounted on Typhoon vehicles, detected and captured  a group of infiltrators who sought to gain access to the training range.

MPs.JPG

CBRN units setup smoke and aerosol cover for a river crossing exercise, where T-72 tanks forded the river with snorkels, while other vehicles were transported via specialized amphibious carriers. Engineer and sapper units established a pontoon bridge for tanks and BMPs to drive over. The exercise seems based around a motor rifle battalion, with helicopter support, effecting a river crossing both via bridge and in shallow places with its own means.

Units positioned preparing to cross.JPG

pontoon bridge.JPG

Other exercises of note: Russia’s Ministry of Emergencies held a joint exercise with Chinese counterparts, simulating a ship collision at a bridge being constructed across the Amur River. The exercise consisted of a Chinese passenger ship colliding with a Russian ship working on the bridge. Both sides worked together to put out a fire on the Chinese ship, evacuate passengers, and rescue others from the water. Russian Be-200 firefighting aircraft and Mi-8s  belonging to the Ministry were involved, with about 300 people all together engaged in this exercise. I found the event interesting simply because it reflects another level of cooperation between Russian and Chinese ministries along the border outside of the military dimension.

The Baltic Fleet has also been busy, though their activities doubtfully have anything to do with Vostok 2018. About 25 ships, 30 aircraft, helicopters, drones, and 50 pieces of equipment were involved in conducting an amphibious landing at Khmelevka. Russian Su-24 + Su-30SM fixed wing aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters conducted a strike against enemy positions, so that naval infantry units could then land and seize the beach. Ships involved included LSTs Aleksandr Shabalin, Korolev, Minsk, three smaller landing boats from project 21820, and support by three project 20380 corvettes (Stereguschiy). The landing force consisted of about 30 BTR-82A, which is consistent with what about 3 LSTs can carry, though at the same time they also air lifted several naval infantry units behind enemy lines – presumably via Ka-27 helicopters which is typically how these forces effect an amphibious assault.

Northern Fleet – The Northern Fleet ran an anti-submarine warfare exercise, with its principal combatant Vice Admiral Kulakov (Udaloy-class) leading the submarine hunt. Their scenario involved using different systems to hunt for the submarine, such as onboard sonar and the ship’s Ka-27PL helicopter. Kulakov practiced torpedo and depth charge attacks, along with evading torpedo attacks fired by the opposing submarine.

Ka-27 deploying dipping sonar

dipping sonar.JPG

Pacific Fleet – Naval Infantry conducted an assault to enable a larger amphibious force to land near the Klerk training range on Primoriye. This is an interesting exercise in that they were working together VKS Aerospace Forces, who supported their attack, along with ships from the Pacific Fleet, combat aviation, artillery, sappers, and air defense units. Supposedly the next phase of this exercise will involve an air assault brigade of VDV Airborne conducting a similar type of attack, though it seems things are winding down. The Eastern MD is already looking to an upcoming joint exercise with Mongolian troops under a different title.

Some additional pictures of note:

CBRN units treating tanks

treating tanks.JPG

Tank sanitation checkpoint

sanitizing T-72s.JPG

T-72 snorkeling

Loch Ness T-72.JPG

 

Vostok 2018 Day 4 (September 14)

Michael KofmanLeave a comment

Vostok Day 4

Most of the exercises are taking place at Tsugol and Telemba, but there was word today of various live fire events from a few of the other ranges. Elements of 5th CAA are at Bikinskiy, and the air force is doing most of its bombing runs at Mukhor-Kondui. More word from the two fleets, the Northern Fleet is exercising in the Bering Sea, while the Pacific Fleet has launched a surface action group together with support ships and a number of smaller vessels. Less news from the airborne on this day, but some interesting simulations among air defense forces, CBRN troops, and engineer units. Across the ranges where most of the forces are staged the day was taken up by artillery and MLRS fires, together with combat maneuvers by motor rifle battalions.

VKS Aerospace Forces – At Tusgol, Russia employed A-50U (AWACS system) in conjunction with Mig-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-30SMs conducting combat air patrols and simulating intercepts. Meanwhile at Mukhor-Kondui, another  range with targets for the air force, Russia’s air force conducted several air strikes with mostly unguided munitions. Including about 30 aircraft consisting of Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, and Su-25s. Their target was a column of enemy armor and artillery on the march. Coordinates and targeting relayed by Su-24MP.

Su-25s about to fire unguided rockets (Mukhor-Kondui)

Su-25s.JPG

Followed by bombing passes from Su-30SM and Su-24 bombers

Su-30sm.JPG

Some word on the earlier air strike with cruise missiles, IZ reported it as 4xTu-95MS and 6xTu-22M3 participating. The Tu-95MS flight in the first two days of the exercise clearly cut through the Alaska air identification zone for the United States, as F-22s were sent up to greet them. The need for air refueling during this flight now makes sense since they seemingly made a large lap before firing missiles at the target range.

F-22 and Tu-95MS.JPG

VDV Airborne – Seems they conducted an airborne drop of one battalion, together with a heliborne assault with soldiers repelling. I honestly can’t say if this took place on the 14th, or if the photos are from the 13th. Part of the problem is some nice people seem to have taken down the Russian MoD website making it a bit difficult to compare announcements and images from the two days.

airborne repelling.jpg

Eastern MD – CBRN troops simulated an emergency chemical cleanup whereby several railcars carrying dangerous/toxic chemicals spilled their load, presumably onto the roadway and the surrounding area. Supposedly about 1,500 CBRN troops, and 300 pieces of equipment are taking part in the exercises, using RHM-6 chemical detector systems, and RPM-2 radiological detectors. Engineer units also simulated a natural and/or man-made disaster, testing their ability to manage flooding, evacuation of the local population, dealing with unexploded ordnance, etc. About 350 soldiers listed for this one, with 80 pieces of equipment including excavators, cranes, floating transports, etc.

At Telemba range, Col Tikhonov, commander of 76th Air Defense division, highlighted the use of air defense targets designed to simulate small radar profiles, i.e. low observation aircraft and cruise missiles. Not only did they use the typical dummy missiles, and conventional targets, but they wanted to replicate a large scale aerospace attack with cruise missiles. The addition of targets with small radar cross sections seems new  compared to previous exercises.

At Tsugol there was a sizable artillery and MLRS live fire exercise, different types of self-propelled and towed artillery involved, together with BM-21 and BM-27 MLRS.

2s3 firing.jpg

Tsugol BM-27 firing.JPG

At Bikinskyi range, in Khabarovsk, a motor rifle unit of the 5th CAA stopped an advancing opposing force. Air defense units assigned to them, including ZSU-23-4 shilka, and Igla manpads, were fired to simulate defending against enemy air power. Artillery units with BM-21 Grad were similarly engaged in supporting the defending motor rifle formation. All together at this range they are listing 200 pieces of equipment, and 1700 troops. The number suggests that this is a battalion tactical group, with short range air defense and MLRS units assigned to it.

Elements of 5th CAA

5th CAA.JPG

This is rather small by the way, and I suspect at the end of all the announcements, if we add up all the troops listed as participating at the individual ranges over the period of these eight days, we’re going to have a hard time coming up not only with 300,000 but probably with anything approaching 50,000-70,000. Recalling we have 5 combined arms ranges, 4 air defense ranges, and two gulfs as the overall area of the exercise.

tanks at Tsugol.jpg

As an aside, there are several exercises, annual certification checks, and live fire drills going on in other military districts. At the same time, the Southern MD is hosting a sizable exercise with about 5,000 troops, including air defense, artillery, missile, and air force units. About 500 pieces of artillery, MLRS, listed, including BM-21, BM-27, BM-30, Tulpan 240mm mortar, Iskander-M, and several ships participating. About 20 fixed and rotary wing aviation involved in this exercise. Black Sea Fleet coastal defense forces (ground forces part of its army corps) held several smaller exercises of their own, simulating defense against diversionary forces attacking its bases. Dvornikov is placing emphasis on working out the recon-strike contour, command and control across his district for employing long range firepower, i.e. cruise missiles and the like at operational ranges. It seems he’s trying to bring experience from the Syrian war to the district.

Pacific Fleet – Several ships from the fleet escorted a Russian squadron near the Sea of Okhotsk. Varyag (Slava-class guided missile cruiser), together with Bystruy (Sov destroyer), two  Udaloy class large anti-submarine warfare ships and other smaller vessels served as escorts to Irtysh, a hospital ship, and several LSTs. The SAG seems to consist of 2x Udaloy, 1x Sov, and 1xSlava-class with a few support ships and LSTs. The exercise involved changing formation, arraying the surface action group for air defense, signaling, C2, and anti-submarine warfare. Ka-27 helicopters carried onboard the larger combatants also participated in the exercise. All together about 15-20 ships from the Pacific Fleet are listed for this exercise. I say 15-20 because Russian MoD announcements can’t agree whether it was 15 or 20, depending on which one you read.

Pacific SAG

Pacific Fleet.JPG

Northern Fleet – Elements of the Northern Fleet’s specialized Arctic brigade, which were dropped off two days ago on Chukotka, marched from their landing point to the Pacific coastline, i.e. they drove 270km on their articulated DT-10P vehicles over the course of two days. Along the way they practiced raiding enemy formations, some live fire drills, etc. This is an interesting exercise, noting that the small surface action group sent by the Northern Fleet has been traveling since August 8th, conducting multiple landings with both naval infantry and the arctic brigade detachment. The rest of the surface action group spent this day in the Bering Sea, practicing search and rescue operations. Their mission was to aid a ship in distress along the northern sea route. Kulakov (Udaloy-class) conducted search operations with its Ka-27 onboard helicopter, which then practiced evacuating individuals from the supposed vessel, together with a rescue party launched from the ship on small high speed boats. Meanwhile their large tug, Pamir, and the diesel-electric ice breaker Ilya Muromets, practiced firefighting at sea.

Kulakov launching Ka-27

Kulakov

Ilya Muromets firefighting together with the large ocean going tug

firefighting.JPG

I would note that today the Russian MoD website appears to be down, and I would bet a good deal of money that it is likely due to a DDOS attack.

Some additional photos of note:

Russian and PLA forces coordinating something

lost in translation

The display signs at Tsugol – this seems to be the Chinese contingent section

best friends forever.jpg

Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)

Michael Kofman2 Comments

Russian and Chinese leadership at Tsygol range opened up Phase 2 of the exercise with a large review of forces. The optics were clearly meant to rekindle the images of Zapad-1981, with numerous vehicles and infantry arrayed in parade formation on the grounds of the range. Indeed the display was quite large, and it seemed clear by the number of Chinese tanks, SPA, wheeled and other vehicles that probably about 3,000 troops and several hundred pieces of equipment did actually come to join Russia in these strategic maneuvers. Judging by the reporting, it is likely most of the drills during Vostok are taking place at Tsygol and Telemba, i.e. it’s quite difficult to picture Vostok being all that large as an exercise. Right now, going off of fairly little (but still a lot more honest than 300,000), around 50,000 seems a much more reasonable number of participants.

DigitalGlobe had good satellite photos of some of the parade grounds at the range and exercises for a different perspective.

satellite

Of course Putin came to look through binoculars, because it wouldn’t be a strategic exercise otherwise. Note unlike in Zapad, where Putin and Lukashenko were not together in the same command center, we can see the Chinese counterparts sitting further along the table.

Putin came.JPG

More photos can be found on BMPD. But here’s s sample of some of the gear Chinese brought with them.

Chinese tanks.jpg

Chinese forces.jpg

As this is the opening of Phase 2, most of the activity was characterized by VDV air assaults, VKS bombing missions, combined arms artillery and motor rifle unit actions. Strong emphasis on employment of drones, integrated C2, and more ‘jointness’ so to speak between ground, airborne, and VKS forces. VDV seems to be conducted several force structure and air assault experiments, including with new light high mobility vehicles, creating a air mobile reserve, etc. Ground units are mostly doing what they do best, lots of artillery and MLRS fire, armored assault, etc.

Vostok 2018 military exercise in Transbaikal Territory, Russia

VDV Airborne – More than 700 soldiers and 51 vehicles (BMD-2) made a parachutte jump at Tsygol range. At the Belaya airfield near Irkutsk, a detachment of the Ulan-Ude air assault brigade loaded 25 Il-76MD transports. They were then air lifted ~1000km towards Zabaikal where they conducted a jump at 600 meters. The scenario was air assault and seizure of an enemy airfield. All together about 6000 VDV  and 900 pieces of equipment are taking part in Vostok, in earlier posts I mentioned these are units from 3 independent air assault brigades, and two additional special detachments.

VDV Ulan Ude assault brigade.JPG

As part of the scenario unfolding at Tsygol range, an air mobile battalion belonging to the 31st independent air assault brigade conducted an air assault on an enemy command center, with air support.  About 40 helicopters of Mi-8AMTSh were used (supposed capacity 26 soldiers), two Mi-26 helicopters, and more than 10 Mi-24 helicopters in support. They are billing this exercise as an experiment of a ‘new type’ of air assault detachment. There was also a mobile reserve in support of this assault, composed of light wheeled high mobility vehicles (pickups). Mi-26s delivered 8 of these light pickups, together with 4 armored Rys light vehicles equipped with Kornet ATGMs and Kord heavy machine guns.

airborne ATVs.JPG

VKS Aerospace Forces – About 40 bombers and strike fixed wing aircraft were used in an attack on opposing ground forces, key infrastructure, and staged reserves. Units involved fielded Tu-22M3, Su-34, Su-24, and Su-25SM strike aircraft. Air cover provided by Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters. Strikes were coordinated via ground based C2 system Strelets, and Orlan-10 drones.

Tu-22M3.JPG

Eastern MD – Other activities of note: CBRN units used smoke and aerosol covers on more than 60 sq km, covering moving units and critical infrastructure – equipment used includes TDA-3K smoke machines, and RP3-8x aerosols. Anti-tank units belonging to a battalion tactical group of motor rifle and artillery units simulated strikes against enemy armor and fortified positions with 130mm Shturm-S ATGMs and Konkurs-M. Sapper units plan to use not only UR-77 Meteorit, BMP-3M, but also Uran-6 and Uran-9 UGVs for demining.

Tsygol Range – Seven artillery battalions created a rolling artillery barrage ahead of an advance, covering a line of ~3000 meters. A motor rifle battalion advanced, and there are photos of host of T-72B1 tanks engaged in a live fire exercise as part of this maneuver. They employed more than 150 pieces of artillery, including 2s3, 2s1, 2s19, Giatsint, and Pion. Meanwhile Iskander-M units fired two cruise missiles at critically important targets, at the same time a large artillery and MLRS barrage hit the opposing force. All together they employed 2 Iskander TELs, 52 MLRS systems, and 72 tube artillery. Targeting for the strike conducted via an air based system called Klever, with Su-24MP recon aviation, and Orlan-10 drones – they used live video feed for battle damage assessment. In one scenario, Russian and Chinese artillery units simultaneously attacked enemy forward command posts. Russian BM-27 Uragan were employed together with Chinese Type-81 MLRS.

Motor rifle bttn.JPG

Artillery units will also practice employing precision guided munitions called Krasnopol, these will be fired by MSTA-S and 2s3 Akatsiya, Granat-4 short range drones are to be used for targeting. Krasnopol is a 152mm semi-active laser guided munition which can be used by most self-propelled and towed artillery.

life fire.jpg

Of course a detachment of Terminator BMPT, heavy tank support vehicles will make another debut at Tsygol, undoubtedly in the hope that someone will buy them. They were first  featured in Zapad 2017 in desert camo paint, undoubtedly marketed towards a certain set of countries that like to buy equipment in such colors.

Interesting photos emerged of drone companies, fielding both Orlan-10s, but also counter drone hand held weapons, that are worth noting.

drone company.JPG

counter drone gun.jpg

Not much from the two fleets today, except that the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean is still there, and recently concluded a first time joint exercise with Russian VKS. A sizable grouping of ships and a few submarines remains there.

Some additional photos of note:

Parachute jump skeptic

in airborne now.JPG

Of course you can’t assault an enemy airbase without taking a photo first

can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo.JPG

And a time honored tradition emerging from modern exercises, people pointing at screens:

pointing at screens.jpg

 

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  • and more…

This hands-on training was attended by security specialists from Oracle, Adobe, ESET, ING, Red Hat, Trend Micro, Philips, government sector and it was very well-received. Recommendations can be found here (https://silesiasecuritylab.com/services/training/#opinions).

Target Audience

Pentesters, bug hunters, security researchers/consultants

What students will receive

Students will be handed in a VMware image with a specially prepared testing environment to play with the bugs. What’s more, this environment is self-contained and when the training is over, students can take it home (after signing a non-disclosure agreement) to hack again at their own pace.

Student Requirements

To get the most of this training basic knowledge of web application security is needed. Students should have some experience in using a proxy, such as Burp, or similar, to analyze or modify the traffic.

What to Bring

Students will need a laptop with 64-bit operating system, at least 4 GB RAM (8 GB preferred), 35 GB free hard drive space, USB port (2.0 or 3.0), wireless network adapter, administrative access, ability to turn off AV/firewall and VMware Player installed (64-bit version). Prior to the training, make sure there are no problems with booting 64-bit VMs (BIOS settings changes may be needed).

About the Trainer

Dawid Czagan (@dawidczagan) is an internationally recognised security researcher and trainer. He is listed among Top 10 Hackers (HackerOne). Dawid Czagan has found security vulnerabilities in Google, Yahoo, Mozilla, Microsoft, Twitter and other companies. Due to the severity of many bugs, he received numerous awards for his findings.

Dawid Czagan shares his security bug hunting experience in his very well-received hands-on training “Hacking web applications – case studies of award-winning bugs in Google, Yahoo, Mozilla and more”. He delivered security training courses at key industry conferences such as Hack In The Box (Amsterdam), CanSecWest (Vancouver), Hack In Paris (Paris), DeepSec (Vienna), HITB GSEC (Singapore), BruCON (Ghent) and for many corporate clients. His students include security specialists from Oracle, Adobe, ESET, ING, Red Hat, Trend Micro, Philips and government sector (recommendations: https://silesiasecuritylab.com/services/training/#opinions).

He presented his research at Security Seminar Series (University of Cambridge), HITB GSEC (Singapore), DeepSec (Vienna) and published over 20 security articles (InfoSec Institute). Dawid Czagan is founder and CEO at Silesia Security Lab, which delivers specialised security auditing and training services. He is also Security Advisor at Future Processing.

To find out about the latest in Dawid Czagan’s work, you are invited to visit his blog and follow him on Twitter.

Buy now

#####EOF##### Support — WordPress.com

Need Help?

Start

Build the site of your dreams with WordPress.com. Learn about our best features, and how to get started.

Let's Go

Create

Write, click, publish, and revel. Your words can be read by anyone in the world. Isn't that exciting?

Show Me How

Customize

Find the perfect theme for your site and make it your own with widgets, menus, and custom design.

Make It Mine

Connect

Share your work with the world through Facebook, Twitter, and other social networks.

Get Connected

We care about your happiness!

They don't call us Happiness Engineers for nothing. If you need help, don't sweat it. We're here for you!

Get Help
#####EOF##### About Us — WordPress.com

About Us

Automatticians at the Company Meetup

At WordPress.com, our mission is to democratize publishing one website at a time.

Open source WordPress is the most popular online publishing platform, currently powering more than 32% of the web. We wanted to bring the WordPress experience to an even larger audience, so in 2005 we created WordPress.com.

We’re a hosted version of the open source software. Here, you can start a blog or build a website in seconds without any technical knowledge.

Overall, the WordPress.com network welcomes more than 409 million people viewing more than 15.5 billion pages each month. Our users publish about 41.7 million new posts and leave 60.5 million new comments each month.

All of us at Automattic constantly work on improving WordPress.com. We roll out updates almost every day, and develop other services, like Gravatar and Simplenote, to enhance your experience on the web. We want to build products, features, and themes you will love using, so don’t hesitate to leave us your feedback.

Almost everything on WordPress.com is free, and what’s currently free will remain so in the future. We keep your sites free by offering upgrades for things like Plans and custom domains, as well as products like anti-spam software Akismet and VIP hosting partnerships with major media outlets.

Whether you’re a blogger or a website owner, we know you have many places where you can pitch your online tent. If you’re a current user, thanks for choosing us — we love having you around. If you’re looking to build your online presence and haven’t decided where to drop anchor, give us a try. We’d love to become your home on the web.

#####EOF##### Stats — WordPress.com

Stats

A live look at activity across WordPress.com

This is a collection of stats from around WordPress.com that we’ve decided to share with the world. Interested in your own stats? Every WordPress.com blog includes an integrated stats system, also available for self-hosted WordPress sites with Jetpack.The following stats are for blogs we host here on WordPress.com, both on subdomains and their own domains, or externally-hosted blogs that use our Jetpack plugin and are part of our network.

How many people are reading blogs?

Over 409 million people view more than 20 billion pages each month.

How many posts are being published?

Users produce about 70 million new posts and 77 million new comments each month.

Who publishes on WordPress.com?

From TechCrunch to TED, CNN, and the National Football League, WordPress.com users span a broad range.

We have a publisher blog focusing on some leading WordPress sites. You can also see more notable users or view our editors’ picks at Freshly Pressed.

Where in the world is WordPress.com used?

We host WordPress blogs written in over 120 languages. Below is a breakdown of the top 10 languages:

  1. English: 71%
  2. Spanish: 4.7%
  3. Indonesian: 2.4%
  4. Portuguese (Brazil): 2.3%
  5. French: 1.5%
  6. Russian: 1.3%
  7. German: 1.2%
  8. Italian: 1%
  9. Turkish: 0.7%
  10. Dutch: 0.6%

Frequently asked questions

What topics do people write about on WordPress.com?
All of them! Check out our tags to get a glimpse (other languages: Spanish, Indonesian, French, German…).

How does WordPress compare to other publishing platforms?
It’s a somewhat subjective call, but we like this Google Trends chart comparing some of the leading platforms.

Will WordPress continue to grow?
It shows no signs of slowing down. As of 2014, tens of thousands of new WordPress sites are created every day. Blogs continue to be highly popular around the world, and we’re now seeing a trend that’s potentially even bigger: publishers are using WordPress to create all kinds of sites beyond blogs — news sites, company sites, magazines, social networks, sports sites, and more. The WordPress Showcase contains many interesting examples.

What’s the difference between WordPress.com and WordPress.org?
WordPress.com is a service that hosts WordPress blogs. WordPress.org is a community where people work on the open source WordPress software. It’s also where that software can be downloaded to be run on your own web server. Still confused? You might want to read this support document.

Do you have more public stats?
Why yes. Here’s info on embeds (posts that contain Twitter, Flickr, YouTube, Photobucket, Vimeo and more) and some miscellaneous stats (support requests, theme switches, new avatars).

#####EOF##### Support — WordPress.com

Need Help?

New to WordPress.com?

Start

Build the site of your dreams with WordPress.com. Learn about our best features, and how to get started.

Let's Go

Create

Write, click, publish, and revel. Your words can be read by anyone in the world. Isn't that exciting?

Show Me How

Customize

Find the perfect theme for your site and make it your own with widgets, menus, and custom design.

Make It Mine

Connect

Share your work with the world through Facebook, Twitter, and other social networks.

Get Connected

We care about your happiness!

They don't call us Happiness Engineers for nothing. If you need help, don't sweat it. We're here for you!

Get Help
#####EOF##### WordPress.com
#####EOF##### Go WordPress
Go Own Your Passion. Boost Your Business.

How to Track Site Visits Using UTM Codes

Whether you launch a social media campaign or refresh your site with new content, using UTM codes can provide valuable campaign performance data.

Making Your E-Commerce Website More Mobile-Responsive

Ready to get selling online? You’ll need to make sure your e-commerce website is responsive to different devices, or risk losing customers.

How to Check Keyword Ranking for Your Content

Trying to evaluate your content’s SEO performance? Learn how to check keyword ranking and make adjustments that can help you boost your site traffic.

Advertising Using Social Media: Sponsored Posts and Social Ads 101

Advertising using social media can boost organic marketing efforts, generate website visits, and help target potential new customers. Learn how to start.

Create a Nonprofit Mission Statement That Inspires

If creating your nonprofit mission statement is still on your to-do list, follow these tips for creating a concise, impactful statement.

3 Paywall Examples and How to Use Them

What are paywalls and how can you use them to monetize your content? Here are three paywall examples as well as the best scenarios for each.

Create a Paywall With WordPress.com

Looking for ways to monetize your site? Try creating a paywall with WordPress.com.

Online Bookings: Tips and Plugins for Your WordPress.com Site

How can online bookings help your business? Here’s what you need to know, and a few easy ways to add online bookings to your WordPress.com site.

Boost Content on Social Media in 3 Steps

The ability to boost content on social media is a great way to meet your marketing goals, without having to create an ad strategy.

CSS Cheat Sheets to Eliminate the Mystery of Web Design

CSS cheat sheets are incredible resources for making your website look exactly the way you want it, without paying for a designer or an expensive theme.

Go by WordPress.com

Welcome to Go by WordPress.com, where experts share their knowledge on building and growing a successful web presence.

Explore by category:

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#####EOF##### WordPress.com Apps - Mobile Apps

WordPress at your fingertips.

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Features

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Post on the Go

Post on the Go

Publish blog updates from any corner of the globe, like travel writer Chérie King, who explores the world with her iPad and a thirst for adventure. Or draft posts from the palm of your hand: you might find writer Dave Graham editing a post on his Android phone, in a Yorkshire coffee shop in the United Kingdom.
Stats

Stats

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Reader

Reader

Catch up with your favorite sites and join the conversation anywhere, any time — like Toronto street photographer Shane Francescut, who follows popular photography tags, browses new blog posts right in the Reader, and leaves likes and comments, all on his Android device.
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Keep up with your site’s activity, even when away from your desk. Check your notifications to keep conversations flowing with your followers. Engage with the community you’ve built — with just a touch on your screen.
Jetpack Integration

Jetpack Integration

If you’re a self-hosted user with a Jetpack-powered site, like lifestyle blogger Katie Hoffman, you can publish posts and connect with readers from your device of choice. From notifications to sharing tools, you’ve got the entire WordPress community in your pocket.
#####EOF##### Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP – Our best-in-class enterprise WordPress hosting platform, expert consulting and support, and diverse partner ecosystem free you to focus on your business objectives.

Your enterprise content platform shouldn’t be a drag on time, resources, and sanity.

We free you to publish.
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End-to-end guidance and hands-on support, from project consideration through launch and every day thereafter.

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Enterprise WordPress hosting

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Solutions at the ready. See how WordPress powers mission critical enterprise media and marketing systems.

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print cover of Variety magazine

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USA Today logo

Abril's digital transformation brought dozens of publishing brands under a common theme and infrastructure with VIP, gaining speed and efficiency and freeing them up to reshape resources company-wide.

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Partners

The best WordPress design and development agencies on the planet, covering a wide range of specialties.

See agency partners

Freedom

Expert code review, managed hosting, proactive advice, and everything you need to focus on your business objectives.

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Highly available and robust APIs

Connect WordPress to all kinds of systems and processes, including mobile apps and decoupled front ends. The possibilities are endless.

Backwards compatibility and forward flexibility

Free your pipeline from maintenance updates and releases, and never worry again about what version you’re running.

The power of open source

Avoid vendor lock-in, enjoy the transparency of a public roadmap, take advantage of the knowledge base in the enterprise user community, and join a massive ecosystem.

Total cost of ownership

Savings from licensing fees, flat-rate traffic pricing, included code review, and our managed hosting and support services all reduce CapEx and OpEx burdens when compared with other solutions.

A different kind of partnership

Do business at human scale, with a team of people who won’t disappear after the contract is signed, and who are personally invested in your success. We’re proud to be considered pioneers of an open, globally distributed, agile way of working.

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Ready to get started?

Drop us a note.

No matter where you are in the planning process, we’re happy to help, and we’re actual humans here on the other side of the form. 👋 We’re here to discuss your challenges and plans, evaluate your existing resources or a potential partner, or even make some initial recommendations. And, of course, we’re here to help any time you’re in the market for some robust WordPress awesomeness.

#####EOF##### WordPress.com
#####EOF##### 44CON Media Coverage – 44CON

44CON Media Coverage

The Top 50 Must-Attend Information Security Conferences (Published January 2019)

Digital Guardian announce their list of the top 50 infosec conferences happening around the world in 2019, 44CON 2019 among them

44CON Insider: The importance of collaborative efforts in cybersecurity (Published 2017-09-19)

Great write up about 44CON 2017 by Richard Morrell.

“For those who don’t know what 44CON is, the show has grown become one of the cornerstones of the UK security and technology industry. It is truly about the security troops in the trenches.”

44CON revisited: Secure Design in Software is still a new Concept (Published 2017-09-17)

Write up about 44CON 2017 by our friends at DeepSec

“So we enjoyed being at 44CON, meetings friends, and exchanging ideas about infosec. A big thanks to the crew! They made the event really smooth and worked a lot behind the scenes, so that everyone felt right at home. Looking forward to 44CON 2018!”

NewStatesman Cyber Security supplement (Published 2017-03-06)

Check for 44CON in NewStatesman Spotlight Cyber Security supplement (we’re on page 46)

The Top 50 Must-Attend Information Security Conferences (Published 2017-01-26)

Digital Guardian announce their list of the top 50 infosec conferences happening around the world in 2017, 44CON London has made the list again this year

44CON London 2016: When Hackers Meet a Corgi! (Published 2016-02-25)44CON London sign

A 44CON 2016 write up by one of our attendees.

Fancy Bears’ infiltration of WADA shows how hacking is changing (Published 2016-09-15)

For years, Fancy Bear was quiet about its infiltration activities – now it seems happy to shout from the rooftops. Sky News came to 44CON 2016 and talked to some of our speakers and sponsors.

The Top 50 Must-Attend Information Security Conferences (Published 2016-02-25)

Digital Guardian announce their list of the top 50 infosec conferences happening around the world in 2016, 44CON London among them

44CON 2015 write up by w1bble (Published 2015-09-24)44CON London sign

Post 44CON London 2015 write up and photo spread by w1bble

Risky Business #383 — Inside FireEye’s research gag (Published 2015-09-17)

A podcast from Risky Business taking a look at what happened in Germany, where FireEye sought and obtained an ex parte injunction against some security researchers over a presentation they were about to do at 44CON London 2015.

Notes from 44CON (Published 2015-09-16)

Dave Lewis, one of our speakers, talks about his experience at 44CON London 2015 and vulnerabilities disclosure.

LabTalk Episode 7: 44CON London (Published 2015-09-16)

Raytheon!Websense Podcast. In this episode Andrew Settle and Carl Leonard discuss responsible disclosure & more hot topics from this year’s 44CON London conference.

Researchers find backdoor bug in NASA rovers’ real-time OS (Published 2015-09-14)

Help Net Security reports on Yannick Formaggio‘s presentation at 44CON London 2015

Head Hacking (Published 2015-09-13)

Head hacking asked people  at 44CON LONDON 2015 what’s wrong with security and made an uplifting music video about it

 

#####EOF##### Integrate Your WordPress.com Website with Google Tools

WordPress.com + Google

Discover the easiest way to use Google tools and services on your WordPress website. No need to pick and choose. Get the best of the web on WordPress.com.

Google Analytics

Inform your business decisions with in-depth data – powered by Google.

Add Google Analytics to your WordPress.com Business site to track performance. Get timely and detailed statistics about where your visitors are coming from, how they’re interacting with your site, and whether they’re responding to your marketing efforts.

Get Started

G Suite by Google Cloud

Enjoy the most popular Google products right at your fingertips.

Add a professional Gmail address, Drive, Docs, Calendars, and Hangouts to your WordPress.com account. Our integration with G Suite improves your site’s performance and your workflow – no software required.

 

Search Console

Make your site easier to find with Search Console

With Google Search Console integration, you can see your site like a search engine does. Get detailed reports that show how visitors are searching for you, what they’re clicking on, who is linking to your site, and much more. Optimize your site for more traffic and better discoverability.

Google Docs

Embrace collaborative editing for your WordPress website.

Google Docs for WordPress.com lets you write, edit, and collaborate in Docs, then save it as a blog post on any WordPress.com site. Your images and most formatting will carry over from Docs to WordPress too. No more copy-and-paste headaches.

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Google Photos

Streamline your workflow with Google Photos for WordPress.

Upload once, share anywhere. With Google Photos for WordPress, you can manage your media easily and save on web storage. Rather than uploading twice, browse, search, and copy photos from your Google account right into your WordPress.com blog posts and pages.

Get the best web performance for your business site with the power of Google on WordPress.com.

Build your site with our Business Plan to add Google tools and services, no installation required.

Get Started
#####EOF##### WordPress.com
#####EOF##### 44CON CYBER SECURITY 2016 – 44CON
#####EOF##### WordPress.com: Create a Free Website or Blog
Watch Annette’s story

Build a website, build a movement.

Whatever you want to create, share, or sell, we’ll help you do it right here.

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Free to start, with room to grow.

Whether it’s a website, online store, portfolio, or blog, our plans scale with your dreams. All you need is an idea and an internet connection.
Blogs and Personal Sites Business Sites and Online Stores

Blogger

$3

per month, billed yearly

Best for Bloggers Brand your blog with a custom .blog domain name, and remove all WordPress.com advertising. Receive additional storage space and email support.

Start with Blogger

  • Free .blog Domain for One Year
  • Jetpack Essential Features
  • Email Support
  • Dozens of Free Themes
  • Basic Design Customization
  • 6GB Storage Space
  • Remove WordPress.com Ads

Start with Blogger

Personal

$5

per month, billed yearly

Best for Personal Use Boost your website with a custom domain name, and remove all WordPress.com advertising. Get access to high‑quality email and live chat support.

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  • Free Domain for One Year
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Premium

$8

per month, billed yearly

Best for Freelancers Build a unique website with advanced design tools, CSS editing, lots of space for audio and video, and the ability to monetize your site with ads.

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  • Free Domain for One Year
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  • Remove WordPress.com Ads
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  • VideoPress Support

Start with Premium

Business

$25

per month, billed yearly

Best for Small Businesses Power your business website with unlimited premium and business theme templates, Google Analytics support, unlimited storage, and the ability to remove WordPress.com branding.

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  • Free Domain for One Year
  • Jetpack Essential Features
  • Email & Live Chat Support
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  • Advanced Design Customization
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  • Remove WordPress.com Ads
  • Advanced Social Media
  • Simple Payments
  • Site Monetization
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  • Get Personalized Help
  • SEO Tools
  • Upload Plugins
  • Install Themes
  • Google Analytics Integration
  • Remove WordPress.com Branding

Start with Business

eCommerce

$45

per month, billed yearly

Best for Online Stores Sell products or services with this powerful, all‑in‑one online store experience. This plan includes premium integrations and is extendable, so it’ll grow with you as your business grows.

Start with eCommerce

  • Free Domain for One Year
  • Jetpack Essential Features
  • Email & Live Chat Support
  • Unlimited Premium Themes
  • Advanced Design Customization
  • Unlimited Storage Space
  • Remove WordPress.com Ads
  • Advanced Social Media
  • Simple Payments
  • Site Monetization
  • VideoPress Support
  • Get Personalized Help
  • SEO Tools
  • Upload Plugins
  • Install Themes
  • Google Analytics Integration
  • Remove WordPress.com Branding
  • Accept Payments in 60+ Countries
  • Integrations with Top Shipping Carriers
  • Unlimited Products or Services
  • eCommerce Marketing Tools
  • Premium Customizable Starter Themes

Start with eCommerce

WordPress.com Free

A free WordPress.com site includes a WordPress.com subdomain, community support, dozens of free themes, basic design customization, and more. Start with Free ›

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WordPress.com gives you everything you need to create anything you want. It’s flexible, secure, and powerful, just like you want your business to be.

Build a fan base.
Promote your products, use advanced statistics and SEO tools, and connect with built-in audiences on social media to grow your business.
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Process payments, configure taxes and shipping, build a marketing plan—you make the widgets, we’ll make the website.
Start a blog.
Everyone has a point of view. Make your mark online with the world’s greatest blogging tool, and join a community millions strong that’s waiting to hear what you have to say.
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MORE THAN 300 Humans
AVAILABLE 24/7 Instantly

You’re in good company.

People all over the world are doing all sorts of amazing things on WordPress.

Watch Annette’s story

An innovative New York City hair salon.

I looked into what other bloggers whom I admired were using, and the Cadillac of platforms is WordPress.com, hands down. The themes are breathtaking — even the free ones! — and all of the supporting infrastructure and information is top shelf.
Alexis Kanda-Olmstead
alexiskanda-olmstead.com
WordPress.com works really well with Google for a great SEO ranking. I can also embed YouTube videos, Google Maps, and other content easily and without any coding ability.
Quintin Lake
theperimeter.uk

You can. You will. We’ll help.

Invent the world’s greatest cat food, save a rainforest, start a needlepoint club. Whatever it is, it’s going to need a website — that’s where we come in.

Start your website
#####EOF##### WordPress.com
#####EOF##### WordPress.com Forums

Need help? Check out our Support site, then

#####EOF##### The WordPress.com Blog

Three New WordPress.com Color Schemes

We’ve launched three new color schemes to customize your WordPress.com dashboard!

April 3, 2019 / 17

Caroline Moore

WordPress.com’s Parent Company Announces Happy Tools, a New Suite of Products for the Future of Work

Happy Schedule, our first offering, will help distributed teams manage employee schedules and customer support.

April 1, 2019 / 0

Matt Wondra

Electric Literature Moves to WordPress — Here’s How an Indie Publisher Thrives on the Open Web

Lessons from 10 years of publishing essays and fiction.

March 25, 2019 / 4

Mark Armstrong

Gender Balance is a Business Issue

On gender balance, diversity, and inclusion at Automattic.

March 8, 2019 / 11

Deborah Beckett

Join WordPress.com for an International Women’s Day Livestream Panel

On International Women’s Day this Friday, WordPress.com parent company Automattic is hosting four outstanding women tech leaders for a livestreamed conversation about professional advancement, technology, and mutual support as we strive for equity in the workplace. It’s happening Friday, March 8 at 6 pm UTC / 1 pm ET / …

March 7, 2019 / 1

Niesha Sweet

Free Domain Privacy Protection

Every domain registered through WordPress.com includes privacy protection at no extra charge.

March 6, 2019 / 4

Andrija Vucinic

Introducing Six New Business-Oriented Themes

Elevate your business website with one of our six new free themes! Calm, sophisticated, friendly, professional, elegant, modern — find the style that’s just right for you.

February 7, 2019 / 23

Laurel Fulford

Announcing Newspack by WordPress.com — A New Publishing Solution for News Organizations

We’re teaming up with Google, Lenfest, Civil funder ConsenSys, and Knight to develop a next-generation publishing platform.

January 14, 2019 / 0

Mark Armstrong

Customize Your WordPress.com Dashboard

We’re happy to announce new improvements to your WordPress.com dashboard for a more accessible and customized experience. From your desktop, you can now customize your dashboard by choosing one of our two new color schemes, Classic Bright for a fresh modern feel and Classic Blue as the standard you’ve known …

January 8, 2019 / 115

Courtney Burton Doker

Introducing the 2019 ‘Anything Is Possible’ List

WordPress.com’s inaugural New Year’s list celebrates the people and organizations who are using the web to make the world a better place.

January 3, 2019 / 32

Mark Armstrong

New Theme: Twenty Nineteen

Meet Twenty Nineteen, the brand new WordPress default theme.

December 19, 2018 / 47

Chris Runnells

Search
Read our other blogs:

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#####EOF##### WordPress.com
#####EOF##### Developer Resources | Create cool applications that integrate with WordPress.com

Howdy, Developers

Build something amazing and make a difference for millions of WordPress users.

Get Started
rest-api

REST API

Our REST API lets you build applications that can manage a user's blogs, fetch stats, and much more.
rest-api

oEmbed

Support WordPress.com embeds in your own applications using oEmbed.
rest-api

Developer Console

Try before build. Test the REST API using our console to get back live JSON data.
rest-api

wpcom.js

The official JavaScript library for the WordPress.com REST API. It is compatible with Node.js and web browsers.
rest-api

Embeddable Timeline

Display a listing of your latest posts to your website with one line of code.
rest-api

Photon

Speed up and manipulate how your images are served using the WordPress.com CDN.

rest-api

Design Resources

Download WordPress.com assets to use in your apps. Coming soon

A few partners integrating with us

#####EOF##### WordPress.com
    #####EOF##### Blog Tool, Publishing Platform, and CMS — WordPress

    WordPress.org

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    Minimum PHP Version update

    WordPress 5.2 is targeted for release at the end of this month, and with it comes an update to the minimum required version of PHP. WordPress will now require a minimum of PHP 5.6.20. Beginning in WordPress 5.1, users running PHP versions below 5.6 have had a notification in their dashboard that includes information to […]

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    #####EOF##### Discover | A daily selection of the best content published on WordPress, collected for you by humans who love to read.
    Lit Lovers, Rejoice: Electric Literature Moves to WordPress
    Love to read and write? Explore Electric Literature, now on WordPress.
    Explore this literary publication
    Alt Oasis 2019 Inspiration List: 10 Entrepreneurs to Follow
    These 10 speakers at the Alt Oasis conference in Palm Springs use their WordPress websites to promote their businesses and brands.
    Meet 10 speakers with beautiful WordPress sites
    Getting the Most out of our Business Concierge Service
    Unlock the power of one-to-one support with our Business Concierge service.
    Learn more
    Editors' PicksSee all
    1. Columbine, 20 Years Later

      “Was it possible, we wondered, that Columbine, that seminal moment in American history, had taught us nothing?” A special issue at 5280 covers the community of Columbine, Colorado, 20 years after the Columbine High School shooting.
      Commentary
    2. What it means to become British

      From Nadia El-Awady: “I come from a culture that tends to glorify non-elected, autocratic, all-powerful leaders. They have to. The consequences of not doing so are not pretty. So I’ve grown up with a disdain for the glorification of single human beings; even those that don’t have much power.”
      Commentary
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    3. The Chriselle Factor

      The Chriselle Factor is stylist and YouTube influencer Chriselle Lim’s blog of beauty, fashion, and lifestyle tips.
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    4. Wonder Woman

      “We’re all a little weird thanks to our mothers. I’m carrying that tradition on with my own children.” Mary Laura Philpott, who blogged previously at I Miss You When I Blink, shares an excerpt from her new essay collection at Longreads.
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    1. 5 Tools You May Not Know About

      Here’s a look at five features you may not know existed.
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    2. Celebrating International Women’s Day: Stories By Fantastic Women

      These five excellent reads deserve your attention.

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    3. Choosing a Color Palette? It’s For the Birds (Literally!)

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    3. L.A. Taco

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      Chris Spiker’s watercolor is so rich and detailed, you might mistake it for one of his photographs.
    5. Poetry
    6. A year of haiku about my kids.

      “It turns out the nightly parenting haiku is not only Minimum Viable Creativity, but also an opportunity to journal milestones every night without having to figure out what to say.” This post from 2017 at Unlikely Words compiles a year of haiku from a parent.
      As we grow old

      A beautiful poem on aging and and wisdom by Senator Murray Sinclair, former chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: As we grow old / the ground we walk on / rises up / so that, / as each of those few moments / left to us / pass by…
      An interview with Ohio Poet Laureate Dave Lucas

      “Too many of us seem to have been taught that poems are supposed to be solved, some ‘deeper meaning’ discovered and extracted like a vein of ore from a mine. If we can’t find ‘it’ . . . we feel inadequate.” Rebecca Moon Ruark interviews Dave Lucas on her blog, Rust Belt Girl.
      Acts of Faith

      If I am lost in the blowing grasses, / If I wander from the path, / I am in your hands, time. / And in them there is a stillness, / Where light become animate, / And tactile, / Like little lost pieces of a former self.
    #####EOF##### ILEC Conference Centre – 44CON

    ILEC Conference Centre

    One of the largest Conference-Hotels in West London, ILEC Conference Centre offers a capacious and flexible event hall at around 1500sqm in a single space as well as 5 additional syndicate rooms.

    Free secure wireless networking will be available to all attendees and sponsors in the conference area.

    The conference centre is a short walk from the West Brompton and Earls Court Underground Stations. Hyde Park, Kensington Palace and Gardens, The Royal Albert Hall, The Natural History Museum, Science and Victoria & Albert Museums are a short walk away for your security conference tourism convenience! With the rest of central London within easy reach.

    #####EOF##### Create a Website with WordPress.com

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    #####EOF##### WordPress.com Plans and Pricing – Get Started for Free Today!

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    #####EOF##### WordPress.com
      #####EOF##### Terms of Service — WordPress.com

      Terms of Service

      The Gist

      We (the folks at Automattic) are on a mission to make the web a better place. We hope you love our products and services — from website publishing tools to ecommerce solutions to security backup systems to management tools for global companies to the next great idea that we haven’t even thought of yet — as much as we love creating them.

      These Terms of Service (“Terms”) describe our commitments to you, and your rights and responsibilities when using our services. Please read them carefully and reach out to us if you have any questions.

      We’ve decided to make these Terms available under a Creative Commons Sharealike license. You can grab a copy of these Terms and other legal documents on Github. You’re more than welcome to copy them, adapt them, and repurpose them for your own use. Just make sure to revise the language so that your Terms reflect your actual practices. Also, if you do use these Terms, we’d appreciate a credit and link to Automattic somewhere on your website.

      Terms of Service

      These Terms govern your access to and use of WordPress.com, Jetpack.com, VaultPress.com, and Happy.Tools, as well as all content and Automattic products and services (for example, ecommerce services as outlined below in Section 7e) available at or though these websites (collectively, “Services”).

      These Terms also govern visitors’ access to and use of any websites that use our Services, such as websites hosted on WordPress.com that are operated by our users.

      For some of Automattic’s other products and services, such as WooCommerce, Akismet, CrowdSignal, and WordPress.com VIP, additional Terms of Service may apply and will be posted on the websites for those products and services.

      Our Services are offered subject to your acceptance, without modification, of all of the terms and conditions contained herein and all other operating rules, policies (including, without limitation, Automattic’s Privacy Policy), and procedures that may be published from time to time by Automattic (collectively, the “Agreement”). You agree that we may automatically upgrade our Services, and the Agreement will apply to any upgrades.

      Please read the Agreement carefully before accessing or using our Services. By accessing or using any part of our Services, you agree to become bound by the Agreement. If you do not agree to all the terms of the Agreement, then you may not access or use our Services.

      1. Who’s Who

      Throughout these Terms, “you” applies to both individuals and entities that access or use our Services. If you are an individual using our Services on behalf of an entity, you represent and warrant that you have the authority to bind that entity to the Agreement and that by using our Service(s), you are accepting the Agreement on behalf of that entity.

      We use the term “Designated Countries” to refer to Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and all countries located in the European continent. If you reside in the “Designated Countries,” your Agreement is with Aut O’Mattic A8C Ireland Ltd. If you reside outside of the “Designated Countries,” your Agreement is with Automattic Inc.

      We refer to Aut O’Mattic A8C Ireland Ltd. and Automattic Inc. collectively as “Automattic” or “we” throughout these Terms.

      2. Your Account

      Where use of our Services requires an account, you agree to provide us with complete and accurate information when you register for an account. You will be solely responsible and liable for any activity that occurs under your username. You are responsible for keeping your account information up-to-date and for keeping your password secure.

      You are responsible for maintaining the security of your account and any Service-related website, store, or other content, and you are fully responsible for all activities that occur under your account and any other actions taken in connection with our Services. You shall not share or misuse your access credentials. You must immediately notify us of any unauthorized uses of your account, store, or website, or of any other breach of security. We will not be liable for any acts or omissions by you, including any damages of any kind incurred as a result of such acts or omissions.

      3. Minimum Age Requirements

      Our Services are not directed to children. Access to and use of our Services is only for those over the age of 13 (or 16 in the European Union). If you are younger than this, you may not register for or use our Services. Any person who registers as a user or provides their personal information to our Services represents that they are 13 years of age or older (or 16 years or older in the European Union).

      4. Responsibility of Visitors and Users

      We have not reviewed, and cannot review, all of the content (such as, but not limited to, text, photo, video, audio, code, computer software, items for sale, or other materials) posted to our Services by users or anyone else (“Content”) and are not responsible for any use or effects of such Content. So, for example:

      • We do not endorse any Content or represent that Content is accurate, useful, or non-harmful. Content could be offensive, indecent, or objectionable; include technical inaccuracies, typographical mistakes, or other errors; or violate or infringe the privacy, publicity rights, intellectual property rights (see our Copyright Infringement and DMCA Policy section to submit copyright complaints), or other proprietary rights of third parties.
      • If you post Content, comment on a website, or otherwise make (or allow any third party to make) Content available on our Services, you are entirely responsible for the Content, and any harm resulting from, that Content or your conduct.
      • We disclaim any responsibility for any harm resulting from anyone’s use, purchase, or downloading of Content. If you access or use any Content, you are responsible for taking precautions as necessary to protect yourself and your computer systems from viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and other harmful or destructive content.
      • Any Content offered for sale through any of our Services are the seller’s sole responsibility, and you agree that you will look solely to the seller for any damages that result from your purchase or use of Content.
      • We are not a party to, and will have no responsibility or liability for, any communications, transactions, interactions, or disputes between you and the provider of any Content.
      • Please note that additional third party terms and conditions may apply to the downloading, copying, purchase, or use of Content.

      We also have not reviewed, and cannot review, all of the material, including computer software, made available through the websites and web pages that link to, or are linked from, WordPress.com or our other Services. For example:

      • We do not have any control over those websites and are not responsible for their contents or their use.
      • The existence of a link to or from one of our Services does not represent or imply that we endorse such website.
      • You are responsible for taking precautions as necessary to protect yourself and your computer systems from viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and other harmful or destructive content.
      • We disclaim any responsibility for any harm resulting from non-Automattic websites.

      5. Fees, Payment, and Renewal

      Fees. Some of our Services are offered for a fee — such as Jetpack, and VaultPress, and Happy Tools – while other Services may be free with optional paid upgrades, such as a WordPress.com plan (collectively, “Paid Services”). By using a Paid Service, you agree to pay the specified fees. Depending on the Paid Service, there may be a one-time fee or recurring fees. For recurring fees, we’ll bill or charge you for in regular intervals (such as monthly, annually, or biennially), on a pre-pay basis until you cancel, which you can do at any time by contacting the relevant support team.

      Taxes. To the extent permitted by law, or unless explicitly stated otherwise, all fees are exclusive of applicable federal, provincial, state, local or other governmental sales, goods and services, harmonized or other taxes, fees, or charges now in force or enacted in the future (“Taxes”). You are responsible for payment of all applicable Taxes relating to your use of our Services, your payments, or your purchases. If we are obligated to pay or collect Taxes on the Fees you’ve paid or will pay, you are responsible for such Taxes, and we may collect payment for such Taxes.

      Payment. If your payment fails or Paid Services are otherwise not paid for on time, we may immediately cancel or revoke your access to the Paid Services. If you contact your bank or credit card company to decline or reverse the charge of fees for Paid Services, we may revoke your access to our Services in general.

      Automatic Renewal. To ensure uninterrupted service, recurring Paid Services are automatically renewed. This means that unless you cancel a Paid Service before the end of the applicable subscription period, it will automatically renew, and you authorize us to invoice you or use any payment mechanism we have on record for you to collect the then-applicable subscription fee (as well as any Taxes). Your Paid Services are renewed for the same interval of time. For example, if you purchase a WordPress.com annual plan, you will be charged each year.

      Refunds. While you may cancel a Paid Service at any time, refunds are issued in our sole discretion, unless otherwise required by applicable law.

      Fee Changes. We may change our fees at any time. When applicable, we may give you advance notice of the fee changes. If you don’t agree with the fee changes, you can cancel your Paid Service.

      6. General Representation and Warranty

      You represent and warrant that your use of our Services:

      • Will be in strict accordance with these Terms;
      • Will comply with all applicable laws and regulations (including, without limitation, all applicable laws regarding online conduct and acceptable content, privacy, data protection, and the transmission of technical data exported from the United States or the country in which you reside);
      • Will not use the Services for any unlawful purposes, to publish illegal content, or in furtherance of illegal activities;
      • Will not infringe or misappropriate the intellectual property rights of any third party;
      • Will not overburden Automattic’s systems, as determined by us in our sole discretion;
      • Will not disclose sensitive personal information of others;
      • Will not be used to send spam or bulk unsolicited messages;
      • Will not interfere with, disrupt, or attack any service or network; and
      • Will not be used to create, distribute, or enable material that is – or that facilitates or operates in conjunction with – malware, spyware, adware, or other malicious programs or code.

      7. Specific Service Terms

      a. WordPress.com Websites and Accounts

      WordPress.com enables you to create beautiful websites and blogs, and we would love for you to use it. A WordPress.com account also allows you to sign into some of our Services.

      WordPress.com’s basic service is free, and we offer paid plans for advanced features such as a custom domain name, extra storage, and access to premium themes. Our service is designed to give you as much control and ownership over what goes on your website as possible and encourage you to express yourself freely. However, be responsible in what you publish. In particular, make sure that none of the prohibited items (like spam, viruses, or serious threats of violence) appear on your website.

      If you find a WordPress.com website that you believe violates these Terms, please visit our dispute resolution and reporting page.

      Your WordPress.com Website. If you create a website on WordPress.com, you get to use an Automattic-owned subdomain, such as example.wordpress.com or mollys.food.blog. You must not engage in “domain squatting,” claim an unreasonable number of subdomains (as determined by us), or sell access to any subdomains.

      License. By submitting Content to Automattic for inclusion on your website, you grant Automattic a world-wide, royalty-free, and non-exclusive license to reproduce, modify, adapt, and publish the Content solely for the purpose of displaying, distributing, and promoting your website. This license also allows Automattic to make any publicly-posted Content available to third parties selected by Automattic (through Firehose, for example) so that these third parties can analyze and distribute (but not publicly display) the Content through their services. You also give other WordPress.com users permission to share your Content on other WordPress.com websites and add their own Content to it (aka to “reblog” your Content), so long as they use only a portion of your post and they give you credit as the original author by linking back to your website (the reblogging function on WordPress.com does this automatically!).

      Removing Content. If you delete Content, we will use reasonable efforts to remove it from public view (or in the case of a private website, from view by the authorized visitors) on WordPress.com, but you acknowledge that caching or references to the Content may not be made immediately unavailable.

      Web Traffic. We use a third party, comScore, Inc. (“comScore”), to measure WordPress.com’s audience and usage. By hosting your website on WordPress.com, you agree to assign the traffic relating to your website to Automattic and authorize us to sign a Traffic Assignment Letter on your behalf for comScore audience measurement reports. Your website’s traffic will be included under Automattic. You understand that your website will not receive credit for traffic in these reports, and you must not assign your website’s traffic to any other party. If we or comScore require additional documentation to verify ownership of your website or domain name, you agree to make reasonable efforts to accommodate such requests.

      Prohibited Uses. By using WordPress.com, you represent and warrant that your Content and conduct do not violate the User Guidelines.

      HTTPS. We offer free HTTPS on all WordPress.com websites by default, including those using custom domains, via Let’s Encrypt. By signing up and using a custom domain on WordPress.com, you authorize us to act on the domain name registrant’s behalf (by requesting the necessary certificates, for example) for the sole purpose of providing HTTPS on your website.

      Advertisements. We reserve the right to display advertisements on your website unless you have purchased a plan that includes the removal of ads.

      Attribution. We reserve the right to display attribution text or links in your website footer or toolbar, attributing WordPress.com or the theme author, for example. Some of these attributions may not be altered or removed. For more details about what these attributions might look like, and under which circumstances (if any) they may be altered or removed, please see our Admin and Action Bars support page.

      Friends of WP.com Themes. By activating a partner theme from the Friends of WP.com section of our themes directory, you agree to that partner’s terms of service. You can decline the terms of service at any time by deactivating the partner theme.

      Domain Names. We act as a registrar and also work with third party registrars in order to provide our users with domain name services. When you register or renew a domain name on WordPress.com, or when you transfer an existing domain name to WordPress.com, you become bound by the relevant registrar’s terms and conditions, either the Automattic Domain Name Registration Agreement, Tucows Domain Inc. Registration Agreement, or this Domain Name Registration Agreement, in addition to these Terms. Which registrar terms apply depends on the top-level domain (TLD) you choose, and in some cases, the date you register your domain, so please see this table that outlines all of the TLDs we offer and the applicable registration agreement to determine which agreement(s) apply to you. These registrar terms are incorporated by reference into these Terms.

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      Change log

      #####EOF##### Go WordPress
      Go Own Your Passion. Boost Your Business.

      Which Types of Digital Media Are Best for Your Business?

      Determining what types of digital media is essential for moving your business forward. We break down your options here.

      5 WordPress Hosting Considerations

      Here are 5 WordPress hosting considerations for picking a platform to house your site.

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      What Is Pantone?: Your Guide to Complete Color Competency

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      Start a Paid Subscription Blog to Monetize Your Content

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      Use the Patreon Plugin to Centralize Your Creative Brand

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      Local SEO Tips: Create a Business Website

      If you’re a small business looking for local SEO tips, you need an engaging website.

      How to Make Your Online Business Idea a Reality

      Doing what you love for a living has never been more within reach. Anyone who has an online business idea can follow these tips to get started.

      Boost Your Fanbase and Search Ranking with Credible Writing

      Credible writing can help attract an audience while improving your SEO.

      To Reach Your Goals, Identify What’s Holding You Back

      Ready to break out of the brainstorming phase? Identify what’s holding you back in order to move forward.

      Go by WordPress.com

      Welcome to Go by WordPress.com, where experts share their knowledge on building and growing a successful web presence.

      Explore by category:

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      Whether you’re looking to promote your business or share your story, we have a plan that’s right for you.

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      #####EOF##### Features | Discover
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      #####EOF##### Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system – Russia Military Analysis

      Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system

      Michael Kofman6 Comments

      I’ve recently put out an article on Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system in the well known Russian journal The New Times, under the title “ЧТО ВСЕ-ТАКИ ПУТИН ПОДАРИЛ РОССИЯНАМ НА НОВЫЙ ГОД,” but for those interested, please find the unedited English version below, which hopefully covers the subject in some depth.

      Earlier in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced at his annual address to the federal assembly that a Russian hypersonic boost-glide system, named Avangard, would start entering serial production. Subsequently on December 26th, 2018 Russian officials claimed that they had successfully conducted a test from the Dombarovsky missile site, to the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 3,760 miles away. Russia’s president proudly announced that the system as a wonderful ‘New Year’s gift’ to Russia. According to Putin’s statement, the hypersonic glide vehicle is able to conduct intensive maneuvers at speeds in excess of Mach 20, which would render it “invulnerable” to any existing or prospective missile defenses. In this article I will briefly explore the logic behind Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, recent claims of technological accomplishment, and the strategic implications of deploying such weapon systems.

      Despite rather questionable public statements about the technical characteristics of this weapon system, a number of which appear inconsistent, it is clear that Russian military science has made considerable advancements along one of the most sophisticated axis of weapons research. While claims pertaining to the readiness of this system to enter serial production, and operational service, are probably exaggerated, the more important questions are conceptual. More than likely Russia will be able to deploy a hypersonic boost glide system in the 2020s, perhaps alongside other hypersonic weapons projects, but the promise of this technology was always at the tactical-operational level of war, not strategic. This was never considered a ‘game changer’ as a system for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. If anything, Russia has invested a substantial amount of money, and years of research, in overdoing its strengths. Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of ‘Russian national achievement’ for domestic audiences, it’s unclear if this weapon system truly answers Russia’s strategic challenges in the coming decades. The question is not whether it works, or when it will work, but does it even matter?

      Hypersonic boost glide weapons function by using a multi-stage ballistic missile as the boost phase, throwing a vehicle into near earth orbit, which then descends and begins gliding at hypersonic speeds along the edge of the atmosphere. As the vehicle descends back to earth, it pulls upwards, and begins skimming the atmosphere in a ‘glide’ phase, before diving downwards onto its target at the terminal phase. Russia has spent years developing this technology under a project referenced as Object 4202, which married a series of  experimental hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Yu-71, with a liquid fueled ICBM УР-100УНТТХ (NATO designation SS-19 mod 2 Stiletto). This system builds on the Soviet Union’s extensive research into hypersonic weapons programs , including work on a hypersonic-boost aircraft named «Спираль», a modified S-200V surface-to-air missile under the project name Холод, and hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as Kh-80 and Kh-90 GELA (гиперзвуковой экспериментальный летательный аппарат).

      kh-90 gela
      Kh-90 GELA
      kholod
      Kholod
      spiral
      Spiral

      Although claimed successes in testing may have come as a surprise in 2018, in truth Russian officials have been announcing tests of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle, using the УР-100УНТТХ missile, as far back as the strategic nuclear forces exercise in 2004. Hence, this particular system has been in publicly acknowledged development for at least 14 years, and the glide vehicle itself for quite a few years beforehand. The booster, УР-100 (SS-19), is a 105 ton liquid fueled silo-based missile, which together with the boost glide vehicle payload proved too long for a standard silo. Hence this system is being tested in a modified R-36M2 silo (SS-18 Satan), and although it is being developed with the УР-100, it is meant for the much heavier liquid fueled missile currently in testing, RS-28 Sarmat. While the question of boost method may seem a technicality, the boosting mechanism is actually quite deterministic of the strategic role this weapon can play, as I will discuss a bit later in this article.

      However, the principal challenges with this system have little to do with the decades established technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or boosting objects into near earth orbit. Hypersonic boost glide vehicles, if successful, represent a major breakthrough in material sciences, as the object must be able to withstand incredibly high temperatures with the payload and guidance system intact. Although impossible to verify, Russian announcements can often be categorized as ‘true lies,’ impressive sounding figures that have some factual basis, but are inevitably inaccurate. The proposition that the vehicle can reach mach 27 is likely true only during the brief return phase, when it is falling back to earth like a rock from near earth orbit, prior to beginning its hypersonic glide at the edges of the atmosphere. The vehicle itself will have considerably different speeds during the pull-up, glide, and dive to target phase, while having to endure incredible temperatures.

      Below are a few graphical illustrations available on the web

      explainer 1explainer 2explainer 3

      In U.S. testing of an analogous system in 2011, Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2), the vehicle was able to sustain glide at mach 20 speeds for three minutes, enduring a temperature of 3500 Fahrenheit. These figures track with Russian statements on temperatures experienced, but the actual speeds and altitudes at which the Russian vehicle is able to glide, and whether the systems actually survive this experience, remain a mystery. Although Russia’s defense sector seems to have made progress on this weapon system, claims that it is ready for serial production, or operational deployment in the near future, should be treated with educated skepticism. Ironically, the most significant potential breakthrough is in material sciences, not in building a seemingly scary strategic weapon.

      Yet the rationale for Avangard seems less than straightforward when compared to other Russian hypersonic weapons programs, including the Tsirkon 3M22 scramjet hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic missile. Those are operational depth systems able to deliver meaningful conventional or nuclear payloads to shape the military balance in a theater of military operations. They can offset U.S. conventional superiority, and pose genuine challenges in conventional warfare. What does Avangard do for Russia that existing silo-based, road-mobile, air-launched, and submarine launched missiles cannot?

      supposed image of the vehicle (draped on the right)

      The Avangard system is best seen as one element in an expensive Russian strategy to develop technological hedges for a security environment perhaps 20-30 years from now where the United States might deploy a cost effective missile defense system, making a percentage of Russia’s nuclear deterrent vulnerable to interception. To be clear, there is no missile defense system now, or on the horizon, able to intercept Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Modern ICBMs can come with multiple reentry vehicles and numerous penetration aids or false targets, creating a complex ‘threat cloud’ that would make interception an improbable business. Nonetheless, ever since the Bush administration chose in 2002 to exit the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russian leadership has been concerned that the United States could eventually devalue the deterrence provided by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

      Russia’s General Staff worries that a vast arsenal of long range conventional cruise missiles, paired with a semi-viable missile defense, would pose major challenges for their calculations to ensure the ability of Russian nuclear forces to deliver ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tailored’ damage in the coming decades. The 1972 ABM Treaty was not just a cornerstone of Cold War arms control, but fundamental to Russian military thinking on strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability at the strategic level. Ever since June 1941, Soviet, and subsequently Russian, military thought has been wracked by the possibility of a disarming first strike, and the need to position Russian forces along a strategy of ‘counter-surprise.’

      However, unlike other expensive strategic projects, such as the Poseidon nuclear powered torpedo, Avangard does not contribute to a survivable second strike. Thus there are a few ways to interpret the actual purpose of this weapon. The first is as a retaliatory-meeting strike system to attack high-value targets, i.e. civilian targets with political or economic significance, which will provide some insurance for a counter value strike. The second is that it is a first strike weapon against hard to penetrate targets. Since Avangard is silo based, designed for heavier liquid fueled ICBMs, in the event of strategic attack the boosting missile would not be survivable. It must be fired either first, or in a “launch under attack” scenario, when Russia has confirmed a U.S. launch, but the missiles have not yet impacted.

      Avangard may be designed to give Russia’s RVSN the ability to penetrate hard targets, getting around missile defenses, and leveraging greater accuracy to take out well-hardened facilities. That said, from a nuclear warfighting standpoint, this makes Avangard a somewhat specialized, but expensive strategic nuclear weapon. Given how few of these systems Russia is likely to be able to afford, the weapon may offer some targeting advantages, but at a high price relative to the benefits. Another possibility is that this is not a system to get around future missile defenses, but a first strike system to be used specifically against missile defenses, clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even if more accurate and survivable in flight, Avangard is a questionable investment when compared to the numerous road-mobile ICBM systems Russia fields today, including Topol-M and Rs-24 Yars (but then the logic for Russia’s SSBN program is also somewhat circumspect).

      This slideshow requires JavaScript.

      Perhaps in the future, Avangard will be deployed on a road-mobile launcher, but as conceived, this system adds little to Russia’s existing large strategic nuclear arsenal. An expensive insurance policy that in no way alters the strategic nuclear balance either today or tomorrow, which is why the reaction in Washington has been so muted. If anything, the United States should thank Russia for investing money in such super weapons, instead of buying large quantities of conventional precision guided munitions.

      Moscow has sought to leverage Avangard and similar novel systems to sell the notion of a qualitative arms race to Washington, D.C., hoping to establish a bilateral agenda for summits. Yet while the world is genuinely witnessing a renewed period of nuclear modernization, with qualitatively new or novel weapon systems in development, there is no arms race in progress. The major nuclear powers of today are pursuing distinctly divergent strategies, concepts, and requirements behind their nuclear weapons programs, rather than racing which each other for superiority. This is why Avangard, if completed and deployed, is unlikely to alter strategic military balance or elicit any meaningful response from Washington, D.C.

      6 thoughts on “Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system”

      1. I think that from military point of view your analysis is good as always, but IMO Avangard and Poseidon have a significant political reasoning behind them. From some statements made by Putin it seems that the Russian leadership is hedging against an irrational US leadership coming to the (false) conclusion that the US can send some ICBMs towards Russia and deflect a counter-strike with its ABM. I know that to a rational observer this seems crazy, but it seems that Russian leadership is considering US political elite to be on a downward slope rationality-wise. It has probably begun long time ago, after 2001, when the people in Bush Jr.’s presidency associated with Project for the New American Century started to push PNAC’s agenda as the official US agenda.
        So, the Russian leadership (which is the same since 2000 so has a big advantage in implementation of long-term projects) wants not only weapons that would deter a rational person (like you or me) but also any exceptionalism-infested neocon. Their unbeatability has to be obvious and undisputable.

        Like

        Reply

        • Its not an issue of rationality. The possibility of select counter force has been a factor ever since 1974 change in U.S. planning to limited nuclear options (LNOs) under Schlesinger. There was always a difference in that the USSR did not believe limited strategic exchange could be contained, and escalation limited. The strategy was not especially credible because the U.S. held no force advantages back then, so it would be self-deterred from such options. An argument could be made that viable missile defense creates an opening for the U.S. to believe it has limited nuclear options, creating a window for negotiations. However, the problem with this thinking is that a limited U.S. nuclear strike with counterforce in mind could just target these few ‘Avangard’ carriers in fixed silos.

          The problem is also entirely one of boxed logic. There is no reason to believe that a missile defense system designed for X missiles would simply not invite a retaliation by Y missiles. Unfortunately parts of the strategy community believe in what I call the ‘nuclear trebuchet dilemma’ – that is, if someone builds a nuclear trebuchet, it can only be deterred by a nuclear trebuchet, even though any number of other systems, yields, and so on would do. Hence, the existence of something as ridiculous as a nuclear trebuchet would result in an asymmetry, and a ‘trebuchet gap’ on which many articles will be written.

          Liked by 1 person

          Reply

          • Do you think that Avangard will be only on silo-based missiles? They’re using the UR-100N for now because it was available, and of course it makes sense to use Avangard for the new RS-28, classic RVs are sooo the 1980’s 🙂 But as I understood it, the original plan was to use also the mobile RS-26, and I think they’ll get back to it once budget permits, for now the RS-28 has priority. They’re safe against the current capabilities of US ABM so they can do it in the next armament program after 2027.

            As for Avangard and the ‘no mineshaft gap’ policy, it seems to me that Russia does not continue the Soviet doctrine. They needed to counter a possible future working ABM defense. They had three options – a viable comprehensive ABM defense of their own (ridiculously expensive if it is even possible), ridiculous numbers of classic RVs (also extremely expensive, and they would need to forget about nuclear arms limitation treaties), or something that could so clearly beat any ABM defense that nobody in the US would consider its ABM defense able to defend anything. This was the most economic option, they went with it, and now they have results…

            Do you plan to do an article on future Russian carriers? I’ve read that they’re developing a VTOL aircraft (first said by Borisov back in 2017) and that they won’t go with Shtorm (of course) or even the Lavina/Priboy concept, instead they want something that can land ground forces while at the same time carrying also helis and VTOL aircraft. Economic option once again…

            Liked by 1 person

          • RS-26 was a piece of misinformation from years ago. It does not have the throw weight, and I do not think it was ever meant for a HGV. Next generation ABM may intercept HGVs, so I’m not sure how sound of an investment it really is. Might have been much cheaper to go with alternative missile defense defeat systems.

            I don’t think there will be future Russian carriers, or VTOL aircraft. Unless Indians are silly enough to pay for such programs. There will be a LPD ship of the Dutch style such as Rotterdam, in the 12,000-14,000 displacement range. Russian MoD officials love making announcements to drive the news cycle, but most of this is nonsense. Don’t expect to see anything laid down until the end of this state armament program.

            If you dig through this blog you can find several entries covering Russian naval development programs and amphibs.

            Like

          • On Soviet Doctrine. It depends what you’re referring to. Russia maintains Soviet plans for theater nuclear strike, while at the same time not accepting the possibility of limited nuclear war between homelands, i.e. limited strategic nuclear options.

            For implications, I offer one opinion from Robert Jervis:
            “Neither side can employ limited nuclear options unless it is quite confident that the other accepts the rules of the game. For if the other believes that nuclear war cannot be controlled, it will either refrain from responding-which would be fine-or launch all-out retaliation.”

            Liked by 1 person

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      Font changes as page loads

      • Author
        Posts
      • #3290586

        davisforestschool
        Member

        Hi, I have this annoying thing happening on my website (www.davisforestschool.org for reference) where the text first appears as the default font for the theme, and then after half a second it changes to the font I set up for the site. Is this just something that happens? Or is there some setting I am missing? Or some other way to fix it? I have another site on squarespace and this definitely does not happen there. Any help is appreciated! Thanks!

        The blog I need help with is davisforestschool.org.

        #3290797

        fstat
        Staff

        Hi there,

        On slower connections, we display text in the theme’s default font first. This way, people can start reading your content before the custom font loads, instead of waiting while looking at a blank page. This might mean that there’s a flash of a different font before the page finishes loading, but we think overall this is better for folks on slower connections than seeing a blank screen.

        #3290996

        davisforestschool
        Member

        Hi, thanks for your reply. Is the only way around this to switch back to the default font then?

        #3291025

        lizkarkoski
        Staff

        Well, it’s only happening to folks with a slower or intermittent connection issues. You can test it on several different public wifi networks to see how it looks.

        #3291032

        davisforestschool
        Member

        Well, it happens on my computer every single time I load a page, and I do not have a slow connection. Is it possible that something else is going on here?

        #3291035

        lizkarkoski
        Staff

        I don’t see the reported issue on my computer.

        Is it happening across more than one browser?

        That theme is heavy on images so it won’t hurt to optimize those for loading speeds. https://en.support.wordpress.com/media/image-optimization/

        #3291043

        supernovia
        Staff

        Hi @davisforestschool, it’s unfortunately a well-known phenomenon. It’s called Flash of Unstyled Text, and it’s so common it’s got its own acronym. The text shows unstyled while the browser downloads a font.

        The only current fix I’m aware of is to not display any text on the site until the font is loaded. On a very slow connection, that could lead folks to believe your site doesn’t actually have any content, so while some systems do that by default, we do not since we think content is pretty important.

        There are ideas out there, but for now, if you have a CSS upgrade on your site, you can add lines to stop the text from displaying until it’s styled properly. If you don’t have a CSS upgrade, here are my recommendations to minimize the effect:

        – Use the default body font if you can
        – Use a logo for your site title and tagline (you can uncheck a box so they won’t show up twice on the site.)

        Hoping this helps :)

        #3291776

        counterweighttechno
        Member

        Even with a fast internet connection and up to date browser it’s visible, only for the blink of an eye, but it’s still there and it looks very unprofessional.
        My website that I made as a teenager 20 years ago looked like this and regarding my skill level that time it was quite acceptable.
        I don’t understand at all why WP is not taking care of this properly, we are paying for this, so we should at least have the option to activate font preloading.

        #3291862

        supernovia
        Staff

        Thanks for the feedback; I’ll file a feature request.

        For now, I recommend one of the options we listed earlier.

        #3291863

        supernovia
        Staff

        Oh, I did just notice you do have an upgrade that supports CSS. So, you can add this if you’d like:

        .wf-loading body {
visibility: hidden;
}

        That will prevent any flashes.

        #3291908

        davisforestschool
        Member

        Oh great, that does the trick! Thanks! I just wish this information was more readily available. Nothing like this came up when I searched the help documents. But thanks, I do appreciate it.

        #3291910

        davisforestschool
        Member

        I also want to add, now without the font changing in the beginning, the pages appear to load much faster than they did before. So it seems to me that the font change might have been slowing things down. Wouldn’t it just make more sense all around to have this way be the default, rather than showing up with the old font first?

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      New Theme: Twenty Nineteen

      Meet Twenty Nineteen, the brand new WordPress default theme.

      December 19, 2018

      Chris Runnells

      We’re pleased to announce that Twenty Nineteen — the new WordPress default theme designed by Allan Cole and Kjell Reigstad — is available to all WordPress.com sites.

      Twenty Nineteen was designed with simple but sophisticated typography and a pared-down, open aesthetic, making it a great foundation for a variety of websites. It also fully supports the new WordPress Editor, which allows you to create a wide range of content for your site.

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      47 Comments

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      1. JenT Dec 19th at 4:38 pm

        What a wonderful way to ring in the New Year! Thank you WordPress.com!

        Liked by 11 people

      2. Cerita Bahasa Dec 19th at 4:41 pm

        I love the simplicity, but could you please provide us with more font variations?

        Liked by 14 people

      3. Rita Dec 19th at 4:53 pm

        Will surely check soon.
        I am not comfortable with new editor in WordPress. In classic editor, changing text color, adding slideshow is way more easier.

        Liked by 23 people

        • Chris Runnells Dec 20th at 10:06 pm

          There is a Classic editor block so you can still have the simplicity of the original editor, while using the new features and functionality offered by the new blocks. A slideshow block is something we’re looking at adding in the future.

          Liked by 4 people

          • Rita Dec 21st at 12:28 am

            Thank you very much. Slideshow was a challenge to me in new editor. I searched on Google but was not able to understand it. So only difficultly faced in new editor were slideshow and changing color of few words to highlight it. Otherwise it is nice.

            Liked by 2 people

      4. Tamarack Mountain Studio Dec 19th at 5:17 pm

        Can this be used with Storefront?

        Liked by 6 people

        • Chris Runnells Dec 19th at 10:42 pm

          I’m not sure I fully understand your question: Storefront is a theme, just as Twenty Nineteen is a theme. As such, you can’t use two themes at the same time.

          However, if you’re asking if Twenty Nineteen will work with WooCommerce, then answer is yes! The WooCommerce team added support for Twenty Nineteen about a month ago.

          Liked by 6 people

      5. Chris David Miles Dec 19th at 7:08 pm

        I love the twenty nineteen theme! This is the first time one of the “twenty” themes has made me want to switch themes. Especially the menu, I’d like to see more sites get away from the flat sticky top style navigation menu that’s so common.

        Liked by 7 people

      6. Sven Seebeck Dec 19th at 7:24 pm

        Very nice! Noticed it already before the weekend. Fantastic theme. 👍🏻

        Liked by 7 people

        • cjreinhart Dec 19th at 9:59 pm

          I have a WordPress blog which I can’t manage very well. I feel totally incompetent with WordPress but would like to get better at it and use it more fruitfully.

          Will the changes which you are suggesting be implemented to everyone’s site, including mine? I welcome any improvements and can’t comment otherwise since I know so little as it is.

          Thank you Carolyn Reinhart

          ________________________________

          Liked by 6 people

          • Chris Runnells Dec 19th at 10:52 pm

            Hi Carolyn! WordPress can certainly be a challenge at times, but there are tons of resources out there to help you out. I highly recommend taking a look at our support site: https://en.support.wordpress.com/ especially the Start, Create, and Customize sections seen below the search box on that page.

            The new editor is currently available on all WordPress.com sites.

            Liked by 4 people

      7. Tebatjo Malaka Dec 19th at 7:53 pm

        It’s time to upgrade. 🤗

        Liked by 8 people

      8. Cikgu Ismail Omar Dec 19th at 8:18 pm

        Superb! Just in the nick of time.

        Liked by 9 people

      9. Samuel Dec 19th at 10:02 pm

        I didn’t like the theme! I think if we be able to design a custom front page for any of the wordpress themes, then the 2011 theme is the best among all these 282 themes.

        Liked by 12 people

        • Chris Runnells Dec 19th at 11:00 pm

          As you can imagine, making a theme that _everyone_ likes is impossible. But, you may be pleased to know that we updated the other default themes (including Twenty Eleven) to work with the new editor. Cheers!

          Liked by 7 people

          • Samuel Dec 19th at 11:46 pm

            thank you so much because of your response. yes it is really difficult. as I myself do coding and I am aware of it. and yes Gutenberg is great! but it need more and more tools to be armed enough to customize the front page of themes. by the way I really enjoy work with wordpress platform and I hope more and more success for the team.

            Liked by 6 people

      10. jeremyjameshongkong Dec 20th at 1:36 am

        All these themes are a bit of a mystery to me… If you simply blog and read other blogs on the mobile app… Then the themes don’t really change your experience right?

        Liked by 7 people

      11. Mai Hải Đăng Dec 20th at 1:56 am

        Your theme have a problem that really makes me sad yesterday. The mobile version have a problem with touching links while scrolling, when I scroll on my iPhone it just active Click Event when touch on links.

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      12. Greg Peterson Dec 20th at 3:28 am

        In Customizer > Colors I deselected color filters (unchecked the box beside “Apply a filter to featured images using the primary color”). That worked fine for the Home view: all featured images appear as-is (no filters) for my Post excerpts; however, when I select posts, color filters obscure my featured images. That looks like a bug. Otherwise, Twenty Nineteen looks great so far. Thanks!

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      13. Joshua Evan Dec 20th at 6:08 am

        Tried it a couple of days ago and while it was the closest I’ve got to a perfect theme (for me) it was lacking in the customisation options, particularly with fonts. I’ll give it a try again in the future to see if it gains some more customisation options.

        Liked by 4 people

      14. Nicolina Dec 20th at 8:42 am

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        Liked by 4 people

      15. Tebatjo Malaka Dec 20th at 9:12 am

        Is it me. But the theme works elegantly on computer and rather buggy on mobile. It takes you pages you’ve never clicked on mobile. I had to uninstall it.

        Liked by 5 people

      16. candacewithstyle Dec 20th at 9:59 am

        Is it free?

        Liked by 3 people

      17. Jessi's Story Dec 20th at 10:26 am

        Already convinced because you included such wonderful beings in the example as Taco, the good dog.

        Liked by 4 people

      18. Laura Bloomsbury Dec 20th at 11:04 am

        I personally do not like the theme as with so much of the Gutenberg blocks it is all too big and spacey -Gutenberg in general has too many bells and whistles at the expense of straightforward simplicity. I know many share my opinion but maybe new bloggers will adapt quicker

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      19. David Bennett Dec 20th at 11:22 am

        Thanks, Chris.

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      22. João de Mancelos Dec 21st at 7:45 am

        I simply love Twenty Nineteen! The option to hide the title page was something that previously could only be available if you had a plugin. An option to remove automatically the underline from links would be very much welcome! Good job!

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      23. danteawriter Dec 21st at 9:43 pm

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      24. Melody.com.ng Dec 21st at 9:57 pm

        I really don’t like the 3 WordPress default themes, they display full post content on homepage.

        Liked by 5 people

      25. ShankySalty Dec 23rd at 11:42 am

        Is it free????😕

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      26. Run.Lift.Breathe Dec 23rd at 7:46 pm

        It looks very interesting! While I’m very happy with the current themes used on my blogs, it’s always nice seeing new themes, and I’m sure this will be perfect for someone. 🙂 Great work!

        Liked by 4 people

      27. karyhma Dec 24th at 2:22 pm

        Love the new theme

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      #####EOF##### Ollie Whitehouse – 44CON

      Ollie Whitehouse

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      Ollie Whitehouse is a Technical Director with NCC Group and has a key and strategic role in guiding NCC Group’s technical direction and development. Until December 2011 Ollie was Manager for Security Research & Assessment at RIM (BlackBerry) in EMEA for four years. Over the past twelve years Ollie has worked for Recx, RIM, Symantec and @stake in a variety of consultancy, research and management roles.

      Ollie has presented at:

      • 44CON 2013 (workshop): Real World Application Threat Modelling by Example
      • 44CON 2012: Software Security Austerity – Software security debt in modern software development
      #####EOF##### Object 4202 – Russia Military Analysis

      Tag: Object 4202

      Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system

      Michael Kofman6 Comments

      I’ve recently put out an article on Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system in the well known Russian journal The New Times, under the title “ЧТО ВСЕ-ТАКИ ПУТИН ПОДАРИЛ РОССИЯНАМ НА НОВЫЙ ГОД,” but for those interested, please find the unedited English version below, which hopefully covers the subject in some depth.

      Earlier in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced at his annual address to the federal assembly that a Russian hypersonic boost-glide system, named Avangard, would start entering serial production. Subsequently on December 26th, 2018 Russian officials claimed that they had successfully conducted a test from the Dombarovsky missile site, to the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 3,760 miles away. Russia’s president proudly announced that the system as a wonderful ‘New Year’s gift’ to Russia. According to Putin’s statement, the hypersonic glide vehicle is able to conduct intensive maneuvers at speeds in excess of Mach 20, which would render it “invulnerable” to any existing or prospective missile defenses. In this article I will briefly explore the logic behind Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, recent claims of technological accomplishment, and the strategic implications of deploying such weapon systems.

      Despite rather questionable public statements about the technical characteristics of this weapon system, a number of which appear inconsistent, it is clear that Russian military science has made considerable advancements along one of the most sophisticated axis of weapons research. While claims pertaining to the readiness of this system to enter serial production, and operational service, are probably exaggerated, the more important questions are conceptual. More than likely Russia will be able to deploy a hypersonic boost glide system in the 2020s, perhaps alongside other hypersonic weapons projects, but the promise of this technology was always at the tactical-operational level of war, not strategic. This was never considered a ‘game changer’ as a system for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. If anything, Russia has invested a substantial amount of money, and years of research, in overdoing its strengths. Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of ‘Russian national achievement’ for domestic audiences, it’s unclear if this weapon system truly answers Russia’s strategic challenges in the coming decades. The question is not whether it works, or when it will work, but does it even matter?

      Hypersonic boost glide weapons function by using a multi-stage ballistic missile as the boost phase, throwing a vehicle into near earth orbit, which then descends and begins gliding at hypersonic speeds along the edge of the atmosphere. As the vehicle descends back to earth, it pulls upwards, and begins skimming the atmosphere in a ‘glide’ phase, before diving downwards onto its target at the terminal phase. Russia has spent years developing this technology under a project referenced as Object 4202, which married a series of  experimental hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Yu-71, with a liquid fueled ICBM УР-100УНТТХ (NATO designation SS-19 mod 2 Stiletto). This system builds on the Soviet Union’s extensive research into hypersonic weapons programs , including work on a hypersonic-boost aircraft named «Спираль», a modified S-200V surface-to-air missile under the project name Холод, and hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as Kh-80 and Kh-90 GELA (гиперзвуковой экспериментальный летательный аппарат).

      kh-90 gela
      Kh-90 GELA
      kholod
      Kholod
      spiral
      Spiral

      Although claimed successes in testing may have come as a surprise in 2018, in truth Russian officials have been announcing tests of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle, using the УР-100УНТТХ missile, as far back as the strategic nuclear forces exercise in 2004. Hence, this particular system has been in publicly acknowledged development for at least 14 years, and the glide vehicle itself for quite a few years beforehand. The booster, УР-100 (SS-19), is a 105 ton liquid fueled silo-based missile, which together with the boost glide vehicle payload proved too long for a standard silo. Hence this system is being tested in a modified R-36M2 silo (SS-18 Satan), and although it is being developed with the УР-100, it is meant for the much heavier liquid fueled missile currently in testing, RS-28 Sarmat. While the question of boost method may seem a technicality, the boosting mechanism is actually quite deterministic of the strategic role this weapon can play, as I will discuss a bit later in this article.

      However, the principal challenges with this system have little to do with the decades established technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or boosting objects into near earth orbit. Hypersonic boost glide vehicles, if successful, represent a major breakthrough in material sciences, as the object must be able to withstand incredibly high temperatures with the payload and guidance system intact. Although impossible to verify, Russian announcements can often be categorized as ‘true lies,’ impressive sounding figures that have some factual basis, but are inevitably inaccurate. The proposition that the vehicle can reach mach 27 is likely true only during the brief return phase, when it is falling back to earth like a rock from near earth orbit, prior to beginning its hypersonic glide at the edges of the atmosphere. The vehicle itself will have considerably different speeds during the pull-up, glide, and dive to target phase, while having to endure incredible temperatures.

      Below are a few graphical illustrations available on the web

      explainer 1explainer 2explainer 3

      In U.S. testing of an analogous system in 2011, Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2), the vehicle was able to sustain glide at mach 20 speeds for three minutes, enduring a temperature of 3500 Fahrenheit. These figures track with Russian statements on temperatures experienced, but the actual speeds and altitudes at which the Russian vehicle is able to glide, and whether the systems actually survive this experience, remain a mystery. Although Russia’s defense sector seems to have made progress on this weapon system, claims that it is ready for serial production, or operational deployment in the near future, should be treated with educated skepticism. Ironically, the most significant potential breakthrough is in material sciences, not in building a seemingly scary strategic weapon.

      Yet the rationale for Avangard seems less than straightforward when compared to other Russian hypersonic weapons programs, including the Tsirkon 3M22 scramjet hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic missile. Those are operational depth systems able to deliver meaningful conventional or nuclear payloads to shape the military balance in a theater of military operations. They can offset U.S. conventional superiority, and pose genuine challenges in conventional warfare. What does Avangard do for Russia that existing silo-based, road-mobile, air-launched, and submarine launched missiles cannot?

      supposed image of the vehicle (draped on the right)

      The Avangard system is best seen as one element in an expensive Russian strategy to develop technological hedges for a security environment perhaps 20-30 years from now where the United States might deploy a cost effective missile defense system, making a percentage of Russia’s nuclear deterrent vulnerable to interception. To be clear, there is no missile defense system now, or on the horizon, able to intercept Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Modern ICBMs can come with multiple reentry vehicles and numerous penetration aids or false targets, creating a complex ‘threat cloud’ that would make interception an improbable business. Nonetheless, ever since the Bush administration chose in 2002 to exit the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russian leadership has been concerned that the United States could eventually devalue the deterrence provided by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

      Russia’s General Staff worries that a vast arsenal of long range conventional cruise missiles, paired with a semi-viable missile defense, would pose major challenges for their calculations to ensure the ability of Russian nuclear forces to deliver ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tailored’ damage in the coming decades. The 1972 ABM Treaty was not just a cornerstone of Cold War arms control, but fundamental to Russian military thinking on strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability at the strategic level. Ever since June 1941, Soviet, and subsequently Russian, military thought has been wracked by the possibility of a disarming first strike, and the need to position Russian forces along a strategy of ‘counter-surprise.’

      However, unlike other expensive strategic projects, such as the Poseidon nuclear powered torpedo, Avangard does not contribute to a survivable second strike. Thus there are a few ways to interpret the actual purpose of this weapon. The first is as a retaliatory-meeting strike system to attack high-value targets, i.e. civilian targets with political or economic significance, which will provide some insurance for a counter value strike. The second is that it is a first strike weapon against hard to penetrate targets. Since Avangard is silo based, designed for heavier liquid fueled ICBMs, in the event of strategic attack the boosting missile would not be survivable. It must be fired either first, or in a “launch under attack” scenario, when Russia has confirmed a U.S. launch, but the missiles have not yet impacted.

      Avangard may be designed to give Russia’s RVSN the ability to penetrate hard targets, getting around missile defenses, and leveraging greater accuracy to take out well-hardened facilities. That said, from a nuclear warfighting standpoint, this makes Avangard a somewhat specialized, but expensive strategic nuclear weapon. Given how few of these systems Russia is likely to be able to afford, the weapon may offer some targeting advantages, but at a high price relative to the benefits. Another possibility is that this is not a system to get around future missile defenses, but a first strike system to be used specifically against missile defenses, clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even if more accurate and survivable in flight, Avangard is a questionable investment when compared to the numerous road-mobile ICBM systems Russia fields today, including Topol-M and Rs-24 Yars (but then the logic for Russia’s SSBN program is also somewhat circumspect).

      This slideshow requires JavaScript.

      Perhaps in the future, Avangard will be deployed on a road-mobile launcher, but as conceived, this system adds little to Russia’s existing large strategic nuclear arsenal. An expensive insurance policy that in no way alters the strategic nuclear balance either today or tomorrow, which is why the reaction in Washington has been so muted. If anything, the United States should thank Russia for investing money in such super weapons, instead of buying large quantities of conventional precision guided munitions.

      Moscow has sought to leverage Avangard and similar novel systems to sell the notion of a qualitative arms race to Washington, D.C., hoping to establish a bilateral agenda for summits. Yet while the world is genuinely witnessing a renewed period of nuclear modernization, with qualitatively new or novel weapon systems in development, there is no arms race in progress. The major nuclear powers of today are pursuing distinctly divergent strategies, concepts, and requirements behind their nuclear weapons programs, rather than racing which each other for superiority. This is why Avangard, if completed and deployed, is unlikely to alter strategic military balance or elicit any meaningful response from Washington, D.C.

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      #####EOF##### Kuznetsov – Russia Military Analysis

      Tag: Kuznetsov

      Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

      Michael Kofman3 Comments

      On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

      Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

      PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

      PD-50 sinking.jpg

      Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

      PD-50 on a good day

      PD-50 dry dock

      According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

      Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

      Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

      That looks like it may be the crane

      Crane.jpg

      A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

      Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

      Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

      As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

      This is PD-50 now

      PD-50 gone

      The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

      Russian Navy Part 4: Naval Aviation Taking Flight Again…Slowly

      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

      This if the fourth and final installment of my article series with Norman Polmar, the last issue focuses on Russian naval aviation.

      Naval aviation is perhaps the component of the Russian Navy most frequently ignored and difficult to analyze. The air group aboard Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, which recently conducted combat sorties over Syria, is only a small part of the country’s overall naval aviation force. While the carrier’s deployment to the eastern Mediterranean in late 2016 made world-wide headlines, the rest of Russian naval aviation is undergoing a revival.

      Russian carrier aviation currently is based on a single ship, the Admiral Kuznetsov. When she sailed from the Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean last fall with several major surface combatants in company, the carrier’s air group consisted of: ten Su-33 Flanker- D’s, five newer MiG-29 Fulcrums, and an assortment of Ka-27 Helix antisubmarine helicopters and Ka-31 Helix airborne early warning helicopters. Several of the new naval variants of the Ka-52K Katran attack helicopters also were on board the carrier during operations off Syria. The Su-33 Flanker-D is primarily an air superiority, all-weather fighter, capable of carrying a variety of unguided bombs. The MiG-29K multirole fighter, meant to be the Su-33’s replacement, carries laser and electro-optical-guided precision munitions.

      The Admiral Kuznetsov’s combat debut off Syria in November went relatively poorly. The ship has a notoriously faulty pressure-fired boiler system and is underpowered, belching black smoke as she sails. As a consequence of her limited top speed and ski-jump design, aircraft takeoff weights were constrained. The carrier air group’s greatest limitation, however, is not technical but human. Russia reportedly has more planes than carrier-qualified pilots. Early in operations off Syria, a MiG-29K reportedly suffered an engine problem, lost power, and crashed into the sea. The pilot survived. Three weeks later a Su-33 broke an arresting cable on landing and rolled off the deck for a second aircraft loss. The air group subsequently transferred to the Russian air base in Syria. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that more than 400 sorties were flown from the carrier while off Syria, more realistic estimates place the number closer to 150.

      The Admiral Kuznetsov’s main role has always been “status projection” or political presence rather than power projection. Russia retained the ship and sustained a nascent carrier aviation component for the appearance of being a major naval power. The aircraft carrier, with embarked fixed-wing fighter/attack aircraft, is a type of capital ship that few countries possess, conferring a degree of prestige on any nation able to send one to sea.

      Kuznetsov on its Syrian deployment

      3620644_original

      After her Mediterranean deployment, the Admiral Kuznetsov entered a multiyear overhaul and modernization at the massive Sevmash shipyard at Severodvinsk in northern Russia. While in the yard, the carrier will receive a modernization package, focusing on the flight deck, arresting gear and air craft handling components of the ship. Speculation remains on whether or not more serious problems will be addressed such as the ship’s notoriously troublesome propulsion.

      The Russian government periodically announces plans for new carrier construction. Beginning in 1967, when the missile cruiser-helicopter carrier Moskva joined the fleet, the Nikolayev shipyard on the Black Sea produced a second ship of that type, followed by four vertical/short take-off and landing carriers of the Kiev class, and then two “conventional” aircraft carriers of the Riga class, one of which is the Admiral

      Kuznetsov. Although only one of those eight ships today remains under the Russian flag, a Kiev-class carrier now serves as India’s Vikramaditya, and the Admiral Kuznetsov’s sister ship serves as the Chinese Liaoning. Any future Russian carrier construction is expected to take place at the Sevmash yard in northern Russia, as Nikolayev is now in Ukraine.

      The real “teeth” of Russian naval aviation are land-based aircraft, and this is where interesting changes are in progress. Each of the four Russian fleets has a dozen or more Su-24 Fencers—variable-swept-wing attack aircraft intended for the maritime strike role and capable of carrying Kh-31 and Kh-35 air-to surface missiles. These workhorses are being replaced by a new generation of strike aircraft: the Su-30SM, a heavy, multirole fighter attack aircraft, reportedly with a six-ton payload. Already in service with the Black Sea Fleet, the aircraft began to be delivered to the Baltic and Northern Fleets in late 2016. These planes will likely be configured to carry the air launched versions of the advanced SSN-26 anti-ship missile as well as older anti-ship missiles now in service, offering substantial advancement over previous strike aircraft.

      The Su-34 Fullback will also take part in the naval strike role. Derived from the Su-27 Flanker airframe, it is a capable, long-range aircraft, perhaps better classified as a medium bomber.

      Russia’s principal aircraft in the strike role are the 60 or more Soviet-era Tu-22 Backfire medium bombers. During tumultuous military reforms in 2009, the Russian General Staff transferred the Tu-22 Backfires from the Navy—where they probably were not being well maintained—to the Long-Range Aviation (LRA) component of the Air Force. They remain under LRA control although still are assigned the anti-ship maritime strike role. They carry the infamous truck-size Kh-22 (NATO AS-4 Kitchen) missile and its upgraded variant, the Kh-32. Backfire bombers carried out combat missions over Syria in 2015 and 2016,dropping unguided bombs, a secondary role for which they were not well suited, but one that nonetheless shows there is still a functioning LRA component in the Russian air arsenal.

      Tu-22 with Kh-22 missiles

      tu-22-backfire-c

      In addition to strike aircraft, Russia retains several large Tu-142 Bear-F long-range, antisubmarine aircraft, derived from the venerable Tu-95 Bear platform. The Tu-142s are undergoing modernization, as only a few remain operational in the fleets. They occasionally have been spotted over Syrian coastal waters. Similarly, Il-38 May maritime patrol and submarine hunting aircraft are being upgraded to the    Il-38N configuration with the Novella system, a high-resolution radar, and other new equipment. The Mays are being prioritized for the Pacific Fleet along with the updated Tu-142s. From ships, the antisubmarine role is conducted by Ka-27 Helix helicopters carried on Russian cruisers and destroyers that remain operational, along with newer frigates designed to replace them.

      It is difficult to discuss Russian naval aviation without mentioning the saga of Russia’s 2010 deal with France to buy two large, Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. These would have been highly capable, multirole ships for the Russian Navy, modified for larger Ka-27 and Ka-52K helicopters. The deal was scuttled in 2014 following the Russian annexation of Crimea, which resulted in Western sanctions and a political climate that made going forward with the deal impossible for France. After more than a year of discussions, Russia and France amicably parted ways, with the ships being sold to a mutually acceptable third party—Egypt—with funds provided by Saudi Arabia. Moscow made out like a proverbial bandit, recouping its initial deposit of 800 million Euros and doubling its money in rubles when converting at the 2015 exchange rates. Meanwhile Russian funds invested in developing the Ka-52K also were recovered because Egypt bought the Russian helicopters separately for its new ships.

      One element of Russian naval aviation often overlooked by Western analysts is its non-strategic nuclear arsenal. Post-Soviet Russia inherited some 20,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. While that number has been reduced by more than 75 percent, according to Russian statements, it still leaves a notable number of tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of the Russian Navy and Air Force.

      Overall, Russian naval aviation might be a small force, but it too is benefiting from a bow wave of modernization across the Russian military. Though mainly shore based, it retains viable capabilities for conventional and nuclear combat.

      Reprinted with permission from the U.S. Naval Institute. Copyright U.S. Naval Institute.

      The Russian Navy’s Great Mediterranean Show of Force

      Michael Kofman1 Comment

      My latest on the Russian flotilla sailing to the Eastern Med in The National Interest.  A more technical brief to follow in next post.

      News has been rippling across Western media of a Russian naval squadron headed by the country’s only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, slowly making its way towards Syria.  Originally announced on July 11th, the combat tour to Syria has been long in the works, together with a host of other Russian naval activities unfolding simultaneously this month.  The Russian squadron has been lurching along at a steady pace as part of a tour de force around NATO countries and towards the Eastern Mediterranean.  At the time of this writing, the ships were passing through the English Channel. While the military objectives of this mission are not entirely insignificant, Russia’s chief purpose is status projection, leveraging its navy to demonstrate that it is a great power.

      The squadron will first irk Russia’s already apprehensive Western neighbors and then make its presence felt in the Middle East.  Yet this latest bit of political theater and military showmanship is not without risk.  Kuznetsov’s fortunes will determine whether this becomes a demonstration of Russia’s power projection, or an unintended embarrassment, leaving the impression that Moscow is only imitating great power status.  The carrier is notoriously unreliable, while many of its fellow ships are also Soviet inheritances—capable but aging.

      Russia seeks to intimate that it is one of the few countries able to project military power to distant shores and present the image of having some parity with the United States.  Both images will play well with a domestic audience.  Behind the scenes, a two year battle over the future of the State Armament Program is also unfolding in Moscow, with military services fighting over a defense procurement budget on the ebb.  Despite being a vast Eurasian land power, Russian leaders going back to Peter the Great have a history of lavishing disproportionate attention to the navy, believing that in the international system one must be able to show prowess on the high seas to be recognized as one of the great players in the system.

      Vladimir Putin has not deviated from this traditional mindset, only exemplified it.  He has at times quoted Alexander III’s famous line that Russia has only two dependable allies: “its army and its navy.”  A commentary on geopolitics more so than military matters, but it still holds true to this day.  Russia’s navy has taken on considerable risk in a bid to convey to national leadership that it is an invaluable instrument for global status ambitions and national inspiration.

      Though often a point of fixation, the Russian carrier Kuznetsov—or perhaps more accurately the originally Soviet-built ‘heavy aviation cruiser’—is also accompanied by the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great. This flagship of the Russian Navy packs an arsenal of anti-ship missiles, air defenses and combat capabilities worthy of its prominent name.  Kuznetsov’s mission is in part to make a combat debut in Syria, having sailed several times to the region, but never having fought.  This is a public relations mission at heart, but also an important training event for Russia’s tiny naval aviation component.

      The military aspects of the operation should not be overlooked.  Russia’s carrier is often disparaged as a floating lemon, and such criticisms are fair, but the West has an unhealthy track record of underestimating Russian military capabilities for the sake of disparaging them.  Unlike previous tours, which were largely for show, this time the ship will likely conduct combat operations, and it’s not traveling alone either.

      The Kuznetsov set sail on October 15th from Severomorsk for the Syrian coast together with Peter the Great, two Udaloy-class destroyers, a tanker ship and a large tugboat.  Little noticed is that on the same day a squadron from Russia’s Pacific Fleet departed Vladivostok on the other side of the world.  The second grouping consists of two destroyers (Udaloy and Sovremenny class), together with a large tanker and tug, headed for the Indian Ocean.  It’s possible that this task force may choose to rally with the Kuznetsov in the Eastern Mediterranean, or perhaps standby on call in nearby waters.

      A host of other naval movements are playing out simultaneously.  One of Russia’s newly completed Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates is transferring from the Baltic to the Black Sea Fleet, and may join the group off Syria to fire land attack cruise missiles.  It’s possible one of the Northern Fleet’s nuclear-powered submarines has joined this tour as well.  The Russian Navy’s comparative strength, its submarine force, is unlikely to have been left completely without a role in this affair.

      Two large corvettes from the Baltic Fleet have ventured out of port, either to escort the carrier or join it for exercises on its voyage south.  Already on October 18th, the carrier began flight-training operations in the Norwegian Sea, shadowed by the British and Norwegian militaries.  Traveling slowly, the Russian Navy will probably make several exercise stops as a pointed show of force to NATO along the way.  Although planned well in advance, the first part of this tour will undoubtedly answer some of the ‘deterrence messaging’ by the United States 6th Fleet and NATO ships routinely visiting the Baltic and Black Sea.

      More at TNI.

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      #####EOF##### Special Forces – Russia Military Analysis

      Tag: Special Forces

      Russian Special Forces

      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

      Below is a Q&A I did with the Cipher Brief that outlines much of what we know about the Russian special operations community.  The rest is on their website. 

      The Cipher Brief: How are Russian special operations organized within the military?

      Michael Kofman: The best way to parse through a myriad of Russian special designation units is to break them into three categories: elite infantry primarily for reconnaissance in ground, airborne, and naval services (Spetsnaz GRU), special purpose units belonging to intelligence agencies (Alpha and Vympel), and the Special Operations Command (SSO or KSSO). The last one is of particular note as a recent development and arguably the most interesting of all, since it represents a Russian special forces capability that featured prominently in Crimea and Syria.

      Spetsnaz GRU are sometimes shorthanded as Russian special operations forces, but this is a common misnomer. Spetsnaz are elite infantry intended to support conventional unit formations. These units consist of eight Spetsnaz brigades, one Spetsnaz regiment (25th), four naval infantry Spetz units, and the 45th VDV (Airborne) brigade with a total complement of 9,000-10,500.  Currently the Russian armed forces are integrating Spetsnaz units into brigades and divisions, adding a company to each reconnaissance battalion. These units are almost invariably under the purview of the main intelligence directorate for Russia’s General Staff, the GRU.

      Meanwhile the FSB, Russia’s domestic intelligence service, fields two specialized units for counterterrorism and defending strategic infrastructure at home, named Alpha and Vympel respectively. Less mentioned is the FSB’s Directorate S (Smerch), a special reconnaissance outfit founded on the basis of the FSB’s economic counter-intelligence unit, and likely larger than Alpha or Vympel.

      The rest of the discussion focuses on KSSO.

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      The Durability of Russian Military Power: Moscow’s Prospects for Sustaining Direct Competition

      Michael Kofman6 Comments

      My issue brief as part a series run by the Changing Character of War Centre at Oxford, assessing the durability of Russian military power. I recommend their centre’s website for some great Russia mil analysis. This briefing in particular focuses on manpower, materiel, and funding. I tackle the issue of whether Russia is able to sustain a competition with the United States, and the extent to which it will be able to sustain the military as an effective instrument of national power despite the many problems the country faces. I’ve found that some of the discourse on this subject, particularly with respect to manpower/demographics, could be better informed by data, and merits a closer look.

       

      Political analysis in the West retains a strong bias towards measuring state influence and status according to economic foundations of power, yet Russia has demonstrated that military power remains an important instrument in international politics. Having enacted a period of military reform 2008-2012 and financed a sustained program of modernization, Russian foreign policy is increasingly underwritten either by the use of force, or threat of force, as part and parcel of coercive diplomacy. Though much attention is drawn today to indirect competition, it is Russia’s successful resurrection of military power which enables the country to ‘bench press’ above its weight in the international arena. Indeed, indirect competition is often messy, indecisive, and ineffectual without the weight of conventional military power supporting it.

      While observers are cognizant of the resurrection of Russian military power, there remains, however, a considerable debate as to its durability. Simply put, many believe that demographic, economic and industrial trends are against Russia – the country will not be able to sustain this level of direct competition. Yet there is little to suggest, looking ten years out and even beyond, that Russia will suffer from those severe shortages of either manpower, money or materiel which would reduce Russia’s ability to underwrite its foreign policy. On the contrary, Russian demographic trends reflect only an increasing availability of manpower for the growing force, a sustainable defence budget in terms of spending, and a modernization program that will suffice to arm the force well into the 2020s. It can go on, and it will.

      Much of the conversation on Russian demographics is simply ill informed. A decline of birth rates throughout the 1990s lasted until 1999. Russia suffered through a decade of declining health standards, fertility, falling birth rates, and emigration. Despite the decline in numbers of 18 year olds available for service, Russian armed forces expanded from perhaps around 700,000 in 2011 to over 900,000 in 2017. The contract share of the force swelled to as much as 380,000, or more than 50% of the enlisted force. Russian birth rates increased year on year from 2000 until 2015. This means that men born in 2000 will be of service age this year, 2018, and the pool of men aged 18-27 should increase every year from now until 2032.

      Russia’s birth rate – World Bank

      world-bank-rf-birthrates.jpg

      Birth rates are hardly the only indicator responsible for growing manpower availability in Russia. The draft board, Voenkomat, has also helped clean up corruption in the number of health exclusions granted to those seeking to dodge service. In the past, many Russians would spontaneously become unhealthy upon turning 18. But with health exclusions revised, and the rampant buying of disqualifications now attended to, the amount of those deemed unfit had declined to only about 23% in 2016 according to head of the General Staff’s Mobilization Directorate Colonel General Tonkoshkurov. Russia’s chief military prosecutor, Valery Petrov, stated more recently in 2018 that overall draft evasion is down by about 30% from the corrupt heydays of the past. Beyond reductions in draft dodging, increases in pay, growing public respect for the armed forces, and overall improving conditions in the military have all had a positive effect on recruitment. Starting in 2018, a change in the conscription law now offers draftees the option of one year conscript service or two years under contract with better terms.

      General demographics trends offer a complex picture of Russia’s future. Russian life expectancy actually reached a record high in 2017, and fertility rates are closing in on those in the United States, up from 1.157 in 1999 to 1.75 in 2016 (U.S. was at 1.8). Russia suffers from three principal problems in demographics: the demographic echo from the disastrous 1990s which will return to haunt Moscow in the mid-2030s, a declining workforce which is losing perhaps 600,000 per year in retirements, and the recent economic recession which slowed birth rates 2015-2017 (even despite generous state sponsored family programmes) which will have knock on effects years from now. Russia’s main problem is not so much the size of its population, but its productivity. Nevertheless, because Russia remains the primary labour market for the former Soviet Union, and is host to a large pool of immigrant labour, it does have answers readily available for the present decline in the labour force. Despite all these challenges, therefore, Russia’s current population is much healthier of late, with the longest lifespan witnessed, and manpower availability is likely to see sustained increases into the mid 2030s.

      Fertility rates comparison – World Bank

      Fertility rates WB
      A steady decline in US fertility rate meets a rise in Russian fertility rate prior to the econ crisis

      From a materiel standpoint, it is also difficult to observe looming shortages. The previous State Armament Program 2011-2020 was meant to jumpstart the defence industry, and effectively provided for a dramatic increase in the modernization rating of Russian equipment from 15% in 2010 to almost 60% in 2017 (according to official figures). That program’s achievements merit briefly recounting, as they include the acquisition of 418 aircraft for tactical aviation, 3 combat aviation brigades and 6 combat aviation regiments, 16 air defence regiments of S-400, more than 70 radars of various types for VKS Aerospace forces, 10 Iskander-M brigade sets, completion of Russia’s early warning radar network, 55 military satellites launched into orbit, 12 new regiments of Yars road-mobile ICBMs deployed, more than 3,000 modernized ground force vehicles, 3 new SSBNs and 2 new 4th generation SSGNs, together with diesel-electric submarines, corvettes, and auxiliary ships. This list includes upgrades in more specialized fields, including electronic warfare brigades and companies, new command and control systems to enable recon-strike and fires, together with more than 1800 drones acquired across services.

      The funds spent by 2017 doubtfully exceed 50-60% of the original 19 trillion RUB allocated. Thus the new state armament program 2018-2027, at another 19 trillion RUB, plus 1 trillion for infrastructure, and 3 trillion for other security services, represents a sustained investment. Albeit with reduced purchasing power, the new state armament program will focus on areas neglected, or perhaps ‘jump started’ by its predecessor. These include large-scale acquisition of precision guided munitions, long-range standoff cruise missiles, transport aviation, bomber modernization, expansion of artillery, armour, and missile formations in the ground forces, more capable drones, and next generation tech like hypersonic weapons.

      Even in Russia’s lagging industry, shipbuilding, one can see that core sectors of competence such as submarine construction remain capable of producing some of the most sophisticated platforms available. Russia currently has 11 nuclear powered submarines laid down, and is able to build a diesel-electric submarine in 18 months, with a division of 6 currently in production for the Pacific Fleet. Despite a messy divorce from Ukraine’s defence sector, the material is not only there to sustain Russian military modernization, but the production rates are more than sufficient even in troublesome sectors.

      In other areas, such as the ground forces, the conflict in Ukraine and Syria has illustrated that Russian ‘good enough’ is can deal with the country’s military requirements for the coming decade. Modernized Soviet platforms are able to beat any former Soviet republic on Russia’s borders. Possessing them at high readiness, and large numbers, means Russia can effectively impose its will on neighbours or coerce them in a crisis. If anything, most of the challenges faced by Moscow are self-imposed, such as the decision to expand the ground force structure so quickly that it will inherently suffer in readiness and mobility. The defence industry has shown itself capable of producing current generation technology such that Russia has a viable path towards conventional deterrence vis-a-vis the United States, meanwhile less advanced elements of the Russian military are more than suitable for compellence in local and regional conflicts.

      Assuming levels of economic growth at 1.5%, there is little to suggest that Russia cannot sustain this level of military expenditure, which will amount to no more than 4% of GDP. Meanwhile Russian spending on national defence will likely hover at around 2.8% of GDP, as the defence budget is only seeing modest cuts relative to other sections of the budget. The fact that oil prices are 50% above the $40 per barrel mark which the government used to underpin its budget expectations is yet another indicator that the economic outlook for defence spending is considerably better than usually appreciated. While the defence budget may still have fat to trim, coming off of historic highs in 2014, there is less urgency in spending on procurement after major gaps have been filled in 2011-2017, and the defence industry revitalized in the process. Adjusted for purchasing power parity, Russia remains just behind Germany as the second largest GDP in Europe. Although it is technically a middle income country, Russia’s raw GDP hides considerable purchasing power when it comes to defence spending and the ability to sustain its armed forces.

      On the basis of macro indicators such as manpower, materiel, and money, therefore, Russia is positioned to sustain its policies, even if this means a prolonged confrontation well into the 2020s, and perhaps 2030s. More importantly, Moscow’s ability to leverage military power as one of the more decisive instruments in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives should be clearly understood. Russia can retain the current degree of military activity, snap readiness tests, large strategic exercises, expeditionary operations in Syria, and a rotating presence in Ukraine. The challenges Russia faces are consequential, often resulting in cycles of stagnation and mobilization, but they are not deterministic, as has historically been the case for this particular power.

      The Collapsing Russian Defense Budget and Other Fairy Tales

      Michael Kofman6 Comments

      Posted today on Russia Matters, a project by Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.  Below is my latest piece in response to the headlines generated by SIRPI’s trends in military expenditure report alleging a 20% reduction in Russian military expenditure in 2017.

      One can only observe with bemusement the growth in size, readiness and modernization of Russia’s armed forces when juxtaposed against recent news stories reporting a 20-percent decline in Russian defense spending from 2016 to 2017, described as the first notable cut since 1998. It is seemingly impossible for both trends to be real. Indeed, Russian defense spending is alive and well, with cuts limited to single digits. The announcement about its steep decline by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, was erroneous. Changes in Russia’s handling of defense funding have led SIPRI and, before it, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly to misreport the reduction. Now, for the second time in as many years, the miscalculation is proliferating across major media outlets.

      The main source of the error is readily identifiable, arcane though it may be: In 2016 the Russian government started paying off defense-sector debt that had piled up over the years, which created the illusion of much higher spending on national defense and, accordingly, a subsequent decline the following year. Before this, the Defense Ministry (MoD) had managed to rack up close to a trillion rubles in debt to defense contractors, who had been producing equipment on credit borrowed from various banks. The MoD was paying the interest on these loans and the Russian leadership was none too happy about it. After the government decided to pay down the debt, the Finance Ministry provided 792 billion rubles for this purpose, a figure that seemed to boost 2016 defense spending from its actual 3.09 trillion rubles to 3.8 trillion. (Subsequently another 186 billion rubles was spent in 2017 on paying down debt, making the spending appear higher for that year as well.) According to the MoD, this measure saved 130 billion rubles in interest alone.

      Another change disrupting the continuity of Russian defense-spending data, adopted by the government in 2017, was to tighten up controls on funding left over in the hands of the defense sector when it was unable to deliver weapons on time. Prior to this, the defense industry was allowed to build up stockpiles of money advanced for armaments that had not been produced as scheduled. Furthermore, some defense enterprises were clever enough to collect interest on these large advances, which sat in their accounts. At the end of the year, about 250-300 billion rubles ended up trapped in this manner, and the MoD had a hard choice to make: either further finance incomplete orders, and therefore reward delinquency, or return the money to the government budget and potentially lose it. To solve the matter, the MoD will now pull unspent funding back to the government budget under the condition that it will be reissued, and roll over payments into the following year. This means that some portion of each year’s budget (perhaps 5 percent or so) will flow into the next year.

      In making its calculations SIPRI also converted the outsized budget figures from 2016 into U.S. dollars, which exacerbated the impression of a dramatic decline in defense spending in 2017. Measuring Russia’s defense budget in dollars is analytically unhelpful, since Russia’s defense sector doesn’t buy much of anything in dollars. Thus, the resulting figures are distorted by changes in currency exchange rates, and they are not adjusted for purchasing power parity. Ultimately, several percentage points in SIPRI’s alleged decline were likely due to currency devaluation, which is almost completely irrelevant to the matter in question.

      While we are in fact witnessing a steady decline of Russian defense spending as a percentage of GDP, defense cuts in absolute terms have been modest at best. Official spending on defense dropped by about 8 percent from 2016 to 2017, from 3.09 trillion rubles to 2.84 trillion, and the defense budget was only scheduled for cuts averaging 5-6 percent over the three-year period of 2017-2019. (The numbers in this article reflect official defense spending, not total military expenditure, which might include funding for other militarized services like the border guards and Interior Ministry troops, or military pensions, which could add another trillion rubles to the bottom line.) Actual reductions in military spending began in 2015, by about 5 percent. Economic factors certainly played a role—primarily Russia’s recession and the drop in oil prices—but perhaps more important were the geopolitical factors: loss of access to certain defense articles imported from the West and the messy divorce from Ukraine’s defense sector. Due to the war with Ukraine, Russia’s defense industry could not buy components from its long-time partner across the border; this, in turn, delayed production and left the Russian Defense Ministry with less materiel to buy, while the funds to pay for it sat in government coffers instead of getting spent.

      Russia’s defense expenditures are not a coherent data set and have become easy to get lost in given the changes that have taken place. Nonetheless, it is especially frustrating to see the narrative of “slashed military spending due to economic woes” resurface now, since the same miscalculation was made last year by Jane’s, which reported a 25-percent reduction in Russian defense spending from 2016 to 2017 based on Moscow’s advance announcement of planned expenditures. Jane’s later acknowledged the mistake and took down its original story, but by that time the sensational figure had already been reported widely in the news media.

      Although it is impossible to know in advance how much will be spent in 2018, it is already looking like this year’s anticipated 5 percent reduction is unlikely to materialize. Instead of the planned 2.768 trillion rubles, the Russian budget’s defense chapter has already been amended to 2.953, a 6.7-percent increase; this higher 2018 figure likely includes carryover payments for armament procurement in 2017. Hence defense spending in 2018 is unlikely to decline, but the Russian leadership still intends to see military expenditure reduced as a share of GDP. Planned spending on national defense was envisioned at 2.815 trillion for 2019 and 2.807 trillion for 2020—also hardly a steep cut, and current performance suggests actual numbers will prove higher.

      Moreover, despite a reduction in Russia’s purchasing power, the new state armament program for 2018-2027 is quite substantial for the defense sector, especially considering the amount of modernization and procurement of new equipment already accomplished under the previous one. The latest program allocates considerable resources for additional procurement. It is configured in a 19+1+3 formula, with 19 trillion rubles for the armed forces, 1 trillion in infrastructure spending and another 3 trillion for other security services, such as the National Guard. The previous program of 2011-2020 was valued at close to 19 trillion rubles (plus infrastructure investment), about half of which was spent by 2017, at a rate that might average 1.35 trillion per year.

      Thus, Russian defense spending and procurement is in for a sustained trim, but the reductions are fairly minor in comparison to the sensational headlines. Moscow has long declared its intentions to halt the growth in defense spending and reduce military expenditure as a share of GDP over time. Given the complexity of Russia’s defense budget, and a data set that lacks continuity, the best thing one can do is tread with care when it comes to pronouncements.

      Because budget work is kind of lackluster and doesn’t offer much in terms of photos, I’m attaching this picture of Ivan, our lead analyst of budget analytics and kibble.

      Ivan director of budget analytics and kibble

      The Russian Defense Budget and You

      Michael Kofman8 Comments

      IHS Janes’s story “Russia announces deepest budget cuts since 1990s” got a lot of attention this week, claiming the Russian defense budget will be reduced by $1 trillion rubles or 25%. It is also wrong and has a bombastic headline to boot.  Here is a concise assessment of Russia’s defense budget, the cuts, and the reasons.

      Bottom line, the Russian defense budget is going from 3.09 trillion RUB in 2016, to 2.84 trillion RUB in 2017, a reduction of ~7%, which about 1-2% harsher than announced in October of last year. The original estimate for the 2017-2019 budget plan was a 6% reduction over that period of defense spending. The cuts amount to about 250 billion RUB. Including planned cuts for the coming two years, the 3 year average is still a ~6% reduction.

      The Russian defense budget is undergoing a sequester to tamp down growth, but is not experiencing large scale cuts, especially relative to other federal departments who were dealt 10% reductions.

      The defense budget in 2016 was 3.09 trillion RUB. However, Russia had a problem with debt in the defense industrial complex. Manufacturers had been withdrawing commercial loans to cover the costs of production (i.e. they must have been producing on IOUs from the MoD), but this resulted in financing costs, and those costs were being carried over into the price of equipment being produced. This was no small issue, the interest rate + inflation resulted in some notable costs to the manufacturers, and financing this debt was having a waterfall effect on the state armament program.

      Eventually the ministry of finance had to pay them down, so in December 2016 they made a onetime payment of 700 billion RUB to clear this debt (though some sources average it up to 800 billion). Added to 3.09 budgeted, this brought the overall amount spent on national defense to ~3.9 trillion RUB in 2016. Statistically, that resulted in a spike of spending to 4.7% of GDP, but in reality an important chunk was this singular debt payment.

      The budget figures announced for 2017 reduce the budget by 7%, to 2.84 trillion. Janes did the following math, 3.9 trillion – 2.84 = 1 trillion RUB reduction or -25%.  To put it mildly, that is not the right interpretation of what is happening. The annual planned reduction is really just north of 200 billion RUB.

      The future planned reductions are much smaller at 3.2% in 2018, and 4.8% for 2019. This would amount to 3% and 2.8% of GDP respectively, and perhaps 17% of the government budget. Though the figures do not include other spending on national security. My understanding is that these were based on really low oil prices of 40/barrel as well.

      However, based on the past two years the defense budget is probably going to be reduced by less. 2015 saw only a 3.8% reduction, and 2016 a 5% reduction, relative to much louder announcements. Meaning, we should expect MoD to claw back some % points from Ministry of Finance planning. Here IHS Janes also seems to indicate that the 2017 defense budget is the first significant reduction after a period of extended growth, when in reality it is the 3rd straight year of budget reductions, and when everything is reconciled, the degree to which it is a reduction is debatable.

      We should note there is always inflation, which is a tax on everything, and it is steadily eating away at the budget. The real sequester is the inflation rate that the budget must absorb.

      I would add that by spending to reduce the defense sector’s debt, the MoD in reality has also reduced its procurement costs for the future so it’s unclear how the 7% reduction in the budget plays out relative to likely lower purchase prices since the budget is no longer forced to absorb financing costs for these debts. In conclusion, the Russian defense budget will remain very much alive, while the state armament program will continue to truck along with reduced expectations.

      NOTE: I edited this article from originally saying the 2015 budget was 3.07 tril to 3.09 tril – with minor adjustments that follow, but the conclusions remain.

      Because budget and spending figures are not that exciting, below I offer a photo of our chief budget analyst, my dog Ivan.

      Ivan

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      #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Akamai® – 44CON

      Akamai®

      akamaiAkamai® is a leading provider of cloud services for delivering, optimising and securing online content and business applications. At the core of the Company’s solutions is the Akamai Intelligent Platform™ providing extensive reach, coupled with first class reliability, security, visibility and expertise. Akamai enables enterprises to securely leverage the cloud, avoid data theft and downtime and protect from increasing frequency, scale and sophistication of Web attacks.

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      #####EOF##### BlackBerry – 44CON

      BlackBerry

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      BlackBerry is securing a connected world, delivering innovative solutions across the entire mobile ecosystem and beyond. We secure the world’s most sensitive data across all end points – from cars to smartphones – making the mobile-first enterprise vision a reality. Founded in 1984 and based in Waterloo, Ontario, BlackBerry operates offices in North America, Europe, Middle East and Africa, Asia Pacific and Latin America. The Company trades under the ticker symbols “BB” on the Toronto Stock Exchange and “BBRY” on the NASDAQ.

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      #####EOF##### Web Application Hacker’s Handbook – 44CON

      Web Application Hacker’s Handbook

      Presented By: MDSec (Marcus Pinto)
      The Web Application Hacker’s Handbook (WAHH) Series is the most deep and comprehensive general purpose guide to hacking web applications that is currently available. This course is a practical opportunity to take the skills and theory taught in the book to the next level, experimenting with all of the tools and techniques against numerous vulnerable web applications and labs, under the guidance of the book’s authors. The course also includes new material from the second edition of WAHH, bringing the course right up to date with the latest attacks.

      The 2 day course will take place on the 8th & 9th September 2015, before 44CON London 2015.

      Course Syllabus
      The course follows the contents of WAHH, with a strong focus on practical techniques:

      Overview of web application security (chapters 1-3)
      Mapping the application and its attack surface (chapter 4)
      Bypassing client-side controls (chapter 5)
      Attacking core security mechanisms: authentication, session handling, access controls (chapters 6-8)
      Using automation to enhance manual testing (chapter 13)
      Injecting code and other input-based attacks (chapters 9-10)
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      The course employs a range of demo applications and lab exercises, containing hundreds of different examples of web application vulnerabilities.

      Student Requirements
      Delegates should be able to meet the following:

      Familiarity using an intercepting proxy
      Understanding of basic concepts such as the HTTP protocol, session management, and basic HTML.
      Computers capable of running Burp Suite (www.portswigger.net). Note that attendees should have administrative access on these machines in order to set IP addresses, modify hosts files and install software.
      What to Bring
      A version of the JRE, capable of running Burp Suite.

      An Ethernet connection.

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      We strongly recommend a personal laptop – if your corporate laptop build is too restrictive this may affect your ability to participate in the course fully.

      About the Trainer
      Marcus Pinto is internationally recognised as a leader in the application and database security field, having spent the last nine years in Information Security both as a consultant and as an end user responsible for a global team securing over 200 build tracks and 50+ externally facing applications. He has delivered training to some of the most high-profile audiences, at 44CON, BlackHat, SyScan, and Hack in the Box. Privately he has run training for many technical audiences including CESG’s penetration testing team.

      Marcus also sat on the assessors panel providing input for the CREST Web Application Exam, the UK’s number one certification for application assessment.

      #####EOF##### Nettitude – 44CON

      Nettitude

      nettitude

      Nettitude is a cyber security and risk management consultancy that provides businesses and public sector organisations with governance, risk management and compliance services. Counting many of the FTSE 350 among its customers, Nettitude specialises in helping companies and organisations that can least afford to fall victim to a security breach due to the value of the data they hold, or the strict compliance regulations governing their industries. Established in 2003, Nettitude has offices in Warwickshire, UK and New York, USA, from which it serves customers worldwide. It is one of only a handful of companies to hold prestigious accreditations in information security testing including CREST, CESG CHECK and CESG CLAS, as well as the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). Nettitude’s specific services include penetration testing, PCI compliance, web application security testing and cyber incident response. For more information visit http://www.nettitude.co.uk/penetration-testing/

       

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      #####EOF##### VIP and the GDPR – Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP

      VIP and the GDPR

      Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (aka GDPR) is a new and far-reaching privacy regulation that took effect in May 2018.

      This page provides information about the law and our plans for implementing the GDPR’s important principles for WordPress VIP’s products and services, including WordPress.com and VIP Go. We are currently working to add features to enhance user choice and bring more transparency to our practices around the collection, storage, and use of your data.

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      #####EOF##### Gavin Ewan – 44CON

      Gavin Ewan

      default Twitter: @jacobyterebel
      Gavin Ewan has been Social Engineering his whole career.  Coming from a background of 12 years at the top as a Sales Manager and having spoken around Europe about Sales Psychology, he is now in the field of Information Security.  Gavin has taken his mastery of Sales Psychology and is now re-writing the Social Engineering rulebook with it.  He has delivered a well received talk on ‘A Salesman’s Guide to Social Engineering’ in Berlin and London.

      Gavin has presented at:

      • 44CON 2012: I’m the guy your CSO warned you about

       
      #####EOF##### WordPress.com
      #####EOF##### Vlad Ovtchinikov – 44CON

      Vlad Ovtchinikov

      default Twitter: @v1ad_o
      Website: sensepost.com
      Vlad is currently employed as a Security Analyst for SensePost. Amongst performing large-scale social engineering exercises against FTSE 100 clients, he is also a trainer for SensePost’s Hacking by Numbers offensive security courses.

      Vlad has presented at:
      #####EOF##### PD-50 – Russia Military Analysis

      Tag: PD-50

      Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

      Michael Kofman3 Comments

      On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

      Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

      PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

      PD-50 sinking.jpg

      Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

      PD-50 on a good day

      PD-50 dry dock

      According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

      Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

      Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

      That looks like it may be the crane

      Crane.jpg

      A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

      Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

      Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

      As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

      This is PD-50 now

      PD-50 gone

      The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

      Back to top
      #####EOF##### Dominic White – 44CON

      Dominic White

      D.White speaker pic Twitter: @singe
      Website: www.sensepost.com/blog
      Dominic is the CTO at SensePost, an informations security consultancy based in South Africa and the UK. Dominic has an MSc from Rhodes University and has been working in infosec for 10 years. Dominic tweets as @singe.

      Dominic has presented at:

      • 44CON 2016: Universal Serial aBUSe: Remote physical access attacks
      • 44CON 2014:  Manna from Heaven; Improving the state of wireless rogue AP attacks
      #####EOF##### Topic Tag: transfer blog to another username account | WordPress.com Forums

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      #####EOF##### Russian Doctrine – Russia Military Analysis

      Tag: Russian Doctrine

      A COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO RUSSIA’S USE OF FORCE: MEASURE TWICE, INVADE ONCE

      Michael Kofman3 Comments

      My latest article examining Russian use of force, published on War on the Rocks.

      —————————————————————–

      In the 20th century, the Soviet military’s penchant for area of effect artillery and armored firepower had earned it the reputation of a large hammer always in search of nails.  This popularized impression stuck with Russia long after the Soviet Union’s demise, but today’s Kremlin employs military power in a much more nuanced manner to pursue its objectives.  In recent conflicts, Russia has demonstrated a keen understanding of how to apply this instrument of national power to achieve desired political ends, doling out force in prescribed doses in the quest for decisive leverage.  Although Russian military power remains a blunt force instrument, the state wields it more like a rapier, demonstrating discretion and timing.

      In a previous article on the key pillars of Russian strategy, I argued that Moscow favors an emergent strategy based on “fail fast and fail cheap” approaches. The Russian military itself has a long way to go in terms of modernization, but conversely, America’s political leadership needs to reexamine how great powers, with far fewer resources, use the so-called “big stick” to get the job done.  The unipolar world order appears to be rapidly melting, while great powers are back on the agenda.  When it comes to use of force by peer rivals contesting America’s interests, it is only going to get harder from here on out.

      The United States may not wish to emulate Russian approaches, but American strategists should certainly study then.  Those who fail to learn from the experience of others must inevitably gain it at personal cost.  As Mark Twain  is said to have remarked, “The man who does not read has no advantage over the man who cannot read.”  To take another step along the journey of understanding Russian strategy, I explore how Russia changes facts on the ground, compels its adversaries, and achieves much of this on the cheap.  The goal is to examine Russian use of force and draw lessons for an era when American use of power must become judicious, timely, and better married to something that resembles political objectives.

      Read the rest here.

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      #####EOF##### Topic Tag: no recycling deleted blog URLs | WordPress.com Forums

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      #####EOF##### Microsoft – 44CON

      Microsoft

      msft_logoMicrosoft is proud to be a continuing sponsor of  44CON London 2015. We appreciate 44CON providing a unique forum in which security researchers from all over the world, IT Pros and industry luminaries can gather to share insights, knowledge and information to advance security research. Microsoft remains dedicated to software security and privacy and continues to collaborate with the community of people and technology organizations helping to protect customers and the broader ecosystem, Microsoft is also dedicated to software security and privacy.

      For many years we’ve fostered a culture of security within Microsoft that includes developing secure code, building strong relationships with industry researchers and partners, and providing guidance to help protect customers. We would like to thank all of the customers, partners and security researchers who have worked with us to advance the state of the art in security science. Only by working together with partners, researchers and the community can we all ensure the advancement and success of the technology industry.

      #####EOF##### Matt King – 44CON

      Matt King

       default

      Matt is a hardware security researcher at a large semiconductor company.

      Matt has presented at:
      #####EOF##### Gatekeeper of the Void's Profile | WordPress.com Forums

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        A beautiful poem on aging and and wisdom by Senator Murray Sinclair, former chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: As we grow old / the ground we walk on / rises up / so that, / as each of those few moments / left to us / pass by…
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      en WordPress.com Forums › Support

      fail to add instagram widget

      • Author
        Posts
      • #3291629

        yuirislee
        Member

        I follow the instruction to add instagram widget in footbar but it failed…(i do log into my IG on another tab first)

        The blog I need help with is yuhsuanirislee.home.blog.

        #3291654

        neelgajjar
        Member

        Hi there,

        First Open a new tab > Login into your Instagram account.
        Then visit > My Site > Customize > Widget > Footer Sidebar > Add Instagram >
        Now Click on Publish > Now Click on Authorize Instagram Access > And then Page should reload.

        Please try these steps.

        Hope this helps! Let me know if you have any questions.
        Thanks!

        #3291663

        yuirislee
        Member

        Hello Neelgajjar,

        After I done this, it shows

        {“error_type”: “OAuthException”, “code”: 400, “error_message”: “There was an error with your request. Please try again.”}

        Do not know why it fail to authorize…

        #3291668

        neelgajjar
        Member

        I have added “modlook” tag for the staff assistance. You will get a reply soon from the staff

        #3291737

        supernovia
        Staff

        Hi @yuirislee, can you try these steps?

        From Chrome,

        1 – Open instagram in a tab. Log in. :)

        2 – Go to My Site > Customize > Widgets. Add an instagram widget.

        3 – Click publish *before* trying to click Authorize

        4 – Click Authorize

        If that does not work, let us know and we’ll offer another option. Cheers :)

        #3291785

        yuirislee
        Member

        Hello,

        Thank you for your suggestions. I tried it several times and it failed…
        got the same error message again..

        #3291864

        supernovia
        Staff

        Please check https://www.instagram.com/accounts/manage_access/ — do you see WordPress.com listed there?

        #3291907

        yuirislee
        Member

        No, it does not list here. I am not able to add Instagram as a widget on my page.

        I followed the instructions you provided but it does not work…

        What should I do next?

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      #####EOF##### Russia Military Analysis – Page 2 – A blog on the Russian military

      Vostok 2018 – Day 2 (September 12)

      Michael Kofman3 Comments

      Day two is here, and I’m a bit behind in posting. Usually I get to these the night of. Photo-ops have begun, and there will be a large review of forces ala Zapad-1981 style, which I hope to cover later tonight. However, September 12 is still the preparatory phase. Special thanks for colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped me put some of this together.

      So far logistics and VDV seems to have the most interesting roles. The VDV commander is clearly making changes and experimenting with a few items in this exercise. Air defense and aerospace attack are taking place early, as are live fire launches for the navy. Much of the action seems to be planned for Tsygol, but Telemba range is seeing a lot of early activity.

      Shoigu and Fenghe – Minister of Defense Shoigu and his Chinese counterpart visited the command point setup by 29th CAA from the Eastern MD, together with the one setup by the PLA. Supposedly Wei Fenghe complimented the Russian side, stating that the Chinese field command point was simple whereas the Russian one was more solid in nature. Shoigu in turn remarked that much of this comes from Russian combat experience in recent conflicts, and they’ve also leveraged the integration provided by the national defense management center.

      Shoigu remarked that they’ve had several operations where the General Staff were able to directly control events in real time, and they’ve made great strides in C2 when it comes to controlling forces in a theater of military operations (TVD). The claim being that much of what is taking place in Tsygol can be controlled directly by the GS via the center in Moscow. No less interesting in this exchange is Fenghe’s supposed comment on the importance of Russian-Chinese military cooperation at the operational and strategic level. Shoigu then stated that they’ve agreed to hold exercises  of this sort regularly from now on.

      beginning of a beautiful friendship.

      VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-95MS took off from an air base in Eastern MD, launched cruise missiles from an altitude over 5000 meters at the range in Telemba (2000km away). Air cover was provided by Su-35s, and in-flight refueling by Il-78 (at that range Tu-95MS doesn’t need it so probably practice for strategic mission).

      ty95MC.png

      VDV Airborne – Cadets at Ryazan airborne school practiced loading different types of equipment onto Il-76MD aircraft as part of the strategic maneuvers. Serduykov seems to have included cadets and those in officer school in this exercise, which is a new development. The idea being to give those in late stages of education practical experience. According to the press, about 6000 airborne troops and 900 pieces of equipment from three units (mentioned in a previous post as 3 independent air assault brigades), and two detachments, are participating in Vostok. On Sept. 11 I saw discussion of three battalions being sent in total, one from each of these brigades, together with a separate comms detachment.

      VDV praciting loading.JPG

      At Tsygol, units from Ulyanovsk VDV air assault brigade will practice three different types of simultaneous assault, low altitude parachute, standard air assault, and assault without parachutes – repelling from helicopters (100-150m). They claim to be using as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters at the same time in this simulated attack, with two Mi-26 (that will carry quite a few VDV if true), gunship support provided by 8x Ka-52s and 14x Mi-24s. Supposedly Mi-26 helicopters will be used to transport VDV Tigr vehicles, recon ATVs, and in ‘airborne-transport’ configuration can carry about 82 soldiers.

      VDV drilling.JPG

      Eastern MD – At Telemeba air defense units from both VKS, and ground formations belonging to the Eastern and Central MD practiced air defense against massed aerospace attack, units employed include S-400, S-300, Buk, Tor, and Pantsir-S1. About 500 pieces of equipment and more than 1000 servicemen listed for this one.

      Engineer and sapper units – busy setting up pontoon bridges, river crossings, and practicing demining with UR-77 Meteorit, and BMP-3M demining variants. Meanwhile in Zabaikal, CBRN units from Central MD were working to cover air fields with smoke and aerosol to hide them from visual, infrared, and radar based detection. They used TDA-3 smoke/aerosol machines, which create cover at about 15 meters, covering 7 hectares worth of terrain.

      Engineers.JPG

      River crossing.jpg

      Electronic warfare – Russian forces plan to use the latest generation EW and drone systems during the exercise, including Silok-01, Zhitel (the second one is quite old actually). Their objective is to defend against drone attack. Silok in particular is advertised as a system for detecting drones, while Zhitel can jamm their sensors. Supposedly both have been tested in Syria.

      Russian Military Police used horses to patrol the area, and defend it from enemy reconnaissance units. Presumably they’re able to move much quieter  on horseback and sneak up on would be ‘diversionary-recon groups’

      Central MD – Tactical aviation from CMD rebased to Krasnoyarsk and Perm regions, the exercise simulates them launching on alert to avoid incoming aerospace attack at their air bases and shifting to forward air fields. Mig-31BMs setup a combat air patrol, launching ‘under fire’ and practiced taking out incoming cruise missiles.  Missile brigade units from 41st CAA in Sverdlovsk have moved via rail to Astrakhan, and will be firing Iskander-Ms as part of the exercise. Apparently they’ve already conducted simulated electronic launches in preparation – planned firing range is several hundred kilometers, i.e in that operational-tactical 300-500km range.

      Pacific Fleet – About 15 small anti-submarine ships, together Il-38 naval aviation and Ka-27PL helicopters conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise. Meanwhile 10 minesweeper ships practiced finding and destroying mines with contact and non-contact means. A surface action group consisting of one Sovremenny destroyer (Bystruiy) and two small missile boats launched three Moskit anti-ship missiles (looks like the destroyer did the firing) against a surface target at about 100km range.

      Moskit fire

      Northern Fleet -Seems to be busy navigating the ice on its way down to meet the Pacific Fleet. Kulakov’s small surface action group was on its way to Kamchatka, with ice breakers in the lead.

      nf4.PNG

      Interesting photos from this day:

      Gerasimov thinking of the choices he made in life that led to this exciting moment, undoubtedly he is paralyzed by the historic moment of a new Sino-Russian entente forming.

      Gerasimovn thinking.jpg

      Later on, trying to explain something to angry looking Shoigu (this is not possible since Shoigu knows everything).

      still angry.JPG

       

      Vostok 2018 – Day 1 (September 11)

      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

      Vostok 2018 Day 1

      In Eastern MD: 5th, 29th, 35th, 35th combined arms armies (CAA) + 11th Air and Air Defense Army from EMD. In Central MD: 2nd and 41st CAAs + 14th Air and Air Defense Army. VDV and VKS are beginning to shift forces to their designated training ranges. In terms of logistics, they activated military and civilian elements of the transport network, including regional infrastructure belonging to the Ministry of Transport, other federal transportation agencies, trains, rail cars, rail beds, etc. 1,500 rail platforms, 50 transport air craft, and 60 or so various military units. The numbers sound incredibly round such that they’re probably ‘stylized’ but it paints a picture.

      This year there’s an emphasis on logistics, organizing forces and moving them large distances across Russia, which is sort of the major challenge in the Eastern/Central MD. Lots of distance, not a lot of infrastructure. Exercise announcements highlight efforts at jointness, having ground, naval and aerospace forces work together, along with combined arms maneuver. The picture I offer here is somewhat incomplete, as there are a few exercises taking place elsewhere, but here we will focus on what is being billed as part of Vostok 2018.

      Already there is interesting news of VDV experimenting with a new formation and air assault maneuver, whereas the Navy is practicing combined naval infantry and motor-rifle amphibious assault. A lot of information early on about setting integrated air defenses, high bandwidth comms networks, and various engineering preparations such as false targets.

      tanks

      Training range list:

      Combined arms ranges: «Цугол», «Бамбурово», «Радыгино», «Успеновский», «Бикинский»

      Air and Air Defense ranges: «Литовко», «Новосельское», «Телемба» и «Бухта Анна»,

      Maritime: Берингова и Охотского морей (seas), Авачинского и Кроноцкого заливов (gulfs off of Kamchatka).

      Airborne VDV – Not only are strategic maneuvers a deviation from the typical strategic command staff exercise, but there will also be some interesting force structure and combat maneuver experiments taking place. They plan to test an experimental VDV air assault formation during the exercise at Tsygol range, equipped with latest C2, and specialized equipment, to be used in some sort of air mobile assault variant. According to Col General A. Serduykov (head of VDV) this test will determine future tactics and overall development of VDV forces. Who is coming so far? One large battalion tactical group formation, composed of units from Ulan-Ude (11th), Ulyanovsk (31st), and Ussuriysk (83rd), and 38th independent VDV communications regiment. This is an interesting formation, if as reported, it consists of elements of three independent air-assault brigades.

      Mi-26 train

      Central MD – 2000 Motor riflemen are completing a march to Zabaikal with 500 pieces of equipment, including T-72B3, BMP-2, BM-21 Grad. They will be drilling at Tsygol, the range being used jointly with PLA units. A communications brigade from 2nd CAA Samara is also joining them, including 1000 troops and 300 pieces of equipment. More than 60 fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft are moving to Eastern MD as well, including Mi-26, Mi-24, and Mi-8AMTSH-V + about 30 fixed wing tactical aviation.

      Pantsir and targeting radar

      Eastern MD – They’ve setup an integrated air defense network, leveraging automated C2, and expect to test their ability to conduct air defense under jamming conditions. So far only mention of Pantsir-S1, S-300 and S-400 units. Communications units have setup more than 150 comm links, including a comm system running 2800km from Vladivostok to Anadyr, 3500km from Ulan-Ude to Petropavlovsk (9800000 sq  km total). Perhaps more interesting, they’ve setup a high bandwidth line running about 900km to connect other federal agencies/civil authorities to ensure closer coordination with the General Staff.

      Communications.JPG

      Combat service support (MTO) in Eastern MD – Lot’s of exciting statistics, 80 ammo and fuel dumps setup, 100 supply points, more than 2000 mechanics and specialists supporting training at Tsygol, etc. All in all, they claim that 36,000 MTO troops are involved in this exercise (seems inflated but then again what isn’t when it comes to Vostok).

      Engineers are busily setting up bouncy castles, otherwise known as the dreaded Russian ‘maskirovka.’ At every field range they will setup false targets, inflatable tanks, IFVs, air defenses, and fake Iskander units.

      Pacific Fleet – The Naval Infantry brigade based on Primorskiy Kray have moved to loading points, embarking onto three LSTs. They’re bringing BTR-82A, BMP-2, 2s1, and BM-21s. Their objective is to form an amphibious assault detachment, and of course seize Gotland Island from Primorskiy Kray (just kidding). Their real objective is to practice different types of amphibious landings, supported by smaller surface combatants from the Pacific Fleet.

      The Pacific Fleet has also launched a surface action group and what they’re calling a search strike group (might be a naval variant of recon strike). The fleet is fielding different types of strike groupings and anti-submarine groupings of ships. Initial goal is to practice air defense, command and control, and survival skills in the water. However, they expect to be taking out enemy surface action groups and submarines soon.

      LST loading gear.JPG

      Northern Fleet – Elements of NF have already made it to Chukotka, which means they’re going to be fighting the Pacific Fleet fairly soon. They’ve been traveling since August 8, taking breaks for different drills along the way. It seems they have three LSTs with naval infantry and units from the arctic motor-rifle brigade onboard. Apparently they conducted an amphibious assault on Chukotka, supported by fire from Kulakov (Udaloy-class), whereby the naval infantry first seized the beachead and the main body of forces then arrived via LST. Not much mention of other ships, hope they brought more than Kulakov along, but Eastern Med is probably sucking in a lot of available naval power. Marshall Ustinov (Slava-class) is heading the E. Med squadron instead of participating in these exercises.

      Arctic brigade unloading

       

      Chinese participation: 24x rotary wing consisting of 6x Mi-171, 9x Z-9, 9x Z-19 + 6  fixed wing aircraft (looks like JH-7) and an unknown number of ground troops at ~3200 total?

      Chinese

      Fun photos for our caption contest:

      Caption contest

      If you camo net the front of the TEL then nobody can see the launch tubes

      air defenses

      Vostok 2018 Strategic Maneuvers: Exercise plan

      Michael Kofman1 Comment

      It seems this year’s annual strategic command-staff exercise has been replaced by Strategic Maneuvers, which depending on your perspective is actually a higher level of exercise in the TVD (theater of military operations). Rather than having a OSK take charge of combat operations in a specific strategic direction, supported by units from other military districts, strategic maneuvers feature multiple military districts, and fleets – these are not held in a single strategic direction. Hence Vostok 2018 is not being done in the format of typical annual exercises rotating between the four main strategic directions.

      These pictures are from Gerasimov’s briefing last week – Youtube link to the briefing

      breakdown of the exercise East vs West

      Instead the participating units will divide into two ostensible opposing forces, divided into an Eastern and Western grouping of forces. Vostok 2018 will thus feature a form of strategic exercise much closer to those practiced in the older days of the Soviet Union, more like 1935-36. For example, in 1936 the Belarus Military District divided into Western and Eastern groupings of forces to practice maneuvers against each other. Those were undoubtedly useful exercises for the Red Army until the officers who learned something got purged 1936-38, but I digress.

      The two ‘teams’ so to speak will include the Central Military District + Northern Fleet, against the Eastern Military District + Pacific Fleet. Russia’s Airborne VDV, and Aerospace Forces VKS will have an important role, though unclear on how they will divide those assets between the two groupings. The exercise itself will last 11-17 September, although snap readiness checks have begun well in advance, as have preparations for MTO, and other supporting services. Perhaps best to bracket this as a August 20-September 17 timeline. Most of the action will be at five combined arms training ranges, four ranges for the Air Force and Air Defense units, the Sea of Okhotsk, Bering Sea, Avachinskiy Zaliv and Kronostkiy Zaliv (gulfs off Kamchatka).

      Exhibit A from the briefing (we can see units Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet engaging each other off of Kamchatka)

      Exercise scenario 2.jpg

      Map of forces involved

      District map

      In his recent briefing Gerasimov highlighted that these exercises are well within the budgetary scope of funds allocated to the MoD for annual training, and that no additional or supplementary spending was required for Vostok, i.e. people protesting pension reform need not blame the MoD for having large scale strategic maneuvers. This is where the inflated force size ‘297,000’ publicity sought by the MoD runs into the problem of being tone deaf given social spending reforms being protested in Moscow. My suspicion is that the number comes from counting all the units stationed in CMD and EMD, plus Northern and Pacific Fleet, and select airborne divisions participating. For every battalion fielded they will likely count the entire brigade, and for a few regiments an entire division, etc.

      Exercise plan

      exrecise scenario 3

      Phase 1 September 11-12: This phase is for planning and organization of forces to be involved, includes aligning command functions, and logistics.

      Phase 2 September 13-17: Exercise begins, and will include: training to conduct large scale air strikes, cruise missile defense, defense, offense, flanking and raiding maneuvers. In the Sea of Okhotsk, and the two gulfs mentioned above, forces will practice defending against aerospace attack, destroying surface action groups, and naval landing forces. Aviation will support offensive ground maneuvers, and coastal defense.

      Tsygol is singled out in particular, the scenario there will involve three combined arms formation from Eastern MD, together with Chinese and Mongolian forces, engaging in maneuvers against two combined arms armies from Central MD. At Tsygol they anticipate 25,000 Russian troops, 7,000 pieces of equipment, and 250 fixed wing/rotary wing aviation. Chinese forces we know to consist of ~3,200, 24 helicopters and 6 fixed aircraft. No numbers have been given for the Mongolian forces participating, but presumably they are quite small so there’s not much to boast about in this regard.

      Tsygol scheme of maneuver

      Gerasimov also highlighted that Vostok 2018 will feature wide scale use of drones, VDV parachute jumps, use of mobile brigades, making ‘non-standard decisions’ which I take to mean planning scheme of maneuver without assembling it from preplanned drills or plays, automated command and control, together with staff planning based on lessons from combat operations in Syria. The whole thing will end with a review of forces in the field, i.e. they plan to do a Zapad 1981 style photo op with all the vehicles and what not lined up, so it will probably seem quite impressive and scary.

      Perhaps more interesting is the increasing focus on logistics, mobilizing reserves to help fill out MTO units.

      MTO and reservists.jpg

      More photos from the brief can be found at BMPD.

      Vostok 2018: Pre-exercise review of events

      Michael Kofman4 Comments

      I’m going to try to cover Vostok 2018  this year, and this time will benefit from some help in covering the space. Special thanks to my colleagues Jeff Edmonds and Kate Baughman who have decided to join in the effort, and offer a welcome reinforcement. Vostok is officially listed as September 11-15. This is unlikely as the exercise is typically longer, and probably will be September 11-20 or thereabouts. However, the MoD announcements on exercises and readiness checks right now list dates of August 20-September 15 inclusive. Which suggest that the standard wave of snap readiness checks, units moving out to ranges, and similar such activities began on the 20th. Exercises that are not directly associated with Vostok are already taking place. It’s a bit of a heavy lift to cover all of these, so in the run up to September 11 I think the best course of action is to summarize preceding weeks and offer a few days of focused coverage to illustrate what is going on.

      Most of the action so far is in the Southern MD, followed by Central MD. The troops based outside Russia in Abkhazia, Tajikistan, Armenia are conducting drills and various exercises. Greater attention being paid to logistics, communications, and coordination between different combat arms. The Northern Fleet has an exercise in progress, and ships from different fleets are gathering for a large joint exercise in the Eastern Med.

      Exercises reflect similar messages: recon-strike contour, combat arms, training between different types of companies, communication, drone and counter drone, integration of ground forces and aviation. There a lot more ‘jointness’ being portrayed than last year.

      Also, of course, Chinese participation. About 3200 PLA troops and 30 aircraft are expected to take part.

      Chinese tanks crossing the border

      Chinese tanks.JPG

      Let’s look at August 31st

      Eastern MD – Engineering units are training in Zabaikal to obtain, purify, and store water. Some 4,000 troops are training on 10 different ranges in this district according to official announcements. Some exercises were focused on dealing with terrorists, who were really saboteurs, seeking to capture arms and destroy equipment. BMP-2 crews practiced fording water obstacles on a special ‘aquadrome’ in Zabaikal. About 450 troops involved. The exercise also involved evacuating damaged IFVs and rescuing crews.

      water.png

      Southern MD – Iskander units in Kuban belonging to the 49th CAA conducted simulated electronic launches against coastal targets. The exercise was focused on practicing recon-strike contour. They were targeting a marine landing force attempting to seize beaches along the Black Sea coastline. The intent was to take out concentrated armor and equipment as it was being unloaded unto the beach by landing craft. This exercise is part of an effort to improve combined arms, the ‘division’ marched to a firing range and aligned C2 with a motor rifle company. Supposedly about 6,000 troops and around 2,000 pieces of equipment are conducting exercises and drilling across the Southern MD from 20 August to 15 September.

      Artillery units from the district exercised separately as part of a large day of live fire drills, practicing recon-strike contour system between different service components, involving ships of the BSF, Caspian Flotilla, air force, and air defense units. Seems there are four main regions involved in the exercises right now, Dagestan, Kuban, Crimea and Russia’s units based in Abkhazia. Official claims of about 70 live fire exercises – 130 pieces of artillery involved, Torando, Smerch, Uragan, BM-21 Grad, MSTA-S, and Iskander-M. Drones were employed, and units of the 4th Air and Air Defense Army participated (about 20 planes and helicopters), and ~12 ships. Each exercise had its own command post in charge of the event.

      About 20 aircraft, including Su-30, Su-27SM, and Su-25s supported the motor rifle units in their exercises across the Southern MD. They too were taking out marines attempting to establish a beach head. Coordination was done by forward observers, not part of the air force, but coordinating from field command points belonging to the CAA units. Supposedly Strelets-VR system was being used to link recon units and air strikes. Col-Gen Dvornikov has placed priority on ground units learning how to coordinate with air power, we know because his personal views are emphasized extensively in press released by Southern MD.

      Abkhazia (SMD) – Armored units practiced outflanking the enemy with T-72B3 tanks. The exercise involved two company sized tactical groups practicing against each other, trying ‘non-standard’ and ‘unconventional’ tactics. (author’s note – this may mean deviating from the standard Russian system of piecing combat maneuvers from smaller prepared ‘plays’ or ‘drills’). According to this announcement Russian forces drilling in Southern MD have 6,000 training and more than 1,500 pieces of equipment.

      Untitled.png

      Engineers and recon units had a busy day. Fording across a water obstacle and taking out diversionary groups. This is an exercise where recon units and engineers worked together, with recon units covering the engineer team. The engineer company’s tasks was demining a  crossing marked it for motor rifle units, and then secured the other side ahead of their arrival.

      Russian units based in Armenia, a communications unit, was raised on alert. They trained in establishing a comms link, operating drones, laying down cables, and maintaining lines of communications between other units involved in the exercise. This is another one in the theme of getting different kinds of companies working together in a combined arms exercise.

      Armenia comms unit.jpg

      Western MD – About 500 troops from 1st Guards Tank Army will start training in a combined arms exercise with artillery and air defense units. The drill is for different types of assault and flanking maneuvers, T-80U, T-72B3, some BMPs and MSTA-S units involved.

      Central MD – CBRN units exercised, dealing with a WMD attack, while air defense units with S-400s departed for Telemba to conduct live fire exercises. They’re training against seemingly everything, planes, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, high and low altitude threats, etc. About 500 troops and 40 pieces of equipment listed for this one. Meanwhile in Samara Spetsnaz units conducted an air assault (parachute) from Mi-8MTV5 helicopters against diversionary groups who were attempting to mine an air field – recon was conducted by Orlan drones.

      Tajikistan 201st base (CMD) – Russian air defense units defended themselves from attack by cruise missiles and drones. Seems like a small exercise, about 50 troops firing good old ZU-23, which can take out drones but not exactly your sophisticated cruise missile defense. Mi-8s were used to simulate low flying targets.

      Eastern Med

      September 1-8 there will be a joint exercise, for the first time, between Russia’s Navy and Aerospace Forces (VKS). They’ve pulled in ships from North, Baltic, Black Sea Fleets and the Caspian Flotilla. They expect about 26 ships to participate, including 2 submarines, and 34 drones. The flagman will be Slava-class Marshall Ustinov. This drill will include sorties by Tu-160 strategic bombers, Tu-142 and Il-38N maritime patrol aviation, Su-33 and Su-30SM from naval aviation (not  sure how Su-33  is going to be a part of this, skeptical on that one).

      Northern Fleet

      A detachment from the fleet, operating off of the New Siberian Islands, conducted live fire exercises. Seems to be mostly artillery and some Rubezh CDCM fire. This exercise combined units stationed on Kotelny Island with a small surface action group send by the Northern Fleet, this SAG is led by Udaloy-class Vice Admiral Kulakov.

      A brief summary of August 29-30th

      • In SCO exercises Peaceful mission 2018, Russian forces demonstrated how they take out shahid-mobiles, together with the ‘tank carousel’ drill. The purpose was to show off experience gained in Syria to other nations who sent troops to participate in the multilateral event.
      • SMD – units specializing in drone defense (they’ve made special mobile detachments for dealing with drones now) practiced taking out drones in Volgograd oblast. This was a combination of EW, R-934BMV, R-330Z Zhitel, for jamming, and then Pansir-S1 + Tor-M2 for taking them out. Meanwhile in Chechnya EW units had something a bit more serious, Borisoglebsk-2, to jam radio communications of a hypothetical opponent. Seems they just got this system in May, and went through retraining for it. There were also sizable artillery drills in counter-battery fire, although the picture showed what looked like Pion 203mm artillery. They expect 5,000 artillerymen to practice in September from SMD.

      Borisoglebsk.jpg

      • BSF’s Naval Infantry Brigade set out to destroy diversionary groups. Using drones in advance of their formation they spotted an ambush and took out the enemy instead of driving into them and the part of the road they supposedly mined.
      • In Abkhazia Ka-52 helicopters practiced taking out shahid-mobiles, and coordinating with ground units. Similar training in Armenia, with Mi-24P and Mi-8MTV, learning how to take out targets in mountainous conditions and applying experience gained in Syria.
      • EMD – Iskander-M units in Zabaikal practiced camouflage, repelling attacks, and conducting electronic simulated launches after receiving target coordinates. Their target was an enemy radar station. At the same time Buk air defense units trained at a different range in intercepting targets, including while being jammed by enemy drones/aircraft.
      • At Sea – lots of small ships drilling. Small anti-submarine corvettes from Novorosiysk (BSF) went submarine hunting. They hunt this elusive submarine every year during operational-strategic exercises. One of the Tarantul-class missile boats trained in air defense, with Su-30SM serving as the simulated attacker. More interesting – Tomsk (Oscar II), was practicing in the Sea of Okhotsk, torpedoing several enemy ships. Tomsk approached an enemy surface action group, being represented by Varyag (Slava-class), Bystry (Sovremenny), and several Udaloys. Tomsk fired 4 practice torpedoes without being detected, i.e. Tomsk is really good or ASW detection on legacy Soviet surface combatants is not so good. Earlier on Tomsk fired an anti-ship missile at a surface target on the 27th. There were quite a few simulated electronic CDCM fires in earlier days as well, from Baltic and Black Sea Fleet, including Bal and Bastion systems.

      Notes on announcements:

      Every exercise announcement from SMD has quotes from Dvornikov along the lines of ‘it is important to do X, and every person should know how to do X, because X is an important thing’ which seems to be a new feature. None of the other military district commanders are offering their wisdom.

      A small percentage of the photos are being reused from Zapad 2017, i.e. I’ve seen them before and can tell they’re from a year ago – not showing what is actually going on in the announcement. It seems in cases where the MoD doesn’t have a photo on hand they’ve decided to search the pile and find something that looks like it might be similar from 2017.

       

      The Durability of Russian Military Power: Moscow’s Prospects for Sustaining Direct Competition

      Michael Kofman6 Comments

      My issue brief as part a series run by the Changing Character of War Centre at Oxford, assessing the durability of Russian military power. I recommend their centre’s website for some great Russia mil analysis. This briefing in particular focuses on manpower, materiel, and funding. I tackle the issue of whether Russia is able to sustain a competition with the United States, and the extent to which it will be able to sustain the military as an effective instrument of national power despite the many problems the country faces. I’ve found that some of the discourse on this subject, particularly with respect to manpower/demographics, could be better informed by data, and merits a closer look.

       

      Political analysis in the West retains a strong bias towards measuring state influence and status according to economic foundations of power, yet Russia has demonstrated that military power remains an important instrument in international politics. Having enacted a period of military reform 2008-2012 and financed a sustained program of modernization, Russian foreign policy is increasingly underwritten either by the use of force, or threat of force, as part and parcel of coercive diplomacy. Though much attention is drawn today to indirect competition, it is Russia’s successful resurrection of military power which enables the country to ‘bench press’ above its weight in the international arena. Indeed, indirect competition is often messy, indecisive, and ineffectual without the weight of conventional military power supporting it.

      While observers are cognizant of the resurrection of Russian military power, there remains, however, a considerable debate as to its durability. Simply put, many believe that demographic, economic and industrial trends are against Russia – the country will not be able to sustain this level of direct competition. Yet there is little to suggest, looking ten years out and even beyond, that Russia will suffer from those severe shortages of either manpower, money or materiel which would reduce Russia’s ability to underwrite its foreign policy. On the contrary, Russian demographic trends reflect only an increasing availability of manpower for the growing force, a sustainable defence budget in terms of spending, and a modernization program that will suffice to arm the force well into the 2020s. It can go on, and it will.

      Much of the conversation on Russian demographics is simply ill informed. A decline of birth rates throughout the 1990s lasted until 1999. Russia suffered through a decade of declining health standards, fertility, falling birth rates, and emigration. Despite the decline in numbers of 18 year olds available for service, Russian armed forces expanded from perhaps around 700,000 in 2011 to over 900,000 in 2017. The contract share of the force swelled to as much as 380,000, or more than 50% of the enlisted force. Russian birth rates increased year on year from 2000 until 2015. This means that men born in 2000 will be of service age this year, 2018, and the pool of men aged 18-27 should increase every year from now until 2032.

      Russia’s birth rate – World Bank

      world-bank-rf-birthrates.jpg

      Birth rates are hardly the only indicator responsible for growing manpower availability in Russia. The draft board, Voenkomat, has also helped clean up corruption in the number of health exclusions granted to those seeking to dodge service. In the past, many Russians would spontaneously become unhealthy upon turning 18. But with health exclusions revised, and the rampant buying of disqualifications now attended to, the amount of those deemed unfit had declined to only about 23% in 2016 according to head of the General Staff’s Mobilization Directorate Colonel General Tonkoshkurov. Russia’s chief military prosecutor, Valery Petrov, stated more recently in 2018 that overall draft evasion is down by about 30% from the corrupt heydays of the past. Beyond reductions in draft dodging, increases in pay, growing public respect for the armed forces, and overall improving conditions in the military have all had a positive effect on recruitment. Starting in 2018, a change in the conscription law now offers draftees the option of one year conscript service or two years under contract with better terms.

      General demographics trends offer a complex picture of Russia’s future. Russian life expectancy actually reached a record high in 2017, and fertility rates are closing in on those in the United States, up from 1.157 in 1999 to 1.75 in 2016 (U.S. was at 1.8). Russia suffers from three principal problems in demographics: the demographic echo from the disastrous 1990s which will return to haunt Moscow in the mid-2030s, a declining workforce which is losing perhaps 600,000 per year in retirements, and the recent economic recession which slowed birth rates 2015-2017 (even despite generous state sponsored family programmes) which will have knock on effects years from now. Russia’s main problem is not so much the size of its population, but its productivity. Nevertheless, because Russia remains the primary labour market for the former Soviet Union, and is host to a large pool of immigrant labour, it does have answers readily available for the present decline in the labour force. Despite all these challenges, therefore, Russia’s current population is much healthier of late, with the longest lifespan witnessed, and manpower availability is likely to see sustained increases into the mid 2030s.

      Fertility rates comparison – World Bank

      Fertility rates WB
      A steady decline in US fertility rate meets a rise in Russian fertility rate prior to the econ crisis

      From a materiel standpoint, it is also difficult to observe looming shortages. The previous State Armament Program 2011-2020 was meant to jumpstart the defence industry, and effectively provided for a dramatic increase in the modernization rating of Russian equipment from 15% in 2010 to almost 60% in 2017 (according to official figures). That program’s achievements merit briefly recounting, as they include the acquisition of 418 aircraft for tactical aviation, 3 combat aviation brigades and 6 combat aviation regiments, 16 air defence regiments of S-400, more than 70 radars of various types for VKS Aerospace forces, 10 Iskander-M brigade sets, completion of Russia’s early warning radar network, 55 military satellites launched into orbit, 12 new regiments of Yars road-mobile ICBMs deployed, more than 3,000 modernized ground force vehicles, 3 new SSBNs and 2 new 4th generation SSGNs, together with diesel-electric submarines, corvettes, and auxiliary ships. This list includes upgrades in more specialized fields, including electronic warfare brigades and companies, new command and control systems to enable recon-strike and fires, together with more than 1800 drones acquired across services.

      The funds spent by 2017 doubtfully exceed 50-60% of the original 19 trillion RUB allocated. Thus the new state armament program 2018-2027, at another 19 trillion RUB, plus 1 trillion for infrastructure, and 3 trillion for other security services, represents a sustained investment. Albeit with reduced purchasing power, the new state armament program will focus on areas neglected, or perhaps ‘jump started’ by its predecessor. These include large-scale acquisition of precision guided munitions, long-range standoff cruise missiles, transport aviation, bomber modernization, expansion of artillery, armour, and missile formations in the ground forces, more capable drones, and next generation tech like hypersonic weapons.

      Even in Russia’s lagging industry, shipbuilding, one can see that core sectors of competence such as submarine construction remain capable of producing some of the most sophisticated platforms available. Russia currently has 11 nuclear powered submarines laid down, and is able to build a diesel-electric submarine in 18 months, with a division of 6 currently in production for the Pacific Fleet. Despite a messy divorce from Ukraine’s defence sector, the material is not only there to sustain Russian military modernization, but the production rates are more than sufficient even in troublesome sectors.

      In other areas, such as the ground forces, the conflict in Ukraine and Syria has illustrated that Russian ‘good enough’ is can deal with the country’s military requirements for the coming decade. Modernized Soviet platforms are able to beat any former Soviet republic on Russia’s borders. Possessing them at high readiness, and large numbers, means Russia can effectively impose its will on neighbours or coerce them in a crisis. If anything, most of the challenges faced by Moscow are self-imposed, such as the decision to expand the ground force structure so quickly that it will inherently suffer in readiness and mobility. The defence industry has shown itself capable of producing current generation technology such that Russia has a viable path towards conventional deterrence vis-a-vis the United States, meanwhile less advanced elements of the Russian military are more than suitable for compellence in local and regional conflicts.

      Assuming levels of economic growth at 1.5%, there is little to suggest that Russia cannot sustain this level of military expenditure, which will amount to no more than 4% of GDP. Meanwhile Russian spending on national defence will likely hover at around 2.8% of GDP, as the defence budget is only seeing modest cuts relative to other sections of the budget. The fact that oil prices are 50% above the $40 per barrel mark which the government used to underpin its budget expectations is yet another indicator that the economic outlook for defence spending is considerably better than usually appreciated. While the defence budget may still have fat to trim, coming off of historic highs in 2014, there is less urgency in spending on procurement after major gaps have been filled in 2011-2017, and the defence industry revitalized in the process. Adjusted for purchasing power parity, Russia remains just behind Germany as the second largest GDP in Europe. Although it is technically a middle income country, Russia’s raw GDP hides considerable purchasing power when it comes to defence spending and the ability to sustain its armed forces.

      On the basis of macro indicators such as manpower, materiel, and money, therefore, Russia is positioned to sustain its policies, even if this means a prolonged confrontation well into the 2020s, and perhaps 2030s. More importantly, Moscow’s ability to leverage military power as one of the more decisive instruments in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives should be clearly understood. Russia can retain the current degree of military activity, snap readiness tests, large strategic exercises, expeditionary operations in Syria, and a rotating presence in Ukraine. The challenges Russia faces are consequential, often resulting in cycles of stagnation and mobilization, but they are not deterministic, as has historically been the case for this particular power.

      The Collapsing Russian Defense Budget and Other Fairy Tales

      Michael Kofman6 Comments

      Posted today on Russia Matters, a project by Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.  Below is my latest piece in response to the headlines generated by SIRPI’s trends in military expenditure report alleging a 20% reduction in Russian military expenditure in 2017.

      One can only observe with bemusement the growth in size, readiness and modernization of Russia’s armed forces when juxtaposed against recent news stories reporting a 20-percent decline in Russian defense spending from 2016 to 2017, described as the first notable cut since 1998. It is seemingly impossible for both trends to be real. Indeed, Russian defense spending is alive and well, with cuts limited to single digits. The announcement about its steep decline by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, was erroneous. Changes in Russia’s handling of defense funding have led SIPRI and, before it, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly to misreport the reduction. Now, for the second time in as many years, the miscalculation is proliferating across major media outlets.

      The main source of the error is readily identifiable, arcane though it may be: In 2016 the Russian government started paying off defense-sector debt that had piled up over the years, which created the illusion of much higher spending on national defense and, accordingly, a subsequent decline the following year. Before this, the Defense Ministry (MoD) had managed to rack up close to a trillion rubles in debt to defense contractors, who had been producing equipment on credit borrowed from various banks. The MoD was paying the interest on these loans and the Russian leadership was none too happy about it. After the government decided to pay down the debt, the Finance Ministry provided 792 billion rubles for this purpose, a figure that seemed to boost 2016 defense spending from its actual 3.09 trillion rubles to 3.8 trillion. (Subsequently another 186 billion rubles was spent in 2017 on paying down debt, making the spending appear higher for that year as well.) According to the MoD, this measure saved 130 billion rubles in interest alone.

      Another change disrupting the continuity of Russian defense-spending data, adopted by the government in 2017, was to tighten up controls on funding left over in the hands of the defense sector when it was unable to deliver weapons on time. Prior to this, the defense industry was allowed to build up stockpiles of money advanced for armaments that had not been produced as scheduled. Furthermore, some defense enterprises were clever enough to collect interest on these large advances, which sat in their accounts. At the end of the year, about 250-300 billion rubles ended up trapped in this manner, and the MoD had a hard choice to make: either further finance incomplete orders, and therefore reward delinquency, or return the money to the government budget and potentially lose it. To solve the matter, the MoD will now pull unspent funding back to the government budget under the condition that it will be reissued, and roll over payments into the following year. This means that some portion of each year’s budget (perhaps 5 percent or so) will flow into the next year.

      In making its calculations SIPRI also converted the outsized budget figures from 2016 into U.S. dollars, which exacerbated the impression of a dramatic decline in defense spending in 2017. Measuring Russia’s defense budget in dollars is analytically unhelpful, since Russia’s defense sector doesn’t buy much of anything in dollars. Thus, the resulting figures are distorted by changes in currency exchange rates, and they are not adjusted for purchasing power parity. Ultimately, several percentage points in SIPRI’s alleged decline were likely due to currency devaluation, which is almost completely irrelevant to the matter in question.

      While we are in fact witnessing a steady decline of Russian defense spending as a percentage of GDP, defense cuts in absolute terms have been modest at best. Official spending on defense dropped by about 8 percent from 2016 to 2017, from 3.09 trillion rubles to 2.84 trillion, and the defense budget was only scheduled for cuts averaging 5-6 percent over the three-year period of 2017-2019. (The numbers in this article reflect official defense spending, not total military expenditure, which might include funding for other militarized services like the border guards and Interior Ministry troops, or military pensions, which could add another trillion rubles to the bottom line.) Actual reductions in military spending began in 2015, by about 5 percent. Economic factors certainly played a role—primarily Russia’s recession and the drop in oil prices—but perhaps more important were the geopolitical factors: loss of access to certain defense articles imported from the West and the messy divorce from Ukraine’s defense sector. Due to the war with Ukraine, Russia’s defense industry could not buy components from its long-time partner across the border; this, in turn, delayed production and left the Russian Defense Ministry with less materiel to buy, while the funds to pay for it sat in government coffers instead of getting spent.

      Russia’s defense expenditures are not a coherent data set and have become easy to get lost in given the changes that have taken place. Nonetheless, it is especially frustrating to see the narrative of “slashed military spending due to economic woes” resurface now, since the same miscalculation was made last year by Jane’s, which reported a 25-percent reduction in Russian defense spending from 2016 to 2017 based on Moscow’s advance announcement of planned expenditures. Jane’s later acknowledged the mistake and took down its original story, but by that time the sensational figure had already been reported widely in the news media.

      Although it is impossible to know in advance how much will be spent in 2018, it is already looking like this year’s anticipated 5 percent reduction is unlikely to materialize. Instead of the planned 2.768 trillion rubles, the Russian budget’s defense chapter has already been amended to 2.953, a 6.7-percent increase; this higher 2018 figure likely includes carryover payments for armament procurement in 2017. Hence defense spending in 2018 is unlikely to decline, but the Russian leadership still intends to see military expenditure reduced as a share of GDP. Planned spending on national defense was envisioned at 2.815 trillion for 2019 and 2.807 trillion for 2020—also hardly a steep cut, and current performance suggests actual numbers will prove higher.

      Moreover, despite a reduction in Russia’s purchasing power, the new state armament program for 2018-2027 is quite substantial for the defense sector, especially considering the amount of modernization and procurement of new equipment already accomplished under the previous one. The latest program allocates considerable resources for additional procurement. It is configured in a 19+1+3 formula, with 19 trillion rubles for the armed forces, 1 trillion in infrastructure spending and another 3 trillion for other security services, such as the National Guard. The previous program of 2011-2020 was valued at close to 19 trillion rubles (plus infrastructure investment), about half of which was spent by 2017, at a rate that might average 1.35 trillion per year.

      Thus, Russian defense spending and procurement is in for a sustained trim, but the reductions are fairly minor in comparison to the sensational headlines. Moscow has long declared its intentions to halt the growth in defense spending and reduce military expenditure as a share of GDP over time. Given the complexity of Russia’s defense budget, and a data set that lacks continuity, the best thing one can do is tread with care when it comes to pronouncements.

      Because budget work is kind of lackluster and doesn’t offer much in terms of photos, I’m attaching this picture of Ivan, our lead analyst of budget analytics and kibble.

      Ivan director of budget analytics and kibble

      Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part 2 – 9M730?, Status-6, Klavesin-2R)

      Michael Kofman6 Comments

      Putin’s March 1st speech unveiled a host of new weapons currently under development. Some were previously known, or had been rumored to exist, but with sparse information about progress, while others were being tracked by those who follow military developments in Russia. Unfortunately, much of the media dismissed these announcements as a bluff intended for the consumption of domestic audiences ahead of the Presidential election, or selection, depending on how you view it. While Vladimir Putin may have exaggerated how far along these ‘fantastical’ weapons are, claiming successful tests, these are not figments of his imagination.

      He wasn’t bluffing – these weapons may all arrive sometime in the 2020s. Some we will meet in the early 2020s, others perhaps later that decade, as William Gibson liked to say “the future is already here, it’s just not evenly distributed.” In Part 1 I covered Kinzhal, R-28 Sarmat, and 4202, while in this section I plan to look at some of the even more interesting systems, including third strike weapons like Status-6, Klavesin-2R deep diving vehicle, and the nuclear powered cruise missile that raised so many eyebrows.

      The Nuclear Posture Review confirms many of these projects, stating, “Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.” That references 4202, R-28 Sarmat, and of course the now famous Status-6. What about the nuclear powered cruise missile? Former SecDef Ash Carter had a rather cryptic line in an article back in 2017, that perhaps we should look back upon and reflect, “Russia is investing in new ballistic missile submarines, heavy bombers, and the development of a new ICBM. These investments by themselves would not be novel, even if they necessitate continued, strong American deterrence. But they are also paired with novel concepts for how nuclear weapons could be used and some entirely new and even bizarre types of nuclear weapons systems…” Now let’s fast forward to March 1, 2018, and Putin’s presentation begins to make a bit more sense.

      As I will discuss in some detail below, most of these weapons are the stuff of science fiction from the 1950s and 1960s, back when science fiction writing was quite brilliant, and the Atomic age was in full swing. The U.S. and USSR considered, designed, and tested, all sorts of nuclear weapon concepts during the early 1950s and 1960s. Some ideas were ahead of the technology of their time, others were feasible but considered too crazy, provocative, or unnecessary. Part of what drove the resurrection of these concepts is Moscow’s desire to hedge against an uncertain future, and technology has changed. The feeling is not uncommon, since I took that notion literally from the language of our 2018 NPR, which also justifies its proposals in the need to ‘hedge against an uncertain future.’

      Image result for 1950s asimov

      Of course with such broad language once can advocate for all sorts of nuclear weapon programs, and sure enough, various industries in Russia seem to have sold the government on boutique weapons that will plus up Russia’s current deterrent. Moscow has thought to capitalize on some its comparative strengths, including nuclear energy technology, missile technology, and submarine designs, to develop what they believe will prove hedging weapons. These are in part in response to U.S. technological superiority in long range conventional fires, aerospace power, sustained U.S. investment in missile defense, and the desire to develop prompt global strike.

      Rumors about the coming missile defense review also suggest that it will be quite provocative, validating Russian concerns that missile defense is no longer just about North Korea and Iran, but instead aimed at Russian and Chinese capabilities as a matter of policy. Thus we embark on mutually assured spending.

      I don’t believe that Russia either needs these weapons to ensure the viability of its deterrent, or that their acquisition fundamentally changes anything in the military balance with the U.S. I’m equally skeptical that they offer any particular coercive effect, though I’m traditionally skeptical of the proposition that there is any efficacy to be found in nuclear powers using nuclear weapons for coercion. The history and theory just isn’t there to support that very much. What it does tell me is that Russia won’t be confident in its conventional capabilities for years to come, or ever, and continues to spend heavily on a nuclear offset, making the conventional and nuclear approaches to deterrence complementary – as in my mind they should be. That said, let’s get to the weapons.

      Novator’s newest creation – 9M730 (designation is a working theory until a better name comes)

      9m730 v2.JPG

      The nuclear powered missile with no name is probably designated 9M730, following after 9M728 (R-500) and 9M729 (SSC-8 INF violator). This is Ramm’s hypothesis based on the fact there is a 9M730 project out there and we know what the other cruise missiles in this series are. Given there is no name, for now 9M730 will do, and I suspect it will ultimately turn out that this is the project’s designation. Since Raduga makes air launched cruise missiles (Kh) it makes sense that this project would be one of Novator’s children, and Novator is quite good at what they do when it comes to cruise missiles. The idea behind the missile is to have special compartments where air is heated by a nuclear reactor to several thousand degrees, then thrust is created by ejecting the superheated air. Judging from the video shown there are four rear vents creating thrust for the missile.

      9m730.JPG

      Putin’s statement that it already passed a successful flight test in December 2017 doesn’t scan, but this empty bragging aside it seems the missile project is quite real and much further along than one would like. Additional reporting from A. Ramm’s article indicates the tests are being done in Nenoksa, Arkhangelsk firing it into the White Sea, although after talking to colleagues the images shown are from Novaya Zemlya. Testing it in the high north makes sense since it’s not the sort of thing anyone would want to test over mainland Russia, and it will likely end up being based there. Due to size and weight considerations a missile such as this would have an unshielded reactor, making it impossible for the weapon to fly without spreading radioactive particles. Furthermore, there were comments from sources familiar with the project that the missile is not being tested with a reactor, but rather an electrical power source to imitate the reactor they have constructed. A. Ramm, who has some good writing on this subject, missile testing is being supported by special Il-976 laboratory planes.

      Readers will undoubtedly recognize this concept as following in the footsteps of U.S. efforts to build a nuclear powered supersonic low altitude missile (SLAM), named project Pluto. From 1957-1964 the U.S. worked on a nuclear powered cruise missile, which would carry 16 nuclear munitions to targets in the USSR. The colossal amount of radiation it generated in flight was considered a feature at the time. However, even though a full scale reactor and engine were built, the project was canceled because the system was considered both highly problematic from an engineering standpoint and also provocative. The SLAM was nixed in 1964. Some believed it would motivate the Soviet Union to build a similar device, and all in all ballistic missiles were far less problematic. Well, it’s 2018, and while technology has clearly advanced substantially from 1964, humanity is an entirely different story.

      A nuclear powered cruise missile? Silly Russians, we would never have spent 8 years on such a reckless project.

      Project Pluto

      pluto engine

      I was skeptical as to whether this was far along, but here Pentagon came to the rescue. Pentagon officials, afraid that anyone finds out we might have some kind of ‘doomsday gap,’ let it be known that the missile in question has already gone through several flight tests in the Arctic and crashed in all of them. So we’re fine, because its not working yet… Also I think missiles typically crash and do not land, whether in testing or not, this is not a bug but a feature of missile technology. Crashing in testing is typical when working on a new missile design, particularly with a unique form of propulsion, but it was surprising to find out that Russia had already conducted several tests with a prototype.

      Image result for dr.strangelove doomsday gap

      Since the weapon has no name, I think we should consider calling it ‘prompt drunken strike,’ if anything based on the flight route shown in the video.

      Status-6 Ocean Multipurpose System

      Image result for статус-6

      Much of what is known about Status-6 appeared on 9 November 2015 during a meeting chaired by Putin on problems in the defense industry. Just as last week, the media was skeptical that this weapon was a bluff, together with the arms control community which is often doubtful when revelations are made about new nuclear weapons. Those are unhelpful confirmation biases, since both Status-6 and the 9M729 missile are turning out to be quite real. The system is now officially referenced in the NPR as a Russian strategic nuclear weapon program.

      status-6 slide.png

      The weapon as conceived will be a multipurpose nuclear powered torpedo, but the initial design is intended to destroy critical economic infrastructure along coastline. By all indications this project is well ahead of the nuclear powered cruise missile, and given the physical size of this weapon, nuclear power poses a much less daunting challenge to integrate. As conceived this will be a third strike countervalue weapon. This nuclear torpedo is meant for taking out U.S. coastal cities, and irradiating an entire area. The reason it comes 3rd is both mechanical, and in terms of function. It would take 35 minutes for ICBMs on a transpolar trajectory whereas this weapon might take days to reach the U.S. once fired, and it is not meant for counterforce targets, but instead to inflict unacceptable damage which historically was calculated as affecting the target’s GDP (people + infrastructure).

      city.JPG

      This is an innovative vengeance weapon, though I don’t believe it will have 100 mt as the warhead. Something much smaller will undoubtedly suffice to wipe out LA or San Francisco if need be and irradiate parts of the coast. The reason I mention Pacific cities is that a deep diving weapon doesn’t make as much sense coming from Russia via GIUK gap into the Atlantic, simply because of the depths and geographical choke points involved. Something to consider before people get started writing articles about the 6th Battle of the Atlantic. The Pacific on the other hand lends itself handily to deep diving autonomous weapons if they’re ‘fire and forget.’

      Does Russia truly needs this weapon to handle U.S. missile defenses? No, and it would be infinitely cheaper to just improve current strategic systems, which they’re also doing. However, need is often only loosely connected to what defense establishments procure. As I mentioned in Part 1, defense spending is at best ‘semi-rational’, representing numerous bureaucratic and domestic equities as much as actual threats and missions.

      It is also difficult to discuss Status-6 without mentioning the legacy of Andrei Sakharov’s famous T-15 torpedo, a Soviet project in 1951-1955. The design concept behind that 40 ton, 1500 mm torpedo, was as a first strike weapon, intended to deliver a large nuclear warhead to U.S. naval bases like Pearl Harbor, generating a destructive tsunami. The specialized submarine was called project 627, but back then Soviet General Staff decided that they had no need for such a system, and would be satisfied with a regular nuclear powered submarine. The technology to realize a mega nuclear torpedo was there, but T-15 was the wrong kind of crazy for its time. You can read more on the history of the T-15 from Norman Polmar’s timely piece.

      Maybe nuclear weapons are like fashion trends, they come back. Here is the old 627 with T-15 tube down the middle.

      t-15-image2.jpg

      According to the MoD slide, Status-6 can reach a depth of 1000 meters, speed up to 185 km per hour (100 knots), range up to 10,000 km, and is 1.6m in diameter. According to Putin’s statements it is excessively fast, deep diving, but also very quiet. This is nonsense, since underwater things can be fast, or they can be quiet, but they typically can’t be both. By all considerations this weapon is exceedingly loud if traveling at such speeds, and 100 knots seems somewhat an exaggeration. The video demonstrating its deployment showed project 09852 Belgorod, Russia’s most interesting submarine currently under construction, a heavily modified Oscar-II that will be the longest submarine in the world when it is completed. Belgorod should be able to carry these torpedoes internally, together with other undersea drones. The MoD slide from 2015 indicates that together with Belgorod, project 09851 Khabarovsk (another GUGI submarine laid down in 2014), will also deploy this torpedo.

      I got this from HI Sutton – don’t sue me HI.

      Pr_08952_pptSTRETCH.jpg

      Status-6, and similarly intriguing undersea weapon projects belong to Russia’s ‘other navy’ known as GUGI, or Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research. GUGI is responsible for fielding specialized submarines, oceanographic research ships, undersea drones, autonomous vehicles, sensor systems, and the like. Around mid-2000s there were some tidbits of information about an undersea drone program being tested. Then it became clear that the project involved a specialized barge, the supporting ship 20180 Zvezdochka, and GUGI’s specialized diesel submarine B-90 Sarov. For more reading on the various GUGI subs and covert underwater projects HI Sutton runs a good blog with various renderings.

      Here is what appears to be Status-6 container being loaded.

      Status-6 tube.jpg

      Based on the 2015 MoD slide, Status-6 is proceeding as a project in several phases, with the pilot system being completed by 2019, and testing 2019-2025. Although the nuclear drone probably doesn’t need much guidance, since cities don’t move around, there will need to be a command and control system built if this weapon is to have a conventional variant for wiping out carriers. I’m skeptical of the ‘carrier strike’ option shown in video during Putin’s speech, just because queuing is a perpetual problem for Russian forces, and it’s hard to see how a deep sea traveling weapon could get course correction from something above water. Hitting moving targets at sea is not so simple, especially over great distances, and with a weapon that is loudly steaming ahead in deep waters. More than likely Russia may try to deploy nuclear powered sensor or communications stations under the sea, as some of Rubin’s design projects suggest, to create the infrastructure for such a weapon. Besides the C2 infrastructure, Status-6 will still have to await the two GUGI submarines designed to carry it.

      Klavesin-2R-PM Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

      Klavesin-2M.jpg

      Klavesin is a creation of Rubin design bureau and ИПМТ ДВО РАН, Владивосток. The parameters of this underwater drone include: 6.5m length, 1m in diameter, 3700 kg weight, 50km range with a 2000 meter diving depth. This drone was also shown in the video being launched by Belgorod. The drone program is so super secret that some of the details regarding the vehicle could be found from Rubin’s public tender seeking a company to insure two of these drones for 48 million rubles. Seems they already have two of them, for Belgorod and another GUGI submarine that is already operational, BS-64 Podmoskovye.

      28379177_10159930236540462_5146440591197111008_n.jpg

      The 2R is, as one might suspect, a further evolution of the 1R variant, designed for oceanographic mapping, research, undersea photography, and probably some covert missions. Not much to add to this project except to say that it undoubtedly helps conduct undersea intelligence and reconnaissance missions for GUGI.

      fun times at GUGI

      Regarding the laser shown at the end of Putin’s talk, I’m not sure what it is yet, but looks like some kind of air/missile defense system by the module and platform. I’ve honestly not seen that weapon before and do not focus on lasers. They should show it more often.

      Laser.JPG

      Not keen on the controller. This feels like 1990s gaming.

      xbox controller.JPG

       

      Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part 1 – Kinzhal, Sarmat, 4202)

      Michael Kofman5 Comments

      Vladimir Putin’s speech on March 1st revealed a number of seemingly new or emerging weapon systems, some of which were known to be in testing, while others may come as somewhat a surprise. However, most of these ‘new weapons’ are long running projects, systems thought to be in development, or testing. Some had not shown themselves in quite some time, while others have never been seen, although there were reports of their tests in public releases or official statements. The weapons represent a mix of hypersonic missiles, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, traditional ballistic missile projects, and third strike vengeance weapons on the basis of Russian advancements in nuclear technology. Here I will briefly cover Kinzhal, R-28 Sarmat, and ‘4202’ – the rest of the more fantastical weapons will come in Part 2.

      But first, a brief comment on the overall presentation. The speech itself felt like a “послание” in more than one meaning of that word for those who speak Russian. It was certainly a ‘challenge accepted’ message from VVP, in part responding to the NDS and NPR. After a good run through new and seemingly fantastical capabilities, VVP returned to the subject of Russia’s military doctrine, nuclear policy, and the like. So, aside from domestic politics, there is a fair bit of coercive diplomacy in the message, from talking about the capabilities themselves, to Russian resolve, and concluding with assurances that all will be well if nobody gets into it with Russia. Moscow understands the audience well: nothing gets the attention of U.S. policymakers like nuclear weapons, and there is one person in particular in Washington who is readily impressed by videos of missiles. The graphics were not exactly Lord of the Rings quality, but what can you do, Russian MoD has to live with budget reductions since 2015.

      This was my overall impression listening to the speech and the vision it offered.

      Deathstar Russia

      Now, back to the missiles. A number of the more futuristic projects can only be characterized as semi-rational, in the sense that a fair bit of defense procurement is semi-rational. There was a need to support various design bureaus, Russia’s nuclear energy industry, and a long standing narrative about the need to penetrate a missile defense system the U.S. does not have (and probably after 30 years of copious amounts of funding still won’t have, because Russia is hardly the only country that suffers from semi-rational defense spending).

      There is no way to intercept Russian ICBMs, and with the upgrades to penetration aids they’re already implementing, Russia can ensure the viability of its deterrent for decades to come. This is not to mention recently deployed air launched cruise missiles like Kh-101/102. The ticket price of upgrading strategic nuclear weapons for better penetration, i.e. the offense, is just incredibly lower than the cost of trying to mount any viable defense. Statements on the various projects on March 1st can best be summarized as true lies, that is their stages of development are likely exaggerated, but none of what was said qualifies as science fiction either.

      Mainstream media coverage, and experts quoted have been rather dismissive of Putin’s presentation. That is an unfortunately common but foolhardy reaction, and its almost habitual. Observers are right to say that these technologies will take considerable time to test and deploy, but what some may not recall, because investment in Russian military analysis took a vacation 1992-2014, is actually when testing and development for these weapons began. The narrative of a sanctioned, economically weak and decaying Russia tends to prevail, but it comes with blinders on the issue of military technology. Yes, they can do this, and much of this may become reality in the 2020s. Recall awhile ago when Russian MoD leaked a slide on Status-6, many observers thought it was a PR stunt, and some kind of bluff, until it showed up in the NPR. Some thought T-14 Armata was a bluff, and made of cardboard, that ‘often wrong, but never in doubt list’ of expert dismissals is fairly long.

      Aeroballistic Missile Kinzhal – the air Iskander

      Kinzhal

      The shown missile is a substantially modified version of the Iskander SRBM, with Mig-31 serving as the boost phase, providing a high  altitude launch at supersonic speeds (recommend A. Ramm and Bogdanov for good reading). This is far from the first missile design to leverage Mig-31s performance in speed, takeoff weight, ceiling and combat range. Kinzhal is an operational-tactical complex, able to reach hypersonic speeds, a 2000 km range – although some suggest it is closer to 1500 km. According to official statements this missile can reach mach 10 and can conduct high-G maneuvers on terminal approach. I’m skeptical of the former, that is it likely can do mach 10 at early stages of flight, but then reduce speed for terminal maneuvers. The latter makes sense, because OTK 9M723 Iskander SRBM was designed to make random maneuvers in order to make its flight path difficult to intercept.

      Kinzhal is quite shorter, with smaller control surfaces, and a narrower nose. Gen Sergei Surovikin, head of Aerospace Forces (VKS) said the designation for this missile is Kh-47M2 (although earlier forum sources put it as (9-С-7760 – missile, 9-А-7660 – complex). Iskander, referenced as 9M723, can reach 350-450 km depending on payload, if launched at supersonic speeds from high altitude it stands to reason that a modified variant can achieve a substantially increased range. VKS should be happy since Mig-31s are technically under their service arm, and one of the few types of aviation they actually control. This gives them a new standoff weapon, and better chances at an anti-ship mission.

      Kinzhal is new, but according to A. Ramm and others, the concept initially surfaced 8 years ago. It has since then been mentioned by experts like Pyotr Bukowski in 2017. Given Iskander-M is considered to be a dual-capable replacement for Tochka-U, though its principal mission is conventional, there is ample reason to believe that the same nuclear warhead can be deployed on Kinzhal. Guidance is an interesting question, supposedly it can actively home on targets, and has scene matching as well. How that comes together at hypersonic speeds is a question, but more than likely this weapon is capable of very complex flight profiles. At least it is advertised with different seeker heads, one for traditional air-to-ground work, and the other as an anti-ship weapon.

      Readers will recall that Raduga’s Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback) aeroballistic missile from 1980s was allegedly quite fast, perhaps reaching Mach 5. Kinzhal might have more power than the original Iskander too. Russia’s MoD has plans to upgrade the current Iskander-M, improving range, so a Iskander-M2 is in the offing already for the ground forces.

      Kinzhal anti-ship.JPG

      I’m skeptical of the claim that this weapon has already begun combat duty in the Southern MD, which sounds like a ‘true lie,’ but it is probably the closest to operational deployment among weapons mentioned. One should not be surprised to see this in Syria at some point. Rumor has it the new GPV 2018-2027 plans to upgrade up to 50 Mig-31s to carry this missile. If anything, this weapon is ideally suited for the Pacific theater, where many Mig-31s are based, and in the anti-ship role, as it will prove incredibly difficult to intercept. I will add, there’s been no news of Tsirkon (a hypersonic cruise missile in development) since last year, principally for the anti-ship role. In 2017 everyone was advertising their goods to get funding in the new GPV, but since then Tsirkon has gone a bit quiet.

      Added another photo after more videos came out.

      Кинж

       

      R-28 Sarmat – heavy ICBM replacement for R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18)

      Sarmat 2.jpg

      R-28 Sarmat is a liquid fueled heavy ICBM designed to have high throw weight, deploying multiple warheads and numerous penetration aids. Although often touted as being a 200 ton replacement for SS-18, there’s a lot of conflicting information, some of it suggesting that its actually much closer to the weight of the SS-19, that is towards 100 tons. Earlier information suggested this was a 106 ton missile with a throw weight of 4350 kg. As a silo-based ICBM, SS-18 could deploy 10 warheads, but was designed and produced by Yuzhmash in Ukraine SSR. Hence Russia had an obvious problem, not only is this aging missile fielding a substantial percentage of the currently deployed force under New START, but it was still serviced and maintained by Yuzhmash.

      Currently, Sarmat is about 2 years behind schedule based on the contract initially signed in 2011. The last ejection test was in late December 2017, which seems to have gone successfully, with two more planned for early 2018. Sarmat features prominently in the new state armament program so there’s every reason to believe that it will be completed sooner rather than later, but in the end this is rocket science, not basket weaving. Suffice it to say, this missile is nowhere near serial production or operational readiness. Problems in Russian industry when it comes to missiles, rockets, and space lift, tend to stem less from S&T and more from production quality of complex components. This was at the heart of Bulava’s spotty test record. I’m also skeptical of the south pole trajectory shown in Putin’s address, implying it could be a fractal orbital weapon. In the end, we have to wait for the actual parameters of the missile to become public (100t or 200t ?), because Russian officials have a long established problem with numbers – whether lies, truth, or self-PR, rarely does anyone in Russia give the same figures for anything.

      Capture

      Sarmat is possibly the least interesting item shown during the weapons menagerie. More puzzling is that little has been said about RS-26 Rubezh, which has stayed out of the news for some time after initially being tested as an ICBM and classified as such. Russian MoD needs to do a ‘where are they now’ catch up segment on some of these systems.

      Gerasimov’s face during Sarmat video expresses how I felt.

      Gerasimov's face during talk of Sarmat

      Avangard or 4202 hypersonic boost-glide weapons

      During the address, Vladimir Putin said that they couldn’t show the actual video of the rocket being used, and hence the name reference to Avangard is rather confusing. Avangard was a project mentioned back in 2011 by Serduykov and some sources incorrectly suggested it was based on a modified RS-24, which was made by MIT, whereas 4202 has been a well known hypersonic boost-glide program and is regularly mentioned as being tested on УР-100УНТТХ, which is made by NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The video during Putin’s presentation shows UR-100 (SS-19 Stiletto) as expected, besides being associated with 4202 – this ICBM also forms the basis for two successful space lift variants ‘Rokot’ and ‘Strela.’ The concept involves using an ICBM to boost a vehicle to near orbital speed, then it descents and adjusts flight profile at some altitude where there is still minimal atmospheric resistance into a sustained hypersonic glide, with the terminal phase being dive to target.

      Borrowing this graphic

      HTV-2.jpg

      First mention of Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, and tests using UR-100, actually goes back to large scale RVSN exercise in 2004.  This, like Kinzhal in 2008, is to give the reader some indicator as to how long these programs have been in progress so as to remove any confusion about the proposition that VV Putin ran out of things to claim and is now making all this up. USSR had ideas about hypersonic vehicles back in mid-1980s, so this is hardly a new concept.  N. Surkov has a good article on the program here, adding that 4202’s flight control system was made in Ukraine, and needed replacing after the war. According to Surkov the vehicle is boosted to 100 km altitude and then glides down, perhaps at 5-7 km per second, those could be just official stats though, just like when Shoigu liberated 500,000 sq km of Syria.

      The idea behind 4202 is Russia’s version of Prompt Global Strike, except this system is intended to be an air defense penetrator carrying a strategic nuclear warhead. The vehicle being tested is analogous to U.S. Hypersonic Test Vehicle 2. Russia’s military continues to imagine a distant future where BMD is able to intercept their second strike, and therefore sees value in an expensive program to deliver nuclear weapons via a boost-glide vehicle. Although this threat perception is not too different from our oft advocated need for a new B-21 stealth bomber, since the current $2 billion B-2 is going to be defeated in some future where stealth is no longer viable. How Russians talk about the capabilities of U.S. missile defense to justify programs, and how Americans talk about Russian integrated air defense when it comes to B-21 and LRSO, has quite a bit in common.

      obj 4202

      A. Ramm has one of the best articles with details on 4202. A R-36M2 silo (listed as object 370) is being used to test 4202 (the complex is often referenced as A35-71. The UR-100 in question, together with 4202 on top of it, fits into this R-36 silo because it is designed for a missile that is 7 meters longer. Earlier mention of Avangard on a RS-24 based missile seems incorrect, unless this is a different system altogether, but in my view 4202 and Avangard are the same. Ultimately R-28 Sarmat is the most logical carrier for this hypersonic vehicle. UR-100 is the current test missile for 4202, while Yars or Topol lack the throw weight for such a weapon, but because UR-100 is too old, it means that R-28 Sarmat is the only perspective ICBM ‘booster’ for this weapon when/if it is completed. Before anyone chimes in that these things take a long time to develop, remind them that R-28 contract was signed 2011, and 4202 began testing 2004. So perhaps we will be seeing both by the mid-2020s?

      Bottom line: there remains a strong emphasis on non-contact warfare, particularly tactical operational and operational-strategic weapons, along with dual-capable standoff systems. Even if the rationale of U.S. missile defense doesn’t hold much logic behind it, Russian leadership continuously thinks about a future where their strategic deterrent is somehow compromised, and this threat concept is rather convenient to justify a host of next generation technology programs, delivery systems and the like. Where there is capability in long range precision guided munitions the short coming often ends up being capacity. These are not bluffs, the question is less whether they can make it work and more of ‘how many can they afford.’ The upcoming GPV 2018-2027 will focus on increasing munition stocks and bringing to fruition several new standoff missiles – Kinzhal is just one among several projects. More in part 2 on Dr. Strangelove weapons.

      Beyond the bad graphics, there is a real vehicle somewhere in testing, though it likely has a long way to go.

      4202 video.JPG

      In one brief graphic its even dodging numerous missiles that appear to be GBI interceptors, so there are two fantasies playing out in this image

      past gbi

      Comments and suggestions are welcome.

      U.S. Strikes and Russian PMC Casualties in Syria – Fact vs Fiction

      Michael Kofman4 Comments

      It’s become common knowledge that a U.S. strike took out an advancing column of Syrian forces on February 7th in defense of SDF positions east of Deir ez-Zor, and more likely to protect U.S. SOF embedded with them. Since then the story of Russian casualties among supporting PMCs (mercenaries belonging to private military companies) has proliferated across the internet and newspaper articles, with many of the facts and figures inaccurate. I’ve seen 100 dead, 200 dead, 600 dead, dozens, hundreds, scores of dead, and so on and so forth. Unfortunately Russian casualties, troops participating in military exercises, or similar such events have a large “applied internet multiplier” whereby they increase several fold depending on the source. By current figures many of those involved in the fighting February 7-8 were killed at least twice, if not multiple times.

      Due to a lack of credible information serious newspapers are citing some Russian businessman, a Syrian commander, and all sorts of other conflicting sources. The contradictory stories are reminiscent of Akira Kurosawa’s famous film Rashomon, where every character has their own often self-serving narrative about the same event. After a journalist called this morning to inquire whether it is true that U.S. airpower took out 20% of Russian ground forces in Syria it seems time for something sensible to be written on the matter. I’m updating this a bit as better information comes out.

      Based on the information available at the time I wrote that actual casualties among PMCs in this episode are likely somewhere on the order of 13-15 dead and a relatively equal number wounded. Initial reporting seemed closer to a dozen than dozens. The casualties  from this strike are spread between a Syrian unit known as ISIS Hunters (~20 KIA) and the bulk among SAA units which seemed to include some percentage of local fighters from the area (these numbers might be around 40 or more). There was word of a Syrian brigadier killed as well along with the SAA soldiers. More than likely this was an unit from Syria’s 5th Assault Corps supported by PMCs. The 13-15 PMC casualties are also not all necessarily Russian, but thus far all the confirmed dead are. A good number seem to be Cossacks, and many are fighters who previously were part of separatist formations in the Donbas, either directly on behalf of DNR or under contract as mercs.

      I am very biased towards conservative assessments based on the information that can be confirmed, and makes sense, i.e. I prefer starting low and working my way up. In this case it seems that the less probable event was true, the number of Wagner mercenaries killed was much higher than I initially thought.

      On Feb 16 I updated the count after more information and some additions from fighting February 10th. The better number increasingly looked like ~40 dead and 70 wounded as in MK article. I’m more inclined towards MK numbers in this graphic than any of the other figures, but it is still too low an estimate. Those are figures for combined casualties, referencing 3 companies of Wagner involved in support of Syrian forces. Of these the number of PMCs killed and wounded is probably more than a dozen but doubtfully exceeds 30-40 (or so I thought). Today the more realistic number is somewhere between 100-200 killed in that engagement.

      MK article here: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/02/13/pogibli-40-raneny-72-istochnik-v-chvk-vagnera-utochnil-poteri.html

      A good source comparison chart to figure out where all these numbers are coming from can be found here: https://chervonec-001.livejournal.com/2227259.html

      This is a photo of ISIS Hunters holding a funeral following the strike

      ISIS Hunters funeral

      The KIA count may go up depending on the fate of the wounded. There is a general assumption based on the evidence that the few PMCs killed belong to Wagner ChVK, as Wagner is the principal mercenary group fighting in support of SAA in Syria. As is often the case, facts point to a much less exciting and sensational story behind the headlines.

      According to DoD statements, and those by SecDef Mattis, the attacking force approximated ‘300 pro-regime forces’ in a surprise push towards SDF positions on February 7. Thus, the fantastic figures of hundreds dead, including Igor Girkin’s 644, can be safely thrown out the window. Somewhere on the order of 200 dead is also improbable unless the numbers for those attacking were much higher than being reported by the American side. The U.S. would have to kill literally everyone involved, and that seems quite a reach for typical rules of engagement. But it seems the numbers were somewhere 100-200 after all, that is the reporting from Russia and numerous sources suggest the U.S. intentionally under reported Russian PMC casualties in this fight. Either that, or the additional fighters died from poor morale after seeing the strike.

      Later on, DoD statements elaborated that the attack came evening of Feb 7th, and it included a ‘dismounted battalion sized element’ which was turned back. So this is somewhere on the order of 300-500 attacking but they only had contact with a part of the force. The difference in the numbers between Mattis’ initial 300 and LTG Harrigan’s battalion is in the leading half of the battalion, which dismounted (200-300), that U.S. forces struck and most of the casualties were among this element.

      Since LTG Harrigan indicated the attack was not unexpected, and they observed the buildup for some time (https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1441080/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-lieutenant-general-harrigian-via-teleco/), it explains better how so many assets were involved in beating back the assault – MQ-9, F-15E, F-22, even B-52 and AC-130. B-52 in particular would take some time to arrive on station. This suggests the U.S. knew the attack was coming, and they told the Russians they knew, and the action went forward anyway.

      This episode appears to have taken place around Al-Tabiyeh east of Deir ez-Zor. Syrian forces began an attack on SDF positions, with armor and artillery. Then U.S. forces made contact with Russian MoD to deconflict, and after being told there were no Russian soldiers there, which by all accounts there were not, they struck the advancing units. So, initially I thought total casualties were probably less than 100 with a approximately 40 SAA, 20 ISIS Hunters, and 13-15 PMC split (although unclear if SAA losses include ISIS Hunters losses in which case it might even more conservative). Now looking back, that was grossly conservative. Somewhere between 100-200 were killed, many of them Wagner fighters, that is more than the 42-70 estimate from the MK story.

      The exact reason for why this episode took place is naturally unclear, but it may be connected to the overall friction between Syrian forces wanting to seize energy infrastructure, gas and oil, from SDF forces. The latter took it from ISIS, and of course need the resources, just as the Syrian regime needs the money to sustain a rump state. There are also Russian interests there looming in the background, among people interested in contracts handling Syrian energy extraction post-conflict, and hoping that PMCs can secure potential energy cash cows. This episode may be due to poor coordination, deliberate probing, or as often happens in war – a confluence of events yields compound risk as mistakes and misjudgments stack.

      From higher altitude, the U.S. has a strategy to maintain presence in Syria via SDF, and Russia has a strategy to make the regime as viable as possible financially, while pushing U.S. proxies further east. Astride the war between Turkey and Kurds playing out in Afrin, the war between Israel and U.S. vs Iranian presence in the south, this is technically Syria’s war #3 which involves Russian forces backing SAA to retake more of Idlib and gain ground east of Deir ez-Zor.

      P.S. Behind this tale is another looming story about some Syrian T-72 that was taken out by a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone in defense of SDF positions and embedded U.S. advisers (internet can’t decide if its Russian or Soviet made). Actually on the video available it first looked more like a T-90, supplied by Russia to Syria’s 5th Assault Corps. There is an object right of the gun that looks like a Shtora system than IR illuminator from T-72BA – but this was not the case. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/13/us-mq-9-reaper-takes-out-russian-t-72-tank-syria.html (I got this photo from the same article)

      Looking at it some more later the V barrier on the front seems to point to T-72M, which is the more probable answer. This is is from Feb 10 fighting.

      DoD video shows a U.S Air Force Reaper strike on a Russia-made T-72 tank. (Screen shot of DoD video)

      We stand by to find out from the internet whether this particular tank was filled with hundreds of Russian PMCs or personally driven by Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.

      Figures compiled from a few news sources like Novaya Gazeta, Meduza, etc. some blog sources that are ‘pro-Russian’ but fairly well informed on the situation in Syria, work put out by CIT, other journalists/experts currently working the issue)

      https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/02/13/75496-oshibka-ili-predatelstvo

      https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/02/12/139439-cit-uznala-imena-pogibshih-v-sirii-boytsov-chvk-vagnera

      MK might have the best sources: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/02/13/pogibli-40-raneny-72-istochnik-v-chvk-vagnera-utochnil-poteri.html

      Oryx probably took number of dead and did standard 3x wounded multiplier, which makes sense.

       

      What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?

      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

      Reposting an article that just came out on the Russian campaign in Syria, co-authored with my good colleague and friend, Matthew Rojansky, who directs the Kennan Institute. This piece was published in the Military Review, Army University Press. Below we delve into the origins of Russia’s intervention in Syria, the course of the campaign, Russian strategy, and assess Moscow achieved its political objectives.

      —————————————————————————————————————————————–

      The war in Syria has ground on for more than half a decade. Hundreds of thousands have died, entire cities and towns have been destroyed, and billions of dollars in infrastructure have been decimated. Millions of refugees have flooded into neighboring Middle Eastern states that can ill afford to house them, while others have sought safety as far away as Europe and North America, exacerbating divisive battles over immigration, jobs, and cultural identity in Western democracies.

      Syria has tested every world leader individually and collectively, and has laid bare the failure of international institutions to deal effectively with the problems those institutions were designed to manage and prevent. Despite a prolonged commitment of U.S. military and diplomatic resources to the conflict, a peaceful settlement remains remote, and the bloody-handed Assad regime remains firmly in control of population centers along the Mediterranean coast. The impending battlefield defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in the desert interior of Syria and Iraq is qualified by the fact that its fighters have joined and inspired more elusive terror cells outside the region.

      Meanwhile, the Russian-led coalition, including Syrian forces, Iran, and numerous allied militias, appears to be closing in on its own military and political objectives. The Syrian conflict will likely enter a new phase in 2018, as both IS and the Syrian opposition cease to be relevant forces, and the two coalitions seek to negotiate a postconflict settlement. While it is far from assured that any settlement acceptable to the principle domestic and international players can be struck, for now the main outcome of this war is that President Bashar al-Assad will stay, but the Syria that existed before the war is gone.

      Russia has only been directly involved in this conflict since September 2015, but its intervention has radically changed the war’s outcome. The natural question is whether Russia has, in fact, won a victory. The answer to that question depends first on what Moscow intended to achieve—in other words, how did and does Russia define victory in Syria, what are its continuing interests there, and have those interests been secured or advanced?

      While the Russian campaign might be judged a qualified success from the standpoint of the Kremlin’s own objectives, Russia’s actual performance in both military and political terms bears closer examination. How did the Russians achieve their successes, both on the battlefield and on the wider diplomatic and political stage? Finally, armed with a better awareness of how Russia’s Syria campaign measured up in terms of Russian objectives and capabilities, what lessons should Americans take away for future U.S. engagement in Syria, the Middle East, and beyond?

      Origins of the Russian Intervention

      That American and Russian military power came to meet on the ground and in the skies over Syria in 2015 is a kind of historical accident. The country was hardly the centerpiece of either state’s global strategy, or even their respective regional policies.

      Russian-Syrian relations draw on a Cold War legacy, since Moscow first began to support Syria after the 1956 Suez Crisis. However, Syria did not become a true client state of the Soviet Union until 1971.The Soviet Union gained a well situated naval base in Tartus, on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, to support its Fifth Eskadra—an operational naval squadron—along with intelligence-gathering facilities ashore.

      Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Soviet fleets departed the Mediterranean, and the importance of Syrian bases rapidly declined. Moscow had far less cash available to sustain its patronage network of client states; relations with Syria became decidedly transactional, as Russia sought payment for continued arms sales. Russian ships continued exploiting the port of Tartus as a minor resupply point, but with little military significance. Tartus was, in any case, ill equipped for Russian ships to dock, and for a lengthy period, there was little Russian naval activity to even merit its use. That changed in the wake of the 2015 Russian intervention. The expanded Tartus port is now much more capable of supporting operations and resupplying the Russian Mediterranean squadron, which was stood up in 2013 for the purpose of supporting Syria.

      In general, Russia did not seek bases in Syria; it had to establish them and expand existing infrastructure to save the Syrian regime. Buoyed by perceived success, and looking to stay, in 2017 Russia signed a forty-nine-year lease on Tartus, which is still in the process of being upgraded into a serviceable naval base. What the Syrian relationship truly offered for post-Soviet Russia was a position in the Middle East, which helped confer great power status in international politics. A confluence of events led to what would become Moscow’s most significant military foray beyond the immediate post-Soviet space in over a quarter century.

      Although Russia had lingering interests in Syria, the changing context of U.S.-Russia relations beginning in 2011 was a more influential factor in how Moscow would come to view this conflict. Russia’s response to the U.S.-led intervention in Libya in that year was categorically negative, and Moscow sought to draw a line in the sand in Syria, opposing U.S. use of force to advance what it viewed as a “regime change” agenda. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov applied the Libya logic to Syria directly in May 2011, when he said, “The calculation is that foreign players will get imbued with this problem and will not only condemn the violence there, but subsequently repeat the Libyan scenario, including the use of force.”1

      The cornerstone of Russian policy in Syria became preventing the United States from carrying out a Libya-like intervention to overthrow Assad. Lavrov warned, “Some leaders of the coalition forces, and later the NATO secretary-general, called the Libyan operation a ‘model’ for the future. As for Russia, we will not allow anything like this to happen again in the future.”2 The fear of yet another U.S. military intervention, this time much closer to Russia itself, and targeting its only remaining client in the Middle East, was seemingly vindicated when President Barack Obama called for Assad to step aside.3 Russia was determined to check U.S. interventionism, initially by supplying the Syrian regime with arms and equipment, and by blocking efforts to pressure the regime in the UN Security Council.

      Equally important was the firm belief among Russian elites that Assad’s downfall would result in IS and al-Qaida affiliates taking over the country, spelling disaster for the region and creating a potential superhighway for Sunni extremists into Turkey and the Caucasus. This concern was somewhat vindicated as the ongoing civil war combined with the displacement of civilians due to the rise of IS resulted in a massive refugee flow into Turkey, neighboring countries, and central Europe, causing uncertainty and threatening regional stability (see figure 1). Unlike distant Libya, a complete implosion of Syria was not only too close for Russia’s comfort, but thousands of Russian citizens and thousands more Russian-speakers from the wider region had already joined militant extremist groups fighting there.4 Moscow feared that in the event of an IS victory, some of those fighters would enter Russia and join insurgencies in the North Caucasus or plot attacks against the Russian heartland. Accordingly, some Russians described entering the fray in Syria as launching a preventive war against terrorism.

      Figure 1. Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe

      Figure 1. Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe (Graphic courtesy of the BBC.; latest figures up to 3 March 2016. Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

      Russian interests and objectives in the Syrian intervention also stem from the collapse in Russia-West ties following Moscow’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014. In this sense, U.S. and European sanctions and diplomatic pressure catalyzed the Russian decision to intervene in Syria. Rather than giving in to Western pressure and offering concessions on Ukraine, Moscow looked to Syria to broaden the confrontation on terms more favorable to itself. Eventually, Russia hoped its Syrian intervention could force Washington and its European allies to abandon Ukraine-related sanctions and diplomatic isolation in the interests of achieving a negotiated settlement with Russia over Syria.

      Russian domestic political considerations were also a factor, though their role should not be overstated. Russia’s military dealt Ukraine a blow at the battle of Debaltseve in February 2015, leading to the second Minsk ceasefire agreement, which appeared to be a political victory for Moscow. The agreement quickly broke down, however, and Western sanctions remained in full effect, taxing the Russian economy at a time of persistently low energy prices. Struggling to stabilize the economic situation at home, and with policy in Ukraine increasingly adrift, there was little prospect for Russian leadership to gain further victories either at home or in Russia’s near abroad. Although Moscow hardly saw entering a bloody civil war in the Middle East as a path to easy gains, Russia’s tolerance for the risks attendant on intervention grew dramatically in the face of these domestic and international pressures.

      A limited Syrian intervention, calibrated to reduce political risk at home, became the less perilous proposition. By mid-2015, Moscow had few alternatives to use of force if it hoped to shore up the Assad regime, its ally in Damascus. In April, the situation for Assad’s forces was dire. Al-Qaida’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, had assembled a coalition of fighters into the “Army of Conquest,” which drove back regime forces in the northwest and threatened major population centers further south. At the same time, IS was pushing westward, and had captured the historic city of Palmyra. Assad’s forces were being squeezed, and they were falling back on almost all fronts. That summer, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, together with senior Syrian officials, made several trips to Moscow in an effort to coordinate a military intervention.5 By August that year, there were clear indicators that Russia was preparing to intervene, and when Russian tactical aviation began arriving at Hmeimim Air Base in September 2015, the die was cast. Figure 2 depicts the approximate Syrian situation in terms of territorial control exercised by particiapnts in the conflict near the outset of Russian operations initiated in support of the Assad regime.

      Framing the Russian Intervention

      Although hemmed in by tactical necessities, Moscow’s entry into the Syrian fray was also strategically ambitious. A successful intervention could offer victory on three fronts: preventing U.S.-backed regime change in Syria, breaking out of political isolation and forcing Washington to deal with Russia as an equal, and demonstrating at home that Russia is a great power on the main stage of international politics. Moscow hoped Syria would offer a new and more favorable front, where the United States could be outmaneuvered in the broader confrontation, which up to 2015 centered almost entirely on Russian actions in Ukraine.

      Figure 2. Syrian Civil War: Territorial Control Map as of November 2015

      Figure 2. Syrian Civil War: Territorial Control Map as of November 2015 (Graphic by edmaps.com; Twitter, edmaps.com; © 2017 Cristian Ionita)

      Once military operations began, as is often the case with military campaigns, the intervention would take on additional objectives, reflecting secondary or tertiary vested interests. “Ambition creep” is a common illness afflicting most great powers when they deploy military forces. Russia may not have come to Syria with hopes of regaining power and status in the Middle East at the top of its agenda, but regional aspirations grew with each success on the battlefield. As a consequence, Russia has become a potential powerbroker, and perhaps a balancer against U.S. influence, even if it did not embark on the Syrian campaign with those goals in mind.

      Whatever Russian expectations of success may have been—and there are indications that the Syrian leadership misled Moscow early on as to the true state of its forces (historically not an uncommon practice for Damascus)—Moscow pursued a campaign with both political and military objectives in fairly close alignment. These efforts were mutually reinforcing, but a path to victory had to overcome steep challenges.

      On the ground, Russian forces had to find a way to quickly and dramatically alter the balance in Assad’s favor by destroying the opposition’s capacity to continue the fight, while working under severe resource constraints. In parallel, Russia had to change the calculus and policy of its principal opponents in this conflict, including Turkey, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, while entering into arrangements with other potential actors in the region. Otherwise, military gains would quickly disappear in the sand, and a political victory would be elusive. Russia also needed a political process running concurrently to lock in military gains on the ground, since as Mao Zedong wrote, political power would “grow from the barrel of a gun.”

      Relations with allies like Iran, cobelligerents in the form of local militias, or potential spoilers such as Israel had to be carefully managed. The compound risk of conflicting political incentives and operational objectives among these parties made for a complex battle space. The risks of escalation to direct conflict between the intervening powers were considerable, as underscored by Syria’s use of chemical weapons in March 2017, resulting in a prompt retaliatory U.S. cruise missile strike, or the Turkish shoot down of a Russian Su-24M2 in November 2016. Russia led the coalition, but never controlled it; thus, it had to be comfortable with uncertainty and the associated risk of having the likes of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah on its team.

      Syrian soldiers who have defected to join the Free Syrian Army secure a street 27 January 2012 in Saqba

      Syrian soldiers who have defected to join the Free Syrian Army secure a street 27 January 2012 in Saqba, just east of Damascus, Syria. The diverse groups loosely associated under the Free Syrian Army designation became the initial primary targets of Russian operations in Syria since they most directly and immediately threatened the authority of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. (Photo courtesy of Freedom House, Flickr)

      Success for Russia entailed securing a commitment from the other parties to pursue a political settlement largely on its terms. This meant convincing Saudi Arabia and Turkey that their respective proxies had no chance of victory in the war, and pushing the United States to abandon its policy favoring regime change. Over time, Moscow achieved success on both the military and political fronts, coercing adversaries and negotiating changes to their positions one by one, though the pathway to this outcome was hardly a smooth or straightforward one. Russia’s success is not unqualified, but at the time of this writing, it appears that if the campaign in Syria is not a victory for Russia, it is certainly a defeat for those who opposed the Russian-led coalition.

      Russian Strategy in Syria

      To achieve this success, Russia had to secure some leverage in Syria, which in turn rested on being able to destroy the Syrian opposition and compel opponents to change their policies, forcing them and their proxies in the conflict to the negotiating table on terms favorable to Russia’s coalition. Moscow also sought the opportunity to reframe itself as a positive force in the battle against terrorism, and press the United States into military cooperation. Russian leaders hoped this would ultimately fracture Western cohesion on punitive measures imposed over Ukraine, and grant Russian President Vladimir Putin recognition as a prominent player in international affairs.

      These were the desired ends, yet the Russian strategy was not deliberate. If anything, Russia pursued an “emergent,” or “lean,” strategy. This was an approach characterized by the “fail fast, fail cheap” ethos of startup business, with iterative adjustments to the operation. The centerpiece of this strategy was flexibility, with a preference for adaptation over more structured strategy. In emergent strategy, success begets success, while failure is never final or disqualifying. Several vectors are pursued simultaneously, and at times, they may even appear to be contradictory. Resources are added in favor of the approach that shows the most progress, while others are discarded without regard to “sunk costs.”6

      Militant Islamist fighters parade 30 June 2014 in the streets of northern Raqqa Province, Syria

      Militant Islamist fighters parade 30 June 2014 in the streets of northern Raqqa Province, Syria, to celebrate their declaration of an Islamic “caliphate” after the group captured territory in neighbouring Iraq. The Islamic State (IS) posted pictures similar to this one online of people waving black flags from cars and holding guns in the air, and Russian forces, after supporting Assad’s defeat of Free Syrian Army forces holding the northern city of Aleppo, turned their primary attention to defeating IS. (Photo by Reuters stringer)

      To be successful in implementing a lean strategy, leadership must be agile, politically unconstrained, and uncommitted to any particular approach in the battle space, i.e. willing to improvise and adjust course. In Russia’s case, it actually helped being an authoritarian system, and having relatively few allies or other geopolitical constraints on decision-making. But Russia also had few other options. Given resource constraints and high uncertainty, including poor information about the reality on the ground from its allies, Russia was not in a position to pursue a more deliberate strategy. That limitation ultimately played to Russia’s advantage relative to other powers, which expended considerably more blood and treasure via structured and deliberate, but ultimately less successful approaches in the region. Russia’s lean strategy worked, because when flawed assumptions were proven wrong in the conflict, it could quickly pivot and adapt.

      Still, the limitations of the Russian armed forces imposed hard constraints on Russia’s overall operation. The Russian military had almost no experience with expeditionary operations after withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1989, Syria itself had limited capacity to host a major military footprint, Russia’s long-range supply and support capabilities were weak, and the Russian military was in the midst of major reforms and modernization. Coordinating with Iran and its associated Shia militias like Hezbollah was an added complexity on an already crowded battlefield, while Russian commanders had a generally low opinion of Syrian forces’ combat performance. In short, it was far from clear how the forces Russia could deploy would make the impact needed to turn the conflict around. Early on, outside observers doubted the prospects for Russia’s intervention, especially given recent Western experiences in expeditionary operations in the Middle East.

      The campaign Russia envisioned would be based on a small footprint to keep its exposure low, reducing the chances of being steadily dragged into a conflict where local actors increasingly gain leverage over a stronger international benefactor. Russian leadership instead sought room to maneuver, retaining flexibility and the option of quick withdrawal should things go badly. In the early days of Russia’s intervention, physical constraints limited its presence. Tartus was not a real naval base, Hmeimim Air Base lacked apron space for a large contingent of Russian aircraft, other Syrian bases were exposed, surrounded, or ill equipped, and Russian logistical support would have limited throughput.

      In short, reality helped dictate a more conservative and ultimately smarter approach to the battle space. It was not Moscow’s skill or experience, but the absence of abundance and limited options that made the Russian armed forces savvier in how they approached the conflict. That said, even after expanding the Syrian air base and making major investments in the naval facility, Russia’s General Staff continued to calibrate presence down to the bare minimum necessary. By 2017, it became clear that despite increased local capacity to host Russian forces, and improved infrastructure, Moscow was reluctant to use it. The opportunity to expand the means applied to this conflict was there, but Russia did not want it, judging that Syria would not be won with a means-based approach, the all too familiar “more is more” school of thought.

      The Russian strategy was about Syrian, Iranian, and Shia militias doing the fighting and Russian forces providing support, not the other way around. Syria continued to reveal the general Russian preference to use local forces first, mercenaries and other Russian proxies second, and its own forces last, only for decisive effect on the battlefield. Russian military power would pulse, peaking when necessary in support of offensives and withdrawing when judged unneeded.

      Russian Combat Operations in Syria

      When Russian forces first arrived in Syria in September 2015, they inherently introduced a new dynamic, compelling what became a dialogue on “deconfliction” arrangements with the United States. Several Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters were shown on the runway at Hmeimim Air Base as Su-24M2 bombers began to deploy. Leveraging an upcoming UN Security Council General Assembly summit, Moscow pressed for a high-level bilateral meeting between Putin and Obama—a break from what had been more than a year of U.S.-imposed diplomatic “isolation” of Russia in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

      A Russian Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft drops a KAB-500S, a 560 kg satellite-guided bomb

      A Russian Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft drops a KAB-500S, a 560 kg satellite-guided bomb, on an enemy position 9 October 2015 in the Aleppo or Racca region of Syria. (Photo courtesy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)

      Though the Obama administration rankled at the appearance that it had been coerced into restoring military dialogue, the risk of a military incident between the two big nuclear powers in the skies over Syria trumped other considerations.7 In a ninety-minute discussion, the two sides agreed to continue efforts to “deconflict” operations. Within days, Russia had achieved its first political gains from the intervention, which had yet to conduct a single sortie.

      Still, it was clear that there was no agreement on the political way forward in Syria, and early Russian targeting in the air campaign, which launched on 30 September 2015, revealed that Russia’s air wing would focus on the “moderate” Syrian opposition under the rubric of a counterterrorism fight. Moscow’s rules of engagement were relatively simple: there was little to no distinction between the various nongovernment armed groups in Syria, as all except for Kurds and pro-regime militias would be considered “terrorists.” Putin declared at the UN assembly, “We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its armed forces, who are valiantly fighting terrorism face to face. We should finally acknowledge that no one but President Assad’s armed forces and Kurdish militias are truly fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria.”8

      This was not just a matter of convenience for the sake of establishing a free-fire zone. Indeed, from Russia’s perspective, there was no such thing as a “moderate” opposition in Syria, and the entire term was a misguided Western invention aimed at legitimizing extremists opposed to Assad. The Russian political strategy at home and abroad was to frame the conflict as binary—only Assad’s regime had legitimacy, and all others were de facto terrorist groups of varying stripes allied with IS or Jabhat al-Nusra.9 Over time, Russia would also seek to create a systemic opposition, cobbling together forces that would be amenable to sharing power with the Assad regime.

      Taking advantage of the momentum in 2015, Russia set up an intelligence sharing and coordination center in Baghdad, which included Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Israel. The center’s purpose was to deconflict Russian air operations with neighboring countries. Moscow also hoped to create the public sense that it was leading a coalition of countries in a counterterrorism effort no less legitimate than the U.S.-led coalition against IS. Russia’s leadership sought to parlay this posture and the U.S.-Russian deconfliction dialogue into more formal recognition of U.S.-Russia cooperation in Syria. Indeed, Moscow repeatedly asked for Washington’s acknowledgement of the Russian-led coalition as a legitimate partner in the Syrian war, which would have amounted to a recognition of Russia as Washington’s geopolitical “equal,” at least in this context.

      Initial Russian combat operations were intended to change the momentum on the battlefield, providing a substantial morale boost to the Syrian forces and allied militias. Russia also hoped the United States would cede the battle space, at least by default, by focusing on its own combat operations against IS in Northern Iraq, and Kurdish allies in Syria. This would mean a rapid abandonment of the moderate opposition and other proxies seeking Assad’s overthrow, who would be powerless to deal with Russian airpower and increasingly isolated on the battlefield. In many respects, this goal was accomplished, as Russia and the United States established a de facto division of labor in Syria and complementary campaigns.

      The first Russian deployment to Syria consisted of thirty-three aircraft and seventeen helicopters. These included twelve Su-24M2 bombers, twelve Su-25SM/UB attack aircraft, four Su-34 bombers, four Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters and one Il-20M1 reconnaissance plane. The helicopter contingent consisted of twelve Mi-24P attack helicopters and five Mi-8AMTSh transports.10 Later in 2015, this number would grow with four more Su-34 bombers and four additional Su-35S air superiority fighters. Mi-35M attack helicopters and Mi-8 transports arrived in the following months. A Mediterranean squadron led by the Black Sea Fleet would support the operations from the sea, though the Russian navy mostly concerned itself with providing logistical supplies to the intervention via landing ship tanks in what was dubbed the “Syrian Express.” In order to supplement limited transport capacity at sea, and equipment brought in by air via Ruslan An-124 cargo planes, Russia purchased eight Turkish cargo vessels and pressed four of them into service.

      Initial Russian objectives focused on regaining access to key roads, linking infrastructure, breaking isolated Syrian bases out of encirclement, and softening up opposing forces by destroying as much hardware as possible—much of it captured earlier from the Syrian Army. Although in the early months Russia had supposedly only helped Syria regain control of 2 percent of its territory, by February 2016, it was clear the air campaign was having an effect in shaping the battlefield, and with it, the political fortunes of the Syrian opposition. The opposition’s momentum stunted, Syrian morale began to recover.

      A screenshot of a YouTube video shows cruise missiles being launched 17 November 2015 from a Russian fleet in the Caspian Sea

      A screenshot of a YouTube video shows cruise missiles being launched 17 November 2015 from a Russian fleet in the Caspian Sea. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reported launching eighteen cruise missiles in the salvo, hitting seven terrorist targets in Syria. (Screenshot of RT YouTube video)

      Territorial control in Syria was always elusive, as local leaders would sign up with whoever was winning. Thus, “control” could swing rapidly towards the side that had the clear momentum, and Russian forces oversaw numerous “ceasefire agreements” between Syrian forces and village leaders. In reality, Assad’s forces had control over much of the population of Syria, while large tracts of opposition or extremist held territory were depopulated from the fighting. Thus, it would take less than two years for the Russian-led coalition to make the leap from gaining only 2 percent of territory to appearing to be the victor in the conflict.

      Russian aircrews flew sorties at a high rate, averaging perhaps forty to fifty per day, but spiking to one hundred during peak combat times, such as January 2016. Two crews per airframe were needed to sustain the intensity of operations, along with a small village of defense contractors to support the newer platforms being fielded in Syria. Russian airpower in Syria never exceeded thirty-to-fifty combat aircraft and sixteen-to-forty helicopters of various types, a deployment many times smaller than the combat aviation group the Soviet Union fielded in Afghanistan.11 The rate of mechanical failure or combat loss was also magnitudes less than previous Russian or Soviet air operations.

      During the conflict, Russian aerospace forces would be supported by around 3,000 ground troops, with perhaps 1,500 based at Hmeimim alone. These would include Naval Infantry from the 810th brigade based in Crimea, elements from the 7th Airborne Assault Division, armored companies fielding T-90A tanks, MSTA-B towed artillery, and a host of air defense units including Buk-M2, Pantsir-S1 and S-400 units. Sophisticated electronic warfare equipment was deployed as well, alongside Russia’s Special Operations Command. After the capture of Palmyra in the spring and of Aleppo in the fall of 2016, Russia also introduced demining units and specialized military police units from the North Caucasus.

      Russia’s special operations command featured prominently throughout the conflict, conducting diversionary operations, targeted killings, and reconnaissance. Another two thousand or so private military contractors (PMCs), the largest of which is known as Wagner Group, bolstered Syrian forces and absorbed most of the casualties on the battlefield. With Russian air power in support, veterans-turned-PMCs made a difference amidst the poorly trained militias, taking the risk for $4,000–$5,000 per month.

      On the whole, Moscow sought to keep its presence small. The initial force did not field long-range air defenses or dedicated air superiority fighters; rather, their arrival was prompted by an unexpected incident with Turkey, when Russia’s Su-24M2 was shot down by a Turkish F-16 in November of 2015. The Russian bomber had been attacking Turkmen militias in Syria, and had strayed through Turkish airspace. Indeed, Russia’s air force repeatedly violated Turkish airspace in an effort to coerce Turkey to change its policy in Syria and reach a modus vivendi with the Russian-led coalition. The crisis between Russia and Turkey was arguably the most dangerous moment of the entire intervention, and likely the closest a NATO country had been to military conflict with Russia in decades.

      A Syrian man carries his two girls to safety 7 September 2015 across the rubble caused by a barrel bomb attack on the rebel-held neighborhood of al-Kalasa

      A Syrian man carries his two girls to safety 7 September 2015 across the rubble caused by a barrel bomb attack on the rebel-held neighborhood of al-Kalasa in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo. Once Syria’s economic powerhouse, Aleppo was ravaged by fighting after the rebels seized the eastern part of the city in 2012, confining government forces to the west. As a result of widespread civilian deaths due to such bombings, Russia and Syria received global condemnation for air attacks against Aleppo and other urban targets. (Photo by Karam al-Masri, Agence France-Presse)

      The Russian reaction to the incident was to impose harsh economic and political sanctions on Turkey, while showing on the battlefield that Turkish-backed forces had little hope of achieving victory over Assad. By the summer of 2016, Ankara gave in, issuing a quasi-apology in order to restore normal relations with Moscow. One by one, Russia would seek to change the positions of the major parties backing anti-Assad forces in Syria. First, Moscow pushed Washington to concede that a policy of regime change was not only unrealistic, but that its support for the Syrian opposition had no chance of success, all the while dangling the prospect of a ceasefire and humanitarian relief for civilians in the conflict. The United States did inch towards tacit acceptance of the Russian intervention, and of Assad’s de facto victory over the radicals as well as the U.S.-backed opposition.

      Russian ambitions were also well served by competition among U.S. allies in the region, who frequently and vocally disagreed with Washington’s approach. Turkey was more hostile towards Kurdish fighters in Syria than towards Assad or IS, yet the Kurds were Washington’s chief ally against IS on the ground. Washington also had no interest in supporting Sunni extremist groups favored by the Saudis and other Arab states, nor were extremists seen as a viable alternative to the bloody Syrian regime. Eventually, after crushing Turkish-backed proxies in Syria, Russia got the cooperation it sought with Ankara. Saudi Arabia, too, began to show flexibility, and in October 2017, the Saudi king visited Russia for the first time in recognition of Moscow’s growing significance in the Middle East.

      Russia also saw Syria as a testing ground for new weapons and platforms, giving as much of its military an opportunity to participate in the conflict as possible. This included rotating countless crews through the theater of operations, giving ships and bombers the opportunity to fire cruise missiles, and fielding a small ground force as well. After a period of military reforms from 2008 to 2012 and a large modernization program begun in 2011, Moscow wanted to bloody its air force in conflict.

      Syria has had a profound impact on the Russian armed forces, as countless officers have been rotated through the campaign on three month stints to gain combat experience. According to Russia’s Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, the commanders of military districts, combined arms armies, air force and air defense armies along with many of the divisional commanders have gained experience in Syria.12 Promotions in 2017 further advanced those who served in Syria. The experience will shape Russian military thinking and personnel decisions for years to come.

      Russian military engineers clear approach routes of mines 2 April 2016 in the ancient city of Palmyra, Syria

      Russian military engineers clear approach routes of mines 2 April 2016 in the ancient city of Palmyra, Syria. Russia deployed few ground troops to Syria in order to keep the Russian “footprint” small. Instead, it relied on Syrian army forces, Shiite militias, and Iranian “volunteeers” to serve as the primary ground forces for combined operations primarily planned by the Russians. (Photo by Valery Sharifulin, TASS)

      Alongside these training objectives, Russia also used combat operations in Syria as a technology demonstration for arms sales abroad, showing off the latest generation of Russian tech alongside older Soviet workhorses that did most of the fighting.

      Starting with an initial strike on 7 October 2015, over the course of the conflict, Russian ships and submarines fired numerous Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, Russia’s long-range aviation joined the fray in November 2015, and since then, Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers have flown a substantial number of sorties deploying Kh-555 and newer Kh-101 air launched cruise missiles against targets in Syria.13 The Tu-22M3 medium bomber force supplemented combat sorties from Hmeimim Air Base, though these aircraft exclusively dropped FAB unguided bombs from medium to high altitude. Later Moscow would also field Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems, Bastion-P antiship missiles, and other advanced weapons in an effort to demonstrate their capability.

      Although the precision-guided weapons involved in the conflict represented a tiny portion of the actual mixture of weapons used, perhaps less than 5 percent, Russia demonstrated the capacity to employ long-range guided weapons from various platforms. Syria showcased both the advances Russian airpower forces had made since their dismal performance in the Russia–Georgia War of 2008 as well as the remaining limitations of Russia’s armed forces. Much of the bombing was done by older Su-24M2 and Su-25SM aircraft, and almost all of it with unguided area-of-effect munitions. With the exception of systems on the Su-34, which was used to employ the KAB-500S satellite-guided bomb, among other precision weapons, Russian fixed-wing aircraft as a whole lacked targeting pods to effectively employ precision-guided munitions.14

      Russian naval aviation was not impressive. The carrier strike-group sortie to Syria ferried by Russia’s vintage Kuznetsov heavy-aviation-carrying cruiser in 2016 was a publicity disaster, losing a Su-33 and Mig-29K to equipment failures. Otherwise, remarkably few Russian aircraft were lost, with most of the casualties among helicopter crews. Russian technicians kept both old- and newer-generation aircraft in the sky, with only one Su-24M2 lost to technical failure.

      Russian air strikes were certainly effective, but incredibly costly in civilian casualties and collateral damage inflicted, some of which appeared intentional. Much of the ordinance used was for area of effect, and much too large in payload for targets in Syria. The Russian Aerospace Forces as a whole are still confined to an early 1990s form of fighting (though still a generational leap from where they were in 2008), but relying almost entirely on unguided weapons and, more importantly, lacking in the ISR assets necessary to conduct information-driven combat operations. Russia’s Aerospace Forces also lack the means to engage small moving targets with guided precision, relying on unguided weapons and munitions that are truly overkill.15 Just as the Soviet Union before it, the Russian military is a brutal mauler in close quarters, but continues to struggle in finding and seeing its target.

      Russian military engineers clear approach routes of mines 2 April 2016 in the ancient city of Palmyra, Syria

      Citizens of Aleppo display portraits of fallen Russian servicemen killed while fighting in Syria during a 22 December 2017 parade in Aleppo, Syria. The Syrians were expressing appreciation for the Russian Federation’s contributions during the first anniversary celebration of the capture of Aleppo. (Photo courtesy of the Russian Embassy’s Twitter account, @EmbassyofRussia)

      Russia made heavy use of drones to supplement its manned air campaign, conducting battle damage assessment and reconnaissance. Russian drones are rumored to have flown more sorties than manned aviation over Syria. The best Russian drones were licensed production variants of Israeli models—a product of Russian-Israeli defense cooperation. Despite substantial spending on development, Russia still has no armed unmanned aircraft systems, and thus lacks a real time recon-strike option for its drone platforms. Syria highlighted the need for Russian armed forces to invest further in the development of unmanned strike systems, and develop a larger repertoire of guided weapons for the Aerospace Forces, particularly for tactical employment.

      Those limitations aside, Moscow did use the Syrian campaign effectively as part of a broader diplomatic and political engagement with the United States, demonstrating capability and resolve to use long-range guided weapons, many of which have nuclear-tipped variants. Syria did much for Russian coercive credibility, painting a clear picture about the resurgent capability and capacity of its armed forces to impose costs on NATO in a conventional conflict and its ability to reach out at long ranges to hold much of Europe at risk, if need be. Long-range strikes by strategic bombers, ships, and submarines should not be viewed simply as combat tests to gain experience; they were also intended as strategic messaging to boost Russian credibility writ large.

      Not Home by Christmas

      Upon entering the conflict, Russian armed forces quickly discovered that the intervention would take considerably more time than initially expected or desired. Syria’s army had degenerated into armed militias that were formally unified under the Assad banner but that no longer represented a coherent fighting force. Russian leadership was aghast at the large amount of Syrian and Iraqi hardware captured by the opposition and various militant groups while the Assad regime held barely 10 percent of territory. Some Syrian units were still capable of action, but Russian officers would have to embed across these units to conduct military operations and start rebuilding the Syrian army’s fighting potential.

      Despite an influx of Iranian and Hezbollah troops in October 2015, it was clear that the warring sides were all leveraging proxies on a battlefield with a low density of forces. Their combat effectiveness was poor, and Syrian forces would continually call in Russian air strikes, make small gains, and retreat at the first sight of counteroffensives by well-motivated Jabhat al-Nusra or other fighting groups.

      Over time Russia would train up lower ranking Syrian officers, and establish the 5th Volunteer Assault Corps, led by Russian commanders and equipped with more advanced Russian equipment. The 5th has been Syria’s primary assault force for the past year. Combining Syrian fighters, PMCs, and Russian leadership to put together offenses has yielded battlefield victories at minimal cost.

      Russian operational objectives were suited to its strategy: make decisive gains where possible, fragment the Syrian opposition, and seek to parlay victories in Syria into broader political objectives with the United States. To this end, the Russian General Staff sought to avoid exhaustive battles over population centers, especially given that Syrian forces lacked the manpower to hold anything they took. Such an approach would, and eventually did, result in having to retake the same terrain multiple times, as in the case of Palmyra. Russia also genuinely wanted to turn the fight eastward towards IS in an effort to glue together its effort at cooperation with the United States. Syria and Iran were not interested, instead seeking near total victory over the opposition and the recapture of all the major population centers in the west.

      While Russia retained the image of a powerbroker and leader of the coalition, in reality, it did not have buy-in for such a strategy from its allies and cobelligerents; nor could Moscow compel them. In this regard, Russia suffered from the same deficit as the United States. Both were outside powers intervening in Syria without the necessary influence over local and regional allies to broker big deals. These differences came to the fore in March 2016, when Russia declared its withdrawal from Syria while turning the attention of its forces to Palmyra. In fact, Moscow had no intention of withdrawing, simply deleveraging and settling in for a longer fight, while Assad was focused on retaking Aleppo.

      With its March declaration, Russia sought to recast the intervention in Syria as a sustainable longer-term security presence in support of a political settlement, rather than combat per se. The idea was to normalize Russian operations in the eyes of Russia’s domestic audience and to declare victory in some form. Medals were handed out and a small contingent was rotated back home, but meanwhile, Russia prepared to turn the Syrian campaign into smaller “campaigns” to avoid the perception that the intervention could take years. The first segment was concluded with the Russian capture of Palmyra in March 2016. Syrian and Iranian forces then turned towards Aleppo, a battle that ultimately scuttled Russian attempts to negotiate a joint integration group with the United States. The second cut was made in January of 2017, after the seizure of Aleppo, and a third “victory” has been set at the closing of 2017 as Syrian forces capture Deir ez-Zor and IS appears on the verge of defeat.

      igure 3. Syrian Civil War: Territorial Control Map as of November 2017

      Figure 3. Syrian Civil War: Territorial Control Map as of November 2017(Graphic by edmaps.com; Twitter, @edmapscom; © 2017 Cristian Ionita)

      This latest declaration of victory, ahead of the March 2018 presidential election, is fraught with risk since Russian forces are not just staying but further expanding the infrastructure at Tartus and Hmeimim. As Gerasimov said in a recent interview, “we’re not going anywhere.” Not long thereafter, a mortar attack on 31 December damaged several planes and killed a number of Russian soldiers at the airbase. The strike was followed by a drone attack from militant groups against both bases on 6 January. Both were a stark reminder that triumphalism is somewhat premature, and Russian forces in theater remain at risk. Figure 3 depicts the approximate Syrian situation as of November 2017 in terms of territorial control exercised by participants in the conflict near the official close of Russian operations initiated in support of the Assad regime. (See figure 1 for a comparison to the situation at the beginning of the campaign.)

      Postconflict Settlement and Beyond

      Now that the bulk of Syrian territory and population centers have been wrested from the hands of anti-regime opposition groups, Russia can turn its full attention toward the postconflict settlement. It is true that Assad has committed to retake “every inch” of Syrian territory, and that even if Russia does not support this ambition, it will have little choice but to back continued regime efforts to secure energy and water resources in the country’s north and south. However, the main focus of both the Russian military and political action will be around the diplomatic settlement and supportive conditions on the ground.

      Most importantly, Russia has apparently gained Washington’s acceptance of its role as a key broker in Syria’s future. In their November summit meeting in Vietnam, Presidents Trump and Putin confirmed not only continuing U.S. and Russian deconfliction dialogue and support for “de-escalation zones,” a largely Russian initiative, but also underscored the centrality of the political process for negotiating a postconflict future for Syria. That process is shaping up in line with Russia’s main strategic interests.

      First, Russia has broken the monopoly of the Geneva process, and of U.S. diplomatic leadership. It has successfully integrated both the Astana-based negotiations it launched in 2016 to the formal UN-backed international process, and has regularly convened meetings of various opposition groups in an attempt to foster the emergence of a common opposition grouping, which will be amenable to compromise with the Assad regime. Moscow’s progress on the political front is fitful, but at this writing it appears to be the only plausible path forward.

      Second, Russia has managed to maintain productive ties with each of the other key regional players, ranging from Saudi Arabia on one end of the spectrum to Iran on the other. In fact, despite continuing disagreement with Saudi Arabia over the composition of the “legitimate” Syrian opposition to be represented at Geneva, and with Turkey over the role of the Kurdish self-defense forces, Russian diplomacy (backed by military force) has won recognition from both, a fact that is especially welcome in Moscow in the run-up to Russia’s March 2018 presidential election. Iran has proven a thorny ally for Russia; however, the relationship between the two countries remains largely stable, since the Iranians expect to be able to maintain their de facto dominance on the ground in much of Syria, solidifying their corridor of power from Iraq to Lebanon.

      Finally, Russia will retain its ally in Damascus, because for the foreseeable future, the Assad regime appears back in control. In fact, Assad’s stock has risen so much since the Russian intervention two years ago that he is largely able to set the terms of his participation in the Geneva process. The opposition can howl in protest, but the regime has simply refused to engage in negotiations if the question of its own departure is on the agenda.

      This is also clearly a victory for Russia, since Moscow has capitalized on its victories to secure long-term leases on its military facilities at Hmeimim and Tartus, as well as to position Russian firms to play potentially prominent and lucrative roles in Syrian reconstruction, especially in the energy and energy transit sectors. Russia not only needs these bases to continue supporting Syrian forces, but the conflict is now part of a larger bid for becoming a power broker in the Middle East, and a balancing option for those seeking to hedge against U.S. influence.

      The main area in which Russia’s Syria campaign fell clearly short of initial objectives was in the effort to broaden the platform for diplomatic engagement with Europe and the United States in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and associated Western sanctions. Although Moscow did break through the Obama administration’s attempted isolation policy by forcing Washington to conduct deconfliction talks, those talks have not expanded into the full-fledged Russia-U.S. cooperation for which the Kremlin had hoped. Moreover, there has been zero willingness from Western capitals to think of Syria and Ukraine in quid pro quo terms. As much as Westerners may lament the death toll and flood of refugees from the Syrian civil war, the Ukraine conflict is simply much closer to home, and European governments have held firm in their support for sanctions tied to fulfillment of the Minsk agreements, while the United States has actually ratcheted sanctions dramatically upward in the wake of Russia’s apparent attempts to meddle in the 2016 U.S. election.

      In sum, Russia appears to have won at least a partial victory in Syria, and done so with impressive efficiency, flexibility, and coordination between military and political action. On the one hand, Russia’s embrace of the Assad regime and its Iranian allies, its relative indifference to civilian casualties, and its blanket hostility to anti-regime opposition groups are fundamentally at odds with widely held U.S. views on Syria. On the other hand, Russia’s “lean” strategy, adaptable tactics, and coordination of military and diplomatic initiatives offer important lessons for the conduct of any military intervention in as complex and volatile an environment as the Middle East. More than a decade and a half into the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, with ongoing fighting in Libya and Yemen, and countless other tinderboxes that could ignite wider regional conflict threatening U.S. interests, Washington should pay close attention to the Russian intervention and how Moscow achieved its objectives in Syria.

      Michael Kofman is a senior research scientist at CNA Corporation, where he serves as director of the Russia Studies Program. He is also a Global Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C., and a nonresident Fellow at the Modern War Institute, West Point. Previously he served as program manager at National Defense University. His research focuses on security issues in Russia and the former Soviet Union, specializing in defense and military analysis. He holds a BA from Northeastern University and an MA from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

      Matthew Rojansky is director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He holds an AB from Harvard College and a JD from Stanford Law School. Previously, he was deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He also served as an embassy policy specialist at the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine, and as a visiting scholar in the Research Division at the NATO Defense College.

      Notes

      1. Sergei Lavrov and Russian Media, “On Syria and Libya,” Monthly Review (website), 17 May 2011, accessed 15 December 2017, https://mronline.org/2011/05/17/on-syria-and-libya/. The text is an excerpt from “Transcript of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview to Russian Media Following Attendance at Arctic Council Meeting, Nuuk, May 12, 2011,” published on the Russian Foreign Ministry website on 13 May 2011.
      2. “Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at Joint Press Conference with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah Al Nahyan,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (website), 1 November 2011, accessed 10 January 2018, http://www.mid.ru/en/vistupleniya_ministra/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/186758.
      3. Macon Phillips, “President Obama: The Future of Syria Must Be Determined by Its People, but President Bashar al-Assad Is Standing in Their Way,” White House Press Office (website), accessed 19 December 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be-determined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad.
      4. Vladimir Frolov, “Signing In is Easier than Quitting,” Vedomosti (website), 29 September 2016, accessed 19 December 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/amp/a00ffd6a64/opinion/articles/2016/09/29/658952-voiti-legche-viiti.
      5. “Iran Quds Chief Visited Russia despite U.N. Travel Ban: Iran Official,” Reuters, 7 August 2015, accessed 19 December 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-iran-soleimani-idUSKCN0QC1KM20150807; Michael Kofman, “A Tale of Two Campaigns: U.S. and Russian Military Operations in Syria,” Pathways to Peace and Security1, no. 52 (2017): 163–70.
      6. Michael Kofman, “The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy,” War on the Rocks (website), 17 January 2017, accessed 19 December 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/the-moscow-school-of-hard-knocks-key-pillars-of-russian-strategy/.
      7. Teresa Welsh, “Obama, Putin Meet in New York,” S. News & World Report(website), 28 September 2015, accessed 19 December 2017, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/28/obama-putin-meet-in-new-york.
      8. Washington PostStaff, “Read Putin’s U.N. General Assembly speech,” Washington Post (website), 28 September 2015, accessed 19 December 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/?utm_term=.48d2be2b7823.
      9. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Moscow’s War in the Air: Russia Sends a Message in Syria,” The National Interest(website), 1 October 2015, accessed 19 December 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/moscows-war-the-air-russia-sends-message-syria-13983.
      10. Ruslan Pukhov, “Russian Military, Diplomatic and Humanitarian Assistance” in Syrian Frontier, ed. M. U. Shepovalenko, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2016), 105–107, accessed 9 January 2018, http://cast.ru/upload/iblock/686/6864bf9d4485b9cd83cc3614575e646a.pdf.
      11. Ruslan Pukhov, “The War that Russia Won,” Izvestia (website), 13 October 2017, accessed 10 January 2018, https://iz.ru/652856/ruslan-pukhov/voina-kotoruiu-rossiia-vyigrala.
      12. Valery Gerasimov, “We Broke the Back of Terrorists,” interview by Victor Baranets, Komsomolskaya Pravda (website), 26 December 2017, accessed 10 January 2018, https://www.kp.ru/daily/26775/3808693/.
      13. The initial employment of long-range aviation was in response to the terrorist bombing of Russia’s MetroJet flight out of Egypt.
      14. Pukhov, “The War that Russia Won.”
      15. Ruslan Pukhov, “Polygon Budushego,” Russia in Global Affairs (website), 8 March 2016, accessed 10 January 2018, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Poligon-buduschego-18032.

       

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      The A-Z of #bookblogging

      Having recently done an A-Z of me which seemed to go quite well, I thought I’d turn my attention to bookblogging, and pull off the same trick twice (well, three times as the A-Z came in two bits…)

      Are you sitting comfortably? Got a nice cup of tea/coffee/beverage of your choice? Here we go!

      A is for ARCs

      ARC stands for Advance Reader Copy, and is the holy grail of #bookblogging. If you’re new to the book blogging community you may feel a twinge of jealousy at photos of all the lovely ARCs that lucky bloggers show off. That feeling never goes away – I’m incredibly lucky to get fairly regular #bookpost from lovely publishers, but still get all green-eyed when a fellow blogger tweets about a book from a favourite author.

      How do you get hold of an ARC? Luckily ace bookblogger Drew over at The Tattooed Book Geek has a handy guide.

      Oh, and selling ARCs is very naughty. VERY. I’ve got a SUPER rare ‘two birds’ copy of Jay Kristoff’s awesome Nevernight, but I wouldn’t part with it for anything. ANYTHING. Not even more books.

      Super-rare Nevernight. And it’s all MIIIIINE.
      B is for books

      Need I say more? A bookblogger without a book is just a blogger. Go buy a book, quick!

      B is also for buying books. It’s not all about the freebies. Every bookblogger worth their salt will have a pile of bought books that are jostling for space on the TBR pile.

      And B is for blog tours. A blog tour is where a publisher or publicist organises a group of bloggers to post about a book around the same time. Some blog tours last a week, with one blog for each day, but the bigger tours can last a month, with several bloggers posting each day. They can be a mix of reviews, extracts, giveaways and other content, all with the aim of creating a buzz around the launch of a book.

      C is for conventions

      I’ve been to a few fabulous bookish events, and they’re a brilliant place to go listen to authors talk about books, talk to other people about books, talk to authors about their books, and maybe even get your lovely books signed. And maybe buy a book or three just in case you ever run out of books. IT COULD HAPPEN.

      Anyway, don’t be shy, go and introduce yourself to your favourite author, tell them how much you love their books.

      D is for diversity in fiction

      I’ve written about this elsewhere, but I realised that I spent a lot of time reading books by old white guys and was really missing out. I’ve been making more of a conscious effort to read more books by women, by people of colour, by people who don’t fit into my default. And my reading is so much the better for it. By reading and shouting about more diverse books, publishers will see the demand for more diverse books and we’ll get more diverse books. Which can only be a good thing.

      E is for extracts

      Sometimes on a blog tour you might not have time to read and review a book before it’s published, so you often see bloggers posting an extract from a book. Often just a short snippet from near the start of the book to give readers a flavour for what the book is about.

      F is for fantasy and science fiction

      Two of my very favourite genres. Though I’m also partial to a spot of crime fiction, and especially some Nordic Noir.

      G is for guest posts

      As with extracts, sometimes an author will be generous enough to write a guest post for your blog. They can either be about the book itself, like this interview with a character from A.K. Benedict’s The Evidence of Ghosts, some thoughts on plotting from Neil White, author of The Domino Killer, research by David Mark (of the DS Aector McAvoy series of crime novels), or even a guest post from another blogger, like the time that Liz Barnsley from Liz Loves Books stopped by to take us on a reader’s journey through the world of Charlie Parker from the books of John Connolly.

      H is for helpfulness

      The book blogging community is enormously helpful – we’ll shout about new books that we love, but we’ll also shout about other bloggers reviewing books, new authors that we’ve found and any other bookish things. Take that post from Liz – being helpful setting up a blog week for John Connolly to help promote his new book. We’re a helpful bunch. Just feed us books.

      Mmm, books.

      I is for immersing yourself in a story

      Nothing better than losing yourself in a good book. Apart from maybe losing yourself in a good book with a large cup of tea. And maybe a biscuit. Or a slice of cake.

      Mmm, cake.
      J is for jealousy

      Another blogger gets a book that you *really* want to read. A super advance copy of your favourite author’s new book. One can’t help but be a tiny bit jealous as you wander off to your local bookshop to put in a pre-order.

      K is for kindle

      I love my kindle. I can carry a ton of books around and have a huge virtual TBR pile on there. There’s an age-old debate about which is better – ebook or hard copy. I love both – there’s nothing quite like the feel of a dead tree book, but the sheer convenience of kindle is hard to beat.

      L is for love of books

      Need I say more? Bookbloggers love books, we love talking about books, we love recommending books. Just don’t ask us what our favourite book is, unless you’ve got plenty of spare time, a notebook and pen, and a large cup of tea.

      M is for meeting authors

      I’ve met a few, and taken a few selfies. Felt slightly awkward at the time, but they were all good sports!

      YT with the very dapper Thomas Enger at an Orenda Roadshow.
      Pierce Brown, author of the fabulous Red Rising books at Hodder HQ for the Howler Party launch for Morning Star
      OK, so not a convention, more a pub. Rob Boffard, author of the brilliant Tracer , Impact and Zero-G, books enjoying the sunshine in Leeds. He sent a book into SPACE. Duuuude.
      N is for non-fiction

      It’s not all fiction round here you know. I don’t read a huge amount of non-fiction, but there’s the occasional one which sneaks in. Currently reading Matt Gaw’s The Pull of the River, which is wonderful and has made me investigate getting a canoe.

      I am not getting a canoe.

      O is for Orenda and Orbit

      Two of my favourite publishers. Karen Sullivan at Orenda Books is a veritable force of nature when it comes to promoting brilliant books, and has assembled a phenomenal team of authors, but also a huge team of bloggers. Proud to be part of #TeamOrenda.

      And Orbit Books keep me well-stocked in awesome fantasy and science fiction. Good job they’re two of my favourite genres, eh?

      P is for publishers and publicists

      Where would we be without all the brilliant publishers and awesome publicists who shout about their brilliant books? Looking at empty shelves, sobbing quietly.

      Q is for Q&As

      So, a book blog could feature an extract or a guest post, but I do like a good Q&A, such as this one with Leeds author RJ Tomlin.

      R is for reviews

      Extracts, features, guest posts. They’re all well and good, but the humble review is the core of a good book blog. I’ve written a fair few (obviously), sometimes they just seem to write themselves, and other times you find yourself hunched over the keyboard trying to put into words just how much you loved a book.

      There’s a regular debate in the bookblogging community over negative reviews – some bloggers will review every book that comes in, good or bad, and others will only shout about the books they love. Each point of view is absolutely fine – I tend to mostly post positive reviews because I like talking about great books. If I’ve not enjoyed it, I’ll probably not have finished the book anyway. That said, I *have* written a couple of negative reviews. It’s up to you if you want to go looking…

      S is for shocking twists you didn’t see coming

      Can we just stop with this? At least stop plastering it all over the cover. I read a lot of books, and 90% of the time I *will* see it coming.

      That said, I read one book where I spotted the twist by about page 20, but enjoyed the book enormously (The Fourth Monkey, by J.D. Barker – hugely entertaining). But all too often you get to the end and go, yeah, I spotted that.

      T is for Twitter, TBR and Tsundoku

      Twitter is where the #bookbloggers live, where we moan about the size of our TBR piles (TBR: To Be Read). A TBR can also be known as a Tsundoku.

      U is for updating the blog

      How often should you update your #bookblog? Some bloggers post daily, or multiple times a day. Some weekly, some less often. I tend to go through flurries of posts where I get in the zone and knock out a few reviews at once, or get a bunch of blog tours which all land at the same time. Update as often as you feel comfortable with. There are no rules.

      V is for views

      Blogging is all about the views – how many views did my latest post get? What’s my most popular post? What time should I schedule a post to get the most views? How often should I update twitter to make sure I get more views? Should I cross-post to Facebook groups?

      Stop chasing the views. Blog because you want to talk about the books. I see bloggers who get a ton of retweets and likes, and I’m sure they must get a LOAD of views. But views are just the tip of the iceberg – there’s a lot more to it than that. The conversations that go on about the posts on twitter are often more valuable than the views.

      W is for waitingfor new book coming out

      Especially when you’ve seen the buzz around the book on Twitter, waiting for the book to actually appear in the bookshop can be torture. Luckily I’ve got a bit of a backlog to keep me going until the new book arrives. Though sometimes you get the lovely new book but it ends up on the shelf while other books take precedence for blog tours. Hey, we’ll read them all eventually, right?

      Right?

      X is for x-factor

      No, not the TV series. Who has time to watch telly when you’ve got so many lovely books to read? We’re looking for the book that makes you go whoa. The one with that elusive x-factor, the one which you finish and just know that you’ll pester EVERYONE that you know to read. Books like The Seven Deaths of Evelyn Hardcastle or The Fifth Season. Books that have that certain… something that makes it jump out at you.

      Y is for you, this is why we wrote the reviews

      Without you, dear reader, we’re just shouting into the void. Admittedly, some days it feels like that’s exactly what we’re doing when a post goes live and there’s little reaction, but we do it anyway. We’re #bookbloggers, and proud.

      Z is for sleep

      Pfft. Sleep is for wimps. We’ve got books to read, books that demand to be read, books that insist you read one more chapter. Books like Tall Oaks by Chris Whitaker, which saw me turn the final page at twenty to three in the morning. Books which you just cannot put down.

      Has a book ever kept you awake? I’d love to hear about it.

      Phew! Well done for making it this far. That’s my A-Z of #bookblogging. Love to know what you think!

      The Courier – Kjell Ola Dahl

      In Oslo in 1942, Jewish courier Ester is betrayed, narrowly
      avoiding arrest by the Gestapo. In great haste, she escapes to
      Sweden whilst the rest of her family is deported to Auschwitz.
      In Stockholm, Ester meets the resistance hero, Gerhard Falkum,
      who has left his little daughter and fled both the Germans and
      allegations that he murdered his wife, Åse, Ester ’s childhood
      best friend. A relationship develops between them, but ends
      abruptly when Falkum dies in a fire.
      And yet, twenty-five years later, Falkum shows up in Oslo. He
      wants to reconnect with his daughter Turid. But where has he
      been, and what is the real reason for his return? Ester stumbles
      across information that forces her to look closely at her past,
      and to revisit her war-time training to stay alive…

      So this marks the third appearance of Kjell Ola Dahl’s books on the blog, and roughly a year apart. First we had Faithless, then The Ice Swimmer, books five and six in his series featuring his detectives Gunnarstranda and Frølich. Classic slices of Nordic Noir, both.

      And so now we have The Courier, a standalone historical thriller which delves into the dark history of Norway in WWII. The story is told across three time periods – 1942, 1967 and 2015, though the modern-day element bookends the story.

      It’s a fascinating tale, told in Dahl’s signature style of short, punchy sentences, once more ably translated by Don Bartlett. It’s a style that in previous books took me a little while to get into, but here it’s like sinking into a familiar, favourite armchair and you’re soon lost in the story.

      As with his earlier books, Dahl shows a deft hand with plot, juggling the two main threads between 1942 and 1967 and revealing his cards only when he’s good and ready. Even though we know how things turn out in the quarter century after the earlier chapters, there’s a real sense of menace and genuine peril in the earlier sections.

      It’s not just the plot though, character and especially the relationships between them is where Kjell Ola Dahl excels. Fascinating to see Ester grow from the girl who loses her parents to Auschwitz, a courier who is forced to flee to Sweden to escape the Gestapo herself, to the woman she becomes some 25 years later. The world has changed and so has she, but then everything changes again when an old face makes a startling reappearance.

      I don’t usually read a lot of historical fiction, but couldn’t resist seeing what Kjell Ola Dahl, the Godfather of Nordic Noir, would come up with. It’s proper, hard-boiled Noir with a wonderfully gritty, distressingly authentic edge.

      It’ll keep you thinking for a long while after you’ve finished. Highly recommended.

      The Courier by Kjell Ola Dahl is published by Orenda Books on 21st March 2019. You can find Kjell Ola Dahl on twitter @ko_dahl.

      Huge thanks to Anne Cater and Orenda Books for inviting me to take part in the blog tour, and for the review copy.

      A Gift For Dying – M.J. Arlidge

      Adam Brandt is a forensic psychologist, well used to dealing with the most damaged members of society.
      But he’s never met anyone like Kassie.
      The teenager claims to have a terrible gift – with one look into your eyes, she can see when and how you will die.
      Obviously, Adam knows Kassie must be insane. But then a serial killer hits the city. And only Kassie seems to know where he’ll strike next.
      Against all his intuition, Adam starts to believe her.
      He just doesn’t realise how deadly his faith might prove…

      A Gift for Dying is the first book by M.J. Arlidge that I’ve read, and it definitely won’t be the last. Intriguing premise, great characters and snappy pacing make for a great read.

      Teenager Kassandra Wojcek has a gift (if you can call it that) – she can see how and when a person will die, just by looking in their eyes. And some of those people will be meeting a very sticky end. A serial killer is on the loose, and she is the key to stopping him. She’s a wonderful character, troubled and alone, but with a deeper, hidden strength that she eventually comes to realise she has.

      Forensic psychologist Adam Brandt is faced with a tricky dilemma – Kassie can’t be telling the truth. Or can she? She knows too much about what’s been going on. Is she somehow involved in the murders? Or can she actually do what she claims to be able to?

      Arlidge’s writing style tends towards the short and snappy, with chapters coming thick and fast, giving you the excuse to just read one (or ten) more. A Gift For Dying was very hard to put down, and races towards the ending at breakneck pace.

      Thanks to Tracy Fenton at Compulsive Readers for inviting me to take part in the blog tour.

      A Gift For Dying by M.J. Arlidge is published by Penguin and is out now. You can find M.J. Arlidge on twitter at @mjarlidge

      Blogging

      On 14th March 2003, I wrote my first blog post.

      That was over on Livejournal (remember that, kids?), where I racked up quite a lot of posts. Now some of those are cross-posted from here, but I reckon a good 90% were unique to LJ.

      Now the bit I miss most is the comments – LJ felt like a real community where you’d check in a couple of times a day to see what was going on around the world, or to chew the fat in the comments section on a post, often diverting wildly from the original topic.

      Bit like twitter really. Twitter has kind of taken over from LJ in that regard, for me at least.

      I’ve made a huge number of friends from blogging over the years, and it makes me a little sad to think that I might never actually meet most of them in person. A while back I sent out a small moleskine notebook on a trip around the world and my LJ friends – one person would get it, write something (anything) in there, then when they were done we’d look for a couple of volunteers and send it on its way again. I got it back a few years ago and it’s full (well, half-full) of wonderful things, memories and thoughts and general musings from people I know but might never meet. It even got as far as the White House, just after Obama’s inauguration!

      So, happy blogging birthday to me.

      Espresso coco, on the other hand, celebrates *its* birthday at the end of the month. 🙂

      Do you have a blog? How long have you been blogging? Drop me a link in the comments!

      Like, a #bookblogger mini-rant

      It’s not often I veer off the path of reviews, but something caught my notice this morning and after a mini-rant with a fellow blogger.

      It’s all to do with likes.

      I often wander through my WordPress reader or my fellow bookbloggers’ blogs looking for something interesting to read. And if I find a review that I like, I click on the little star and, erm, like it.

      Often if I’ve liked something, I’ll share it too. Because if I liked it, then chances are other people might like it too. Share the joy.

      There are some bloggers who I know well, who are posting reviews of books that I’ve read and liked, and I may click retweet *then* go and read their posts, but you can count that list on the fingers of one hand.

      And, from time to time, people stumble across *this* little slice of the internet, and click the like button and share the post. And for that I am eternally grateful, and I really do appreciate every like and share.

      They mean a lot. Like, totally a lot. When you’ve put your time and effort into crafting a review (yes, I do craft them, there’s no need for that), it’s nice to see that someone has, you know, liked it.

      Then you stumble across a blog which has HUNDREDS of likes. Much like (sorry) the one above. Over three hundred likes.

      Whoa.

      But… I do wonder with some of these blogs whether it’s a mutual you follow me/I follow you thing, with people autoclicking the like button.

      I know of some bloggers who seem to go through and retweet a bucketload of blogposts. It’s entirely possible that they’re reading them all and genuinely liking/sharing, but the sceptic in me wonders if they’re just going down the list in WordPress reader and liking/sharing.

      Now me, I’d love the likes, but would far rather someone retweet/like a post because they’ve actually *read* it and liked it.

      Talk to me, folks. Why do you like and share?

      Bookblogger guilt

      bookshelves
      One of the many tsundoku in my house

      Look at this photo and tell me what you see.

      Well, yes, books. Obviously there are books. Lots of books.

      But I look at this and see something else.

      Guilt.

      As a book blogger I’m hugely fortunate enough to be sent books to review from publishers. And I’m grateful for every single one of them, believe me. But some days I feel a creeping sense of guilt about those books.

      Each one is a microcosm of an author’s hard work, months (if not years) of hard effort, rejections upon rejections until the joy of getting a book deal. Then there’s the work of the editors, proofreaders, cover designers, publishers and PR folk who send these books out into the wild.

      Then they land on my shelf. Sometimes they’ve been preceded with an email asking if I’d like to take a look at the book. Sometimes they turn up unannounced, in large brown padded envelopes addressed to “Dave Espresso Coco”, with a press release tucked in the the pages. Occasionally they turn up with little tchotchkes, gift wrapped in fancy string or ribbon, with chocolate or, in a couple of instances, little miniatures of booze (I like those ones!)

      But there are also the other books on those shelves. Books that I’ve bought myself, bought despite knowing exactly how big my TBR pile is, books that I’ve thought sound too fabulous to resist, or by authors whose earlier books I’ve read and loved, but now their books sit nestled amongst the others, vying for my attention at the point where I finish a book and sit back to ponder what’s next?

      What will catch my eye? Will it be the book that I agreed to read three months ago for the blog tour that’s due next week (*cough* two days’ time)? Will it be the book that turned up yesterday that just looks *so* good? Will it be one of the many, many bought books? Or one which sounded so interesting from the PR’s excited email that I just couldn’t resist saying yes to?

      I look at these shelves every time I go up and down the stairs. I look at the set of shelves next to this one, which is similarly stacked high with books. Or the pile of books on the dining room table that arrived this week.

      And that’s not counting the virtual pile of books on my kindle, or the NetGalley copies which, despite my self-imposed NetGalley ban in an effort to get my read/reviewed ratio up, seem to be breeding.

      So many books. So little time.

      So much guilt.

      I’ve started to say no to some of the blog tours – reading to order and to deadline was starting to add unnecessary stress, especially after hitting a couple of books which didn’t really do it for me. I should probably start saying no to more of the ‘Dear blogger, would you be interested in [AWESOME BOOK]?’

      And I will get to these books, eventually.

      Honest.

      Anyone else suffer from blogger’s guilt?

      The Leaden Heart – Chris Nickson

      Leeds, England. July, 1899.

      The hot summer has been fairly quiet for Detective Superintendent Tom Harper and his squad, until a daring burglary occurs at an expensive Leeds address. Then his friend and former colleague, Inspector Billy Reed, asks for his help. Billy’s brother, Charlie, a shopkeeper, has committed suicide. Going through Charlie’s papers, Billy discovers crippling rent rises demanded by his new landlord. Could these have driven him to his death? As Harper investigates, he uncovers a web of intimidation and corruption that leads back to the mysterious North Leeds Company. Who is pulling the strings behind the scenes and bringing a new kind of misery and violence to the people of Leeds? Harper is determined to unmask the culprits, but how much blood will be shed as he tries?


      The Leaden Heart is the seventh of Chris Nickson’s Tom Harper Mysteries, but the first I’ve read. Set in Leeds in 1899, we find Detective Superintendent Tom Harper sweltering in the long, hot summer. Harper’s old friend and colleague, Billy Reed, comes back to Leeds from Whitby for the funeral of his brother, only to discover that it was suicide. The two friends dig into the mysterious circumstances of his death to discover there’s a lot more to it than meets the eye, and some powerful men do not want him uncovering the truth.

      I really enjoyed The Leaden Heart. I read a lot of contemporary crime fiction so it was a breath of fresh air to delve back into my adopted city’s past and see it through a different lens. Familiar streets and places brought to life through Nickson’s evident extensive research and love of the city gave the story an extra edge for me. It may be the seventh book in the series, but could easily be read as a standalone as I did. That said, I’d be interested to go back and find out more about Harper and his investigations.

      It’s a great story too, full of political intrigue and corruption. Harper is a fascinating character, a solid, no-nonsense old school copper with a determination to get to the bottom of what’s going on, no matter the consequences to his reputation. There’s an interesting subplot too featuring Harper’s wife Annabelle, a Poor Law Guardian investigating the deaths of two young girls and trying to change the minds of the men who make the rules but have no time or desire to listen to her.

      I’ve not read much historical fiction, but on the strength of The Leaden Heart, perhaps I ought to add a few more to my reading list!

      The Leaden Heart by Chris Nickson is published by Severn House at the end of March 2019. Many thanks to the publisher and author for the advance copy for review. You can find Chris Nickson on twitter @ChrisNickson2 or at his website www.chrisnickson.co.uk

      #####EOF##### Defining the Digital Publishing Playbook Across Brands – Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP
      Case Study

      Defining the Digital Publishing Playbook Across Brands

      print cover of Variety magazine
      Media powerhouse PMC has gained efficiency and fueled business growth by developing streamlined best practices for every aspect of their digital publishing operations. WordPress.com VIP’s support, expertise, and scalable platform helped them establish a canonical approach to each new challenge, making it a part of their growing tool set and playbook.

      Founded in 2003, PMC is a global digital media company representing 22 brands including Variety, Deadline, Hollywood Life, TV Line, WWD and Robb Report. Those brands receive a combined 179 million monthly active users, and 101 million video views. All of their flagship sites are on VIP.

      PMC brought TVLine.com over to VIP in 2011, their first site to move on to the platform. From the start they appreciated the benefits of VIP’s expert code review as part of the site launch process, so much so that it inspired them to develop their own internal code checks for other projects.

      Over the years Koen and the PMC team have turned experiences launching and optimizing sites with VIP into a wealth of internal code libraries and best practices that are then applied across PMC’s family of brands and to any newly acquired sites. This extends far beyond common themes, plugins, and tools to include shared knowledge and processes as well.

       

      Shared Components

      Reuse is a fundamental principle at PMC, where development on behalf of one brand is maximized for potential use across all of them. Koen explains, “We try to build each feature as a standalone component. And then if we need to use a similar feature on another site then we’ll turn it into an actual plug in, and we do have a shared plugin repository. So our plugins are basically single features that are packaged up, and have reuse across all our sites.” 

      This library of features includes granular elements like standard curation modules to display popular posts via various filters, and more complex sets of functionality, like PMC’s AMP integration.

      Common Theme Framework

      Most recently, the team developed a shared baseline theme that surfaces all possible functionality across the family of sites. The theme also incorporates all of the best practices PMC has gleaned over the years. This becomes the default starter theme for new and acquired brands. Over time all brands including legacy sites will also migrate over to that theme, all still retaining their unique look and feel.

      This approach drastically reduces the work involved in maintaining features and rolling out new ones, and also allows the engineering team to easily share all of the innovations developed through work on each brand out to all of them.

      Benefits at Every Level

      The approach spread from product and engineering out to editorial and beyond, streamlining everything that goes in to how the work gets done.

      The SEO team has their own common tools and practices. They support all of the editorial teams across the company, and they all work the same way. The same goes for the teams that run onboarding for writers and editors, and for the publishing processes within each brand. In establishing a common language and way of working, it knits together the culture of many smaller groups and makes resources more fungible.

      “They’re able to work across brands a lot better because there’s a common language there. It’s interesting to see how the things we’re streamlining within product and engineering have this knock on effect across the entire company.”

      — Gabriel Koen, VP of Engineering

      Defining and maintaining best practices has improved the business in immeasurable ways. It has made product and engineering more efficient, and brought major benefits to the C-suite as well.

      • Product teams can quickly find solutions for other stakeholders they are working with, rather than always needing to come up with answers from scratch. There are features already built, along with training materials and documentation, for any challenge the company has already come across.
      • Training and onboarding is smooth and scalable. It’s easier for knowledge to spread to new people who need it. This results in a strong alignment across product teams and throughout the company.
      • The leadership team uses this shared knowledge to quickly and effectively evaluate possible acquisition targets. They can accurately assess the capabilities of external publishing teams and infrastructure, and approximate the level of investment that would be required to bring them to parity with PMC standards.

      “One of the things that I’m consistently impressed with is our executive team, and more specifically with our CEO Jay Penske, the level of really detailed understanding they have of our technology, and our platforms and our capabilities.”

      — Gabriel Koen, VP of Engineering

      Working with VIP

      Like any good partnership, the opportunities for learning are bidirectional. PMC benefits from VIP’s industry-leading infrastructure and extensive experience in supporting enterprise WordPress applications at scale. In turn, PMC’s own drive for continuous improvement pushes VIP to find new ways to support emerging needs.

      “The VIP platform is not static, it’s not like ‘Okay, this is what you get.’ Koen explains. “It’s more collaborative really. They understand what companies are looking for and why it’s important, and they try to look at ways they can address that within the platform, and that’s super encouraging.”

      Ready to get started?

      Drop us a note.

      No matter where you are in the planning process, we’re happy to help, and we’re actual humans here on the other side of the form. 👋 We’re here to discuss your challenges and plans, evaluate your existing resources or a potential partner, or even make some initial recommendations. And, of course, we’re here to help any time you’re in the market for some robust WordPress awesomeness.

      #####EOF##### New Theme: Twenty Nineteen — The WordPress.com Blog

      New Theme: Twenty Nineteen

      Meet Twenty Nineteen, the brand new WordPress default theme.

      December 19, 2018

      Chris Runnells

      We’re pleased to announce that Twenty Nineteen — the new WordPress default theme designed by Allan Cole and Kjell Reigstad — is available to all WordPress.com sites.

      Twenty Nineteen was designed with simple but sophisticated typography and a pared-down, open aesthetic, making it a great foundation for a variety of websites. It also fully supports the new WordPress Editor, which allows you to create a wide range of content for your site.

      Twenty Nineteen gives your featured images a bold treatment on posts and pages: the images cover the full width and height of the screen, along with a color overlay which can be changed in the Customizer.

      Learn more about WordPress’s latest default theme here, or check out the demo site!

      Missing out on the latest WordPress.com developments? Enter your email below to receive future announcements direct to your inbox. An email confirmation will be sent before you will start receiving notifications - please check your spam folder if you don't receive this.

      Join 57,720,033 other followers

      47 Comments

      Comments are closed.

      1. JenT Dec 19th at 4:38 pm

        What a wonderful way to ring in the New Year! Thank you WordPress.com!

        Liked by 11 people

      2. Cerita Bahasa Dec 19th at 4:41 pm

        I love the simplicity, but could you please provide us with more font variations?

        Liked by 14 people

      3. Rita Dec 19th at 4:53 pm

        Will surely check soon.
        I am not comfortable with new editor in WordPress. In classic editor, changing text color, adding slideshow is way more easier.

        Liked by 23 people

        • Chris Runnells Dec 20th at 10:06 pm

          There is a Classic editor block so you can still have the simplicity of the original editor, while using the new features and functionality offered by the new blocks. A slideshow block is something we’re looking at adding in the future.

          Liked by 4 people

          • Rita Dec 21st at 12:28 am

            Thank you very much. Slideshow was a challenge to me in new editor. I searched on Google but was not able to understand it. So only difficultly faced in new editor were slideshow and changing color of few words to highlight it. Otherwise it is nice.

            Liked by 2 people

      4. Tamarack Mountain Studio Dec 19th at 5:17 pm

        Can this be used with Storefront?

        Liked by 6 people

        • Chris Runnells Dec 19th at 10:42 pm

          I’m not sure I fully understand your question: Storefront is a theme, just as Twenty Nineteen is a theme. As such, you can’t use two themes at the same time.

          However, if you’re asking if Twenty Nineteen will work with WooCommerce, then answer is yes! The WooCommerce team added support for Twenty Nineteen about a month ago.

          Liked by 6 people

      5. Chris David Miles Dec 19th at 7:08 pm

        I love the twenty nineteen theme! This is the first time one of the “twenty” themes has made me want to switch themes. Especially the menu, I’d like to see more sites get away from the flat sticky top style navigation menu that’s so common.

        Liked by 7 people

      6. Sven Seebeck Dec 19th at 7:24 pm

        Very nice! Noticed it already before the weekend. Fantastic theme. 👍🏻

        Liked by 7 people

        • cjreinhart Dec 19th at 9:59 pm

          I have a WordPress blog which I can’t manage very well. I feel totally incompetent with WordPress but would like to get better at it and use it more fruitfully.

          Will the changes which you are suggesting be implemented to everyone’s site, including mine? I welcome any improvements and can’t comment otherwise since I know so little as it is.

          Thank you Carolyn Reinhart

          ________________________________

          Liked by 6 people

          • Chris Runnells Dec 19th at 10:52 pm

            Hi Carolyn! WordPress can certainly be a challenge at times, but there are tons of resources out there to help you out. I highly recommend taking a look at our support site: https://en.support.wordpress.com/ especially the Start, Create, and Customize sections seen below the search box on that page.

            The new editor is currently available on all WordPress.com sites.

            Liked by 4 people

      7. Tebatjo Malaka Dec 19th at 7:53 pm

        It’s time to upgrade. 🤗

        Liked by 8 people

      8. Cikgu Ismail Omar Dec 19th at 8:18 pm

        Superb! Just in the nick of time.

        Liked by 9 people

      9. Samuel Dec 19th at 10:02 pm

        I didn’t like the theme! I think if we be able to design a custom front page for any of the wordpress themes, then the 2011 theme is the best among all these 282 themes.

        Liked by 12 people

        • Chris Runnells Dec 19th at 11:00 pm

          As you can imagine, making a theme that _everyone_ likes is impossible. But, you may be pleased to know that we updated the other default themes (including Twenty Eleven) to work with the new editor. Cheers!

          Liked by 7 people

          • Samuel Dec 19th at 11:46 pm

            thank you so much because of your response. yes it is really difficult. as I myself do coding and I am aware of it. and yes Gutenberg is great! but it need more and more tools to be armed enough to customize the front page of themes. by the way I really enjoy work with wordpress platform and I hope more and more success for the team.

            Liked by 6 people

      10. jeremyjameshongkong Dec 20th at 1:36 am

        All these themes are a bit of a mystery to me… If you simply blog and read other blogs on the mobile app… Then the themes don’t really change your experience right?

        Liked by 7 people

      11. Mai Hải Đăng Dec 20th at 1:56 am

        Your theme have a problem that really makes me sad yesterday. The mobile version have a problem with touching links while scrolling, when I scroll on my iPhone it just active Click Event when touch on links.

        I kinda sure it’s a bug, I checked your demo site here on the blog page and it have the same problem. You can go here (on mobile) and scroll and pretend to touch on a title: https://twentynineteendemo.wordpress.com/blog/

        I hope you have an answer here because I love this theme.

        Liked by 6 people

      12. Greg Peterson Dec 20th at 3:28 am

        In Customizer > Colors I deselected color filters (unchecked the box beside “Apply a filter to featured images using the primary color”). That worked fine for the Home view: all featured images appear as-is (no filters) for my Post excerpts; however, when I select posts, color filters obscure my featured images. That looks like a bug. Otherwise, Twenty Nineteen looks great so far. Thanks!

        Liked by 4 people

      13. Joshua Evan Dec 20th at 6:08 am

        Tried it a couple of days ago and while it was the closest I’ve got to a perfect theme (for me) it was lacking in the customisation options, particularly with fonts. I’ll give it a try again in the future to see if it gains some more customisation options.

        Liked by 4 people

      14. Nicolina Dec 20th at 8:42 am

        Yay! Love the new theme!

        Liked by 4 people

      15. Tebatjo Malaka Dec 20th at 9:12 am

        Is it me. But the theme works elegantly on computer and rather buggy on mobile. It takes you pages you’ve never clicked on mobile. I had to uninstall it.

        Liked by 5 people

      16. candacewithstyle Dec 20th at 9:59 am

        Is it free?

        Liked by 3 people

      17. Jessi's Story Dec 20th at 10:26 am

        Already convinced because you included such wonderful beings in the example as Taco, the good dog.

        Liked by 4 people

      18. Laura Bloomsbury Dec 20th at 11:04 am

        I personally do not like the theme as with so much of the Gutenberg blocks it is all too big and spacey -Gutenberg in general has too many bells and whistles at the expense of straightforward simplicity. I know many share my opinion but maybe new bloggers will adapt quicker

        Liked by 7 people

      19. David Bennett Dec 20th at 11:22 am

        Thanks, Chris.

        Liked by 3 people

      20. Netasha Adams Dec 20th at 12:02 pm

        This is awesome, I think it will best for my blog (portfolio)

        Liked by 5 people

      21. kunalbansal12 Dec 20th at 2:24 pm

        You are doing such a great work. First of all Congratulations from Kunal Bansal for your great success. Keep up with the good work.

        Liked by 7 people

      22. João de Mancelos Dec 21st at 7:45 am

        I simply love Twenty Nineteen! The option to hide the title page was something that previously could only be available if you had a plugin. An option to remove automatically the underline from links would be very much welcome! Good job!

        Liked by 9 people

      23. danteawriter Dec 21st at 9:43 pm

        Thank you WordPress.com!

        Liked by 7 people

      24. Melody.com.ng Dec 21st at 9:57 pm

        I really don’t like the 3 WordPress default themes, they display full post content on homepage.

        Liked by 5 people

      25. ShankySalty Dec 23rd at 11:42 am

        Is it free????😕

        Liked by 3 people

      26. Run.Lift.Breathe Dec 23rd at 7:46 pm

        It looks very interesting! While I’m very happy with the current themes used on my blogs, it’s always nice seeing new themes, and I’m sure this will be perfect for someone. 🙂 Great work!

        Liked by 4 people

      27. karyhma Dec 24th at 2:22 pm

        Love the new theme

        Liked by 4 people

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      by

      Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Asia

      Paul Schwartz and I have published a new policy memo through PONARS Eurasia. Here’s a preview. Full memo may be found here, and the complete report that it summarizes was also published last week by IFRI.

      —

      To great fanfare, in May 2016, Russia hosted the third ASEAN-Russia Summit at the Black Sea resort of Sochi. Commemorating the 20th anniversary of Russia’s acceptance as an ASEAN dialog partner, this summit was intended to give new impetus to longstanding efforts by Russia and Southeast Asia to forge closer economic and security ties. Defying efforts by the West to isolate Russia, leaders from all ten ASEAN member states attended the summit.[1]Despite having recently skipped several high-level ASEAN summits, this time President Putin led the Russian delegation himself. He also met separately with the leaders of all ten ASEAN states. After the summit, Putin proclaimed that the two sides had reached agreement “on building a strategic partnership over the long term.” Demonstrating that this was not just mere rhetoric, the two sides also announced a raft of new measures during the summit, on topics ranging from security relations to closer political and economic ties. However, Russia’s ongoing Sino-centric focus, ASEAN’s limited ability to act collectively, and Moscow’s preference for bilateral relations will continue to predominate in its overall relations with the region.

      A Pivot Toward Eastern Relationships?

      In the aftermath of renewed conflict with the West over Ukraine, Russia sought to accelerate its much-discussed “turn to the East” in a bid to avoid isolation and to circumvent Western sanctions. This initiative, which was first launched after the 2008 financial crisis, was intended to allow Russia to reduce its dependence on the West, while harnessing the dynamic growth of the Asia-Pacific region as a means for modernizing the Russian Far East and ultimately Russia itself. The first concrete action to this effect was Russia hosting the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Vladivostok in 2012, followed by an acceleration in efforts to increase economic cooperation. While Russia has consistently placed the highest priority on increasing its ties with China, it also sought to diversify its relations with other Asia Pacific countries in order to avoid becoming overly dependent on Beijing. Southeast Asia figured prominently in this effort, as Russia sought to build upon its existing relations with countries in the region, especially Vietnam, Indonesia, and Myanmar, to maintain its strategic independence. In a move reminiscent of its recent policy in the Middle East, it also sought to expand relations with countries long considered U.S. allies such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand.

      The pivot to Asia came to include three components:

      • a civilizational alliance against Western “universal values”;
      • a geopolitical effort to provide a regional alternative to the U.S.-centered alliance system; and
      • a geo-economic push to integrate Russia into Asia’s dynamic economy.

      Please click here to read the rest of the policy memo

       

      by

      The Kerch Strait skirmish: a Law of the Sea perspective

      The following article was published as a Strategic Analysis piece by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. It’s an expansion of some of the themes mentioned in a piece I co-authored with Michael Kofman for the Monkey Cage in the immediate aftermath of the Kerch Strait skirmish.

      The November 25 naval skirmish between Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Kerch Strait was significant first and foremost as an open military confrontation between the two countries’ armed forces. But it also highlighted the fraught legal status of the strait and the Azov Sea, a status that Russia has been exploiting in recent months to exert political and economic pressure on Ukraine.

      A slow march to confrontation

      The confrontation began months before the recent events that brought the conflict to worldwide attention. In March 2018, Ukrainian border guard vessels detained a Russian fishing vessel in the Azov Sea for violating exit procedures from the “temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”, namely from Crimea. The crew of that vessel remained in detention for several months, until they were exchanged in October for Ukrainian sailors. The captain of the Russian ship remains in Ukraine and is facing prosecution for illegal fishing and “violation of the procedure for entry and exit from the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”. Since that incident, Russia has retaliated by detaining several Ukrainian fishing vessels.

      In May, Russia also began to regularly hold Ukrainian commercial ships for inspection before allowing them to pass through the Kerch Strait. The initiation of this inspection regime largely coincided with the opening of a road and rail bridge across the strait. Russia claimed that the inspections were required to ensure the safety and security of the bridge at a time when some Ukrainians had publicly threatened to attack the bridge. The delays caused by the inspection regime, together with ship height restrictions caused by the bridge, have led to a 30 percent reduction in revenues at Ukraine’s commercial ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, raising fears that Russia is trying to strangle the economy of eastern Ukraine.

      In the same period, Russia also began to build up its naval presence in the Azov Sea, with at least three missile ships based there since summer 2018. Reports indicate that Russia plans to set up a full-fledged flotilla in the Azov in the near future. Ukraine has also strengthened its naval presence in the region, placing several armoured boats in Berdyansk and seeking to expand the base there.

      The transfer of ships from Odesa to Berdyansk that caused the skirmish was part of this effort. Ukraine had moved naval ships through the Kerch Strait as recently as September 2018, but these ships were not armed. In that case, the ships were allowed to pass through without incident, although they were closely followed by Russian border guard vessels. The passage of two armoured boats through the strait in late November was thus the first attempt by the Ukrainian Navy to bring armed ships through the Kerch Strait since tensions began to mount and the bridge was completed in spring 2018.

      The legal background

      The status of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait is regulated by a bilateral treaty that was signed by Russia and Ukraine in 2003. According to the terms of the treaty, the sea is considered to be internal waters for both countries, and both Ukrainian and Russian commercial and military ships have the right of free passage through the strait. Furthermore, the treaty does not specify any particular advance notice procedures for passage through the strait. Foreign commercial ships are allowed to pass through the strait and enter the sea if they are heading to or from a Ukrainian or Russian port. Military ships belonging to other countries may be allowed passage if they are invited by one of the signatories to the treaty, but only with the agreement of the other signatory. In 2015, Russia unilaterally adopted a set of rules requiring ships passing through the strait to give advance notification to the Russian authorities, ostensibly to assure safety of navigation. These rules have not been accepted by Ukraine.

       

      Please follow this link to read the rest of the article.
      by

      Circumstances Have Changed Since 1991, but Russia’s Core Foreign Policy Goals Have Not

      I have a new policy memo out with PONARS Eurasia. Here’s the first half.

      Since the Ukraine crisis, the dominant Western perspective on Russian foreign policy has come to emphasize its increasingly confrontational, even revanchist, nature. Experts have focused on discontinuities in Russian foreign policy either between the ostensibly more pro-Western Yeltsin presidency and the anti-Western Putin presidency or between the more cooperatively inclined early Putin period (2000-2008) and the more confrontational late Putin period (2012-present). In this memo, I argue that Russian foreign policy preferences and activities have been largely continuous since the early 1990s. These preferences have focused on the quest to restore Russia’s great power status and maintain a zone of influence in states around its borders as a buffer against potential security threats. Throughout this time, Russian foreign policy has been neither revanchist nor expansionist in nature. Instead, it has been focused on first stopping and then reversing the decline of Russian power in the late 1980s and the 1990s and on ensuring that Russia was protected against encroachment by the Western alliance led by the United States. However, perceptions of Russian foreign policy during the post-Soviet period among other powers and outside observers have changed markedly as a consequence of a gradual increase in the extent of Russian relative power vis-à-vis its neighbors and especially vis-à-vis Western powers.

      The Discontinuity Argument

      The argument that Russia’s foreign policy has changed markedly over time comes in two versions. The first version of the discontinuity argument paints a sharp contrast between the pro-Western foreign policy followed by Russia in the 1990s under President Boris Yeltsin with the anti-Western foreign policy preferred by Vladimir Putin after he took over the presidency. In this reading, Russia under Yeltsin was in the process of transitioning to democracy and generally supportive of Western foreign policy initiatives despite some occasional disagreements. Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been committed to countering U.S. interests in the world, especially when it comes to the spread of democracy.

      This narrative overstates the continuity of Russian foreign policy under Putin while understating continuities between the 1990s and 2000s. In particular, Russian support for the United States’ intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, which included putting pressure on Central Asian states to accept U.S. bases on their soil and a 2009 agreement to allow for the transit of military goods and personnel to and from Afghanistan through Russia, is downplayed in favor of a focus on Russian opposition to the U.S. intervention in Iraq. Serious disagreements during the Yeltsin period, particularly regarding Western interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, are seen as aberrations in agenerally pro-Western Russian foreign policy, while Russian involvement in the early 1990s in internal conflicts in neighboring states such as Moldova and Georgia is ignored altogether.

      The second version of the discontinuity argument runs counter to the “good Yeltsin, evil Putin” narrative. It focuses on the very aspects of Putin’s first two terms as president that the first narrative elides. This narrative highlights differences between Russian foreign policy in 2000-2012 and the period after Putin’s return to the presidency. Here, Russia is described as a status quo power until the Ukraine crisis and a revisionist power thereafter. The episodes of cooperation in the 2000s are contrasted with Russia’s confrontational statements and actions after 2012. Meanwhile, the confrontational aspects of Russian foreign policy during Putin’s first two terms in office, such as efforts to divide the Euro-Atlantic alliance over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, to force the United States military out of Central Asia after 2005, and to highlight the consequences of Western recognition of Kosovo independence in 2008, are downplayed. The result is a picture of Russian foreign policy under Putin that gradually slides from cooperation with the United States and Western institutions early in his presidency to all-out confrontation in recent years. While this trajectory is largely accurate in terms of the overall relationship, I argue that it is less the result of changes in Russian foreign policy goals and more a consequence of changes in Russia’s relative power in the international system.

      The Argument for Consistency in Russian Foreign Policy Goals

      While the two readings of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy presented above are at odds with each other, they both overstate the extent of discontinuity. In reality, with the possible exception of the very beginning of the Yeltsin period, Russian foreign policy goals have been largely consistent throughout the post-Soviet period. The main driver of Russian foreign policy both under Yeltsin and under Putin has been the effort to restore respect for Russia as a major power in world affairs. From the Russian point of view, this respect was lost as a result of Russia’s political and economic weakness after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Evidence for this lack of respect in the 1990s included disregard for Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement to Central Europe and NATO’s interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. When NATO chose to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1997, Russian politicians condemned the move as a betrayal of Russian trust and a sign that Western leaders and military planners still perceived Russia as a potential military threat. Russian leaders also felt betrayed and humiliated by the lack of consultation by NATO and Western state officials during the process leading up to the decision to bomb Serbia to stop its ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo. They argued that NATO enlargement and the Kosovo War showed that Russia had become so weak that its opinion no longer mattered in determining world reaction to regional crises. Further confirmation of this point of view came in the early 2000s, when Russian opinion was ignored in the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

      The response, both in the 1990s and under Putin, was to seek to restore Russia’s great power status while maintaining a zone of influence in states on Russia’s border as a buffer against potential security threats. As early as 1993, Russia’s Security Council promulgated a foreign policy concept that included “ensuring Russia an active role as a great power” as a key foreign policy goal and asserted a special role for Russia in the former Soviet republics.

      Please click here to read the rest of the policy memo.

      by

      The Kerch Strait naval battle — Here’s what you need to know

      Michael Kofman and I published a short analysis of the naval battle in the Kerch Strait on the Monkey Cage. Here’s a sampler.

      The Nov. 25 skirmish between Russian Border Guard and Ukrainian navy ships in the Kerch Strait has escalated tensions not just between the two countries, but also between Russia and NATO.

      Two Ukrainian navy small-armored boats and a tugboat attempted to cross into the Sea of Azov via the Kerch Strait. A Russian Border Guard ship rammed the tug. Russian forces eventually captured all three boats, holding them in the Crimean port of Kerch. 

      This crisis kicked off months ago 

      In March 2018 Ukraine seized a Russian-flagged fishing vessel, claiming that it had violated exit procedures from the “temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.” Although the Russian crew was released, the boat remains detained in a Ukrainian port. Subsequently, Russia began to seize Ukrainian vessels for inspection, starting in May when a fishing vessel was detained for illegally fishing in Russia’s exclusive economic zone.

      A new Russian-built bridge linking Crimea to southern Russia is at the center of Russia’s attempt to assert sovereignty over the entire Kerch Strait. The bridge opened in May, and its low clearance height cut off many commercial ships and reduced revenue at the Mariupol port by 30 percent. Russia has imposed an informal blockade on the remaining maritime traffic, with ships often waiting more than 50 hours to cross, and Russian authorities insisting upon inspecting the cargo. This has substantially raised transit costs — and has been slowly strangling the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk.

      To read the rest, please click here.

      by

      NATO’s Trident Juncture Exercise as a Deterrence Signal to Russia

      I have a new article examining the impact of the Trident Juncture NATO exercise currently ongoing in Norway, published by the Kennedy School’s Russia Matters project.

      This week, NATO forces are engaged in the largest military exercise the alliance has organized since the end of the Cold War and the first major Western exercise in decades to take place in the Arctic region. To be held in Norway through Nov. 23, the Trident Juncture exercise is designed to improve NATO’s ability to defend member states and to strengthen the alliance’s credibility as a deterrent force against potential aggression. While the scenario does not mention any particular adversaries, the exercise is clearly aimed at bolstering NATO defenses against Russia in the Nordic region. While the political impact will be minor by comparison to any potential permanent troop deployments, the military lessons gleaned by the exercise’s participants promise to be significant.

      The exercise marks NATO’s third time holding the biennial Trident Juncture and differs from the previous two iterations in both size and focus. To begin with, it involves personnel from all 29 NATO members—a first—plus close partners Finland and Sweden. This in itself is significant: While the two Nordic states have regularly participated in NATO exercises in recent years and have invited NATO forces to take part in exercises on their soil, their participation in as large and politically prominent an Article 5 exercise as Trident Juncture highlights how far both have gone since their political decisions to enhance defense cooperation with NATO. The 2018 exercise is not only much bigger than the 2014 and 2016 iterations, which also focused on preparing NATO’s rapid reaction forces to counter Russian aggression, but differs significantly in its primary focus on field exercises instead of command post exercises.

      There are 50,000 total participants, including 20,000 from the ground forces, 24,000 from naval and marine infantry forces, 3,000 from air forces, 1000 logistics specialists and 1300 command personnel.  The United States has provided the largest contingent, including the Harry Truman Carrier Strike Group, the Iwo Jima Marine Expeditionary Strike Group and over 18,000 troops. Preparations, including deployment of forces to the exercise area, began in August. The active phase of the field exercise began on Oct. 25 and will continue through Nov. 7, to be followed by a command post exercise in mid-November.

      You can read the rest of the article here.

      by

      Russian views on U.S. plans to withdraw from the INF Treaty

      I have an explainer article about Russian perceptions of U.S. plans to withdraw from the INF Treaty on the Washington Post Monkey Cage blog today. Here’s a sampler…

      Despite Russian urgings, national security adviser John Bolton is insisting that the United States will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The treaty prohibits all short-range and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles, both nuclear and conventional, as well as systems that can be used to launch such missiles. As a result of the treaty, neither Russia nor the United States can deploy missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, or 310 to 3,420 miles. Since this is a bilateral treaty, other countries are not bound by these constraints.

      Since the U.S. government announced its withdrawal plans, Russian officials and experts have weighed in on what this means for Russia and how to respond. Here are five things to know.

      1. Russians see the INF treaty as giving unfair advantages to the U.S.

      Russian experts and officials have long argued that the treaty that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed with President Ronald Reagan in 1987 was disadvantageous — first to the Soviet Union and then to Russia. Russia gave up its ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles without extracting any restrictions on U.S. sea- and air-launched missiles. That’s significant, because the vast majority of Russia’s nuclear weapons are land-based, whereas the U.S. bases much of its nuclear force on submarines. The Kremlin believes this has allowed the U.S. to dominate the world’s oceans with its Tomahawk cruise missiles, and has left Russia vulnerable to a U.S. sea-launched attack.

      Click here to read the rest of the article.

      by

      Midrats: Russia’s Red Banner Year

       

      I was back on the Blog Talk Radio show Midrats this week, talking about Russian foreign policy, the military, its relations with the United States and China, and the like. The recording is now available on the show’s website. The show description is as follows:

      Episode 457:Russia’s Red Banner Year

      From its largest exercise since the end of the Cold War, to Syria, to a revival of covert direct action and  intermediate nuclear weapons as an issue – Russia continues to claw back her place on the international stage.

      As we approach the last quarter of the 2018 calendar year, what message is Russia trying to give the rest of the world and what should we expect through the end of the decade?

       

      #####EOF##### davisforestschool's Profile | WordPress.com Forums

      Need help? Check out our Support site, then

      #####EOF##### Jared Atkinson – 44CON

      Jared Atkinson

      thumb_jared Twitter: @jaredcatkinson
      Website: www.invoke-ir.com

      Jared Atkinson is the Hunt Capability Lead with Veris Group’s Adaptive Threat Division and is an Adjunct Lecturer in Utica College’s M.S. in Cybersecurity program. Before working for Veris Group, Jared spent 4 years leading incident response missions for the U.S. Air Force Hunt Team, detecting and removing Advanced Persistent Threats on Air Force and DoD networks. Passionate about PowerShell and the Open Source community, Jared is the lead developer of the PowerForensics project, an open source forensics framework for PowerShell, and maintains a DFIR focused blog.

      Jared has presented at:
      #####EOF##### Sarmat – Russia Military Analysis

      Tag: Sarmat

      Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part 1 – Kinzhal, Sarmat, 4202)

      Michael Kofman5 Comments

      Vladimir Putin’s speech on March 1st revealed a number of seemingly new or emerging weapon systems, some of which were known to be in testing, while others may come as somewhat a surprise. However, most of these ‘new weapons’ are long running projects, systems thought to be in development, or testing. Some had not shown themselves in quite some time, while others have never been seen, although there were reports of their tests in public releases or official statements. The weapons represent a mix of hypersonic missiles, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, traditional ballistic missile projects, and third strike vengeance weapons on the basis of Russian advancements in nuclear technology. Here I will briefly cover Kinzhal, R-28 Sarmat, and ‘4202’ – the rest of the more fantastical weapons will come in Part 2.

      But first, a brief comment on the overall presentation. The speech itself felt like a “послание” in more than one meaning of that word for those who speak Russian. It was certainly a ‘challenge accepted’ message from VVP, in part responding to the NDS and NPR. After a good run through new and seemingly fantastical capabilities, VVP returned to the subject of Russia’s military doctrine, nuclear policy, and the like. So, aside from domestic politics, there is a fair bit of coercive diplomacy in the message, from talking about the capabilities themselves, to Russian resolve, and concluding with assurances that all will be well if nobody gets into it with Russia. Moscow understands the audience well: nothing gets the attention of U.S. policymakers like nuclear weapons, and there is one person in particular in Washington who is readily impressed by videos of missiles. The graphics were not exactly Lord of the Rings quality, but what can you do, Russian MoD has to live with budget reductions since 2015.

      This was my overall impression listening to the speech and the vision it offered.

      Deathstar Russia

      Now, back to the missiles. A number of the more futuristic projects can only be characterized as semi-rational, in the sense that a fair bit of defense procurement is semi-rational. There was a need to support various design bureaus, Russia’s nuclear energy industry, and a long standing narrative about the need to penetrate a missile defense system the U.S. does not have (and probably after 30 years of copious amounts of funding still won’t have, because Russia is hardly the only country that suffers from semi-rational defense spending).

      There is no way to intercept Russian ICBMs, and with the upgrades to penetration aids they’re already implementing, Russia can ensure the viability of its deterrent for decades to come. This is not to mention recently deployed air launched cruise missiles like Kh-101/102. The ticket price of upgrading strategic nuclear weapons for better penetration, i.e. the offense, is just incredibly lower than the cost of trying to mount any viable defense. Statements on the various projects on March 1st can best be summarized as true lies, that is their stages of development are likely exaggerated, but none of what was said qualifies as science fiction either.

      Mainstream media coverage, and experts quoted have been rather dismissive of Putin’s presentation. That is an unfortunately common but foolhardy reaction, and its almost habitual. Observers are right to say that these technologies will take considerable time to test and deploy, but what some may not recall, because investment in Russian military analysis took a vacation 1992-2014, is actually when testing and development for these weapons began. The narrative of a sanctioned, economically weak and decaying Russia tends to prevail, but it comes with blinders on the issue of military technology. Yes, they can do this, and much of this may become reality in the 2020s. Recall awhile ago when Russian MoD leaked a slide on Status-6, many observers thought it was a PR stunt, and some kind of bluff, until it showed up in the NPR. Some thought T-14 Armata was a bluff, and made of cardboard, that ‘often wrong, but never in doubt list’ of expert dismissals is fairly long.

      Aeroballistic Missile Kinzhal – the air Iskander

      Kinzhal

      The shown missile is a substantially modified version of the Iskander SRBM, with Mig-31 serving as the boost phase, providing a high  altitude launch at supersonic speeds (recommend A. Ramm and Bogdanov for good reading). This is far from the first missile design to leverage Mig-31s performance in speed, takeoff weight, ceiling and combat range. Kinzhal is an operational-tactical complex, able to reach hypersonic speeds, a 2000 km range – although some suggest it is closer to 1500 km. According to official statements this missile can reach mach 10 and can conduct high-G maneuvers on terminal approach. I’m skeptical of the former, that is it likely can do mach 10 at early stages of flight, but then reduce speed for terminal maneuvers. The latter makes sense, because OTK 9M723 Iskander SRBM was designed to make random maneuvers in order to make its flight path difficult to intercept.

      Kinzhal is quite shorter, with smaller control surfaces, and a narrower nose. Gen Sergei Surovikin, head of Aerospace Forces (VKS) said the designation for this missile is Kh-47M2 (although earlier forum sources put it as (9-С-7760 – missile, 9-А-7660 – complex). Iskander, referenced as 9M723, can reach 350-450 km depending on payload, if launched at supersonic speeds from high altitude it stands to reason that a modified variant can achieve a substantially increased range. VKS should be happy since Mig-31s are technically under their service arm, and one of the few types of aviation they actually control. This gives them a new standoff weapon, and better chances at an anti-ship mission.

      Kinzhal is new, but according to A. Ramm and others, the concept initially surfaced 8 years ago. It has since then been mentioned by experts like Pyotr Bukowski in 2017. Given Iskander-M is considered to be a dual-capable replacement for Tochka-U, though its principal mission is conventional, there is ample reason to believe that the same nuclear warhead can be deployed on Kinzhal. Guidance is an interesting question, supposedly it can actively home on targets, and has scene matching as well. How that comes together at hypersonic speeds is a question, but more than likely this weapon is capable of very complex flight profiles. At least it is advertised with different seeker heads, one for traditional air-to-ground work, and the other as an anti-ship weapon.

      Readers will recall that Raduga’s Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback) aeroballistic missile from 1980s was allegedly quite fast, perhaps reaching Mach 5. Kinzhal might have more power than the original Iskander too. Russia’s MoD has plans to upgrade the current Iskander-M, improving range, so a Iskander-M2 is in the offing already for the ground forces.

      Kinzhal anti-ship.JPG

      I’m skeptical of the claim that this weapon has already begun combat duty in the Southern MD, which sounds like a ‘true lie,’ but it is probably the closest to operational deployment among weapons mentioned. One should not be surprised to see this in Syria at some point. Rumor has it the new GPV 2018-2027 plans to upgrade up to 50 Mig-31s to carry this missile. If anything, this weapon is ideally suited for the Pacific theater, where many Mig-31s are based, and in the anti-ship role, as it will prove incredibly difficult to intercept. I will add, there’s been no news of Tsirkon (a hypersonic cruise missile in development) since last year, principally for the anti-ship role. In 2017 everyone was advertising their goods to get funding in the new GPV, but since then Tsirkon has gone a bit quiet.

      Added another photo after more videos came out.

      Кинж

       

      R-28 Sarmat – heavy ICBM replacement for R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18)

      Sarmat 2.jpg

      R-28 Sarmat is a liquid fueled heavy ICBM designed to have high throw weight, deploying multiple warheads and numerous penetration aids. Although often touted as being a 200 ton replacement for SS-18, there’s a lot of conflicting information, some of it suggesting that its actually much closer to the weight of the SS-19, that is towards 100 tons. Earlier information suggested this was a 106 ton missile with a throw weight of 4350 kg. As a silo-based ICBM, SS-18 could deploy 10 warheads, but was designed and produced by Yuzhmash in Ukraine SSR. Hence Russia had an obvious problem, not only is this aging missile fielding a substantial percentage of the currently deployed force under New START, but it was still serviced and maintained by Yuzhmash.

      Currently, Sarmat is about 2 years behind schedule based on the contract initially signed in 2011. The last ejection test was in late December 2017, which seems to have gone successfully, with two more planned for early 2018. Sarmat features prominently in the new state armament program so there’s every reason to believe that it will be completed sooner rather than later, but in the end this is rocket science, not basket weaving. Suffice it to say, this missile is nowhere near serial production or operational readiness. Problems in Russian industry when it comes to missiles, rockets, and space lift, tend to stem less from S&T and more from production quality of complex components. This was at the heart of Bulava’s spotty test record. I’m also skeptical of the south pole trajectory shown in Putin’s address, implying it could be a fractal orbital weapon. In the end, we have to wait for the actual parameters of the missile to become public (100t or 200t ?), because Russian officials have a long established problem with numbers – whether lies, truth, or self-PR, rarely does anyone in Russia give the same figures for anything.

      Capture

      Sarmat is possibly the least interesting item shown during the weapons menagerie. More puzzling is that little has been said about RS-26 Rubezh, which has stayed out of the news for some time after initially being tested as an ICBM and classified as such. Russian MoD needs to do a ‘where are they now’ catch up segment on some of these systems.

      Gerasimov’s face during Sarmat video expresses how I felt.

      Gerasimov's face during talk of Sarmat

      Avangard or 4202 hypersonic boost-glide weapons

      During the address, Vladimir Putin said that they couldn’t show the actual video of the rocket being used, and hence the name reference to Avangard is rather confusing. Avangard was a project mentioned back in 2011 by Serduykov and some sources incorrectly suggested it was based on a modified RS-24, which was made by MIT, whereas 4202 has been a well known hypersonic boost-glide program and is regularly mentioned as being tested on УР-100УНТТХ, which is made by NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The video during Putin’s presentation shows UR-100 (SS-19 Stiletto) as expected, besides being associated with 4202 – this ICBM also forms the basis for two successful space lift variants ‘Rokot’ and ‘Strela.’ The concept involves using an ICBM to boost a vehicle to near orbital speed, then it descents and adjusts flight profile at some altitude where there is still minimal atmospheric resistance into a sustained hypersonic glide, with the terminal phase being dive to target.

      Borrowing this graphic

      HTV-2.jpg

      First mention of Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, and tests using UR-100, actually goes back to large scale RVSN exercise in 2004.  This, like Kinzhal in 2008, is to give the reader some indicator as to how long these programs have been in progress so as to remove any confusion about the proposition that VV Putin ran out of things to claim and is now making all this up. USSR had ideas about hypersonic vehicles back in mid-1980s, so this is hardly a new concept.  N. Surkov has a good article on the program here, adding that 4202’s flight control system was made in Ukraine, and needed replacing after the war. According to Surkov the vehicle is boosted to 100 km altitude and then glides down, perhaps at 5-7 km per second, those could be just official stats though, just like when Shoigu liberated 500,000 sq km of Syria.

      The idea behind 4202 is Russia’s version of Prompt Global Strike, except this system is intended to be an air defense penetrator carrying a strategic nuclear warhead. The vehicle being tested is analogous to U.S. Hypersonic Test Vehicle 2. Russia’s military continues to imagine a distant future where BMD is able to intercept their second strike, and therefore sees value in an expensive program to deliver nuclear weapons via a boost-glide vehicle. Although this threat perception is not too different from our oft advocated need for a new B-21 stealth bomber, since the current $2 billion B-2 is going to be defeated in some future where stealth is no longer viable. How Russians talk about the capabilities of U.S. missile defense to justify programs, and how Americans talk about Russian integrated air defense when it comes to B-21 and LRSO, has quite a bit in common.

      obj 4202

      A. Ramm has one of the best articles with details on 4202. A R-36M2 silo (listed as object 370) is being used to test 4202 (the complex is often referenced as A35-71. The UR-100 in question, together with 4202 on top of it, fits into this R-36 silo because it is designed for a missile that is 7 meters longer. Earlier mention of Avangard on a RS-24 based missile seems incorrect, unless this is a different system altogether, but in my view 4202 and Avangard are the same. Ultimately R-28 Sarmat is the most logical carrier for this hypersonic vehicle. UR-100 is the current test missile for 4202, while Yars or Topol lack the throw weight for such a weapon, but because UR-100 is too old, it means that R-28 Sarmat is the only perspective ICBM ‘booster’ for this weapon when/if it is completed. Before anyone chimes in that these things take a long time to develop, remind them that R-28 contract was signed 2011, and 4202 began testing 2004. So perhaps we will be seeing both by the mid-2020s?

      Bottom line: there remains a strong emphasis on non-contact warfare, particularly tactical operational and operational-strategic weapons, along with dual-capable standoff systems. Even if the rationale of U.S. missile defense doesn’t hold much logic behind it, Russian leadership continuously thinks about a future where their strategic deterrent is somehow compromised, and this threat concept is rather convenient to justify a host of next generation technology programs, delivery systems and the like. Where there is capability in long range precision guided munitions the short coming often ends up being capacity. These are not bluffs, the question is less whether they can make it work and more of ‘how many can they afford.’ The upcoming GPV 2018-2027 will focus on increasing munition stocks and bringing to fruition several new standoff missiles – Kinzhal is just one among several projects. More in part 2 on Dr. Strangelove weapons.

      Beyond the bad graphics, there is a real vehicle somewhere in testing, though it likely has a long way to go.

      4202 video.JPG

      In one brief graphic its even dodging numerous missiles that appear to be GBI interceptors, so there are two fantasies playing out in this image

      past gbi

      Comments and suggestions are welcome.

      Back to top
      #####EOF##### Tomek Rabczak – 44CON

      Tomek Rabczak

      default Twitter: @sigdroid
      Website: blog.ff7f00.com

      Tomek is an Application Security Consultant at NCC Group with experience in secure web application development, security tool research and development, code review, and penetration testing. Over the past 2 years, he has looked at and assessed the security of some of the largest Ruby on Rails applications on the internet with great success. Tomek has recently been credited with the disclosure of 3 Rails related CVEs. (CVE-2015-3225, CVE-2015-3227, and CVE-2015-4619)

      Tomek has presented at:
      #####EOF##### Terms of Service — WordPress.com

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      Features. Jetpack includes various features, and you can visit Jetpack.com to learn more about them. Some features, like Enhanced Distribution, when activated, will include your Jetpack Content in Firehose. By activating these features, you grant us permission to display your Jetpack Content on WordPress.com for the purpose of distributing and promoting your website. Some features are on by default and others you need to enable manually. You can see which features are active, and activate and deactivate features, on your dashboard.

      License. You agree that we may scan your website, and compile aggregated/anonymized statistics for our internal use to optimize Jetpack’s performance. By submitting Content to Automattic for inclusion on your website, you grant Automattic a world-wide, royalty-free, and non-exclusive license to reproduce, modify, adapt, and publish the Content solely for the purpose of displaying, distributing, and promoting your website. This license also allows Automattic to make any publicly-posted Content available to third parties selected by Automattic (through Firehose, for example) so that these third parties can analyze and distribute (but not publicly display) the Content through their services.

      Storage of Information. Certain Jetpack features rely on WordPress.com servers to function, such as those that allow you to send email, publish links, relate posts to each other, or resize images. To take advantage of the performance boosting features of Jetpack, certain information about the Content, settings, and setup of your website are synced with our servers, as described on our What Data Does Jetpack Sync? support page.

      Prohibited Uses. Your website and Jetpack Content must comply with Jetpack’s Service Guidelines.

      c. VaultPress

      VaultPress is a subscription-based security and backup service for self-hosted WordPress websites.

      VaultPress Content. VaultPress will backup your WordPress content (e.g., your WordPress database, plugins, themes, and uploads, as well as some additional files, as described in this introduction to VaultPress) (“VaultPress Content”). You can view the Content that VaultPress backs up via your VaultPress dashboard. You’re fully responsible for your VaultPress Content. It’s your responsibility to ensure that your website’s Content abides by applicable laws and by these Terms. We don’t actively review the VaultPress Content.

      Access. If you lose access to your WordPress.com account, you may not be able to access your backed up VaultPress Content.

      License. By using VaultPress, you grant us access to your website’s servers for the purpose of backing up and securing your VaultPress Content, and restoring files and database information (which may include access details for multiple servers or accounts for each website that we backup). In order to address security vulnerabilities, we may push an upgrade to your website, or we may access your website to remove malicious code. We may also scan VaultPress Content and compile aggregated/anonymized statistics for our internal use to optimize the performance of the VaultPress service. You also grant us a worldwide, royalty-free, and non-exclusive license to copy and store your VaultPress Content, to the extent necessary to operate the VaultPress service. These Terms don’t give us any rights in your VaultPress Content, beyond those we need to operate VaultPress. You own your VaultPress Content.

      Cancellation. If you cancel your subscription to VaultPress, we will queue your backed-up VaultPress Content for deletion.

      d. Happy Tools

      Happy Tools is a suite of software and consulting services to help modern and distributed companies manage, grow, and support their business.

      Prohibited Uses. You agree not to:

      • Modify, decompile, reverse engineer or otherwise alter or seek to derive the trade secrets and other inherent intellectual property of Happy Tools; or
      • License, sublicense, sell, resell, rent, lease, transfer, assign, distribute, or otherwise commercially exploit or make Happy Tools available to any third party, other than your authorized users.

      e. Ecommerce Services

      There are certain features offered via WooCommerce, WooCommerce Services, or WordPress.com that enable you to sell items (goods, content, services, etc.) on your website (“Ecommerce Services”). If you use WooCommerce, the WooCommerce Use Terms also apply.

      Usage of Information. WooCommerce Services may require Automattic’s servers, a connection to our partners, and/or data from your website, to work, as described on our What Data Does Jetpack Sync? support page.

      Prohibited Uses. If your store is on WordPress.com, you must not violate our User Guidelines or Store Guidelines.

      Third Party Services. You may choose to set up and/or use third party services, such Stripe or PayPal to collect payment, TaxJar to calculate taxes, or EasyPost to manage shipping. If you do so, be aware that some of your — and your customers’ — data may be passed to the respective third party, and the respective third party’s terms of service, privacy policy, and other policies may apply. We are not involved in these relationships. Please note that some of these third party services (like TaxJar) may be enabled by default, but you may disable them before your store is set up. If you do not want to use these third party services, please disable them.

      Tax Calculations. Tax calculations are provided by TaxJar. You are responsible for all taxes and fees associated with your ecommerce activities. You must collect, report, and/or pay the correct amounts to the appropriate authorities, if applicable and, if needed, inform your customers about any taxes they may be required to pay and issue appropriate invoices. While some Ecommerce Services allow you to include sales taxes or Value Added Taxes in transactions, you should not rely solely on these features. While our goal is to keep our documents and tools up-to-date, tax laws change rapidly, and we do not guarantee that tax calculations you receive through or in connection with our Services are complete and accurate. Tax laws also differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may be subject to different interpretations by different authorities. We recommend that you consult with a tax professional for your specific tax situation when assessing the correct tax rates you should charge.

      Shipping Services. Shipping labels are provided by EasyPost and allow you to take advantage of real-time shipping rates to purchase postage and print shipping labels from certain mailing services, such as USPS and Canada Post. We act only as an intermediary between you and these third parties; we are not involved in any way with your product or its shipment. We also do not warrant that the results you obtain from the use of these services (rates and labels, for example) will be accurate or reliable.

      You are solely responsible for compliance with all applicable rules and regulations, including domestic and international shipping and customs regulations and those of the relevant mailing service. For example, if you use USPS postage, you will need to comply with their shipping restrictions and mailing standards, among others.

      In addition, you are solely responsible for customs charges, import taxes or duties, or any other charges related to your shipments. If any charges are assessed against us as a result of your use of the shipping services, you will reimburse us for the full amount within 7 days.

      You authorize us to charge you for the fees associated with each shipping label you create. Each fee will be charged separately to the payment methods you have provided in your WordPress.com account, which you can view and manage as described the Payment Methods support page. If you have multiple payment methods, you can select which should be used for the shipping label service. If we are unable to collect payment from you for these fees, you will be responsible for payment within 7 days; please contact us to remit payment.

      Refunds for unused shipping labels must be requested in your store’s wp-admin within 30 days of creating the label. Please note that depending on your bank and the third party involved, it may take up to 45 days for your refund to issue. If you haven’t received your refund within this time frame, please contact us.
      You may not transfer or sell postage and/or shipping labels to a third party.

      Your Responsibilities. You are solely responsible for all of your ecommerce activities, including your store, your items, its operation, all applicable taxes and fees, compliance with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), and compliance with any applicable laws. Among other things, this means that:

      • You should use your best judgment when setting up your store, operating your store, processing payments, and selling items. For example, you may not want to accept check payments if you are not comfortable sharing your mailing address with a customer, or you may want to publish payment and return policies.
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      • You are responsible for delivering items sold to your customers, and for fulfilling all promises, representations, or warranties you make to them in connection with a sale.

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      As we ask others to respect our intellectual property rights, we respect the intellectual property rights of others. If you believe that material located on or associated with an Automattic product or service violates your copyright, please notify us in accordance with Automattic’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) Policy. We will respond to all such notices, including as required or appropriate by removing the infringing material or disabling all links to the infringing material. We will terminate a visitor’s access to and use of the website if, under appropriate circumstances, the visitor is determined to be a repeat infringer of the copyrights or other intellectual property rights of Automattic or others. In the case of such termination, we will have no obligation to provide a refund of any amounts previously paid to us.

      9. Intellectual Property

      The Agreement does not transfer from Automattic to you any Automattic or third party intellectual property, and all right, title, and interest in and to such property will remain (as between the parties) solely with Automattic. Automattic, WordPress, WordPress.com, the WordPress.com logo, and all other trademarks, service marks, graphics, and logos used in connection with WordPress.com or our Services, are trademarks or registered trademarks of Automattic or Automattic’s licensors. Other trademarks, service marks, graphics, and logos used in connection with our Services may be the trademarks of other third parties. Your use of our Services grants you no right or license to reproduce or otherwise use any Automattic or third party trademarks.

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      13. Termination

      We may terminate your access to all or any part of our Services at any time, with or without cause, with or without notice, effective immediately. We have the right (though not the obligation) to, in our sole discretion, (i) reclaim your username or website’s URL due to prolonged inactivity, (ii) refuse or remove any content that, in our reasonable opinion, violates any Automattic policy or is in any way harmful or objectionable, or (iii) terminate or deny access to and use of any of our Services to any individual or entity for any reason. We will have no obligation to provide a refund of any amounts previously paid.

      If you wish to terminate the Agreement or your WordPress.com account, you may simply discontinue using our Services, or, if you are using a paid service, you may cancel at any time, subject to the Fees, Payment, and Renewal section in these Terms.

      All provisions of the Agreement which by their nature should survive termination shall survive termination, including, without limitation, ownership provisions, warranty disclaimers, indemnity, and limitations of liability.

      14. Disclaimer of Warranties

      Our Services are provided “as is.” Automattic and its suppliers and licensors hereby disclaim all warranties of any kind, express or implied, including, without limitation, the warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose and non-infringement. Neither Automattic, nor its suppliers and licensors, makes any warranty that our Services will be error free or that access thereto will be continuous or uninterrupted. If you’re actually reading this, here’s a treat. You understand that you download from, or otherwise obtain content or services through, our Services at your own discretion and risk.

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      Except to the extent any applicable law provides otherwise, the Agreement and any access to or use of our Services will be governed by the laws of the state of California, U.S.A., excluding its conflict of law provisions. The proper venue for any disputes arising out of or relating to the Agreement and any access to or use of our Services will be the state and federal courts located in San Francisco County, California.

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      Except for claims for injunctive or equitable relief or claims regarding intellectual property rights (which may be brought in any competent court without the posting of a bond), any dispute arising under the Agreement shall be finally settled in accordance with the Comprehensive Arbitration Rules of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service, Inc. (“JAMS”) by three arbitrators appointed in accordance with such Rules. The arbitration shall take place in San Francisco, California, in the English language and the arbitral decision may be enforced in any court. The prevailing party in any action or proceeding to enforce the Agreement shall be entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees.

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      The Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between Automattic and you concerning the subject matter hereof. If any part of the Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable, that part will be construed to reflect the parties’ original intent, and the remaining portions will remain in full force and effect. A waiver by either party of any term or condition of the Agreement or any breach thereof, in any one instance, will not waive such term or condition or any subsequent breach thereof.

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      #####EOF##### Programm des 32. Netzpolitischen Abend AT am 10. Jänner 2019 in Wien | Netzpolitischer Abend AT

      Programm des 32. Netzpolitischen Abend AT am 10. Jänner 2019 in Wien

      06 Sonntag Jan 2019

      Posted by in Wien

      ≈ Ein Kommentar

      Schlagwörter

      , ,

      Der erste Netzpolitische Abend AT (#NetzPAT) im Jahr 2019 steigt am 10. Jänner ab 19:30 im Wiener Metalab, Rathausstrasse 6, 1010 Wien. Zum Jahresauftakt stehen die folgenden Kurzvorträge am Programm:

      Moderation: Claudia Garád (@ClaudiaGarad)

      Im Anschluss an die Kurzvorträge gibt es wie immer die Möglichkeit für kurze Ankündigungen und Lightning Talks, bevor der nicht minder wichtige informelle Teil des gemeinsamen Bier- und Matetrinkens ansteht.

      Wie immer gibt es einen Audio und einen Video-Stream, verfügbar unter folgenden URLs:

      Wer mag, kann sich auch bei Facebook für den #NetzPAT anmelden und so am Laufenden bleiben. Außerdem gibt es seit kurzem einen offiziellen #NetzPAT Newsletter für alle jene, die lieber per Mail über Updates informiert werden möchten.

      Werbeanzeigen

      1 Gedanke zu “Programm des 32. Netzpolitischen Abend AT am 10. Jänner 2019 in Wien”

      1. Pingback: Warum die Post mit Politik-Daten gegen das Gesetz verstoßen könnte | Spitzel Staat - Österreich

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        #####EOF##### Reblogs — Support — WordPress.com

        Support

        Social Tools

        Reblogs

        You can reblog posts directly from your Reader, which displays a stream of all the updates published on all the blogs you follow from your WordPress.com account.

        How does reblogging work?
        What happens when my posts get reblogged?
        Frequently Asked Questions
        Looking for more information about Reblogs?

        reblog-share-reader
        Click the “Share” button in the Reader to reblog a post

        How does reblogging work?

        Reblogging is a quick way to share posts published by other WordPress.com users on your own blog. People have been reblogging others’ posts since blogging started, but our new reblogging system enables authors to retain greater control over their content. To reblog a post, click the Share button from the Reader or the Reblog button at the bottom of a post directly on the site.

        Note that the Reblog button only shows to users who are logged in at WordPress.com.

        When a post is reblogged, it shows up with a link back to the blog it came from, the reblogger’s commentary highlighted, and an excerpt of the post’s text and media. It also shows any comments left by the person who reblogged the post:

        Layout of a reblogged post

        Reblogs published on blogs you follow will also appear in your Reader:

        reblog-shared-reader
        Reblogged post displayed in the Reader

        ↑ Table of Contents ↑

        What happens when my posts get reblogged?

        An excerpt of your post will be published on the reblogger’s site (with a link back to your original post), and you’ll receive a reblog notification in the post comments (you might need to approve the comment first):

        comments

        You’ll also receive an email notification of the reblog.

        ↑ Table of Contents ↑

        Frequently Asked Questions

        Do I get credit when someone else reblogs one of my posts?

        Absolutely! All reblogs contain a link back to your original post, so the more people reblog your posts, the more likely it is that you’ll attract new visitors (and perhaps new followers, too!).

        What happens if I reblog a reblog?

        If, for example, Stephane reblogs a WordPress.com news announcement on his site and Lori reblogs Stephane’s reblog, Lori only re-publishes Stephane’s comment. If Lori wants to share the original announcement, she should reblog the post from en.blog.wordpress.com, not from Stephane’s reblog. But if Stephane leaves a really clever comment, Lori might want to share it on her own site by reblogging his reblog.

        Can I edit a post I’ve reblogged?

        You can go back and edit the comments you left when you reblogged a post, but you cannot edit any parts of the original post excerpt (including the post title). If you like, you can add categories or tags to the post. Reblogs show up under My Site → Blog Posts in your dashboard, and they can be edited the same way you edit your own posts.

        Are there any restrictions on who can reblog posts?

        Reblogging is designed to give all WordPress.com users an easy way to share great posts they find on their own sites. If your content is reblogged on a site you find objectionable, you can ask the blogger to remove it, either by leaving a comment or through their contact form if one is available. Likewise, if you aren’t sure if another blogger would want their post reblogged on your own site, there’s no harm in asking them for permission first. Please note, though, that reblogging is not the same as lifting an entire post without attribution, and so WordPress.com will not remove reblogged posts under the DMCA. If you’re not comfortable with others being able to reblog your content, you may want to make your site private.

        Keep in mind also that the reblog button isn’t currently available for sites on the Business plan with a custom theme or plugin added. However in this case, reblogging can still be accomplished within the Reader.

        How many times can I reblog a post?

        You can only reblog the same post once per user. If you’d like to show an older post again to your readers, consider setting it as a Sticky post.

        Is there anyway I can disable the reblog option?

        Yes, if you decide you would rather not offer the option to reblog your post, you can disable the button by navigating to Sharing â†’ Sharing Buttons.
        Disable Show reblog button under Reblog & Like and the Reblog button will no longer appear on your blog posts. Likewise, if you later decide you would like to offer users the option to reblog your content, you can enable the feature.

        reblog-and-like

        ↑ Table of Contents ↑

        Looking for more information about Reblogs?

        Learn more about the benefits and etiquette of reblogging in “Reblogs: Share the Awesome”, and see how the WordPress.com community uses the Reblog in “Reexamining the Reblog”.

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        Get Help
        #####EOF##### WordPress.com
        #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Courses | The Daily Post
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        Your ideas. Our guidance.
        A blog you can be proud of.

        Here’s how it works:

        Sign up

        All you need is a WordPress.com account

        Read

        Get course materials every day, right in your inbox

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        Achieve your blogging goals

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        First, you’ll need to sign up or log in to WordPress.com
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        “I was thinking today that I would have probably already given up on this blogging thing if it hadn’t been for Blogging U.”

        K. Renae Mostly True Stories of K. Renae P.

        “I haven’t written this much in quite a while, nor had as much fun. The assignments are challenging and interesting.”

        Meredith Meredith’s Musings

        “I feel like we have more language and skills than we did almost two weeks ago that’s shaping us, our blogs, and even our relationships toward one another and the internet.”

        moviemermaid Movie Justice

        “Jeez, Blogging U. When signing up, you should have warned me of the gigantic amount of fun I was about to have!”

        liis Brain-babies

        “I can’t believe how much my blog has not only changed but improved since I started this little ol’ course!”

        Kinglsey Clennel-White kingsley clennel-white

        “My blog has gone from being dull and plain to having widgets and all this shmancy tech stuff, and from having almost no followers to having a loyal following now!”

        microgalactic MicroGalactic
        #####EOF##### Matt Mullenweg: Q&A at WordCamp Portland 2018 – WordPress.tv
        Home » WordCampTV»WordCamp Portland 2018

        Matt Mullenweg: Q&A at WordCamp Portland 2018

        One response on “Matt Mullenweg: Q&A at WordCamp Portland 2018”

        1. Adrian Roselli
          November 11, 2018 at 7:36 pm | Reply

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        Published

        November 8, 2018

        Two weeks before the scheduled release of WordPress 5.0, the first version with the new editor, Gutenberg, Matt Mullenweg, co-founder of WordPress, dropped by WordCamp Portland for an unscheduled Q&A with the audience.

        In this 35 minute session he answers questions about the new editor, accessibility, the business ecosystem around WordPress and more.

        Rate this:

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        This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
        #####EOF##### Introducing Twenty Nineteen – Make WordPress Core

        WordPress.org

        Welcome!

        The WordPress core development team builds WordPress! Follow this site for general updates, status reports, and the occasional code debate. There’s lots of ways to contribute:

        Communication

        We use Slack for real-time communication. Contributors live all over the world, so there are discussions happening at all hours of the day.

        Our core development meeting is every Wednesday at 21:00 UTC in the #core channel on Slack. Anyone can join and participate or listen in!

        #core-themes

        allancole 12:16 pm on October 16, 2018
        Tags:   

        Introducing Twenty Nineteen

        Gutenberg grants users an unprecedented level of freedom to customize their site’s layout and design. In order to fully achieve their vision, users will need a new generation of flexible themes, built to take advantage of the creative freedom that Gutenberg offers.

        With that in mind, WordPress 5.0 will launch with a brand new default theme: Twenty Nineteen. The theme will be led by @allancole, supported by @kjellr as a design coach.

        Twenty Nineteen Theme, Blog Post Example
        Twenty Nineteen Theme, Homepage Example

        Full page mockups: Low-res, High-res
        InVision prototypes: Post Desktop, Post Mobile, Homepage Desktop, Homepage Mobile

        At the core of Twenty Nineteen is its simple, sophisticated typography. The theme’s aesthetic is minimal and non-prescriptive, allowing the theme to work well in a variety of applications. For example: it is effective as an minimal, typography-driven blogging theme, but can also be adapted for use as a static business website.

        Twenty Nineteen will ship with full Gutenberg support. It will include both front and back-end styles, so that users can be fully confident in their site’s appearance when they hit publish.

        Twenty Nineteen Theme, Gutenberg Editor Styles Mockup

        Timeline

        As mentioned in the release plan, WordPress 5.0 will be released on November 19th, 2018, so this is a faster-than-usual theme build. The first release candidate is estimated for the end of October, so we’ll want to have a working version of the theme ready by then. Because of time limitations we may remove Twenty Nineteen from 5.0 if it is not ready in time for launch.

        Get Involved

        If you are interested in contributing, please be sure to follow this blog. During the design and development process, there will be weekly half-hour meetings every Tuesday at 16:00 UTC in #core-themes, beginning today, October 16, 2018.

        Theme development will happen on GitHub and in the interest of time, an in-progress version of the theme code has been uploaded here: https://github.com/WordPress/twentynineteen. Once the theme is stable, it will be merged into core and the GitHub repo will be depreciated.

        Some notes:

        • The theme is based on both _s and the gutenberg-starter-theme.
        • SASS is used in some key areas which has been helpful for keeping styles in-sync between the Gutenberg editor, and the front-end experience. This is not usual for a default theme and open to debate.
        • There is plenty of work left to do too and issues will be created in the coming days to help guide the process.

        Learn more

        If you’re interested in learning more about default themes, you can read the following posts:


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        #####EOF##### Yuki Chen – 44CON

        Yuki Chen

        thumb_Yuki_Chen Twitter: @guhe120

        Yuki Chen is the core member of 360Vulcan Team from 360 Safeguard offensive and defensive research group. In March this year, 360Vulcan Team successfully exploited 64-bit Internet Explorer with EPM enabled at Pwn2Own 2015 in vancouver. Yuki Chen has 6+ years’ experience in security industry. He is mostly interested in vulnerability hunting & analyzing and exploit developing. He has spoken at several security conferences such as SysCan, Xcon and SysCan360.

        Yuki has presented at:
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        #####EOF##### NCC Group – 44CON

        NCC Group

        nccgroup

        NCC Group is a FTSE 250 listed global expert in cyber security and risk mitigation, working with businesses to protect their brand, value and reputation against the ever-evolving threat landscape.

        With our knowledge, experience and global footprint, we are best placed to help businesses identify, assess, mitigate & respond to the risks they face.

        We are passionate about making the Internet safer and revolutionising the way in which organisations think about cyber security.

        Headquartered in Manchester, UK, with over 30 offices across the world, NCC Group employs more than 1,850 people and is a trusted advisor to 15,000 clients worldwide.

        #####EOF##### Blog | Developer Resources | Create cool applications that integrate with WordPress.com

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        Developing WordPress, Jetpack, and Calypso on ChromeOS

        Posted on by goldsounds

        Today I was travelling to meet my team in Mexico City (one of the many perks of working at Automattic), and I decided to see if I could set up a functional development environment on my new Google Pixelbook.

        It’s quite a capable machine (Core i5, 8GB RAM) – not quite Macbook-Pro-level, but powerful enough. Plus it has great battery life, touch and pen support, a beautiful keyboard, Android app support and other really nice things. You can even run Android studio on it.

        So, without further ado – let’s see if we can develop Jetpack and Calypso on ChromeOS! As a bonus, we will add ngrok so that our WordPress instance can be viewed by anyone on the internet.

        These instructions assume you have some familiarity with Linux and the vi editor. Feel free to adapt them to develop your own WordPress plugin or node app.

        Basic Setup

        Enable “Linux Mode” on ChromeOS

        ChromeOS supports running Linux in a container – but only on Pixelbooks right now, and only on the “developer channel”. Just follow these instructions.

        Once you’ve installed Linux, you simply get a Terminal icon in your App drawer. Clicking it boots Linux and opens a Bash shell. Woohoo!

        This Linux is a lightly customized version of Debian 9 (Stretch). Most of the customizations are to support the Wayland display server for the Linux container.

        As always with Linux, it’s worth doing an sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get upgrade to make sure everything is up-to-date.

        Also you should know that the network address for the Linux container is “penguin.linux.test”. Cute 🙂

        Install an Editor

        Installing Visual Studio Code

        This is my preferred editor. You can follow the Debian (Stretch) instructions on the VS Code web page.

        Once you have install VS Code, you can edit the files in any directory using the command code /path/to/directory.

        Developing Calypso

        For the unfamiliar, Calypso is the user interface of WordPress.com. It’s a beautiful, fast and responsive replacement for wp-admin, which talks to your site via the WordPress.com APIs. It’s built using node, with a user interface powered by React.

        Clone wp-calypso

        I personally put my repositories in a folder called `workspace` under my home directory.

        mkdir workspace
cd workspace
git clone git@github.com:Automattic/wp-calypso.git

        Install NVM

        We need this in order to build Calypso.

        sudo apt-get install build-essential libssl-dev
curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/creationix/nvm/v0.33.11/install.sh | bash

        Follow any prompts from the install script, including installing Node 10.

        Let’s run Calypso!

        cd wp-calypso 
npm run start

        Now open http://calypso.localhost:3000/ and behold your beautiful WordPress interface 🙂

        Install WordPress and connect Jetpack

        Installing WordPress

        The Debian Wiki has official instructions, which I have summarized here with light customizations.

        As you may know, WordPress has just three dependencies: PHP, Curl and MySQL (aka MariaDB).

        sudo apt-get install wordpress curl apache2 mariadb-server
sudo mysql_secure_installation

        Follow the prompts to set a MySQL root password and disable remote access.

        Now let’s create an Apache configuration:

        sudo vi /etc/apache2/sites-available/wp.conf

        I have taken the following config from the Debian instructions, but set the ServerName to “penguin.linux.test” (the default address for the VM) and add a ServerAlias directive with something like “myspecialsite.ngrok.io”. This will allow us to connect Jetpack later, when we install ngrok.

        Here’s my config:

        <VirtualHost *:80>
        ServerName penguin.linux.test
        ServerAlias goldsoundschrome.ngrok.io
        ServerAdmin webmaster@example.com
        DocumentRoot /usr/share/wordpress

        Alias /wp-content /var/lib/wordpress/wp-content
        <Directory /usr/share/wordpress>
            Options FollowSymLinks
            AllowOverride Limit Options FileInfo
            DirectoryIndex index.php
            Require all granted
        </Directory>
        <Directory /var/lib/wordpress/wp-content>
            Options FollowSymLinks
            Require all granted
        </Directory>

        ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log
        CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined

</VirtualHost>

        Now let’s disable the default site and enable our wp site in Apache:

        sudo /usr/sbin/a2dissite 000-default
sudo /usr/sbin/a2ensite wp
sudo systemctl reload apache2

        Since we’ll only be running one site (for now) let’s create/edit the default WordPress config file, where the WordPress debian package expects to find it.Also note that contrary to the Debian WP instructions, the a2dissite and a2ensite commands need to be prefixed with /usr/sbin:

        sudo vi /etc/wordpress/config-default.php
        <?php
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');
define('DB_USER', 'wordpress');
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'password');
define('DB_HOST', 'localhost');
define('WP_CONTENT_DIR', '/var/lib/wordpress/wp-content');
define('FS_METHOD', 'direct');
?>

        Be sure to change the password to something more secure 🙂

        Also note that we added define('FS_METHOD', 'direct'); so that we can update plugins using the regular WordPress update mechanism – otherwise WordPress will prompt you for an FTP password whenever you update.

        You will also need to change the ownership of the wp-content directories so that Apache can write to them:

        sudo chown -R www-data:www-data /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content

        Now create a one-time SQL script for creating the DB (remember to match the password here to the one in the config file above).

        CREATE DATABASE wordpress;
GRANT SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE,CREATE,DROP,ALTER
ON wordpress.*
TO wordpress@localhost
IDENTIFIED BY 'password';
FLUSH PRIVILEGES;

        Now load the file to create our database:

        sudo cat ~/wp.sql | sudo mysql --defaults-extra-file=/etc/mysql/debian.cnf

        The command should complete without errors.

        To confirm that the DB was created, load up the MySQL command line:

        sudo mysql --defaults-extra-file=/etc/mysql/debian.cnf

MariaDB [(none)]> show databases;
+--------------------+
| Database |
+--------------------+
| information_schema |
| mysql |
| performance_schema |
| wordpress |
+--------------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)

MariaDB [(none)]>

        Hooray! Ok – now you should be able to go to http://penguin.linux.test in your browser and see the famous 5 minute install! Follow the prompts and you have WordPress running. Yay!

        Install wp-cli

        Follow the instructions at https://wp-cli.org/#installing to install wp-cli

        Now make sure we create a www-data-owned directory for wp-cli to do caching, otherwise you’ll get warnings about that:

        sudo mkdir /var/www/.wp-cli
sudo chown www-data:www-data /var/www/.wp-cli

        Once you’re done, you should be able to cd to /usr/share/wordpress and run commands like this:

        sudo -u www-data wp plugin install --activate jetpack

        Reinstall default plugin and theme

        At this point, we can remove the old akisment and twentyseventeen symlinks and use wp-cli to install them again (so they can be auto-updated).

        sudo rm /var/lib/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/akismet
sudo rm /var/lib/wordpress/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeencd /usr/share/wordpress
sudo -u www-data wp theme install --activate twentyseventeen
sudo -u www-data wp plugin install --activate akismet

        In order to connect Jetpack, our WordPress install needs to be accessible on the internet. To do this, I use ngrok.

        Installing ngrok

        Head to https://ngrok.com/download and copy the link to the latest Linux amd64 build, then unzip it.

        In my case, the commands were:

        wget https://bin.equinox.io/c/4VmDzA7iaHb/ngrok-stable-linux-amd64.zip
unzip ngrok-stable-linux-amd64.zip
sudo mv ngrok /usr/local/bin/

        Now we need to activate ngrok. If you head to ngrok.io and log in, then you should be able to copy the “Connect your account” command (careful of that leading ./) and activate your ngrok install.

        ngrok authtoken blahblahblahblahtokentokentoken

        Assuming you successfully authenticated, you should now be able to launch ngrok using the subdomain you specified in your ServerAlias command in the Apache config:

        ngrok http -subdomain=goldsoundschrome 80

        Now go to http://goldsoundschrome.ngrok.io and see your site!

        There’s one wrinkle here – if you attempt to authenticate or connect to your site externally, it will redirect to penguin.linux.test.

        Luckily the wp command we installed earlier gives us an easy way to change all the domain-related settings:

        cd /usr/share/wordpress
wp search-replace penguin.linux.test goldsoundschrome.ngrok.io

        Now head to http://goldsoundschrome.ngrok.io/wp-admin (or whatever your address is) and log in, then follow the prompts to set up Jetpack.

        Woohoo!

        Observations / Thoughts

        This actually works pretty well. Developing on my Pixelbook feels really fast and snappy (and it’s not the highest-end model, either). I honestly didn’t notice an enormous difference between the Pixelbook and my Macbook Pro in terms of performance.

        Display scaling issues for Linux apps need to be tuned – some are teeny-tiny (xterm), some are middling (Visual Studio Code) and some are normal-sized (GTK apps like the Package Manager).

        Overall, it’s a perfectly functional system for developing WordPress plugins, themes, and node apps. It has tons of battery life, great security, and thanks to the Linux mode it has access to all the useful software you can think of.

        Enjoy!

        ***

        Daniel Walmsley is a Team Lead at Automattic, mainly working on partnerships. He loves working from home in beautiful Nevada City.

        Video of Automated Test Runs

        Posted on by bsessions85

        Sometimes, automated end-to-end (e2e) tests fail and it’s difficult to tell why. Screenshots and stack traces are useful, but video of the actual test running in the CI environment would also be helpful. That’s why we recently added video to the automated tests we run in CircleCI. We are now able to see everything that occurred during the test and can quickly debug issues that would previously require more investigation.

        How we’re using it

        Any time we run our full automated e2e test suite, we make a video recording of every test. If the test passes, we delete the video. If it fails, we keep the video, and it’s returned as an artifact in CircleCI. We also output the path of the video file so it’s easier to find the file that corresponds to the test that you’re looking at.

        We are currently only making recordings when running the full suite of tests; we don’t record the “canaries” to avoid adding additional overhead to simple test runs.

        How it works

        The builds we use in CircleCI are running in Linux docker images. To get video of the automated tests, we install FFmpeg in the container and use Xvfb for the display. For each test we:

        1. Start an Xvfb session on a display that is not already in use.
        2. Start a recording of the display using FFmpeg.
        3. Run the automated test in Chrome. There is a --display parameter that allows you to specify which display to run the test on.
        4. Stop the FFmpeg recording when the test is completed or has failed.
        5. Stop the Xvfb session.

        Get involved!

        Feel free to check out our e2e tests repository, make a fork, and give us your feedback or suggestions. Pull requests are always welcome.

        ***
        Brent Sessions is an Excellence Wrangler for Automattic working to provide tools and technology to help developers improve product testing.

        Cloud-hosted Branches for Painless Testing

        Posted on by Jake Fried

        Anyone familiar with developing web applications knows how tedious it is to test code changes made by your peers. Whether it’s a designer learning how to build and run a local server, or even a developer that needs to stash local changes and wait for a server rebuild, testing changes is a major workflow interruption that can mean minutes of thumb twiddling. At WordPress.com, we’re proud that we’ve made testing in-progress work a quick process that’s as easy as sharing a url.

        Introducing Calypso.live

        If you’ve ever seen a Calypso pull request, you might have noticed that our helpful matticbot always comments on the request with a link to calypso.live. If you follow the link, it takes you to a hosted version of that branch. If you’re the first person to access the branch, you may have to wait a couple of minutes for the app to be built, during which you’ll be greeted with this loading screen:

        Screen Shot 2018-04-10 at 7.02.21 PM.png

        calypso.live loading screen

        Once the server is done building, it presents you with a version of Calypso corresponding to that branch of code. This makes it easy and quick for developers to review functionality and designers to review the look and feel, all without having to manage local development servers.

        One piece of good news is that you usually aren’t the first to access a branch. That’s because our automated tests actually rely on these cloud-hosted branches to test against.

        How does this work technically?

        Calypso.live is powered by a specialized docker server named dserve, which was written to work for any Docker-based web application. It automatically manages thousands of versions of an app and makes both each git sha and branch accessible by url. An example request might go like this:

        1. Request is made for calypso.live?branch=my-branch
        2. Once dserve receives the request, it checks to see if my-branch is ready to be served
        3. Assuming a container is already running for my-branch, dserve proxies the request to the right container — very similar to how a load balancer sits in front of an array of servers and proxies the request.

        Get involved!

        Feel free to check out the dserve repository, our e2e tests repository, or wp-calypso, make a fork, and provide us with any feedback or suggestions. Pull requests are always welcome.

        ***

        Jake Fried is a Software Engineer at Automattic, mainly working on Calypso.

        How Canaries Help Us Merge Good Pull Requests

        Posted on by Alister Scott

        At WordPress.com we strive to provide a consistent and reliable user experience as we merge and release hundreds of code changes each week.

        We run automated unit and component tests for our Calypso user interface on every commit against every pull request (PR).

        We also have 32 automated end-to-end (e2e) test scenarios that, until recently, we would only automatically run across our platform after merging and deploying to production. While these e2e scenarios have found regressions fairly quickly after deploying (the 32 scenarios execute in parallel in just 10 minutes), they don’t prevent us from merging and releasing regressions to our customer experience.

        Introducing our Canaries

        Earlier this year we decided to identify three of our 32 automated end-to-end test scenarios that would act as our “canaries”: a minimal subset of automated tests to quickly tell us if our most important flows are broken. These tests execute after a pull request is merged and deployed to our staging environment, but before we deploy the changes to all our customers in production.

        These canaries have been very successful in preventing us from deploying regressions to production, however, running these after merging to master (and automatically deploying code to staging) means we’d have to revert code changes if something was wrong. This wasn’t good enough.

        Last month we took our canaries to the next level. Instead of just running canaries on merging to master, we now execute canaries against live pull requests and provide feedback to the pull request itself about the canary test status.

        How does it work?

        Our process is that if you’re a developer working on a pull request for Calypso and it’s ready to review, you add the “[Status] Needs Review” label to alert someone to review your code. Adding this label automatically triggers the e2e canary tests against your pull request:

        The results are separate from the unit and component tests which already run against every pull request (on every push).

        How does this technically work?

        Our automated e2e tests are open-source, but they reside separately from our Calypso GitHub code repository. This is because the e2e scenarios represent the entire WordPress.com customer experience: they’re not just automated Calypso user interface tests. For example, our tests include verifying that our customers receive appropriate emails that are not part of the Calypso code base.

        We “connect” our two projects using CircleCI builds and a custom “bridge” written in Node.js (which is also open-source). This bridge provides webhooks for GitHub pull requests to execute CircleCI builds using the CircleCI API. It reports the status of these builds using the GitHub status API. We do apply a little bit of cleverness in that we can match branch names so we can make changes to our e2e tests that correspond to changes to our Calypso changes. Our bridge runs on Automattic’s VIP Go platform.

        A summary and what’s next?

        Running our canaries on pull requests has been a great success. Developers love the confidence the canaries give them in knowing that our key end-to-end scenarios won’t regress when introducing changes rapidly.

        We’d now like to expand the bridge’s scope to optionally run the full set of 32 end-to-end automated tests on pull requests that have a broader impact, changes like upgrading a dependency or refactoring a framework design pattern. This again will give our developers even greater confidence in the ability to merge code and provide a consistent and reliable experience to our customers.

        Get involved!

        Feel free to check out our e2e tests repository, or our bridge repository, make a fork, and provide us with any feedback or suggestions. Pull requests are always welcomed.

        ***

        Alister Scott is an Excellence Wrangler for Automattic and blogs regularly about software testing at his blog WatirMelon.

        New WordPress unified API console

        Posted on by Riad Benguella

        Since the WordPress 4.7 “Vaughan” release, each WordPress installation includes REST API endpoints to access and manipulate its content.  These endpoints will be the foundation for the next generation of WordPress websites and applications.

        Today we’re releasing a brand new Open Source WordPress API console. You can use it to try these endpoints and explore the results.  The console works for any website on WordPress.com and also for any self-hosted WordPress installation.

        Using the console with WordPress.com APIs

        You can use this application today to make read and write requests to the WordPress.com API or the WordPress REST API for any website hosted on WordPress.com or using Jetpack.  Visit the new version of the application here:  https://developer.wordpress.com/docs/api/console/

        Using the console with your self-hosted WordPress sites

        To use the console with your self-hosted WordPress installation(s), you’ll need to download the application from GitHub, configure it, and run it on your local machine.  You’ll also need to install the WP REST API – OAuth 1.0a Server plugin on your WordPress site.  The Application Passwords plugin is another option – but – if you use this plugin, make sure that your site is running over HTTPS.  Otherwise, this configuration is insecure.

        Full installation and configuration instructions are on the GitHub repository.

        Technical Details

        The console is a React/Redux application based on create-react-app that persists its state to localStorage.

        What’s next?

        We have a few more features planned that we think you’ll like.

        • We can use the new console application to allow you to easily generate and save OAuth2 tokens for your WordPress.com API Applications.  As compared to implementing the OAuth2 flow yourself, this will be a much easier way to obtain an API token for testing your applications.
        • We also plan to ship the console as a regular WordPress plugin, replacing the existing older plugin.
        • We can allow you to add/edit self-hosted WordPress websites on our hosted version of the console and persist them to localStorage.  This way you’ll be able to query your WordPress sites without having to install the console yourself.

        Contribute

        As usual, the new console is open source, and we hope this will be a tool that will benefit the entire WordPress community.

        If you find a bug, think of a new feature, or want to make some modifications to the API console, feel free to look through existing issues and open a new issue or a PR on the GitHub repository.  We welcome all contributions.

        Get.blog Goes Open Source

        Posted on by Stéphane

        We’re happy to announce that we’ve open-sourced two projects last week: Delphin and its sibling, Delphin Bootstrap. Delphin powers get.blog, a site we built for a smooth registration of .blog domains. Delphin Bootstrap is a portable development environment for Delphin — it makes getting Delphin up and running easy on any operating system.

        One of Delphin’s main goals was to simplify the process of registering and managing a domain. We’ve focused on the user experience, trying to avoid as much industry jargon as possible, while keeping in mind that purchasing a domain is just the first step in the journey toward a larger goal, like telling a story or selling products.

        Delphin is a web application that uses parts of the WordPress.com API, as well as a few more specific endpoints built on the new WordPress REST API. Like Calypso — the WordPress.com front end — it is based on technologies such as React, Redux, and Webpack. We also used Delphin as a platform to experiment with new technologies including Yarn, Jest, CSS modules, and React Router. Some of these experiments will make it back to Calypso.

        We wanted to share some of our findings:

        • Yarn is a fantastic package manager. We had a few hiccups when we integrated it with CircleCI, but it now works smoothly.
        • CSS modules was a great addition to this project, as it makes it possible to use semantic names for the CSS classes of components, instead of coming up with a convention to prevent namespace collisions in a global stylesheet.
        • We ended up using a lot of wonderful tools and modules shared by the community.

        At Automattic, we’ve been open-sourcing code for more than a decade now, and have more than 350 repositories on GitHub. We’re excited to add Delphin to this list, and welcome contributions, feedback, or reported issues!

        WordPress REST API on WordPress.com

        Posted on by Kat

        As you might know if you follow WordPress developer news, the WordPress REST API content endpoints are slated to be merged into WordPress core in the upcoming 4.7 release. These endpoints cover basic WordPress features (posts, pages, custom post types, revisions, media, comments, taxonomies, users, and settings). While they have also been available via the WP REST API plugin for some time, this is the latest step in a multi-year project to bring a modern, RESTful API to all WordPress installations.

        We are pleased to announce that WordPress.com is now running the WordPress REST infrastructure alongside our pre-existing v1 API. Additionally, we have made the new content endpoints available now so that developers can try them out, provide feedback and drive wider adoption of the new API.

        The success metrics for this feature, detailed here, focus on increasing utilization of the new API in plugins, themes, third-party clients and within WordPress core itself. This new API represents the future of WordPress and WordPress.com, and we want to make it as solid as we can. We encourage all WordPress developers to take it for a spin and let us know what you think!

        Using the New API

        The WordPress REST API is available on WordPress.com with the following base URL: https://public-api.wordpress.com/wp/v2/. This new API is backwards-incompatible with the v1 API, which we have no plans to deprecate at this time.

        Going forward, we encourage developers to write new code against the v2 API whenever possible. This has the added benefit of making your applications able to run against both WordPress.com and self-hosted WordPress sites.

        Documentation for the WordPress REST API and its endpoints can be found at http://v2.wp-api.org/.  Our installation of the API uses the same OAuth2 authentication tokens as our version 1 API.

        To make testing and exploration easier, we’ve also updated our API console to support both versions of our API. You can switch API versions using the dropdown toggle in the upper left:

        wpcom-wp-rest-api-1

         

        Once you’ve selected the WP REST API, you can view and select endpoints and make authenticated requests just as in the previous version:

        wpcom-wp-rest-api-2-cropped

        Caveats

        For self-hosted sites running the Jetpack plugin, we expect read requests to work (but you must be running at least Jetpack version 4.3.2).  Write requests to Jetpack sites do not work yet, since this will require the site to be running the content endpoints and a future version of the Jetpack plugin that supports them.

        In addition, a few endpoints are restricted or disabled on WordPress.com, generally for parity with our v1 API. A few examples:

        • Listing and retrieving media items requires authentication
        • Listing and retrieving user info requires authentication
        • Endpoints to create/edit/delete users are disabled
        • Updating the email and URL settings via the settings endpoint is disabled

        Examples

        Here are some examples that could serve as a starting point. If you build your own, please share it in the comments!

        How to Provide Feedback

        #####EOF##### WordPress.com
        #####EOF##### WordPress.com Connect | Developer Resources

        WordPress.com Connect

        Documentation → WordPress.com Connect

        A secure and easy way for millions of WordPress.com users to log in to your website or app. By integrating with WordPress.com Connect, WordPress.com users can quickly log in and start using your service. Their profile information is shared with your app saving you the hassle of collecting name, email address, etc. You even get their Gravatar profile picture.


        Benefits

        Millions Of Users – WordPress.com consists of millions of users and is growing every day. By adding WordPress.com Connect you will become part of a large family that makes it easy for WordPress.com users to explore new services.

        Compatible with your existing sign-in system – WordPress.com Connect can be used on its own or as a complimentary sign-in option to your existing registration system. Once a user connects, you will get access to their profile information which you can use in your own app.

        Trusted Relationship – Allow users to sign-in with the same credentials they use every day on WordPress.com. This takes the pain out of having to remember and manage a new log-in for another service.

        Get Started

        The first thing you need to do is create a new WordPress.com Application, this will give you a chance to describe your application and how we should communicate with it. You should give your app the same title as your website as that information is used in the login form users see. Once configured you will receive your CLIENT ID and CLIENT SECRET to identify your app.

        Integrate with your app using the below instructions or use the code examples in this Github Project for implementing in other languages (PHP, Python, Node.js, maybe others in the future).

        PHP Example Integration

        Here is a simple example of how you can connect a WordPress.com user to your app or website and then get back their profile information.

        When you created your WordPress.com Application above you will have received a number of items back. Let’s set those as constants to make them easy to reference. (Please replace the values of the CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SECRET and REDIRECT_URL with those values from your WordPress.com Application)

        define( 'CLIENT_ID', 1234 );
define( 'CLIENT_SECRET', 'XXXXXXXXXXXX' );
define( 'REDIRECT_URL', 'http://example.com/wpcc.php' );
define( 'REQUEST_TOKEN_URL', 'https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/token' );
define( 'AUTHENTICATE_URL', 'https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/authenticate' );

        Create a Connect button

        In the following code snippets we will just use the constant CLIENT_ID etc. to denote the values that are unique to your WordPress.com Application. First up we need to generate the button that your users will click in order to connect to WordPress.com. An anti-forgery “state” token is required to protect the security of your users. Create the variable with a good random number generator and save it on your server. The token is sent back to your server after the user authenticates and you must verify that the tokens match. The button’s link should navigate a visitor to the authentication URL and include query parameters describing your application.

        <?php

session_start();
$wpcc_state = md5( mt_rand() );
$_SESSION[ 'wpcc_state' ] = $wpcc_state;

$url_to = AUTHENTICATE_URL . '?' . http_build_query( array(
	'response_type' => 'code',
	'client_id'     => CLIENT_ID,
	'state'         => $wpcc_state,
	'redirect_uri'  => REDIRECT_URL
) );

echo '<a href="' . $url_to . '"><img src="//s0.wp.com/i/wpcc-button.png" width="231" /></a>';

        This will output a button like so:

        Request an Access Token

        When the user clicks on the Connect button they will be brought to a form that asks them to log in and explains what information will be revealed to your app.

        oauth-approve

        Once they complete this they will be sent to the “redirect URL” you have set in your WordPress.com Application (which is the value of the REDIRECT_URL constant above). When this URL is loaded please check that the state variable returned matches the one stored locally and also look for the code parameter. Using that code variable your app then sends a request to WordPress.com looking for a permanent access_token which you can use from then on to reference this user. You can store the access_token in your app for future use.

        <?php

require_once dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/defines.php';

if ( ! isset( $_GET[ 'code' ] ) ) {
	die( 'Warning! Visitor may have declined access or navigated to the page without being redirected.' );
}

session_start();
if ( $_GET[ 'state' ] !== $_SESSION[ 'wpcc_state' ] ) {
	die( 'Warning! State mismatch. Authentication attempt may have been compromised.' );  	
}

$curl = curl_init( REQUEST_TOKEN_URL );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_POST, true );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, array(
	'client_id'     => CLIENT_ID,
	'redirect_uri'  => REDIRECT_URL,
	'client_secret' => CLIENT_SECRET,
	'code'          => $_GET[ 'code' ],
	'grant_type'    => 'authorization_code'
) );

curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1 );
$auth = curl_exec( $curl );
$secret = json_decode( $auth );

        $secret is an object that contains the access_token that you will use to query the users profile information.

        stdClass Object 
(
    [access_token] => XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
    [token_type] => bearer
    [blog_id] => 0
    [blog_url] => http://public-api.wordpress.com
    [scope] => auth
)

        Request user profile information

        After you get an access_token you must authenticate the user on your local site. You use the access_token to request their profile information through the /me/ endpoint on WordPress.com.

        <?php
$access_token = $secret->access_token;

$curl = curl_init( 'https://public-api.wordpress.com/rest/v1/me/' );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, array( 'Authorization: Bearer ' . $access_token ) );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1 );
$me = json_decode( curl_exec( $curl ) );

        A typical request for profile information would return JSON encoded data with the following profile information in an object:

        {
  "ID": 1,
  "display_name": "Bob",
  "username": "bobsmith",
  "email": "bob@example.com",
  "primary_blog": 1,
  "avatar_URL": "http://gravatar.com/avatar/xxxx?s=96",
  "profile_URL": "http://en.gravatar.com/xxxx",
  "verified": true
}

        Authenticate the User

        The verified flag in the profile is true when the user has verified their email address on WordPress.com. You should take this into consideration before using the profile. If it is false be wary of trusting the information and using it in an automated way.
        With this information you should query your user database and log the user in if a record exists. Otherwise you may auto-generate a new account or redirect the user to a signup form. You should pre-populate as many fields as possible from the profile information above.

        Limits of Login Apps

        If you already have WordPress.com apps do not use one app for both login and interacting with a WordPress.com blog. Access tokens generated through the authenticate endpoint used in login requests only have access to the /me/ endpoint. Your users will not be able to access their blogs if they attempt to login through the same app.

        #####EOF##### Einsatz im Mittelmeer: Jetzt offiziell Jagd auf Schleuser | Augen geradeaus!

        Einsatz im Mittelmeer: Jetzt offiziell Jagd auf Schleuser

        Veröffentlicht am 7. Oktober 2015 | 10 Kommentare

        Die europäische Militäraktion EUNAVFOR MED im Mittelmeer, an dem die Bundeswehr mit zwei Schiffen beteiligt ist, ist am (heutigen) Mittwoch offiziell in eine neue Phase eingetreten – ab jetzt können die beteiligten Schiffe aus verschiedenen EU-Staaten auch gezielt gegen Schlepper vorgehen, die Flüchtlinge vor allem von der libyschen Küste über das Meer nach Italien bringen.

        Den Beginn der so genannten Phase 2 i hatte das Politische und Sicherheitspolitische Komitee der EU am 28. September beschlossen. Da damit auch der mögliche Einsatz militärischer Gewalt verbunden ist, war für die Deutsche Marine ein Mandat des Bundestages nötig, das das Parlament am 1. Oktober billigte. Die in dem Mandat genannten Aufgaben:

        Auftrag
        Aus den unter Nummer 2 aufgeführten Grundlagen, dem Operationsplan von EUNAVFORMED sowie den durch die EU festgelegten Einsatzregeln und nach Maßgabe des Völkerrechts ergibt sich für die Bundeswehr im Rahmen der Operation EUNAVFOR MEDfolgender Auftrag:
        − durch Sammeln von Informationen und durch Patrouillen auf Hoher See im Einklang mit dem Völkerrecht die Aufdeckung und Beobachtung von Migrationsnetzwerken zu unterstützen,
        − auf Hoher See Schiffe anhalten und durchsuchen, beschlagnahmen und umleiten, bei denen der Verdacht besteht, dass sie für Menschenschmuggel oder Menschenhandel benutzt werden,
        − zu Personen, die auf an der EUNAVFOR MED beteiligten Schiffen an Bord genommen werden, personenbezogene Daten erheben, wobei sich diese Daten auf Merkmale beziehen, die wahrscheinlich der Identifizierung besagter Personen dienlich sind, einschließlich Fingerabdrücke sowie folgender Angaben unter Ausschluss sonstiger personenbezogener Angaben: Name, Geburtsname, Vornamen, gegebenenfalls Aliasnamen; Geburtsdatum und -ort, Staatsangehörigkeit, Geschlecht; Wohnort, Beruf und Aufenthaltsort; Führerscheine, Identitätsdokumente und Reisepassdaten,
        − die Weiterleitung dieser Daten und der Daten zu den von diesen Personen benutzten Schiffen und Ausrüstungen an die einschlägigen Strafverfolgungsbehörden der Mitgliedstaaten und/oder an die zuständigen Stellen der Union,
        − die Mitwirkung an der Führung von EUNAVFOR MED unter Einschluss der temporären Führung der maritimen Operation,
        − die Sicherung und der Schutz eigener Kräfte und sonstiger Schutzbefohlener.
        Zudem gilt für alle im Rahmen von EUNAVFOR MED eingesetzten Schiffe die völkerrechtliche Verpflichtung zur Hilfeleistung für in Seenot geratene Personen fort.

        Deutschland will sich auf Dauer mit zwei Schiffen beteiligen; derzeit sind dort die Fregatte Schleswig-Holstein und der Tender Werra im Einsatz. Die Werra wird demnächst vom Einsatzgruppenversorger Berlin abgelöst, die Schleswig-Holstein etwas später von der Fregatte Augsburg.

        Die deutsche Position bleibt vorerst, das kommt auch im Mandat zum Ausdruck, ein Vorrang der Seenotrettung. Zugleich soll aber das Sammeln von Informationen ausgeweitet werden – und eben auch die Möglichkeit, Schiffe mit Schleusern an Bord robuster anzugehen. Damit sind nicht die Boote mit den Flüchtlingen selbst gemeint; dort sind in der Regel keine Schleuser an Bord. Die verfolgen aus sicherer Entfernung das Geschehen. Aber diese so genannten Spotterschiffe sollen künftig auch verfolgt, gestoppt und gegebenenfalls umgeleitet, also zur Kursänderung gezwungen werden können – wenn sie sich dann nicht schon in libysche Hoheitsgewässer gerettet haben. Denn die bleiben auch in der neuen Phase für die EU-Einheiten tabu.

        Mit den neuen Befugnissen bekommt die Operation auch einen neuen Namen: Künftig soll von der Operation Sophia die Rede sein, benannt nach dem somalischen Mädchen, das an Bord der deutschen Fregatte Schleswig-Holstein geboren wurde.

        Fragen und Antworten zur Phase 2 i auf der Webseite der Bundeswehr hier.

        Nachtrag: Die offizielle Pressemitteilung von EUNAVFOR MED dazu.

        Nachtrag 2: Der Bloggerkollege von Bruxelles2 hat eine Übersicht der derzeit eingesetzten Einheiten.

        (Archivbild 3. Mai 2015: Der Einsatzgruppenversorger Berlin im Mittelmeer – Bundeswehr/Jonack)

        Dieser Beitrag wurde unter Einsatz in aller Welt, Freunde&Verbündete, GeoPolitics abgelegt und mit , , , verschlagwortet. Setze ein Lesezeichen auf den Permalink.

        10 Antworten zu “Einsatz im Mittelmeer: Jetzt offiziell Jagd auf Schleuser”

        1. Samir Awwad | 7. Oktober 2015 um 13:11 |

          So ne Idee vom Mensch aus der Wirtschaft: Kann man nicht die Infrastruktur der Schleuser an Land analysieren und „kreativ“ auf deren Beschaffung von Booten und Anderem einwirken?

          Da wird es irgendwo ne Schwachstelle geben, wer such der findet!

        2. klabautermann | 7. Oktober 2015 um 14:12 |

          @Samir Awward

          Tja, aus „wirtschaftlicher Sicht“ natürlich eine gute Idee ;-)
          Als nach der Theorie der Disruptive Innovation („create a new market and value network“) könnte man in der Tat darüber nachdenken, wie man jetzt den “ sauren Senf“ wieder in eine Tube hineinbekommt, die einstmals recht stabil aus einer „Materialmischung“ bestehend aus klassischem Tribalismus und Neo-Feudalismus hergestellt war. Das dumme ist bloß, dass die disruptive innovators durch ihren democratic change by adopt a revolution mittels privater und staatlicher Geld- und Sachspenden (vorrangig in Form von Bomben und Waffenlieferungen) die Tube nachhaltig beschädigt haben…so dass jetzt wieder klassische Geschäftsmodelle aus dem klassischen Zeitalter des Tribalismus und Feudalismus in Form von organisierter Piraterie, Drogen-, Waffen-, Öl- und Menschen-Handel sowie Schmuggel in jedweder Form erstmal viele Tubenmarktplätze in NEMA quasi übernommen haben. Dabei tritt natürlich der „saure Senf“ in Form von Flüchtlingen zunehmend auch über die Grenzen des NEMA-Tubengroßmarktes auch bis in unsere Wohnstuben vor. Und daran wird eine „kreative“ Beseitigung der Betriebsmittel der Schleuser- und Schlepperstrukturen auch wenig ändern, denn das Angebot passt sich immer der Nachfrage an ;-)

        3. Samir Awwad | 7. Oktober 2015 um 14:24 |

          @ Klabautermann: Dann gehen wir, ich wiederhole mich, instituionsökonomisch vor und greifen die Marktmechanismen an! Wo kein Marktplatz da kein Markt ;)

          Kein Senf ohne Einkaufswagen! „Amazon dicht machen“

        4. klabautermann | 7. Oktober 2015 um 14:43 |

          @Samir A.

          Also nocht mehr „trial&error“…..wie stellen Sie sich denn Ihren „instituionsökonomischen Angriff auf die Marktmechanismen“ in Libyen ganz konkret vor ??

        5. Georg | 7. Oktober 2015 um 15:05 |

          @ Samir Awwad

          Man könnte sogar ganz effektiv gegen die Schleuser vorgehen, indem man die astronomisch hohen illegalen Gewinne der Schleuserbanden abschöpft. Ähnlich wie bei der Piraterie vor Somalia, werden die Gewinne ja irgendwo investiert. Bei den Somalia-Piratennetzwerk war es wohl der Finanzplatz London wo die Gelder gewaschen wurden.
          Das Problem dabei ist nur das Gleiche wie bei den afghanischen Geldern der Drogenbarone. Man muss dabei sehr mächtigen, z.T. auch politisch Verantwortlichen in den Herkunftsländern der Gelder (Libyien, Afghanistan, Somalia usw.) auf die Füße treten und anscheinend will man dies nicht tun.

        6. Bang50 | 7. Oktober 2015 um 18:32 |

          Um die Sache abzukürzen: Ein Herausdrängen der Wettbewerber aus dem Markt sieht vor – realisiert durch unterbieten des Preises und überbieten der Qualität – den Flüchtlingen gleich eine Fahrkarte nach Europa in die Hand zu drücken.

        7. Samir Awwad | 7. Oktober 2015 um 18:43 |

          Nun, der Gedanke ist eigentlich ganz simpel:
          – Wir schauen uns die Bote an die es rüber geschafft haben. Die sind den Schleusern wichtig, weil das ist ihre Werbebotschaft.
          – Dann subsummieren wir die Eigenschaften:
          – Unterboden ist dicht; Motor hält t Stunden; Schiff trägt gestapelt x Menschen.
          – Dann schreibt man daneben die technischen Daten die diesen Eigenschaften zugrunde liegen. Ing fragen.
          – Dann redet man mit Leuten vor Ort und fragt, woher die Materialien und Rohstoffe, die diese Eigenschaften gewährleisten, kommen bzw. wo sie verarbeitet werden etc.

          Und irgendwo wird es dann einen Schwachpunkt in der Lieferkette geben … da entleert man dann das Dixie aus der Luft ;) Und wenn wir 50 Bootbauer und Instandsetzer und deren Familien Asyl gewähren… Markt futsch!

          P.S: Sollten die von den Europäern gesammelten Boote nicht mehr da sein, … omg, kann mal einer nachsehen? ;)

          P.P.S: @ Klabautermann: nice texting ich habe es mir neben die Panzerfaust zum ausschneiden vom Kollegen über den Bildschirm geklebt, dennoch: Es gab auch Fehler seitens der Produktdiskriminierung aus Abnehmersicht.

          Demokratie wurde zu derartig niedrigen Dumpingpreisen angeboten, dass die Abnehmer den Demokraten nicht mehr vom Islamisten oder Stammeskämpfer trennen konnten. Durch das allgemeine Überangebot an Letzterem, kam es zu Konsum des falschen Gutes. Am Ende wurden dann die Demokraten von den Islamisten und Stammeskämpfern in den Küchenregalen der Kunden entweder umgedreht oder getötet.

          Thema: Pricing von Premiumprodukten und mangelnde Markteigenschaft und Marktabsatzanalyse. Ich meine wenn einem schon die munition ausgeht… SCNR

        8. Samir Awwad | 7. Oktober 2015 um 18:56 |

          @Georg/Bank 50: Wie wäre es mit den Hasswörtern Blauhelmeinsatz und Nation Building vor Ort?

        9. Georg | 7. Oktober 2015 um 19:56 |

          @ Samir Awwad

          „Nation Building“ ist eine Aufgabe für 50+ Jahre. Das erleben wir gerade in AFG wie es nicht funktioniert.
          „Blauhelmeinsatz“ in einer mafiösen Umgebung von Menschenschmugglern hieße den Bock zum Gärtner zu machen. Für Truppen aus Bangla Desch u.ä. Staaten vielleicht eine Einnahmequelle für den Heimatstaat, aber ansonsten in einer bewaffneten Umgebung uneffektiv.

          Greifen Sie die Idee des „Weges des Geldes“ auf ! (wenn Sie wollen).
          Wenn man die Gewinne des illegalen Menschenschmuggels abgreift, dann stoppt man auch den gewerblichen Menschenschmuggel.

        10. Samir Awwad | 7. Oktober 2015 um 20:15 |

          „First follow the trail of the money, then you follow the trail of the blood. If both come together, you are there!“
          by a friend

          @ Georg: Richtig, und da überlappen sich unsere Sichtweisen. Konzept: „Cause and Effekt“

        #####EOF##### Swag | WordPress.org

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        Swag

        WordPress Swag Whether you’re a seasoned WordPress fanatic or just getting warmed up, wear your WordPress love with pride. The official WordPress Swag Store sells shirts and hoodies in a variety of designs and colors, printed on stock from socially responsible companies.

        The swag store also rotates other products through the lineup on a regular basis.

        The proceeds from these sales help offset the cost of providing free swag (buttons, stickers, etc.) to WordCamps and WordPress meetups around the world.

        So show the love and spread the word — get your WordPress swag today.

        #####EOF##### Topic Tag: changing a blog address | WordPress.com Forums

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        Tag: Far East

        Assessing Vostok-2018

        Michael KofmanLeave a comment

        I’d like to close out coverage of Vostok 2018 with a brief summary and analysis of the exercise, which was written for Oxford’s CCW Russia Brief, Issue 3. I strongly recommend the issue briefs from Oxford’s changing character of war program, which feature some of the best experts on the Russian armed forces in the field.

        Russia’s annual strategic exercises offer an important window into the evolution of the Russian armed forces, their ability to mobilize, deploy, and command large groupings of forces, together with the latest capabilities. The recently held Vostok-2018 (September 11-17), which as the name suggests focused on the Russian Eastern Military District, offered an important deviation from the typically held command-staff strategic exercise which the Russian General Staff organises every September. In a standard exercise, an operational-strategic command (OSK) takes in forces from other districts and fields them in a particular strategic direction, organizing a hypothetical fight together with the General Staff in the theatre of military operations (TVD). But in 2018, Vostok was changed into strategic manoeuvers. Under this framework two military districts, Central and Eastern, divided into opposing forces to conduct manoeuvers in different strategic directions. China’s official involvement in the annual exercises, which is a first, made the event politically significant in Sino-Russian relations, and a mutually agreed upon political signal send by both sides to international observers.

        Unlike previous such exercises, Vostok-2010 and 2014, this event represents more of an “in-progress report” for the Russian armed forces. When he was first appointed Chief of General Staff in late 2012, Valery Gerasimov was dismayed with the Russian armed forces inability to move across the country and effectively engage in drills or training events at ranges distant from their home garrisons. The recently reformed military had become a permanent standing force, but it had little experience or credibility in being able to deploy to Russia’s borders in the event of conflict and successfully engage an adversary. The high tempo of snap readiness checks, drills, joint exercises, together with modernization investments under the State Armament Program, were meant to turn the Russian armed forces into a combat credible force, able to effectively deter large scale conventional conflict. Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than the Russian Far East, a vast region that is sparsely populated and lacks much transportation infrastructure.

        Vostok-2018 was also as an opportunity for political signalling, featuring a large review of forces and photo opportunities similar to that of Zapad-1981. Russian pronouncements that the exercise would feature 297,000 soldiers – which would have been fully a third of the entire Russian military – was meant to underscore the state’s resilience and undiminished military potential in the face of political and economic pressure from the United States.

        In reality, the exercise was rather smaller, probably not exceeding 50,000 participants (this is a guesstimate, use at your own risk) in the actual exercises, with most of the major events taking place at the Tsugol training range. The official numbers given likely represent the total forces on paper from the Central and Eastern Military Districts: often the Russian General Staff will count an entire brigade or division as having participated even when their contribution is only one unit. A large number of units were raised on alert on August 20th, in advance of the exercise, but few had any connection to the actual events. Official statements by Russian commanders also suggest that the exercise was much smaller in reality: Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), stated that 7,000 troops participated at Tsugol from his district. Together with aviation and airborne units sent, it is unlikely that the CMD’s involvement exceeded 15,000-20,000 soldiers.

        The reason for dramatically inflated figures for every Vostok exercise is straightforward: Moscow is unconcerned that announcing fantastical figures would engender a security dilemma in the region. Moreover, political agreements governing military exercises in Europe such as the Vienna Document have no jurisdiction east of the Ural mountains. As such, the Russian leadership can count unit participation however it likes, without stoking NATO fears. At the same time, including China in the exercise was a prudent measure to alleviate any inherent suspicions Beijing might have that these strategic manoeuvers were aimed at them, or a manifestation of Russian security apprehensions. Since most of the exercise events took place in Zabaykalsky Krai, a land-locked region bordering China and Mongolia, this was an important precaution. Moscow’s effort at engaging the Chinese military is quite clever, intended to foster greater partnership, engendering stronger military ties, while at the same time demonstrating to their strategic partners the capability of the Russian armed forces in an effort to bolster coercive credibility.

        Vostok featured elements of both contact and non-contact warfare, from a series of attack, defence and flanking manoeuvers by battalion tactical groups, to blunting massed aerospace attacks, and effecting precision strikes against critical infrastructure at operational depths. Going into the exercise Valery Gerasimov said he wanted to see non-standard solutions practiced, code for the Chief of General Staff not wishing to see Russian units arrive at ranges to execute pre-rehearsed manoeuvers, i.e. put on a five-day bit of military theatre for him and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu. It remains unclear whether or not he got what he wanted, but Shoigu indicated this type of exercise might be held every five years, pegged to implementation of the State Armament Program, the implication being that strategic manoeuvers would be used as a form of in-process review and reflection on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

        Although every strategic exercise is designed to be a stress test for the Russian armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, Vostok had four principal areas of focus: logistics, mobilization, command and control, and tactical innovation. Emphasis was placed on the logistics, combat service support, and combat engineer components of the Russian armed forces. Command and control of forces in combined arms manoeuver, along with integration with other services remains a prominent feature, as does experimentation with the force structure itself. The Russian military continues to work on integrating recon-strike and recon-fire contours, connecting targeting in real time from drones, soldiers or aircraft, with artillery fires at the tactical level or strike assets distributed among the services. There was also a mobilization component aimed at taking in reservists to help fill out combat service support units and integrating civilian authorities into the exercise under the model that ‘everyone fights’.

        Vostok was spread across five combined arms ranges, four air and air defence ranges, and several coastal regions in the Russian Far East. Ground force exercises featured large attacks with artillery and MLRS systems with targeting and battle damage assessments done via drone systems. River fording, bridging, masking of units with smoke and aerosol were all parts of the exercise to simulate the logistical difficulty of getting to the battlefield while under fire. Engineers also setup false targets, inflatable dummy units, practicing various forms of deception on the battlefield. The strategic nuclear component of the exercise involved flights by Tu-95MS bombers, which cut through the U.S. air defence identification zone, earning a free F-22 fighter escort before returning to fire cruise missiles at target ranges in Russia.

        Efforts at innovation could be seen in the attempt by the airborne forces to create a new type of air assault detachment, together with an airmobile reserve based on heavy transport helicopters and light vehicles. Colonel General Andrei Serduykov, commander of Russia’s airborne forces, was trying new things this year by assembling battalions from three independent air assault brigades to practice large scale heli-borne attacks, some involved as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two large transport Mi-26 helicopters in the action. The Russian airborne also conducted a sizable parachute drop, using 25 transports to deliver 700 soldiers and 51 BMD infantry fighting vehicles, while specialized light utility units were brought in as a ready reserve for the action. Russia’s Northern Fleet similarly brought a new force mix, including naval infantry and specialized units from its Arctic brigade, some of which conducted a raid in depth across as much as 270km of terrain.

        China’s participation included some 3,200 soldiers mounted on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs and self-propelled artillery, together with 6 aircraft and 24 helicopters. Interactions between Russian and Chinese forces at the tactical level, assuming any serious collaboration even took place, seemed of lower import than the utility of this event as a form of political signalling. China’s Minister of Defence, Wei Fenghe, highlighted the importance of Sino-Russian cooperation at the operational and strategic level, while Shoigu announced that they had agreed to hold exercises regularly in the future. In a subsequent interview, Shoigu referred to the Chinese participants as allies. While it is difficult to interpret Vostok, or any other exercise, as a proof of a budding Sino-Russian entente, it is clear the two countries seek to demonstrate that they do not see each other as a threat.

        While Western policymakers typically describe alliance formation as some sort of state-level dating, where relationships are formed based on trust, common values, similar political systems and so on, in reality this has little semblance to the history of how powers actually form alliances. Alliance formation behaviour takes place as a form of balancing behaviour in response to threats, therefore the only logical catalyst for a Sino-Russian entente is the threat posed by the United States, and the extent to which the two countries see their respective challenges as worth the risk and liability of closer cooperation. Having identified both countries as great power competitors in the National Defense Strategy, and practical measures to intensify the confrontation in economic and military domains, Washington has taken important steps to further enhance cooperation between its disparate adversaries.

        Vostok-2018 strategic manoeuvers illustrate that while much progress remains to be made in improving the capability and capacity of the Russian armed forces, the military as a whole is increasingly greater than the sum of its parts, and certainly much improved from its relatively raw state in 2012-2013. Meanwhile Russian policy has become rather more deft in managing their ‘strategic partnership’ with China, seeking to leverage military events as part of a boarder effort to slowly and incrementally pull the latter into a balancing entente against the United States.

         

        Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

        Michael Kofman2 Comments

        Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

        Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

        This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

        Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

        time to go home.jpg

        Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

        VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

        Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

        Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

        exercise table

         

        Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

        Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

        Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

        BTR-82As.jpg

        Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

        Egvekinot.JPG

        naval infantry 2.JPG

        Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

        Vostok 2018 Days 5-6 (September 15-16)

        Michael KofmanLeave a comment

        Vostok 2018 Days 5 and 6

        The weekend was relatively quiet. Comparably few activities took place as the forces involved were either taking a break, or perhaps there was a media blackout compared to the information flowing about the first several days. For a brief period the MoD main website was down, which was unusual. However, other news sources which typically cover the exercises reflected a dearth of information for September 15-16. I’ve decided to group the events of both days into one post here. The main exercises over the weekend included another series of bombing raids by Russian aerospace forces, a motor rifle battalion assault at Tsugol, complex river crossing exercises supported by engineer and CBRN troops, and two naval exercises held by the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

        VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-22M3s conducted another series of air raids at a training range in Zabaikal, practicing bombing runs against various targets simulating an enemy air base. It reads like this was another unguided bombing exercise, dropping FAB-500s and 250s. The precision guided munitions tend to be reserved for Syria, so they tend not to waste them on exercises. Ten air crews were involved in the event, though unclear if they all had their own individual platforms, i.e. 10 bombers, or were rotated through a smaller number of aircraft.

        Tu-22M3.JPG

        Meanwhile Russian Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters took on the role of incoming enemy fighters. They approached the integrated air defenses setup by Eastern MD, and not did not respond to ground control requests for identification. Mig-31BM and Su-35s fighters were scrambled to intercept, simulating air combat at different ranges, including short range dog fighting. The Su-30SMs were defeated by Eastern MD’s air superiority fighters.

        Eastern MD – There was another motor rifle and armored assault at Tsugol, with T-62s setup as targets representing the opposing force. Several companies of T-72B1 tanks, in conjunction with BMP-2s conducted an attack across the range.

        Motor rifle and armored assault.JPG

        Meanwhile Russian military police units, mounted on Typhoon vehicles, detected and captured  a group of infiltrators who sought to gain access to the training range.

        MPs.JPG

        CBRN units setup smoke and aerosol cover for a river crossing exercise, where T-72 tanks forded the river with snorkels, while other vehicles were transported via specialized amphibious carriers. Engineer and sapper units established a pontoon bridge for tanks and BMPs to drive over. The exercise seems based around a motor rifle battalion, with helicopter support, effecting a river crossing both via bridge and in shallow places with its own means.

        Units positioned preparing to cross.JPG

        pontoon bridge.JPG

        Other exercises of note: Russia’s Ministry of Emergencies held a joint exercise with Chinese counterparts, simulating a ship collision at a bridge being constructed across the Amur River. The exercise consisted of a Chinese passenger ship colliding with a Russian ship working on the bridge. Both sides worked together to put out a fire on the Chinese ship, evacuate passengers, and rescue others from the water. Russian Be-200 firefighting aircraft and Mi-8s  belonging to the Ministry were involved, with about 300 people all together engaged in this exercise. I found the event interesting simply because it reflects another level of cooperation between Russian and Chinese ministries along the border outside of the military dimension.

        The Baltic Fleet has also been busy, though their activities doubtfully have anything to do with Vostok 2018. About 25 ships, 30 aircraft, helicopters, drones, and 50 pieces of equipment were involved in conducting an amphibious landing at Khmelevka. Russian Su-24 + Su-30SM fixed wing aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters conducted a strike against enemy positions, so that naval infantry units could then land and seize the beach. Ships involved included LSTs Aleksandr Shabalin, Korolev, Minsk, three smaller landing boats from project 21820, and support by three project 20380 corvettes (Stereguschiy). The landing force consisted of about 30 BTR-82A, which is consistent with what about 3 LSTs can carry, though at the same time they also air lifted several naval infantry units behind enemy lines – presumably via Ka-27 helicopters which is typically how these forces effect an amphibious assault.

        Northern Fleet – The Northern Fleet ran an anti-submarine warfare exercise, with its principal combatant Vice Admiral Kulakov (Udaloy-class) leading the submarine hunt. Their scenario involved using different systems to hunt for the submarine, such as onboard sonar and the ship’s Ka-27PL helicopter. Kulakov practiced torpedo and depth charge attacks, along with evading torpedo attacks fired by the opposing submarine.

        Ka-27 deploying dipping sonar

        dipping sonar.JPG

        Pacific Fleet – Naval Infantry conducted an assault to enable a larger amphibious force to land near the Klerk training range on Primoriye. This is an interesting exercise in that they were working together VKS Aerospace Forces, who supported their attack, along with ships from the Pacific Fleet, combat aviation, artillery, sappers, and air defense units. Supposedly the next phase of this exercise will involve an air assault brigade of VDV Airborne conducting a similar type of attack, though it seems things are winding down. The Eastern MD is already looking to an upcoming joint exercise with Mongolian troops under a different title.

        Some additional pictures of note:

        CBRN units treating tanks

        treating tanks.JPG

        Tank sanitation checkpoint

        sanitizing T-72s.JPG

        T-72 snorkeling

        Loch Ness T-72.JPG

         

        Vostok 2018 Day 4 (September 14)

        Michael KofmanLeave a comment

        Vostok Day 4

        Most of the exercises are taking place at Tsugol and Telemba, but there was word today of various live fire events from a few of the other ranges. Elements of 5th CAA are at Bikinskiy, and the air force is doing most of its bombing runs at Mukhor-Kondui. More word from the two fleets, the Northern Fleet is exercising in the Bering Sea, while the Pacific Fleet has launched a surface action group together with support ships and a number of smaller vessels. Less news from the airborne on this day, but some interesting simulations among air defense forces, CBRN troops, and engineer units. Across the ranges where most of the forces are staged the day was taken up by artillery and MLRS fires, together with combat maneuvers by motor rifle battalions.

        VKS Aerospace Forces – At Tusgol, Russia employed A-50U (AWACS system) in conjunction with Mig-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-30SMs conducting combat air patrols and simulating intercepts. Meanwhile at Mukhor-Kondui, another  range with targets for the air force, Russia’s air force conducted several air strikes with mostly unguided munitions. Including about 30 aircraft consisting of Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, and Su-25s. Their target was a column of enemy armor and artillery on the march. Coordinates and targeting relayed by Su-24MP.

        Su-25s about to fire unguided rockets (Mukhor-Kondui)

        Su-25s.JPG

        Followed by bombing passes from Su-30SM and Su-24 bombers

        Su-30sm.JPG

        Some word on the earlier air strike with cruise missiles, IZ reported it as 4xTu-95MS and 6xTu-22M3 participating. The Tu-95MS flight in the first two days of the exercise clearly cut through the Alaska air identification zone for the United States, as F-22s were sent up to greet them. The need for air refueling during this flight now makes sense since they seemingly made a large lap before firing missiles at the target range.

        F-22 and Tu-95MS.JPG

        VDV Airborne – Seems they conducted an airborne drop of one battalion, together with a heliborne assault with soldiers repelling. I honestly can’t say if this took place on the 14th, or if the photos are from the 13th. Part of the problem is some nice people seem to have taken down the Russian MoD website making it a bit difficult to compare announcements and images from the two days.

        airborne repelling.jpg

        Eastern MD – CBRN troops simulated an emergency chemical cleanup whereby several railcars carrying dangerous/toxic chemicals spilled their load, presumably onto the roadway and the surrounding area. Supposedly about 1,500 CBRN troops, and 300 pieces of equipment are taking part in the exercises, using RHM-6 chemical detector systems, and RPM-2 radiological detectors. Engineer units also simulated a natural and/or man-made disaster, testing their ability to manage flooding, evacuation of the local population, dealing with unexploded ordnance, etc. About 350 soldiers listed for this one, with 80 pieces of equipment including excavators, cranes, floating transports, etc.

        At Telemba range, Col Tikhonov, commander of 76th Air Defense division, highlighted the use of air defense targets designed to simulate small radar profiles, i.e. low observation aircraft and cruise missiles. Not only did they use the typical dummy missiles, and conventional targets, but they wanted to replicate a large scale aerospace attack with cruise missiles. The addition of targets with small radar cross sections seems new  compared to previous exercises.

        At Tsugol there was a sizable artillery and MLRS live fire exercise, different types of self-propelled and towed artillery involved, together with BM-21 and BM-27 MLRS.

        2s3 firing.jpg

        Tsugol BM-27 firing.JPG

        At Bikinskyi range, in Khabarovsk, a motor rifle unit of the 5th CAA stopped an advancing opposing force. Air defense units assigned to them, including ZSU-23-4 shilka, and Igla manpads, were fired to simulate defending against enemy air power. Artillery units with BM-21 Grad were similarly engaged in supporting the defending motor rifle formation. All together at this range they are listing 200 pieces of equipment, and 1700 troops. The number suggests that this is a battalion tactical group, with short range air defense and MLRS units assigned to it.

        Elements of 5th CAA

        5th CAA.JPG

        This is rather small by the way, and I suspect at the end of all the announcements, if we add up all the troops listed as participating at the individual ranges over the period of these eight days, we’re going to have a hard time coming up not only with 300,000 but probably with anything approaching 50,000-70,000. Recalling we have 5 combined arms ranges, 4 air defense ranges, and two gulfs as the overall area of the exercise.

        tanks at Tsugol.jpg

        As an aside, there are several exercises, annual certification checks, and live fire drills going on in other military districts. At the same time, the Southern MD is hosting a sizable exercise with about 5,000 troops, including air defense, artillery, missile, and air force units. About 500 pieces of artillery, MLRS, listed, including BM-21, BM-27, BM-30, Tulpan 240mm mortar, Iskander-M, and several ships participating. About 20 fixed and rotary wing aviation involved in this exercise. Black Sea Fleet coastal defense forces (ground forces part of its army corps) held several smaller exercises of their own, simulating defense against diversionary forces attacking its bases. Dvornikov is placing emphasis on working out the recon-strike contour, command and control across his district for employing long range firepower, i.e. cruise missiles and the like at operational ranges. It seems he’s trying to bring experience from the Syrian war to the district.

        Pacific Fleet – Several ships from the fleet escorted a Russian squadron near the Sea of Okhotsk. Varyag (Slava-class guided missile cruiser), together with Bystruy (Sov destroyer), two  Udaloy class large anti-submarine warfare ships and other smaller vessels served as escorts to Irtysh, a hospital ship, and several LSTs. The SAG seems to consist of 2x Udaloy, 1x Sov, and 1xSlava-class with a few support ships and LSTs. The exercise involved changing formation, arraying the surface action group for air defense, signaling, C2, and anti-submarine warfare. Ka-27 helicopters carried onboard the larger combatants also participated in the exercise. All together about 15-20 ships from the Pacific Fleet are listed for this exercise. I say 15-20 because Russian MoD announcements can’t agree whether it was 15 or 20, depending on which one you read.

        Pacific SAG

        Pacific Fleet.JPG

        Northern Fleet – Elements of the Northern Fleet’s specialized Arctic brigade, which were dropped off two days ago on Chukotka, marched from their landing point to the Pacific coastline, i.e. they drove 270km on their articulated DT-10P vehicles over the course of two days. Along the way they practiced raiding enemy formations, some live fire drills, etc. This is an interesting exercise, noting that the small surface action group sent by the Northern Fleet has been traveling since August 8th, conducting multiple landings with both naval infantry and the arctic brigade detachment. The rest of the surface action group spent this day in the Bering Sea, practicing search and rescue operations. Their mission was to aid a ship in distress along the northern sea route. Kulakov (Udaloy-class) conducted search operations with its Ka-27 onboard helicopter, which then practiced evacuating individuals from the supposed vessel, together with a rescue party launched from the ship on small high speed boats. Meanwhile their large tug, Pamir, and the diesel-electric ice breaker Ilya Muromets, practiced firefighting at sea.

        Kulakov launching Ka-27

        Kulakov

        Ilya Muromets firefighting together with the large ocean going tug

        firefighting.JPG

        I would note that today the Russian MoD website appears to be down, and I would bet a good deal of money that it is likely due to a DDOS attack.

        Some additional photos of note:

        Russian and PLA forces coordinating something

        lost in translation

        The display signs at Tsugol – this seems to be the Chinese contingent section

        best friends forever.jpg

        Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)

        Michael Kofman2 Comments

        Russian and Chinese leadership at Tsygol range opened up Phase 2 of the exercise with a large review of forces. The optics were clearly meant to rekindle the images of Zapad-1981, with numerous vehicles and infantry arrayed in parade formation on the grounds of the range. Indeed the display was quite large, and it seemed clear by the number of Chinese tanks, SPA, wheeled and other vehicles that probably about 3,000 troops and several hundred pieces of equipment did actually come to join Russia in these strategic maneuvers. Judging by the reporting, it is likely most of the drills during Vostok are taking place at Tsygol and Telemba, i.e. it’s quite difficult to picture Vostok being all that large as an exercise. Right now, going off of fairly little (but still a lot more honest than 300,000), around 50,000 seems a much more reasonable number of participants.

        DigitalGlobe had good satellite photos of some of the parade grounds at the range and exercises for a different perspective.

        satellite

        Of course Putin came to look through binoculars, because it wouldn’t be a strategic exercise otherwise. Note unlike in Zapad, where Putin and Lukashenko were not together in the same command center, we can see the Chinese counterparts sitting further along the table.

        Putin came.JPG

        More photos can be found on BMPD. But here’s s sample of some of the gear Chinese brought with them.

        Chinese tanks.jpg

        Chinese forces.jpg

        As this is the opening of Phase 2, most of the activity was characterized by VDV air assaults, VKS bombing missions, combined arms artillery and motor rifle unit actions. Strong emphasis on employment of drones, integrated C2, and more ‘jointness’ so to speak between ground, airborne, and VKS forces. VDV seems to be conducted several force structure and air assault experiments, including with new light high mobility vehicles, creating a air mobile reserve, etc. Ground units are mostly doing what they do best, lots of artillery and MLRS fire, armored assault, etc.

        Vostok 2018 military exercise in Transbaikal Territory, Russia

        VDV Airborne – More than 700 soldiers and 51 vehicles (BMD-2) made a parachutte jump at Tsygol range. At the Belaya airfield near Irkutsk, a detachment of the Ulan-Ude air assault brigade loaded 25 Il-76MD transports. They were then air lifted ~1000km towards Zabaikal where they conducted a jump at 600 meters. The scenario was air assault and seizure of an enemy airfield. All together about 6000 VDV  and 900 pieces of equipment are taking part in Vostok, in earlier posts I mentioned these are units from 3 independent air assault brigades, and two additional special detachments.

        VDV Ulan Ude assault brigade.JPG

        As part of the scenario unfolding at Tsygol range, an air mobile battalion belonging to the 31st independent air assault brigade conducted an air assault on an enemy command center, with air support.  About 40 helicopters of Mi-8AMTSh were used (supposed capacity 26 soldiers), two Mi-26 helicopters, and more than 10 Mi-24 helicopters in support. They are billing this exercise as an experiment of a ‘new type’ of air assault detachment. There was also a mobile reserve in support of this assault, composed of light wheeled high mobility vehicles (pickups). Mi-26s delivered 8 of these light pickups, together with 4 armored Rys light vehicles equipped with Kornet ATGMs and Kord heavy machine guns.

        airborne ATVs.JPG

        VKS Aerospace Forces – About 40 bombers and strike fixed wing aircraft were used in an attack on opposing ground forces, key infrastructure, and staged reserves. Units involved fielded Tu-22M3, Su-34, Su-24, and Su-25SM strike aircraft. Air cover provided by Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters. Strikes were coordinated via ground based C2 system Strelets, and Orlan-10 drones.

        Tu-22M3.JPG

        Eastern MD – Other activities of note: CBRN units used smoke and aerosol covers on more than 60 sq km, covering moving units and critical infrastructure – equipment used includes TDA-3K smoke machines, and RP3-8x aerosols. Anti-tank units belonging to a battalion tactical group of motor rifle and artillery units simulated strikes against enemy armor and fortified positions with 130mm Shturm-S ATGMs and Konkurs-M. Sapper units plan to use not only UR-77 Meteorit, BMP-3M, but also Uran-6 and Uran-9 UGVs for demining.

        Tsygol Range – Seven artillery battalions created a rolling artillery barrage ahead of an advance, covering a line of ~3000 meters. A motor rifle battalion advanced, and there are photos of host of T-72B1 tanks engaged in a live fire exercise as part of this maneuver. They employed more than 150 pieces of artillery, including 2s3, 2s1, 2s19, Giatsint, and Pion. Meanwhile Iskander-M units fired two cruise missiles at critically important targets, at the same time a large artillery and MLRS barrage hit the opposing force. All together they employed 2 Iskander TELs, 52 MLRS systems, and 72 tube artillery. Targeting for the strike conducted via an air based system called Klever, with Su-24MP recon aviation, and Orlan-10 drones – they used live video feed for battle damage assessment. In one scenario, Russian and Chinese artillery units simultaneously attacked enemy forward command posts. Russian BM-27 Uragan were employed together with Chinese Type-81 MLRS.

        Motor rifle bttn.JPG

        Artillery units will also practice employing precision guided munitions called Krasnopol, these will be fired by MSTA-S and 2s3 Akatsiya, Granat-4 short range drones are to be used for targeting. Krasnopol is a 152mm semi-active laser guided munition which can be used by most self-propelled and towed artillery.

        life fire.jpg

        Of course a detachment of Terminator BMPT, heavy tank support vehicles will make another debut at Tsygol, undoubtedly in the hope that someone will buy them. They were first  featured in Zapad 2017 in desert camo paint, undoubtedly marketed towards a certain set of countries that like to buy equipment in such colors.

        Interesting photos emerged of drone companies, fielding both Orlan-10s, but also counter drone hand held weapons, that are worth noting.

        drone company.JPG

        counter drone gun.jpg

        Not much from the two fleets today, except that the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean is still there, and recently concluded a first time joint exercise with Russian VKS. A sizable grouping of ships and a few submarines remains there.

        Some additional photos of note:

        Parachute jump skeptic

        in airborne now.JPG

        Of course you can’t assault an enemy airbase without taking a photo first

        can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo.JPG

        And a time honored tradition emerging from modern exercises, people pointing at screens:

        pointing at screens.jpg

         

        Vostok 2018 – Day 2 (September 12)

        Michael Kofman3 Comments

        Day two is here, and I’m a bit behind in posting. Usually I get to these the night of. Photo-ops have begun, and there will be a large review of forces ala Zapad-1981 style, which I hope to cover later tonight. However, September 12 is still the preparatory phase. Special thanks for colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped me put some of this together.

        So far logistics and VDV seems to have the most interesting roles. The VDV commander is clearly making changes and experimenting with a few items in this exercise. Air defense and aerospace attack are taking place early, as are live fire launches for the navy. Much of the action seems to be planned for Tsygol, but Telemba range is seeing a lot of early activity.

        Shoigu and Fenghe – Minister of Defense Shoigu and his Chinese counterpart visited the command point setup by 29th CAA from the Eastern MD, together with the one setup by the PLA. Supposedly Wei Fenghe complimented the Russian side, stating that the Chinese field command point was simple whereas the Russian one was more solid in nature. Shoigu in turn remarked that much of this comes from Russian combat experience in recent conflicts, and they’ve also leveraged the integration provided by the national defense management center.

        Shoigu remarked that they’ve had several operations where the General Staff were able to directly control events in real time, and they’ve made great strides in C2 when it comes to controlling forces in a theater of military operations (TVD). The claim being that much of what is taking place in Tsygol can be controlled directly by the GS via the center in Moscow. No less interesting in this exchange is Fenghe’s supposed comment on the importance of Russian-Chinese military cooperation at the operational and strategic level. Shoigu then stated that they’ve agreed to hold exercises  of this sort regularly from now on.

        beginning of a beautiful friendship.

        VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-95MS took off from an air base in Eastern MD, launched cruise missiles from an altitude over 5000 meters at the range in Telemba (2000km away). Air cover was provided by Su-35s, and in-flight refueling by Il-78 (at that range Tu-95MS doesn’t need it so probably practice for strategic mission).

        ty95MC.png

        VDV Airborne – Cadets at Ryazan airborne school practiced loading different types of equipment onto Il-76MD aircraft as part of the strategic maneuvers. Serduykov seems to have included cadets and those in officer school in this exercise, which is a new development. The idea being to give those in late stages of education practical experience. According to the press, about 6000 airborne troops and 900 pieces of equipment from three units (mentioned in a previous post as 3 independent air assault brigades), and two detachments, are participating in Vostok. On Sept. 11 I saw discussion of three battalions being sent in total, one from each of these brigades, together with a separate comms detachment.

        VDV praciting loading.JPG

        At Tsygol, units from Ulyanovsk VDV air assault brigade will practice three different types of simultaneous assault, low altitude parachute, standard air assault, and assault without parachutes – repelling from helicopters (100-150m). They claim to be using as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters at the same time in this simulated attack, with two Mi-26 (that will carry quite a few VDV if true), gunship support provided by 8x Ka-52s and 14x Mi-24s. Supposedly Mi-26 helicopters will be used to transport VDV Tigr vehicles, recon ATVs, and in ‘airborne-transport’ configuration can carry about 82 soldiers.

        VDV drilling.JPG

        Eastern MD – At Telemeba air defense units from both VKS, and ground formations belonging to the Eastern and Central MD practiced air defense against massed aerospace attack, units employed include S-400, S-300, Buk, Tor, and Pantsir-S1. About 500 pieces of equipment and more than 1000 servicemen listed for this one.

        Engineer and sapper units – busy setting up pontoon bridges, river crossings, and practicing demining with UR-77 Meteorit, and BMP-3M demining variants. Meanwhile in Zabaikal, CBRN units from Central MD were working to cover air fields with smoke and aerosol to hide them from visual, infrared, and radar based detection. They used TDA-3 smoke/aerosol machines, which create cover at about 15 meters, covering 7 hectares worth of terrain.

        Engineers.JPG

        River crossing.jpg

        Electronic warfare – Russian forces plan to use the latest generation EW and drone systems during the exercise, including Silok-01, Zhitel (the second one is quite old actually). Their objective is to defend against drone attack. Silok in particular is advertised as a system for detecting drones, while Zhitel can jamm their sensors. Supposedly both have been tested in Syria.

        Russian Military Police used horses to patrol the area, and defend it from enemy reconnaissance units. Presumably they’re able to move much quieter  on horseback and sneak up on would be ‘diversionary-recon groups’

        Central MD – Tactical aviation from CMD rebased to Krasnoyarsk and Perm regions, the exercise simulates them launching on alert to avoid incoming aerospace attack at their air bases and shifting to forward air fields. Mig-31BMs setup a combat air patrol, launching ‘under fire’ and practiced taking out incoming cruise missiles.  Missile brigade units from 41st CAA in Sverdlovsk have moved via rail to Astrakhan, and will be firing Iskander-Ms as part of the exercise. Apparently they’ve already conducted simulated electronic launches in preparation – planned firing range is several hundred kilometers, i.e in that operational-tactical 300-500km range.

        Pacific Fleet – About 15 small anti-submarine ships, together Il-38 naval aviation and Ka-27PL helicopters conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise. Meanwhile 10 minesweeper ships practiced finding and destroying mines with contact and non-contact means. A surface action group consisting of one Sovremenny destroyer (Bystruiy) and two small missile boats launched three Moskit anti-ship missiles (looks like the destroyer did the firing) against a surface target at about 100km range.

        Moskit fire

        Northern Fleet -Seems to be busy navigating the ice on its way down to meet the Pacific Fleet. Kulakov’s small surface action group was on its way to Kamchatka, with ice breakers in the lead.

        nf4.PNG

        Interesting photos from this day:

        Gerasimov thinking of the choices he made in life that led to this exciting moment, undoubtedly he is paralyzed by the historic moment of a new Sino-Russian entente forming.

        Gerasimovn thinking.jpg

        Later on, trying to explain something to angry looking Shoigu (this is not possible since Shoigu knows everything).

        still angry.JPG

         

        Vostok 2018 – Day 1 (September 11)

        Michael KofmanLeave a comment

        Vostok 2018 Day 1

        In Eastern MD: 5th, 29th, 35th, 35th combined arms armies (CAA) + 11th Air and Air Defense Army from EMD. In Central MD: 2nd and 41st CAAs + 14th Air and Air Defense Army. VDV and VKS are beginning to shift forces to their designated training ranges. In terms of logistics, they activated military and civilian elements of the transport network, including regional infrastructure belonging to the Ministry of Transport, other federal transportation agencies, trains, rail cars, rail beds, etc. 1,500 rail platforms, 50 transport air craft, and 60 or so various military units. The numbers sound incredibly round such that they’re probably ‘stylized’ but it paints a picture.

        This year there’s an emphasis on logistics, organizing forces and moving them large distances across Russia, which is sort of the major challenge in the Eastern/Central MD. Lots of distance, not a lot of infrastructure. Exercise announcements highlight efforts at jointness, having ground, naval and aerospace forces work together, along with combined arms maneuver. The picture I offer here is somewhat incomplete, as there are a few exercises taking place elsewhere, but here we will focus on what is being billed as part of Vostok 2018.

        Already there is interesting news of VDV experimenting with a new formation and air assault maneuver, whereas the Navy is practicing combined naval infantry and motor-rifle amphibious assault. A lot of information early on about setting integrated air defenses, high bandwidth comms networks, and various engineering preparations such as false targets.

        tanks

        Training range list:

        Combined arms ranges: «Цугол», «Бамбурово», «Радыгино», «Успеновский», «Бикинский»

        Air and Air Defense ranges: «Литовко», «Новосельское», «Телемба» и «Бухта Анна»,

        Maritime: Берингова и Охотского морей (seas), Авачинского и Кроноцкого заливов (gulfs off of Kamchatka).

        Airborne VDV – Not only are strategic maneuvers a deviation from the typical strategic command staff exercise, but there will also be some interesting force structure and combat maneuver experiments taking place. They plan to test an experimental VDV air assault formation during the exercise at Tsygol range, equipped with latest C2, and specialized equipment, to be used in some sort of air mobile assault variant. According to Col General A. Serduykov (head of VDV) this test will determine future tactics and overall development of VDV forces. Who is coming so far? One large battalion tactical group formation, composed of units from Ulan-Ude (11th), Ulyanovsk (31st), and Ussuriysk (83rd), and 38th independent VDV communications regiment. This is an interesting formation, if as reported, it consists of elements of three independent air-assault brigades.

        Mi-26 train

        Central MD – 2000 Motor riflemen are completing a march to Zabaikal with 500 pieces of equipment, including T-72B3, BMP-2, BM-21 Grad. They will be drilling at Tsygol, the range being used jointly with PLA units. A communications brigade from 2nd CAA Samara is also joining them, including 1000 troops and 300 pieces of equipment. More than 60 fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft are moving to Eastern MD as well, including Mi-26, Mi-24, and Mi-8AMTSH-V + about 30 fixed wing tactical aviation.

        Pantsir and targeting radar

        Eastern MD – They’ve setup an integrated air defense network, leveraging automated C2, and expect to test their ability to conduct air defense under jamming conditions. So far only mention of Pantsir-S1, S-300 and S-400 units. Communications units have setup more than 150 comm links, including a comm system running 2800km from Vladivostok to Anadyr, 3500km from Ulan-Ude to Petropavlovsk (9800000 sq  km total). Perhaps more interesting, they’ve setup a high bandwidth line running about 900km to connect other federal agencies/civil authorities to ensure closer coordination with the General Staff.

        Communications.JPG

        Combat service support (MTO) in Eastern MD – Lot’s of exciting statistics, 80 ammo and fuel dumps setup, 100 supply points, more than 2000 mechanics and specialists supporting training at Tsygol, etc. All in all, they claim that 36,000 MTO troops are involved in this exercise (seems inflated but then again what isn’t when it comes to Vostok).

        Engineers are busily setting up bouncy castles, otherwise known as the dreaded Russian ‘maskirovka.’ At every field range they will setup false targets, inflatable tanks, IFVs, air defenses, and fake Iskander units.

        Pacific Fleet – The Naval Infantry brigade based on Primorskiy Kray have moved to loading points, embarking onto three LSTs. They’re bringing BTR-82A, BMP-2, 2s1, and BM-21s. Their objective is to form an amphibious assault detachment, and of course seize Gotland Island from Primorskiy Kray (just kidding). Their real objective is to practice different types of amphibious landings, supported by smaller surface combatants from the Pacific Fleet.

        The Pacific Fleet has also launched a surface action group and what they’re calling a search strike group (might be a naval variant of recon strike). The fleet is fielding different types of strike groupings and anti-submarine groupings of ships. Initial goal is to practice air defense, command and control, and survival skills in the water. However, they expect to be taking out enemy surface action groups and submarines soon.

        LST loading gear.JPG

        Northern Fleet – Elements of NF have already made it to Chukotka, which means they’re going to be fighting the Pacific Fleet fairly soon. They’ve been traveling since August 8, taking breaks for different drills along the way. It seems they have three LSTs with naval infantry and units from the arctic motor-rifle brigade onboard. Apparently they conducted an amphibious assault on Chukotka, supported by fire from Kulakov (Udaloy-class), whereby the naval infantry first seized the beachead and the main body of forces then arrived via LST. Not much mention of other ships, hope they brought more than Kulakov along, but Eastern Med is probably sucking in a lot of available naval power. Marshall Ustinov (Slava-class) is heading the E. Med squadron instead of participating in these exercises.

        Arctic brigade unloading

         

        Chinese participation: 24x rotary wing consisting of 6x Mi-171, 9x Z-9, 9x Z-19 + 6  fixed wing aircraft (looks like JH-7) and an unknown number of ground troops at ~3200 total?

        Chinese

        Fun photos for our caption contest:

        Caption contest

        If you camo net the front of the TEL then nobody can see the launch tubes

        air defenses

        Vostok 2018: Pre-exercise review of events

        Michael Kofman4 Comments

        I’m going to try to cover Vostok 2018  this year, and this time will benefit from some help in covering the space. Special thanks to my colleagues Jeff Edmonds and Kate Baughman who have decided to join in the effort, and offer a welcome reinforcement. Vostok is officially listed as September 11-15. This is unlikely as the exercise is typically longer, and probably will be September 11-20 or thereabouts. However, the MoD announcements on exercises and readiness checks right now list dates of August 20-September 15 inclusive. Which suggest that the standard wave of snap readiness checks, units moving out to ranges, and similar such activities began on the 20th. Exercises that are not directly associated with Vostok are already taking place. It’s a bit of a heavy lift to cover all of these, so in the run up to September 11 I think the best course of action is to summarize preceding weeks and offer a few days of focused coverage to illustrate what is going on.

        Most of the action so far is in the Southern MD, followed by Central MD. The troops based outside Russia in Abkhazia, Tajikistan, Armenia are conducting drills and various exercises. Greater attention being paid to logistics, communications, and coordination between different combat arms. The Northern Fleet has an exercise in progress, and ships from different fleets are gathering for a large joint exercise in the Eastern Med.

        Exercises reflect similar messages: recon-strike contour, combat arms, training between different types of companies, communication, drone and counter drone, integration of ground forces and aviation. There a lot more ‘jointness’ being portrayed than last year.

        Also, of course, Chinese participation. About 3200 PLA troops and 30 aircraft are expected to take part.

        Chinese tanks crossing the border

        Chinese tanks.JPG

        Let’s look at August 31st

        Eastern MD – Engineering units are training in Zabaikal to obtain, purify, and store water. Some 4,000 troops are training on 10 different ranges in this district according to official announcements. Some exercises were focused on dealing with terrorists, who were really saboteurs, seeking to capture arms and destroy equipment. BMP-2 crews practiced fording water obstacles on a special ‘aquadrome’ in Zabaikal. About 450 troops involved. The exercise also involved evacuating damaged IFVs and rescuing crews.

        water.png

        Southern MD – Iskander units in Kuban belonging to the 49th CAA conducted simulated electronic launches against coastal targets. The exercise was focused on practicing recon-strike contour. They were targeting a marine landing force attempting to seize beaches along the Black Sea coastline. The intent was to take out concentrated armor and equipment as it was being unloaded unto the beach by landing craft. This exercise is part of an effort to improve combined arms, the ‘division’ marched to a firing range and aligned C2 with a motor rifle company. Supposedly about 6,000 troops and around 2,000 pieces of equipment are conducting exercises and drilling across the Southern MD from 20 August to 15 September.

        Artillery units from the district exercised separately as part of a large day of live fire drills, practicing recon-strike contour system between different service components, involving ships of the BSF, Caspian Flotilla, air force, and air defense units. Seems there are four main regions involved in the exercises right now, Dagestan, Kuban, Crimea and Russia’s units based in Abkhazia. Official claims of about 70 live fire exercises – 130 pieces of artillery involved, Torando, Smerch, Uragan, BM-21 Grad, MSTA-S, and Iskander-M. Drones were employed, and units of the 4th Air and Air Defense Army participated (about 20 planes and helicopters), and ~12 ships. Each exercise had its own command post in charge of the event.

        About 20 aircraft, including Su-30, Su-27SM, and Su-25s supported the motor rifle units in their exercises across the Southern MD. They too were taking out marines attempting to establish a beach head. Coordination was done by forward observers, not part of the air force, but coordinating from field command points belonging to the CAA units. Supposedly Strelets-VR system was being used to link recon units and air strikes. Col-Gen Dvornikov has placed priority on ground units learning how to coordinate with air power, we know because his personal views are emphasized extensively in press released by Southern MD.

        Abkhazia (SMD) – Armored units practiced outflanking the enemy with T-72B3 tanks. The exercise involved two company sized tactical groups practicing against each other, trying ‘non-standard’ and ‘unconventional’ tactics. (author’s note – this may mean deviating from the standard Russian system of piecing combat maneuvers from smaller prepared ‘plays’ or ‘drills’). According to this announcement Russian forces drilling in Southern MD have 6,000 training and more than 1,500 pieces of equipment.

        Untitled.png

        Engineers and recon units had a busy day. Fording across a water obstacle and taking out diversionary groups. This is an exercise where recon units and engineers worked together, with recon units covering the engineer team. The engineer company’s tasks was demining a  crossing marked it for motor rifle units, and then secured the other side ahead of their arrival.

        Russian units based in Armenia, a communications unit, was raised on alert. They trained in establishing a comms link, operating drones, laying down cables, and maintaining lines of communications between other units involved in the exercise. This is another one in the theme of getting different kinds of companies working together in a combined arms exercise.

        Armenia comms unit.jpg

        Western MD – About 500 troops from 1st Guards Tank Army will start training in a combined arms exercise with artillery and air defense units. The drill is for different types of assault and flanking maneuvers, T-80U, T-72B3, some BMPs and MSTA-S units involved.

        Central MD – CBRN units exercised, dealing with a WMD attack, while air defense units with S-400s departed for Telemba to conduct live fire exercises. They’re training against seemingly everything, planes, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, high and low altitude threats, etc. About 500 troops and 40 pieces of equipment listed for this one. Meanwhile in Samara Spetsnaz units conducted an air assault (parachute) from Mi-8MTV5 helicopters against diversionary groups who were attempting to mine an air field – recon was conducted by Orlan drones.

        Tajikistan 201st base (CMD) – Russian air defense units defended themselves from attack by cruise missiles and drones. Seems like a small exercise, about 50 troops firing good old ZU-23, which can take out drones but not exactly your sophisticated cruise missile defense. Mi-8s were used to simulate low flying targets.

        Eastern Med

        September 1-8 there will be a joint exercise, for the first time, between Russia’s Navy and Aerospace Forces (VKS). They’ve pulled in ships from North, Baltic, Black Sea Fleets and the Caspian Flotilla. They expect about 26 ships to participate, including 2 submarines, and 34 drones. The flagman will be Slava-class Marshall Ustinov. This drill will include sorties by Tu-160 strategic bombers, Tu-142 and Il-38N maritime patrol aviation, Su-33 and Su-30SM from naval aviation (not  sure how Su-33  is going to be a part of this, skeptical on that one).

        Northern Fleet

        A detachment from the fleet, operating off of the New Siberian Islands, conducted live fire exercises. Seems to be mostly artillery and some Rubezh CDCM fire. This exercise combined units stationed on Kotelny Island with a small surface action group send by the Northern Fleet, this SAG is led by Udaloy-class Vice Admiral Kulakov.

        A brief summary of August 29-30th

        • In SCO exercises Peaceful mission 2018, Russian forces demonstrated how they take out shahid-mobiles, together with the ‘tank carousel’ drill. The purpose was to show off experience gained in Syria to other nations who sent troops to participate in the multilateral event.
        • SMD – units specializing in drone defense (they’ve made special mobile detachments for dealing with drones now) practiced taking out drones in Volgograd oblast. This was a combination of EW, R-934BMV, R-330Z Zhitel, for jamming, and then Pansir-S1 + Tor-M2 for taking them out. Meanwhile in Chechnya EW units had something a bit more serious, Borisoglebsk-2, to jam radio communications of a hypothetical opponent. Seems they just got this system in May, and went through retraining for it. There were also sizable artillery drills in counter-battery fire, although the picture showed what looked like Pion 203mm artillery. They expect 5,000 artillerymen to practice in September from SMD.

        Borisoglebsk.jpg

        • BSF’s Naval Infantry Brigade set out to destroy diversionary groups. Using drones in advance of their formation they spotted an ambush and took out the enemy instead of driving into them and the part of the road they supposedly mined.
        • In Abkhazia Ka-52 helicopters practiced taking out shahid-mobiles, and coordinating with ground units. Similar training in Armenia, with Mi-24P and Mi-8MTV, learning how to take out targets in mountainous conditions and applying experience gained in Syria.
        • EMD – Iskander-M units in Zabaikal practiced camouflage, repelling attacks, and conducting electronic simulated launches after receiving target coordinates. Their target was an enemy radar station. At the same time Buk air defense units trained at a different range in intercepting targets, including while being jammed by enemy drones/aircraft.
        • At Sea – lots of small ships drilling. Small anti-submarine corvettes from Novorosiysk (BSF) went submarine hunting. They hunt this elusive submarine every year during operational-strategic exercises. One of the Tarantul-class missile boats trained in air defense, with Su-30SM serving as the simulated attacker. More interesting – Tomsk (Oscar II), was practicing in the Sea of Okhotsk, torpedoing several enemy ships. Tomsk approached an enemy surface action group, being represented by Varyag (Slava-class), Bystry (Sovremenny), and several Udaloys. Tomsk fired 4 practice torpedoes without being detected, i.e. Tomsk is really good or ASW detection on legacy Soviet surface combatants is not so good. Earlier on Tomsk fired an anti-ship missile at a surface target on the 27th. There were quite a few simulated electronic CDCM fires in earlier days as well, from Baltic and Black Sea Fleet, including Bal and Bastion systems.

        Notes on announcements:

        Every exercise announcement from SMD has quotes from Dvornikov along the lines of ‘it is important to do X, and every person should know how to do X, because X is an important thing’ which seems to be a new feature. None of the other military district commanders are offering their wisdom.

        A small percentage of the photos are being reused from Zapad 2017, i.e. I’ve seen them before and can tell they’re from a year ago – not showing what is actually going on in the announcement. It seems in cases where the MoD doesn’t have a photo on hand they’ve decided to search the pile and find something that looks like it might be similar from 2017.

         

        Chebarkul and Chukotka – a tale of two new divisions

        Michael Kofman5 Comments

        In a previous post I had not discussed that alongside the three announced divisions around Ukraine, Russia’s General Staff also planned a fourth in Chelyabinsk oblast.  This division has at times been announced as part of “Russia’s response to NATO” though its location naturally tells us otherwise given it is right across the border from Kazakhstan.  First news of it came in late January 2016. Adding to the spread of divisions is the recent announcement on August 23rd from a Ministry of Defense meeting that there is another division in the works for 2018.  A press report from the recently held meeting revealed that the General Staff intends to form a coastal defense division on Chukotka.

        I’ve compiled the history and background of these changes from a few news announcements, including posts from colleagues and other blogs on the subject, such as bmpd, eagle_rost, and one of the better takes out there written by Aleksei Ramm on Defence.ru

        7th Armor Brigade’s T-72B tanks

        2803756_original.jpg

        The 7th Independent Armor Brigade in Chebarkul (Chelyabinsk oblast) will be converted into a division – this unit is part of the Central Military District. This brigade is one of the two remnants of the 15th Tank Division, which was moved back to Russia form Czechoslovakia in 1991.  Later in 2004 the division was disbanded, leaving two regiments that would become the core of a new division, the 34th, headquartered in Ekaterinburg.  During the 2009 reforms, which led to the consolidation, displacement or disbanding of numerous units across Russia, all divisions were turned into brigades.  Hence the 34th was broken into two brigades, the 28th Motor Rifle which stayed in Ekaterinburg, and the 7th Armor in Chebarkul.  The region hosts a sprawling military base not far from the border with Kazakhstan.

        The division’s structure will include the following elements: 1 motor rifle regiment, 1 self-propelled artillery regiment, 1 air defense ‘division’, a reconnaissance and an engineering battalion, along with several supporting units of smaller size.  It was not officially stated, but we should venture an assumption that the tanks of the 7th will be included in a tank regiment as part of the new division.  Suffice it to say, this does not match a six regiment Soviet division, though it looks close to the 2nd or 4th half divisions which also have two regiments.  In Aleksei Ramm’s view, because this unit only has one motor rifle regiment and an air defense ‘division’ in place of a full regiment, it is simply an expanded combined arms brigade.  It’s chief accomplishment is a larger staff and a substantially larger artillery compliment than a normal brigade would have.  There is no timetable for completing this unit formation, but I suspect late 2017 is a good date to go by given the timetable for the other divisions announced.

        A recap of why Russia is recreating divisions: The concept is to have an organization with the staff and logistics base that would allow brigades to send tactical battalion groups to the front, making the division a  management rung  below that of the combined arms army, i.e. Military District -> Combined Arms Army -> Division HQ-> regiment or battalion tactical group.  Brigades are too small to take in battalions from other brigades and command or support them.  Hence divisions may prove the most useful tell of where the Russian military expects the need for task organized formations.  Russia’s force structure remains in an experimental state, absorbing the experiences of the last two years, but its becoming clear that brigades remain the force generating component while divisions are the task organizing command and support structure for expected contingencies.

        Turning to the far east – a new division on Chukotka is a bit of a surprise since it is about as remote piece of real estate for a base as one can find in Russia.  This will not be a combined arms division, but likely a coastal defense unit integrating various missile fires and artillery units under one command.  The principal motivation was the decision back in July 2015 to create a unified coastal defense system from Primorye to the Arctic.  It’s objective is to effect “sea control” (or in reality sea denial) over the littorals by Kuril Islands, the Bering Strait, and defend Russia’s ballistic missile submarines stationed in the Pacific Fleet.  Of note, two of Russia’s new Borei-class SSBNs have arrived to start replacing the rather ancient Delta IIIs stationed there.

        Abandoned military base at Gydim.  Photo from basov chukoka.

        2-4

        According to the announcement the Pacific fleet had conducted a survey from April to June of this year of two Kuril islands for suitability to host garrisons, namely Matua and Paramushir.  It’s unclear how that statement connects to the formation of the division in Chukotka, except that it will likely extend coastal defense from the Kurils all the way to the Bering Strait.  Russia has already invested heavily in reinforcing the A2/AD systems on the Kuril Islands since that chain forms the outer boundary of the SSBN bastion in the Pacific.

        Another photo of abandoned ‘Gydim’ an unofficial name of the military town by Anadyr where once nuclear warheads were stored, presumably in summer time, when it is more ‘cheerful’ (my implication is not that Gydim will be reactivated, or Anadyr will once more help host the division, but simply to speak to the efficacy of establishing bases in these remote regions).  Photo from Alexander Belenkiy’s blog.

        LR2014.06-RUS.87-Gudym-31.jpg

        Some history offered by bmpd blog on Russian military presence in Chukotka: under Stalin in 1947-53 Chukotka hosted the 14th Army, but this unit was disbanded promptly after his death.  Subsequently in the 1980s the 99th motor rifle division was based here, although it was only manned at cadre levels.  That unit was eventually disbanded in 1994.  A Russian military base in Gydim has become a ghost town, like many other Soviet towns and bases sprawling across the country’s less inhabitable regions.  It is an attraction for photo adventurers who are drawn to abandoned buildings and Soviet military infrastructure.  Photos of what was left of Russian military presence on Chukotka are illustrative of how expensive, and arguably wasteful, establishing a sizable contingent there would be.

        Although it may have a stronger rationale than the string of bases in the Arctic, this plan seems to entail burying substantial money into the snow.  Those stationed on Chukotka will be able to reflect positively only on the fact that they were not stationed on Novaya Zemlya.  More than likely this new coastal defense division will also be presented as ‘Russia’s answer to NATO’ and in Western press be characterized as militarization of the Far East.  In reality it will further integrate various artillery and missile units in the region, and perhaps extend the A2/AD layer north of the Kuril island chain towards the Bering strait.

        Recommended: Aleksei Ramm’s piece here, BMPD piece on the division in Chebarkul and Chukotka,  also eagle rost. Russian defense policy is always a good read.

         

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        #####EOF##### Shift – 44CON
        #####EOF##### Klavesin – Russia Military Analysis

        Tag: Klavesin

        Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part 2 – 9M730?, Status-6, Klavesin-2R)

        Michael Kofman6 Comments

        Putin’s March 1st speech unveiled a host of new weapons currently under development. Some were previously known, or had been rumored to exist, but with sparse information about progress, while others were being tracked by those who follow military developments in Russia. Unfortunately, much of the media dismissed these announcements as a bluff intended for the consumption of domestic audiences ahead of the Presidential election, or selection, depending on how you view it. While Vladimir Putin may have exaggerated how far along these ‘fantastical’ weapons are, claiming successful tests, these are not figments of his imagination.

        He wasn’t bluffing – these weapons may all arrive sometime in the 2020s. Some we will meet in the early 2020s, others perhaps later that decade, as William Gibson liked to say “the future is already here, it’s just not evenly distributed.” In Part 1 I covered Kinzhal, R-28 Sarmat, and 4202, while in this section I plan to look at some of the even more interesting systems, including third strike weapons like Status-6, Klavesin-2R deep diving vehicle, and the nuclear powered cruise missile that raised so many eyebrows.

        The Nuclear Posture Review confirms many of these projects, stating, “Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.” That references 4202, R-28 Sarmat, and of course the now famous Status-6. What about the nuclear powered cruise missile? Former SecDef Ash Carter had a rather cryptic line in an article back in 2017, that perhaps we should look back upon and reflect, “Russia is investing in new ballistic missile submarines, heavy bombers, and the development of a new ICBM. These investments by themselves would not be novel, even if they necessitate continued, strong American deterrence. But they are also paired with novel concepts for how nuclear weapons could be used and some entirely new and even bizarre types of nuclear weapons systems…” Now let’s fast forward to March 1, 2018, and Putin’s presentation begins to make a bit more sense.

        As I will discuss in some detail below, most of these weapons are the stuff of science fiction from the 1950s and 1960s, back when science fiction writing was quite brilliant, and the Atomic age was in full swing. The U.S. and USSR considered, designed, and tested, all sorts of nuclear weapon concepts during the early 1950s and 1960s. Some ideas were ahead of the technology of their time, others were feasible but considered too crazy, provocative, or unnecessary. Part of what drove the resurrection of these concepts is Moscow’s desire to hedge against an uncertain future, and technology has changed. The feeling is not uncommon, since I took that notion literally from the language of our 2018 NPR, which also justifies its proposals in the need to ‘hedge against an uncertain future.’

        Image result for 1950s asimov

        Of course with such broad language once can advocate for all sorts of nuclear weapon programs, and sure enough, various industries in Russia seem to have sold the government on boutique weapons that will plus up Russia’s current deterrent. Moscow has thought to capitalize on some its comparative strengths, including nuclear energy technology, missile technology, and submarine designs, to develop what they believe will prove hedging weapons. These are in part in response to U.S. technological superiority in long range conventional fires, aerospace power, sustained U.S. investment in missile defense, and the desire to develop prompt global strike.

        Rumors about the coming missile defense review also suggest that it will be quite provocative, validating Russian concerns that missile defense is no longer just about North Korea and Iran, but instead aimed at Russian and Chinese capabilities as a matter of policy. Thus we embark on mutually assured spending.

        I don’t believe that Russia either needs these weapons to ensure the viability of its deterrent, or that their acquisition fundamentally changes anything in the military balance with the U.S. I’m equally skeptical that they offer any particular coercive effect, though I’m traditionally skeptical of the proposition that there is any efficacy to be found in nuclear powers using nuclear weapons for coercion. The history and theory just isn’t there to support that very much. What it does tell me is that Russia won’t be confident in its conventional capabilities for years to come, or ever, and continues to spend heavily on a nuclear offset, making the conventional and nuclear approaches to deterrence complementary – as in my mind they should be. That said, let’s get to the weapons.

        Novator’s newest creation – 9M730 (designation is a working theory until a better name comes)

        9m730 v2.JPG

        The nuclear powered missile with no name is probably designated 9M730, following after 9M728 (R-500) and 9M729 (SSC-8 INF violator). This is Ramm’s hypothesis based on the fact there is a 9M730 project out there and we know what the other cruise missiles in this series are. Given there is no name, for now 9M730 will do, and I suspect it will ultimately turn out that this is the project’s designation. Since Raduga makes air launched cruise missiles (Kh) it makes sense that this project would be one of Novator’s children, and Novator is quite good at what they do when it comes to cruise missiles. The idea behind the missile is to have special compartments where air is heated by a nuclear reactor to several thousand degrees, then thrust is created by ejecting the superheated air. Judging from the video shown there are four rear vents creating thrust for the missile.

        9m730.JPG

        Putin’s statement that it already passed a successful flight test in December 2017 doesn’t scan, but this empty bragging aside it seems the missile project is quite real and much further along than one would like. Additional reporting from A. Ramm’s article indicates the tests are being done in Nenoksa, Arkhangelsk firing it into the White Sea, although after talking to colleagues the images shown are from Novaya Zemlya. Testing it in the high north makes sense since it’s not the sort of thing anyone would want to test over mainland Russia, and it will likely end up being based there. Due to size and weight considerations a missile such as this would have an unshielded reactor, making it impossible for the weapon to fly without spreading radioactive particles. Furthermore, there were comments from sources familiar with the project that the missile is not being tested with a reactor, but rather an electrical power source to imitate the reactor they have constructed. A. Ramm, who has some good writing on this subject, missile testing is being supported by special Il-976 laboratory planes.

        Readers will undoubtedly recognize this concept as following in the footsteps of U.S. efforts to build a nuclear powered supersonic low altitude missile (SLAM), named project Pluto. From 1957-1964 the U.S. worked on a nuclear powered cruise missile, which would carry 16 nuclear munitions to targets in the USSR. The colossal amount of radiation it generated in flight was considered a feature at the time. However, even though a full scale reactor and engine were built, the project was canceled because the system was considered both highly problematic from an engineering standpoint and also provocative. The SLAM was nixed in 1964. Some believed it would motivate the Soviet Union to build a similar device, and all in all ballistic missiles were far less problematic. Well, it’s 2018, and while technology has clearly advanced substantially from 1964, humanity is an entirely different story.

        A nuclear powered cruise missile? Silly Russians, we would never have spent 8 years on such a reckless project.

        Project Pluto

        pluto engine

        I was skeptical as to whether this was far along, but here Pentagon came to the rescue. Pentagon officials, afraid that anyone finds out we might have some kind of ‘doomsday gap,’ let it be known that the missile in question has already gone through several flight tests in the Arctic and crashed in all of them. So we’re fine, because its not working yet… Also I think missiles typically crash and do not land, whether in testing or not, this is not a bug but a feature of missile technology. Crashing in testing is typical when working on a new missile design, particularly with a unique form of propulsion, but it was surprising to find out that Russia had already conducted several tests with a prototype.

        Image result for dr.strangelove doomsday gap

        Since the weapon has no name, I think we should consider calling it ‘prompt drunken strike,’ if anything based on the flight route shown in the video.

        Status-6 Ocean Multipurpose System

        Image result for статус-6

        Much of what is known about Status-6 appeared on 9 November 2015 during a meeting chaired by Putin on problems in the defense industry. Just as last week, the media was skeptical that this weapon was a bluff, together with the arms control community which is often doubtful when revelations are made about new nuclear weapons. Those are unhelpful confirmation biases, since both Status-6 and the 9M729 missile are turning out to be quite real. The system is now officially referenced in the NPR as a Russian strategic nuclear weapon program.

        status-6 slide.png

        The weapon as conceived will be a multipurpose nuclear powered torpedo, but the initial design is intended to destroy critical economic infrastructure along coastline. By all indications this project is well ahead of the nuclear powered cruise missile, and given the physical size of this weapon, nuclear power poses a much less daunting challenge to integrate. As conceived this will be a third strike countervalue weapon. This nuclear torpedo is meant for taking out U.S. coastal cities, and irradiating an entire area. The reason it comes 3rd is both mechanical, and in terms of function. It would take 35 minutes for ICBMs on a transpolar trajectory whereas this weapon might take days to reach the U.S. once fired, and it is not meant for counterforce targets, but instead to inflict unacceptable damage which historically was calculated as affecting the target’s GDP (people + infrastructure).

        city.JPG

        This is an innovative vengeance weapon, though I don’t believe it will have 100 mt as the warhead. Something much smaller will undoubtedly suffice to wipe out LA or San Francisco if need be and irradiate parts of the coast. The reason I mention Pacific cities is that a deep diving weapon doesn’t make as much sense coming from Russia via GIUK gap into the Atlantic, simply because of the depths and geographical choke points involved. Something to consider before people get started writing articles about the 6th Battle of the Atlantic. The Pacific on the other hand lends itself handily to deep diving autonomous weapons if they’re ‘fire and forget.’

        Does Russia truly needs this weapon to handle U.S. missile defenses? No, and it would be infinitely cheaper to just improve current strategic systems, which they’re also doing. However, need is often only loosely connected to what defense establishments procure. As I mentioned in Part 1, defense spending is at best ‘semi-rational’, representing numerous bureaucratic and domestic equities as much as actual threats and missions.

        It is also difficult to discuss Status-6 without mentioning the legacy of Andrei Sakharov’s famous T-15 torpedo, a Soviet project in 1951-1955. The design concept behind that 40 ton, 1500 mm torpedo, was as a first strike weapon, intended to deliver a large nuclear warhead to U.S. naval bases like Pearl Harbor, generating a destructive tsunami. The specialized submarine was called project 627, but back then Soviet General Staff decided that they had no need for such a system, and would be satisfied with a regular nuclear powered submarine. The technology to realize a mega nuclear torpedo was there, but T-15 was the wrong kind of crazy for its time. You can read more on the history of the T-15 from Norman Polmar’s timely piece.

        Maybe nuclear weapons are like fashion trends, they come back. Here is the old 627 with T-15 tube down the middle.

        t-15-image2.jpg

        According to the MoD slide, Status-6 can reach a depth of 1000 meters, speed up to 185 km per hour (100 knots), range up to 10,000 km, and is 1.6m in diameter. According to Putin’s statements it is excessively fast, deep diving, but also very quiet. This is nonsense, since underwater things can be fast, or they can be quiet, but they typically can’t be both. By all considerations this weapon is exceedingly loud if traveling at such speeds, and 100 knots seems somewhat an exaggeration. The video demonstrating its deployment showed project 09852 Belgorod, Russia’s most interesting submarine currently under construction, a heavily modified Oscar-II that will be the longest submarine in the world when it is completed. Belgorod should be able to carry these torpedoes internally, together with other undersea drones. The MoD slide from 2015 indicates that together with Belgorod, project 09851 Khabarovsk (another GUGI submarine laid down in 2014), will also deploy this torpedo.

        I got this from HI Sutton – don’t sue me HI.

        Pr_08952_pptSTRETCH.jpg

        Status-6, and similarly intriguing undersea weapon projects belong to Russia’s ‘other navy’ known as GUGI, or Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research. GUGI is responsible for fielding specialized submarines, oceanographic research ships, undersea drones, autonomous vehicles, sensor systems, and the like. Around mid-2000s there were some tidbits of information about an undersea drone program being tested. Then it became clear that the project involved a specialized barge, the supporting ship 20180 Zvezdochka, and GUGI’s specialized diesel submarine B-90 Sarov. For more reading on the various GUGI subs and covert underwater projects HI Sutton runs a good blog with various renderings.

        Here is what appears to be Status-6 container being loaded.

        Status-6 tube.jpg

        Based on the 2015 MoD slide, Status-6 is proceeding as a project in several phases, with the pilot system being completed by 2019, and testing 2019-2025. Although the nuclear drone probably doesn’t need much guidance, since cities don’t move around, there will need to be a command and control system built if this weapon is to have a conventional variant for wiping out carriers. I’m skeptical of the ‘carrier strike’ option shown in video during Putin’s speech, just because queuing is a perpetual problem for Russian forces, and it’s hard to see how a deep sea traveling weapon could get course correction from something above water. Hitting moving targets at sea is not so simple, especially over great distances, and with a weapon that is loudly steaming ahead in deep waters. More than likely Russia may try to deploy nuclear powered sensor or communications stations under the sea, as some of Rubin’s design projects suggest, to create the infrastructure for such a weapon. Besides the C2 infrastructure, Status-6 will still have to await the two GUGI submarines designed to carry it.

        Klavesin-2R-PM Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

        Klavesin-2M.jpg

        Klavesin is a creation of Rubin design bureau and ИПМТ ДВО РАН, Владивосток. The parameters of this underwater drone include: 6.5m length, 1m in diameter, 3700 kg weight, 50km range with a 2000 meter diving depth. This drone was also shown in the video being launched by Belgorod. The drone program is so super secret that some of the details regarding the vehicle could be found from Rubin’s public tender seeking a company to insure two of these drones for 48 million rubles. Seems they already have two of them, for Belgorod and another GUGI submarine that is already operational, BS-64 Podmoskovye.

        28379177_10159930236540462_5146440591197111008_n.jpg

        The 2R is, as one might suspect, a further evolution of the 1R variant, designed for oceanographic mapping, research, undersea photography, and probably some covert missions. Not much to add to this project except to say that it undoubtedly helps conduct undersea intelligence and reconnaissance missions for GUGI.

        fun times at GUGI

        Regarding the laser shown at the end of Putin’s talk, I’m not sure what it is yet, but looks like some kind of air/missile defense system by the module and platform. I’ve honestly not seen that weapon before and do not focus on lasers. They should show it more often.

        Laser.JPG

        Not keen on the controller. This feels like 1990s gaming.

        xbox controller.JPG

         

        Back to top
        #####EOF##### Introducing Six New Business-Oriented Themes — The WordPress.com Blog

        Introducing Six New Business-Oriented Themes

        Elevate your business website with one of our six new free themes! Calm, sophisticated, friendly, professional, elegant, modern — find the style that’s just right for you.

        February 7, 2019

        Laurel Fulford

        Today we’re excited to announce six new themes with an entrepreneurial spin: Calm Business, Elegant Business, Friendly Business, Modern Business, Professional Business, and Sophisticated Business.

        Designed by Takashi Irie, each theme in this collection is based on a clean, easy-to-navigate layout that’s well-suited to a wide range of businesses — but with six unique styles and tones, there’s a version that suits your distinctive brand.

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        Modern Business
        Sophisticated Business

        Calm Business’s softness matches the peaceful tone of your small yoga studio, while and Friendly Business adds subtle but uplifting touches to create a welcoming online home for your hobby farm.

        Calm Business
        Friendly Business

        Not to be outdone, Professional Business is solid and grounded to echo the integrity of your accounting firm, and Elegant Business’s combination of warmth and sophistication makes it a perfect fit for coffee shops.

        Professional Business
        Elegant Business

        Each themes has a bold accent color you can customize to match your business’s branding.

        They all also include full support for the new WordPress block editor, allowing you to create a wide range of content for your site.

        You can learn more about each of these themes in our showcase!

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        23 Comments

        Comments are closed.

        1. ShankySalty Feb 7th at 5:32 pm

          Woooowww I love it 🌺😊

          Liked by 5 people

        2. Edith Aint Feb 7th at 7:08 pm

          Fascinating….I wonder, what would you recommend for a nursery or daycare? My husband’s aunt is considering a blog to advertise her services, and he suggested the “Calm Business” theme. How about a butcher shop?

          Liked by 9 people

          • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 12:19 am

            Calm Business sounds like a great recommendation for a nursery or daycare!

            For a butcher shop, that’s good question! I think it would depend on the shop’s existing branding. Like, if it was more of a mom & pop shop, Friendly Business could be a good fit; for one that’s higher end, Elegant Business would probably be better. Or if none of these themes quite hit the mark, we have several more geared towards businesses here: https://wordpress.com/themes/filter/business

            Liked by 9 people

        3. scoobiesnacks Feb 7th at 8:15 pm

          Do you intend to launch blogging / magazine themes for the new block editor?

          Liked by 7 people

          • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 12:21 am

            Yes! Most recently we’ve launched Photos and Twenty Nineteen on WordPress.com. Any of these six new business themes can also be used for blogging – their demos are set up to showcase a static front page, but like our other themes, they include styles and functionality for blog posts.

            A number of our existing themes also have had styles added for the new block editor – they can be found here: https://wordpress.com/themes/filter/featured Though it can be used with any of our themes.

            Liked by 3 people

            • scoobiesnacks Feb 8th at 12:28 am

              Sorry. I meant grid based magazine blogging themes. Also, when I browse through all the themes I’m not able to tell which are fully compatible with V5 block editor

              Liked by 4 people

              • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 8:32 pm

                Apologies! I wasn’t very clear above — any of the themes with the ‘featured’ tag, linked above, do include styles for the new editor.

                There isn’t a new grid-based magazine theme on the horizon at the moment, but we’re always working on new themes, so that could change. 🙂

                Liked by 3 people

        4. thevalueofsparrows Feb 7th at 11:16 pm

          Are you stuck with using the “new” block editor? Or can you use the traditional editor?

          Liked by 4 people

          • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 12:22 am

            Both will work with these themes! However, the demo sites for these themes do use blocks, so to create a site with the same kind of content, it will be necessary to use the new editor.

            Liked by 3 people

        5. Steve Celuch Promotions Feb 8th at 2:42 am

          I’m going to help promote a commercial diver and his store, any suggestions? 🤔

          Liked by 3 people

        6. Leo Feb 8th at 5:38 am

          I’m actually fascinated by the theme used in this blog.wordpress.com. Is it available for public?

          Liked by 5 people

          • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 8:33 pm

            We’re glad you like it! Unfortunately, that theme has some specific functionality built in that wouldn’t work well outside of this site, so it’s not publicly available.

            Liked by 4 people

        7. tmaxfilm Feb 8th at 5:57 am

          I like the Modern, Sophisticated, and Elegant themes the most. Very nice. I always enjoy looking at the new themes it’s exciting.

          With that being said I still enjoy my tried and true awesome theme for my photography. It’s a really cool theme WordPress.com put out. Thanks for the Finder Theme I use for my photoblog. I love it!

          Liked by 2 people

        8. Maria Feb 8th at 10:44 am

          are these themes free?

          Liked by 4 people

        9. Food Klinik Feb 8th at 11:23 am

          Beautiful

          Liked by 2 people

        10. jamesandwer644 Feb 8th at 11:28 am

          Nice theme

          Liked by 1 person

        11. Lissa Murphy Feb 8th at 1:08 pm

          Wowsers! I absolutely love these themes 😁 Will definitely will look into this. Thank you!

          Liked by 2 people

        12. katepete839370646 Feb 8th at 1:35 pm

          Nice themes. Will they become available on wordpress.org at https://wordpress.org/themes ?

          Liked by 4 people

        13. Lester Bauman Feb 8th at 8:39 pm

          Do they support a full content RSS? The themes I’ve been using only give you an excerpt, even if you use the content_full merge tag.

          Liked by 3 people

        14. Jen @The Haute Mommy Handbook Feb 12th at 5:15 pm

          These themes are beautiful! Thanks for sharing!

          Liked by 3 people

        15. deepanilamani Feb 14th at 5:43 am

          Excellent to have such a diverse set of Themes for different business ventures. Thank you for all the information!

          Liked by 3 people

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          #####EOF##### Topic: Justify button in paragraph block is not working | WordPress.com Forums

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          en WordPress.com Forums › Support

          Justify button in paragraph block is not working

          • Author
            Posts
          • #3291657

            radtrad
            Member

            I liked to see the evolution of the paragraph block, especially with the addition of the buttons to underline and justify, but the latter is not working.

            #3291672

            vinnykaur
            Member

            Hi there,

            Could you please share your website’s URL and the post that you tried it on?
            I just tried the justify alignment and it works fine for me.

            #3291674

            radtrad
            Member

            Do you tried in the paragraph block?

            #3291678

            vinnykaur
            Member

            Yes, I did. Linking a screenshot(https://prnt.sc/n71lsx)
            Hope this is what you talking about!

            #3291681

            radtrad
            Member

            Yes, it is. It is nor working in my test site for Gutenberg.

            #3291683

            vinnykaur
            Member

            What is the issue that you are getting?
            Also, if you can share your website’s URL it would be great!

            #3291685

            radtrad
            Member

            Now I see that it is working when I publish the text, but not inside the text editor (visual mode).

            #3291726

            radtrad
            Member

            I think it is a simples bug…

            #3291917

            vinnykaur
            Member

            Well, it works for me in the visual mode as well. I guess there might be some issue with your browser or something.
            You can always preview and check though, to make sure it works all right. :)

          • Author
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          #####EOF##### Quentyn Taylor – 44CON

          Quentyn Taylor

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          Quentyn Taylor is Director of Information Security for Canon Europe. He has a wealth of experience in both the IT and information security arenas and, in recent years, has focused his attention on building business relationships across the world.Quentyn has driven Canon’s strategy to highlight the importance of document security and help business customers to minimise their security risk. Quentyn strongly believes in educating users about the importance of a comprehensive overall security policy that will allow Canon’s business customers to improve security in a cost-effective way.

          During his career, Quentyn has worked in a variety of industries for a number of organisations including outsourced service providers, Internet service providers as well as Dotcom businesses, before moving to Canon in 2000.

          Quentyn has presented at:
          #####EOF##### Dave Lewis – 44CON

          Dave Lewis

          thumb_2015-Dave-Lewis-ISMG Twitter: gattaca
          Website: www.liquidmatrix.org/blog

          Dave has almost two decades of industry experience. He has extensive experience in IT operations and management. Currently, Dave is a Global Security Advocate for Akamai Technologies . He is the founder of the security site Liquidmatrix Security Digest and co-host of the Liquidmatrix podcast. Dave also serves on the (ISC)2 Board of Directors. Dave writes a column for CSO Online, Forbes and Huffington Post.

          Dave has presented at:

          • 44CON LONDON 2015:  Barbarians At The Gate(way): An Examination Of The Attacker’s Tool Box
          #####EOF##### WordPress.com
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          #####EOF##### Hypersonic Weapons – Russia Military Analysis

          Tag: Hypersonic Weapons

          Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system

          Michael Kofman6 Comments

          I’ve recently put out an article on Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system in the well known Russian journal The New Times, under the title “ЧТО ВСЕ-ТАКИ ПУТИН ПОДАРИЛ РОССИЯНАМ НА НОВЫЙ ГОД,” but for those interested, please find the unedited English version below, which hopefully covers the subject in some depth.

          Earlier in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced at his annual address to the federal assembly that a Russian hypersonic boost-glide system, named Avangard, would start entering serial production. Subsequently on December 26th, 2018 Russian officials claimed that they had successfully conducted a test from the Dombarovsky missile site, to the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 3,760 miles away. Russia’s president proudly announced that the system as a wonderful ‘New Year’s gift’ to Russia. According to Putin’s statement, the hypersonic glide vehicle is able to conduct intensive maneuvers at speeds in excess of Mach 20, which would render it “invulnerable” to any existing or prospective missile defenses. In this article I will briefly explore the logic behind Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, recent claims of technological accomplishment, and the strategic implications of deploying such weapon systems.

          Despite rather questionable public statements about the technical characteristics of this weapon system, a number of which appear inconsistent, it is clear that Russian military science has made considerable advancements along one of the most sophisticated axis of weapons research. While claims pertaining to the readiness of this system to enter serial production, and operational service, are probably exaggerated, the more important questions are conceptual. More than likely Russia will be able to deploy a hypersonic boost glide system in the 2020s, perhaps alongside other hypersonic weapons projects, but the promise of this technology was always at the tactical-operational level of war, not strategic. This was never considered a ‘game changer’ as a system for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. If anything, Russia has invested a substantial amount of money, and years of research, in overdoing its strengths. Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of ‘Russian national achievement’ for domestic audiences, it’s unclear if this weapon system truly answers Russia’s strategic challenges in the coming decades. The question is not whether it works, or when it will work, but does it even matter?

          Hypersonic boost glide weapons function by using a multi-stage ballistic missile as the boost phase, throwing a vehicle into near earth orbit, which then descends and begins gliding at hypersonic speeds along the edge of the atmosphere. As the vehicle descends back to earth, it pulls upwards, and begins skimming the atmosphere in a ‘glide’ phase, before diving downwards onto its target at the terminal phase. Russia has spent years developing this technology under a project referenced as Object 4202, which married a series of  experimental hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Yu-71, with a liquid fueled ICBM УР-100УНТТХ (NATO designation SS-19 mod 2 Stiletto). This system builds on the Soviet Union’s extensive research into hypersonic weapons programs , including work on a hypersonic-boost aircraft named «Спираль», a modified S-200V surface-to-air missile under the project name Холод, and hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as Kh-80 and Kh-90 GELA (гиперзвуковой экспериментальный летательный аппарат).

          kh-90 gela
          Kh-90 GELA
          kholod
          Kholod
          spiral
          Spiral

          Although claimed successes in testing may have come as a surprise in 2018, in truth Russian officials have been announcing tests of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle, using the УР-100УНТТХ missile, as far back as the strategic nuclear forces exercise in 2004. Hence, this particular system has been in publicly acknowledged development for at least 14 years, and the glide vehicle itself for quite a few years beforehand. The booster, УР-100 (SS-19), is a 105 ton liquid fueled silo-based missile, which together with the boost glide vehicle payload proved too long for a standard silo. Hence this system is being tested in a modified R-36M2 silo (SS-18 Satan), and although it is being developed with the УР-100, it is meant for the much heavier liquid fueled missile currently in testing, RS-28 Sarmat. While the question of boost method may seem a technicality, the boosting mechanism is actually quite deterministic of the strategic role this weapon can play, as I will discuss a bit later in this article.

          However, the principal challenges with this system have little to do with the decades established technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or boosting objects into near earth orbit. Hypersonic boost glide vehicles, if successful, represent a major breakthrough in material sciences, as the object must be able to withstand incredibly high temperatures with the payload and guidance system intact. Although impossible to verify, Russian announcements can often be categorized as ‘true lies,’ impressive sounding figures that have some factual basis, but are inevitably inaccurate. The proposition that the vehicle can reach mach 27 is likely true only during the brief return phase, when it is falling back to earth like a rock from near earth orbit, prior to beginning its hypersonic glide at the edges of the atmosphere. The vehicle itself will have considerably different speeds during the pull-up, glide, and dive to target phase, while having to endure incredible temperatures.

          Below are a few graphical illustrations available on the web

          explainer 1explainer 2explainer 3

          In U.S. testing of an analogous system in 2011, Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2), the vehicle was able to sustain glide at mach 20 speeds for three minutes, enduring a temperature of 3500 Fahrenheit. These figures track with Russian statements on temperatures experienced, but the actual speeds and altitudes at which the Russian vehicle is able to glide, and whether the systems actually survive this experience, remain a mystery. Although Russia’s defense sector seems to have made progress on this weapon system, claims that it is ready for serial production, or operational deployment in the near future, should be treated with educated skepticism. Ironically, the most significant potential breakthrough is in material sciences, not in building a seemingly scary strategic weapon.

          Yet the rationale for Avangard seems less than straightforward when compared to other Russian hypersonic weapons programs, including the Tsirkon 3M22 scramjet hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic missile. Those are operational depth systems able to deliver meaningful conventional or nuclear payloads to shape the military balance in a theater of military operations. They can offset U.S. conventional superiority, and pose genuine challenges in conventional warfare. What does Avangard do for Russia that existing silo-based, road-mobile, air-launched, and submarine launched missiles cannot?

          supposed image of the vehicle (draped on the right)

          The Avangard system is best seen as one element in an expensive Russian strategy to develop technological hedges for a security environment perhaps 20-30 years from now where the United States might deploy a cost effective missile defense system, making a percentage of Russia’s nuclear deterrent vulnerable to interception. To be clear, there is no missile defense system now, or on the horizon, able to intercept Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Modern ICBMs can come with multiple reentry vehicles and numerous penetration aids or false targets, creating a complex ‘threat cloud’ that would make interception an improbable business. Nonetheless, ever since the Bush administration chose in 2002 to exit the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russian leadership has been concerned that the United States could eventually devalue the deterrence provided by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

          Russia’s General Staff worries that a vast arsenal of long range conventional cruise missiles, paired with a semi-viable missile defense, would pose major challenges for their calculations to ensure the ability of Russian nuclear forces to deliver ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tailored’ damage in the coming decades. The 1972 ABM Treaty was not just a cornerstone of Cold War arms control, but fundamental to Russian military thinking on strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability at the strategic level. Ever since June 1941, Soviet, and subsequently Russian, military thought has been wracked by the possibility of a disarming first strike, and the need to position Russian forces along a strategy of ‘counter-surprise.’

          However, unlike other expensive strategic projects, such as the Poseidon nuclear powered torpedo, Avangard does not contribute to a survivable second strike. Thus there are a few ways to interpret the actual purpose of this weapon. The first is as a retaliatory-meeting strike system to attack high-value targets, i.e. civilian targets with political or economic significance, which will provide some insurance for a counter value strike. The second is that it is a first strike weapon against hard to penetrate targets. Since Avangard is silo based, designed for heavier liquid fueled ICBMs, in the event of strategic attack the boosting missile would not be survivable. It must be fired either first, or in a “launch under attack” scenario, when Russia has confirmed a U.S. launch, but the missiles have not yet impacted.

          Avangard may be designed to give Russia’s RVSN the ability to penetrate hard targets, getting around missile defenses, and leveraging greater accuracy to take out well-hardened facilities. That said, from a nuclear warfighting standpoint, this makes Avangard a somewhat specialized, but expensive strategic nuclear weapon. Given how few of these systems Russia is likely to be able to afford, the weapon may offer some targeting advantages, but at a high price relative to the benefits. Another possibility is that this is not a system to get around future missile defenses, but a first strike system to be used specifically against missile defenses, clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even if more accurate and survivable in flight, Avangard is a questionable investment when compared to the numerous road-mobile ICBM systems Russia fields today, including Topol-M and Rs-24 Yars (but then the logic for Russia’s SSBN program is also somewhat circumspect).

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          Perhaps in the future, Avangard will be deployed on a road-mobile launcher, but as conceived, this system adds little to Russia’s existing large strategic nuclear arsenal. An expensive insurance policy that in no way alters the strategic nuclear balance either today or tomorrow, which is why the reaction in Washington has been so muted. If anything, the United States should thank Russia for investing money in such super weapons, instead of buying large quantities of conventional precision guided munitions.

          Moscow has sought to leverage Avangard and similar novel systems to sell the notion of a qualitative arms race to Washington, D.C., hoping to establish a bilateral agenda for summits. Yet while the world is genuinely witnessing a renewed period of nuclear modernization, with qualitatively new or novel weapon systems in development, there is no arms race in progress. The major nuclear powers of today are pursuing distinctly divergent strategies, concepts, and requirements behind their nuclear weapons programs, rather than racing which each other for superiority. This is why Avangard, if completed and deployed, is unlikely to alter strategic military balance or elicit any meaningful response from Washington, D.C.

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          #####EOF##### Russian Forces – Russia Military Analysis

          Tag: Russian Forces

          Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

          Michael Kofman4 Comments

          Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

          —————————————————————————————————————————————–

          The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

          Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

          The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

          can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

          And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

           

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          Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

          There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

          VDV praciting loading

          Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

          Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

          airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

          Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

          Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

          These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

          The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

          T62 vdv.jpg
          VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

          Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

          But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

          Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part 1 – Kinzhal, Sarmat, 4202)

          Michael Kofman5 Comments

          Vladimir Putin’s speech on March 1st revealed a number of seemingly new or emerging weapon systems, some of which were known to be in testing, while others may come as somewhat a surprise. However, most of these ‘new weapons’ are long running projects, systems thought to be in development, or testing. Some had not shown themselves in quite some time, while others have never been seen, although there were reports of their tests in public releases or official statements. The weapons represent a mix of hypersonic missiles, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, traditional ballistic missile projects, and third strike vengeance weapons on the basis of Russian advancements in nuclear technology. Here I will briefly cover Kinzhal, R-28 Sarmat, and ‘4202’ – the rest of the more fantastical weapons will come in Part 2.

          But first, a brief comment on the overall presentation. The speech itself felt like a “послание” in more than one meaning of that word for those who speak Russian. It was certainly a ‘challenge accepted’ message from VVP, in part responding to the NDS and NPR. After a good run through new and seemingly fantastical capabilities, VVP returned to the subject of Russia’s military doctrine, nuclear policy, and the like. So, aside from domestic politics, there is a fair bit of coercive diplomacy in the message, from talking about the capabilities themselves, to Russian resolve, and concluding with assurances that all will be well if nobody gets into it with Russia. Moscow understands the audience well: nothing gets the attention of U.S. policymakers like nuclear weapons, and there is one person in particular in Washington who is readily impressed by videos of missiles. The graphics were not exactly Lord of the Rings quality, but what can you do, Russian MoD has to live with budget reductions since 2015.

          This was my overall impression listening to the speech and the vision it offered.

          Deathstar Russia

          Now, back to the missiles. A number of the more futuristic projects can only be characterized as semi-rational, in the sense that a fair bit of defense procurement is semi-rational. There was a need to support various design bureaus, Russia’s nuclear energy industry, and a long standing narrative about the need to penetrate a missile defense system the U.S. does not have (and probably after 30 years of copious amounts of funding still won’t have, because Russia is hardly the only country that suffers from semi-rational defense spending).

          There is no way to intercept Russian ICBMs, and with the upgrades to penetration aids they’re already implementing, Russia can ensure the viability of its deterrent for decades to come. This is not to mention recently deployed air launched cruise missiles like Kh-101/102. The ticket price of upgrading strategic nuclear weapons for better penetration, i.e. the offense, is just incredibly lower than the cost of trying to mount any viable defense. Statements on the various projects on March 1st can best be summarized as true lies, that is their stages of development are likely exaggerated, but none of what was said qualifies as science fiction either.

          Mainstream media coverage, and experts quoted have been rather dismissive of Putin’s presentation. That is an unfortunately common but foolhardy reaction, and its almost habitual. Observers are right to say that these technologies will take considerable time to test and deploy, but what some may not recall, because investment in Russian military analysis took a vacation 1992-2014, is actually when testing and development for these weapons began. The narrative of a sanctioned, economically weak and decaying Russia tends to prevail, but it comes with blinders on the issue of military technology. Yes, they can do this, and much of this may become reality in the 2020s. Recall awhile ago when Russian MoD leaked a slide on Status-6, many observers thought it was a PR stunt, and some kind of bluff, until it showed up in the NPR. Some thought T-14 Armata was a bluff, and made of cardboard, that ‘often wrong, but never in doubt list’ of expert dismissals is fairly long.

          Aeroballistic Missile Kinzhal – the air Iskander

          Kinzhal

          The shown missile is a substantially modified version of the Iskander SRBM, with Mig-31 serving as the boost phase, providing a high  altitude launch at supersonic speeds (recommend A. Ramm and Bogdanov for good reading). This is far from the first missile design to leverage Mig-31s performance in speed, takeoff weight, ceiling and combat range. Kinzhal is an operational-tactical complex, able to reach hypersonic speeds, a 2000 km range – although some suggest it is closer to 1500 km. According to official statements this missile can reach mach 10 and can conduct high-G maneuvers on terminal approach. I’m skeptical of the former, that is it likely can do mach 10 at early stages of flight, but then reduce speed for terminal maneuvers. The latter makes sense, because OTK 9M723 Iskander SRBM was designed to make random maneuvers in order to make its flight path difficult to intercept.

          Kinzhal is quite shorter, with smaller control surfaces, and a narrower nose. Gen Sergei Surovikin, head of Aerospace Forces (VKS) said the designation for this missile is Kh-47M2 (although earlier forum sources put it as (9-С-7760 – missile, 9-А-7660 – complex). Iskander, referenced as 9M723, can reach 350-450 km depending on payload, if launched at supersonic speeds from high altitude it stands to reason that a modified variant can achieve a substantially increased range. VKS should be happy since Mig-31s are technically under their service arm, and one of the few types of aviation they actually control. This gives them a new standoff weapon, and better chances at an anti-ship mission.

          Kinzhal is new, but according to A. Ramm and others, the concept initially surfaced 8 years ago. It has since then been mentioned by experts like Pyotr Bukowski in 2017. Given Iskander-M is considered to be a dual-capable replacement for Tochka-U, though its principal mission is conventional, there is ample reason to believe that the same nuclear warhead can be deployed on Kinzhal. Guidance is an interesting question, supposedly it can actively home on targets, and has scene matching as well. How that comes together at hypersonic speeds is a question, but more than likely this weapon is capable of very complex flight profiles. At least it is advertised with different seeker heads, one for traditional air-to-ground work, and the other as an anti-ship weapon.

          Readers will recall that Raduga’s Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback) aeroballistic missile from 1980s was allegedly quite fast, perhaps reaching Mach 5. Kinzhal might have more power than the original Iskander too. Russia’s MoD has plans to upgrade the current Iskander-M, improving range, so a Iskander-M2 is in the offing already for the ground forces.

          Kinzhal anti-ship.JPG

          I’m skeptical of the claim that this weapon has already begun combat duty in the Southern MD, which sounds like a ‘true lie,’ but it is probably the closest to operational deployment among weapons mentioned. One should not be surprised to see this in Syria at some point. Rumor has it the new GPV 2018-2027 plans to upgrade up to 50 Mig-31s to carry this missile. If anything, this weapon is ideally suited for the Pacific theater, where many Mig-31s are based, and in the anti-ship role, as it will prove incredibly difficult to intercept. I will add, there’s been no news of Tsirkon (a hypersonic cruise missile in development) since last year, principally for the anti-ship role. In 2017 everyone was advertising their goods to get funding in the new GPV, but since then Tsirkon has gone a bit quiet.

          Added another photo after more videos came out.

          Кинж

           

          R-28 Sarmat – heavy ICBM replacement for R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18)

          Sarmat 2.jpg

          R-28 Sarmat is a liquid fueled heavy ICBM designed to have high throw weight, deploying multiple warheads and numerous penetration aids. Although often touted as being a 200 ton replacement for SS-18, there’s a lot of conflicting information, some of it suggesting that its actually much closer to the weight of the SS-19, that is towards 100 tons. Earlier information suggested this was a 106 ton missile with a throw weight of 4350 kg. As a silo-based ICBM, SS-18 could deploy 10 warheads, but was designed and produced by Yuzhmash in Ukraine SSR. Hence Russia had an obvious problem, not only is this aging missile fielding a substantial percentage of the currently deployed force under New START, but it was still serviced and maintained by Yuzhmash.

          Currently, Sarmat is about 2 years behind schedule based on the contract initially signed in 2011. The last ejection test was in late December 2017, which seems to have gone successfully, with two more planned for early 2018. Sarmat features prominently in the new state armament program so there’s every reason to believe that it will be completed sooner rather than later, but in the end this is rocket science, not basket weaving. Suffice it to say, this missile is nowhere near serial production or operational readiness. Problems in Russian industry when it comes to missiles, rockets, and space lift, tend to stem less from S&T and more from production quality of complex components. This was at the heart of Bulava’s spotty test record. I’m also skeptical of the south pole trajectory shown in Putin’s address, implying it could be a fractal orbital weapon. In the end, we have to wait for the actual parameters of the missile to become public (100t or 200t ?), because Russian officials have a long established problem with numbers – whether lies, truth, or self-PR, rarely does anyone in Russia give the same figures for anything.

          Capture

          Sarmat is possibly the least interesting item shown during the weapons menagerie. More puzzling is that little has been said about RS-26 Rubezh, which has stayed out of the news for some time after initially being tested as an ICBM and classified as such. Russian MoD needs to do a ‘where are they now’ catch up segment on some of these systems.

          Gerasimov’s face during Sarmat video expresses how I felt.

          Gerasimov's face during talk of Sarmat

          Avangard or 4202 hypersonic boost-glide weapons

          During the address, Vladimir Putin said that they couldn’t show the actual video of the rocket being used, and hence the name reference to Avangard is rather confusing. Avangard was a project mentioned back in 2011 by Serduykov and some sources incorrectly suggested it was based on a modified RS-24, which was made by MIT, whereas 4202 has been a well known hypersonic boost-glide program and is regularly mentioned as being tested on УР-100УНТТХ, which is made by NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The video during Putin’s presentation shows UR-100 (SS-19 Stiletto) as expected, besides being associated with 4202 – this ICBM also forms the basis for two successful space lift variants ‘Rokot’ and ‘Strela.’ The concept involves using an ICBM to boost a vehicle to near orbital speed, then it descents and adjusts flight profile at some altitude where there is still minimal atmospheric resistance into a sustained hypersonic glide, with the terminal phase being dive to target.

          Borrowing this graphic

          HTV-2.jpg

          First mention of Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, and tests using UR-100, actually goes back to large scale RVSN exercise in 2004.  This, like Kinzhal in 2008, is to give the reader some indicator as to how long these programs have been in progress so as to remove any confusion about the proposition that VV Putin ran out of things to claim and is now making all this up. USSR had ideas about hypersonic vehicles back in mid-1980s, so this is hardly a new concept.  N. Surkov has a good article on the program here, adding that 4202’s flight control system was made in Ukraine, and needed replacing after the war. According to Surkov the vehicle is boosted to 100 km altitude and then glides down, perhaps at 5-7 km per second, those could be just official stats though, just like when Shoigu liberated 500,000 sq km of Syria.

          The idea behind 4202 is Russia’s version of Prompt Global Strike, except this system is intended to be an air defense penetrator carrying a strategic nuclear warhead. The vehicle being tested is analogous to U.S. Hypersonic Test Vehicle 2. Russia’s military continues to imagine a distant future where BMD is able to intercept their second strike, and therefore sees value in an expensive program to deliver nuclear weapons via a boost-glide vehicle. Although this threat perception is not too different from our oft advocated need for a new B-21 stealth bomber, since the current $2 billion B-2 is going to be defeated in some future where stealth is no longer viable. How Russians talk about the capabilities of U.S. missile defense to justify programs, and how Americans talk about Russian integrated air defense when it comes to B-21 and LRSO, has quite a bit in common.

          obj 4202

          A. Ramm has one of the best articles with details on 4202. A R-36M2 silo (listed as object 370) is being used to test 4202 (the complex is often referenced as A35-71. The UR-100 in question, together with 4202 on top of it, fits into this R-36 silo because it is designed for a missile that is 7 meters longer. Earlier mention of Avangard on a RS-24 based missile seems incorrect, unless this is a different system altogether, but in my view 4202 and Avangard are the same. Ultimately R-28 Sarmat is the most logical carrier for this hypersonic vehicle. UR-100 is the current test missile for 4202, while Yars or Topol lack the throw weight for such a weapon, but because UR-100 is too old, it means that R-28 Sarmat is the only perspective ICBM ‘booster’ for this weapon when/if it is completed. Before anyone chimes in that these things take a long time to develop, remind them that R-28 contract was signed 2011, and 4202 began testing 2004. So perhaps we will be seeing both by the mid-2020s?

          Bottom line: there remains a strong emphasis on non-contact warfare, particularly tactical operational and operational-strategic weapons, along with dual-capable standoff systems. Even if the rationale of U.S. missile defense doesn’t hold much logic behind it, Russian leadership continuously thinks about a future where their strategic deterrent is somehow compromised, and this threat concept is rather convenient to justify a host of next generation technology programs, delivery systems and the like. Where there is capability in long range precision guided munitions the short coming often ends up being capacity. These are not bluffs, the question is less whether they can make it work and more of ‘how many can they afford.’ The upcoming GPV 2018-2027 will focus on increasing munition stocks and bringing to fruition several new standoff missiles – Kinzhal is just one among several projects. More in part 2 on Dr. Strangelove weapons.

          Beyond the bad graphics, there is a real vehicle somewhere in testing, though it likely has a long way to go.

          4202 video.JPG

          In one brief graphic its even dodging numerous missiles that appear to be GBI interceptors, so there are two fantasies playing out in this image

          past gbi

          Comments and suggestions are welcome.

          U.S. Strikes and Russian PMC Casualties in Syria – Fact vs Fiction

          Michael Kofman4 Comments

          It’s become common knowledge that a U.S. strike took out an advancing column of Syrian forces on February 7th in defense of SDF positions east of Deir ez-Zor, and more likely to protect U.S. SOF embedded with them. Since then the story of Russian casualties among supporting PMCs (mercenaries belonging to private military companies) has proliferated across the internet and newspaper articles, with many of the facts and figures inaccurate. I’ve seen 100 dead, 200 dead, 600 dead, dozens, hundreds, scores of dead, and so on and so forth. Unfortunately Russian casualties, troops participating in military exercises, or similar such events have a large “applied internet multiplier” whereby they increase several fold depending on the source. By current figures many of those involved in the fighting February 7-8 were killed at least twice, if not multiple times.

          Due to a lack of credible information serious newspapers are citing some Russian businessman, a Syrian commander, and all sorts of other conflicting sources. The contradictory stories are reminiscent of Akira Kurosawa’s famous film Rashomon, where every character has their own often self-serving narrative about the same event. After a journalist called this morning to inquire whether it is true that U.S. airpower took out 20% of Russian ground forces in Syria it seems time for something sensible to be written on the matter. I’m updating this a bit as better information comes out.

          Based on the information available at the time I wrote that actual casualties among PMCs in this episode are likely somewhere on the order of 13-15 dead and a relatively equal number wounded. Initial reporting seemed closer to a dozen than dozens. The casualties  from this strike are spread between a Syrian unit known as ISIS Hunters (~20 KIA) and the bulk among SAA units which seemed to include some percentage of local fighters from the area (these numbers might be around 40 or more). There was word of a Syrian brigadier killed as well along with the SAA soldiers. More than likely this was an unit from Syria’s 5th Assault Corps supported by PMCs. The 13-15 PMC casualties are also not all necessarily Russian, but thus far all the confirmed dead are. A good number seem to be Cossacks, and many are fighters who previously were part of separatist formations in the Donbas, either directly on behalf of DNR or under contract as mercs.

          I am very biased towards conservative assessments based on the information that can be confirmed, and makes sense, i.e. I prefer starting low and working my way up. In this case it seems that the less probable event was true, the number of Wagner mercenaries killed was much higher than I initially thought.

          On Feb 16 I updated the count after more information and some additions from fighting February 10th. The better number increasingly looked like ~40 dead and 70 wounded as in MK article. I’m more inclined towards MK numbers in this graphic than any of the other figures, but it is still too low an estimate. Those are figures for combined casualties, referencing 3 companies of Wagner involved in support of Syrian forces. Of these the number of PMCs killed and wounded is probably more than a dozen but doubtfully exceeds 30-40 (or so I thought). Today the more realistic number is somewhere between 100-200 killed in that engagement.

          MK article here: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/02/13/pogibli-40-raneny-72-istochnik-v-chvk-vagnera-utochnil-poteri.html

          A good source comparison chart to figure out where all these numbers are coming from can be found here: https://chervonec-001.livejournal.com/2227259.html

          This is a photo of ISIS Hunters holding a funeral following the strike

          ISIS Hunters funeral

          The KIA count may go up depending on the fate of the wounded. There is a general assumption based on the evidence that the few PMCs killed belong to Wagner ChVK, as Wagner is the principal mercenary group fighting in support of SAA in Syria. As is often the case, facts point to a much less exciting and sensational story behind the headlines.

          According to DoD statements, and those by SecDef Mattis, the attacking force approximated ‘300 pro-regime forces’ in a surprise push towards SDF positions on February 7. Thus, the fantastic figures of hundreds dead, including Igor Girkin’s 644, can be safely thrown out the window. Somewhere on the order of 200 dead is also improbable unless the numbers for those attacking were much higher than being reported by the American side. The U.S. would have to kill literally everyone involved, and that seems quite a reach for typical rules of engagement. But it seems the numbers were somewhere 100-200 after all, that is the reporting from Russia and numerous sources suggest the U.S. intentionally under reported Russian PMC casualties in this fight. Either that, or the additional fighters died from poor morale after seeing the strike.

          Later on, DoD statements elaborated that the attack came evening of Feb 7th, and it included a ‘dismounted battalion sized element’ which was turned back. So this is somewhere on the order of 300-500 attacking but they only had contact with a part of the force. The difference in the numbers between Mattis’ initial 300 and LTG Harrigan’s battalion is in the leading half of the battalion, which dismounted (200-300), that U.S. forces struck and most of the casualties were among this element.

          Since LTG Harrigan indicated the attack was not unexpected, and they observed the buildup for some time (https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1441080/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-lieutenant-general-harrigian-via-teleco/), it explains better how so many assets were involved in beating back the assault – MQ-9, F-15E, F-22, even B-52 and AC-130. B-52 in particular would take some time to arrive on station. This suggests the U.S. knew the attack was coming, and they told the Russians they knew, and the action went forward anyway.

          This episode appears to have taken place around Al-Tabiyeh east of Deir ez-Zor. Syrian forces began an attack on SDF positions, with armor and artillery. Then U.S. forces made contact with Russian MoD to deconflict, and after being told there were no Russian soldiers there, which by all accounts there were not, they struck the advancing units. So, initially I thought total casualties were probably less than 100 with a approximately 40 SAA, 20 ISIS Hunters, and 13-15 PMC split (although unclear if SAA losses include ISIS Hunters losses in which case it might even more conservative). Now looking back, that was grossly conservative. Somewhere between 100-200 were killed, many of them Wagner fighters, that is more than the 42-70 estimate from the MK story.

          The exact reason for why this episode took place is naturally unclear, but it may be connected to the overall friction between Syrian forces wanting to seize energy infrastructure, gas and oil, from SDF forces. The latter took it from ISIS, and of course need the resources, just as the Syrian regime needs the money to sustain a rump state. There are also Russian interests there looming in the background, among people interested in contracts handling Syrian energy extraction post-conflict, and hoping that PMCs can secure potential energy cash cows. This episode may be due to poor coordination, deliberate probing, or as often happens in war – a confluence of events yields compound risk as mistakes and misjudgments stack.

          From higher altitude, the U.S. has a strategy to maintain presence in Syria via SDF, and Russia has a strategy to make the regime as viable as possible financially, while pushing U.S. proxies further east. Astride the war between Turkey and Kurds playing out in Afrin, the war between Israel and U.S. vs Iranian presence in the south, this is technically Syria’s war #3 which involves Russian forces backing SAA to retake more of Idlib and gain ground east of Deir ez-Zor.

          P.S. Behind this tale is another looming story about some Syrian T-72 that was taken out by a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone in defense of SDF positions and embedded U.S. advisers (internet can’t decide if its Russian or Soviet made). Actually on the video available it first looked more like a T-90, supplied by Russia to Syria’s 5th Assault Corps. There is an object right of the gun that looks like a Shtora system than IR illuminator from T-72BA – but this was not the case. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/13/us-mq-9-reaper-takes-out-russian-t-72-tank-syria.html (I got this photo from the same article)

          Looking at it some more later the V barrier on the front seems to point to T-72M, which is the more probable answer. This is is from Feb 10 fighting.

          DoD video shows a U.S Air Force Reaper strike on a Russia-made T-72 tank. (Screen shot of DoD video)

          We stand by to find out from the internet whether this particular tank was filled with hundreds of Russian PMCs or personally driven by Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.

          Figures compiled from a few news sources like Novaya Gazeta, Meduza, etc. some blog sources that are ‘pro-Russian’ but fairly well informed on the situation in Syria, work put out by CIT, other journalists/experts currently working the issue)

          https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/02/13/75496-oshibka-ili-predatelstvo

          https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/02/12/139439-cit-uznala-imena-pogibshih-v-sirii-boytsov-chvk-vagnera

          MK might have the best sources: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/02/13/pogibli-40-raneny-72-istochnik-v-chvk-vagnera-utochnil-poteri.html

          Oryx probably took number of dead and did standard 3x wounded multiplier, which makes sense.

           

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          #####EOF##### Russia Military Analysis – A blog on the Russian military

          Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

          Michael Kofman4 Comments

          Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

          —————————————————————————————————————————————–

          The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

          Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

          The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

          can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

          And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

           

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          Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

          There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

          VDV praciting loading

          Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

          Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

          airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

          Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

          Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

          These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

          The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

          T62 vdv.jpg
          VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

          Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

          But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

          Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system

          Michael Kofman6 Comments

          I’ve recently put out an article on Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system in the well known Russian journal The New Times, under the title “ЧТО ВСЕ-ТАКИ ПУТИН ПОДАРИЛ РОССИЯНАМ НА НОВЫЙ ГОД,” but for those interested, please find the unedited English version below, which hopefully covers the subject in some depth.

          Earlier in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced at his annual address to the federal assembly that a Russian hypersonic boost-glide system, named Avangard, would start entering serial production. Subsequently on December 26th, 2018 Russian officials claimed that they had successfully conducted a test from the Dombarovsky missile site, to the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 3,760 miles away. Russia’s president proudly announced that the system as a wonderful ‘New Year’s gift’ to Russia. According to Putin’s statement, the hypersonic glide vehicle is able to conduct intensive maneuvers at speeds in excess of Mach 20, which would render it “invulnerable” to any existing or prospective missile defenses. In this article I will briefly explore the logic behind Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, recent claims of technological accomplishment, and the strategic implications of deploying such weapon systems.

          Despite rather questionable public statements about the technical characteristics of this weapon system, a number of which appear inconsistent, it is clear that Russian military science has made considerable advancements along one of the most sophisticated axis of weapons research. While claims pertaining to the readiness of this system to enter serial production, and operational service, are probably exaggerated, the more important questions are conceptual. More than likely Russia will be able to deploy a hypersonic boost glide system in the 2020s, perhaps alongside other hypersonic weapons projects, but the promise of this technology was always at the tactical-operational level of war, not strategic. This was never considered a ‘game changer’ as a system for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. If anything, Russia has invested a substantial amount of money, and years of research, in overdoing its strengths. Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of ‘Russian national achievement’ for domestic audiences, it’s unclear if this weapon system truly answers Russia’s strategic challenges in the coming decades. The question is not whether it works, or when it will work, but does it even matter?

          Hypersonic boost glide weapons function by using a multi-stage ballistic missile as the boost phase, throwing a vehicle into near earth orbit, which then descends and begins gliding at hypersonic speeds along the edge of the atmosphere. As the vehicle descends back to earth, it pulls upwards, and begins skimming the atmosphere in a ‘glide’ phase, before diving downwards onto its target at the terminal phase. Russia has spent years developing this technology under a project referenced as Object 4202, which married a series of  experimental hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Yu-71, with a liquid fueled ICBM УР-100УНТТХ (NATO designation SS-19 mod 2 Stiletto). This system builds on the Soviet Union’s extensive research into hypersonic weapons programs , including work on a hypersonic-boost aircraft named «Спираль», a modified S-200V surface-to-air missile under the project name Холод, and hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as Kh-80 and Kh-90 GELA (гиперзвуковой экспериментальный летательный аппарат).

          kh-90 gela
          Kh-90 GELA
          kholod
          Kholod
          spiral
          Spiral

          Although claimed successes in testing may have come as a surprise in 2018, in truth Russian officials have been announcing tests of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle, using the УР-100УНТТХ missile, as far back as the strategic nuclear forces exercise in 2004. Hence, this particular system has been in publicly acknowledged development for at least 14 years, and the glide vehicle itself for quite a few years beforehand. The booster, УР-100 (SS-19), is a 105 ton liquid fueled silo-based missile, which together with the boost glide vehicle payload proved too long for a standard silo. Hence this system is being tested in a modified R-36M2 silo (SS-18 Satan), and although it is being developed with the УР-100, it is meant for the much heavier liquid fueled missile currently in testing, RS-28 Sarmat. While the question of boost method may seem a technicality, the boosting mechanism is actually quite deterministic of the strategic role this weapon can play, as I will discuss a bit later in this article.

          However, the principal challenges with this system have little to do with the decades established technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or boosting objects into near earth orbit. Hypersonic boost glide vehicles, if successful, represent a major breakthrough in material sciences, as the object must be able to withstand incredibly high temperatures with the payload and guidance system intact. Although impossible to verify, Russian announcements can often be categorized as ‘true lies,’ impressive sounding figures that have some factual basis, but are inevitably inaccurate. The proposition that the vehicle can reach mach 27 is likely true only during the brief return phase, when it is falling back to earth like a rock from near earth orbit, prior to beginning its hypersonic glide at the edges of the atmosphere. The vehicle itself will have considerably different speeds during the pull-up, glide, and dive to target phase, while having to endure incredible temperatures.

          Below are a few graphical illustrations available on the web

          explainer 1explainer 2explainer 3

          In U.S. testing of an analogous system in 2011, Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2), the vehicle was able to sustain glide at mach 20 speeds for three minutes, enduring a temperature of 3500 Fahrenheit. These figures track with Russian statements on temperatures experienced, but the actual speeds and altitudes at which the Russian vehicle is able to glide, and whether the systems actually survive this experience, remain a mystery. Although Russia’s defense sector seems to have made progress on this weapon system, claims that it is ready for serial production, or operational deployment in the near future, should be treated with educated skepticism. Ironically, the most significant potential breakthrough is in material sciences, not in building a seemingly scary strategic weapon.

          Yet the rationale for Avangard seems less than straightforward when compared to other Russian hypersonic weapons programs, including the Tsirkon 3M22 scramjet hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic missile. Those are operational depth systems able to deliver meaningful conventional or nuclear payloads to shape the military balance in a theater of military operations. They can offset U.S. conventional superiority, and pose genuine challenges in conventional warfare. What does Avangard do for Russia that existing silo-based, road-mobile, air-launched, and submarine launched missiles cannot?

          supposed image of the vehicle (draped on the right)

          The Avangard system is best seen as one element in an expensive Russian strategy to develop technological hedges for a security environment perhaps 20-30 years from now where the United States might deploy a cost effective missile defense system, making a percentage of Russia’s nuclear deterrent vulnerable to interception. To be clear, there is no missile defense system now, or on the horizon, able to intercept Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Modern ICBMs can come with multiple reentry vehicles and numerous penetration aids or false targets, creating a complex ‘threat cloud’ that would make interception an improbable business. Nonetheless, ever since the Bush administration chose in 2002 to exit the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russian leadership has been concerned that the United States could eventually devalue the deterrence provided by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

          Russia’s General Staff worries that a vast arsenal of long range conventional cruise missiles, paired with a semi-viable missile defense, would pose major challenges for their calculations to ensure the ability of Russian nuclear forces to deliver ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tailored’ damage in the coming decades. The 1972 ABM Treaty was not just a cornerstone of Cold War arms control, but fundamental to Russian military thinking on strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability at the strategic level. Ever since June 1941, Soviet, and subsequently Russian, military thought has been wracked by the possibility of a disarming first strike, and the need to position Russian forces along a strategy of ‘counter-surprise.’

          However, unlike other expensive strategic projects, such as the Poseidon nuclear powered torpedo, Avangard does not contribute to a survivable second strike. Thus there are a few ways to interpret the actual purpose of this weapon. The first is as a retaliatory-meeting strike system to attack high-value targets, i.e. civilian targets with political or economic significance, which will provide some insurance for a counter value strike. The second is that it is a first strike weapon against hard to penetrate targets. Since Avangard is silo based, designed for heavier liquid fueled ICBMs, in the event of strategic attack the boosting missile would not be survivable. It must be fired either first, or in a “launch under attack” scenario, when Russia has confirmed a U.S. launch, but the missiles have not yet impacted.

          Avangard may be designed to give Russia’s RVSN the ability to penetrate hard targets, getting around missile defenses, and leveraging greater accuracy to take out well-hardened facilities. That said, from a nuclear warfighting standpoint, this makes Avangard a somewhat specialized, but expensive strategic nuclear weapon. Given how few of these systems Russia is likely to be able to afford, the weapon may offer some targeting advantages, but at a high price relative to the benefits. Another possibility is that this is not a system to get around future missile defenses, but a first strike system to be used specifically against missile defenses, clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even if more accurate and survivable in flight, Avangard is a questionable investment when compared to the numerous road-mobile ICBM systems Russia fields today, including Topol-M and Rs-24 Yars (but then the logic for Russia’s SSBN program is also somewhat circumspect).

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          Perhaps in the future, Avangard will be deployed on a road-mobile launcher, but as conceived, this system adds little to Russia’s existing large strategic nuclear arsenal. An expensive insurance policy that in no way alters the strategic nuclear balance either today or tomorrow, which is why the reaction in Washington has been so muted. If anything, the United States should thank Russia for investing money in such super weapons, instead of buying large quantities of conventional precision guided munitions.

          Moscow has sought to leverage Avangard and similar novel systems to sell the notion of a qualitative arms race to Washington, D.C., hoping to establish a bilateral agenda for summits. Yet while the world is genuinely witnessing a renewed period of nuclear modernization, with qualitatively new or novel weapon systems in development, there is no arms race in progress. The major nuclear powers of today are pursuing distinctly divergent strategies, concepts, and requirements behind their nuclear weapons programs, rather than racing which each other for superiority. This is why Avangard, if completed and deployed, is unlikely to alter strategic military balance or elicit any meaningful response from Washington, D.C.

          Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future?

          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

          Following the November 25th Kerch Strait naval skirmish, in which Russia seized three Ukrainian boats,  Ukrainian leadership has issued warnings of a Russian buildup near Ukraine’s borders. These began in early December and have led to a media echo chamber of concerns that a Russian attack on Ukraine is imminent, in part bolstered by press releases from ISW. Actual evidence of Russian preparations for offensive operations, force movements indicating an unexpected buildup, or an imminent attack, is hard to come by. In this somewhat longer post I want to explore the existing evidence, what little there is, and examine a few conflict scenarios that may be within the realm of possibility in coming months.

          Unfortunately this simmering conflict is subject to frequent false alarms, while actual points of escalation are rarely predicted, as was the case on November 25th. It is relatively easy to take a week’s worth of Russian troop movements, equipment deployments, drills, and MoD announcements, compile them together into a bullet point list of nefarious activities, and then declare them ‘data points’ indicating preparations for an invasion. As of today it seems Ukraine will not be extending the 30 day state of martial law, which casts some doubt on the urgency and immediacy of the anticipated Russian threat as presented earlier this month by Ukrainian authorities.

          The more problematic element in all of this has been senior official Russian statements, which suggest a change in Moscow’s stance on dealing with Ukraine is afoot. Sergey Lavrov, Maria Zakharova, and Sergey Naryshkin, have issued statements expecting a possible Ukrainian ‘provocation’ and or ‘attack’ which could be interpreted as indications and warnings of Moscow preparing the information space, i.e. setting expectations of renewed violence in the coming weeks. However, they may also be a poor Russian attempt at getting Washington, D.C. to restrain Ukraine, or otherwise influence Ukrainian decision making to Russian benefit.

          The Russian narrative offers cause for concern, because it is a form of signaling not dissimilar from official statements in the run up to the Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008. That said, it is likely some officials in Moscow believed Ukraine would try to use martial law as a cover for a military operation in the Donbas, especially given their experience with Saakashvili in 2008. Although real evidence is scant, I’ll try to unpack the different stories, and the likelihood of an upcoming Russian military operation against Ukraine.

          Bottom line up front: Almost every year there is a sizable artillery duel that takes place after the holiday truce (clashes likely to resume between orthodox Christmas on January 7 and perhaps the old new year on January 14th), and so a notable escalation in violence is likely in January, but there is no evidence of Russian preparations for a major assault in Ukraine, certainly not in Crimea.  It is possible, but highly improbable. Most of the information available reflects planned modernization, expected force structure changes, and troop movements on the Russian side not indicative of unusual activity or preparations for an assault. However, as covered years ago on this blog, the long term force posture and structure changes to create three divisions along Ukraine’s borders, return earlier displaced brigades, and a focus on modernizing equipment in the Southern MD, mean that capacity and capability is there to engage in a high intensity conventional conflict with Ukraine at any time. Ukrainian leadership has used evidence from these long term trends to create the sense of an imminent tactical threat, but that is not the case, and they likely know it.

          Expectations of an attack are based on three disparate sets of information, if we can charitably call them that, which are seemingly being woven together by various outlets, blogs, and sites like ISW who warn of Russian preparations for an imminent attack. The first is an alleged increase in Russian hardware in the Rostov region of the Southern Military District. The second is a series of disparate troop movements in Crimea, which in and of themselves do not speak to anything, but some believe are indications of a Russian operation against Ukraine’s Kherson region, presumably to seize the Crimea-Dnepr fresh water canal. The third involves statements by Russia’s MFA, Sergey Naryshkin, and others, that indicate Russian preparations for a conflict in the near future.

          Issue #1 The Russian tank build up in the east and frightening Google photos of lots of tanks

          skynews-petro-poroshenko-putin_4504080.jpg
          Poroshenko on Sky News earlier this month with google satellite imagery

           

          Ukraine’s chief of general staff, Victor Muzhneko, stated that there is an increase in Russian tanks near the Ukrainian border, having grown from 93 to 250 within two weeks from mid-September. This information was spread by a Ukrainian run English-language blog run by Dylan Malyasov, which is a defense news amalgamator. The problem is that these are mostly T-62 variants (M/MV), which have long been retired from the Russian military, and are not in service with Russian trained separatist forces either. This tank last saw service during the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, and was considered obsolete decades ago. There is no Russian unit that fields T-62 tanks today, or T-64 tanks for that matter. The Russian armed forces use this tank for target practice during major military exercises, as was the case in recently held Vostok 2018.

          Separatist forces use T-64BV and T-72B1 variants, which are different main battle tanks, but can perform the same missions and are comparable in their performance characteristics. The T-62 is a completely different design, using different caliber ammunition, sights, fire control, and so on – so it is not possible for someone trained on a T-72 to just jump into this tank and ‘invade Ukraine.’ At this point the same can be said of T-64BVs being supplied to the two separatist corps, doubtfully anyone in line Russian units is current and certified to operate either T-62s, or T-64s. Russian forces use more modern T-72BA or B3 variants almost exclusively, with select units fielding T-80Us or T-80BVM.

          Here is a quick slide of T-72B3 use by Russian forces in Ukraine 2014, T-64BV manned by separatists, and a T-62M

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          Below we can see the alleged tank build up near Ukraine’s borders. Note the rest of the vehicle park at the base, and the contingent, remains the same after the arrival of these tanks, which suggests that they are here for storage and not a force addition.

          08162018
          August 16 – clearing for tanks
          09232018
          September 23 most of the tanks have arrived
          09302018
          September 30 – about 250 tanks there

          The main force currently being supplied with refurbished Russian T-62M tanks is the Syrian Army, particularly the 5th Corps. These tanks are coming out of Russian reserve storehouses with T-62s and BMP infantry fighting vehicles. During Vostok 2018 there was news of T-62s being activated and shipped east, but in reality several batches of these vehicles were loaded and shipped West in October. Ukraine’s alleged tank build up is almost certainly a series of old T-62s taken out of the Central Tank Reserve Base in Ulan Ude, which were tracked through social media (you can get a more detailed story on the T-62 shipment from DFR Lab) as arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, which is where Muzhenko’s photos are from. Subsequently these tanks tend to show up at the port of Novorossiysk for shipment to Syria via the ‘Syrian Express.’

          Storage base in Ulan-Ude, before September and after September of this year. A number of tanks have moved from the lot, indicating that some of the vehicles likely came from this base.

          T-62M tanks heading west from Central Military District and same ones arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, some are likely destined for Syria.

          The recently arrived tanks near Ukraine’s borders are most likely being stored in Rostov region near the port for shipment, or may be used in training, but the story that Russia is planning to invade Ukraine with ancient tanks that they themselves don’t use and don’t train on stretches the imagination beyond the realm of the possible. It is equally possible that these tanks are there to establish a new reserve structure. Russia has been lacking mobilization force structure, and at best has developed a territorial battalion type reserve system for infrastructure defense. Operational reserve capacity comes out of active units which force generate units from active servicemen rather than mobilize reservists. Therefore one possible explanation is that these older vehicles are designed to park equipment for some nascent reserve force structure.

          What’s frustrating is that Ukraine’s military leadership doubtlessly knows all of this, which makes it hard to understand why Muzhenko would use google earth satellite images of old T-62 tanks to push this story in the media. Any military analyst who studies the Russian armed forces could likely tell you this information. Yet Petro Poroshenko went on Sky News with these very same images of Russian tanks, as though they were legitimate evidence of Russian preparations for an invasion.

          My personal interpretation of the Ukrainian claims is that this is an information campaign to justify and defend Poroshenko’s controversial decision to institute martial law in advance of Presidential elections, where his chances of winning are quite tenuous. This is a cynical, but optimistic view, because the alternative suggests that Ukraine’s armed forces don’t know much about the Russian military, and use dated google earth images to hunt down old T-62 tanks that are neither here or there to anything. Ukrainian force posture doesn’t suggest that they themselves expect a Russian offensive either, and the temporary state of martial law has ended as scheduled, so this seems to be mostly a large information wave with little substance to substantiate it.

          However, the Russian Rostov region is seeing a steady build up of forces as part of the formation of the 150th division in the reestablished 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern MD). This will prove a decade long process. Other units that have been announced as far back as early 2015, include the 144th MR Division and 3rd MR Division in 20th Combined Arms Army (Western MD), some shifting of brigades, and steady addition or maneuver regiments to only partially filled divisions in 1st Tank Guards Army headquartered in Moscow. The 144th Division is somewhat lagging here in formation. The 150th division is a 2×2 motor rifle and tank regiment configuration (+2 supporting regiments), which is almost filled now in its maneuver regiments. Supposedly the last motor rifle regiment is being formed as of this month. There are also interesting force structure changes afoot in the Russian VDV, creating much larger air mobile formations, which were partially covered during experiments in Vostok-2018 exercises.

          Issue #2 Russian build up in Crimea for an invasion of Kherson

          image of the dried up canal.jpeg
          The dried up canal on the Russian side of the Crimean border

          There is another concern out there, based on sighting of Russian troop movements near the Crimean border with Kherson, that Russia might conduct an offensive operation from Crimea. At least this is ISW’s thesis on the basis of a few troop trucks, some APCs, and artillery being moved towards the border – which is not at all uncommon. Basically, we have a story of an overturned Russian truck as part of a military convoy on the way to the border, with a field kitchen. What’s naturally missing from this equation is a concentration of armor, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, large volumes of ammunition, etc. moved about on flatbed trucks, i.e. there is no evidence of the sort of hardware one would expect in support of an offensive operation or the formation of battalion tactical groups near Ukraine’s borders in Crimea. The Army Corps in Crimea has a dearth of maneuver elements, so units would have to cross into the peninsula via bridge from the rest of the Southern Military District (presumably 58th Army), concentrate, and deploy – which nobody is seeing happen. More than likely Russian troop movements are indicators of preparations for an artillery duel – exchanges of indirect fire that typically escalate in January/February.

          Partly responsible for the confusion are two planned force additions to Crimea. First we have the formation of the 171st independent air assault battalion in Crimea, which was announced December 2, 2017. This battalion is technically part of the 7th VDV Air assault division, but will create a permanently based unit in Crimea with air mobility, and add to the ‘elite infantry’ stationed there which can serve as a rapid reaction force. However, VDV units have been rotating through Crimea for years now, so this is less of a force increase and more institutionalizing that which has already been taking place.

          171th VDV Regiment
          171st Independent Battalion receiving its honorary title, establishing it in Crimea

          The second tidbit of information regards the deployment of a 4th S-400 battalion to Dzhankoi in Crimea, which likely completes the rearmament of the 18th and 12th air defense regiments based there (31st air defense division within the 4th Air and Air Defense Army of the Southern Military District). The first S-400 battalion was deployed January 2017 in Feodosia, the second January 2018 in Sevastopol, and a third in September 2018 in Yevpatoria. The S-400 replaces the older S-300 systems deployed to Crimea, and is part of a general wave of modernization which prioritized the Southern Military District. Alongside S-400 deployments one can find Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters, and Su-34 bombers steadily replacing Su-24s and older Su-27s in the Russian Aerospace Forces and naval aviation units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

          S-400 in Crimea.jpg
          The 2nd Russian S-400 battalion set deployed to Crimea early this year

          There is cause for concern that long term Russia may need to resolve the fresh water crisis in Crimea, but no way to know how this situation will play out in the coming year. In May 2014 Ukraine blocked off the water supply from the Crimea-Dnepr canal that links the Dnepr river to the peninsula. Although Russia was able to quickly build an ‘energy bridge’ to supply power, and Kerch strait bridge officially opened May 2018 to commercial traffic, the water problem remains a potential cause of conflict (Jane’s here briefly summarizes the issue: Ukraine supplied 86% of Crimea’s water, and this summer there was an acute water shortage in about 20% of the peninsula). The fresh water issue is problematic, but I’ve found it to be overly spun as the next “land bridge to Crimea” narrative. The only sort of offensive military operation that makes sense is a thrust to the Dnepr river, which seizes the entire canal, and the southern half of Ukraine’s Kherson region. There is no way to take part of the canal since it is easily blocked at any point south of the river itself. In scope, this is about a 65-70km push, which is equivalent to depth of territory seized in the Donbas region. Kherson may be relatively easy to cut off, but it would require a substantial number of forces to effect this kind of operation and earn Russia an entire new host of problems.

          Kherson map.JPG
          Basic map with the path of the Dnepr-Crimea canal indicated
          Kherson vector
          ~65km from the Crimean border to the Dnepr river to get to the starting point of the canal (beyond which it cannot be blocked)

          Taking Kherson, like taking most any other Ukrainian region, is well within the realm of Russian military capability, but it would mean inheriting a new region which is also dependent on other parts of Ukraine. One of the obvious challenges Russia has faced in taking pieces of Ukraine is that it may seem easy to to dismember a country on a map, but in reality a state is full of integrated pieces that depend on each other for electricity, water, road networks, trade, supply of food, etc. Resolving the fresh water problem in Crimea by taking another region that would itself bring new supply challenges, and while it could probably be done relatively quickly, it would also require a substantial force build up and subsequent deployment. There are no ‘separatist’ or other volunteer battalions ready to take over internal security, man block posts, and create an entirely new line of control with Ukrainian forces. Also, there is the small matter than absent a ‘Kherson People’s Republic’ movement, there are no proxy forces behind which Russia can mask its invasion, and so this would have to be an overt, outright, and bloody business from the very start.

          Russia could build up forces in Crimea relatively quickly, combining an air mobile airborne operation with a ground assault, but there would be indications and warnings. Unlike in February-March 2014, the West has a lot of technical and human resources now focused on the Russian problem set. Ground force movements, airborne unit shifts, forward deployment of several battalion tactical groups in Crimea, etc. These are regularly recorded by people, spotters, social media, and traditional news. Right now there is no evidence of such troop movements, though one should not discount a military solution to the water issue in 2019, but the entire scenario remains in the realm of low probability events.

          Issue #3 Russian warnings and threats

          Finally, Russian press statements by Lavrov, Naryshkin, Maria Zakharova are perhaps the most alarming, since they indicate a readiness of Russian forces to see through an escalation with Ukraine in the coming weeks or months. This of course brings us into the realm of political analysis and out of the world of military analysis. These warnings indicate the expectation of a conflict, with Russia positioning Ukraine as a the provocateur, something that’s become rote in Russian political statements. The messaging is probably not meant for domestic audiences, or Ukrainian audiences, but for the West, which Russian elites believe can heavily influence Ukrainian decision making. As such, they represent a pattern of thinking reminiscent of the run up to the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, reflecting the Russian perception that they can threaten the potential risk of escalation in order to get the United States to lean on what Moscow sees as Washington’s client state.

          Russians do see Poroshenko as a provocateur, expecting him to “pull something” in the run up to the election, and engage in military posturing. Like many policymakers in the West, they are subscribers to diversionary war theory, which has little empirical basis, but is very much in vogue with political decision makers. Moscow thinks that Poroshenko needs Western attention on Ukraine, and the cheapest way Ukraine can achieve that is with a narrative that draws attention to the ongoing ‘Russian threat.’ Hence warnings of imminent danger tend to crop up every fall around November-December time. Putting aside the likelihood that Russia itself will execute some of the more dire plans discussed above, there is little incentive for Russia to launch any attack during the election as it would only benefit Poroshenko’s cause, in every scenario. That doesn’t mean it wont happen, because bounded rationality leads to outcomes akin to November 25th, i.e. one should not ignore the likely outcome of a chain of events that results in a conflict spiral between these two actors, but there is no sign that Russia intends to intervene in Ukrainian politics via overt military means.

          There is a strong possibility of miscalculation, with January 2019 being different than previous artillery duels and skirmishes that have followed the last major operation in February-March 2015 (Battle of Debaltseve). Ukrainian forces have been slowly gaining ground in the ‘grey zone’ that exists between the two sides respective positions along the line of control in the Donbas. These steady gains are often referenced as the ‘creeping offensive’ to retake lost territory, leading to artillery duels with Russian backed separatists. Separatist units are organized and supported with logistics, technical capabilities like EW, air defense, and other equipment, by a contingent of Russian regulars in Ukraine stationed further behind the line of control. The daily exchanges of indirect fire often flare up after the holiday truce in January, particularly when one side decides to creep into the no man’s land between them, and shift the battle lines.

          Russian controlled separatists have also played this game with Ukrainian forces for several years now, making small shifts in the line over the years. It’s what keeps this a hot war rather than a frozen conflict. However, there is a sense that Russia is spoiling for a fight – just one person’s opinion. Russian public statements are designed to paint them as the reasonable party seeking to deter potential Ukrainian adventurism, but in truth, it feels like Moscow is looking to bloody Ukraine at the first available opportunity.

          It could be vengeance for Ukraine gaining autocephaly, splitting from the Russian orthodox church, or it could be that Moscow wants to show that it is unconstrained and feels free to use the military toolkit. The November 25th naval skirmish with the Russian FSB border guard service demonstrated that when pressed to make decisions in the moment, the Russian leadership turned what could have been a minor incident into a serious clash, overt, heavy handed, with disproportionate use of force. This is at best personal inference, but it is unlikely that Russia is planning an offensive operation to seize Kherson. It is more probable that Moscow is spoiling for a fight with Ukraine, with the intent of handing Ukraine and by proxy, the United States, a small but politically consequential military defeat.

           

           

          The Kerch strait naval skirmish

          Michael Kofman7 Comments

          After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

          On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

          Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

          towing command ship

          On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

          One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

          Don ramming.jpg

          Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

          Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

          original

          Another shot

          Izumrud

          Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

          blocked strait.jpg

          After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

          Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

          damaged Berdyansk.jpg

          Ships parked at Kerch

          parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

          Some thoughts –

          The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

          Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

          That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

          Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

          12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

          Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

          Michael Kofman3 Comments

          On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

          Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

          PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

          PD-50 sinking.jpg

          Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

          PD-50 on a good day

          PD-50 dry dock

          According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

          Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

          Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

          That looks like it may be the crane

          Crane.jpg

          A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

          Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

          Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

          As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

          This is PD-50 now

          PD-50 gone

          The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

          Assessing Vostok-2018

          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

          I’d like to close out coverage of Vostok 2018 with a brief summary and analysis of the exercise, which was written for Oxford’s CCW Russia Brief, Issue 3. I strongly recommend the issue briefs from Oxford’s changing character of war program, which feature some of the best experts on the Russian armed forces in the field.

          Russia’s annual strategic exercises offer an important window into the evolution of the Russian armed forces, their ability to mobilize, deploy, and command large groupings of forces, together with the latest capabilities. The recently held Vostok-2018 (September 11-17), which as the name suggests focused on the Russian Eastern Military District, offered an important deviation from the typically held command-staff strategic exercise which the Russian General Staff organises every September. In a standard exercise, an operational-strategic command (OSK) takes in forces from other districts and fields them in a particular strategic direction, organizing a hypothetical fight together with the General Staff in the theatre of military operations (TVD). But in 2018, Vostok was changed into strategic manoeuvers. Under this framework two military districts, Central and Eastern, divided into opposing forces to conduct manoeuvers in different strategic directions. China’s official involvement in the annual exercises, which is a first, made the event politically significant in Sino-Russian relations, and a mutually agreed upon political signal send by both sides to international observers.

          Unlike previous such exercises, Vostok-2010 and 2014, this event represents more of an “in-progress report” for the Russian armed forces. When he was first appointed Chief of General Staff in late 2012, Valery Gerasimov was dismayed with the Russian armed forces inability to move across the country and effectively engage in drills or training events at ranges distant from their home garrisons. The recently reformed military had become a permanent standing force, but it had little experience or credibility in being able to deploy to Russia’s borders in the event of conflict and successfully engage an adversary. The high tempo of snap readiness checks, drills, joint exercises, together with modernization investments under the State Armament Program, were meant to turn the Russian armed forces into a combat credible force, able to effectively deter large scale conventional conflict. Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than the Russian Far East, a vast region that is sparsely populated and lacks much transportation infrastructure.

          Vostok-2018 was also as an opportunity for political signalling, featuring a large review of forces and photo opportunities similar to that of Zapad-1981. Russian pronouncements that the exercise would feature 297,000 soldiers – which would have been fully a third of the entire Russian military – was meant to underscore the state’s resilience and undiminished military potential in the face of political and economic pressure from the United States.

          In reality, the exercise was rather smaller, probably not exceeding 50,000 participants (this is a guesstimate, use at your own risk) in the actual exercises, with most of the major events taking place at the Tsugol training range. The official numbers given likely represent the total forces on paper from the Central and Eastern Military Districts: often the Russian General Staff will count an entire brigade or division as having participated even when their contribution is only one unit. A large number of units were raised on alert on August 20th, in advance of the exercise, but few had any connection to the actual events. Official statements by Russian commanders also suggest that the exercise was much smaller in reality: Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), stated that 7,000 troops participated at Tsugol from his district. Together with aviation and airborne units sent, it is unlikely that the CMD’s involvement exceeded 15,000-20,000 soldiers.

          The reason for dramatically inflated figures for every Vostok exercise is straightforward: Moscow is unconcerned that announcing fantastical figures would engender a security dilemma in the region. Moreover, political agreements governing military exercises in Europe such as the Vienna Document have no jurisdiction east of the Ural mountains. As such, the Russian leadership can count unit participation however it likes, without stoking NATO fears. At the same time, including China in the exercise was a prudent measure to alleviate any inherent suspicions Beijing might have that these strategic manoeuvers were aimed at them, or a manifestation of Russian security apprehensions. Since most of the exercise events took place in Zabaykalsky Krai, a land-locked region bordering China and Mongolia, this was an important precaution. Moscow’s effort at engaging the Chinese military is quite clever, intended to foster greater partnership, engendering stronger military ties, while at the same time demonstrating to their strategic partners the capability of the Russian armed forces in an effort to bolster coercive credibility.

          Vostok featured elements of both contact and non-contact warfare, from a series of attack, defence and flanking manoeuvers by battalion tactical groups, to blunting massed aerospace attacks, and effecting precision strikes against critical infrastructure at operational depths. Going into the exercise Valery Gerasimov said he wanted to see non-standard solutions practiced, code for the Chief of General Staff not wishing to see Russian units arrive at ranges to execute pre-rehearsed manoeuvers, i.e. put on a five-day bit of military theatre for him and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu. It remains unclear whether or not he got what he wanted, but Shoigu indicated this type of exercise might be held every five years, pegged to implementation of the State Armament Program, the implication being that strategic manoeuvers would be used as a form of in-process review and reflection on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

          Although every strategic exercise is designed to be a stress test for the Russian armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, Vostok had four principal areas of focus: logistics, mobilization, command and control, and tactical innovation. Emphasis was placed on the logistics, combat service support, and combat engineer components of the Russian armed forces. Command and control of forces in combined arms manoeuver, along with integration with other services remains a prominent feature, as does experimentation with the force structure itself. The Russian military continues to work on integrating recon-strike and recon-fire contours, connecting targeting in real time from drones, soldiers or aircraft, with artillery fires at the tactical level or strike assets distributed among the services. There was also a mobilization component aimed at taking in reservists to help fill out combat service support units and integrating civilian authorities into the exercise under the model that ‘everyone fights’.

          Vostok was spread across five combined arms ranges, four air and air defence ranges, and several coastal regions in the Russian Far East. Ground force exercises featured large attacks with artillery and MLRS systems with targeting and battle damage assessments done via drone systems. River fording, bridging, masking of units with smoke and aerosol were all parts of the exercise to simulate the logistical difficulty of getting to the battlefield while under fire. Engineers also setup false targets, inflatable dummy units, practicing various forms of deception on the battlefield. The strategic nuclear component of the exercise involved flights by Tu-95MS bombers, which cut through the U.S. air defence identification zone, earning a free F-22 fighter escort before returning to fire cruise missiles at target ranges in Russia.

          Efforts at innovation could be seen in the attempt by the airborne forces to create a new type of air assault detachment, together with an airmobile reserve based on heavy transport helicopters and light vehicles. Colonel General Andrei Serduykov, commander of Russia’s airborne forces, was trying new things this year by assembling battalions from three independent air assault brigades to practice large scale heli-borne attacks, some involved as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two large transport Mi-26 helicopters in the action. The Russian airborne also conducted a sizable parachute drop, using 25 transports to deliver 700 soldiers and 51 BMD infantry fighting vehicles, while specialized light utility units were brought in as a ready reserve for the action. Russia’s Northern Fleet similarly brought a new force mix, including naval infantry and specialized units from its Arctic brigade, some of which conducted a raid in depth across as much as 270km of terrain.

          China’s participation included some 3,200 soldiers mounted on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs and self-propelled artillery, together with 6 aircraft and 24 helicopters. Interactions between Russian and Chinese forces at the tactical level, assuming any serious collaboration even took place, seemed of lower import than the utility of this event as a form of political signalling. China’s Minister of Defence, Wei Fenghe, highlighted the importance of Sino-Russian cooperation at the operational and strategic level, while Shoigu announced that they had agreed to hold exercises regularly in the future. In a subsequent interview, Shoigu referred to the Chinese participants as allies. While it is difficult to interpret Vostok, or any other exercise, as a proof of a budding Sino-Russian entente, it is clear the two countries seek to demonstrate that they do not see each other as a threat.

          While Western policymakers typically describe alliance formation as some sort of state-level dating, where relationships are formed based on trust, common values, similar political systems and so on, in reality this has little semblance to the history of how powers actually form alliances. Alliance formation behaviour takes place as a form of balancing behaviour in response to threats, therefore the only logical catalyst for a Sino-Russian entente is the threat posed by the United States, and the extent to which the two countries see their respective challenges as worth the risk and liability of closer cooperation. Having identified both countries as great power competitors in the National Defense Strategy, and practical measures to intensify the confrontation in economic and military domains, Washington has taken important steps to further enhance cooperation between its disparate adversaries.

          Vostok-2018 strategic manoeuvers illustrate that while much progress remains to be made in improving the capability and capacity of the Russian armed forces, the military as a whole is increasingly greater than the sum of its parts, and certainly much improved from its relatively raw state in 2012-2013. Meanwhile Russian policy has become rather more deft in managing their ‘strategic partnership’ with China, seeking to leverage military events as part of a boarder effort to slowly and incrementally pull the latter into a balancing entente against the United States.

           

          Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

          Michael Kofman2 Comments

          Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

          Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

          This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

          Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

          time to go home.jpg

          Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

          VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

          Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

          Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

          exercise table

           

          Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

          Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

          Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

          BTR-82As.jpg

          Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

          Egvekinot.JPG

          naval infantry 2.JPG

          Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

          Vostok 2018 Days 5-6 (September 15-16)

          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

          Vostok 2018 Days 5 and 6

          The weekend was relatively quiet. Comparably few activities took place as the forces involved were either taking a break, or perhaps there was a media blackout compared to the information flowing about the first several days. For a brief period the MoD main website was down, which was unusual. However, other news sources which typically cover the exercises reflected a dearth of information for September 15-16. I’ve decided to group the events of both days into one post here. The main exercises over the weekend included another series of bombing raids by Russian aerospace forces, a motor rifle battalion assault at Tsugol, complex river crossing exercises supported by engineer and CBRN troops, and two naval exercises held by the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

          VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-22M3s conducted another series of air raids at a training range in Zabaikal, practicing bombing runs against various targets simulating an enemy air base. It reads like this was another unguided bombing exercise, dropping FAB-500s and 250s. The precision guided munitions tend to be reserved for Syria, so they tend not to waste them on exercises. Ten air crews were involved in the event, though unclear if they all had their own individual platforms, i.e. 10 bombers, or were rotated through a smaller number of aircraft.

          Tu-22M3.JPG

          Meanwhile Russian Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters took on the role of incoming enemy fighters. They approached the integrated air defenses setup by Eastern MD, and not did not respond to ground control requests for identification. Mig-31BM and Su-35s fighters were scrambled to intercept, simulating air combat at different ranges, including short range dog fighting. The Su-30SMs were defeated by Eastern MD’s air superiority fighters.

          Eastern MD – There was another motor rifle and armored assault at Tsugol, with T-62s setup as targets representing the opposing force. Several companies of T-72B1 tanks, in conjunction with BMP-2s conducted an attack across the range.

          Motor rifle and armored assault.JPG

          Meanwhile Russian military police units, mounted on Typhoon vehicles, detected and captured  a group of infiltrators who sought to gain access to the training range.

          MPs.JPG

          CBRN units setup smoke and aerosol cover for a river crossing exercise, where T-72 tanks forded the river with snorkels, while other vehicles were transported via specialized amphibious carriers. Engineer and sapper units established a pontoon bridge for tanks and BMPs to drive over. The exercise seems based around a motor rifle battalion, with helicopter support, effecting a river crossing both via bridge and in shallow places with its own means.

          Units positioned preparing to cross.JPG

          pontoon bridge.JPG

          Other exercises of note: Russia’s Ministry of Emergencies held a joint exercise with Chinese counterparts, simulating a ship collision at a bridge being constructed across the Amur River. The exercise consisted of a Chinese passenger ship colliding with a Russian ship working on the bridge. Both sides worked together to put out a fire on the Chinese ship, evacuate passengers, and rescue others from the water. Russian Be-200 firefighting aircraft and Mi-8s  belonging to the Ministry were involved, with about 300 people all together engaged in this exercise. I found the event interesting simply because it reflects another level of cooperation between Russian and Chinese ministries along the border outside of the military dimension.

          The Baltic Fleet has also been busy, though their activities doubtfully have anything to do with Vostok 2018. About 25 ships, 30 aircraft, helicopters, drones, and 50 pieces of equipment were involved in conducting an amphibious landing at Khmelevka. Russian Su-24 + Su-30SM fixed wing aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters conducted a strike against enemy positions, so that naval infantry units could then land and seize the beach. Ships involved included LSTs Aleksandr Shabalin, Korolev, Minsk, three smaller landing boats from project 21820, and support by three project 20380 corvettes (Stereguschiy). The landing force consisted of about 30 BTR-82A, which is consistent with what about 3 LSTs can carry, though at the same time they also air lifted several naval infantry units behind enemy lines – presumably via Ka-27 helicopters which is typically how these forces effect an amphibious assault.

          Northern Fleet – The Northern Fleet ran an anti-submarine warfare exercise, with its principal combatant Vice Admiral Kulakov (Udaloy-class) leading the submarine hunt. Their scenario involved using different systems to hunt for the submarine, such as onboard sonar and the ship’s Ka-27PL helicopter. Kulakov practiced torpedo and depth charge attacks, along with evading torpedo attacks fired by the opposing submarine.

          Ka-27 deploying dipping sonar

          dipping sonar.JPG

          Pacific Fleet – Naval Infantry conducted an assault to enable a larger amphibious force to land near the Klerk training range on Primoriye. This is an interesting exercise in that they were working together VKS Aerospace Forces, who supported their attack, along with ships from the Pacific Fleet, combat aviation, artillery, sappers, and air defense units. Supposedly the next phase of this exercise will involve an air assault brigade of VDV Airborne conducting a similar type of attack, though it seems things are winding down. The Eastern MD is already looking to an upcoming joint exercise with Mongolian troops under a different title.

          Some additional pictures of note:

          CBRN units treating tanks

          treating tanks.JPG

          Tank sanitation checkpoint

          sanitizing T-72s.JPG

          T-72 snorkeling

          Loch Ness T-72.JPG

           

          Vostok 2018 Day 4 (September 14)

          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

          Vostok Day 4

          Most of the exercises are taking place at Tsugol and Telemba, but there was word today of various live fire events from a few of the other ranges. Elements of 5th CAA are at Bikinskiy, and the air force is doing most of its bombing runs at Mukhor-Kondui. More word from the two fleets, the Northern Fleet is exercising in the Bering Sea, while the Pacific Fleet has launched a surface action group together with support ships and a number of smaller vessels. Less news from the airborne on this day, but some interesting simulations among air defense forces, CBRN troops, and engineer units. Across the ranges where most of the forces are staged the day was taken up by artillery and MLRS fires, together with combat maneuvers by motor rifle battalions.

          VKS Aerospace Forces – At Tusgol, Russia employed A-50U (AWACS system) in conjunction with Mig-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-30SMs conducting combat air patrols and simulating intercepts. Meanwhile at Mukhor-Kondui, another  range with targets for the air force, Russia’s air force conducted several air strikes with mostly unguided munitions. Including about 30 aircraft consisting of Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, and Su-25s. Their target was a column of enemy armor and artillery on the march. Coordinates and targeting relayed by Su-24MP.

          Su-25s about to fire unguided rockets (Mukhor-Kondui)

          Su-25s.JPG

          Followed by bombing passes from Su-30SM and Su-24 bombers

          Su-30sm.JPG

          Some word on the earlier air strike with cruise missiles, IZ reported it as 4xTu-95MS and 6xTu-22M3 participating. The Tu-95MS flight in the first two days of the exercise clearly cut through the Alaska air identification zone for the United States, as F-22s were sent up to greet them. The need for air refueling during this flight now makes sense since they seemingly made a large lap before firing missiles at the target range.

          F-22 and Tu-95MS.JPG

          VDV Airborne – Seems they conducted an airborne drop of one battalion, together with a heliborne assault with soldiers repelling. I honestly can’t say if this took place on the 14th, or if the photos are from the 13th. Part of the problem is some nice people seem to have taken down the Russian MoD website making it a bit difficult to compare announcements and images from the two days.

          airborne repelling.jpg

          Eastern MD – CBRN troops simulated an emergency chemical cleanup whereby several railcars carrying dangerous/toxic chemicals spilled their load, presumably onto the roadway and the surrounding area. Supposedly about 1,500 CBRN troops, and 300 pieces of equipment are taking part in the exercises, using RHM-6 chemical detector systems, and RPM-2 radiological detectors. Engineer units also simulated a natural and/or man-made disaster, testing their ability to manage flooding, evacuation of the local population, dealing with unexploded ordnance, etc. About 350 soldiers listed for this one, with 80 pieces of equipment including excavators, cranes, floating transports, etc.

          At Telemba range, Col Tikhonov, commander of 76th Air Defense division, highlighted the use of air defense targets designed to simulate small radar profiles, i.e. low observation aircraft and cruise missiles. Not only did they use the typical dummy missiles, and conventional targets, but they wanted to replicate a large scale aerospace attack with cruise missiles. The addition of targets with small radar cross sections seems new  compared to previous exercises.

          At Tsugol there was a sizable artillery and MLRS live fire exercise, different types of self-propelled and towed artillery involved, together with BM-21 and BM-27 MLRS.

          2s3 firing.jpg

          Tsugol BM-27 firing.JPG

          At Bikinskyi range, in Khabarovsk, a motor rifle unit of the 5th CAA stopped an advancing opposing force. Air defense units assigned to them, including ZSU-23-4 shilka, and Igla manpads, were fired to simulate defending against enemy air power. Artillery units with BM-21 Grad were similarly engaged in supporting the defending motor rifle formation. All together at this range they are listing 200 pieces of equipment, and 1700 troops. The number suggests that this is a battalion tactical group, with short range air defense and MLRS units assigned to it.

          Elements of 5th CAA

          5th CAA.JPG

          This is rather small by the way, and I suspect at the end of all the announcements, if we add up all the troops listed as participating at the individual ranges over the period of these eight days, we’re going to have a hard time coming up not only with 300,000 but probably with anything approaching 50,000-70,000. Recalling we have 5 combined arms ranges, 4 air defense ranges, and two gulfs as the overall area of the exercise.

          tanks at Tsugol.jpg

          As an aside, there are several exercises, annual certification checks, and live fire drills going on in other military districts. At the same time, the Southern MD is hosting a sizable exercise with about 5,000 troops, including air defense, artillery, missile, and air force units. About 500 pieces of artillery, MLRS, listed, including BM-21, BM-27, BM-30, Tulpan 240mm mortar, Iskander-M, and several ships participating. About 20 fixed and rotary wing aviation involved in this exercise. Black Sea Fleet coastal defense forces (ground forces part of its army corps) held several smaller exercises of their own, simulating defense against diversionary forces attacking its bases. Dvornikov is placing emphasis on working out the recon-strike contour, command and control across his district for employing long range firepower, i.e. cruise missiles and the like at operational ranges. It seems he’s trying to bring experience from the Syrian war to the district.

          Pacific Fleet – Several ships from the fleet escorted a Russian squadron near the Sea of Okhotsk. Varyag (Slava-class guided missile cruiser), together with Bystruy (Sov destroyer), two  Udaloy class large anti-submarine warfare ships and other smaller vessels served as escorts to Irtysh, a hospital ship, and several LSTs. The SAG seems to consist of 2x Udaloy, 1x Sov, and 1xSlava-class with a few support ships and LSTs. The exercise involved changing formation, arraying the surface action group for air defense, signaling, C2, and anti-submarine warfare. Ka-27 helicopters carried onboard the larger combatants also participated in the exercise. All together about 15-20 ships from the Pacific Fleet are listed for this exercise. I say 15-20 because Russian MoD announcements can’t agree whether it was 15 or 20, depending on which one you read.

          Pacific SAG

          Pacific Fleet.JPG

          Northern Fleet – Elements of the Northern Fleet’s specialized Arctic brigade, which were dropped off two days ago on Chukotka, marched from their landing point to the Pacific coastline, i.e. they drove 270km on their articulated DT-10P vehicles over the course of two days. Along the way they practiced raiding enemy formations, some live fire drills, etc. This is an interesting exercise, noting that the small surface action group sent by the Northern Fleet has been traveling since August 8th, conducting multiple landings with both naval infantry and the arctic brigade detachment. The rest of the surface action group spent this day in the Bering Sea, practicing search and rescue operations. Their mission was to aid a ship in distress along the northern sea route. Kulakov (Udaloy-class) conducted search operations with its Ka-27 onboard helicopter, which then practiced evacuating individuals from the supposed vessel, together with a rescue party launched from the ship on small high speed boats. Meanwhile their large tug, Pamir, and the diesel-electric ice breaker Ilya Muromets, practiced firefighting at sea.

          Kulakov launching Ka-27

          Kulakov

          Ilya Muromets firefighting together with the large ocean going tug

          firefighting.JPG

          I would note that today the Russian MoD website appears to be down, and I would bet a good deal of money that it is likely due to a DDOS attack.

          Some additional photos of note:

          Russian and PLA forces coordinating something

          lost in translation

          The display signs at Tsugol – this seems to be the Chinese contingent section

          best friends forever.jpg

          Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)

          Michael Kofman2 Comments

          Russian and Chinese leadership at Tsygol range opened up Phase 2 of the exercise with a large review of forces. The optics were clearly meant to rekindle the images of Zapad-1981, with numerous vehicles and infantry arrayed in parade formation on the grounds of the range. Indeed the display was quite large, and it seemed clear by the number of Chinese tanks, SPA, wheeled and other vehicles that probably about 3,000 troops and several hundred pieces of equipment did actually come to join Russia in these strategic maneuvers. Judging by the reporting, it is likely most of the drills during Vostok are taking place at Tsygol and Telemba, i.e. it’s quite difficult to picture Vostok being all that large as an exercise. Right now, going off of fairly little (but still a lot more honest than 300,000), around 50,000 seems a much more reasonable number of participants.

          DigitalGlobe had good satellite photos of some of the parade grounds at the range and exercises for a different perspective.

          satellite

          Of course Putin came to look through binoculars, because it wouldn’t be a strategic exercise otherwise. Note unlike in Zapad, where Putin and Lukashenko were not together in the same command center, we can see the Chinese counterparts sitting further along the table.

          Putin came.JPG

          More photos can be found on BMPD. But here’s s sample of some of the gear Chinese brought with them.

          Chinese tanks.jpg

          Chinese forces.jpg

          As this is the opening of Phase 2, most of the activity was characterized by VDV air assaults, VKS bombing missions, combined arms artillery and motor rifle unit actions. Strong emphasis on employment of drones, integrated C2, and more ‘jointness’ so to speak between ground, airborne, and VKS forces. VDV seems to be conducted several force structure and air assault experiments, including with new light high mobility vehicles, creating a air mobile reserve, etc. Ground units are mostly doing what they do best, lots of artillery and MLRS fire, armored assault, etc.

          Vostok 2018 military exercise in Transbaikal Territory, Russia

          VDV Airborne – More than 700 soldiers and 51 vehicles (BMD-2) made a parachutte jump at Tsygol range. At the Belaya airfield near Irkutsk, a detachment of the Ulan-Ude air assault brigade loaded 25 Il-76MD transports. They were then air lifted ~1000km towards Zabaikal where they conducted a jump at 600 meters. The scenario was air assault and seizure of an enemy airfield. All together about 6000 VDV  and 900 pieces of equipment are taking part in Vostok, in earlier posts I mentioned these are units from 3 independent air assault brigades, and two additional special detachments.

          VDV Ulan Ude assault brigade.JPG

          As part of the scenario unfolding at Tsygol range, an air mobile battalion belonging to the 31st independent air assault brigade conducted an air assault on an enemy command center, with air support.  About 40 helicopters of Mi-8AMTSh were used (supposed capacity 26 soldiers), two Mi-26 helicopters, and more than 10 Mi-24 helicopters in support. They are billing this exercise as an experiment of a ‘new type’ of air assault detachment. There was also a mobile reserve in support of this assault, composed of light wheeled high mobility vehicles (pickups). Mi-26s delivered 8 of these light pickups, together with 4 armored Rys light vehicles equipped with Kornet ATGMs and Kord heavy machine guns.

          airborne ATVs.JPG

          VKS Aerospace Forces – About 40 bombers and strike fixed wing aircraft were used in an attack on opposing ground forces, key infrastructure, and staged reserves. Units involved fielded Tu-22M3, Su-34, Su-24, and Su-25SM strike aircraft. Air cover provided by Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters. Strikes were coordinated via ground based C2 system Strelets, and Orlan-10 drones.

          Tu-22M3.JPG

          Eastern MD – Other activities of note: CBRN units used smoke and aerosol covers on more than 60 sq km, covering moving units and critical infrastructure – equipment used includes TDA-3K smoke machines, and RP3-8x aerosols. Anti-tank units belonging to a battalion tactical group of motor rifle and artillery units simulated strikes against enemy armor and fortified positions with 130mm Shturm-S ATGMs and Konkurs-M. Sapper units plan to use not only UR-77 Meteorit, BMP-3M, but also Uran-6 and Uran-9 UGVs for demining.

          Tsygol Range – Seven artillery battalions created a rolling artillery barrage ahead of an advance, covering a line of ~3000 meters. A motor rifle battalion advanced, and there are photos of host of T-72B1 tanks engaged in a live fire exercise as part of this maneuver. They employed more than 150 pieces of artillery, including 2s3, 2s1, 2s19, Giatsint, and Pion. Meanwhile Iskander-M units fired two cruise missiles at critically important targets, at the same time a large artillery and MLRS barrage hit the opposing force. All together they employed 2 Iskander TELs, 52 MLRS systems, and 72 tube artillery. Targeting for the strike conducted via an air based system called Klever, with Su-24MP recon aviation, and Orlan-10 drones – they used live video feed for battle damage assessment. In one scenario, Russian and Chinese artillery units simultaneously attacked enemy forward command posts. Russian BM-27 Uragan were employed together with Chinese Type-81 MLRS.

          Motor rifle bttn.JPG

          Artillery units will also practice employing precision guided munitions called Krasnopol, these will be fired by MSTA-S and 2s3 Akatsiya, Granat-4 short range drones are to be used for targeting. Krasnopol is a 152mm semi-active laser guided munition which can be used by most self-propelled and towed artillery.

          life fire.jpg

          Of course a detachment of Terminator BMPT, heavy tank support vehicles will make another debut at Tsygol, undoubtedly in the hope that someone will buy them. They were first  featured in Zapad 2017 in desert camo paint, undoubtedly marketed towards a certain set of countries that like to buy equipment in such colors.

          Interesting photos emerged of drone companies, fielding both Orlan-10s, but also counter drone hand held weapons, that are worth noting.

          drone company.JPG

          counter drone gun.jpg

          Not much from the two fleets today, except that the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean is still there, and recently concluded a first time joint exercise with Russian VKS. A sizable grouping of ships and a few submarines remains there.

          Some additional photos of note:

          Parachute jump skeptic

          in airborne now.JPG

          Of course you can’t assault an enemy airbase without taking a photo first

          can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo.JPG

          And a time honored tradition emerging from modern exercises, people pointing at screens:

          pointing at screens.jpg

           

          Back to top
          #####EOF##### Joe Goodings – 44CON

          Joe Goodings

          default
          Joe Goodings is a professional problem solver in information, process, and communications areas as relates to ICT.
          He started using technology at an early age as a hobby and has now made a career out of it.Highlights have included analysing and programming software for the British legal system; running some of the first courses on ‘what is the internet and what can it do’ for a further education college; and setting up some of the first internet connections and implementing its use; sending pictures from a camera 1 mile via pre 802.11b wifi connection; introducing SAN storage and virtualization to an NGO, and all the time keeping all the systems and the people safe and secure.

          Over the last 17 years he has been using technology to further the aims of the third sector and sharing his experiences wherever possible.

          Joe has presented at:
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          #####EOF##### Jaime Cochran – 44CON

          Jaime Cochran

          default Twitter: @asshurtACKFlags
          Website: www.rustleleague.com
          Jaime Cochran has been involved in the information security scene for almost fifteen years. In the late 1990’s, she successfully wrote a zero-day script that compromised almost one thousand computers in an hour. This attack, being a novel feat at the time, was highlighted in several news articles around the world. Next, Jaime (along with two fellow hackers) would become infamous in South Korea after being interviewed on national television regarding the ability to hack into nuclear power plant sites. From humble beginnings writing exploits in C and assembly, Jaime has evolved into a high level thinker and driving force in the information security ethics scene. Her interest today is to evaluate the security complexities that hinder American and World society, and how relevant failures may be adequately rectified through social and technological change.

          Jaime has presented at:

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          #####EOF##### Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces – Russia Military Analysis

          Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

          Michael Kofman4 Comments

          Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

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          The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

          Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

          The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

          can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

          And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

           

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          Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

          There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

          VDV praciting loading

          Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

          Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

          airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

          Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

          Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

          These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

          The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

          T62 vdv.jpg
          VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

          Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

          But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

          4 thoughts on “Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces”

          1. Thank you for your articles. I’ve spent a few hours enjoying your material about Vostok 2018 and the VDV. Your analysis is balanced, well-informed and free of pro and anti Russia hysteria common through most of the open source Russian watcher community.

            Denis Mokrushin (twower blog) has tracked announcements from the Russian MoD about kontraktnik numbers over the last few years. He notes that it seems they have hit a wall at just under 400,000 contract soldiers. At the same time, the number of draftees seems to be declining slightly even though Russia has passed the worst of its demographic black hole. How are they staffing these new units? Also, can you comment on the recent announcement that the land forces are staffing 1 of 3 BTGs with draftees and keeping them away from front line combat?

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            Reply

            • There is not a demographic problem but a choice on where to spend money. Contracts are simply a question of money, if they wanted more contractors they could have them. However, with 3-5% spending sequester they have to make choices between force size, readiness, and capability.

              Draftees are declining to plan, since they want to get to a sustainable number somewhere around 220-230k. The short answer is that they will create tiered formations at 100-90-80% staffing and have to eat the manpower that way. Golts is wrong on this, predicting some return to cadre formations. Large divisions do not need 100% staffing and can be setup under mobilization model to take people in during period of threat. So I think the short answer to this question is mobilization.

              USSR had a great system for mobilization, and not so great system of command and control. The Russian military now has a great system for command and control, but largely destroyed Soviet mobilization model – no operational reserve, etc. This was always one of the unfinished pieces from the mil reforms.

              As I understand it, a brigade is only supposed to force generate 2 BTGs anyway, and the rest is its reserve. This announcement does not tell us much and I’m skeptical of official statistics, although it is useful to see that they think of the force in BTG counts and are structuring it less on number of brigades/divisions but mostly on the basis of force generation potential (unlike NATO which focuses on defense spending and excel spreadsheets that wont fight). The conscripts are there to be recruited as contractors at the end of their year. However we don’t know in a 6 regiment division how many battalions are supposed to be contract vs conscript, though we can glean that Russians don’t intend to send conscripts to fight in the initial period of war.

              Liked by 1 person

              Reply

              • Thank you for that. How many soldiers does a BTG have? Around 1,000? If so, then 2 BTGs generated from each brigade is not that much larger than a Soviet regiment. Although, a BTG is likely much better trained and equipped than a regiment. How did they come up with the idea of a BTG in the first place?

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              • 800-1200 depending, some can go up to 1500. A brigade is realistically a super sized regiment, since it has 3 maneuver battalions at its core. A BTG is exactly as good as its components are, it is a task organized formation or kampfgruppen. Most of the discussion on contractors and conscripts is rather strained by some strange notions about basic military organization and warfighting functions.

                Liked by 1 person

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            #####EOF##### Western MD – Russia Military Analysis

            Tag: Western MD

            New Russian Divisions and other units shifting to Ukraine’s borders – second look with updates

            Michael Kofman1 Comment

            Bill Gertz’s article alleging that there were “40,000” troops massing on Ukraine’s borders inspired me to take another look at where the three planned divisions, and other unit movements stand right now.  There is quite a bit of activity and leadership announcements as part of the Russian shift to what Shoigu calls the “southwestern strategic direction.”  Essentially, a containment ring is being built circumscribing Ukraine, including large unit formations in permanent garrisons to serve as a quick reaction force in the event of a conventional war.

            Some plans dating back to 2014 have already been realized, most are in progress, and several announcements are only now getting under way with completion timelines set for late 2017.  I’m underlining dates because certain people misread the May post in this blog, and I suspect other blogs on this topic, and then said that all these announced units were already in position – they are not.

            At the moment Russia does not have 40,000 troops massing on Ukraine’s borders, but principally Russia’s General Staff seems to have Ukraine in mind.  The changes in force posture are designed to deal with medium-long term scenarios rather than the current conflict.  This is a large force that can effect conventional deterrence by denial, and if need be compellence, in a future crisis with Ukraine.

            The reason for moving the 20th Army HQ back, resurrecting the 1st Tank Army, and creating a host of new units on Ukraine’s borders is fairly straightforward.  During the chaotic reforms 2009-2011 numerous units were consolidated or cut from the Western MD.  Others were moved further south or east.  In 2014 Russia had to improvise a combined staff of 20th and 58th Armies to put together two task forces on Ukraine’s borders.  That may have worked in February-April 2014, but its far from optimal, and simply will not do in a contingency where Russian forces need to intervene again.  Ukraine’s military is far larger in size and more capable relative to the hollowed out paper force that existed in spring of 2014.

            Russian staff likely fears a ‘Croatia scenario’ whereby  Ukraine cordons off the separatist republics and then builds up an army large enough to wipe them out in a few years.  With three divisions, plus several brigades, organized under two combined arms armies (CAA) headquartered nearby, they figure it will deter future Ukrainian leaders from such adventurism.  It also places Ukraine in a geographic vice, running from Yelnya to Crimea.  It is not feasible that Ukraine will build an army capable of attacking Donbass and holding Russian units on so many fronts.  The units required to attempt an ATO 2.0 (now with a real army) would leave no defenders for other vectors of Russian attack.  Each division will be a self-sustaining strike force, ensuring that Kiev does not feel confident in the ability to retake the separatist regions through force.

            A breakdown of the plans:

            1.)  10th Armored Division (presumed) in Bogychar (Voronezh oblast) – When 20th Combined Arms Army moved from Mulino in Nizhegorod Oblast to Voronezh, so did 9th Motor Rifle Brigade from Dzerzhinsk to Bogychar.  This began in February 2015.  I wrote in May of this year that 1st Independent Armored Brigade will likely assume the legacy of 10th Armored Division, a move announced in July 2015.

            10th Armor served in Easter Germany during the Cold War and returned in 1991.  In 2009 this division was turned into the 262nd Military Storage and Repair Base during the Serduykov period of consolidation and knocking down units in Western MD.  That base has a large stockpile and it looks like the 1st Armored Brigade will be needing it to become the 10th Armored Division.  All the divisions are likely to have a classic Soviet six regiment structure.  This unit will take into 2017  to form. So, this is a case of there and back again for the Russian army. Between 2009-2016 the process flow has been: 10th Div -> 262nd Base -> 1st Bde -> 10th Div.

            Here  is a nice photo of the 262nd base in Bogychar.  It’s going to get busy with 9th Bde and a new division there.

            262nd base bogychar

            2.) 144th Motor Rifle Division in Yelnya (Smolensk oblast) – The plans for this unit were essentially announced back in 23 November 2014, and in September 2015 it was confirmed that a newly formed independent motor rifle brigade will return to Yelnya.  The 144th motor rifle division was once based here after being withdrawn from Estonia, disbanded in 1998, and converted into a military warehouse base.  A new unit will assume the legacy of the 144th and become the core of the announced division.

            Early July of 2015 the MoD announced that this motor rifle division will be formed by second half of 2017 and be assigned to the 1st Tank Guards Army.  Second half of 2017 is optimistic since according to one paper the total military personnel expected by summer of 2017 is 6,000, of which 3,600 will be contract and officers.  It goes without saying that 6,000 is less than the 10,000 promised.  Not quite enough to fill six regiments of 3 motor rifle , 1 armor, 1 artillery, 1 air defense and the rest support units.  The expectation for 2016  is two battalions will arrive, and become two regiments in 2017, with plans to have an active tank field range by then.

            The photo below is just north of Yelnya. It is a snapshot from Yandex.ru, which I checked, but the actual image I borrowed from an Infonapalm post.

            Yelnya new base forming

            3.) 28th Motor Rifle Brigade in Klintsy (Bryansk Oblast), this unit is in the process of moving from Ekateriburg (Central MD) to the town of Klintsy, with lead elements arriving May 30, 2016.  A widely shared government tender, issued June 28th of this year, has shown the planned structure of the base, for what looks like a newly formed unit designated to be the 488th Motor Rifle Regiment.  This may well be the base of the division since typical Russian units are organized as brigade/battalion.  Perhaps the division itself will be headquartered further north in Yelnya, but with regiments as far south as Klintsy.  The work is slated for completion in Summer of 2017, so more than likely this unit will be stood up piecemeal over the coming year.

            0_113de82_68975f8e_orig.jpg

            Which army gets what division? TASS news agency claimed that the Yelnya division will be assigned to the 1st Tank Army, but other sources suggested the unit in Klintsy, which forms the first regiment of this division,  will belong to 20th CAA.  This makes more sense, and it would be logical for the 10th Armored Division to go to 1st Tank Army, except for the fact that in the 1990s it was part  of the 20th CAA.  Back then the 20th was based in Voronezh and if Shoigu decides to ‘set right what Serduykov once set wrong’ then all must be put back in its place.

            4.) 23rd Motor Rifle Brigade in Valuyki (Belgorod oblast) – This unit is moving from Samara in the Central MD as well, to a base planned to be completed by November 2016.  A government tender issued indicates that the construction is slated for 3,500 soldiers (size fits).  The brigade is composed of the following battalions: one armored, three motor rifle, two self-propelled artillery, one rocket artillery, two air defense and a host of supporting units.

            This is the Valuyki base under construction.

            Valuyki

            Below is a satellite shot of the facility being built.

            Vakuyki google earth image

            5.) 150th Division near Novocherkassk (Rostov Oblast) –  This division was rumored to be based on the 33rd Independent Motor Rifle Brigade, but it is also said it will be formed anew without building off of an existing brigade.  This particular division will be named after the 150th Idritsk-Berlin Division, famous for raising the flag over the Reichstag in 1945.  The 33rd Bde belongs to the 49th Army in Southern MD, however the contract servicemen were moved from Maikop to Novocherkassk, so it resides in two locations at the same time.  According to the timetable, the housing for this division is being thrown up quickly using modular construction, but it too is not planned to be finished until sometime in 2017.  Whether or not the 33rd will be subsumed into this division is an outstanding question, my view is that inevitably Russia will have to consume that brigade if they are to come up with 10,000 soldiers to staff a six regiment division.

            The thing is some news reports also suggested Millerovo as one of the locations for a part of this division, Novocherkassk and Millerovo are not that close to each other.  It is still unknown how spread out this division will be in Rostov oblast. This photo was widely circulated in April 2016 of a deputy minister inspecting housing construction for the division.  No timeline for when it will be ready, but given the photo’s date its safe to assume they’ve not materialized the division out of thin air between April and August.

            Novocherkassk house inspection generals

            This could be another shot of a base being built for the division, complete with soccer fields.

            One of the bases in Rostov region.jpg

            6.) Millerovo Airbase (Rostov Oblast) – The airbase has been around for years. Close to the Ukrainian border, and well positioned to provide air support to the ground units in the region. In December 2014 Millerovo saw the restoration of the 31st Fighter Regiment with Mig-29 variants.  Following October 2015 the unit is being upgraded to much more capable Su-30SM, a heavy multirole fighter.  The 31st has received 20 new Su-30SMs, which is no small feat given they’re in high demand across the air force and aerospace forces.  Today the base likely houses ~60 fighters, including 20 Su-30Sm, 32 Mig-29, and a mix of Su-27 variants.

            During various times the base has hosted a fair bit of ground equipment.  There is a motorized battalion assigned to it but at times satellite footage shows it hosting a decent ground contingent.  I’ve also noticed what looks like a 3D low bandwidth surveillance radar planted there on google earth, a Nebo 55G6 (Tall Rack).  No doubt has a good look over Ukrainian skies, and decent visibility on ‘low visibility’ aircraft.

            Millerovo March 2014 – fairly clear.

            Millerovo wide shot March 2014

            Millerovo August 2015 with a larger footprint being taken up by ground units.

            Millerovo wide shot August 2015

            Millerovo runway shot from March 2016 (Janes paid for AirBus sat footage)

            Millerovo march 9 2016.jpg

            7.) Rostov region bases – The region is packed with military bases, but a few in particular are quite vast, including staging bases for units arriving to the region and going on rotation.  Some call this Rostov One.  I’m unsure of where the title came from.

            Large base/staging area between Golovinka and Vodino – this is about one third of it in the shot from google on October 2014.  The base is so large that it would take three images to do it justice.  This area was setup promptly during the start of conflict with Ukraine for self explainable reasons.  Nothing was here in late 2013 except green fields according to google earth.

            staging base 3.jpg

            Up close you will find a variety of units camped out there.  In this shot we have towed artillery, but there’s plenty of MLRS, and various armored vehicle types as well.

            Up close of Rostov one

            Persianovsky, northeast of Novocherkassk is one of many bases in the Rostov region, which hosts training fields, and numerous military equipment storage areas.  This facility has been mentioned in recent articles, erroneously, because a look on google earth shows its been here for years and has not substantially expanded.  I don’t quite understand why it is making headlines.

            Persianovsky, Rostov.jpg

            Conclusion: There has been a large force shift in the southwestern direction for Russia, and incidentally, nothing comparable to speak of in the Baltic region or Kaliningrad. Today most of these plans are progressing, although some announcements are only now being realized with construction tenders.  Most of the units are at least a year out from being stood up or completing their transfer to the region.  By the second half of 2017 many of the units should be in place, though likely not at full strength.  Russian leaders speak of these divisions frequently in the press, framing them as a  response to “NATO’s build up”, but its quite clear these plans long in motion before any of NATO’s recent initiatives and their purpose has little to nothing to do with the Alliance.

            This is a network of garrisons designed to deter Ukraine from believing it could win a limited conventional war some years down the line.  The concept is centered around creating strike groups under the organizational framework of divisions.  Each formation is designed to handle an assault in their sector, taking in other units as necessary and supporting them in the fight.  With two CAAs, Russia intends to ring Ukraine sufficiently so as not to be concerned with the question of what a mid-long term high end fight might look like should a different leader arrive in Kiev and choose to retake the separatist regions by force.  The revival of these forces in Western and Southern MD is a permanent insurance policy for Moscow.

            Special thanks to the other blogs that compile news and information, in particular for this blog: BMPD and Russian Defense Policy.  Some Ukrainian sources were helpful as well.

            THE EXPENSIVE PRETZEL LOGIC OF DETERRING RUSSIA BY DENIAL

            Michael KofmanLeave a comment
            This article was published on War on the Rocks (June 23, 2016)

            The question of how to best deter Russia looms large over the upcoming NATO Summit hosted in Warsaw.  If this week’s news is anything to go by, the annual NATO gathering promises to be an eventful one.  Germany’s Foreign Minister Steinmeier recently ridiculed the alliance’s BALTOPS exercise as “saber rattling,” while U.S. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus defended the event.  The chief proposal for enhancing NATO deterrence on the table this year is the establishment of four multinational battalions to rotate through the Baltics, but NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Soltenberg said there was no “immediate threat against any NATO country from the East,” implying that despite being branded as a deterrent this is more about reassurance.  The past two weeks in the run up to the summit makes one wonder, what exactly are we doing here?

            In my critical essay last month, I challenged the current thinking on NATO’s deterrence problems in the East, taking on prominent advocates for deploying U.S. forces in the Baltic in the quest of strengthening deterrence.  Part of that article took aim at RAND’s wargame and similar arguments from deterrence proponents like Elbridge Colby.  The goal of that article was to take one-sided policy advocacy, rarely the stuff of good decision-making, and turn it into a more substantive discussion.  In this essay, I circle back to the problem of fixing NATO deterrence and the policy implications, with a crystallized and hopefully better distilled approach to the argument.

            When discussing NATO force structure, it is crucial to decide whether one can truly attain deterrence by denial. I argue that this is a fool’s errand.  The fear of a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic is simply the latest conventional wisdom, following on the foot heels of equally wrongheaded concerns that Russia would create a land bridge to Crimea in 2014 and 2015. In my view, improving deterrence by punishment is not just the smarter approach, but also the only feasible option NATO has available.

            So where do we go from here?  At first glance these perspectives are diametrically opposed.  However, a closer reading of deterrence proponents’ arguments reveals to me that we are largely in agreement on the basics.  Proponents of bolstering, enhancing, or increasing the robustness of NATO’s deterrence in the Baltics are fixated on conventional deterrence by denial.  Their intent is in the right place, but their ideas for how to solve this problem are not.  In the process of defending their views, they concede all my principal points on the nature of the fight and its problems.  The difference is then in the analysis and consequently the policy recommendations.

            The rest can be found at http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/the-expensive-pretzel-logic-of-deterring-russia-by-denial/

            Russia’s New Divisions in the West

            Michael Kofman3 Comments

            On January 12th Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the formation of three new divisions.  These are not a response to U.S. force deployments in Europe, NATO’s exercises, or the prospect of new multinational battalions in the Baltic states.  The thinking in Russia’s General Staff appears to be about a Ukrainian and Belorussian contingency, namely a second and more intense war with Ukraine or perhaps a color revolution in Belarus.  The map of where these new units will be formed is quite telling: Yelnya, Bogychar and Novocherkassk.  While NATO is busy discussing deterrence, reassurance, resolve, Russia has Ukraine on it’s mind and is implementing long discussed plans to permanently base units on Ukraine’s borders.

            From Vedomosti:

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            What we know about the new divisions is that they be formed on the basis of existing brigades, likely not composed of new units but generated from forces already deployed in the Western Military District.  The divisions are promised to number 10,000 strong and were announced piecemeal between 2014-2016, formations to be based largely on garrisoned or newly formed independent brigades already in those regions.

            1.) Bogychar, Voronezh Oblast.  This division will likely be formed on the basis of the 1st Independent Armored Brigade (not to be confused with 1st Tank Army), which will assume the legacy of the 10th Armor Division a unit that during the reforms was converted in 2009 into the 262nd military base.  The 9th independent motor rifle brigade may contribute units to this division because in February 2015 it shifted elements to Bogychar from Dzerzhinsk.  The plans for this division were first revealed in July 2015.  In September 2015 plans were also announced to build a military garrison in Belogorod for a yet undisclosed unit to be housed there, close to Ukraine’s northern border.

            2.) Yelnya, Smolensk Oblast.  The plans for this division were announced back in November 2014.  In September 2015 it was said that a newly formed motor rifle brigade will return to Yelnya, where there once used to be the 144th motor rifle division withdrawn from Germany.  That unit was disbanded in 1998 and converted into a military warehouse base.  It’s possible the new unit will assume the legacy of the 144th and become the core of the announced division. Early July of 2015 the MoD announced that this motor rifle division will be formed by June of 2017 (optimistically) and be assigned to the 1st Tank Guards Army.  It’s structure will be a classic 6 regiment build, 3 motor rifle, 1 armor, 1 artillery, 1 air defense and the rest support units.

            3.) Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.  This division is likely to be based on the 33rd Independent Motor Rifle Brigade shifted from Maikop to Rostov.  This particular division will be named after the 150th Idritsk-Berlin Division, famous for raising the flag over the Reichstag in 1945.

            strelbi_tankisty-14

            4th Kantemirovskaya Division training

            The Return

            The steady change in force posture 2013-2016 is an important overall development among Russian ground forces.  During the 2008-2012 Serdyukov military reforms, Russia reduced the number of armor and motor rifle battalions from 50 to 22 around Moscow in the Western Military District.  Most forces from Ukraine’s borders were almost completely withdrawn during the reforms, such as the 10th Armor Division that may be restored in part in Bogychar, Voronezh.

            Since 2013 Russia has seen the partial return of disbanded or relocated units to the Western Military District largely based South West of Moscow near Belarus and Ukraine.  Additional brigades were created for the 20th Army, then the 1st Tank Army was formed, and following the war in Ukraine some units were brought north from the Southern Military District.  According to Sergei Shoigu’s announcement this year 30 military units have been brought back to the region, though their basing seems largely distant from NATO’s borders.  The recent history of the Western Military District can likely be divided into two periods 2009-2013, a time of demobilization and relocation of units away from Russia’s Western borders, and 2013-2016 the return of heavy ground forces in part driven by the conflict with Ukraine.

            The most logical reason for bringing these units back is the Russian experience of having to put together Battalion Tactical Groups in early 2014 when deploying on Ukraine’s borders.  This was an improvised effort, combining the staff’s of 20th and 58th armies to plan out the deployments, which put together several powerful strike groups on Ukraine’s borders.  Despite their success, the process exposed two obvious problems for Russia’s Western MD.  First, Russia lacked permanently based units near Ukraine’s and Belarus’ borders, fully equipped with supporting elements allowing them to sustain a deployment.  The second was the absence of a larger formation that could take in battalions from other military districts and command them in the field, i.e. no divisional structure.  This made rotating units from Central MD and Eastern MD in the fight harder from a command perspective.  With three new divisions, Russia can now send battalion sized units to those commands, have them sort out logistics and support, or in a larger war serve as the center piece in a task organized strike group.

            There and back again: divisions to brigades to divisions

            What does this mean for the Russian army as a whole?  The return of divisions could be seen in line with the general walking back of Serdyukov’s reorganization, given the return of air regiments and divisions in the Air Force, back from air bases.  Similarly Shoigu restored the 4th Kantemirovskaya Armor Division and the 2nd Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division, although both are honorary division names brought back for their historical legacy.  In reality these are half divisions in the Western Military District formed around two regiments each, composing the 1st Tank Army (announced though yet to be created).  However, thinking that divisions are back in the Russian military and brigades are out is an incorrect assessment.

            Russia is not sticking wholly with brigades or switching back to divisions, instead looking at a mixed force structure.  In some ways this may be reminiscent of the U.S. Marine Corps which has brigades and battalions, divisions and regiments all within one service.  A very ‘hybrid’ organization in the parlance of modern military discourse, i.e. an eclectic mix of formations and groupings.

            One of the unanswered questions is whether these divisions will truly be based more on a Soviet division structure, composed of four combined arms regiments and a much larger combination of supporting units.  If so, it will take quite a bit of equipment and existing units to form them.  Alternatively, they are likely to look like the 4th and 2nd division, formed around two regiments and a host of supporting units.  These would be in effect expanded brigades, with division level command staff and larger supporting units (artillery, air-defense, etc.)

            Thanks to a number of sources: BMPD, Vedomosti, Gazeta RU, Topwar.ru, EagleRost, Defence.ru and others.

             

             

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            Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

            Michael Kofman4 Comments

            Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

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            The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

            Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

            The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

            can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

            And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

             

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            Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

            There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

            VDV praciting loading

            Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

            Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

            airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

            Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

            Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

            These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

            The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

            T62 vdv.jpg
            VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

            Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

            But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

            Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system

            Michael Kofman6 Comments

            I’ve recently put out an article on Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system in the well known Russian journal The New Times, under the title “ЧТО ВСЕ-ТАКИ ПУТИН ПОДАРИЛ РОССИЯНАМ НА НОВЫЙ ГОД,” but for those interested, please find the unedited English version below, which hopefully covers the subject in some depth.

            Earlier in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced at his annual address to the federal assembly that a Russian hypersonic boost-glide system, named Avangard, would start entering serial production. Subsequently on December 26th, 2018 Russian officials claimed that they had successfully conducted a test from the Dombarovsky missile site, to the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 3,760 miles away. Russia’s president proudly announced that the system as a wonderful ‘New Year’s gift’ to Russia. According to Putin’s statement, the hypersonic glide vehicle is able to conduct intensive maneuvers at speeds in excess of Mach 20, which would render it “invulnerable” to any existing or prospective missile defenses. In this article I will briefly explore the logic behind Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, recent claims of technological accomplishment, and the strategic implications of deploying such weapon systems.

            Despite rather questionable public statements about the technical characteristics of this weapon system, a number of which appear inconsistent, it is clear that Russian military science has made considerable advancements along one of the most sophisticated axis of weapons research. While claims pertaining to the readiness of this system to enter serial production, and operational service, are probably exaggerated, the more important questions are conceptual. More than likely Russia will be able to deploy a hypersonic boost glide system in the 2020s, perhaps alongside other hypersonic weapons projects, but the promise of this technology was always at the tactical-operational level of war, not strategic. This was never considered a ‘game changer’ as a system for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. If anything, Russia has invested a substantial amount of money, and years of research, in overdoing its strengths. Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of ‘Russian national achievement’ for domestic audiences, it’s unclear if this weapon system truly answers Russia’s strategic challenges in the coming decades. The question is not whether it works, or when it will work, but does it even matter?

            Hypersonic boost glide weapons function by using a multi-stage ballistic missile as the boost phase, throwing a vehicle into near earth orbit, which then descends and begins gliding at hypersonic speeds along the edge of the atmosphere. As the vehicle descends back to earth, it pulls upwards, and begins skimming the atmosphere in a ‘glide’ phase, before diving downwards onto its target at the terminal phase. Russia has spent years developing this technology under a project referenced as Object 4202, which married a series of  experimental hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Yu-71, with a liquid fueled ICBM УР-100УНТТХ (NATO designation SS-19 mod 2 Stiletto). This system builds on the Soviet Union’s extensive research into hypersonic weapons programs , including work on a hypersonic-boost aircraft named «Спираль», a modified S-200V surface-to-air missile under the project name Холод, and hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as Kh-80 and Kh-90 GELA (гиперзвуковой экспериментальный летательный аппарат).

            kh-90 gela
            Kh-90 GELA
            kholod
            Kholod
            spiral
            Spiral

            Although claimed successes in testing may have come as a surprise in 2018, in truth Russian officials have been announcing tests of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle, using the УР-100УНТТХ missile, as far back as the strategic nuclear forces exercise in 2004. Hence, this particular system has been in publicly acknowledged development for at least 14 years, and the glide vehicle itself for quite a few years beforehand. The booster, УР-100 (SS-19), is a 105 ton liquid fueled silo-based missile, which together with the boost glide vehicle payload proved too long for a standard silo. Hence this system is being tested in a modified R-36M2 silo (SS-18 Satan), and although it is being developed with the УР-100, it is meant for the much heavier liquid fueled missile currently in testing, RS-28 Sarmat. While the question of boost method may seem a technicality, the boosting mechanism is actually quite deterministic of the strategic role this weapon can play, as I will discuss a bit later in this article.

            However, the principal challenges with this system have little to do with the decades established technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or boosting objects into near earth orbit. Hypersonic boost glide vehicles, if successful, represent a major breakthrough in material sciences, as the object must be able to withstand incredibly high temperatures with the payload and guidance system intact. Although impossible to verify, Russian announcements can often be categorized as ‘true lies,’ impressive sounding figures that have some factual basis, but are inevitably inaccurate. The proposition that the vehicle can reach mach 27 is likely true only during the brief return phase, when it is falling back to earth like a rock from near earth orbit, prior to beginning its hypersonic glide at the edges of the atmosphere. The vehicle itself will have considerably different speeds during the pull-up, glide, and dive to target phase, while having to endure incredible temperatures.

            Below are a few graphical illustrations available on the web

            explainer 1explainer 2explainer 3

            In U.S. testing of an analogous system in 2011, Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2), the vehicle was able to sustain glide at mach 20 speeds for three minutes, enduring a temperature of 3500 Fahrenheit. These figures track with Russian statements on temperatures experienced, but the actual speeds and altitudes at which the Russian vehicle is able to glide, and whether the systems actually survive this experience, remain a mystery. Although Russia’s defense sector seems to have made progress on this weapon system, claims that it is ready for serial production, or operational deployment in the near future, should be treated with educated skepticism. Ironically, the most significant potential breakthrough is in material sciences, not in building a seemingly scary strategic weapon.

            Yet the rationale for Avangard seems less than straightforward when compared to other Russian hypersonic weapons programs, including the Tsirkon 3M22 scramjet hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic missile. Those are operational depth systems able to deliver meaningful conventional or nuclear payloads to shape the military balance in a theater of military operations. They can offset U.S. conventional superiority, and pose genuine challenges in conventional warfare. What does Avangard do for Russia that existing silo-based, road-mobile, air-launched, and submarine launched missiles cannot?

            supposed image of the vehicle (draped on the right)

            The Avangard system is best seen as one element in an expensive Russian strategy to develop technological hedges for a security environment perhaps 20-30 years from now where the United States might deploy a cost effective missile defense system, making a percentage of Russia’s nuclear deterrent vulnerable to interception. To be clear, there is no missile defense system now, or on the horizon, able to intercept Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Modern ICBMs can come with multiple reentry vehicles and numerous penetration aids or false targets, creating a complex ‘threat cloud’ that would make interception an improbable business. Nonetheless, ever since the Bush administration chose in 2002 to exit the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russian leadership has been concerned that the United States could eventually devalue the deterrence provided by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

            Russia’s General Staff worries that a vast arsenal of long range conventional cruise missiles, paired with a semi-viable missile defense, would pose major challenges for their calculations to ensure the ability of Russian nuclear forces to deliver ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tailored’ damage in the coming decades. The 1972 ABM Treaty was not just a cornerstone of Cold War arms control, but fundamental to Russian military thinking on strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability at the strategic level. Ever since June 1941, Soviet, and subsequently Russian, military thought has been wracked by the possibility of a disarming first strike, and the need to position Russian forces along a strategy of ‘counter-surprise.’

            However, unlike other expensive strategic projects, such as the Poseidon nuclear powered torpedo, Avangard does not contribute to a survivable second strike. Thus there are a few ways to interpret the actual purpose of this weapon. The first is as a retaliatory-meeting strike system to attack high-value targets, i.e. civilian targets with political or economic significance, which will provide some insurance for a counter value strike. The second is that it is a first strike weapon against hard to penetrate targets. Since Avangard is silo based, designed for heavier liquid fueled ICBMs, in the event of strategic attack the boosting missile would not be survivable. It must be fired either first, or in a “launch under attack” scenario, when Russia has confirmed a U.S. launch, but the missiles have not yet impacted.

            Avangard may be designed to give Russia’s RVSN the ability to penetrate hard targets, getting around missile defenses, and leveraging greater accuracy to take out well-hardened facilities. That said, from a nuclear warfighting standpoint, this makes Avangard a somewhat specialized, but expensive strategic nuclear weapon. Given how few of these systems Russia is likely to be able to afford, the weapon may offer some targeting advantages, but at a high price relative to the benefits. Another possibility is that this is not a system to get around future missile defenses, but a first strike system to be used specifically against missile defenses, clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even if more accurate and survivable in flight, Avangard is a questionable investment when compared to the numerous road-mobile ICBM systems Russia fields today, including Topol-M and Rs-24 Yars (but then the logic for Russia’s SSBN program is also somewhat circumspect).

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            Perhaps in the future, Avangard will be deployed on a road-mobile launcher, but as conceived, this system adds little to Russia’s existing large strategic nuclear arsenal. An expensive insurance policy that in no way alters the strategic nuclear balance either today or tomorrow, which is why the reaction in Washington has been so muted. If anything, the United States should thank Russia for investing money in such super weapons, instead of buying large quantities of conventional precision guided munitions.

            Moscow has sought to leverage Avangard and similar novel systems to sell the notion of a qualitative arms race to Washington, D.C., hoping to establish a bilateral agenda for summits. Yet while the world is genuinely witnessing a renewed period of nuclear modernization, with qualitatively new or novel weapon systems in development, there is no arms race in progress. The major nuclear powers of today are pursuing distinctly divergent strategies, concepts, and requirements behind their nuclear weapons programs, rather than racing which each other for superiority. This is why Avangard, if completed and deployed, is unlikely to alter strategic military balance or elicit any meaningful response from Washington, D.C.

            Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future?

            Michael KofmanLeave a comment

            Following the November 25th Kerch Strait naval skirmish, in which Russia seized three Ukrainian boats,  Ukrainian leadership has issued warnings of a Russian buildup near Ukraine’s borders. These began in early December and have led to a media echo chamber of concerns that a Russian attack on Ukraine is imminent, in part bolstered by press releases from ISW. Actual evidence of Russian preparations for offensive operations, force movements indicating an unexpected buildup, or an imminent attack, is hard to come by. In this somewhat longer post I want to explore the existing evidence, what little there is, and examine a few conflict scenarios that may be within the realm of possibility in coming months.

            Unfortunately this simmering conflict is subject to frequent false alarms, while actual points of escalation are rarely predicted, as was the case on November 25th. It is relatively easy to take a week’s worth of Russian troop movements, equipment deployments, drills, and MoD announcements, compile them together into a bullet point list of nefarious activities, and then declare them ‘data points’ indicating preparations for an invasion. As of today it seems Ukraine will not be extending the 30 day state of martial law, which casts some doubt on the urgency and immediacy of the anticipated Russian threat as presented earlier this month by Ukrainian authorities.

            The more problematic element in all of this has been senior official Russian statements, which suggest a change in Moscow’s stance on dealing with Ukraine is afoot. Sergey Lavrov, Maria Zakharova, and Sergey Naryshkin, have issued statements expecting a possible Ukrainian ‘provocation’ and or ‘attack’ which could be interpreted as indications and warnings of Moscow preparing the information space, i.e. setting expectations of renewed violence in the coming weeks. However, they may also be a poor Russian attempt at getting Washington, D.C. to restrain Ukraine, or otherwise influence Ukrainian decision making to Russian benefit.

            The Russian narrative offers cause for concern, because it is a form of signaling not dissimilar from official statements in the run up to the Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008. That said, it is likely some officials in Moscow believed Ukraine would try to use martial law as a cover for a military operation in the Donbas, especially given their experience with Saakashvili in 2008. Although real evidence is scant, I’ll try to unpack the different stories, and the likelihood of an upcoming Russian military operation against Ukraine.

            Bottom line up front: Almost every year there is a sizable artillery duel that takes place after the holiday truce (clashes likely to resume between orthodox Christmas on January 7 and perhaps the old new year on January 14th), and so a notable escalation in violence is likely in January, but there is no evidence of Russian preparations for a major assault in Ukraine, certainly not in Crimea.  It is possible, but highly improbable. Most of the information available reflects planned modernization, expected force structure changes, and troop movements on the Russian side not indicative of unusual activity or preparations for an assault. However, as covered years ago on this blog, the long term force posture and structure changes to create three divisions along Ukraine’s borders, return earlier displaced brigades, and a focus on modernizing equipment in the Southern MD, mean that capacity and capability is there to engage in a high intensity conventional conflict with Ukraine at any time. Ukrainian leadership has used evidence from these long term trends to create the sense of an imminent tactical threat, but that is not the case, and they likely know it.

            Expectations of an attack are based on three disparate sets of information, if we can charitably call them that, which are seemingly being woven together by various outlets, blogs, and sites like ISW who warn of Russian preparations for an imminent attack. The first is an alleged increase in Russian hardware in the Rostov region of the Southern Military District. The second is a series of disparate troop movements in Crimea, which in and of themselves do not speak to anything, but some believe are indications of a Russian operation against Ukraine’s Kherson region, presumably to seize the Crimea-Dnepr fresh water canal. The third involves statements by Russia’s MFA, Sergey Naryshkin, and others, that indicate Russian preparations for a conflict in the near future.

            Issue #1 The Russian tank build up in the east and frightening Google photos of lots of tanks

            skynews-petro-poroshenko-putin_4504080.jpg
            Poroshenko on Sky News earlier this month with google satellite imagery

             

            Ukraine’s chief of general staff, Victor Muzhneko, stated that there is an increase in Russian tanks near the Ukrainian border, having grown from 93 to 250 within two weeks from mid-September. This information was spread by a Ukrainian run English-language blog run by Dylan Malyasov, which is a defense news amalgamator. The problem is that these are mostly T-62 variants (M/MV), which have long been retired from the Russian military, and are not in service with Russian trained separatist forces either. This tank last saw service during the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, and was considered obsolete decades ago. There is no Russian unit that fields T-62 tanks today, or T-64 tanks for that matter. The Russian armed forces use this tank for target practice during major military exercises, as was the case in recently held Vostok 2018.

            Separatist forces use T-64BV and T-72B1 variants, which are different main battle tanks, but can perform the same missions and are comparable in their performance characteristics. The T-62 is a completely different design, using different caliber ammunition, sights, fire control, and so on – so it is not possible for someone trained on a T-72 to just jump into this tank and ‘invade Ukraine.’ At this point the same can be said of T-64BVs being supplied to the two separatist corps, doubtfully anyone in line Russian units is current and certified to operate either T-62s, or T-64s. Russian forces use more modern T-72BA or B3 variants almost exclusively, with select units fielding T-80Us or T-80BVM.

            Here is a quick slide of T-72B3 use by Russian forces in Ukraine 2014, T-64BV manned by separatists, and a T-62M

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            Below we can see the alleged tank build up near Ukraine’s borders. Note the rest of the vehicle park at the base, and the contingent, remains the same after the arrival of these tanks, which suggests that they are here for storage and not a force addition.

            08162018
            August 16 – clearing for tanks
            09232018
            September 23 most of the tanks have arrived
            09302018
            September 30 – about 250 tanks there

            The main force currently being supplied with refurbished Russian T-62M tanks is the Syrian Army, particularly the 5th Corps. These tanks are coming out of Russian reserve storehouses with T-62s and BMP infantry fighting vehicles. During Vostok 2018 there was news of T-62s being activated and shipped east, but in reality several batches of these vehicles were loaded and shipped West in October. Ukraine’s alleged tank build up is almost certainly a series of old T-62s taken out of the Central Tank Reserve Base in Ulan Ude, which were tracked through social media (you can get a more detailed story on the T-62 shipment from DFR Lab) as arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, which is where Muzhenko’s photos are from. Subsequently these tanks tend to show up at the port of Novorossiysk for shipment to Syria via the ‘Syrian Express.’

            Storage base in Ulan-Ude, before September and after September of this year. A number of tanks have moved from the lot, indicating that some of the vehicles likely came from this base.

            T-62M tanks heading west from Central Military District and same ones arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, some are likely destined for Syria.

            The recently arrived tanks near Ukraine’s borders are most likely being stored in Rostov region near the port for shipment, or may be used in training, but the story that Russia is planning to invade Ukraine with ancient tanks that they themselves don’t use and don’t train on stretches the imagination beyond the realm of the possible. It is equally possible that these tanks are there to establish a new reserve structure. Russia has been lacking mobilization force structure, and at best has developed a territorial battalion type reserve system for infrastructure defense. Operational reserve capacity comes out of active units which force generate units from active servicemen rather than mobilize reservists. Therefore one possible explanation is that these older vehicles are designed to park equipment for some nascent reserve force structure.

            What’s frustrating is that Ukraine’s military leadership doubtlessly knows all of this, which makes it hard to understand why Muzhenko would use google earth satellite images of old T-62 tanks to push this story in the media. Any military analyst who studies the Russian armed forces could likely tell you this information. Yet Petro Poroshenko went on Sky News with these very same images of Russian tanks, as though they were legitimate evidence of Russian preparations for an invasion.

            My personal interpretation of the Ukrainian claims is that this is an information campaign to justify and defend Poroshenko’s controversial decision to institute martial law in advance of Presidential elections, where his chances of winning are quite tenuous. This is a cynical, but optimistic view, because the alternative suggests that Ukraine’s armed forces don’t know much about the Russian military, and use dated google earth images to hunt down old T-62 tanks that are neither here or there to anything. Ukrainian force posture doesn’t suggest that they themselves expect a Russian offensive either, and the temporary state of martial law has ended as scheduled, so this seems to be mostly a large information wave with little substance to substantiate it.

            However, the Russian Rostov region is seeing a steady build up of forces as part of the formation of the 150th division in the reestablished 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern MD). This will prove a decade long process. Other units that have been announced as far back as early 2015, include the 144th MR Division and 3rd MR Division in 20th Combined Arms Army (Western MD), some shifting of brigades, and steady addition or maneuver regiments to only partially filled divisions in 1st Tank Guards Army headquartered in Moscow. The 144th Division is somewhat lagging here in formation. The 150th division is a 2×2 motor rifle and tank regiment configuration (+2 supporting regiments), which is almost filled now in its maneuver regiments. Supposedly the last motor rifle regiment is being formed as of this month. There are also interesting force structure changes afoot in the Russian VDV, creating much larger air mobile formations, which were partially covered during experiments in Vostok-2018 exercises.

            Issue #2 Russian build up in Crimea for an invasion of Kherson

            image of the dried up canal.jpeg
            The dried up canal on the Russian side of the Crimean border

            There is another concern out there, based on sighting of Russian troop movements near the Crimean border with Kherson, that Russia might conduct an offensive operation from Crimea. At least this is ISW’s thesis on the basis of a few troop trucks, some APCs, and artillery being moved towards the border – which is not at all uncommon. Basically, we have a story of an overturned Russian truck as part of a military convoy on the way to the border, with a field kitchen. What’s naturally missing from this equation is a concentration of armor, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, large volumes of ammunition, etc. moved about on flatbed trucks, i.e. there is no evidence of the sort of hardware one would expect in support of an offensive operation or the formation of battalion tactical groups near Ukraine’s borders in Crimea. The Army Corps in Crimea has a dearth of maneuver elements, so units would have to cross into the peninsula via bridge from the rest of the Southern Military District (presumably 58th Army), concentrate, and deploy – which nobody is seeing happen. More than likely Russian troop movements are indicators of preparations for an artillery duel – exchanges of indirect fire that typically escalate in January/February.

            Partly responsible for the confusion are two planned force additions to Crimea. First we have the formation of the 171st independent air assault battalion in Crimea, which was announced December 2, 2017. This battalion is technically part of the 7th VDV Air assault division, but will create a permanently based unit in Crimea with air mobility, and add to the ‘elite infantry’ stationed there which can serve as a rapid reaction force. However, VDV units have been rotating through Crimea for years now, so this is less of a force increase and more institutionalizing that which has already been taking place.

            171th VDV Regiment
            171st Independent Battalion receiving its honorary title, establishing it in Crimea

            The second tidbit of information regards the deployment of a 4th S-400 battalion to Dzhankoi in Crimea, which likely completes the rearmament of the 18th and 12th air defense regiments based there (31st air defense division within the 4th Air and Air Defense Army of the Southern Military District). The first S-400 battalion was deployed January 2017 in Feodosia, the second January 2018 in Sevastopol, and a third in September 2018 in Yevpatoria. The S-400 replaces the older S-300 systems deployed to Crimea, and is part of a general wave of modernization which prioritized the Southern Military District. Alongside S-400 deployments one can find Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters, and Su-34 bombers steadily replacing Su-24s and older Su-27s in the Russian Aerospace Forces and naval aviation units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

            S-400 in Crimea.jpg
            The 2nd Russian S-400 battalion set deployed to Crimea early this year

            There is cause for concern that long term Russia may need to resolve the fresh water crisis in Crimea, but no way to know how this situation will play out in the coming year. In May 2014 Ukraine blocked off the water supply from the Crimea-Dnepr canal that links the Dnepr river to the peninsula. Although Russia was able to quickly build an ‘energy bridge’ to supply power, and Kerch strait bridge officially opened May 2018 to commercial traffic, the water problem remains a potential cause of conflict (Jane’s here briefly summarizes the issue: Ukraine supplied 86% of Crimea’s water, and this summer there was an acute water shortage in about 20% of the peninsula). The fresh water issue is problematic, but I’ve found it to be overly spun as the next “land bridge to Crimea” narrative. The only sort of offensive military operation that makes sense is a thrust to the Dnepr river, which seizes the entire canal, and the southern half of Ukraine’s Kherson region. There is no way to take part of the canal since it is easily blocked at any point south of the river itself. In scope, this is about a 65-70km push, which is equivalent to depth of territory seized in the Donbas region. Kherson may be relatively easy to cut off, but it would require a substantial number of forces to effect this kind of operation and earn Russia an entire new host of problems.

            Kherson map.JPG
            Basic map with the path of the Dnepr-Crimea canal indicated
            Kherson vector
            ~65km from the Crimean border to the Dnepr river to get to the starting point of the canal (beyond which it cannot be blocked)

            Taking Kherson, like taking most any other Ukrainian region, is well within the realm of Russian military capability, but it would mean inheriting a new region which is also dependent on other parts of Ukraine. One of the obvious challenges Russia has faced in taking pieces of Ukraine is that it may seem easy to to dismember a country on a map, but in reality a state is full of integrated pieces that depend on each other for electricity, water, road networks, trade, supply of food, etc. Resolving the fresh water problem in Crimea by taking another region that would itself bring new supply challenges, and while it could probably be done relatively quickly, it would also require a substantial force build up and subsequent deployment. There are no ‘separatist’ or other volunteer battalions ready to take over internal security, man block posts, and create an entirely new line of control with Ukrainian forces. Also, there is the small matter than absent a ‘Kherson People’s Republic’ movement, there are no proxy forces behind which Russia can mask its invasion, and so this would have to be an overt, outright, and bloody business from the very start.

            Russia could build up forces in Crimea relatively quickly, combining an air mobile airborne operation with a ground assault, but there would be indications and warnings. Unlike in February-March 2014, the West has a lot of technical and human resources now focused on the Russian problem set. Ground force movements, airborne unit shifts, forward deployment of several battalion tactical groups in Crimea, etc. These are regularly recorded by people, spotters, social media, and traditional news. Right now there is no evidence of such troop movements, though one should not discount a military solution to the water issue in 2019, but the entire scenario remains in the realm of low probability events.

            Issue #3 Russian warnings and threats

            Finally, Russian press statements by Lavrov, Naryshkin, Maria Zakharova are perhaps the most alarming, since they indicate a readiness of Russian forces to see through an escalation with Ukraine in the coming weeks or months. This of course brings us into the realm of political analysis and out of the world of military analysis. These warnings indicate the expectation of a conflict, with Russia positioning Ukraine as a the provocateur, something that’s become rote in Russian political statements. The messaging is probably not meant for domestic audiences, or Ukrainian audiences, but for the West, which Russian elites believe can heavily influence Ukrainian decision making. As such, they represent a pattern of thinking reminiscent of the run up to the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, reflecting the Russian perception that they can threaten the potential risk of escalation in order to get the United States to lean on what Moscow sees as Washington’s client state.

            Russians do see Poroshenko as a provocateur, expecting him to “pull something” in the run up to the election, and engage in military posturing. Like many policymakers in the West, they are subscribers to diversionary war theory, which has little empirical basis, but is very much in vogue with political decision makers. Moscow thinks that Poroshenko needs Western attention on Ukraine, and the cheapest way Ukraine can achieve that is with a narrative that draws attention to the ongoing ‘Russian threat.’ Hence warnings of imminent danger tend to crop up every fall around November-December time. Putting aside the likelihood that Russia itself will execute some of the more dire plans discussed above, there is little incentive for Russia to launch any attack during the election as it would only benefit Poroshenko’s cause, in every scenario. That doesn’t mean it wont happen, because bounded rationality leads to outcomes akin to November 25th, i.e. one should not ignore the likely outcome of a chain of events that results in a conflict spiral between these two actors, but there is no sign that Russia intends to intervene in Ukrainian politics via overt military means.

            There is a strong possibility of miscalculation, with January 2019 being different than previous artillery duels and skirmishes that have followed the last major operation in February-March 2015 (Battle of Debaltseve). Ukrainian forces have been slowly gaining ground in the ‘grey zone’ that exists between the two sides respective positions along the line of control in the Donbas. These steady gains are often referenced as the ‘creeping offensive’ to retake lost territory, leading to artillery duels with Russian backed separatists. Separatist units are organized and supported with logistics, technical capabilities like EW, air defense, and other equipment, by a contingent of Russian regulars in Ukraine stationed further behind the line of control. The daily exchanges of indirect fire often flare up after the holiday truce in January, particularly when one side decides to creep into the no man’s land between them, and shift the battle lines.

            Russian controlled separatists have also played this game with Ukrainian forces for several years now, making small shifts in the line over the years. It’s what keeps this a hot war rather than a frozen conflict. However, there is a sense that Russia is spoiling for a fight – just one person’s opinion. Russian public statements are designed to paint them as the reasonable party seeking to deter potential Ukrainian adventurism, but in truth, it feels like Moscow is looking to bloody Ukraine at the first available opportunity.

            It could be vengeance for Ukraine gaining autocephaly, splitting from the Russian orthodox church, or it could be that Moscow wants to show that it is unconstrained and feels free to use the military toolkit. The November 25th naval skirmish with the Russian FSB border guard service demonstrated that when pressed to make decisions in the moment, the Russian leadership turned what could have been a minor incident into a serious clash, overt, heavy handed, with disproportionate use of force. This is at best personal inference, but it is unlikely that Russia is planning an offensive operation to seize Kherson. It is more probable that Moscow is spoiling for a fight with Ukraine, with the intent of handing Ukraine and by proxy, the United States, a small but politically consequential military defeat.

             

             

            The Kerch strait naval skirmish

            Michael Kofman7 Comments

            After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

            On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

            Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

            towing command ship

            On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

            One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

            Don ramming.jpg

            Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

            Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

            original

            Another shot

            Izumrud

            Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

            blocked strait.jpg

            After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

            Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

            damaged Berdyansk.jpg

            Ships parked at Kerch

            parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

            Some thoughts –

            The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

            Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

            That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

            Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

            12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

            Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

            Michael Kofman3 Comments

            On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

            Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

            PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

            PD-50 sinking.jpg

            Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

            PD-50 on a good day

            PD-50 dry dock

            According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

            Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

            Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

            That looks like it may be the crane

            Crane.jpg

            A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

            Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

            Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

            As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

            This is PD-50 now

            PD-50 gone

            The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

            Assessing Vostok-2018

            Michael KofmanLeave a comment

            I’d like to close out coverage of Vostok 2018 with a brief summary and analysis of the exercise, which was written for Oxford’s CCW Russia Brief, Issue 3. I strongly recommend the issue briefs from Oxford’s changing character of war program, which feature some of the best experts on the Russian armed forces in the field.

            Russia’s annual strategic exercises offer an important window into the evolution of the Russian armed forces, their ability to mobilize, deploy, and command large groupings of forces, together with the latest capabilities. The recently held Vostok-2018 (September 11-17), which as the name suggests focused on the Russian Eastern Military District, offered an important deviation from the typically held command-staff strategic exercise which the Russian General Staff organises every September. In a standard exercise, an operational-strategic command (OSK) takes in forces from other districts and fields them in a particular strategic direction, organizing a hypothetical fight together with the General Staff in the theatre of military operations (TVD). But in 2018, Vostok was changed into strategic manoeuvers. Under this framework two military districts, Central and Eastern, divided into opposing forces to conduct manoeuvers in different strategic directions. China’s official involvement in the annual exercises, which is a first, made the event politically significant in Sino-Russian relations, and a mutually agreed upon political signal send by both sides to international observers.

            Unlike previous such exercises, Vostok-2010 and 2014, this event represents more of an “in-progress report” for the Russian armed forces. When he was first appointed Chief of General Staff in late 2012, Valery Gerasimov was dismayed with the Russian armed forces inability to move across the country and effectively engage in drills or training events at ranges distant from their home garrisons. The recently reformed military had become a permanent standing force, but it had little experience or credibility in being able to deploy to Russia’s borders in the event of conflict and successfully engage an adversary. The high tempo of snap readiness checks, drills, joint exercises, together with modernization investments under the State Armament Program, were meant to turn the Russian armed forces into a combat credible force, able to effectively deter large scale conventional conflict. Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than the Russian Far East, a vast region that is sparsely populated and lacks much transportation infrastructure.

            Vostok-2018 was also as an opportunity for political signalling, featuring a large review of forces and photo opportunities similar to that of Zapad-1981. Russian pronouncements that the exercise would feature 297,000 soldiers – which would have been fully a third of the entire Russian military – was meant to underscore the state’s resilience and undiminished military potential in the face of political and economic pressure from the United States.

            In reality, the exercise was rather smaller, probably not exceeding 50,000 participants (this is a guesstimate, use at your own risk) in the actual exercises, with most of the major events taking place at the Tsugol training range. The official numbers given likely represent the total forces on paper from the Central and Eastern Military Districts: often the Russian General Staff will count an entire brigade or division as having participated even when their contribution is only one unit. A large number of units were raised on alert on August 20th, in advance of the exercise, but few had any connection to the actual events. Official statements by Russian commanders also suggest that the exercise was much smaller in reality: Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), stated that 7,000 troops participated at Tsugol from his district. Together with aviation and airborne units sent, it is unlikely that the CMD’s involvement exceeded 15,000-20,000 soldiers.

            The reason for dramatically inflated figures for every Vostok exercise is straightforward: Moscow is unconcerned that announcing fantastical figures would engender a security dilemma in the region. Moreover, political agreements governing military exercises in Europe such as the Vienna Document have no jurisdiction east of the Ural mountains. As such, the Russian leadership can count unit participation however it likes, without stoking NATO fears. At the same time, including China in the exercise was a prudent measure to alleviate any inherent suspicions Beijing might have that these strategic manoeuvers were aimed at them, or a manifestation of Russian security apprehensions. Since most of the exercise events took place in Zabaykalsky Krai, a land-locked region bordering China and Mongolia, this was an important precaution. Moscow’s effort at engaging the Chinese military is quite clever, intended to foster greater partnership, engendering stronger military ties, while at the same time demonstrating to their strategic partners the capability of the Russian armed forces in an effort to bolster coercive credibility.

            Vostok featured elements of both contact and non-contact warfare, from a series of attack, defence and flanking manoeuvers by battalion tactical groups, to blunting massed aerospace attacks, and effecting precision strikes against critical infrastructure at operational depths. Going into the exercise Valery Gerasimov said he wanted to see non-standard solutions practiced, code for the Chief of General Staff not wishing to see Russian units arrive at ranges to execute pre-rehearsed manoeuvers, i.e. put on a five-day bit of military theatre for him and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu. It remains unclear whether or not he got what he wanted, but Shoigu indicated this type of exercise might be held every five years, pegged to implementation of the State Armament Program, the implication being that strategic manoeuvers would be used as a form of in-process review and reflection on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

            Although every strategic exercise is designed to be a stress test for the Russian armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, Vostok had four principal areas of focus: logistics, mobilization, command and control, and tactical innovation. Emphasis was placed on the logistics, combat service support, and combat engineer components of the Russian armed forces. Command and control of forces in combined arms manoeuver, along with integration with other services remains a prominent feature, as does experimentation with the force structure itself. The Russian military continues to work on integrating recon-strike and recon-fire contours, connecting targeting in real time from drones, soldiers or aircraft, with artillery fires at the tactical level or strike assets distributed among the services. There was also a mobilization component aimed at taking in reservists to help fill out combat service support units and integrating civilian authorities into the exercise under the model that ‘everyone fights’.

            Vostok was spread across five combined arms ranges, four air and air defence ranges, and several coastal regions in the Russian Far East. Ground force exercises featured large attacks with artillery and MLRS systems with targeting and battle damage assessments done via drone systems. River fording, bridging, masking of units with smoke and aerosol were all parts of the exercise to simulate the logistical difficulty of getting to the battlefield while under fire. Engineers also setup false targets, inflatable dummy units, practicing various forms of deception on the battlefield. The strategic nuclear component of the exercise involved flights by Tu-95MS bombers, which cut through the U.S. air defence identification zone, earning a free F-22 fighter escort before returning to fire cruise missiles at target ranges in Russia.

            Efforts at innovation could be seen in the attempt by the airborne forces to create a new type of air assault detachment, together with an airmobile reserve based on heavy transport helicopters and light vehicles. Colonel General Andrei Serduykov, commander of Russia’s airborne forces, was trying new things this year by assembling battalions from three independent air assault brigades to practice large scale heli-borne attacks, some involved as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two large transport Mi-26 helicopters in the action. The Russian airborne also conducted a sizable parachute drop, using 25 transports to deliver 700 soldiers and 51 BMD infantry fighting vehicles, while specialized light utility units were brought in as a ready reserve for the action. Russia’s Northern Fleet similarly brought a new force mix, including naval infantry and specialized units from its Arctic brigade, some of which conducted a raid in depth across as much as 270km of terrain.

            China’s participation included some 3,200 soldiers mounted on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs and self-propelled artillery, together with 6 aircraft and 24 helicopters. Interactions between Russian and Chinese forces at the tactical level, assuming any serious collaboration even took place, seemed of lower import than the utility of this event as a form of political signalling. China’s Minister of Defence, Wei Fenghe, highlighted the importance of Sino-Russian cooperation at the operational and strategic level, while Shoigu announced that they had agreed to hold exercises regularly in the future. In a subsequent interview, Shoigu referred to the Chinese participants as allies. While it is difficult to interpret Vostok, or any other exercise, as a proof of a budding Sino-Russian entente, it is clear the two countries seek to demonstrate that they do not see each other as a threat.

            While Western policymakers typically describe alliance formation as some sort of state-level dating, where relationships are formed based on trust, common values, similar political systems and so on, in reality this has little semblance to the history of how powers actually form alliances. Alliance formation behaviour takes place as a form of balancing behaviour in response to threats, therefore the only logical catalyst for a Sino-Russian entente is the threat posed by the United States, and the extent to which the two countries see their respective challenges as worth the risk and liability of closer cooperation. Having identified both countries as great power competitors in the National Defense Strategy, and practical measures to intensify the confrontation in economic and military domains, Washington has taken important steps to further enhance cooperation between its disparate adversaries.

            Vostok-2018 strategic manoeuvers illustrate that while much progress remains to be made in improving the capability and capacity of the Russian armed forces, the military as a whole is increasingly greater than the sum of its parts, and certainly much improved from its relatively raw state in 2012-2013. Meanwhile Russian policy has become rather more deft in managing their ‘strategic partnership’ with China, seeking to leverage military events as part of a boarder effort to slowly and incrementally pull the latter into a balancing entente against the United States.

             

            Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

            Michael Kofman2 Comments

            Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

            Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

            This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

            Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

            time to go home.jpg

            Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

            VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

            Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

            Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

            exercise table

             

            Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

            Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

            Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

            BTR-82As.jpg

            Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

            Egvekinot.JPG

            naval infantry 2.JPG

            Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

            Vostok 2018 Days 5-6 (September 15-16)

            Michael KofmanLeave a comment

            Vostok 2018 Days 5 and 6

            The weekend was relatively quiet. Comparably few activities took place as the forces involved were either taking a break, or perhaps there was a media blackout compared to the information flowing about the first several days. For a brief period the MoD main website was down, which was unusual. However, other news sources which typically cover the exercises reflected a dearth of information for September 15-16. I’ve decided to group the events of both days into one post here. The main exercises over the weekend included another series of bombing raids by Russian aerospace forces, a motor rifle battalion assault at Tsugol, complex river crossing exercises supported by engineer and CBRN troops, and two naval exercises held by the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

            VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-22M3s conducted another series of air raids at a training range in Zabaikal, practicing bombing runs against various targets simulating an enemy air base. It reads like this was another unguided bombing exercise, dropping FAB-500s and 250s. The precision guided munitions tend to be reserved for Syria, so they tend not to waste them on exercises. Ten air crews were involved in the event, though unclear if they all had their own individual platforms, i.e. 10 bombers, or were rotated through a smaller number of aircraft.

            Tu-22M3.JPG

            Meanwhile Russian Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters took on the role of incoming enemy fighters. They approached the integrated air defenses setup by Eastern MD, and not did not respond to ground control requests for identification. Mig-31BM and Su-35s fighters were scrambled to intercept, simulating air combat at different ranges, including short range dog fighting. The Su-30SMs were defeated by Eastern MD’s air superiority fighters.

            Eastern MD – There was another motor rifle and armored assault at Tsugol, with T-62s setup as targets representing the opposing force. Several companies of T-72B1 tanks, in conjunction with BMP-2s conducted an attack across the range.

            Motor rifle and armored assault.JPG

            Meanwhile Russian military police units, mounted on Typhoon vehicles, detected and captured  a group of infiltrators who sought to gain access to the training range.

            MPs.JPG

            CBRN units setup smoke and aerosol cover for a river crossing exercise, where T-72 tanks forded the river with snorkels, while other vehicles were transported via specialized amphibious carriers. Engineer and sapper units established a pontoon bridge for tanks and BMPs to drive over. The exercise seems based around a motor rifle battalion, with helicopter support, effecting a river crossing both via bridge and in shallow places with its own means.

            Units positioned preparing to cross.JPG

            pontoon bridge.JPG

            Other exercises of note: Russia’s Ministry of Emergencies held a joint exercise with Chinese counterparts, simulating a ship collision at a bridge being constructed across the Amur River. The exercise consisted of a Chinese passenger ship colliding with a Russian ship working on the bridge. Both sides worked together to put out a fire on the Chinese ship, evacuate passengers, and rescue others from the water. Russian Be-200 firefighting aircraft and Mi-8s  belonging to the Ministry were involved, with about 300 people all together engaged in this exercise. I found the event interesting simply because it reflects another level of cooperation between Russian and Chinese ministries along the border outside of the military dimension.

            The Baltic Fleet has also been busy, though their activities doubtfully have anything to do with Vostok 2018. About 25 ships, 30 aircraft, helicopters, drones, and 50 pieces of equipment were involved in conducting an amphibious landing at Khmelevka. Russian Su-24 + Su-30SM fixed wing aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters conducted a strike against enemy positions, so that naval infantry units could then land and seize the beach. Ships involved included LSTs Aleksandr Shabalin, Korolev, Minsk, three smaller landing boats from project 21820, and support by three project 20380 corvettes (Stereguschiy). The landing force consisted of about 30 BTR-82A, which is consistent with what about 3 LSTs can carry, though at the same time they also air lifted several naval infantry units behind enemy lines – presumably via Ka-27 helicopters which is typically how these forces effect an amphibious assault.

            Northern Fleet – The Northern Fleet ran an anti-submarine warfare exercise, with its principal combatant Vice Admiral Kulakov (Udaloy-class) leading the submarine hunt. Their scenario involved using different systems to hunt for the submarine, such as onboard sonar and the ship’s Ka-27PL helicopter. Kulakov practiced torpedo and depth charge attacks, along with evading torpedo attacks fired by the opposing submarine.

            Ka-27 deploying dipping sonar

            dipping sonar.JPG

            Pacific Fleet – Naval Infantry conducted an assault to enable a larger amphibious force to land near the Klerk training range on Primoriye. This is an interesting exercise in that they were working together VKS Aerospace Forces, who supported their attack, along with ships from the Pacific Fleet, combat aviation, artillery, sappers, and air defense units. Supposedly the next phase of this exercise will involve an air assault brigade of VDV Airborne conducting a similar type of attack, though it seems things are winding down. The Eastern MD is already looking to an upcoming joint exercise with Mongolian troops under a different title.

            Some additional pictures of note:

            CBRN units treating tanks

            treating tanks.JPG

            Tank sanitation checkpoint

            sanitizing T-72s.JPG

            T-72 snorkeling

            Loch Ness T-72.JPG

             

            Vostok 2018 Day 4 (September 14)

            Michael KofmanLeave a comment

            Vostok Day 4

            Most of the exercises are taking place at Tsugol and Telemba, but there was word today of various live fire events from a few of the other ranges. Elements of 5th CAA are at Bikinskiy, and the air force is doing most of its bombing runs at Mukhor-Kondui. More word from the two fleets, the Northern Fleet is exercising in the Bering Sea, while the Pacific Fleet has launched a surface action group together with support ships and a number of smaller vessels. Less news from the airborne on this day, but some interesting simulations among air defense forces, CBRN troops, and engineer units. Across the ranges where most of the forces are staged the day was taken up by artillery and MLRS fires, together with combat maneuvers by motor rifle battalions.

            VKS Aerospace Forces – At Tusgol, Russia employed A-50U (AWACS system) in conjunction with Mig-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-30SMs conducting combat air patrols and simulating intercepts. Meanwhile at Mukhor-Kondui, another  range with targets for the air force, Russia’s air force conducted several air strikes with mostly unguided munitions. Including about 30 aircraft consisting of Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, and Su-25s. Their target was a column of enemy armor and artillery on the march. Coordinates and targeting relayed by Su-24MP.

            Su-25s about to fire unguided rockets (Mukhor-Kondui)

            Su-25s.JPG

            Followed by bombing passes from Su-30SM and Su-24 bombers

            Su-30sm.JPG

            Some word on the earlier air strike with cruise missiles, IZ reported it as 4xTu-95MS and 6xTu-22M3 participating. The Tu-95MS flight in the first two days of the exercise clearly cut through the Alaska air identification zone for the United States, as F-22s were sent up to greet them. The need for air refueling during this flight now makes sense since they seemingly made a large lap before firing missiles at the target range.

            F-22 and Tu-95MS.JPG

            VDV Airborne – Seems they conducted an airborne drop of one battalion, together with a heliborne assault with soldiers repelling. I honestly can’t say if this took place on the 14th, or if the photos are from the 13th. Part of the problem is some nice people seem to have taken down the Russian MoD website making it a bit difficult to compare announcements and images from the two days.

            airborne repelling.jpg

            Eastern MD – CBRN troops simulated an emergency chemical cleanup whereby several railcars carrying dangerous/toxic chemicals spilled their load, presumably onto the roadway and the surrounding area. Supposedly about 1,500 CBRN troops, and 300 pieces of equipment are taking part in the exercises, using RHM-6 chemical detector systems, and RPM-2 radiological detectors. Engineer units also simulated a natural and/or man-made disaster, testing their ability to manage flooding, evacuation of the local population, dealing with unexploded ordnance, etc. About 350 soldiers listed for this one, with 80 pieces of equipment including excavators, cranes, floating transports, etc.

            At Telemba range, Col Tikhonov, commander of 76th Air Defense division, highlighted the use of air defense targets designed to simulate small radar profiles, i.e. low observation aircraft and cruise missiles. Not only did they use the typical dummy missiles, and conventional targets, but they wanted to replicate a large scale aerospace attack with cruise missiles. The addition of targets with small radar cross sections seems new  compared to previous exercises.

            At Tsugol there was a sizable artillery and MLRS live fire exercise, different types of self-propelled and towed artillery involved, together with BM-21 and BM-27 MLRS.

            2s3 firing.jpg

            Tsugol BM-27 firing.JPG

            At Bikinskyi range, in Khabarovsk, a motor rifle unit of the 5th CAA stopped an advancing opposing force. Air defense units assigned to them, including ZSU-23-4 shilka, and Igla manpads, were fired to simulate defending against enemy air power. Artillery units with BM-21 Grad were similarly engaged in supporting the defending motor rifle formation. All together at this range they are listing 200 pieces of equipment, and 1700 troops. The number suggests that this is a battalion tactical group, with short range air defense and MLRS units assigned to it.

            Elements of 5th CAA

            5th CAA.JPG

            This is rather small by the way, and I suspect at the end of all the announcements, if we add up all the troops listed as participating at the individual ranges over the period of these eight days, we’re going to have a hard time coming up not only with 300,000 but probably with anything approaching 50,000-70,000. Recalling we have 5 combined arms ranges, 4 air defense ranges, and two gulfs as the overall area of the exercise.

            tanks at Tsugol.jpg

            As an aside, there are several exercises, annual certification checks, and live fire drills going on in other military districts. At the same time, the Southern MD is hosting a sizable exercise with about 5,000 troops, including air defense, artillery, missile, and air force units. About 500 pieces of artillery, MLRS, listed, including BM-21, BM-27, BM-30, Tulpan 240mm mortar, Iskander-M, and several ships participating. About 20 fixed and rotary wing aviation involved in this exercise. Black Sea Fleet coastal defense forces (ground forces part of its army corps) held several smaller exercises of their own, simulating defense against diversionary forces attacking its bases. Dvornikov is placing emphasis on working out the recon-strike contour, command and control across his district for employing long range firepower, i.e. cruise missiles and the like at operational ranges. It seems he’s trying to bring experience from the Syrian war to the district.

            Pacific Fleet – Several ships from the fleet escorted a Russian squadron near the Sea of Okhotsk. Varyag (Slava-class guided missile cruiser), together with Bystruy (Sov destroyer), two  Udaloy class large anti-submarine warfare ships and other smaller vessels served as escorts to Irtysh, a hospital ship, and several LSTs. The SAG seems to consist of 2x Udaloy, 1x Sov, and 1xSlava-class with a few support ships and LSTs. The exercise involved changing formation, arraying the surface action group for air defense, signaling, C2, and anti-submarine warfare. Ka-27 helicopters carried onboard the larger combatants also participated in the exercise. All together about 15-20 ships from the Pacific Fleet are listed for this exercise. I say 15-20 because Russian MoD announcements can’t agree whether it was 15 or 20, depending on which one you read.

            Pacific SAG

            Pacific Fleet.JPG

            Northern Fleet – Elements of the Northern Fleet’s specialized Arctic brigade, which were dropped off two days ago on Chukotka, marched from their landing point to the Pacific coastline, i.e. they drove 270km on their articulated DT-10P vehicles over the course of two days. Along the way they practiced raiding enemy formations, some live fire drills, etc. This is an interesting exercise, noting that the small surface action group sent by the Northern Fleet has been traveling since August 8th, conducting multiple landings with both naval infantry and the arctic brigade detachment. The rest of the surface action group spent this day in the Bering Sea, practicing search and rescue operations. Their mission was to aid a ship in distress along the northern sea route. Kulakov (Udaloy-class) conducted search operations with its Ka-27 onboard helicopter, which then practiced evacuating individuals from the supposed vessel, together with a rescue party launched from the ship on small high speed boats. Meanwhile their large tug, Pamir, and the diesel-electric ice breaker Ilya Muromets, practiced firefighting at sea.

            Kulakov launching Ka-27

            Kulakov

            Ilya Muromets firefighting together with the large ocean going tug

            firefighting.JPG

            I would note that today the Russian MoD website appears to be down, and I would bet a good deal of money that it is likely due to a DDOS attack.

            Some additional photos of note:

            Russian and PLA forces coordinating something

            lost in translation

            The display signs at Tsugol – this seems to be the Chinese contingent section

            best friends forever.jpg

            Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)

            Michael Kofman2 Comments

            Russian and Chinese leadership at Tsygol range opened up Phase 2 of the exercise with a large review of forces. The optics were clearly meant to rekindle the images of Zapad-1981, with numerous vehicles and infantry arrayed in parade formation on the grounds of the range. Indeed the display was quite large, and it seemed clear by the number of Chinese tanks, SPA, wheeled and other vehicles that probably about 3,000 troops and several hundred pieces of equipment did actually come to join Russia in these strategic maneuvers. Judging by the reporting, it is likely most of the drills during Vostok are taking place at Tsygol and Telemba, i.e. it’s quite difficult to picture Vostok being all that large as an exercise. Right now, going off of fairly little (but still a lot more honest than 300,000), around 50,000 seems a much more reasonable number of participants.

            DigitalGlobe had good satellite photos of some of the parade grounds at the range and exercises for a different perspective.

            satellite

            Of course Putin came to look through binoculars, because it wouldn’t be a strategic exercise otherwise. Note unlike in Zapad, where Putin and Lukashenko were not together in the same command center, we can see the Chinese counterparts sitting further along the table.

            Putin came.JPG

            More photos can be found on BMPD. But here’s s sample of some of the gear Chinese brought with them.

            Chinese tanks.jpg

            Chinese forces.jpg

            As this is the opening of Phase 2, most of the activity was characterized by VDV air assaults, VKS bombing missions, combined arms artillery and motor rifle unit actions. Strong emphasis on employment of drones, integrated C2, and more ‘jointness’ so to speak between ground, airborne, and VKS forces. VDV seems to be conducted several force structure and air assault experiments, including with new light high mobility vehicles, creating a air mobile reserve, etc. Ground units are mostly doing what they do best, lots of artillery and MLRS fire, armored assault, etc.

            Vostok 2018 military exercise in Transbaikal Territory, Russia

            VDV Airborne – More than 700 soldiers and 51 vehicles (BMD-2) made a parachutte jump at Tsygol range. At the Belaya airfield near Irkutsk, a detachment of the Ulan-Ude air assault brigade loaded 25 Il-76MD transports. They were then air lifted ~1000km towards Zabaikal where they conducted a jump at 600 meters. The scenario was air assault and seizure of an enemy airfield. All together about 6000 VDV  and 900 pieces of equipment are taking part in Vostok, in earlier posts I mentioned these are units from 3 independent air assault brigades, and two additional special detachments.

            VDV Ulan Ude assault brigade.JPG

            As part of the scenario unfolding at Tsygol range, an air mobile battalion belonging to the 31st independent air assault brigade conducted an air assault on an enemy command center, with air support.  About 40 helicopters of Mi-8AMTSh were used (supposed capacity 26 soldiers), two Mi-26 helicopters, and more than 10 Mi-24 helicopters in support. They are billing this exercise as an experiment of a ‘new type’ of air assault detachment. There was also a mobile reserve in support of this assault, composed of light wheeled high mobility vehicles (pickups). Mi-26s delivered 8 of these light pickups, together with 4 armored Rys light vehicles equipped with Kornet ATGMs and Kord heavy machine guns.

            airborne ATVs.JPG

            VKS Aerospace Forces – About 40 bombers and strike fixed wing aircraft were used in an attack on opposing ground forces, key infrastructure, and staged reserves. Units involved fielded Tu-22M3, Su-34, Su-24, and Su-25SM strike aircraft. Air cover provided by Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters. Strikes were coordinated via ground based C2 system Strelets, and Orlan-10 drones.

            Tu-22M3.JPG

            Eastern MD – Other activities of note: CBRN units used smoke and aerosol covers on more than 60 sq km, covering moving units and critical infrastructure – equipment used includes TDA-3K smoke machines, and RP3-8x aerosols. Anti-tank units belonging to a battalion tactical group of motor rifle and artillery units simulated strikes against enemy armor and fortified positions with 130mm Shturm-S ATGMs and Konkurs-M. Sapper units plan to use not only UR-77 Meteorit, BMP-3M, but also Uran-6 and Uran-9 UGVs for demining.

            Tsygol Range – Seven artillery battalions created a rolling artillery barrage ahead of an advance, covering a line of ~3000 meters. A motor rifle battalion advanced, and there are photos of host of T-72B1 tanks engaged in a live fire exercise as part of this maneuver. They employed more than 150 pieces of artillery, including 2s3, 2s1, 2s19, Giatsint, and Pion. Meanwhile Iskander-M units fired two cruise missiles at critically important targets, at the same time a large artillery and MLRS barrage hit the opposing force. All together they employed 2 Iskander TELs, 52 MLRS systems, and 72 tube artillery. Targeting for the strike conducted via an air based system called Klever, with Su-24MP recon aviation, and Orlan-10 drones – they used live video feed for battle damage assessment. In one scenario, Russian and Chinese artillery units simultaneously attacked enemy forward command posts. Russian BM-27 Uragan were employed together with Chinese Type-81 MLRS.

            Motor rifle bttn.JPG

            Artillery units will also practice employing precision guided munitions called Krasnopol, these will be fired by MSTA-S and 2s3 Akatsiya, Granat-4 short range drones are to be used for targeting. Krasnopol is a 152mm semi-active laser guided munition which can be used by most self-propelled and towed artillery.

            life fire.jpg

            Of course a detachment of Terminator BMPT, heavy tank support vehicles will make another debut at Tsygol, undoubtedly in the hope that someone will buy them. They were first  featured in Zapad 2017 in desert camo paint, undoubtedly marketed towards a certain set of countries that like to buy equipment in such colors.

            Interesting photos emerged of drone companies, fielding both Orlan-10s, but also counter drone hand held weapons, that are worth noting.

            drone company.JPG

            counter drone gun.jpg

            Not much from the two fleets today, except that the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean is still there, and recently concluded a first time joint exercise with Russian VKS. A sizable grouping of ships and a few submarines remains there.

            Some additional photos of note:

            Parachute jump skeptic

            in airborne now.JPG

            Of course you can’t assault an enemy airbase without taking a photo first

            can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo.JPG

            And a time honored tradition emerging from modern exercises, people pointing at screens:

            pointing at screens.jpg

             

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            #####EOF##### Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17) – Russia Military Analysis

            Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

            Michael Kofman2 Comments

            Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

            Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

            This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

            Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

            time to go home.jpg

            Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

            VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

            Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

            Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

            exercise table

             

            Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

            Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

            Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

            BTR-82As.jpg

            Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

            Egvekinot.JPG

            naval infantry 2.JPG

            Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

            2 thoughts on “Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)”

            1. This is my first time reading. I see that you work for CNA. I used to work at CNA in the Chicago office. I am intrigued to know how a scientific research guy working for a huge Reinsurance Co comes to know specifics about Russian Military. You have a follower. Please let me know more about you.

              Like

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              #####EOF##### Topic: Best Practices & Community Standards | WordPress.com Forums

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              Best Practices & Community Standards

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                supernovia
                Staff

                Welcome to the official public support community for the sites, products, and services hosted by WordPress.com! Here you can search for answers, ask for help, and give back by helping other community members.

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              #####EOF##### Dan Raywood – 44CON

              Dan Raywood

              default Twitter: @danraywood
              Website: www.itsecurityguru.org
              Dan Raywood is a security journalist, previously news editor of SC Magazine and currently editor of IT Security Guru. He joined the new title last September after being on holiday and missing 2013’s 44Con, and launched a new website in January.

              He spends his time swimming against the tide of PR approaches to video and interview security’s leading lights.

              Hacker Fantastic has presented at:
              #####EOF##### #####EOF##### My publications – Russia Military Analysis

              My publications

              Kofman, Michael, (2017) Russia’s Fifth-Generation Sub Looms. Proceeding Magazine, Vol.143/10/1,376

              Kofman, Michael, “Russian Military Buildup in the West: Fact Versus Fiction,” Russia Matters, September 7, 2017

              Kofman, Michael, “For the U.S., Arming Ukraine Could Be a Deadly Mistake, The New York Times, August 25, 2017

              Kofman, Michael, “What to expect when you’re expecting Zapad,” War on the Rocks. August 23, 2017

              Kofman, Michael and Edmonds, Jeffrey, “Why the Russian Navy is a More Capable Adversary Than It Appears,” The National Interest, August 22, 2017

              Kofman, Michael, “A Tale of Two Campaigns: U.S. and Russian Military Operations in Syria,” in Pathways to Peace and Security. p.163-170, No. 1(52) Special Issue. Edited by Ekaterina Stepanova, 2017 ISBN 978-5-9535-0502-4 

              Kofman, Michael and Gorenburg, Dmitry, “Moscow Conference on International Security 2017: Cooperation Lost in Translation,” The National Interest. May 9, 2017.

              Kofman, Michael et al. (2017). Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. (Report No. RR-1498-A). Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation.

              Kofman, Michael, “No Plan? No Strategy? No Problem! Syria and why Trump’s Russia Policy is off to a rough start,” War on the Rocks, April 11, 2017.

              Kofman, Michael, “Reports of Deep Cuts to Russia’s Defense Budget Have Been Grossly Exaggerated,” World Politics Review. March 22, 2017

              Kofman, Michael, “Russian Spetsnaz: Learning from Experience,” The Cipher Brief. March 15, 2017.

              Kofman, Michael and Polmar, Norman (2017) Naval Aviation Taking Flight Again…Slowly. Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 143/3/1,369

              Kofman, Michael, “A Comparative Guide to Russia’s Use of Force: Measure Twice, Invade Once,” War on the Rocks, February 16, 2017.

              Kofman, Michael, “The ABCs of Russian Military Power: A Primer for the New Administration,” The National Interest, February 2, 2017.

              Polmar, Norman and Kofman, Michael (2017) Impressive Beneath the Waves. Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 143/2/1, 368.

              Kofman, Michael, “The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy,” War on the Rocks, January 17, 2017.

              Kofman, Michael “Russia Will Continue Setting the Agenda,” The Cipher Brief. January 17, 2017.

              Polmar, Norman and Kofman, Michael (2017) One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 143/1/1,367, pp.66-67

              Kofman, Michael and Polmar, Norman. (2016) Toward Smaller Ships and Professional Sailors. Proceedings Magazine, Vol 142/11/1.365, pp.66-67

              Kofman, Michael. (2016) US and Russia in Syria’s War: Cooperation and Competition, in Artis Pabriks, The War in Syria Lessons for the West (pp.65-86) University of Latvia Press, Riga.

              Kofman, Michael, “The Russian Navy’s Great Mediterranean Show of Force,” The National Interest, October 21, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael, “The Misadventures of Russia and the United States in Syria: Complete Strategy Implosion Edition,” War on the Rocks. October 11, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael, “Putin’s Military is Playing the Long Game in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy. August 31, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. “The Crimean Crisis and Russia’s Military Posture in the Black Sea,” War on the Rocks. August 19, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael, “NATO Deterrence and the Russian Specter in the Baltics,” The Russia File. Wilson Center. August 9, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. “Как надо сдерживать Россию,” Lenta.ru August 8, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. “Ложные реальные угрозы,” Vedomosti July 15, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael, “The Russian Dream: Power Without Substance,” Book Review Roundtable. Asia Policy, Number 22, 223-48.

              Kofman, Michael. The Expensive Pretzel Logic of Deterring Russia by Denial. War on the Rocks. June 23, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. The Russian Military: A Force in Transition. Report for the Center on Global Interests. June 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. Fixing NATO Deterrence In the East or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia. War on the Rocks. May 12, 2016

              Kofman, Michael and Andrey Sushentsov. What Makes Great Power War Possible. Valdai Discussion Club Report. April 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. Russia’s submarine program: How big a threat? CNN Opinion. April 25, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. Гибридная война, которой нет. Vedomosti. April 20, 2016.

              Dmitry Gorenburg and Kofman, Michael. There is no Russian withdrawal from Syria. War on the Rocks. March, 18, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. How to Lose a Proxy War with Russia. The National Interest. March 6, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. The Russian Quagmire in Syria and Other Washington Fairy Tales. War on the Rocks. February 16, 2016.

              Kofman, Michael. The Seven Deadly Sins of Russia Analysis. War on the Rocks. December 23, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. The Russian Navy: Strategies and Missions of a Force in Transition. CIMSEC. November 23, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Why the U.S. Should Be Paying Attention to Russia’s Latest Strikes in Syria. War on the Rocks. November 19, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Six Key Trends in Russian Foreign Policy, As Seen by the West. Russia Direct. November 6, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Russia’s New Strategy in the Middle East. Russia Direct Report. October 29, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. The Russian Intervention in Syria: Policy Options and Exit Strategies. War on the Rocks. October 21, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Russia Banks on Brief Campaign to Determine Syria Endgame. World Politics Review. War on the Rocks. October 19, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Russia’s Arsenal in Syria: what do we know? War on the Rocks. October 18, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. How Russia’s Gambit in Syria Changes the Game. War on the Rocks. September 21, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Putin’s Strategy is Far Better Than You Think. War on the Rocks. September 7, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Is Russia’s Power to Annoy Changing the Game? War on the Rocks. August 24, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Pulling Russia and Ukraine Back from the Brink of War. The National Interest. August 14, 2015.

              Matthew Rojansky and Kofman, Michael. Isolated Russia has little left to lose. CNN. July 16, 2015

              Graham, T.E., Rojansky, Matthew, Kofman, Michael. Are Ukraine and the U.S. allies or not? Reuters. June 10, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael and Matthew Rojansky. U.S. and German Views on Ukraine: The Risks of Trans-Atlantic Misunderstanding. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. June 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Germany’s G7 Summit and Russia. The Diplomatic Courier. June 3, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael and Matthew Rojansky. A Closer Look at Russia’s Hybrid War. Kennan Cable No7. April, 2015

              Kofman, Michael. Don’t Doubt the Ceasefire. Foreign Affairs. February 22, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Sending Arms to Ukraine won’t work. CNN. February 10, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. How to Start a Proxy War with Russia. The National Interest. February 5, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael and Roger McDermott. No Return to Cold War in Russia’s New Military Doctrine. Eurasia Review. February 3, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Germany proves an uncertain leader in confrontation with Russia. The Diplomatic Courier. January/February Edition, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Time to rethink Ukraine deal. CNN. January 23, 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine. Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 76. National Defense University Press. January 2015.

              Kofman, Michael. Strong or weak, bully or buffoon? Will the real Russia please stand up? Reuters. December 17, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. An Uneasy Menage a Trois. Foreign Affairs. December 4, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Is Russia planning a winter offensive? CNN. November 13, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Russia rejects global governance norms, and the US is running out of options. The Diplomatic Courier, November 7, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Why sending weapons to Ukraine would be a terrible idea. Quartz. October 24, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Weapons are not the answer to Ukraine’s military woes. Wilson Center. Wilson Brief 1, October 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Ukraine’s Battle for the East is Over. The National Interest. September 9, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. The battle for Ukraine: Who is winning? The National Interest. May 17, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Can you confront Russia and save Ukraine? The Diplomatic Courier, May 7, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Targeted Sanctions on Russia will work, but mostly for Vladimir Putin. The Diplomatic Courier, April 30, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Putin’s Grand Strategy for Ukraine. The National Interest. April 25, 2014.

              Kofman, Michael. Russia Can’t Afford to Lose. The National Interest. April 14, 2014.

              Parker, John and Kofman, Michael. Russia Still Matters: Strategic Challenges and Opportunities for the Obama Administration. Strategic Forum, March 2013, National Defense University Press.

              Gompert, David and Kofman, Michael. Raising Our Sights: Russian-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability. Strategic Forum, January 2012, NDU Press.

              Kofman, Michael. Central Asia: Great Games or Graveyard? The Diplomatic Courier. Print Edition. June 2011.

              Andres, Richard and Kofman, Michael. European Energy Security: Reducing Volatility of Ukraine-Russia Natural Gas Pricing Disputes. Strategic Forum, February 2011, NDU Press.

              Back to top
                #####EOF##### Develop WooCommerce – The official WooCommerce development blog

                Develop WooCommerce

                The official WooCommerce development blog

                Extension Suggestions in 3.6 — April 3, 2019

                Extension Suggestions in 3.6

                /Todd Wilkens/Leave a comment

                One of the greatest strengths of WooCommerce as a platform is the ecosystem of powerful extensions that allow users to customize and adapt their online stores to address the unique needs of their businesses. In fact, there are very few stores out there that are running without any extensions.

                There are 400+ extensions on the WooCommerce.com marketplace, which can be daunting for a user to dig through in order to discover the things that will help their business.

                So, starting in WooCommerce 3.6, we are going to start suggesting relevant WooCommerce extensions to users based on details of their store. This post covers what these suggestions are.

                What are Marketplace Suggestions?

                We are calling this feature/function “Marketplace Suggestions”. They are contextual mentions of official extensions that may be relevant to a customer. This currently includes all extensions on the official WooCommerce marketplace, which is open for submissions and lists extensions written by Automattic as well as by trusted partners and third-party developers. Continue reading →

                Dev Chat #25 Notes — April 2, 2019
                Performance improvements in 3.6 — April 1, 2019

                Performance improvements in 3.6

                /Mike Jolley/7 Comments

                The upcoming release of 3.6 contains a plethora of performance enhancements that improve both admin and frontend page load times. This post summarises some of the smaller changes, and explains the reasoning behind some of the larger changes and how they work.

                If you’re keen on testing any of this before 3.6 drops, you can test out the release candidate here.

                Product Data Lookup Tables

                Post meta is super flexible, but not that efficient when we need to sort or filter by many meta values at once. This is mostly down to the need to do multiple joins between the wp_postmeta and wp_posts tables

                Something our team has been looking at is moving data from post meta to custom tables to mitigate this. We actually have a feature plugin in progress to do just that, but it does introduce challenges such as backwards compatibility so it’s a long term project. To ship some improvements short term we’ve looked at an alternative approach…lookup tables.

                Lookup tables can be tailored to the needs of the application, making data available in a structured, efficient format, with correct indexes, without needing to move data out of wp_postmeta. Data is formatted and synced to the lookup table when a product is updated.

                The new product lookup table contains data we use for searching, sorting, and filtering, and the schema is as follows:

                  `product_id` bigint(20) NOT NULL,
  `sku` varchar(100) NULL default '',
  `virtual` tinyint(1) NULL default 0,
  `downloadable` tinyint(1) NULL default 0,
  `min_price` decimal(10,2) NULL default NULL,
  `max_price` decimal(10,2) NULL default NULL,
  `onsale` tinyint(1) NULL default 0,
  `stock_quantity` double NULL default NULL,
  `stock_status` varchar(100) NULL default 'instock',
  `rating_count` bigint(20) NULL default 0,
  `average_rating` decimal(3,2) NULL default 0.00,
  `total_sales` bigint(20) NULL default 0,

                The new lookup table is used by joining it to the main posts table (product_id maps to post id) when running queries.

                As an example, frontend sorting and filtering prior to 3.6 the queries was done by joining the wp_postmeta table to the wp_posts table and using ORDER BY and WHERE clauses on that data. Now we simply join to the new lookup table instead which should be more efficient.

                This can be useful during searches or when sorting by meta. Examples where this can be useful include:

                • Stock reports
                • Dashboard reports
                • Sorting by X on the frontend
                • Sorting by X in admin
                • Searching by SKU in the backend
                • Filtering by price

                ref: https://github.com/woocommerce/woocommerce/pull/22718

                Updating the Lookup Table

                The data stores handle updating of lookup tables when data changes. WC_Data_Store_WP has 4 new methods which are extended by other data stores:

                • get_data_for_lookup_table – Returns an array of data to store in a lookup table, by name
                • get_primary_key_for_lookup_table – Returns the primary key of the lookup table, by name
                • update_lookup_table – Updates a row, by ID, for a named table. It uses get_data_for_lookup_table and get_primary_key_for_lookup_table to gather updated data.
                • delete_from_lookup_table – Removes a row from a lookup table.

                Updates are done only when data is updated, for example, the product data store monitors all changes to products:

                if ( array_intersect( $this->updated_props, array( 'sku', 'regular_price', 'sale_price', 'date_on_sale_from', 'date_on_sale_to', 'total_sales', 'average_rating', 'stock_quantity', 'stock_status', 'manage_stock', 'downloadable', 'virtual' ) ) ) {
    $this->update_lookup_table( $product->get_id(), 'wc_product_meta_lookup' );
}

                As long as plugins/extensions use the CRUD system, the data stores will keep things in sync.

                Initial population of the data store is done via an update routine which calls a new function named wc_update_product_lookup_tables(). This queues a bunch of updates using Action Scheduler to populate the tables in stages.

                The product table can also be forced to update via a tool in system status, WooCommerce > Status > Tools > Product lookup tables, or using a CLI command which does the updates all at once:

                wp wc tool run regenerate_product_lookup_tables --user=1

                This process can take a while depending on the number of products, but once updated the sync only does updates/deletes.

                Transient Invalidation

                WooCommerce 3.5 and below had a transient versioning system which would invalidate data and clean up expired transients. In this system, the transients names were given a ‘version’ suffix to allow them to be invalidated all at once. Cron jobs cleaned up expired transients after invalidation.

                The drawbacks of this included:

                • Hundreds of cron jobs being created when updating many products at once, for example, when generating or importing products
                • The cronjobs, when ran, would slow down other pages due to load
                • Large number of cleanups were needed after any form of cache invalidation
                • Cleanups were difficult because the transient names are unknown (they were appended with a random suffix) so this had to be done with a custom SQL query.

                To fix this, we’ve introduced a new method of handling versioned transients. Instead of changing transient names and invalidating transient data by name, we store transients as an array with this structure:

                array(
    'version' => 12345,
    'data'    => ....
)

                When the transient is read, if the version is outdated, the transient is regenerated. This allows us to invalidate cache without expensive cleanup operations.

                ref: https://github.com/woocommerce/woocommerce/pull/22511

                REST API Initialisation

                In 3.5 and earlier, the REST API was loaded on each page. To improve performance we’re now only including and initialising the REST API during the rest_api_init hook.

                ref: https://github.com/woocommerce/woocommerce/pull/22615

                Similarly, to speed up the API request itself, frontend/theme code is no longer loaded during REST requests.

                ref: https://github.com/woocommerce/woocommerce/pull/21090

                To ensure this was not a breaking change, specifically for plugins extending the WooCommerce REST API or using it’s classes directly, the WC autoloader will include all REST API classes if used. If this occurs a warning will be logged or displayed if WP_DEBUG_DISPLAY is enabled.

                We recommend other plugins switch to using the rest_api_init hook to prevent performance issues.

                Loading Active Webhooks

                WooCommerce creates instances of the WC_Webhook class to listen out for events and send requests out when specific events are triggered. Each webhook has its own instance.

                Because there is no limit on the number of webhooks a user can add this can create bottlenecks if many webhooks exist, even if the webhooks are not in use. Webhooks are loaded regardless of status in 3.5.x.

                WooCommerce 3.6 will only load active webhooks. Other webhooks (i.e. those that are disabled or paused) will no longer be loaded. This reduces the load on stores with inactive webhooks.

                ref: https://github.com/woocommerce/woocommerce/pull/22760

                Caching Improvements

                These improvements introduce new caches, and improve existing caches, to speed up database read times if the same query is run multiple times on the same page, or on future page loads if using dedicated object caching.

                • Prime caches when reading variations (#22587) – Priming caches reduces the number of queries by bulk-selecting all data that will be needed later on.
                • Use day, not time, in status widget for caching (#22950) – This increases the likelihood of a cache being available by caching data for longer.
                • Added caching to System Status Report (#22887) – Adds transient caches for expensive remote posts on the status report so it doesn’t retest as often.
                • Add caching to attribute functions (#22938) – Caches global attribute data to prevent multiple DB reads or looping over arrays of attributes.
                • Improved caching of template loader, product types, and layered navigation widget (#22612)

                Query Improvements

                These improvements increase the speed of queries, or reduce the number of queries per page load.

                • Delete empty meta on update in data-stores (#22773) – This change will remove ’empty’ meta values, rather than keep them in the database. Thus reducing the amount of meta stored in total.
                • Don’t query for an order count unnecessarily (#22984) – Prevents a query if the order count is not needed for the main menu in admin, either because of permissions, or if removed intentionally.
                • Index on the downloadable_product_permissions table to improve speed when fetching downloads for customers (#22906) – A new index on this table speeds up lookups of download permissions on stores with many downloads/customers.
                • Improve slow term ordering by using queries instead of PHP (#22570, #22570) – The previous queries grabbed all terms then sorted them with PHP code/loops which used memory and was slower than pure SQL queries that are now in 3.6.
                • Improved speed of the find_matching_product_variation variation lookup function (#22423) – This is used when a product has a large number of variations to find matches based on selections.

                Miscellaneous Improvements

                • Remove external lookup of IP addresses on localhost (#22608) – A slow lookup was performed to get the IP address of the user when on localhost. Since this only affects those testing locally, this bottleneck has been removed.
                • Optimized product CSS class functions to avoid multiple product reads and duplication (#22610) – The CSS class name generation for products was terribly slow and inefficient and did lots of logic twice. This is now improved.
                • Image regeneration edge cases (#22818) – Some sizes of images, in combination with image size settings, lead to images being regenerated on every page load. This is now resolved.
                • Remove unused legacy ‘woocommerce_lock_down_admin’ option and use filter only instead (#17796) – This option has not existed for some time so removing it removes a query per page load.
                • Removes legacy woocomerce_termmeta table and swap out all calls to legacy term meta functions to the new WP ones (#22570) – This table has not been needed since WP 4.4.0. Removing the checks for it prevents unnecessary conditionals.

                Benchmarking the Improvements

                To measure the above improvements we wrote a script which would hit various frontend/admin endpoints and time them, making sure caches were cleared between each run. These were then loaded into a spreadsheet to calculate averages and generate some charts.

                The tests were ran on WooCommerce 3.6 RC1, 3.5.7, and 3.4.7 to see the change over time, and we tested with 3 data sets:

                • small (20 products from sample data)
                • medium (1000 products generated with wc-smooth-generator)
                • large (25k products generated again with wc-smooth-generator).

                This was to ensure changes such as the new lookup table improved the performance of large stores without negatively impacting smaller stores which may not be facing problems.

                We tested mostly product-related endpoints since the majority of performance improvements in 3.6 targeted them. These included:

                • Shop page
                  • Main shop page
                  • sorting by price/reviews/sales
                  • filtering by price
                • Stock reports (low, out of stock, most stocked)
                • Admin dashboard (which shows stock reports)
                • Product list in admin

                Each test was ran 10 times and used to calculate an average.

                Results

                On the small store, the results were almost identical between each version of WooCommerce. With such as small data set, this was expected. Postmeta copes fine with small amounts of data.

                The medium store also had similar results, however, the SKU searching and price filtering did show some positive improvement due to the lookup table:

                The large store, which had 25k products and 50k variations, showed the benefits of the lookup table more clearly, showing improvements of up to 62% between 3.5 and 3.6. This chart shows the frontend requests we measured (results in seconds):

                On the admin side, the performance improvements were more substantial, particularly when reporting or dealing with SKUs:

                For example, the SKU search above is a fulltext search which on the large data set took ~40 seconds. With the lookup table, results were matched in under 1 second.

                What’s Next?

                The above changes are shipping in April 2019 inside WC 3.6 which is now in release candidate stage. We hope the performance improvements help you and your clients. This is an ongoing process and we’re continually looking at ways to improve performance further, so stay tuned to the dev blog to find out these changes are coming.

                If you have suggestions or feedback about the work that has been carried out so far, please let us know in the comments or on GitHub.

                WooCommerce 3.6 RC1 — March 28, 2019

                WooCommerce 3.6 RC1

                /Timmy Crawford/Leave a comment

                The release candidate for WooCommerce 3.6 is now available! To see all the new features being shipped in 3.6, please check out the Beta 1 post for all the details.

                By publishing the release candidate ( RC ) – this signals that we feel 3.6 is ready for release – but we would love your help testing things out prior to the final release! We are still targeting to release WooCommerce 3.6 on Thursday, April 11th.

                What’s New

                In addition to the changelog and feature list that was included in the Beta 1 Announcement – the following items have been added since Beta 1:

                • Enhancement – Improved username generation and introduced wc_create_new_customer_username function. #23145
                • Dev – Update action scheduler to version 2.2.2. #23162
                • Fix – Download link URL in helper. #23146
                • Fix – Completed email wording update. #23128
                • Fix – REST API: Allow filtering by future status #23138
                • Fix – Update refund reason to make it clear process is manual. #23149
                • Fix – Hide stock status for variations when the parent is managing stock. #23069
                • Fix – Force variation product type in WC_Ajax::add_variation. #23131
                • Fix – WooCommerce writes current_theme_supports_woocommerce option on every regular page view. #23035
                • Fix – Update the rating request text in the footer to be friendlier for screen reader users. #23039
                • Fix – Null check variable before accessing its properties on checkout page. #23047
                • Fix – Recognize all input fields with ID for checkout fields. #23050
                • Fix – Avoid regenerating thumbnails on every page load. #21800
                • Fix – Changed ‘private’ methods on WC_Breadcrumb class to ‘protected’. #23057
                • Fix – Jumping to top of page when dismissing store notice. #23066

                Testing

                To test WooCommerce 3.6 RC1, you can use our WooCommerce Beta Tester plugin or you can download the release candidate here (zip).

                Since 3.6 is now in release candidate stage, only bug fixes will be made. No other changes should take place.

                Think you’ve found a bug? Please post in detail to Github.

                Developers, 3.6 is a minor release, so it should be fully backwards compatible. Despite this, it’s still a good idea to test your plugins and themes and help us catch any issues we may have missed before the final release.

                March 28th: Dev Chat #25 — March 22, 2019

                March 28th: Dev Chat #25

                /Timmy Crawford/3 Comments

                We had a grand time last month for Dev Chat #24 – and my how time flies, it is time for the twenty-fifth installment of Dev Chat!

                The next chat will be on Thursday March 28th at 16:00 UTC in the #core channel of the WooCommerce Community Slack. If you don’t already have access to the group, you can request an invite here.

                For this devchat we will be talking a bit more about performance enhancements coming in 3.6 – and will have some benchmarks to share with everyone. Also we will go over some examples of how you can customize the functionality of the new WooCommerce Blocks.

                As always – if you have any other questions, or topics you would like to chat about during Dev Chat #25, please drop a comment below. And if you haven’t checked out the Beta of 3.6 yet – be sure to give it a look and come equipped with any questions or issues!

                See you all on the 28th!

                #####EOF##### Security at VIP – Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP

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                Automattic maintains emergency and contingency plans for the facilities in which data is located. These plans include redundant storage and recovery procedures designed to attempt to reconstruct data in its original or last-replicated state from before the time it was lost.

                As a client, you may choose to delete content published on Automattic’s service. Upon deletion Automattic will clear deleted content from its internal cache within 2 business days, but deleted content may not be cleared as quickly from external caches (for example, Google search index). You may also request deletion of any personal data (for example, usernames and addresses) that it provided to Automattic and/or stored on Automattic.

                Security Breach Notification

                If we discover a security breach involving your site data, Automattic will notify Customer of the breach, except to the extent prohibited by applicable law, notify the Customer of any third-party legal processes received by Automattic relating to the breach, and cooperate with customer in investigating and remedying the breach.

                Let's Talk Security

                We love talking about security, our approach to safeguarding data and systems, and emerging industry standards and best practices. If there’s anything you’d like to know more about, please drop us a note.

                #####EOF##### Introducing Six New Business-Oriented Themes — The WordPress.com Blog

                Introducing Six New Business-Oriented Themes

                Elevate your business website with one of our six new free themes! Calm, sophisticated, friendly, professional, elegant, modern — find the style that’s just right for you.

                February 7, 2019

                Laurel Fulford

                Today we’re excited to announce six new themes with an entrepreneurial spin: Calm Business, Elegant Business, Friendly Business, Modern Business, Professional Business, and Sophisticated Business.

                Designed by Takashi Irie, each theme in this collection is based on a clean, easy-to-navigate layout that’s well-suited to a wide range of businesses — but with six unique styles and tones, there’s a version that suits your distinctive brand.

                The sleek minimalism of Modern Business brings focus to your high-end fashion photography; Sophisticated Business brings a moody palette and stylized typography to complement the style of your upscale restaurant.

                Modern Business
                Sophisticated Business

                Calm Business’s softness matches the peaceful tone of your small yoga studio, while and Friendly Business adds subtle but uplifting touches to create a welcoming online home for your hobby farm.

                Calm Business
                Friendly Business

                Not to be outdone, Professional Business is solid and grounded to echo the integrity of your accounting firm, and Elegant Business’s combination of warmth and sophistication makes it a perfect fit for coffee shops.

                Professional Business
                Elegant Business

                Each themes has a bold accent color you can customize to match your business’s branding.

                They all also include full support for the new WordPress block editor, allowing you to create a wide range of content for your site.

                You can learn more about each of these themes in our showcase!

                Missing out on the latest WordPress.com developments? Enter your email below to receive future announcements direct to your inbox. An email confirmation will be sent before you will start receiving notifications - please check your spam folder if you don't receive this.

                Join 57,721,218 other followers

                23 Comments

                Comments are closed.

                1. ShankySalty Feb 7th at 5:32 pm

                  Woooowww I love it 🌺😊

                  Liked by 5 people

                2. Edith Aint Feb 7th at 7:08 pm

                  Fascinating….I wonder, what would you recommend for a nursery or daycare? My husband’s aunt is considering a blog to advertise her services, and he suggested the “Calm Business” theme. How about a butcher shop?

                  Liked by 9 people

                  • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 12:19 am

                    Calm Business sounds like a great recommendation for a nursery or daycare!

                    For a butcher shop, that’s good question! I think it would depend on the shop’s existing branding. Like, if it was more of a mom & pop shop, Friendly Business could be a good fit; for one that’s higher end, Elegant Business would probably be better. Or if none of these themes quite hit the mark, we have several more geared towards businesses here: https://wordpress.com/themes/filter/business

                    Liked by 9 people

                3. scoobiesnacks Feb 7th at 8:15 pm

                  Do you intend to launch blogging / magazine themes for the new block editor?

                  Liked by 7 people

                  • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 12:21 am

                    Yes! Most recently we’ve launched Photos and Twenty Nineteen on WordPress.com. Any of these six new business themes can also be used for blogging – their demos are set up to showcase a static front page, but like our other themes, they include styles and functionality for blog posts.

                    A number of our existing themes also have had styles added for the new block editor – they can be found here: https://wordpress.com/themes/filter/featured Though it can be used with any of our themes.

                    Liked by 3 people

                    • scoobiesnacks Feb 8th at 12:28 am

                      Sorry. I meant grid based magazine blogging themes. Also, when I browse through all the themes I’m not able to tell which are fully compatible with V5 block editor

                      Liked by 4 people

                      • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 8:32 pm

                        Apologies! I wasn’t very clear above — any of the themes with the ‘featured’ tag, linked above, do include styles for the new editor.

                        There isn’t a new grid-based magazine theme on the horizon at the moment, but we’re always working on new themes, so that could change. 🙂

                        Liked by 3 people

                4. thevalueofsparrows Feb 7th at 11:16 pm

                  Are you stuck with using the “new” block editor? Or can you use the traditional editor?

                  Liked by 4 people

                  • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 12:22 am

                    Both will work with these themes! However, the demo sites for these themes do use blocks, so to create a site with the same kind of content, it will be necessary to use the new editor.

                    Liked by 3 people

                5. Steve Celuch Promotions Feb 8th at 2:42 am

                  I’m going to help promote a commercial diver and his store, any suggestions? 🤔

                  Liked by 3 people

                6. Leo Feb 8th at 5:38 am

                  I’m actually fascinated by the theme used in this blog.wordpress.com. Is it available for public?

                  Liked by 5 people

                  • Laurel Fulford Feb 8th at 8:33 pm

                    We’re glad you like it! Unfortunately, that theme has some specific functionality built in that wouldn’t work well outside of this site, so it’s not publicly available.

                    Liked by 4 people

                7. tmaxfilm Feb 8th at 5:57 am

                  I like the Modern, Sophisticated, and Elegant themes the most. Very nice. I always enjoy looking at the new themes it’s exciting.

                  With that being said I still enjoy my tried and true awesome theme for my photography. It’s a really cool theme WordPress.com put out. Thanks for the Finder Theme I use for my photoblog. I love it!

                  Liked by 2 people

                8. Maria Feb 8th at 10:44 am

                  are these themes free?

                  Liked by 4 people

                9. Food Klinik Feb 8th at 11:23 am

                  Beautiful

                  Liked by 2 people

                10. jamesandwer644 Feb 8th at 11:28 am

                  Nice theme

                  Liked by 1 person

                11. Lissa Murphy Feb 8th at 1:08 pm

                  Wowsers! I absolutely love these themes 😁 Will definitely will look into this. Thank you!

                  Liked by 2 people

                12. katepete839370646 Feb 8th at 1:35 pm

                  Nice themes. Will they become available on wordpress.org at https://wordpress.org/themes ?

                  Liked by 4 people

                13. Lester Bauman Feb 8th at 8:39 pm

                  Do they support a full content RSS? The themes I’ve been using only give you an excerpt, even if you use the content_full merge tag.

                  Liked by 3 people

                14. Jen @The Haute Mommy Handbook Feb 12th at 5:15 pm

                  These themes are beautiful! Thanks for sharing!

                  Liked by 3 people

                15. deepanilamani Feb 14th at 5:43 am

                  Excellent to have such a diverse set of Themes for different business ventures. Thank you for all the information!

                  Liked by 3 people

                Create your new blog or website for free

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                  #####EOF##### Agency Partners – Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP

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                  #####EOF##### Forum: Support | WordPress.com Forums
                  #####EOF##### Roaming around at random | Miscellany

                  A simple method of key verification for multi-device key exchange

                  There are tons of devices around with practically no user faced interface at all, which need to communicate securely with other devices. This includes devices such as a wireless thermometer communicating with a HVAC unit or a wireless lock on your door communicating with your phone when you tell it what keys to accept. The risks include violation of privacy, physical damage and economic loss.

                  With the current Internet of Things trend there will only be more of this type of devices in the future. To be able to use these devices securely you need to ensure there are no room for anybody to attempt to MITM these connections (to intercept it so that they are in the middle and can see and manipulate all data), but practically ensuring that can be incredibly hard if the devices don’t even have a screen.

                  My idea for how to achieve it securely, with minimal interaction required from the user that links the devices together, is to show a visual pattern derived from a shared key.

                  But since most devices don’t have any interface beyond a single LED light, that could typically be hard to achieve. But that’s fortunately not a dead end, because the simple solution is to let the two devices you’re linking together both show the exact same on/off blinking pattern, perfectly synchronized, while you hold them edge to edge. If the patterns are identical, they have the same key (details below on how this can be guaranteed). If you see that they don’t blink in perfect synchronization, then you know the devices you are trying to link do NOT have a secure direct connection to each other.

                  So how do you link them together in the first place? There’s lots of methods, including using NFC and holding them together, temporarily using a wired connection (this likely won’t be common for consumer grade devices), using radio based method similar to WiFi WPS (press a button on both devices), and more. The two options likely to become the most common of those are the simultaneous button press method for wireless devices and NFC. While NFC has reasonable MITM resistance as a result of its design (simultaneously interfering with both parties of a connection is nearly impossible), that doesn’t guarantee that the user will notice an attack (attacking by connecting to the devices one at a time would still work).

                  So by confirming that two devices have a secure communication link by comparing blink patterns, it becomes easy to ensure configuration can be done securely for a wide range of devices. But how can we be sure of this? What can two devices communicate to allow security through comparing a blink pattern? Thanks to cryptographic key exchange this is easy, since all the devices have to do is to generate a large secret number each and perform an algorithm together like Diffie-Hellman. When two devices perform DH together, they generate a shared large secret number that no other device can know. This allows the devices to communicate securely by using this large number as an encryption key. And it also allows us to verify that it is these two devices that are talking to each other by running that number through a one-way transformation like a cryptographic hash function, and using that to generate the pattern to show – and only the two devices that were part of the same DH key exchange will show the same pattern.

                  If anybody tries to attack the connection and perform DH key exchange with the devices separately, they will end up having DIFFERENT secret numbers and will therefore NOT show the same blink pattern.

                  Note that due to human visual bias, there’s a certain risk with showing a pattern with very few components (to barely have more bits than what an attacker can bruteforce) you can’t just display the binary version of the hashed key this way, since the risk is too large that many different combinations of blink patterns would be confused with each other. This can however be solved easily, you can use a form of key expansion with a hash function to give you more unique bits to compare. One way to do this is by doing an iterated HMAC. With HMAC-SHA256 you get 256 bits to compare per HMAC key. So computing HMAC(Diffie-Hellman shared secret key, iteration number) for 10 iterations you get 2560 bits to compare. There’s actually a better way to expand the shared key into enough bits, that’s reliable and fairly independent of what key exchange algorithm you deploy: SHA3’s SHAKE256 algorithm. It’s something kind of in between a hash and a stream cipher, called an extendable-output function (XOF). You get to select how many bits of output you want, and it will process the input data and give you precisely that many bits out. You want 2500 bits exactly? That’s what it will give you. This means that if the user looks at the pattern for long enough, he WILL be able to identify mismatches. 


                  To achieve strong security, you only need for approximately 100+ pairs of bits to be identical to ensure bruteforce is unachievable – and in this setup, it means the user only needs to be able to verify that 4% of the full pattern is identical. So if you have a blink pattern where the blink rate is at 5 bits per second, continously comparing the pattern for any 20 seconds out of the 512 seconds it would take for the pattern to start repeating would correspond to verifying that 100 bits is identical. Of course the blinking would need to be kept synchronized, which would require the devices to synchronize their clocks before starting and could also require them to keep doing so while the blink pattern is showing to prevent “drift”.

                  There are of course other possible methods than just on/off blink. You could have an RGB LED to represent multiple bits for every blink. You could also have geometric patterns shown on a screen when holding the screens of two devices up against each other. You could even do the same thing for mechanical/haptic outputs like Braille screens so that blind people can do it too.

                  What if you can’t hold the two devices physically close to each other? You could use another device as a “courier”. As one example, by letting your smartphone perform key exchange through this method with both devices one by one, it could also then tell the two devices how to connect to each other and what encryption key to use. This way your smartphone would act as a trusted proxy for key exhange. It would also be possible to have a dedicated device for this, such as a small NFC tag with an RGB LED and a smartcard like chip to perform the key exchange with both devices. Using a tag like that would make configuration of new devices as simple as to hold it against the devices and comparing the pattern, and then the connection is secure, with minimal user interaction.

                  Then there’s the question of how to tell the devices that the key exchange was a success or not. Typically most devices will have at least ONE button somewhere. It could be as easy as one press = success, two presses = start over. If there’s no button, and they are the type of devices that just run one task as soon as they get power, then you could use multiple NFC taps in place of button presses. The device could respond with a long solid flash to confirm a successfull key exchange or repeated on/off blinking to show it did reset itself.

                  Originally posted here: http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2uah2b/weve_launched_the_coolwallet_on_indigogo/co6rru6

                  Relevant prior art (found via Google, there may be more):
                  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary;jsessionid=7E99A2B9922A0AE79CF6CAC65634FD8C?doi=10.1.1.41.1574
                  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary;jsessionid=7E99A2B9922A0AE79CF6CAC65634FD8C?doi=10.1.1.126.4242

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                  2015
                  02/01
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                  Leave a comment

                  Why it is possible for cryptocurrencies to gain and sustain value

                  This text is in large part based on the arguments from the NPR article for why gold historically has become the standard currency, “A Chemist Explains Why Gold Beat Out Lithium, Osmium, Einsteinium”, and on my own comparison between the valuable properties of gold and the equivalent properties of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.

                  Link: http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/02/15/131430755/a-chemist-explains-why-gold-beat-out-lithium-osmium-einsteinium

                  So why DID gold win thousands of years ago over other forms of money and stay popular until now?

                  There’s a few basic properties which is necessary for something to useful as money: It is easy to store, easy to move, it is easy to accurately divide in parts, it doesn’t corrode and isn’t otherwise fragile or deteriorate over time and it isn’t dangerous to handle. Those are the basic physical properties, and without those nobody will want to use it.

                  And for the economic properties: It is scarce (unlike sand and practically all relevant metal alloys), it is hard to forge (or else you’ll get counterfeits everywhere) and supply is reasonably predictable and don’t increase too fast (something which is scarce on a global scale but doubles every month isn’t useful as money, and something you don’t know the supply of is too uncertain). Another important property is fungibility, that the majority of samples of it is similar enough to be interchangable – which gold fulfills since it is an atom that allows you to purify a sample of the metal by melting it and clearing out the unwanted elements, leaving you with pure gold which always will be the same (without fungibility every sample needs to be valued independently, which is a major PITA).

                  And since gold has fulfilled all those requirements better than the alternatives (as an example, it is more scarce and corrodes much less than silver), it has become highly valuable. You can with relative ease melt it into whatever shape and size you want, divide it in chunks of arbitary size and store it safely for centuries without it going bad. And you could fairly easily verify that the gold indeed is real gold. So when people wanted to make trades with each other for valuable items, gold was one of the simplest options because there’s always somebody willing to accept it. All the other options were lacking in one or more of these properties compared to gold.

                  So how does cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin compare?

                  The comparison is quite straightforward: Scarcity is guaranteed by the blockchain (ledger of transactions) and the accompanying rules which all miners and Bitcoin wallets obey (anybody breaking the rules will be detected and ignored!), the rules of Bitcoin guarantee a maximum of just below 21 million coins and there’s no way around it. You can trivially confirm if the “coins” somebody claims to have is real by looking at the blockchain to see if the referenced transaction is there or not, and if it has been moved away or not. And fungibility is provided as well since on the blockchain all “coins” are essentially equivalent, they are all a form of “statement” in the ledger/database which the blockchain is (“X coins belongs to address Y”). The divisibility goes down to 8 decimals, making for a total of 2,099,999,997,690,000 subunits (that’s two thousand trillion) and more decimals can be added if necessary.

                  To pay with gold you need to make sure it already is divided in parts with equal value to what you’re buying. No such need with Bitcoin, the software takes care of it automatically. Verifying that the gold is real is much harder than to verify Bitcoins. Bitcoins are far more lightweight – you just need to store the private keys that your addresses are connected to (using public key cryptography) and that can be done on paper, which means storage is far easier by a huge margin once you reach larger values. Like gold, Bitcoins which you hold don’t deteriorate over time. The supply for Bitcoin is highly predictable, scarcity is certain, similar to gold (it is actually far less certain for gold, with the potential for asteroid mining in the future).

                  Using a Bitcoin wallet is simple. Some of the most common ones are Electrum or Bitcoin Core on computers, Mycelium and Schildbach’s Bitcoin Wallet on Android, and Breadwallet on iOS. None of them need any registration of any kind to use and they can all verify that the “coins” sent to you is real with no extra work required on your part. To send a transaction all you need is an internet connection. Making transactions takes merely seconds, and you can send money globally without a problem. Receiving coins is equally simple, just install one of those wallets and start it, and give the sender the address which your wallet just automatically generated – you don’t even need to be online when recieving! That’s all you have to do, and the wallet tells you when the “coins” is yours to spend. The “coins” will stay there forever if you don’t touch them, and with the high divisibility of Bitcoin you can easily send exactly the sum you want (one thousandth of a dollar? no problem!). No third party needs to be involved, neither part needs to trust the other anymore than they normally would if it were a cash payment or if gold was used to pay.

                  So then we have established that Bitcoin can match the properties which enabled gold to gain and sustain value, but why would it gain value in the first place? Why do people want start to use it, where is the demand coming from?

                  I have already mentioned some of the first reasons above – it can be used globally without any need for shipping anything around, it is easier to verify and it is easier to store. But that’s not all, far from it. Thanks to the combination of the blockchain and proof-of-work mining, Bitcoin had the ability to introduce a bunch of new features which are unparalleled – Bitcoin has a scripting language, making it programmable money! It is the first truly decentralized cryptocurrency, all the predecessors relied on central servers and was under the control of a third party.

                  Can you imagine being able to program a piece of gold to teleport back into your vault if the seller didn’t fulfill the terms you agreed to? With Bitcoin you can do something with just that effect that using 2-of-2 multisignature escrow. Can you imagine being able to securely ensure that something like 3 of 5, or 7 of 10 (or any other combination of numbers you like), people on the board of a company MUST sign all transactions that spend money from the reserves of the company, as if a bar of gold would refuse to move unless enough board members agreed? With Bitcoin you can achieve just that using m-of-n multisignature transactions. Can you imagine being able to prevent a sum of money to be spent before a certain date, as if you could make a bar of gold refuse to move until a given day? With Bitcoin you can do that using timelock transactions. And that’s just the beginning!

                  So not only does Bitcoin match the properties of gold which enabled it to gain and sustain value, it also provides entirely new and unmatched incentives to use it. If you are involved in just about anything where you want to enforce a certain set of rules on how the money can be spent, Bitcoin can make your life much simpler. If Bitcoin is the best option available to achieve a goal, then there also exists demand for it. And when there’s both demand and a limited supply, it gains value and will have a market price.

                  What about altcoins (“alternative coins”, other blockchain based cryptocurrencies), why wouldn’t one of them replace Bitcoin? That answer could fill an entire book, but the short answer is that because of the network effect most people will want to use the most popular cryptocurrency, a spot that Bitcoin holds and has held since shortly after its release.

                  Cryptocurrencies become exponentially more useful the more people that accepts it. It’s the same reason for why there’s usually just a few social networks that’s big at a time, being considered the place to go for discussions and organizing events, and so on. It is the same reason for why the phone networks of most countries are compatible and interconnected. Bitcoin was both first out and good enough to make sure that any competitor needs to be substantially better to be able to beat it. Any competitor would need features that Bitcoin is unable to replicate, but since Bitcoin fundamentally is a computer protocol implemented in software it can also be updated to replicate any features of a competitor before that competitor would gain momentum. So the probability that an altcoin would overtake Bitcoin is very slim, and any software developer capable of creating a better altcoin likely would gain more from working on improving Bitcoin itself instead.

                  Then there’s the question of how valuable it will become. Since the demand on global markets is inherently unpredictable (you can never be certain that current trends continue), nobody can possibly know for certain. There’s no guarantee it will ever go up from here, because for all we know it might already have found its niche in the market. My personal opinion is that what it offers is so much better than the current options (mainly fiat currencies, also known as state issued paper money) and payment mechanisms (such as credit cards and paypal) that the demand should grow in the future when other people takes a closer look and decide that its features is desirable.

                  One thing we can know for certain is that it will be interesting to follow its progress in the future, no matter where it goes.

                  If you have any questions, feel free to ask below. I’ll try my best to answer most questions, anything from questions about the technology to the economic incentives and how to use it.

                  2014
                  11/10
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                  Web-of-Trust DNS

                  Originally published here, copied below (edits and references coming later): http://www.reddit.com/r/Meshnet/comments/o3wex/wotdns_web_of_trust_based_domain_name_system

                  Previously mentioned on my blog here: https://roamingaroundatrandom.wordpress.com/2010/12/06/my-ideas-for-dns-p2p/

                  WoT-DNS – Description

                  Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust

                  TL;DR: A system for deciding where domain names should go based on who you trust.

                  WoT-DNS is my proposal for a new P2P based DNS system.

                  This system decides where a domain name like reddit.wot should go based on your trust, as an invidividual; it does not care about the opinion of random strangers. You are the one who choose who’s trusted and who’s not, since it’s using WoT (web of trust). Also, domain names are intentionally NOT globally unique, since the only way to achieve that is with a centralized service or a first-come, first-serve system like Namecoin, and I dislike both those solutions. This means that if you would ask for a sitename like reddit.wot, you could get many results instead of going straight to one site. But whenever one site is trusted (for you) much more than the rest (like reddit’s official site would be), that’s where you’ll go.

                  Basic idea: Gather site registrations for a domain name from the network and from friends -> calculate your WoT metrics for each of the results -> pick the top site if one stands out at the top as most trusted -> let the application go to that site.

                  Basics

                  Every participant runs a WoT-DNS client. There are several ways to enable browsers and IM clients, etc, to use this system. One is to run a local proxy where only .wot domains are intercepted, and normal traffic are untouched. When connecting, it would start by asking the WoT-DNS network about who has registered their site with that domain name.

                  Every client has a unique asymmetric keypair, both regular users and servers have them. Servers additionally generate one unique keypair per registered domain. Registered .wot domains are identified by their key. Each registered domain has at least two addresses: The readable one, such as example-domain.wot, and one that contains it’s public key hash (like I2P, [the 52 base32 characters of the SHA256 hashed public key].key.wot, so “key.wot” are one of those domains you can’t register). That means you can always go directly to a particular site by entering it’s key hash.

                  A domain registration has to contain at least this: The domain name, the server’s public key, addresses (yes, more than one if you like, useful for load balancing and to additionally specify I2P/Tor addresses along with regular-internet IP addresses). Additionally, you can add all the data that ordinary DNS servers can hold for a domain. Also, it can hold a site name and a description of the site, which is useful for telling sites with the same domain name apart. All registrations are also timestamped. I would also like to see a trusted timestamping system built in, to ensure that nobody claims that their domain registrations are older than they are, and the point is to prevent phishing by faking a site’s age.

                  Domain registrations are stored in a distributed database. This means that every node keeps local copies of plenty of registrations. Updates will be continously added to the distributed database (such as when IP addresses change), and the old registrations are then replaced (but only if the keys and signature match). I suggest that we use some DHT system (“distributed hash table”) like Kademelia for the database, or something similiar that provides the features we need.

                  The Web of Trust part:

                  The keypairs make this possible. Since everybody has a unique key pair that consists of a public key and a secret one (using asymmetric cryptography, public key encryption), PGP makes it possible to create signatures of data that likely can’t be forged in our lifetimes. 2048 & 4096 bit keys using RSA are highly secure (while I prefer larger and safer 4096 bit keys, they’re unfortunately also about 5-6 times slower). Keypairs are both used by the site owners for signing their domain registrations, as well as by users that additionally sign them as a means to show that they trust that that site. You can also sign a site as untrusted.

                  WoT details: You have a list of trusted people and organizations, including their public keys. Organizations like Verisign (SSL certificate authority) could be predefined for the sake of newcomers, this will make it like SSL out of the box. If a site has been signed by a friend or by a trusted organization your client will detect that and calculate what level of trust (trust metric) that site gets based on it. Since there can be several sites for a domain name, the site with the highest trust metric are the site your client chooses to go to. If both Microsoft and a spammer registered microsoft.wot and only MS has a signature from Verisign, then Microsoft’s site will be more trusted so your client will prefer to go to Microsoft’s site if your client is set to trust Verisign.

                  If the site in the top don’t have a trust metric that’s high enough (not enough trusted signatures or less than around 30% higher trust than the runner-up) it triggers some an alert (some spam/scam detection should also be built in), then you won’t be sent to the top site right away – instead you get a list of the matching sites, ranked by the trust metrics.

                  So, how are trust metrics calculated? There are PLENTY of ways. One is to assign various levels of trust to your friends, and then simply take a look at how trusted a site is by the people in your web of trust, such as your friends friend. If it’s fully trusted by somebody you fully trust, then you fully trust the site. If it’s a bit trusted by somebody you trust a bit, it’s just a little bit trusted by you. And that’s just the short version!

                  Note that a signature of a domain from a user or organization as Verisign aren’t intended as a method to indicate how trustable the site owner is, it’s primarily a means of voting in this case (choosing who gets what domain name). The trust part is secondary, but necessary to make sure that scammers and spammers won’t be able to take over popular domain names to trick people.

                  So how do you get started? If you want to clear out Verisign and those from the predefined list because you don’t trust them, how do you add people you trust? Well, one way is to “bootstrap” using social networks. Let your client announce on Facebook, Twitter or Google+ that you now are using WoT-DNS with a message that contains the key. When your friends start using WoT-DNS, their clients will automatically find your key and connect to you (if they choose to connect to the same social network). Then you’ll have a list of your friends in your client, and can set the trust levels there. And we don’t need to limit it to social networks.

                  For site admins: While sites will have one keypair, it’s not the only one. Your client also have your personal (or corporate) keypair that your site’s key will be signed with. This “master keypair” for that site can be kept away from your servers, so you can keep it encrypted on a drive in a safe (obviously you can have multiple separate keypairs, so you don’t need that level of security for the rest). If the server is hacked and somebody get your site key, you can issue a revokation signature with your master key pair, which will tell everybody that the site’s old keys now are revoked.

                  Then you can restore the servers and generate a new site key, and all the old trust signatures can be “moved over”. This won’t be automatic, but everybody who has signed the site key will get notified about the replacement key pair so that they can sign it.

                  Problems

                  • Vulnerable to targeted social engineering. A scammer could try to trick several close friends of some CEO to sign his site, in order to convince the CEO that his site is legitimate.
                  • Trust metrics. How do we calculate them? How do we make them hard to “game”/mess with?
                  • Evaluating trust. How do you know if your friend can judge if a site is legitimate? How do you yourself know if a site is legitimate?

                  NON-issues

                  • Botnets/spammers that mass-sign phishing sites’ keys. This is only a problem if a significant part of YOUR Web of Trust (your friends) sign the site’s public key and it hasn’t been flagged yet by somebody like Microsoft or Google (they keep their own blacklists already for spam domains for use in Chrome and IE).
                  • A bunch of strangers or Group X or Group Y signing the key for a site that’s in conflict with the one you want to go to from Group Z. This will NOT prevent you from getting to the site you want. Just don’t set your client to trust X or Y. But yes, this means that followers of different groups can end up on different sites for the same domain name. This is by design, as I can’t come up with any other solution that isn’t first come, first serve, and that would make domain names globally unique. So I’m allowing domain name conflicts and letting different people get to different sites for them. I do not see this as an issue.
                  • Non-static URL:s. We can have those too, but you need to use the key hash domain names. A static URL could look like this: abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcd.key.wot/news/global/reddit-is-awesome.php
                  • Single point of failures/hacked Certificate Authorities. Remember that we are computing a site’s trust based on what ALL of the nodes that WE trust think of it. A single flag from somebody you trust could alert you about a malicious site. If Verisign were to be hacked, it could be a flag from StartSSL. Or from somebody else. Doesn’t matter. All it needs is one warning. But the scammer has to trick almost everybody you trust into trusting him.

                  Feedback and questions, please! Please contribute by giving me feature suggestions, or by pointing out possible problems, or by just telling me about any useful idea you might have. All feedback is welcome! If you don’t like my idea, tell me why!

                  [This is not finished yet, it’s a work in progress…]

                  2014
                  09/20
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                  Tamper resistant full-disk encryption

                  There are various problems with many of the common methods of applying full disk encryption (FDE) that isn’t always obvious right away. The common FDE programs also typically have a number of limitations or drawbacks that make them less than ideal.

                  One class of attacks one wouldn’t necessarily consider is called evil maid attacks (tampering with the ciphertext, altering the bootloader), another is comparing different versions of the ciphertext over time. One particular type of tampering attack is a ciphertext modification attack against certain implementations of CBC cipher mode, which allows the attacker to essentially replace parts of the plaintext by altering the ciphertext in a certain way (which however will randomly scramble the first block in the series that you tamper with). For most FDE variants you can see exactly which parts of the ciphertext has changed and which changes has been undone (a previously seen ciphertext block returns), and much more. There is also the risk of an attacker simply reversing selected parts of the ciphertext to a previous version, which in some cases could reintroduce vulnerabilities in software that is in the encrypted volume. Some methods of getting around the problems is highly complex, and don’t always solve all of the problems.

                  I’m suggesting one way of implementing full disk encryption that should be secure against a wide range of attacks, even against an attacker in full control of the storage space such as a compromised cloud storage host, both preserving secrecy/privacy and ensuring any tampering with the data can’t be undetected.

                  First of all we need to be able to encrypt blocks of an arbitrary size, because that’s one of the limitations with trying to implement efficient full disk encryption as the smallest writable block can have varying sizes. XTS mode handles this, has good performance and is widely used.

                  While it doesn’t allow you to tamper with it in a way that can control the plaintext (unlike CBC) one can see on the ciphertext when the plaintext have been reversed, and when used alone it don’t stop an attacker from reversing the ciphertext to a previous version or scrambling it (which could allow an attacker to reintroduce security holes in software, or to scramble plaintext undetected). So we need to add authentication to the encryption so that modified ciphertexts will be detected, and further add a method to make sure that no individual blocks can be reversed to previous states.

                  Exactly how it should be implemented isn’t my expertise, but the most simple (but inefficient) method would be to generate authentication tags through using HMAC on all XTS blocks, and then further HMAC that list of HMAC’s such that they can’t be individually reversed, and store it encrypted. The method I’m suggesting later will have some similarities to that method. Ideally I would want a type of authentication tag generation integrated into the XTS cipher mode, or some other efficient method of generating authentication tags. Another approach would be to generate something like a Merkle hash tree of the ciphertexts and HMAC that as the authentication method, which allows you to save space as you don’t need to store all the authentication tags (generating it might not be very efficient, however). Yet another option (in case it would end up performing better) would be to combine those two and use an authenticated version of XTS and generate a Merkle hash tree of the tags for storage rather than storing them directly. The ideal solution is some form of authenticated block cipher which can handle arbitary block sizes.

                  Then we need to make sure that any attacker can’t easily see what you have changed in the encrypted volume. To do this, I’m suggesting that each time you mount the disk as writable you generate a new encryption IV (or key) for that session, which is used to encrypt all blocks you edit. This IV is also used to generate the key for the encryption authentication for the session. All generated IV:s are encrypted with the master key, and there’s a means of tracking which block is encrypted with which IV (some form of database). The IV list is also authenticated together with the list of authentication tags such that modifying any single block in the volume, even replacing them with previous versions, would lead to the authentication of the ciphertext failing (as it would only validate if the the stored authentication tags for the latest version of that block verifies for that ciphertext).

                  To improve the security of this approach, one could use a form of ratcheting where each new IV or key is derived from the last key, a counter and fresh collected entropy. Using a counter together with the above approach of making sure everything is authenticated also enables you to ensure the entire volume is intact, and that nothing have been replaced with a previous version as all you need to see is that your software decrypts the volume successfully without warnings and that the counter is one number higher than last time, because an attacker can’t get your software to show a slightly higher counter value and also not warn about tampering without knowing your encryption password.

                  On top of that one can also add features like read-write access controls by adding in public key cryptography. Use a public key from a master keypair that is stored in the header, together with a signed ACL and signed public keys of everybody with editing rights. These keys would be required to sign the IV/key list as well, such that somebody who only have the decryption password but not a a keypair with editing rights can’t make any edits without the cryptographic authentication failing. Detailed ACL:s would require some form of support in the OS to not cause errors, potentially this could be done by treating sections with different access rules as separate volumes, some of which would be read-only.

                  One way to speed up detection of attemps to modify the ciphertext is random pre-boot verification of a subset of authentication tags. Checking a few hundreds to a few thousand tags can take less than a second, and has a high probability of detecting modifications if an attacker (or a disk error!) has caused any part larger than a few thousand blocks in a row being modified. After boot, on-access verification is performed and blocks which verification fails for is reported as corrupted to the OS.

                  Then further we need to make sure that an attacker can’t easily tell exactly which parts actually have been modified each time, and the easy way to do this is to randomly select additional ranges of blocks to reencrypt with the new session IV, which you didn’t touch yourself. Once a previous session IV no longer is used for any blocks (all blocks that was encrypted with it has been overwritten) it can be deleted from the IV list. Another way could be to randomly reorder sections of blocks, like reverse defragmentation.

                  2014
                  09/20
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                  My take on the ideal password manager

                  There’s a few variants of password managers. The simplest are a list of password entries in am encrypted file. Some are fancier and can automatically fill in your password for you when logging in on websites. Some supports authentication types that aren’t passwords (HOTP/TOTP secrets, etc). But I’m thinking more of the backend here, since all those other features can be added on top.

                  I want a password manager where you can add entries without unlocking it first. This isn’t difficult to achieve, just use public key encryption with a keypair associated to the password database. But the details can be finicky. What if you have several devices synced via online file storage services, which are online and offline at varying times, and where you sometimes make offline edits on several devices independently before syncing? My idea here is for how to make syncing easy to achieve silently, while being able to add password entries from anywhere, anytime (and yes, this turns the password database into an append-only database during normal usage, but you can clear out old entries manually to save space).

                  First of all we need an encrypted database, and SQLCipher should do just fine. Password entries are database entries with all the relevant data: entry name, service name and address, username, authentication details (passwords would be the standard but not the only one), comments. To add entries when it is locked we need a keypair for asymmetric encryption, so the private key is stored in the database with the public key stored unencrypted in the same type as the database.

                  But how exactly should entries by added? The simplest method is to create a fresh encrypted SQLCipher database with its encryption key itself being encrypted with the public key of the main password database. This is stored in a separate file. The encrypted key is stored appended to the encrypted new entries, with a flag that identifies the password database it should be merged into. When you unlock the main database, the private key is used to decrypt the key for the new entries, and they are then added to the main database. This allows for adding passwords from several devices in parallel and merging them in. Once merged with the main one, those temporary database files can be deleted.

                  And how do we handle conflicts? What if you end up doing password resets from a library computer you don’t trust much to access some service, and then do it again elsewhere, create entries at both occasions and don’t sync them until later? The simplest way is to keep all versions and store a version history for every entry, so you don’t lose what might be the real current password because you thought it got changed or thought it happened in a different order. But what about devices that have been offline for a while? How would your old laptop know how to sync in a new version of the database with its old version when it hasn’t seen every added entry up until the latest version (considering the new version might lack entries the laptop has, but have others)? The simplest method would be to let the devices use a separate working copy from the one on the file syncing service so it can compare the versions, and then it compare all entries. The history of entries should be identified by hashes of the details, so that a direct comparison is simple (add all entries with unknown hashes). But when the histories differ, what do you do? You could sort the entry versions by timestamp and assume the latest timestamp is the current correct password, allowing the user to change later. It would also keep a history of deleted entries by their hashes, to simplify sync with devices that have been offline for a while (so they don’t add back old deleted entries).

                  (More details and a simplified summary coming later)

                  2014
                  08/04
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                  An MPC based privacy-preserving flexible cryptographic voting scheme

                  There are various reasons for why electronic voting isn’t widely used, and some of their biggest problems are to ensure anonymity for the voters, ensuring that votes can’t be manipulated or otherwise tampered with, that you can be certain your vote has been included and counted correctly, that the full vote count is performed correctly, that the implementation is secure, that votes can’t be selectively excluded, that fake votes won’t be counted, etc…

                  That’s a pretty long list of dangers!

                  My own idea for a cryptographic voting scheme below attempts to account for all these problems, as well as some more. Originally I posted about this idea on Reddit here.

                  This voting scheme relies on the usage of a variety of cryptographic primitives, including symmetric cryptography like key derivation functions (KDF, like HKDF) and encryption (such as XChaCha20+Poly1305), public key encryption / asymmetric encryption (ECC / ECIES), Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC, like SCALE-MAMBA), Shamir’s Secure Sharing Scheme (SSSS), Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP, like ZK-STARKs) and personal smartcards to implement signing and encryption of the votes.

                  As a fundamental requirement every voter must have their own personal cryptographic asymmetric keypair on a smartcard. This card could for example be integrated in a state issued ID card, like they do in Estonia. As a simple way of improving the security margin for these keys (to avoid risks like insecure key generation), a new keypair is generated on the card when the owner has received it, and they digitally sign a notification to the issuer to replace the old keypair and register the new one. The card issuing entity verifies the identity of the voters and thus of the card owners, and tracks which public key is linked to each card.

                  Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) can described as a way of letting several entities create a shared “virtual machine” that nobody can manipulate or see the inside of, in order to simulate a secure trusted third party server. Thanks to advanced cryptography, we can use distrust to our advantage since strong implementations of MPC can’t be exploited unless the majority of the participants collude maliciously against the rest.

                  The MPC participants would include a number of different organizations involved in the voting process which has conflicting interests (to prevent them from willingly collaborating), such as the major parties (as an assurance for them), civil organizations like EFF and ACLU (as an assurance for the people), federal agencies like NSA, FBI and the White House (as a assurance for the government), the department running the election, and more.

                  Because they all only runs one node each following the MPC protocols, they know nothing more than what they put in and what they are supposed to get as an output from it – and because they DO NOT want to work together (due to conflicting goals) to spy on or alter the result, it’s safe*!

                  • For various probabilities of safe. You also have to assume nobody’s able to hack a majority of the participants, or blackmail enough participants, or break the cryptography.

                  As a part of the initial setup process, they all create a random “seed” each (a large random number) that they provide as input to the MPC. First of all, when the MPC system has the random input seeds, it combines them with a HKDF to ensure the output is properly random – this means that only one participant needs to be honest and use a true random number, in order for the result to be both unpredictability random and secret from all the participants. This result is the MPC seed.

                  Then that output is used as the seed for generating secure keys and random numbers, including the main MPC voting system’s main keypair. The MPC participants also provides a list of the registered eligible voters and their respective public keys. All participants must provide IDENTICAL lists, or the MPC algorithm’s logic will detect it and just stop with an error. This means that all MPC participants have an equal chance to audit the list of voters in advance, because the list can’t be altered after they all have decided together on which version to use. Something like a “vote manifest” is also included to identify the particular vote and declare the rules in use.

                  The MPC system will then use its main keypair to sign the voter list and the manifest, and then it will use Shamir’s Secure Sharing Scheme (SSSS) and encryption to split it’s private key into one part for each MPC participant (more on this below), and provide each MPC participant with the MPC public key, the signed manifest, the voter list and an individual share of the main keypair’s private key.

                  SSSS is a method of splitting up data so that it only can be recovered if you have enough shares (reaching a defined threshold), which in the case of the vote system would be all all the shares of all the MPC participants (if you don’t have enough shares to reach the threshold, the key can’t be recovered). Setting other tresholds is possible, such as 2 of 3 or 45 of 57 or anything else you need.

                  Time for voting. The public MPC key is now distributed EVERYWHERE. On every advertisement about the vote, the key is there (maybe in Qr code form). This ensures that everybody knows what it is, and thus we prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against voters (which would be somebody swapping out the MPC key to find out what people voted for).

                  Now, the voter makes his vote. He generate a nonce (unique number used once), makes his vote, signs it with his keypair, and encrypts this with the public MPC key (the signing and encryption is both done on the personal smartcard in one go). This vote is now sent to the voting management organization (maybe this is done on-the-spot if the voter is at a voting booth).

                  Since the vote wasn’t encrypted with his own keypair, he CAN NOT decrypt it which means that nobody can prove what he voted for using just the encrypted message (for as long as the MPC remains secure!). To know what a person voted for, you need to physically watch him vote!

                  To add a level of transparency in the vote submission process, all votes are registered on a blockchain or similar timestamping mechanism such as through Bitcoin, and they are digitally signed by the voting management organization to that prove they too have seen them. This means that you can nearly instantly verify that your vote is going to be included unmodified in the count. Attempts at excluding votes from certain areas or certain users would be obvious and provable as soon as the voting result is published.

                  Encrypted votes can’t be modified without detection, and once timestamped they can also NOT be modified in a way which would change what it would count towards and yet remain valid – any modified votes WILL be detected by the MPC system and rejected. Fake votes will also be detected and rejected. To make sure your encrypted vote will be counted, you just need to make sure it is included unmodified. When the time to vote ends, new submissions is no longer accepted or signed by the vote management organization. After the deadline, a final list of encrypted votes is signed and published.

                  For efficiency in the MPC counting and for transparency, the voting management organization gathers all the encrypted votes that was signed and registered in the blockchain, takes the hash of the last block and generates a Zero-knowledge proof of that all votes submitted before that last block, with the given hash, is included in the vote list. The signed vote list is published with the Zero-knowledge proof.

                  Then it is time for the vote counting. The MPC participants then hands the MPC their individual SSSS shares for the master keypair, the signed vote list with the blockchain hash and the Zero-knowledge proof, the manifest and list of voters, the counting rules, and random seeds, and all other data it needs.

                  The MPC keypair is reassembled and decrypted inside the MPC system. It verifies the Zero-knowledge proof of the vote list being complete, decrypts the votes, verifies all votes (checks signatures, syntax and that it follows the rules from the manifest), checks that no voter’s key is used more than once (duplicates are discarded; alternatively a more recent vote in the blockchain could replace previous ones), and counts them according to the chosen method of vote counting.

                  When it is done it generates the voting statistics as output where each vote option is listed together with all vote nonces listed next to it, it specifies which blockchain hash it was given (to show it has processed all votes registered in the blockchain), references the manifest, and the MPC then signs this output. Except for the vote result itself, the statistics could also include things like the number of possible voters (how many there was in the voting list), the number of votes, how many parties there were, how many votes each party got, etc…

                  So now you search for your nonce in the output and checks that the vote is correct. The nonce CAN NOT be tied to you, it’s just some random number. You can lie that yours belongs to somebody else, you can pretend to have another one. The number of votes can be verified.

                  However, done in this way we’re vulnerable to a so called “birthday attack”. The thing is that if there’s been 20 000 votes for political party X and their followers threaten 5 000 people, chances are that more than one voter will claim the same nonce voting for party X is theirs (roughly 22% risk per-voter). So how do we solve this? Simple: Let the voter make both one real vote and several fake votes (“decoy votes”). Then the voter has several false nonces that he can give, including one that says that he voted for party X. Only the voter himself can know which nonce belongs to the real vote! To prevent the adversary that threaten him from figuring out if and how many false votes the voter made, the size of the encrypted voting messages should be static with enough margin for a number of “decoy votes” (if there’s several possible adversaries that could threaten you based on your vote). Now these guys could threaten 30 000 people, but even if there’s just 20 000 voters for their party they still can’t say which 10 000 (or more) it was that voted for somebody else or prove anybody wrong. (The MPC would then also report the total number of decoy nonces vs real ones).

                  The best part? We can use ANY type of voting, such as preferential, approval, wheighted, ranked, etc! It’s just a piece of text anyway that allows for arbitary syntax, and you can “encode” ANY kind of vote in it! You can use a simple most-number-of-votes, or score from 1-10, etc…

                  In the end, you know that your vote has been counted correctly, everybody knows no fake votes have been added, that none has been removed, it’s anonymous, and the only way to force individual voters to vote as you wish is to physically watch them vote.

                  If you trust that these maybe +10 organizations won’t all conspire together against the voters, you can be pretty sure the voting has been anonymous AND secure. The only way to alter the counting or other computational parts on the side of the voting management requires nearly full cooperation between people in ALL participating organizations that have full access to the machines running the Secure Multiparty Computation protocol – and they MUST avoid ALL suspiscion while at it!

                  Advantages

                  If you can distribute personal keypairs securely to the voters, nobody can alter/fake votes outside the Secure Multiparty Computation system.

                  • A majority of the Secure Multiparty Computation participants have to collude and be in (near) full agreement to break the security of the system. If their interests are conflicting, it just won’t happen.
                  • The security of the system relies on the cryptographic security + the low risk of collusion among enough MPC participants. If you accept both of these points as strong, this system is strong enough for you.
                  • It’s anonymous
                  • You can verify your vote
                  • You can’t be blackmailed/forced to reveal your vote, because you can fake *any* vote

                  Potential weaknesses

                  • The public won’t fully understand it
                  • The ID smartcards with the personal keypairs must be protected, the new personal keys must be generated securely
                  • We need to ensure that the MPC and Zero-knowledge proof algorithms really are as secure as we assume they are

                  I’ve changed the scheme a bit now from the original version. It should be entirely secure against all “plausible” attacks except for hacking all the MPC participants at once or against an attacker that can watch you physically while you make the vote. The latter should not be an issue in most places and can probably not be defended against with any cryptographic scheme, while the first is all about infrastructure security, and also not cryptographic security.

                  Feedback is welcome. Am I missing anything? Do you have any suggestions for useful additions or modifications? Comment below.

                  2014
                  06/16
                  POSTED BY
                  CATEGORY
                  Security
                  Software/protocol ideas
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                  Basic blueprint for a link encryption protocol with modular authentication

                  The last few years we have seen more and more criticism build up against one of the most commonly used link encryption protocols on the internet, called SSL (Secure Socket Layer, or more precisely it’s current successor TLS, Transport Layer Security) for various reasons. A big part of it is the Certificate Authority issued certificates model of authenticating websites where national security agencies easily can get fake certificates issued, and another big part is the complexity who have lead to numerous implementation bugs such as OpenSSL’s Heartbleed and Apple’s Goto Fail and many more, due to the sheer mass of code where you end up not being able to ensure all of it is secure simply because the effort required would be far too great. Another (although relatively minor) problem is that SSL is quite focused on the server-client model, despite that there’s a whole lot of peer-to-peer software using it where that model don’t make sense, and more.

                  There’s been requests for something simpler which can be verified as secure, something with opportunistic encryption enabled by default (to thwart passive mass surveillance and increase the cost of spying on connections), something with a better authentication model, and with more modern authenticated encryption algorithms. I’m going to make a high-level description here of a link encryption protocol blueprint with modular authentication, that has been inspired by the low-level opportunistic encryption protocol TCPcrypt and the PGP Web of Trust based connection authentication software Monkeysphere (which currently only hooks into SSH). In essence it is about the separation and simplification of the encryption and the authentication. The basic idea is quite simple, but what it enables is a huge amount of flexibility and features.

                  The link encryption layer is quite simple. While the protocol don’t really have separate defined server / client roles, I’m going to describe how the connections work with that terminology for simplicity. This will be a very high-level description. Applying it to P2P models won’t be difficult. So here it goes (and to the professional cryptographers in case any would read this, please don’t hit me if something is wrong or flawed, please tell me how and why it is bad and suggest corrections so I can try to fix it);

                  The short summary: A key exchange is made, an encrypted link is established and a unique session authentication token is derived from the session key.

                  A little longer summary: The client initiates the connection by sending a connection request to the server where it initates a key exchange (assuming a 3-step key exchange will be used). The server responds by continuing the key exchange and replying with it’s list of supported ciphers and cipher modes (prioritization supported). Then the client finishes the key exchange and generates a session key and selects a cipher from the list (if there is an acceptable option on the list), and tells the server what it chose (this choice can be hidden from the network since the client can send the HMAC or an encrypted message or similar of it’s choice to the server). The server then confirms the encryption choice, and the rest of the encryption is then encrypted using that session key using the chosen cipher. A session authentication token is derived from the session key, such as through hashing the session key with a predefined constant, and is the same for both the client and the server, and the token is exposed to the authentication system to be used to authenticate the connection (for this reason it is important that it is globally unique, untamperable and unpredictable). Note that to prevent cipher downgrade attacks the cipher lists must also be authenticated, which could be done by verifying the hashes of the lists together with the session auth token – if the hashes is incorrect, somebody has tampered with the cipher lists and the connection is shut down.

                  And for the modular authentication mechanism:

                  The short summary: Authentication is made through both cryptographically verifying that the other end is who he claims to be and verifying that both ends have the same session auth token (it must not be possible to manipulate the key exchange to control the value of the session key and thus the session auth token). It is important that the proof of knowing the session auth token and the authentication is combined and inseparable and can’t be replayed in other sessions, so the token should be used as a verifiable input in the authentication mechanism.

                  A little longer summary: What type of authentication is required varies among types of applications. Since the authentication is modular, both ends has to tell the other what type of authentication it supports. A public server would often only care about authenticating itself to visitors and not care about authenticating the visitors themselves. A browser would usually only care about identifying the servers it connects to. Not all supported methods must be declared (for privacy/anonymity and because listing them all rarely is needed), some can be secondary and manually activated. The particular list of authentication methods used can also be selected by the application based on several rules, including based on what server the user is connecting to.

                  There could be authentication modules hooking into DNSSEC + DANE, Namecoin, Monkeysphere, good old SSL certificates, custom corporate authentication modules, Kerberos, PAKE/SRP and other password based auth, or purely unauthenticated opportunistic encryption, and much more. The browser could use only the custom corporate authentication module (remotely managed by the corporate IT department) against intranet servers while using certificate based authentication against servers on the internet, or a maybe a Google specific authentication module against Google servers, and so on. The potential is endless, and the applications is free to choose what modules to use and how. It would also be possible to use multiple authentication modules in both directions, which sometimes could be useful for multifactor authentication systems like using a TOTP token & smartcards & PAKE towards the server with DNSSEC + DANE & custom certificates towards the client. It could also be possible for the authentication modules on both ends to request the continous presence of a smartcard or HSM on both ends to keep the connection active, which could be useful for high-security applications where simply pulling the smartcard out of the reader would instantly kill the connection. When multiple authentication modules is used, one should be the “primary” module which in turn invokes the others (such as a dedicated multifactor auth module, in turn invoking the smartcard and TOTP token modules) to simplify the base protocol.

                  Practically, the authentication could be done like in these examples: For SRP/PAKE and HMAC and other algorithms based on a pre-shared key (PSK) both sides generate a hash of the shared password/key, the session auth token, the cipher lists and potentially of additional nonces (one from each party) as a form of additional challenge and reply-resistance. If both sides have the same data, then the mutual authentication will work. For OpenPGP based authentication like with Monkeysphere, a signature would be generated for the session auth token, both parties’ public keys and nonces from both parties, and then that signature would be sent stand-alone to the other party (because the other party already have the input data if he is the intended recipient), potentially encrypted with the public key of the other party. For unauthenticated opportunistic encryption, you would just compare the cipher lists together with the session auth token (maybe using simple HMAC together with challenge nonces) to make a downgrade attack expensive (it might be cheaper to manipulate the initial data packet with the cipher list for many connections so that the ciphertext later can be decrypted if one of the algorithms is weak, than to outright pull off a full active MITM on all connections).

                  I have also thought about how to try to authenticate semi-anonymously, i.e. such that neither party reveals who they are unless both parties know each other. The only way I think this is possuble is through the usage of Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) and similar algorithms (SRP/PAKE is capable of something similar, but would need on average a total of x*y/2 comparisons of shared passwords if party A has x passwords and B has y passwords). Algorithms like MPC can be said to cryptographically mimic a trusted third party server. It could be used in this way: Both parties have a list of public keys of entities it would be willing to identify itself to, and a list of corresponding keypairs it would use to identify itself with. Using MPC, both parties would compare those lists without revealing their contents to the other party – and if they both are found to have a matching set of keypairs the other recognize and is willing to authenticate towards, the MPC algorithm tells both parties which keypairs matches. If there’s no match, it just tells them that instead. If you use this over an anonymizing network like Tor or I2P, you can then suddenly connect to arbitary services and be able to prove who you are to those you already know, while remaining anonymous towards everybody else.

                  It would even be possible for an application to recognize a server it is connecting to as a front-end for several services, and tell the authentication manager to authenticate towards those services separately over encrypted connections (possibly relayed by the front-end server) – in particular this allows for secure authentication towards a site that uses both outsourced cache services (like Akamai) and encryption accelerator hardware (which you no longer have to trust with sensitive private keys), making it cheaper to securely implement services like private video hosting. In this case the device performing the server-side authentication could even be a separate HSM, performing authentication towards clients on the behalf of the server.

                  The protocol is also aware of who initiated the connection, but otherwise have no defined server / client roles. Although the authentication modules are free to introduce their own roles if they want to, for example based on the knowledge of who initated the connection and/or who the two parties of the connection is. It is also aware of the choice of cipher, and can therefore choose to provide limited access to clients who connects using ciphers that are considered having low security, but still secure enough to be granted access to certain services (this would mainly be important for reasons such as backwards compatibility and/or performance on embedded devices).

                  The authentication module could also request rekeying on the link encryption layer, which both could be done using a new key exchange or through ratcheting like in the Axolotl protocol, or simply through hashing the current session key to generate a new one and deleting the old one from RAM (to limit the room for cryptanalysis, and to limit how much of the encrypted session data can be recovered if the server is breached and the current session keys is extracted).

                  But what if you already have a link encryption layer with opportunistic encryption or other mechanism that allow you to generate a secure session auth token? You shouldn’t have to stack another layer of encryption on top of it just to be compatible if the one you already are using is secure enough. There’s a reason the link encryption and authentication is separate here – rather than hardcoding them together, they would be combined using a standardized API. Basically, if you didn’t use the “default” link encryption protocol, you would be using custom “wrapper software” that would make the link encryption you are using look like the default one to the authentication manager and provide the same set of basic features. The authentication manager is meant to only rely on the session auth token being globally unique and secure (unpredictable) to be able to authenticate the connection, so if you can achieve that for the link encryption then you’re good to go.

                  (More updates coming later)

                  References:

                  http://web.monkeysphere.info/

                  http://tcpcrypt.org/

                  https://gist.github.com/Natanael90/556350

                  https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/tcpcrypt-dev/2010-August/000007.html

                  https://whispersystems.org/blog/advanced-ratcheting/

                  http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-May/021475.html

                  2014
                  06/06
                  POSTED BY
                  CATEGORY
                  Security
                  Software/protocol ideas
                  TAGS




                  5 comments

                  A decentralized hash-chained discussion system

                  After thinking for a while about how I want a discussion system to work. Since I’ve seen numerous forums get abandoned, old archived discussions getting lost when servers crash, discussions jumping between various forums and chat rooms and blogs and more, etc, I came to the conclusion that I want a commenting system that is directly focused on the posts themselves, and which is decentralized and can easily reference external discussions, and where you don’t simply lose the history of old discussions because one server went down.

                  So with inspiration by Git and the Bitcoin blockchain, I’ve got an idea about a discussion system based on posts encoded in JSON (or a similar format, maybe XML), where each comment is signed by it’s author(s), references its author’s profile/ID (ideally in a verifiable manner, such as referencing a cryptographic public key), has topic tagging, which references to the comments it replies to with the hashes of the comments (so that anybody reading it can verify exactly what the author was responding to), and more.

                  The default use case I’m considering is the one that would work like mailing lists (email servers that relay messages sent to it to its subscribers, so you can discuss topics with a group of people by email). In this system the equivalent would be what I call a channel. A channel would be defined by an initial “channel definition post” that declares that a specific method of delivery (or several!) of the messages is to be used, what topics is allowed, moderation rules, where you can find an archive of messages, and other relevant details. You could then register with the server from your client (if registration would be required on the channel), send in your messages through the defined method (uploading to the server by default – serverless distribution methods would also be possible) and it would then relay it to all subscribers. On open lists where anybody can post directly, moderation posts could be used to declare that certain messages that went through are to be considered spam or breaks the rules, so that the subscribers’ software clients could delete or hide them automatically so that you don’t have to see them when you open your client to read the discussions on the channel. In a similar manner, moderation posts could also flag for rule updates and more in the channel.

                  Since we would be defining a standard format for how to encode the comments from scratch, we could also enable full semantic tagging from the start. Dates and events can be marked as such, just like addresses, phone numbers, even nicknames, and more. Disambiguation would be made far easier when you don’t have to wonder if you should write a long explanation or put details in paranthesis or omit it entirely hoping nobody will misunderstand you. Whenever you think a phrase or word or expression is unclear, you can just add a tag that shows what it means which would be hidden by default and that the readers can chose to display or not (and it would be possible to clarify that for example a word is used as a verb, or even make a link back to a previous or latter sentence in your post).

                  And since the whole discussions are defined simply by signed messages of a defined format that references each other by hashes, it suddenly becomes easy to let a discussion jump as a whole to other forums when the commenters agree that they want to continue it elsewhere. No longer do you have to simply cut-and-paste raw text if you want to import the discussion history, instead the posts can be reuploaded to the new place together and the whole history can be fetched by the subscribers’ client software when they want to see which posts is referenced or quoted, in a verifiable manner (the digital signatures allow you to verify the comments haven’t been modified).

                  This actually even enables the subscribers of two or more separate channels to crosstalk easily, since you can directly quote messages from the other channels / forums and at the same time include a reference to the “channel definition post” so that your client can see how to fetch the rest of the history of the discussion. So for example, in a channel about RC cars a quote could be made of a post in an electronics channel, allowing the RC folks to look up the rest of the discussion with just a few clicks, and to even join that channel to post questions which in turn reference the initial crosspost, further allowing the commenters on both channels to follow the discussions on each side. There’s even the possibility of having a shared discussion among several channels on multiple servers where all commenters only needs to reply to the discussion on their own channel, having it automatically synchronized among all the channels on all servers.

                  Author identities could be verified in several ways. Posts would as I mentioned be digitally signed (using public key cryptography such as ECDSA), and the public key would be included in the message. This public key could then be tied to for example a Twitter or Facebook account, or a GPG key, or a Namecoin profile (see onename.io), or whatever else you like. Your client would then (by default) verify that the public key used to sign the message can be found on the profile in question or is signed by it’s keypair. Combined with the previously mentioned address book software here on my blog, your client could automatically show which posts has been verified to be made by people in your address book, and the client could automatically verify Namecoin registered profiles through the signatures, etc. This way you can verify which posts have been made by the same person, and not just by different people with the same nickname. And since your profile also could have an index of all your previous public comments, your client could also trivially allow you to look up all public posts from people from all channels on all servers where they’ve participated in discussions.

                  (More updates coming later)

                  2014
                  06/01
                  POSTED BY
                  CATEGORY
                  Software/protocol ideas
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                  3 comments
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                    #####EOF##### Beliebte Schlagwörter auf WordPress.com

                    Schlagwörter

                    Das ist ein kleiner Einblick in Themen, welche bei WordPress.com in genau diesem Moment besprochen werden. Er zeigt nur neue Aktivitäten und sollte sich deshalb über die Zeit ziemlich schnell ändern. Klicke auf ein Wort um die neuesten Einträge bezüglich dieses Tags oder dieser Kategorie zu sehen.

                    #####EOF##### Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13) – Russia Military Analysis

                    Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)

                    Michael Kofman2 Comments

                    Russian and Chinese leadership at Tsygol range opened up Phase 2 of the exercise with a large review of forces. The optics were clearly meant to rekindle the images of Zapad-1981, with numerous vehicles and infantry arrayed in parade formation on the grounds of the range. Indeed the display was quite large, and it seemed clear by the number of Chinese tanks, SPA, wheeled and other vehicles that probably about 3,000 troops and several hundred pieces of equipment did actually come to join Russia in these strategic maneuvers. Judging by the reporting, it is likely most of the drills during Vostok are taking place at Tsygol and Telemba, i.e. it’s quite difficult to picture Vostok being all that large as an exercise. Right now, going off of fairly little (but still a lot more honest than 300,000), around 50,000 seems a much more reasonable number of participants.

                    DigitalGlobe had good satellite photos of some of the parade grounds at the range and exercises for a different perspective.

                    satellite

                    Of course Putin came to look through binoculars, because it wouldn’t be a strategic exercise otherwise. Note unlike in Zapad, where Putin and Lukashenko were not together in the same command center, we can see the Chinese counterparts sitting further along the table.

                    Putin came.JPG

                    More photos can be found on BMPD. But here’s s sample of some of the gear Chinese brought with them.

                    Chinese tanks.jpg

                    Chinese forces.jpg

                    As this is the opening of Phase 2, most of the activity was characterized by VDV air assaults, VKS bombing missions, combined arms artillery and motor rifle unit actions. Strong emphasis on employment of drones, integrated C2, and more ‘jointness’ so to speak between ground, airborne, and VKS forces. VDV seems to be conducted several force structure and air assault experiments, including with new light high mobility vehicles, creating a air mobile reserve, etc. Ground units are mostly doing what they do best, lots of artillery and MLRS fire, armored assault, etc.

                    Vostok 2018 military exercise in Transbaikal Territory, Russia

                    VDV Airborne – More than 700 soldiers and 51 vehicles (BMD-2) made a parachutte jump at Tsygol range. At the Belaya airfield near Irkutsk, a detachment of the Ulan-Ude air assault brigade loaded 25 Il-76MD transports. They were then air lifted ~1000km towards Zabaikal where they conducted a jump at 600 meters. The scenario was air assault and seizure of an enemy airfield. All together about 6000 VDV  and 900 pieces of equipment are taking part in Vostok, in earlier posts I mentioned these are units from 3 independent air assault brigades, and two additional special detachments.

                    VDV Ulan Ude assault brigade.JPG

                    As part of the scenario unfolding at Tsygol range, an air mobile battalion belonging to the 31st independent air assault brigade conducted an air assault on an enemy command center, with air support.  About 40 helicopters of Mi-8AMTSh were used (supposed capacity 26 soldiers), two Mi-26 helicopters, and more than 10 Mi-24 helicopters in support. They are billing this exercise as an experiment of a ‘new type’ of air assault detachment. There was also a mobile reserve in support of this assault, composed of light wheeled high mobility vehicles (pickups). Mi-26s delivered 8 of these light pickups, together with 4 armored Rys light vehicles equipped with Kornet ATGMs and Kord heavy machine guns.

                    airborne ATVs.JPG

                    VKS Aerospace Forces – About 40 bombers and strike fixed wing aircraft were used in an attack on opposing ground forces, key infrastructure, and staged reserves. Units involved fielded Tu-22M3, Su-34, Su-24, and Su-25SM strike aircraft. Air cover provided by Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters. Strikes were coordinated via ground based C2 system Strelets, and Orlan-10 drones.

                    Tu-22M3.JPG

                    Eastern MD – Other activities of note: CBRN units used smoke and aerosol covers on more than 60 sq km, covering moving units and critical infrastructure – equipment used includes TDA-3K smoke machines, and RP3-8x aerosols. Anti-tank units belonging to a battalion tactical group of motor rifle and artillery units simulated strikes against enemy armor and fortified positions with 130mm Shturm-S ATGMs and Konkurs-M. Sapper units plan to use not only UR-77 Meteorit, BMP-3M, but also Uran-6 and Uran-9 UGVs for demining.

                    Tsygol Range – Seven artillery battalions created a rolling artillery barrage ahead of an advance, covering a line of ~3000 meters. A motor rifle battalion advanced, and there are photos of host of T-72B1 tanks engaged in a live fire exercise as part of this maneuver. They employed more than 150 pieces of artillery, including 2s3, 2s1, 2s19, Giatsint, and Pion. Meanwhile Iskander-M units fired two cruise missiles at critically important targets, at the same time a large artillery and MLRS barrage hit the opposing force. All together they employed 2 Iskander TELs, 52 MLRS systems, and 72 tube artillery. Targeting for the strike conducted via an air based system called Klever, with Su-24MP recon aviation, and Orlan-10 drones – they used live video feed for battle damage assessment. In one scenario, Russian and Chinese artillery units simultaneously attacked enemy forward command posts. Russian BM-27 Uragan were employed together with Chinese Type-81 MLRS.

                    Motor rifle bttn.JPG

                    Artillery units will also practice employing precision guided munitions called Krasnopol, these will be fired by MSTA-S and 2s3 Akatsiya, Granat-4 short range drones are to be used for targeting. Krasnopol is a 152mm semi-active laser guided munition which can be used by most self-propelled and towed artillery.

                    life fire.jpg

                    Of course a detachment of Terminator BMPT, heavy tank support vehicles will make another debut at Tsygol, undoubtedly in the hope that someone will buy them. They were first  featured in Zapad 2017 in desert camo paint, undoubtedly marketed towards a certain set of countries that like to buy equipment in such colors.

                    Interesting photos emerged of drone companies, fielding both Orlan-10s, but also counter drone hand held weapons, that are worth noting.

                    drone company.JPG

                    counter drone gun.jpg

                    Not much from the two fleets today, except that the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean is still there, and recently concluded a first time joint exercise with Russian VKS. A sizable grouping of ships and a few submarines remains there.

                    Some additional photos of note:

                    Parachute jump skeptic

                    in airborne now.JPG

                    Of course you can’t assault an enemy airbase without taking a photo first

                    can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo.JPG

                    And a time honored tradition emerging from modern exercises, people pointing at screens:

                    pointing at screens.jpg

                     

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                      #####EOF##### brandonr304's Profile | WordPress.com Forums

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                      #####EOF##### Columbine, 20 Years Later: What Have We Learned?
                      Photo by Benjamin Rasmussen

                      There was a time when the words “active shooter” weren’t part of our lexicon. That was before Columbine.

                      Twenty years later, what have we learned?

                      By Geoff Van Dyke |

                      It was cold and starting to snow when I visited the Columbine Memorial on a Sunday afternoon this past winter. Perched atop a hill just northwest of Columbine High School, in Robert F. Clement Park, the monument feels exceedingly small given the magnitude of the events of April 20, 1999, and the place they hold in our collective consciousness. My colleague Lindsey Koehler and I were the only ones there that day. We split up, separately reading the short remembrances of the 13 people who’d been murdered nearly two decades earlier, before taking in the plaques that are embedded in the outside border of the memorial. It was very quiet. We didn’t talk, really. There wasn’t much to say.

                      When our editorial team started thinking about creating this special issue, though, we knew there would be plenty to discuss. Our conversations began more than a year ago—just after the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. The intense energy and impassioned appeals emanating from the Parkland students were undeniably powerful and rekindled a conversation that started—but didn’t get nearly far enough—with Columbine. Although we were glad to see a renewed dialogue about school violence, we realized many Americans were having almost the exact same discussions they’d had after Columbine, 19 years earlier. It was as if nothing had changed. Was it possible, we wondered, that Columbine, that seminal moment in American history, had taught us nothing?

                      We decided to find out. We began talking with experts and reading books and scouring journals that addressed the issues surrounding school shootings in our country. For the better part of a year, we immersed ourselves in this very disturbing, very complicated, and very divisive issue. What we discovered was both horrifying and encouraging.

                      There is no simple answer to the problem of school and mass shootings, even though Americans would like it to be thus. Change will only happen if we take a multipronged approach, and our research and reporting revealed four critical issues, all of which are connected to this uniquely American problem: the media, gun laws, school security, and mental health.

                      On that winter day we visited the memorial, I was struck by the humility and humanity of the words on the plaques, just as I was awed by the mountains of the Front Range in the distance. One inscription on the outer wall reads: “It brought the nation to its knees, but now that we’ve gotten back up how have things changed; what have we learned?” Twenty years later, we don’t have all the answers, and we’re under no illusion that we could fully explore the intricacies of these broad topics. But we do believe we have answered the question we initially posed. America—and Colorado, in particular—has learned from Columbine, and we’ve made significant progress in dealing with school shootings. As these stories illustrate, and as recent history has taught us, our successes have only brought us so far. We may never have all of the answers we seek—that may be out of our control. What is in our control is fostering the will, political and otherwise, to do everything we can to prevent tragedies like Columbine from continuing to plague our communities, our schools, and our children.

                      Table of Contents:

                      Intro
                      The Media
                      Gun Laws
                      School Security
                      Mental Health
                      The Legacy
                      In Memoriam 

                      #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Thomas Mackenzie – 44CON

                      Thomas Mackenzie

                      default Twitter: @tmacuk
                      Thomas Mackenzie is an Application Security Consultant for SpiderLabs in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. SpiderLabs is the global advanced security services team within Trustwave responsible for:

                      * Security Analysis and Testing
                      * Incident Response and Investigation
                      * Research & Development

                      Thomas has been asked to present technical talks at a number of international events including, DeepSec, Bsides Chicago and BlackHat Abu Dhabi. Thomas also speaks at a number of domestic venues including; OWASP events across the UK, PHP London, Marketing Event around WordPress, DC4420 and guest lecturing on application security and vulnerability management at a number of UK universities.

                      Thomas is the founder of upSploit Advisory Management, an automated disclosure system that helps security researchers and vendors communicate vulnerability information quickly, easily and in an ethical manner.

                      Previously to Trustwave Thomas worked for security boutique in the North of England, where he worked as a security engineer in the web application security testing team. Before completing his move to SpiderLabs, he contracted for a number of companies providing consulting services in the area of web application security.

                      Thomas has founded a number of vulnerabilities in well known software i.e. WordPress and a highly downloaded iPhone App.

                      Thomas has presented at:
                      #####EOF##### #####EOF##### ITC – 44CON

                      ITC

                      itc-logoFounded in 1995, ITC are a network and security integrator providing businesses with assured IT. We design, build, optimise and manage your Network & Security infrastructures, enhancing network performance, safeguarding information and simplifying management. At the core of ITC is our dedicated Secure Operations Centre (SOC) in London, where we have developed and deliver NetSure360°. This unique service integrates management of our customers Network & Security infrastructures providing them with complete visibility, control and assurance through real time performance dashboards and risk analysis.

                      #####EOF##### Patrick Stewin – 44CON

                      Patrick Stewin

                      default Twitter: @patrickx27
                      Website: stewin.org
                      Patrick Stewin is a PhD student and researcher in the field of system security at the Security in Telecommunications (SecT) research group at the Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin) and the Telekom Innovation Laboratories. Patrick’s main research interest includes stealthy attacks on computer platforms. His academic research focuses on developing efficient and effective stealthy attacks based on platform peripherals as well as new and novel techniques to reliably detect such attacks. Most recently, Patrick was involved in the development and analysis of a keystroke code logger that is hidden in the computer platform’s northbridge.

                      Patrick has presented at:

                      • 44CON 2013: Persistent, Stealthy, Remote-controlled Dedicated Hardware Malware
                      #####EOF##### Choosing a Color Palette? It’s For the Birds (Literally!) | Discover

                      Choosing a Color Palette? It’s For the Birds (Literally!)

                      Feature by

                      Color is a significant part of any website; even black and white are color choices that communicate a lot about your personality and brand. And there’s endless possibility, with infinite options for tone and hue. How do you choose a color, let alone an entire color palette?

                      Lucky for you, you have 24-7 access to a free color library with thousands of palettes for any mood or style. It’s called nature, and all you have to do to find it is look out the window — or at these excellent nature photographers.

                      Beyond black and white

                      Basic black and white will always make for a clean website, but there can be a lot more to monochrome and minimalism. At Explorers, photographer Christopher Michael captures some penguins who have a lot to teach us about the power of adding a pop of color…

                      Want to identify the exact color in a photo and get the color code you’ll need to apply it on your website? There are lots of free tools available.

                      … while Shoot From the Trip’s Dylan Jones shares a shot from the Dolomite Mountains showing us that a monochrome palette can have a lot more depth than we might think.

                      High contrast!

                      Sharply contrasting colors add power and dynamism to a website. These Northern Gannetts soaring over a turbulent sea, captured by Bob Montgomerie at the American Ornithological Society, are a study in creamy whites juxtaposed with dusky purples…

                      … and Chris Spiker’s watercolor of a trio of Rainbow Bee Eaters shows us that nature has something for the most bold and brash among us as well.

                      Ready to explore color in more depth? Automattic designer Kjell Reigstad has a great overview of the principles of color harmony, and over at wordpress.com/go you’ll find advice on everything from choosing the best color scheme for your brand to understanding color systems like RGB and CYMK.

                      Gentler gradients

                      Nature isn’t just birds; if fauna brings us bold and bright, flora teaches us that color can be softer, too, both in the shades themselves and in how they relate. Anita of Anita’s Images shares photos of some of the unique plants that surround her in Malta, with purples and greens flowing into and out of one another…

                      … and Celia of the eponymous Celia in Tokyo brings us cherry blossoms that teach us how very different colors can harmonize if they’re all of a similar softness …

                      … while in England, Pete Hillman’s macro photos of moss give us a palette that’s warmly cheerful.

                      For more color inspiration, look through the Nature or Photography topics and take a walk through the natural world from the comfort of your computer.

                      Looking for more ways to play with the color on your site? Upgrade to WordPress.com Personal, Premium, or Business for advanced customizing tools.

                      Compare our plans

                      February 28, 2019Design, Inspiration, Nature, ,
                      31 Comments

                      11. 👍👍👍… very interesting… colors are very important and one should actually take time to see the effect of varying or changing them before finally selecting a color or combination of colors

                        Liked by 10 people

                      15. I follow a birder group on facebook that constantly has amazing photos of the most colorful birds from all over the world. I totally sample from them for my design projects.

                        Liked by 11 people

                      17. Nicely written. I would usually opt for the easy way out when choosing colors for my blog. But this has thought me a few things and showed me resources that can help my color shades. Thanks

                        Liked by 12 people

                      25. I really appreciated this post because my blog’s main picture is of some seagulls (even though my content has nothing to do with birds, but whatever.) and I’ve been having a hard time with the color palette.

                        Liked by 9 people

                      29. I am enjoying all those color palettes. I especially like the lavender from Anita’s Images. I also really appreciate the contrast between the yellow and light pink from Celia in Tokyo. A resource I like to use to save my favorite color palettes is Coolors. It’s a very handy app. Thank you for the great article!

                        Liked by 9 people

                      Comments are closed.

                        #####EOF##### WordPress.com’s Parent Company Announces Happy Tools, a New Suite of Products for the Future of Work — The WordPress.com Blog

                        WordPress.com’s Parent Company Announces Happy Tools, a New Suite of Products for the Future of Work

                        Happy Schedule, our first offering, will help distributed teams manage employee schedules and customer support.

                        April 1, 2019

                        Matt Wondra

                        Distributed teams, different geographies, and complex dynamics are redefining the modern workday. Soon, “job perks” like flexible hours and work-from-anywhere will become table-stakes benefits that every company needs to offer to stay competitive.

                        WordPress.com’s parent company Automattic has long been ahead of this curve, growing a global software company of more than 850 people across 68 countries with no central office. Along the way, we’ve found that many business products are still locked into old assumptions about how a company runs, so we had to build our own internal tools to work the way we want. Now, we’re making these tools available to like-minded companies who need a better way to work.

                        Today Automattic is announcing Happy Tools, a suite of products for the future of work. Each product in Happy Tools has been used internally at Automattic to grow our company.

                        The suite is launching with Happy Schedule, a new take on workforce management. Designed to handle the complexities that come up when business goals are planned around real-world schedules, it helps you treat your employees like humans instead of resources. Using Happy Schedule, Automattic is able to plan 24/7 customer support while offering flexible working hours to our 300+ Happiness Engineers spanning many timezones.

                        Happy Schedule helps you meet coverage goals across a distributed team.

                        Happy Schedule is just the start. Over the coming years Automattic will release more of its internal applications into Happy Tools, with smart integrations between the products that make them even better when used together.

                        We hope that by offering Happy Tools, even more forward-thinking companies will be able to move to a new way of working with customer support, internal communication, and people-management.

                        You can get a 30-day free trial of Happy Tools when you sign up for a Happy Schedule demo at https://happy.tools.

                        Missing out on the latest WordPress.com developments? Enter your email below to receive future announcements direct to your inbox. An email confirmation will be sent before you will start receiving notifications - please check your spam folder if you don't receive this.

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                          #####EOF##### Customize Your WordPress.com Dashboard — The WordPress.com Blog

                          Customize Your WordPress.com Dashboard

                          January 8, 2019

                          Courtney Burton Doker

                          We’re happy to announce new improvements to your WordPress.com dashboard for a more accessible and customized experience. From your desktop, you can now customize your dashboard by choosing one of our two new color schemes, Classic Bright for a fresh modern feel and Classic Blue as the standard you’ve known and loved. As part of our commitment to inclusive design, these new colors have been optimized for higher contrast and increased legibility with a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1.

                          Examples of color contrast before and after in color.
                          Color
                          Examples of color contrast before and after in grayscale.
                          Grayscale

                          We’ll soon be introducing additional color scheme options that will continue our mission of a better more accessible web for everyone.

                          Here’s how to customize your color scheme:

                          1. On your desktop, sign in to your WordPress.com account that you’d like to customize.
                          2. Click your account avatar in the upper right corner.
                          3. Select Account Settings
                          4. Under Dashboard Color Scheme select an option

                          Have ideas for color schemes you’d like to see? Please comment below.

                          Missing out on the latest WordPress.com developments? Enter your email below to receive future announcements direct to your inbox. An email confirmation will be sent before you will start receiving notifications - please check your spam folder if you don't receive this.

                          Join 57,721,395 other followers

                          115 Comments

                          Comments are closed.

                          1. Money Bear Jan 8th at 6:33 pm

                            Loved the earlier much brighter scheme. Now the colours feel more sad and depressive.

                            Liked by 26 people

                            • Alphe Jan 8th at 7:03 pm

                              Yes, that’s what I thought! When I first noticed the change it looked to me like some temporary connection issues, as if everything went offline.

                              Liked by 20 people

                          2. Alphe Jan 8th at 6:45 pm

                            Improvement is always great, but my memory tells me that the ‘standard I’ve known and loved’ was blue and orange, not just blue?

                            Liked by 15 people

                          3. Samuel Jan 8th at 6:50 pm

                            both color schemes are beautiful. thank you wordpress.com.

                            Liked by 6 people

                          4. Alphe Jan 8th at 6:53 pm

                            I don’t want to spread negativity, but both currently available themes are extremely dark. Yes, that applies to ‘Classic Bright’ too. In the dashboard, the pink highlighting the day on the stats chart barely stands out, it’s so dark, very close to the blue. The world map with traffic source doesn’t even have the pink at all, it’s just all dark greyish blue.

                            Liked by 17 people

                          5. Kelsey @ There's Something About KM Jan 8th at 7:02 pm

                            The former, brighter color scheme please.

                            Liked by 16 people

                          6. glenmckenzie(justabitfurther) Jan 8th at 7:09 pm

                            I would agree that both current options are a “tad dark.” Much enjoyed the older colours.

                            Liked by 11 people

                          7. exploringcolour Jan 8th at 7:24 pm

                            I’ve just logged in, in New Zealand, and was horrified to find that the colour scheme had been changed for me without my choice. The usual tan-coloured dot for notifications was a sickly pinky colour (as was the login button). When I clicked to “like” something it just went a darker blue and wasn’t clearly different at all. I don’t appreciate the interference of WP in matters that were perfectly fine as they were. Now I’ll have to go and try and get it configured back to how it was. Why couldn’t you have just left it as it was?

                            Liked by 12 people

                          8. exploringcolour Jan 8th at 7:30 pm

                            And I’ve gone into Settings and I don’t have a choice shown there that allows me to go back to the old colour scheme. Please reinstall the old scheme, I loathe this one.

                            Liked by 10 people

                          9. Queenie Jan 8th at 7:52 pm

                            It looks sad and monochromatic, kind of dark and just. . . blue?

                            Liked by 6 people

                          10. Queenie Jan 8th at 8:07 pm

                            The original classic blue, white, and yellow theme would be nice to have back. . .

                            Liked by 8 people

                          11. sassycoupleok Jan 8th at 8:13 pm

                            Left ours like it was, satisfied. 🙂

                            Liked by 5 people

                          12. House of Heart Jan 8th at 8:21 pm

                            I’m pleased with what I have had , I’m afraid if WP has commited to formats that I’m not happy with I will be closing out my blog. Hopefully that’s not going to happen.

                            Liked by 8 people

                          13. Jason McFadden Jan 8th at 8:26 pm

                            Nice. How about a “dark mode”?

                            Liked by 8 people

                          14. Lance Willett Jan 8th at 8:35 pm

                            I love the readability and refreshed feel of the new color schemes. Bravo!

                            Liked by 7 people

                            • exploringcolour Jan 8th at 9:22 pm

                              Really? How is it more readable to see what you’ve put a “like” on when the star only goes a darker shade of blue instead of orange?

                              Liked by 8 people

                              • Lance Willett Jan 8th at 9:55 pm

                                It’s much better contrast from the foreground to the background — and thus easier on my old eyes, especially on my mobile devices where often tiny text is hard to read without my glasses on.

                                Liked by 4 people

                                • Alphe Jan 9th at 7:23 am

                                  How is blue more contrasting to blue than the good old orange?
                                  It’s interesting that you say the new scheme is easier on your eyes, for some reason my eyes have been hurting ever since the change, something in this colour scheme is extremely eye straining in my case.

                                  Liked by 6 people

                          15. Karandi Jan 8th at 8:36 pm

                            The classic blue isn’t the same as what it was. When the colours just changed on me I thought my computer screen had glitched, then realised the scheme had changed. Saw this post and changed the setting back to Classic Blue but the colours on the map, the lack of orange bar, everything is different and honestly both schemes are harder on the eyes than what we had.

                            Liked by 15 people

                          16. Daniela Jan 8th at 8:36 pm

                            Let’s say that I don’t have any issues with the colors, bright, blue could be anything, I will get used to it. But as a fun fact I can’t see the text anymore on the Notification option, just the picture of the blogger who liked or is following my blog. And this is happening when I am in the My site. When I enter the Reader I can see also the notification text. This seems to be a bug.

                            Liked by 6 people

                          17. Connor McFire Jan 8th at 8:50 pm

                            Honestly, it is kind of depressing and the pink isn’t all the great… I much preferred the orange. I would be a lot happier if there was an option to go back to the old one, which was way better.
                            I wrote an article reviewing it too, if anyone wants to read it: https://wp.me/pa0p2b-8a

                            Liked by 14 people

                          18. Deli Lanoux, Ed.D. Jan 8th at 9:01 pm

                            First, thanks for always trying to improve things for us. But, sometimes, the way it is works just fine. I went in to free myself from the pink— I’ve grown too accustomed to the blues and/or I’m a creature of habit— so I accessed “account settings” and clicked “classic” to revert to what some might consider the same ol’, same ol’ but what I think is just perfect. And it’s just not the same. Too dark and hurts my eyes. I like the lighter hues the way they were. And, yes, while it’s novel to scroll over any given day to see the contrasts better, I’m not convinced that the new-and-improved works better for me. So, what’s the likelihood that we’ll get back what we had before? Thanks so very much!

                            Liked by 15 people

                          19. Judy Labensohn Jan 8th at 9:22 pm

                            Here’s my honest response: The more your folks at wordpress change and upgrade, the more I feel like leaving wp. It look me some time to master the blog and the web site and I do not have patience for mastering new things every six months or every year. I get very frustrated with every new change. I am of the age that I need a person to totally walk me through every new change, a live person, on a phone or in a chat, or better yet, in the room. So when you change something else, please do not inform me of it. It just makes me nervous. I have reached the stage in life where I accept What Is.

                            Liked by 17 people

                          20. DerekL Jan 8th at 9:27 pm

                            Being able to switch between two equally lame and unattractive color schemes is not “customization”.

                            Liked by 23 people

                          21. exploringcolour Jan 8th at 9:46 pm

                            Why do you provide this option only through the Dashboard “Settings”. When I joined WP there was no link provided under “My Sites” to the Dashboard and it took ages before I read you have to add wp-admin/ onto the end of the blog url to get the Dashboard. Under the “My Sites” Settings which I can easily access you don’t colour scheme options. There’s such a disconnect between “My Sites” and “Dashboard”.

                            Liked by 10 people

                          22. northie Jan 8th at 10:01 pm

                            I agree with many of the comments above concerning the new colours. The blue is dreary. When the bright pink is present, the blue appears even more drab. A colour with more life and warmth would be appreciated. That should be possible while also delivering greater contrast. Yes, improving accessibility is good, but not at the cost of colouring everything dull.

                            Liked by 11 people

                          23. Audrey Driscoll Jan 8th at 10:48 pm

                            I miss the orange. Orange contrasts well with blue. I would prefer a choice between “Classic Orange and Blue” and the new “bright” scheme. The so-called “Classic Blue” hasn’t enough contrast, so is no improvement.

                            Liked by 7 people

                          24. exploringcolour Jan 8th at 10:51 pm

                            I want the option to revert to how it was before. To just impose this new scheme is insulting. It always was fine on my laptop. Maybe folks using WP on cellphones screens and such benefit from this, I wouldn’t know. But for me, I want the colours just how they were!

                            Liked by 5 people

                          25. createjewels Jan 8th at 11:07 pm

                            Hi Courtney My name is Deb Peisner. I now have a wix site and am no longer using my WordPress site. I am getting these continual spam type of e mails. Do I need to turn off my WordPress site due to moving my domain to my new wix site?

                            Liked by 4 people

                          26. Rosalie P. Krajci Jan 8th at 11:12 pm

                            I applaud your desire to change, improve, innovate. I’m probably in the minority, but perhaps you could have a two-track system: one for those who thrive on change, and one for people like me who have limited time and need every second of it for substance over a frequently changing format. Do consider my/our needs. Thanks.

                            Liked by 6 people

                          27. pranabaxom Jan 9th at 1:15 am

                            Not sure what improved. Can barely see where is the like button.

                            Liked by 5 people

                          28. floatinggold Jan 9th at 1:27 am

                            Thank you for trying to improve this platform.

                            Now that I’ve gotten the niceties out of the way, who’s the genius behind this idea? The color scheme is a TOTAL failure. It’s too dark. And stats for today show up either in pink, or in the same color as other days. What diversity. LOL.

                            I’m all for changes, but at least give us the option to keep it the way things were. This is madness.

                            Liked by 10 people

                          29. turning20web Jan 9th at 3:12 am

                            Nice..

                            Liked by 3 people

                          30. Daniel J McIntyre Jan 9th at 3:24 am

                            Since I’m new to word press and publishing this is great information! Thank you so much!

                            Liked by 3 people

                          31. Shashank Gupta Jan 9th at 3:25 am

                            Present appearance is good no offenses but we should try the new one. Somehow little changes are very much necessary.

                            Liked by 4 people

                          32. Luna 🌘 Flicker of Korean Jan 9th at 3:51 am

                            Would it be possible to also leave the option to revert back to old color scheme?

                            It’s great you are trying to be inclusive and make it easier for people with vision problems, but there are also people like me who have neurological issues and have trouble adjusting to any change. It takes me a long time and a lot of effort to deal with even for a small change such as color scheme.

                            Liked by 5 people

                          33. dandelionsalad Jan 9th at 4:28 am

                            A most welcome improvement, thank you. I definitely prefer the higher contrast, so much easier to read. The “new” blue is darker which I prefer over the “old” blue. The added pink is a nice touch. I always use the classic editor and classic Stats, Comments, etc. so don’t see the “new” color scheme except when visiting the Reader and when I log in. And, yes, please give us more color choices in the near future, green would be lovely.

                            Liked by 3 people

                          34. Dan Jan 9th at 4:56 am

                            If it ain’t broke, don’t “fix” it.

                            The new color schemes are atrocious. Give me back the orange bars for the stats and the yellow to orange/red colors on the maps. It’s very difficult to see the gradient on the maps with that dull blue-gray tone.

                            I also agree with Judy L. above. Many of us bloggers are not techies and the more you screw around with the platform with the frequency with which you do it, the more inclined I am to take my five blogs/websites elsewhere. (And I’ve only dipped my toe into the whole Gutenberg blocks thing—again, making something relatively simple more complex.)

                            I’m all for improvement where real improvement is needed, not just for the sake of doing “something.” You can do better, WordPress.

                            Liked by 8 people

                          35. emmbrainparadox Jan 9th at 5:31 am

                            Still won’t improve my traffic

                            Liked by 3 people

                          36. Anjali Roy Jan 9th at 6:04 am

                            Siding with all the above comments, please reintroduce the old theme as the third option, ‘Classic Original‘..

                            Thus, everyone’s problems, including mine will be solved. 🙂

                            Liked by 8 people

                          37. TheNextChaos Jan 9th at 7:27 am

                            Hey. Can anyone help me? I updated my blog today. But whenever I use a browser to read the blog. Everything goes out of screen. Has anyone dealt with this problem? Please help.

                            Liked by 3 people

                          38. Alphe Jan 9th at 7:36 am

                            Okay, fair point, you added a chart comparing the contrast between the new colours vs white. I agree that the contrast is better there (you made the colours darker, so it’s obvious that dark is more contrasting to white).
                            But, you missed the point where new colours also have to be contrasting between one another, not just white.
                            And I’m sorry to break it to you, but two dark colours don’t contrast at all.
                            GUI is supposed to highlight the important information effectively, so that it’s clear and instantly visible. With the current, plain dark colour scheme, I can’t instantly tell which day I’m on in the stats chart, I can’t instantly tell where my traffic comes from looking at the map, I can’t instantly tell if there’s a notification dot on the bell and I can’t instantly tell whether I’ve already liked a post or not. All of those things which should be intuitive and visible at first glance are now extremely eye-straining and since the change I’ve had trouble managing my site for longer than 5 minutes at a time (I had to switch to doing certain actions on my mobile app, which still has nicely contrasting colours).

                            Liked by 6 people

                          39. 321Clic Jan 9th at 8:12 am

                            Same comment as many other here, please add back a third scheme like the old one with light blue/orange.

                            Liked by 6 people

                          40. Money Bear Jan 9th at 9:58 am

                            Love how customer-friendly WordPress.com positions itself to be, when they don’t even listen to their own customers. Will migrate to Bluehost after my plan expires.

                            Liked by 8 people

                          41. Hugh's Views and News Jan 9th at 10:26 am

                            Oh dear! I don’t think these changes are very good, especially given that the classic blue is nowhere near like it used to be. Like many others have said, the new colours are too dark. Brighter colours would not only stand out a lot more but would also be very eyecatching.

                            I know there are more colours on the way, but can we have some bright, cheerful colours, please? How about some yellows and oranges as a start. Or, how about starting by giving us back the classic blue colour, as it used to be, as an option?

                            Liked by 7 people

                          42. Thy Unsuspicious Jan 9th at 10:41 am

                            Can we please have an option to go back to the old color scheme? The new one is NOT the same.

                            Liked by 8 people

                          43. italiafinlandia Jan 9th at 10:45 am

                            Hello, I seem to have a problem: after the re-styling in the tablet version I cannot view the text of my notifications! (Luckily only in the tablet version.)

                            Liked by 3 people

                          44. Robert Jan 9th at 10:52 am

                            Why do I have to keep looking at “ad” of some sickening fat gut and a bunch of scam ads.

                            I pay for the level that is supposed to eliminate ads, instead I have to keep looking at some fat gut and scam ads.

                            What is gong on? Why can’t I eliminate the ads? My fees were raised 26% this year and I still need to look at scam ads?

                            >

                            Liked by 4 people

                          45. Quenya101 Jan 9th at 11:15 am

                            I simply HATE when new changes come and I do not have the option to keep with the same good old thing that I had before. Can you please reverse that awful color scheme change and give us the option to keep the standard one, the real and true “Classic Bright”? Things have changed within the pages as well when I’m editing them. That’s really annoying.

                            Liked by 10 people

                          46. rewsteruk Jan 9th at 11:20 am

                            Please can you return the colours to as they were as the default theme, then when the designers can work out how to deploy a change correctly have it as an option to change the colours (to the depressing themes they have chosen), not force it.

                            Even if you do change to classic blue, the stats current day is no longer highlighted orange, it is the same dark blue.

                            I spoke to support as i thought it was something i messed up, they accepted my concerns about the forced colour change, this was hard to read as the chat window was the horrible pink colour with white writing, but they can only tell me the designers decided to do it, and blogged about it the day they pushed out the change.

                            Liked by 7 people

                            • 2justanotherpost Jan 10th at 12:05 am

                              Restart your computer system when you select classic blue theme and log back in wordpress and that orange color on stat will resume, however the classic blue theme is not the default theme but is similar to it and on the contrary, the like’s color (star) remains the hideous blue color :/

                              Liked by 1 person

                          47. omniscientitsolution Jan 9th at 11:53 am

                            Great blog. what about light theme it looks great. thanks for sharing.

                            Liked by 3 people

                          48. papoopoo Jan 9th at 12:25 pm

                            thankyou

                            ในวันที่ พ. 9 ม.ค. 2019 เวลา 02:51 The WordPress.com Blog เขียนว่า:

                            > Courtney Burton Doker posted: ” We’re happy to announce new improvements > to your WordPress.com dashboard for a more accessible and customized > experience. From your desktop, you can now customize your dashboard by > choosing one of our two new color schemes, Classic Bright for a fresh mod” >

                            Liked by 3 people

                          49. Ernie Myles Keeler. Jan 9th at 12:42 pm

                            Love it.

                            Liked by 4 people

                          50. 2justanotherpost Jan 9th at 1:26 pm

                            This is great but I like the original theme we had first :I

                            Liked by 4 people

                          51. Cks Jan 9th at 1:30 pm

                            Hmm… NICE

                            Liked by 3 people

                          52. Widdershins Jan 9th at 3:27 pm

                            NO, no, no … just STOP IT with all these ridiculous tweaks.

                            Liked by 8 people

                          53. PRINCE GODWIN EROH II Jan 9th at 3:44 pm

                            Well, color impression is Germaine yet, I will stick to the original. Thanks.

                            Liked by 5 people

                          54. -Eugenia Jan 9th at 4:02 pm

                            I find it refreshing but would like to see more options. Orange is always a good color because it represents warmth and happiness. Green, also is a good color because it represents newness and growth. Even, black, which can be stark and sexy. Those that like neutral may go for khaki and brown tones. There are a plethora of color options so offer more, please. Thank you.

                            Liked by 7 people

                          55. Mallee Stanley Jan 9th at 4:45 pm

                            Please, please, please get rid of that ghastly pink

                            Liked by 9 people

                          56. lindasschaub Jan 9th at 4:47 pm

                            I will have to study this later, but … is the new default for the “like” going to stay at blue – if I am unable to read all the new posts in Reader at one time, it is difficult to see where I left off. Sometimes I go through Reader and have time to read the short post, mostly the photographers I follow, but need more time to read lengthier posts and comment on them – I can’t see where I left off. Is this something we can manually adjust?

                            Liked by 4 people

                          57. properlypurple Jan 9th at 5:17 pm

                            Yay for a better contrast. And I just love this deeper, richer blue. It’s easier on the eyes and gets out of the way.

                            Liked by 4 people

                          58. Siti Aisyah A. Jan 9th at 5:41 pm

                            I like this new update for dashboard. Yeay!

                            Liked by 3 people

                          59. ShelbyCourtland Jan 9th at 6:13 pm

                            For those of you who don’t like this latest debacle, I am sorry to have to state this, but WordPress is not going to change things back to the old way. That train wreck that’s our stats page? It’s still ugly and when it was originally rolled out, there was plenty of negative feedback and it did not one bit of good. Save your ire. They’re not listening. They never do.

                            Liked by 6 people

                          60. Lily Jan 9th at 6:17 pm

                            Hate it. Atrocious pink. There was nothing wrong with the previous color scheme. Why waste time on this nonsense? Also not thrilled with the new editor and have been using the mobile version to avoid it. Not my preference for writing. I rarely complain but my tolerance for the unnecessary changes is growing short.

                            Liked by 15 people

                          61. Biblicon Jan 9th at 6:36 pm

                            I agree with exploribgcolour’s comment. I could never find the dashboard or anything leading to it (not for that matter to forums or support to ask them) and now find that it is hidden under the ridiculous name of WPadmin. Who realises that that is the dashboard? Please change the name under My Sites from WPadmin which is meaningless to Dashboard which you often refer to.

                            Liked by 6 people

                          62. thehomeplaceweb Jan 9th at 6:59 pm

                            Add me to the list of people who preferred the old color scheme. When I post links to other posts in the Reader, the blue link is so hard to distinguish from the black that I don’t think people will notice it’s a link….and I don’t like the blue like button either. I have not tried the new editor yet, but have heard nothing but complaints about it too…..will that be forced on us too? Please, if it’s isn’t broke, don’t fix it! Not everyone has tons of time to sift through all these changes.

                            Liked by 2 people

                          63. Mary Anne Jan 9th at 7:15 pm

                            Why are my stats (the columns) black, along with the mapped locations of those who have read my posts? Just wondering if it’s my computer?

                            Liked by 3 people

                          64. guitarsophist Jan 9th at 7:31 pm

                            Not a fan of dork blue and icky pink. The other choice is just dork blue. Classic Bright is annoying and hard to read. Classic Blue is just hard to read. This is a major fail.

                            Liked by 3 people

                          65. ludmilassouza Jan 9th at 8:09 pm

                            I hated the pink thing, so I changed it to the Whatever Blue, and it was WORSE. Also, the new editor, who works in blocks, make it much more difficult to format a single word in a paragraph. The color scheme for text and backgrounds is not particularly working. Pure black is impossible, only very, verydark gray. I feel I’m in the LEGO movie.

                            Liked by 6 people

                          66. ronvmmm Jan 9th at 9:24 pm

                            I find that the orange colour highlighting a selected column in the charts is better than the new ‘pinky-purple’. More options of colour schemes, as others have requested, would indeed be welcome. However, could you please change the orange text highlighting the most frequent number of views per month and the highest average views per month in tables — the bright orange here on the white background is hardly visible (perhaps red text or a yellow background coloured cell would make the record figure more noticeable).

                            Liked by 6 people

                          67. Courtney Burton Doker Jan 9th at 10:49 pm

                            Hi everyone :wave:

                            I wanted to share an update that we were experimenting with different accent colors for the Classic Blue theme and decided to land with orange. Hopefully by now this shift should be propagated to everyone.

                            Best,
                            Courtney

                            Liked by 4 people

                            • Connor McFire Jan 10th at 12:18 am

                              Hello Courtney,

                              I am glad to see that WordPress has taken some thoughts from their users! Although the new orange color is not as ‘bright’ as the old design, it certainly looks better than the old navy blue. Thanks!

                              Regards,
                              Connor

                              Liked by 2 people

                            • Ms. Liz Jan 10th at 3:58 am

                              I noticed the change and have posted on my Exploring Colour blog about how glad I am to have an orange bar back again on the stats chart. That’s great, BUT its still not good enough that the orange colour has not yet propagated to when I hit the “Like” button on posts in Reader. It still just goes to a dark blue solid star. If I’m browsing down Reader to see what I may have missed the contrast between a blue unfilled star and a darker blue filled star is simply not enough!! Please, please attend to this as well PLEASE!!

                              Liked by 2 people

                            • Ms. Liz Jan 10th at 5:15 am

                              PS. I actually like the new blue in the Classic Blue scheme. Obviously different people have different preferences for the blue therefore I’d like to see an option for “Classic Blue” and another option for “Classic Blue – Original”. So many people like the orange that I’d expect you’d retain the orange in both schemes. I’d like WP to also please re-configure “Likes” so that if I click on “Like” then the star goes orange. And also in the Traffic chart, now we have an orange “Current” bar, lets have the current day’s posts with an orange line (vertical bar) beside them. Thanks.

                              Liked by 3 people

                            • Alphe Jan 10th at 7:04 am

                              Thank goodness for adjusting the shades, current accents are still worse than what we used to have but better than what the first update brought.
                              Now bring back colours to the world map and it might actually be bearable!

                              Liked by 3 people

                          68. guitarsophist Jan 9th at 11:30 pm

                            Adding orange to the Classic Blue is certainly a change in the right direction. Make both the blue and the orange a bit lighter and we would be back to where we were, which was fine. But this is an improvement. Thanks for making it.

                            Liked by 2 people

                          69. anne leueen Jan 10th at 2:58 am

                            Better contrast is good but the stats map is so dull only in shades of grey and blue etc. i liked the RED to tell me where most of my readers were located. Also in Reader when I”like” a post it just goes to a darker blue. The yellow/orange would let me know what posts I had already liked. So I’m not a fan of the new design.

                            Liked by 6 people

                          70. Biblicon Jan 10th at 10:33 am

                            Text in a light colour on a dark background is always difficult to read. If the background is a dark colour the text should be in white. It would help more if you could fix this.

                            Liked by 4 people

                          71. Diane Jan 10th at 3:29 pm

                            I prefer a mixture of med to dark gray scales with very light gray to white fonts presenting option boxes. And with bright colors for the chosen box options. The brighter colors for the chosen options would have the reverse color in fonts. Med to dark gray fonts. I can see better with the dark color option than I can with white backgrounds.

                            Liked by 2 people

                          72. tufiddin.com Jan 10th at 3:53 pm

                            Love the new color scheme 🍁😊

                            Liked by 2 people

                          73. ralphlen5930 Jan 11th at 12:16 am

                            i don’t know how to use this..im beginer here

                            Liked by 2 people

                          74. ashleyleia Jan 11th at 9:42 am

                            With the new scheme it is much harder to see which notifications have been read and which haven’t, seen they’re almost the same colour. It’s also harder to see which posts in the reader I have liked, whereas before it was quickly apparent.

                            Liked by 5 people

                          75. deepanilamani Jan 11th at 1:22 pm

                            I like the new colours. Thank you for the new improvements. Looking forward for further changes for the better in the coming years 🙂

                            Liked by 2 people

                          76. werlibertyauto Jan 11th at 4:24 pm

                            I exclusively use the mobile app and always appreciate when features are made available on mobile and not just desktop.

                            Liked by 2 people

                          77. abdulfarel Jan 11th at 8:52 pm

                            Mantap

                            Liked by 1 person

                          78. abdulfarel Jan 11th at 9:51 pm

                            Mantap bg

                            Liked by 2 people

                          79. River Jan 11th at 11:27 pm

                            I appreciate WP’s commitment to inclusive design. However, the new themes are harder on my eyes, not easier. It would be wonderful if we could have the option of a light theme, like the classic themes available until just a few days ago, as well as the high-contrast themes. 🙂

                            Liked by 1 person

                          80. Edith Aint Jan 12th at 2:29 am

                            So….this is why my dashboard has so much pink now? Pink buttons, pink stats….Not that I mind the color pink, I just thought maybe a feminist hacked my account.

                            Liked by 3 people

                          81. B.Groves Jan 13th at 1:40 am

                            As usual, WordPress is behind the times.

                            Like

                          82. Komodo Nabila Tour Jan 13th at 2:27 am

                            Hi….

                            Liked by 1 person

                          83. Marcelo Gomes Jan 13th at 2:52 am

                            Can we still use the old theme?
                            Not the Classic Blue, the original one with blue and orange!
                            These new color are so bad!

                            Liked by 1 person

                          84. Abdul Hadi Jan 13th at 3:30 pm

                            Hai

                            Liked by 1 person

                          85. raghav464 Jan 14th at 10:58 am

                            i like this new colours

                            Liked by 1 person

                          86. mireku foster Jan 14th at 12:11 pm

                            thanks

                            Liked by 1 person

                          87. Sarjoni Jan 14th at 3:57 pm

                            wordpress is very power on SEO..

                            Liked by 1 person

                            • libertymark13 Jan 14th at 8:35 pm

                              Yeah i love the new color

                              On Jan 14, 2019 9:30 PM, “The WordPress.com Blog” wrote:

                              Sarjoni commented: “wordpress is very power on SEO..”

                              Like

                          88. M. K. Waller Jan 15th at 12:58 am

                            Regarding colors, as long as I can read them easily, I don’t care much about them. I don’t know why they needed to be changed, but I don’t notice them (except for the bright pink, which is a little much). The bar denoting visitors as opposed to views, however, seems to have disappeared from my page in wp-admin.

                            If a color change is made, I’d like it to be the default font color. The gray is difficult to read. Black would be a help–if not the default, at least the choice to change easily.

                            I do everything from the wp-admin page because it’s convenient–I can go anywhere from there. The new blocks are nice–I used it several times–but the page hides buttons and icons, requires more clicks, and has less functionality than the classic editor. I can start new paragraphs in the classic editor without needing blocks.

                            Liked by 3 people

                          89. diloartwrites Jan 15th at 2:57 pm

                            I suggest the colour should be more brighter and simple

                            Liked by 1 person

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                            #####EOF##### KSSO – Russia Military Analysis

                            Tag: KSSO

                            Russian Special Forces

                            Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                            Below is a Q&A I did with the Cipher Brief that outlines much of what we know about the Russian special operations community.  The rest is on their website. 

                            The Cipher Brief: How are Russian special operations organized within the military?

                            Michael Kofman: The best way to parse through a myriad of Russian special designation units is to break them into three categories: elite infantry primarily for reconnaissance in ground, airborne, and naval services (Spetsnaz GRU), special purpose units belonging to intelligence agencies (Alpha and Vympel), and the Special Operations Command (SSO or KSSO). The last one is of particular note as a recent development and arguably the most interesting of all, since it represents a Russian special forces capability that featured prominently in Crimea and Syria.

                            Spetsnaz GRU are sometimes shorthanded as Russian special operations forces, but this is a common misnomer. Spetsnaz are elite infantry intended to support conventional unit formations. These units consist of eight Spetsnaz brigades, one Spetsnaz regiment (25th), four naval infantry Spetz units, and the 45th VDV (Airborne) brigade with a total complement of 9,000-10,500.  Currently the Russian armed forces are integrating Spetsnaz units into brigades and divisions, adding a company to each reconnaissance battalion. These units are almost invariably under the purview of the main intelligence directorate for Russia’s General Staff, the GRU.

                            Meanwhile the FSB, Russia’s domestic intelligence service, fields two specialized units for counterterrorism and defending strategic infrastructure at home, named Alpha and Vympel respectively. Less mentioned is the FSB’s Directorate S (Smerch), a special reconnaissance outfit founded on the basis of the FSB’s economic counter-intelligence unit, and likely larger than Alpha or Vympel.

                            The rest of the discussion focuses on KSSO.

                            Back to top
                            #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Kyle Wilhoit – 44CON

                            Kyle Wilhoit

                            default Twitter: @lowcalspam

                            Kyle Wilhoit is a Sr. Threat Researcher at Trend Micro on the Future Threat Research Team. Kyle focuses on original threat, malware, vulnerability discovery/analysis and criminal activity on the Internet. Kyle also actively tracks targeted malware based espionage worldwide. Kyle has spoken at many worldwide conferences such as FIRST, HiTB, and Blackhat US/EU and he has been featured on New York Times, LA Times, Fox Business, ABC, and other outlets. Prior to joining Trend Micro, he was the lead incident handler and reverse engineer at a large energy company, focusing on ICS/SCADA security and targeted persistent threats. Kyle is also involved with several open source projects and actively enjoys reverse engineering things that shouldn’t be.

                            Kyle has presented at:

                            • 44CON 2014:  Chicken of the ‘APT’: Using Shadowlab Incubation for Targeted Attack Attribution
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                            #####EOF##### Customize Your WordPress.com Dashboard — The WordPress.com Blog

                            Customize Your WordPress.com Dashboard

                            January 8, 2019

                            Courtney Burton Doker

                            We’re happy to announce new improvements to your WordPress.com dashboard for a more accessible and customized experience. From your desktop, you can now customize your dashboard by choosing one of our two new color schemes, Classic Bright for a fresh modern feel and Classic Blue as the standard you’ve known and loved. As part of our commitment to inclusive design, these new colors have been optimized for higher contrast and increased legibility with a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1.

                            Examples of color contrast before and after in color.
                            Color
                            Examples of color contrast before and after in grayscale.
                            Grayscale

                            We’ll soon be introducing additional color scheme options that will continue our mission of a better more accessible web for everyone.

                            Here’s how to customize your color scheme:

                            1. On your desktop, sign in to your WordPress.com account that you’d like to customize.
                            2. Click your account avatar in the upper right corner.
                            3. Select Account Settings
                            4. Under Dashboard Color Scheme select an option

                            Have ideas for color schemes you’d like to see? Please comment below.

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                            115 Comments

                            Comments are closed.

                            1. Money Bear Jan 8th at 6:33 pm

                              Loved the earlier much brighter scheme. Now the colours feel more sad and depressive.

                              Liked by 26 people

                              • Alphe Jan 8th at 7:03 pm

                                Yes, that’s what I thought! When I first noticed the change it looked to me like some temporary connection issues, as if everything went offline.

                                Liked by 20 people

                            2. Alphe Jan 8th at 6:45 pm

                              Improvement is always great, but my memory tells me that the ‘standard I’ve known and loved’ was blue and orange, not just blue?

                              Liked by 15 people

                            3. Samuel Jan 8th at 6:50 pm

                              both color schemes are beautiful. thank you wordpress.com.

                              Liked by 6 people

                            4. Alphe Jan 8th at 6:53 pm

                              I don’t want to spread negativity, but both currently available themes are extremely dark. Yes, that applies to ‘Classic Bright’ too. In the dashboard, the pink highlighting the day on the stats chart barely stands out, it’s so dark, very close to the blue. The world map with traffic source doesn’t even have the pink at all, it’s just all dark greyish blue.

                              Liked by 17 people

                            5. Kelsey @ There's Something About KM Jan 8th at 7:02 pm

                              The former, brighter color scheme please.

                              Liked by 16 people

                            6. glenmckenzie(justabitfurther) Jan 8th at 7:09 pm

                              I would agree that both current options are a “tad dark.” Much enjoyed the older colours.

                              Liked by 11 people

                            7. exploringcolour Jan 8th at 7:24 pm

                              I’ve just logged in, in New Zealand, and was horrified to find that the colour scheme had been changed for me without my choice. The usual tan-coloured dot for notifications was a sickly pinky colour (as was the login button). When I clicked to “like” something it just went a darker blue and wasn’t clearly different at all. I don’t appreciate the interference of WP in matters that were perfectly fine as they were. Now I’ll have to go and try and get it configured back to how it was. Why couldn’t you have just left it as it was?

                              Liked by 12 people

                            8. exploringcolour Jan 8th at 7:30 pm

                              And I’ve gone into Settings and I don’t have a choice shown there that allows me to go back to the old colour scheme. Please reinstall the old scheme, I loathe this one.

                              Liked by 10 people

                            9. Queenie Jan 8th at 7:52 pm

                              It looks sad and monochromatic, kind of dark and just. . . blue?

                              Liked by 6 people

                            10. Queenie Jan 8th at 8:07 pm

                              The original classic blue, white, and yellow theme would be nice to have back. . .

                              Liked by 8 people

                            11. sassycoupleok Jan 8th at 8:13 pm

                              Left ours like it was, satisfied. 🙂

                              Liked by 5 people

                            12. House of Heart Jan 8th at 8:21 pm

                              I’m pleased with what I have had , I’m afraid if WP has commited to formats that I’m not happy with I will be closing out my blog. Hopefully that’s not going to happen.

                              Liked by 8 people

                            13. Jason McFadden Jan 8th at 8:26 pm

                              Nice. How about a “dark mode”?

                              Liked by 8 people

                            14. Lance Willett Jan 8th at 8:35 pm

                              I love the readability and refreshed feel of the new color schemes. Bravo!

                              Liked by 7 people

                              • exploringcolour Jan 8th at 9:22 pm

                                Really? How is it more readable to see what you’ve put a “like” on when the star only goes a darker shade of blue instead of orange?

                                Liked by 8 people

                                • Lance Willett Jan 8th at 9:55 pm

                                  It’s much better contrast from the foreground to the background — and thus easier on my old eyes, especially on my mobile devices where often tiny text is hard to read without my glasses on.

                                  Liked by 4 people

                                  • Alphe Jan 9th at 7:23 am

                                    How is blue more contrasting to blue than the good old orange?
                                    It’s interesting that you say the new scheme is easier on your eyes, for some reason my eyes have been hurting ever since the change, something in this colour scheme is extremely eye straining in my case.

                                    Liked by 6 people

                            15. Karandi Jan 8th at 8:36 pm

                              The classic blue isn’t the same as what it was. When the colours just changed on me I thought my computer screen had glitched, then realised the scheme had changed. Saw this post and changed the setting back to Classic Blue but the colours on the map, the lack of orange bar, everything is different and honestly both schemes are harder on the eyes than what we had.

                              Liked by 15 people

                            16. Daniela Jan 8th at 8:36 pm

                              Let’s say that I don’t have any issues with the colors, bright, blue could be anything, I will get used to it. But as a fun fact I can’t see the text anymore on the Notification option, just the picture of the blogger who liked or is following my blog. And this is happening when I am in the My site. When I enter the Reader I can see also the notification text. This seems to be a bug.

                              Liked by 6 people

                            17. Connor McFire Jan 8th at 8:50 pm

                              Honestly, it is kind of depressing and the pink isn’t all the great… I much preferred the orange. I would be a lot happier if there was an option to go back to the old one, which was way better.
                              I wrote an article reviewing it too, if anyone wants to read it: https://wp.me/pa0p2b-8a

                              Liked by 14 people

                            18. Deli Lanoux, Ed.D. Jan 8th at 9:01 pm

                              First, thanks for always trying to improve things for us. But, sometimes, the way it is works just fine. I went in to free myself from the pink— I’ve grown too accustomed to the blues and/or I’m a creature of habit— so I accessed “account settings” and clicked “classic” to revert to what some might consider the same ol’, same ol’ but what I think is just perfect. And it’s just not the same. Too dark and hurts my eyes. I like the lighter hues the way they were. And, yes, while it’s novel to scroll over any given day to see the contrasts better, I’m not convinced that the new-and-improved works better for me. So, what’s the likelihood that we’ll get back what we had before? Thanks so very much!

                              Liked by 15 people

                            19. Judy Labensohn Jan 8th at 9:22 pm

                              Here’s my honest response: The more your folks at wordpress change and upgrade, the more I feel like leaving wp. It look me some time to master the blog and the web site and I do not have patience for mastering new things every six months or every year. I get very frustrated with every new change. I am of the age that I need a person to totally walk me through every new change, a live person, on a phone or in a chat, or better yet, in the room. So when you change something else, please do not inform me of it. It just makes me nervous. I have reached the stage in life where I accept What Is.

                              Liked by 17 people

                            20. DerekL Jan 8th at 9:27 pm

                              Being able to switch between two equally lame and unattractive color schemes is not “customization”.

                              Liked by 23 people

                            21. exploringcolour Jan 8th at 9:46 pm

                              Why do you provide this option only through the Dashboard “Settings”. When I joined WP there was no link provided under “My Sites” to the Dashboard and it took ages before I read you have to add wp-admin/ onto the end of the blog url to get the Dashboard. Under the “My Sites” Settings which I can easily access you don’t colour scheme options. There’s such a disconnect between “My Sites” and “Dashboard”.

                              Liked by 10 people

                            22. northie Jan 8th at 10:01 pm

                              I agree with many of the comments above concerning the new colours. The blue is dreary. When the bright pink is present, the blue appears even more drab. A colour with more life and warmth would be appreciated. That should be possible while also delivering greater contrast. Yes, improving accessibility is good, but not at the cost of colouring everything dull.

                              Liked by 11 people

                            23. Audrey Driscoll Jan 8th at 10:48 pm

                              I miss the orange. Orange contrasts well with blue. I would prefer a choice between “Classic Orange and Blue” and the new “bright” scheme. The so-called “Classic Blue” hasn’t enough contrast, so is no improvement.

                              Liked by 7 people

                            24. exploringcolour Jan 8th at 10:51 pm

                              I want the option to revert to how it was before. To just impose this new scheme is insulting. It always was fine on my laptop. Maybe folks using WP on cellphones screens and such benefit from this, I wouldn’t know. But for me, I want the colours just how they were!

                              Liked by 5 people

                            25. createjewels Jan 8th at 11:07 pm

                              Hi Courtney My name is Deb Peisner. I now have a wix site and am no longer using my WordPress site. I am getting these continual spam type of e mails. Do I need to turn off my WordPress site due to moving my domain to my new wix site?

                              Liked by 4 people

                            26. Rosalie P. Krajci Jan 8th at 11:12 pm

                              I applaud your desire to change, improve, innovate. I’m probably in the minority, but perhaps you could have a two-track system: one for those who thrive on change, and one for people like me who have limited time and need every second of it for substance over a frequently changing format. Do consider my/our needs. Thanks.

                              Liked by 6 people

                            27. pranabaxom Jan 9th at 1:15 am

                              Not sure what improved. Can barely see where is the like button.

                              Liked by 5 people

                            28. floatinggold Jan 9th at 1:27 am

                              Thank you for trying to improve this platform.

                              Now that I’ve gotten the niceties out of the way, who’s the genius behind this idea? The color scheme is a TOTAL failure. It’s too dark. And stats for today show up either in pink, or in the same color as other days. What diversity. LOL.

                              I’m all for changes, but at least give us the option to keep it the way things were. This is madness.

                              Liked by 10 people

                            29. turning20web Jan 9th at 3:12 am

                              Nice..

                              Liked by 3 people

                            30. Daniel J McIntyre Jan 9th at 3:24 am

                              Since I’m new to word press and publishing this is great information! Thank you so much!

                              Liked by 3 people

                            31. Shashank Gupta Jan 9th at 3:25 am

                              Present appearance is good no offenses but we should try the new one. Somehow little changes are very much necessary.

                              Liked by 4 people

                            32. Luna 🌘 Flicker of Korean Jan 9th at 3:51 am

                              Would it be possible to also leave the option to revert back to old color scheme?

                              It’s great you are trying to be inclusive and make it easier for people with vision problems, but there are also people like me who have neurological issues and have trouble adjusting to any change. It takes me a long time and a lot of effort to deal with even for a small change such as color scheme.

                              Liked by 5 people

                            33. dandelionsalad Jan 9th at 4:28 am

                              A most welcome improvement, thank you. I definitely prefer the higher contrast, so much easier to read. The “new” blue is darker which I prefer over the “old” blue. The added pink is a nice touch. I always use the classic editor and classic Stats, Comments, etc. so don’t see the “new” color scheme except when visiting the Reader and when I log in. And, yes, please give us more color choices in the near future, green would be lovely.

                              Liked by 3 people

                            34. Dan Jan 9th at 4:56 am

                              If it ain’t broke, don’t “fix” it.

                              The new color schemes are atrocious. Give me back the orange bars for the stats and the yellow to orange/red colors on the maps. It’s very difficult to see the gradient on the maps with that dull blue-gray tone.

                              I also agree with Judy L. above. Many of us bloggers are not techies and the more you screw around with the platform with the frequency with which you do it, the more inclined I am to take my five blogs/websites elsewhere. (And I’ve only dipped my toe into the whole Gutenberg blocks thing—again, making something relatively simple more complex.)

                              I’m all for improvement where real improvement is needed, not just for the sake of doing “something.” You can do better, WordPress.

                              Liked by 8 people

                            35. emmbrainparadox Jan 9th at 5:31 am

                              Still won’t improve my traffic

                              Liked by 3 people

                            36. Anjali Roy Jan 9th at 6:04 am

                              Siding with all the above comments, please reintroduce the old theme as the third option, ‘Classic Original‘..

                              Thus, everyone’s problems, including mine will be solved. 🙂

                              Liked by 8 people

                            37. TheNextChaos Jan 9th at 7:27 am

                              Hey. Can anyone help me? I updated my blog today. But whenever I use a browser to read the blog. Everything goes out of screen. Has anyone dealt with this problem? Please help.

                              Liked by 3 people

                            38. Alphe Jan 9th at 7:36 am

                              Okay, fair point, you added a chart comparing the contrast between the new colours vs white. I agree that the contrast is better there (you made the colours darker, so it’s obvious that dark is more contrasting to white).
                              But, you missed the point where new colours also have to be contrasting between one another, not just white.
                              And I’m sorry to break it to you, but two dark colours don’t contrast at all.
                              GUI is supposed to highlight the important information effectively, so that it’s clear and instantly visible. With the current, plain dark colour scheme, I can’t instantly tell which day I’m on in the stats chart, I can’t instantly tell where my traffic comes from looking at the map, I can’t instantly tell if there’s a notification dot on the bell and I can’t instantly tell whether I’ve already liked a post or not. All of those things which should be intuitive and visible at first glance are now extremely eye-straining and since the change I’ve had trouble managing my site for longer than 5 minutes at a time (I had to switch to doing certain actions on my mobile app, which still has nicely contrasting colours).

                              Liked by 6 people

                            39. 321Clic Jan 9th at 8:12 am

                              Same comment as many other here, please add back a third scheme like the old one with light blue/orange.

                              Liked by 6 people

                            40. Money Bear Jan 9th at 9:58 am

                              Love how customer-friendly WordPress.com positions itself to be, when they don’t even listen to their own customers. Will migrate to Bluehost after my plan expires.

                              Liked by 8 people

                            41. Hugh's Views and News Jan 9th at 10:26 am

                              Oh dear! I don’t think these changes are very good, especially given that the classic blue is nowhere near like it used to be. Like many others have said, the new colours are too dark. Brighter colours would not only stand out a lot more but would also be very eyecatching.

                              I know there are more colours on the way, but can we have some bright, cheerful colours, please? How about some yellows and oranges as a start. Or, how about starting by giving us back the classic blue colour, as it used to be, as an option?

                              Liked by 7 people

                            42. Thy Unsuspicious Jan 9th at 10:41 am

                              Can we please have an option to go back to the old color scheme? The new one is NOT the same.

                              Liked by 8 people

                            43. italiafinlandia Jan 9th at 10:45 am

                              Hello, I seem to have a problem: after the re-styling in the tablet version I cannot view the text of my notifications! (Luckily only in the tablet version.)

                              Liked by 3 people

                            44. Robert Jan 9th at 10:52 am

                              Why do I have to keep looking at “ad” of some sickening fat gut and a bunch of scam ads.

                              I pay for the level that is supposed to eliminate ads, instead I have to keep looking at some fat gut and scam ads.

                              What is gong on? Why can’t I eliminate the ads? My fees were raised 26% this year and I still need to look at scam ads?

                              >

                              Liked by 4 people

                            45. Quenya101 Jan 9th at 11:15 am

                              I simply HATE when new changes come and I do not have the option to keep with the same good old thing that I had before. Can you please reverse that awful color scheme change and give us the option to keep the standard one, the real and true “Classic Bright”? Things have changed within the pages as well when I’m editing them. That’s really annoying.

                              Liked by 10 people

                            46. rewsteruk Jan 9th at 11:20 am

                              Please can you return the colours to as they were as the default theme, then when the designers can work out how to deploy a change correctly have it as an option to change the colours (to the depressing themes they have chosen), not force it.

                              Even if you do change to classic blue, the stats current day is no longer highlighted orange, it is the same dark blue.

                              I spoke to support as i thought it was something i messed up, they accepted my concerns about the forced colour change, this was hard to read as the chat window was the horrible pink colour with white writing, but they can only tell me the designers decided to do it, and blogged about it the day they pushed out the change.

                              Liked by 7 people

                              • 2justanotherpost Jan 10th at 12:05 am

                                Restart your computer system when you select classic blue theme and log back in wordpress and that orange color on stat will resume, however the classic blue theme is not the default theme but is similar to it and on the contrary, the like’s color (star) remains the hideous blue color :/

                                Liked by 1 person

                            47. omniscientitsolution Jan 9th at 11:53 am

                              Great blog. what about light theme it looks great. thanks for sharing.

                              Liked by 3 people

                            48. papoopoo Jan 9th at 12:25 pm

                              thankyou

                              ในวันที่ พ. 9 ม.ค. 2019 เวลา 02:51 The WordPress.com Blog เขียนว่า:

                              > Courtney Burton Doker posted: ” We’re happy to announce new improvements > to your WordPress.com dashboard for a more accessible and customized > experience. From your desktop, you can now customize your dashboard by > choosing one of our two new color schemes, Classic Bright for a fresh mod” >

                              Liked by 3 people

                            49. Ernie Myles Keeler. Jan 9th at 12:42 pm

                              Love it.

                              Liked by 4 people

                            50. 2justanotherpost Jan 9th at 1:26 pm

                              This is great but I like the original theme we had first :I

                              Liked by 4 people

                            51. Cks Jan 9th at 1:30 pm

                              Hmm… NICE

                              Liked by 3 people

                            52. Widdershins Jan 9th at 3:27 pm

                              NO, no, no … just STOP IT with all these ridiculous tweaks.

                              Liked by 8 people

                            53. PRINCE GODWIN EROH II Jan 9th at 3:44 pm

                              Well, color impression is Germaine yet, I will stick to the original. Thanks.

                              Liked by 5 people

                            54. -Eugenia Jan 9th at 4:02 pm

                              I find it refreshing but would like to see more options. Orange is always a good color because it represents warmth and happiness. Green, also is a good color because it represents newness and growth. Even, black, which can be stark and sexy. Those that like neutral may go for khaki and brown tones. There are a plethora of color options so offer more, please. Thank you.

                              Liked by 7 people

                            55. Mallee Stanley Jan 9th at 4:45 pm

                              Please, please, please get rid of that ghastly pink

                              Liked by 9 people

                            56. lindasschaub Jan 9th at 4:47 pm

                              I will have to study this later, but … is the new default for the “like” going to stay at blue – if I am unable to read all the new posts in Reader at one time, it is difficult to see where I left off. Sometimes I go through Reader and have time to read the short post, mostly the photographers I follow, but need more time to read lengthier posts and comment on them – I can’t see where I left off. Is this something we can manually adjust?

                              Liked by 4 people

                            57. properlypurple Jan 9th at 5:17 pm

                              Yay for a better contrast. And I just love this deeper, richer blue. It’s easier on the eyes and gets out of the way.

                              Liked by 4 people

                            58. Siti Aisyah A. Jan 9th at 5:41 pm

                              I like this new update for dashboard. Yeay!

                              Liked by 3 people

                            59. ShelbyCourtland Jan 9th at 6:13 pm

                              For those of you who don’t like this latest debacle, I am sorry to have to state this, but WordPress is not going to change things back to the old way. That train wreck that’s our stats page? It’s still ugly and when it was originally rolled out, there was plenty of negative feedback and it did not one bit of good. Save your ire. They’re not listening. They never do.

                              Liked by 6 people

                            60. Lily Jan 9th at 6:17 pm

                              Hate it. Atrocious pink. There was nothing wrong with the previous color scheme. Why waste time on this nonsense? Also not thrilled with the new editor and have been using the mobile version to avoid it. Not my preference for writing. I rarely complain but my tolerance for the unnecessary changes is growing short.

                              Liked by 15 people

                            61. Biblicon Jan 9th at 6:36 pm

                              I agree with exploribgcolour’s comment. I could never find the dashboard or anything leading to it (not for that matter to forums or support to ask them) and now find that it is hidden under the ridiculous name of WPadmin. Who realises that that is the dashboard? Please change the name under My Sites from WPadmin which is meaningless to Dashboard which you often refer to.

                              Liked by 6 people

                            62. thehomeplaceweb Jan 9th at 6:59 pm

                              Add me to the list of people who preferred the old color scheme. When I post links to other posts in the Reader, the blue link is so hard to distinguish from the black that I don’t think people will notice it’s a link….and I don’t like the blue like button either. I have not tried the new editor yet, but have heard nothing but complaints about it too…..will that be forced on us too? Please, if it’s isn’t broke, don’t fix it! Not everyone has tons of time to sift through all these changes.

                              Liked by 2 people

                            63. Mary Anne Jan 9th at 7:15 pm

                              Why are my stats (the columns) black, along with the mapped locations of those who have read my posts? Just wondering if it’s my computer?

                              Liked by 3 people

                            64. guitarsophist Jan 9th at 7:31 pm

                              Not a fan of dork blue and icky pink. The other choice is just dork blue. Classic Bright is annoying and hard to read. Classic Blue is just hard to read. This is a major fail.

                              Liked by 3 people

                            65. ludmilassouza Jan 9th at 8:09 pm

                              I hated the pink thing, so I changed it to the Whatever Blue, and it was WORSE. Also, the new editor, who works in blocks, make it much more difficult to format a single word in a paragraph. The color scheme for text and backgrounds is not particularly working. Pure black is impossible, only very, verydark gray. I feel I’m in the LEGO movie.

                              Liked by 6 people

                            66. ronvmmm Jan 9th at 9:24 pm

                              I find that the orange colour highlighting a selected column in the charts is better than the new ‘pinky-purple’. More options of colour schemes, as others have requested, would indeed be welcome. However, could you please change the orange text highlighting the most frequent number of views per month and the highest average views per month in tables — the bright orange here on the white background is hardly visible (perhaps red text or a yellow background coloured cell would make the record figure more noticeable).

                              Liked by 6 people

                            67. Courtney Burton Doker Jan 9th at 10:49 pm

                              Hi everyone :wave:

                              I wanted to share an update that we were experimenting with different accent colors for the Classic Blue theme and decided to land with orange. Hopefully by now this shift should be propagated to everyone.

                              Best,
                              Courtney

                              Liked by 4 people

                              • Connor McFire Jan 10th at 12:18 am

                                Hello Courtney,

                                I am glad to see that WordPress has taken some thoughts from their users! Although the new orange color is not as ‘bright’ as the old design, it certainly looks better than the old navy blue. Thanks!

                                Regards,
                                Connor

                                Liked by 2 people

                              • Ms. Liz Jan 10th at 3:58 am

                                I noticed the change and have posted on my Exploring Colour blog about how glad I am to have an orange bar back again on the stats chart. That’s great, BUT its still not good enough that the orange colour has not yet propagated to when I hit the “Like” button on posts in Reader. It still just goes to a dark blue solid star. If I’m browsing down Reader to see what I may have missed the contrast between a blue unfilled star and a darker blue filled star is simply not enough!! Please, please attend to this as well PLEASE!!

                                Liked by 2 people

                              • Ms. Liz Jan 10th at 5:15 am

                                PS. I actually like the new blue in the Classic Blue scheme. Obviously different people have different preferences for the blue therefore I’d like to see an option for “Classic Blue” and another option for “Classic Blue – Original”. So many people like the orange that I’d expect you’d retain the orange in both schemes. I’d like WP to also please re-configure “Likes” so that if I click on “Like” then the star goes orange. And also in the Traffic chart, now we have an orange “Current” bar, lets have the current day’s posts with an orange line (vertical bar) beside them. Thanks.

                                Liked by 3 people

                              • Alphe Jan 10th at 7:04 am

                                Thank goodness for adjusting the shades, current accents are still worse than what we used to have but better than what the first update brought.
                                Now bring back colours to the world map and it might actually be bearable!

                                Liked by 3 people

                            68. guitarsophist Jan 9th at 11:30 pm

                              Adding orange to the Classic Blue is certainly a change in the right direction. Make both the blue and the orange a bit lighter and we would be back to where we were, which was fine. But this is an improvement. Thanks for making it.

                              Liked by 2 people

                            69. anne leueen Jan 10th at 2:58 am

                              Better contrast is good but the stats map is so dull only in shades of grey and blue etc. i liked the RED to tell me where most of my readers were located. Also in Reader when I”like” a post it just goes to a darker blue. The yellow/orange would let me know what posts I had already liked. So I’m not a fan of the new design.

                              Liked by 6 people

                            70. Biblicon Jan 10th at 10:33 am

                              Text in a light colour on a dark background is always difficult to read. If the background is a dark colour the text should be in white. It would help more if you could fix this.

                              Liked by 4 people

                            71. Diane Jan 10th at 3:29 pm

                              I prefer a mixture of med to dark gray scales with very light gray to white fonts presenting option boxes. And with bright colors for the chosen box options. The brighter colors for the chosen options would have the reverse color in fonts. Med to dark gray fonts. I can see better with the dark color option than I can with white backgrounds.

                              Liked by 2 people

                            72. tufiddin.com Jan 10th at 3:53 pm

                              Love the new color scheme 🍁😊

                              Liked by 2 people

                            73. ralphlen5930 Jan 11th at 12:16 am

                              i don’t know how to use this..im beginer here

                              Liked by 2 people

                            74. ashleyleia Jan 11th at 9:42 am

                              With the new scheme it is much harder to see which notifications have been read and which haven’t, seen they’re almost the same colour. It’s also harder to see which posts in the reader I have liked, whereas before it was quickly apparent.

                              Liked by 5 people

                            75. deepanilamani Jan 11th at 1:22 pm

                              I like the new colours. Thank you for the new improvements. Looking forward for further changes for the better in the coming years 🙂

                              Liked by 2 people

                            76. werlibertyauto Jan 11th at 4:24 pm

                              I exclusively use the mobile app and always appreciate when features are made available on mobile and not just desktop.

                              Liked by 2 people

                            77. abdulfarel Jan 11th at 8:52 pm

                              Mantap

                              Liked by 1 person

                            78. abdulfarel Jan 11th at 9:51 pm

                              Mantap bg

                              Liked by 2 people

                            79. River Jan 11th at 11:27 pm

                              I appreciate WP’s commitment to inclusive design. However, the new themes are harder on my eyes, not easier. It would be wonderful if we could have the option of a light theme, like the classic themes available until just a few days ago, as well as the high-contrast themes. 🙂

                              Liked by 1 person

                            80. Edith Aint Jan 12th at 2:29 am

                              So….this is why my dashboard has so much pink now? Pink buttons, pink stats….Not that I mind the color pink, I just thought maybe a feminist hacked my account.

                              Liked by 3 people

                            81. B.Groves Jan 13th at 1:40 am

                              As usual, WordPress is behind the times.

                              Like

                            82. Komodo Nabila Tour Jan 13th at 2:27 am

                              Hi….

                              Liked by 1 person

                            83. Marcelo Gomes Jan 13th at 2:52 am

                              Can we still use the old theme?
                              Not the Classic Blue, the original one with blue and orange!
                              These new color are so bad!

                              Liked by 1 person

                            84. Abdul Hadi Jan 13th at 3:30 pm

                              Hai

                              Liked by 1 person

                            85. raghav464 Jan 14th at 10:58 am

                              i like this new colours

                              Liked by 1 person

                            86. mireku foster Jan 14th at 12:11 pm

                              thanks

                              Liked by 1 person

                            87. Sarjoni Jan 14th at 3:57 pm

                              wordpress is very power on SEO..

                              Liked by 1 person

                              • libertymark13 Jan 14th at 8:35 pm

                                Yeah i love the new color

                                On Jan 14, 2019 9:30 PM, “The WordPress.com Blog” wrote:

                                Sarjoni commented: “wordpress is very power on SEO..”

                                Like

                            88. M. K. Waller Jan 15th at 12:58 am

                              Regarding colors, as long as I can read them easily, I don’t care much about them. I don’t know why they needed to be changed, but I don’t notice them (except for the bright pink, which is a little much). The bar denoting visitors as opposed to views, however, seems to have disappeared from my page in wp-admin.

                              If a color change is made, I’d like it to be the default font color. The gray is difficult to read. Black would be a help–if not the default, at least the choice to change easily.

                              I do everything from the wp-admin page because it’s convenient–I can go anywhere from there. The new blocks are nice–I used it several times–but the page hides buttons and icons, requires more clicks, and has less functionality than the classic editor. I can start new paragraphs in the classic editor without needing blocks.

                              Liked by 3 people

                            89. diloartwrites Jan 15th at 2:57 pm

                              I suggest the colour should be more brighter and simple

                              Liked by 1 person

                            Create your new blog or website for free

                            Get Started

                              #####EOF##### Getting Started with the API | Developer Resources

                              Getting Started with the API

                              Documentation → REST API Resources → Getting Started with the API

                              What is it?

                              Our REST API allows you to view, create or edit content on any WordPress.com site, as well as any self-hosted (WordPress.org) site connected via Jetpack. This includes not only blog posts and pages but also comments, tags, categories, media, site stats, notifications, sharing settings, user profiles, and many other WordPress.com features.

                              Some requests (e.g. listing public posts) do not need to be authenticated, but any action that would require a user to be logged in (such as creating a post) requires an authentication token. To make authenticated requests, you’ll need to set up an account on WordPress.com if you don’t have one already. You’ll also need to create a WordPress.com client application.

                              How To Use It

                              There are two ways to explore the features of the API: via the documentation or the development console. The documentation (developer.wordpress.com/docs/api/) lists all available endpoints and details the input and output of each one, along with example code in curl and PHP. The development console (developer.wordpress.com/docs/api/console/),  allows you to construct and try out real API requests.

                              Making unauthenticated requests is simple. Since there are no special headers required, you can even open this one in your browser to see what it will return: https://public-api.wordpress.com/rest/v1.1/sites/en.blog.wordpress.com/posts/?number=2&pretty=true

                              Making authenticated requests requires a few more steps. (If you’re already familiar with OAuth2, now might be a good time to skip directly to the technical documentation.)

                              We use the OAuth2 protocol, which is simply a way for your application to act on behalf of a user. This is why you need to create a client application, even for a single-user app; the client mediates between any WordPress.com user and our API. For a single-user application, this can be confusing, because in this case you are both the client and the user who is logging in. However, one client can acquire tokens for many users, similar to a professional dog-walker who’s been entrusted with many leashes, or a hotel valet with the keys to many cars.

                              One of the features of OAuth is the use of tokens, strings which act as a sort of key. They represent the user’s consent to act on their behalf. This has several advantages: client apps do not need to request or store user’s passwords, and tokens can expire or be revoked on a per-client basis. Unlike a username + password combination, which can be used all over the place, tokens can only be used by the client that requested them.

                              If you’ve ever logged into a website using your Facebook or Twitter login, you’ve seen OAuth in action. The interesting part is the way it sends you over to Facebook, asking Facebook to log you in and allow access. You can think of it as a three-way conversation:

                              User: “I’d like to make a post via this API client.”
                              Client: “Okay. Hey, WordPress.com, I’d like to do something on behalf of this user. Can you ask them if it’s okay?”
                              WordPress.com: “Sure. Hey, user, is it okay if Client acts on your behalf?”
                              User: “Yes, that is okay. I trust this client to take actions for me in the future.”
                              WordPress.com: “Okay, Client, here is a token that will allow you to take actions for this user. Keep it secret. Keep it safe.”
                              (later)
                              Client: “Hi, WordPress.com. I’m making a post on behalf of a particular user. Here are all the details about the post, and to go with it, here’s the token that shows I’m allowed to post as this user.”

                              So, how does this work from the client’s perspective? The first thing you need to do is send the user over to WordPress.com to request access. You’ll link them to a specific URL that includes, most importantly, your client ID and a redirect URL. The client ID tells us which client is making the request; the redirect URL is where we’ll send the user back to. As a security measure, we ask for the redirect URL to be defined in your application’s settings as well; if the one you pass in doesn’t match the one in your settings, the request cannot be completed.

                              When the user authorizes the request, we’ll send them back to your redirect URL, but with a bonus: the token will be tacked on to the end. Your application should be prepared to handle that URL, extracting incoming tokens which it can then save for later use.

                              Once you have your token, you can authenticate any API request by including it in the request headers. You do this by including a header called “Authorization" with the value “BEARER your_token_here".

                              Now that you understand the basics of the authentication process, refer to the OAuth2 docs for a more technical walkthrough, including code examples.

                              Next Steps

                              The full documentation is a great way to explore all the features of the API. You might also want to check out our example apps, or familiarize yourself with the development console.

                              Not sure where to start? Here are a few interesting endpoints:

                              Questions? Comments? Want to tell us about the cool stuff you’ve built with our API? Get in touch.

                              #####EOF##### Demographics – Russia Military Analysis

                              Tag: Demographics

                              The Durability of Russian Military Power: Moscow’s Prospects for Sustaining Direct Competition

                              Michael Kofman6 Comments

                              My issue brief as part a series run by the Changing Character of War Centre at Oxford, assessing the durability of Russian military power. I recommend their centre’s website for some great Russia mil analysis. This briefing in particular focuses on manpower, materiel, and funding. I tackle the issue of whether Russia is able to sustain a competition with the United States, and the extent to which it will be able to sustain the military as an effective instrument of national power despite the many problems the country faces. I’ve found that some of the discourse on this subject, particularly with respect to manpower/demographics, could be better informed by data, and merits a closer look.

                               

                              Political analysis in the West retains a strong bias towards measuring state influence and status according to economic foundations of power, yet Russia has demonstrated that military power remains an important instrument in international politics. Having enacted a period of military reform 2008-2012 and financed a sustained program of modernization, Russian foreign policy is increasingly underwritten either by the use of force, or threat of force, as part and parcel of coercive diplomacy. Though much attention is drawn today to indirect competition, it is Russia’s successful resurrection of military power which enables the country to ‘bench press’ above its weight in the international arena. Indeed, indirect competition is often messy, indecisive, and ineffectual without the weight of conventional military power supporting it.

                              While observers are cognizant of the resurrection of Russian military power, there remains, however, a considerable debate as to its durability. Simply put, many believe that demographic, economic and industrial trends are against Russia – the country will not be able to sustain this level of direct competition. Yet there is little to suggest, looking ten years out and even beyond, that Russia will suffer from those severe shortages of either manpower, money or materiel which would reduce Russia’s ability to underwrite its foreign policy. On the contrary, Russian demographic trends reflect only an increasing availability of manpower for the growing force, a sustainable defence budget in terms of spending, and a modernization program that will suffice to arm the force well into the 2020s. It can go on, and it will.

                              Much of the conversation on Russian demographics is simply ill informed. A decline of birth rates throughout the 1990s lasted until 1999. Russia suffered through a decade of declining health standards, fertility, falling birth rates, and emigration. Despite the decline in numbers of 18 year olds available for service, Russian armed forces expanded from perhaps around 700,000 in 2011 to over 900,000 in 2017. The contract share of the force swelled to as much as 380,000, or more than 50% of the enlisted force. Russian birth rates increased year on year from 2000 until 2015. This means that men born in 2000 will be of service age this year, 2018, and the pool of men aged 18-27 should increase every year from now until 2032.

                              Russia’s birth rate – World Bank

                              world-bank-rf-birthrates.jpg

                              Birth rates are hardly the only indicator responsible for growing manpower availability in Russia. The draft board, Voenkomat, has also helped clean up corruption in the number of health exclusions granted to those seeking to dodge service. In the past, many Russians would spontaneously become unhealthy upon turning 18. But with health exclusions revised, and the rampant buying of disqualifications now attended to, the amount of those deemed unfit had declined to only about 23% in 2016 according to head of the General Staff’s Mobilization Directorate Colonel General Tonkoshkurov. Russia’s chief military prosecutor, Valery Petrov, stated more recently in 2018 that overall draft evasion is down by about 30% from the corrupt heydays of the past. Beyond reductions in draft dodging, increases in pay, growing public respect for the armed forces, and overall improving conditions in the military have all had a positive effect on recruitment. Starting in 2018, a change in the conscription law now offers draftees the option of one year conscript service or two years under contract with better terms.

                              General demographics trends offer a complex picture of Russia’s future. Russian life expectancy actually reached a record high in 2017, and fertility rates are closing in on those in the United States, up from 1.157 in 1999 to 1.75 in 2016 (U.S. was at 1.8). Russia suffers from three principal problems in demographics: the demographic echo from the disastrous 1990s which will return to haunt Moscow in the mid-2030s, a declining workforce which is losing perhaps 600,000 per year in retirements, and the recent economic recession which slowed birth rates 2015-2017 (even despite generous state sponsored family programmes) which will have knock on effects years from now. Russia’s main problem is not so much the size of its population, but its productivity. Nevertheless, because Russia remains the primary labour market for the former Soviet Union, and is host to a large pool of immigrant labour, it does have answers readily available for the present decline in the labour force. Despite all these challenges, therefore, Russia’s current population is much healthier of late, with the longest lifespan witnessed, and manpower availability is likely to see sustained increases into the mid 2030s.

                              Fertility rates comparison – World Bank

                              Fertility rates WB
                              A steady decline in US fertility rate meets a rise in Russian fertility rate prior to the econ crisis

                              From a materiel standpoint, it is also difficult to observe looming shortages. The previous State Armament Program 2011-2020 was meant to jumpstart the defence industry, and effectively provided for a dramatic increase in the modernization rating of Russian equipment from 15% in 2010 to almost 60% in 2017 (according to official figures). That program’s achievements merit briefly recounting, as they include the acquisition of 418 aircraft for tactical aviation, 3 combat aviation brigades and 6 combat aviation regiments, 16 air defence regiments of S-400, more than 70 radars of various types for VKS Aerospace forces, 10 Iskander-M brigade sets, completion of Russia’s early warning radar network, 55 military satellites launched into orbit, 12 new regiments of Yars road-mobile ICBMs deployed, more than 3,000 modernized ground force vehicles, 3 new SSBNs and 2 new 4th generation SSGNs, together with diesel-electric submarines, corvettes, and auxiliary ships. This list includes upgrades in more specialized fields, including electronic warfare brigades and companies, new command and control systems to enable recon-strike and fires, together with more than 1800 drones acquired across services.

                              The funds spent by 2017 doubtfully exceed 50-60% of the original 19 trillion RUB allocated. Thus the new state armament program 2018-2027, at another 19 trillion RUB, plus 1 trillion for infrastructure, and 3 trillion for other security services, represents a sustained investment. Albeit with reduced purchasing power, the new state armament program will focus on areas neglected, or perhaps ‘jump started’ by its predecessor. These include large-scale acquisition of precision guided munitions, long-range standoff cruise missiles, transport aviation, bomber modernization, expansion of artillery, armour, and missile formations in the ground forces, more capable drones, and next generation tech like hypersonic weapons.

                              Even in Russia’s lagging industry, shipbuilding, one can see that core sectors of competence such as submarine construction remain capable of producing some of the most sophisticated platforms available. Russia currently has 11 nuclear powered submarines laid down, and is able to build a diesel-electric submarine in 18 months, with a division of 6 currently in production for the Pacific Fleet. Despite a messy divorce from Ukraine’s defence sector, the material is not only there to sustain Russian military modernization, but the production rates are more than sufficient even in troublesome sectors.

                              In other areas, such as the ground forces, the conflict in Ukraine and Syria has illustrated that Russian ‘good enough’ is can deal with the country’s military requirements for the coming decade. Modernized Soviet platforms are able to beat any former Soviet republic on Russia’s borders. Possessing them at high readiness, and large numbers, means Russia can effectively impose its will on neighbours or coerce them in a crisis. If anything, most of the challenges faced by Moscow are self-imposed, such as the decision to expand the ground force structure so quickly that it will inherently suffer in readiness and mobility. The defence industry has shown itself capable of producing current generation technology such that Russia has a viable path towards conventional deterrence vis-a-vis the United States, meanwhile less advanced elements of the Russian military are more than suitable for compellence in local and regional conflicts.

                              Assuming levels of economic growth at 1.5%, there is little to suggest that Russia cannot sustain this level of military expenditure, which will amount to no more than 4% of GDP. Meanwhile Russian spending on national defence will likely hover at around 2.8% of GDP, as the defence budget is only seeing modest cuts relative to other sections of the budget. The fact that oil prices are 50% above the $40 per barrel mark which the government used to underpin its budget expectations is yet another indicator that the economic outlook for defence spending is considerably better than usually appreciated. While the defence budget may still have fat to trim, coming off of historic highs in 2014, there is less urgency in spending on procurement after major gaps have been filled in 2011-2017, and the defence industry revitalized in the process. Adjusted for purchasing power parity, Russia remains just behind Germany as the second largest GDP in Europe. Although it is technically a middle income country, Russia’s raw GDP hides considerable purchasing power when it comes to defence spending and the ability to sustain its armed forces.

                              On the basis of macro indicators such as manpower, materiel, and money, therefore, Russia is positioned to sustain its policies, even if this means a prolonged confrontation well into the 2020s, and perhaps 2030s. More importantly, Moscow’s ability to leverage military power as one of the more decisive instruments in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives should be clearly understood. Russia can retain the current degree of military activity, snap readiness tests, large strategic exercises, expeditionary operations in Syria, and a rotating presence in Ukraine. The challenges Russia faces are consequential, often resulting in cycles of stagnation and mobilization, but they are not deterministic, as has historically been the case for this particular power.

                              Back to top
                              #####EOF##### Olli-Pekka Niemi – 44CON

                              Olli-Pekka Niemi

                              default Twitter: @0pi
                              Olli-Pekka Niemi has been working in Internet security since 1996. He has experience in offensive security as a Penetration Tester and in defensive security as a System Administrator. Since December 2000, he has been working for Stonesoft R&D, developing Intrusion Prevention Systems and Next Generation Firewalls. His main R&D interests are analyzing network-based threats and evasion research. Mr. Niemi is the founder and head of the Stonesoft Vulnerability Analysis Group (VAG). He is also the Chief Research Officer of Stonesoft. Mr. Niemi has given presentations at various security conferences such as T2, DeepSec, Positive Hack Days, and SIGCOMM.

                              Olli-Pekka has presented at:

                              • 44CON 2013: Signatureless Breach Detection Under The Microscope

                              https://vimeo.com/109380800
                              #####EOF##### Daniel Cuthbert – 44CON

                              Daniel Cuthbert

                              default
                              The face of SensePost.

                              Daniel has presented at:

                              • 44CON 2013 (workshop): Malware Reverse Engineering Workshop
                              • 44CON 2012: Terrorism, tracking, privacy and human interactions.
                              #####EOF##### Cheri Lucas Rowlands | Discover
                              Cheri Lucas Rowlands
                              Story Wrangler, WordPress.com. Senior Editor, Longreads. Not to be fed after midnight.
                              Filter
                              1. Columbine, 20 Years Later

                                “Was it possible, we wondered, that Columbine, that seminal moment in American history, had taught us nothing?” A special issue at 5280 covers the community of Columbine, Colorado, 20 years after the Columbine High School shooting.
                                Commentary
                              2. What it means to become British

                                From Nadia El-Awady: “I come from a culture that tends to glorify non-elected, autocratic, all-powerful leaders. They have to. The consequences of not doing so are not pretty. So I’ve grown up with a disdain for the glorification of single human beings; even those that don’t have much power.”
                                Commentary
                                Inner Workings of My Mind
                                by nadiaelawady
                              3. The Chriselle Factor

                                The Chriselle Factor is stylist and YouTube influencer Chriselle Lim’s blog of beauty, fashion, and lifestyle tips.
                                Fashion
                              4. Wonder Woman

                                “We’re all a little weird thanks to our mothers. I’m carrying that tradition on with my own children.” Mary Laura Philpott, who blogged previously at I Miss You When I Blink, shares an excerpt from her new essay collection at Longreads.
                                Authors
                                Longreads
                                by Longreads
                              5. Lit Lovers, Rejoice: Electric Literature Moves to WordPress

                                Love to read and write? Explore Electric Literature, now on WordPress.
                                Authors
                                Feature
                                by
                              6. Alta

                                Alta publishes writing on the issues, culture, personalities, politics, lifestyle, and history of California and the West.
                                Culture
                                Photo by Oscar Salgado from Pexels
                              7. Aubrie Pick Photography

                                Aubrie Pick is a San Francisco-based photographer specializing in food, interiors, portraits, lifestyle, and travel photography. Notable projects include the cookbooks of celebrities, from Giada De Laurentiis to Chrissy Teigen.
                                Food
                              8. Tiny House Giant Journey

                                Tiny House Giant Journey is Jenna Spesard’s popular tiny house and travel blog, filled with practical tiny house advice and travel stories, videos, and photography from around the world.
                                DIY
                              9. L.A. Taco

                                The people behind L.A. Taco are obsessed with Los Angeles. The indie publication was founded in 2006, mostly to document tacos and street art. The site now covers the Los Angeles food scene, music, galleries, festivals, and more.
                                Art
                                L.A. TACO
                                by Tien Nguyen
                              10. Alt Oasis 2019 Inspiration List: 10 Entrepreneurs to Follow

                                These 10 speakers at the Alt Oasis conference in Palm Springs use their WordPress websites to promote their businesses and brands.
                                Business
                                Danielle Lucia Schaffer's City Girl Gone Mom and Angela Kim's Mommy Diary, both powered by WordPress.
                                Feature
                                by
                              11. For the Record

                                At Columbia Journalism Review, 18 journalists share how — or whether — they use tape recorders during interviews.
                                Authors
                                Columbia Journalism Review
                                by Matthew Kassel
                              12. Teachers & Writers Magazine

                                Teachers & Writers Magazine is a resource for teaching the art of writing in kindergarten through college and in non-classroom settings. Its mission is to “educate the imagination.”
                                Academia
                                Teachers
                              13. A year of haiku about my kids.

                                “It turns out the nightly parenting haiku is not only Minimum Viable Creativity, but also an opportunity to journal milestones every night without having to figure out what to say.” This post from 2017 at Unlikely Words compiles a year of haiku from a parent.
                                Parenting
                                Photo by Lum3n.com from Pexels
                                A year of haiku about my kids.
                              14. Knowing When to Rest

                                “I walked out of my Crossfit box the other day sobbing.” At Barbell Asana, Crossfitter and yoga teacher Erica Varlese writes about taking a break from Crossfit so her body can retrain and heal.
                                Health
                                Barbell Asana
                              15. Faith

                                From Spikosauropod: “I have read the Bible from cover to cover, but it never really spoke to me…. I was also considering collecting some writings of my own and binding them together to be my bible…. Suddenly, I realized that this was all a mistake. There was no book of rules for me.”
                                Exploration
                                spikosauropod
                              #####EOF##### Alt Oasis 2019 Inspiration List: 10 Entrepreneurs to Follow | Discover

                              Alt Oasis 2019 Inspiration List: 10 Entrepreneurs to Follow

                              Feature by
                              Danielle Lucia Schaffer's City Girl Gone Mom and Angela Kim's Mommy Diary, both powered by WordPress.

                              This week, thousands of creative entrepreneurs and social influencers are gathering in sunny Palm Springs, California, for Alt Oasis: a week-long retreat dedicated to networking, skill-building, and launching or growing an online presence or business. From content and social media sessions to branding and marketing workshops, there’s no shortage of inspiration.

                              Interested in meeting some of the attendees? Here are 10 conference speakers who have built their online presence with WordPress and use their websites to promote their passions and drive their businesses.

                              Archel Bernard // It’s Archel

                              Archel Bernard is the owner of The Bombchel Factory in Monrovia, Liberia. She designs contemporary African clothing using prints purchased locally in West Africa and employs an all-woman staff of Ebola survivors, rape victims, and the deaf, teaching them to sew and become self-sufficient. On her blog, she shares stories and vibrant photographs that bring her work to life.

                              Aleisha McCormack // Bridechilla

                              “I am but a mortal woman, comedian and TV presenter who discovered rather quickly after getting engaged that many aspects of the wedding planning world (like Westworld but less fun) is bullshit,” writes Aleisha McCormack, the founder of Bridechilla, a wedding planning podcast. In her website’s menu, you can also access her blog and store, where you can buy her “bullshit-free” wedding planning guides, among other things.

                              Danielle Lucia Schaffer // CityGirlGoneMom

                              CityGirlGoneMom is the website of Danielle Lucia Schaffer, a New York City girl turned San Diego mom of four. On Danielle’s sophisticated, well-designed site, she combines a focus on parenting, travel, and California lifestyle with gorgeous photography. She also has a podcast, “The Mom Confidential.”

                              Angela Kim // Mommy Diary

                              Angela Kim created Mommy Diary as a space to connect with other women and to reflect after overcoming postpartum depression. Running her blog has turned into a full-time career, and she now works with lifestyle brands to bring products and services to her readers.

                              Aimee LaLiberte // Virtual CFO

                              Aimee LaLiberte comes from the nonprofit and finance worlds. As a virtual CFO to clients, she has helped more than 75 business owners with bookkeeping and “managing their growth without losing their mind.” She has a solid example of a business website: sections for a blog, testimonials, services, and a well-presented front page with clear calls to action.

                              Andrea Serrano // Charleston Shop Curator

                              Andrea Serrano moved from New York to Charleston in 2004 for a slower pace of life and to follow her dream of owning a store. She has since closed her brick-and-mortar shop and now works on a variety of fashion, shopping, and styling projects. Charleston Shop Curator is a fashion blog and shopping guide for the city, with stylish images and a fun vibe.

                              Jessica Litman // The Organized Mama

                              Jessica Litman created The Organized Mama as an outlet for her organizing, decorating, and DIY projects. It has grown into a professional firm in Chicago that helps clients and families lead neater and calmer lives, “one drawer at a time.” It’s not surprising that Jessica’s homepage is organized effectively: scroll down to access essential pages, view press mentions and partnerships, and read blog posts.

                              Amber Kemp Gerstel // Damask Love

                              Amber Kemp Gerstel’s mission at Damask Love is to bring out your creative side. Her “doable-DIY” approach and positive attitude encourage people to make beautiful things. Her blog’s playful color palette and engaging, instructional posts and videos create a welcoming, non-intimidating space to explore the world of crafting.

                              Stephanie Uchima

                              Los Angeles-based business strategy coach Stephanie Uchima left a successful corporate career behind to start a company that helps entrepreneurs build and grow their businesses. Her services include a one-on-one mentorship, a 12-week bootcamp, and a one day, one-on-one “VIP intensive” for people who have limited time.

                              Carrie Anton // Wonder: An Idea Studio

                              Wonder, an ideation studio headed by Carrie Anton, offers creative training, guided brainstorm sessions, and innovation strategies to businesses. She shows people how to tap into their creativity and bring their ideas to life. Her website effectively presents her services, and its modern design makes it easy for visitors to check out her book (at the top) or sign up for her mailing list (at the bottom).

                              Inspired by these entrepreneurs? Upgrade to WordPress.com Business and build an online store, install plugins and themes, tap into advanced SEO tools, integrate Google Analytics, and more.

                              40 Comments

                              31. Oh my god thank you Jesus. I ham happy to have read this. I am a creative and looking for ideas. I write picture books and I share my process. I’m doing more how to posts and this gives me what I needed. I have made a few changes and simplified.

                                Liked by 4 people

                              Comments are closed.

                                #####EOF##### Dave Lodge – 44CON

                                Dave Lodge

                                default Twitter: @tautology0
                                Dave is a modest guy, which is why he hasn’t written this bio. Dave’s research and experimentation with Android has seen him become an authority in its subversion and has led directly to manufacturers improving devices no mean feat. He’s presented and run workshops at Black Hat and DefCon, as well as being on hand for comments and advice for people like the BBC and The Register.

                                His love of Androind led him to the lovely IoT with all its flaky, insecure wonders. From fridges to kids toy spy tanks Dave has pried them apart, analysed their code and found ways to abuse them. If you have a question about IoT or Android security Dave probably has the answer.

                                Dave has presented a Workshop at:
                                #####EOF##### #####EOF##### #####EOF##### How to give your website visitors all the information they need.
                                Go Own Your Passion. Boost Your Business.

                                Browsing tag Pages  —  How to give your website visitors all the information they need.

                                Create your new blog or website for free

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                                #####EOF##### Topic Tag: suburbia | WordPress.com Forums

                                Need help? Check out our Support site, then

                                #####EOF##### Free Domain Privacy Protection — The WordPress.com Blog

                                Free Domain Privacy Protection

                                Every domain registered through WordPress.com includes privacy protection at no extra charge.

                                March 6, 2019

                                Andrija Vucinic

                                Keeping your data safe is as important to us as it is to you. Privacy protection for domains that are registered at WordPress.com is now free, so you don’t have to choose between your site and your security.

                                What is domain privacy protection?

                                When you register a new domain, you have to provide personal contact information. This information is stored at WHOIS, a database containing the details of every registered domain.

                                In the past, WHOIS made this information publicly accessible unless you opted in to — and paid extra for — privacy protection. If you chose not to buy privacy protection (or couldn’t afford to), spammers and marketing firms could look up your domain and get access to your name, address, email, phone number, and other information about you or your business.

                                Privacy protection replaces this public information with generic data, so WHOIS gets the necessary details but keeps your personal info safe from prying internet eyes — but at a cost.

                                What’s changing?

                                In May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into effect for EU citizens. It resulted in changes to WHOIS that, in many cases, prevent contact information from being publicly published whether or not someone purchases enhanced privacy for a domain.

                                We’re committed to protecting your data and believe online safety shouldn’t depend on where in the world you live, so from now on, every domain registered through WordPress.com also includes privacy protection at no extra charge.

                                How do I turn it on?

                                Head to My Site > Domains, pick a domain, and turn Privacy Protection on. If it’s blue, you’re all set. If not, toggle the setting to turn it on!

                                Missing out on the latest WordPress.com developments? Enter your email below to receive future announcements direct to your inbox. An email confirmation will be sent before you will start receiving notifications - please check your spam folder if you don't receive this.

                                Join 57,722,018 other followers

                                4 Comments

                                Comments are closed.

                                1. Julie de Rohan Mar 6th at 11:17 am

                                  Really helpful, thank you for this.

                                  Liked by 5 people

                                2. James Riddett Mar 6th at 3:54 pm

                                  That’s a nice touch, much appreciated!

                                  Liked by 4 people

                                3. Ellen Count Mar 6th at 6:15 pm

                                  Seems like an important extra, free is great. Thanks!

                                  Liked by 5 people

                                4. Metro Square Mar 6th at 7:46 pm

                                  Thanks for the great news, I see the GDPR effect is trickling down and over and up with the privacy thing. Certainly getting more bloggers and site owners to take note both with being compliant and with knowing how much of their data gets shared when folks look up domain names.

                                  Liked by 4 people

                                Create your new blog or website for free

                                Get Started

                                  #####EOF##### Fashion | Discover
                                  Fashion Filter
                                  1. The Chriselle Factor

                                    The Chriselle Factor is stylist and YouTube influencer Chriselle Lim’s blog of beauty, fashion, and lifestyle tips.
                                    Fashion
                                  2. Alt Oasis 2019 Inspiration List: 10 Entrepreneurs to Follow

                                    These 10 speakers at the Alt Oasis conference in Palm Springs use their WordPress websites to promote their businesses and brands.
                                    Business
                                    Danielle Lucia Schaffer's City Girl Gone Mom and Angela Kim's Mommy Diary, both powered by WordPress.
                                    Feature
                                    by
                                  3. If You Want Change to Happen, You Have to Do It Yourself

                                    From Gillian Whitcombe at The Sewcialists: “Sewing is amazing because it’s really creative and really logical at the same time. It’s not like, ‘Why don’t I fit into this size?’ You know your body inside and out; it’s really empowering that way.”
                                    Crafts
                                    WordPress.com
                                  4. I Inspire Women to Keep Wearing — and Doing — What They Love

                                    “When I was pregnant with my fourth child, Maely, I just wanted to keep wearing my jeans.” Holly Kjar discusses the product she created for pregnant women, the Maeband, and the growth of her business and online community.
                                    Business
                                    WordPress.com
                                  5. Golden Girls Fashion Corner

                                    From purses to wallpaper, the fashion and design choices in iconic ’80s (and early-’90s) show The Golden Girls get the love and respect they deserve on Claire’s blog.
                                    Culture
                                  6. Life & Soul Magazine

                                    Life & Soul Magazine publishes and curates stories, profiles, and reviews that focus on sustainable lifestyles, from food and design to travel.
                                    Cooking
                                  7. Atomic Redhead

                                    From visiting the world’s oldest McDonald’s location to sharing vintage Disneyland postcards, Janie Ellis’s Atomic Redhead blog focuses on fashion, design, and travel inspired by America’s mid-century aesthetic.
                                    Architecture
                                  8. The Ugly History of Beautiful Things: Perfume

                                    Sometimes it takes a touch of darkness (from the “glandular sacs of dead musk deer” to particularly putrid flowers) to create something alluring.
                                    Culture
                                    Longreads
                                    by Katy Kelleher
                                  9. Messy Nessy Chic

                                    A self-described “Cabinet of Chic Curiosities,” Messy Nessy Chic is the labor of love of Paris-based Nessy and Alex, who share posts on travel, art, and fashion, as well as a well-curated selection of internet finds.
                                    Art
                                  10. Redefining the Hero: The Extrapolated Costume Design of Wonder Woman

                                    Wonder Woman was filled with beautiful, powerful costuming, and a rich, detailed culture for the Amazons — and it all came from Lynda Carter and her 1970’s leotard.
                                    Fashion
                                    Tom + Lorenzo
                                    by TLo
                                  11. Would the Real Queen Elizabeth Please Stand Up

                                    Cultural historian Benjamin Wild writes on a newly discovered portrait of Tudor monarch Elizabeth I — one that, unlike previously known depictions, doesn’t show her as a perfectly poised queen.
                                    Art
                                    Benjamin Wild
                                    by Benjamin Wild
                                  12. Project Run and Play Week One: Modern Mayan

                                    Inspired by the geometry of the ruins of Chichen Itza, SewSophieLynn uses the bright color palette of Mexico to create fun spring fashions for her two daughters.
                                    Crafts
                                    Fashion creations by SewSophieLynn
                                    SewSophieLynn
                                    by SewSophieLynn
                                  13. Document Journal

                                    Document is a New York City-based magazine devoted to essays and visual storytelling on art, fashion, and travel (among other topics).
                                    Art
                                  14. Best Street Style Looks of Milan Fashion Week

                                    “What’s the first thing that comes to your mind when you hear Milan and fashion in the same sentence? While for most people it’s heritage or leather or stuff like that, for me it’s always PRINTS. Followed by COLOR.” Elif Filyos Tezer at The Fashion Medley selects her favorite street style picks of Milan Fashion Week.
                                    Fashion
                                    The Fashion Medley
                                    by Elif Filyos Tezer
                                  15. Fringe Association

                                    On the blog of Karen Templer, you’ll find knitting inspiration, free patterns, crochet and weaving ideas, and more.
                                    Crafts
                                  #####EOF##### Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP – Our best-in-class enterprise WordPress hosting platform, expert consulting and support, and diverse partner ecosystem free you to focus on your business objectives.

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                                  Hachette Book Group (HBG) turned to VIP and featured partner Alley to fulfill a vision to support digital marketing for thousands of titles, authors, and imprints on one central platform, with WordPress at the center.

                                  “In the past, if a website wasn’t meeting its goals, the marketing campaign would be over before the team was able to make any improvements. Now, changes like this happen instantly. It’s a new world for us.”

                                  — Ryan Pugatch, HBG
                                  print cover of Variety magazine

                                  The media powerhouse behind 22 brands including Variety, Deadline, and WWD maximizes code reuse and efficiency on VIP, building an ever-growing code library, tool set, and playbook across their publications.

                                  “Working with WordPress.com VIP allows our team to focus on building awesome stuff”

                                  — David Parsons, USA Today
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                                  Abril's digital transformation brought dozens of publishing brands under a common theme and infrastructure with VIP, gaining speed and efficiency and freeing them up to reshape resources company-wide.

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                                  The power of open source

                                  Avoid vendor lock-in, enjoy the transparency of a public roadmap, take advantage of the knowledge base in the enterprise user community, and join a massive ecosystem.

                                  Total cost of ownership

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                                  No matter where you are in the planning process, we’re happy to help, and we’re actual humans here on the other side of the form. 👋 We’re here to discuss your challenges and plans, evaluate your existing resources or a potential partner, or even make some initial recommendations. And, of course, we’re here to help any time you’re in the market for some robust WordPress awesomeness.

                                  #####EOF##### Mark Wickenden – 44CON
                                  #####EOF##### James Kettle – 44CON

                                  James Kettle

                                  thumb_james Twitter: albinowax
                                  Website: skeletonscribe.net
                                  James Kettle is head of research at PortSwigger Web Security, where he designs and refines vulnerability detection techniques for Burp Suite’s scanner. Recent work has focused on design of the new Burp Collaborator system for identifying and exploiting SSRF, asynchronous blind code injection and out-of-band attack delivery.

                                  James has extensive experience vulnerability bounty hunting across Mozilla’s and Google’s heavily secured infrastructure, resulting in being ranked 6th in Google’s 0x0A list for 2012/13. As part of this he has performed security research culminating in novel attack techniques, such as abusing the HTTP Host header to poison password reset emails and server-side caches, affecting numerous ubiquitous web frameworks including Django, Drupal, Symfony and Joomla.

                                  James has presented at:
                                  #####EOF##### WordPress.com
                                  #####EOF##### Topic Tag: bulk delete media | WordPress.com Forums

                                  Need help? Check out our Support site, then

                                  #####EOF##### Topic Tag: online | WordPress.com Forums

                                  Need help? Check out our Support site, then

                                  #####EOF##### #####EOF##### WordPress.com
                                  #####EOF##### Boost Content on Social Media in 3 Steps
                                  Go Own Your Passion. Boost Your Business.

                                  Boost Content on Social Media in 3 Steps

                                  Many social media platforms are catching onto the fact that we’re using their services to help grow our businesses. In response — and in support of the trend — these platforms have sought ways to help. One of these allows us to boost content so that more people can interact with it.

                                  What does it mean to boost content?

                                  Typically, on social media — whether on a business or personal page — once a post has been up for a while, it doesn’t show up in your followers’s feeds anymore.

                                  Successful social media platforms are designed to make sure that users are seeing new content on a regular basis so that they aren’t bored.

                                  With boosting, you can pay to have the social media platform surface a high-performing post to non-followers for an extended period of time. When you boost a post, and it’s performing really well, you may continue to see rises in engagement. When this is the case, you may not have to worry about reinventing the wheel every single day with a brand-new post.

                                  Choosing posts to boost

                                  If you’ve been active on social media for a while, then you probably have numerous posts you can boost. But how do you know which ones are the best?

                                  In some cases, the social media platform will tell you itself. For example, if you have an Instagram post with more engagement than 80 percent of your other posts, the app will notify you.

                                  But if you’re hoping to receive engagement before a social media platform suggests something, here’s how to choose:

                                  1. Know your average numbers

                                  How many likes, comments, profile clicks, and link clicks do your posts receive on average?

                                  2. Which posts are above average?

                                  Sort your posts based on their numbers — any posts that are below-average should not be considered. Posts that are already performing better than average are the ones you want to pay attention to.

                                  Highlight each higher-than-average post in a spreadsheet, along with the specific engagement metrics that you’re tracking.

                                  3. What are your boosting goals?

                                  Do you want to gain more followers or more traffic to your website? Or perhaps you’d like to boost engagement numbers on your posts?

                                  Based on your #1 goal for boosting posts, choose the post (or posts) that have the highest numbers corresponding to these goals. If you want more traffic, choose the posts with the most link clicks.

                                  Pay for the boost

                                  Each platform is different, but they all make it fairly easy to boost posts from your business or page dashboard.

                                  Here’s what it looks like on two of the most popular social media platforms that don’t require ad campaigns to boost:

                                  Facebook:

                                  Facebook content boost

                                  This appears at the bottom of each of your page’s posts.

                                  Instagram:

                                  Instagram content boost

                                  The insights and option to promote a post looks like this on Instagram. You’ll see it at the bottom of each post.

                                  After you click on the “Boost” or “Promote” buttons, you’ll be able to set your payment options for the boost.

                                  *Note: For most platforms, you will need your page/account to be listed specifically as a business account before you can boost content.

                                  Track your results

                                  After each boost is done, record your results. Did you reach your goals? Did one post not perform as well the second time around? Keeping these records will tell you which posts are worth the boost, and which ones are better left alone.


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                                  #####EOF##### Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces – Russia Military Analysis

                                  Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

                                  Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                  Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

                                  —————————————————————————————————————————————–

                                  The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

                                  Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

                                  The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

                                  can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

                                  And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

                                   

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                                  Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

                                  There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

                                  VDV praciting loading

                                  Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

                                  Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

                                  airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

                                  Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

                                  Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

                                  These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

                                  The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

                                  T62 vdv.jpg
                                  VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

                                  Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

                                  But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

                                  4 thoughts on “Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces”

                                  1. Thank you for your articles. I’ve spent a few hours enjoying your material about Vostok 2018 and the VDV. Your analysis is balanced, well-informed and free of pro and anti Russia hysteria common through most of the open source Russian watcher community.

                                    Denis Mokrushin (twower blog) has tracked announcements from the Russian MoD about kontraktnik numbers over the last few years. He notes that it seems they have hit a wall at just under 400,000 contract soldiers. At the same time, the number of draftees seems to be declining slightly even though Russia has passed the worst of its demographic black hole. How are they staffing these new units? Also, can you comment on the recent announcement that the land forces are staffing 1 of 3 BTGs with draftees and keeping them away from front line combat?

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                                    Reply

                                    • There is not a demographic problem but a choice on where to spend money. Contracts are simply a question of money, if they wanted more contractors they could have them. However, with 3-5% spending sequester they have to make choices between force size, readiness, and capability.

                                      Draftees are declining to plan, since they want to get to a sustainable number somewhere around 220-230k. The short answer is that they will create tiered formations at 100-90-80% staffing and have to eat the manpower that way. Golts is wrong on this, predicting some return to cadre formations. Large divisions do not need 100% staffing and can be setup under mobilization model to take people in during period of threat. So I think the short answer to this question is mobilization.

                                      USSR had a great system for mobilization, and not so great system of command and control. The Russian military now has a great system for command and control, but largely destroyed Soviet mobilization model – no operational reserve, etc. This was always one of the unfinished pieces from the mil reforms.

                                      As I understand it, a brigade is only supposed to force generate 2 BTGs anyway, and the rest is its reserve. This announcement does not tell us much and I’m skeptical of official statistics, although it is useful to see that they think of the force in BTG counts and are structuring it less on number of brigades/divisions but mostly on the basis of force generation potential (unlike NATO which focuses on defense spending and excel spreadsheets that wont fight). The conscripts are there to be recruited as contractors at the end of their year. However we don’t know in a 6 regiment division how many battalions are supposed to be contract vs conscript, though we can glean that Russians don’t intend to send conscripts to fight in the initial period of war.

                                      Liked by 1 person

                                      Reply

                                      • Thank you for that. How many soldiers does a BTG have? Around 1,000? If so, then 2 BTGs generated from each brigade is not that much larger than a Soviet regiment. Although, a BTG is likely much better trained and equipped than a regiment. How did they come up with the idea of a BTG in the first place?

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                                      • 800-1200 depending, some can go up to 1500. A brigade is realistically a super sized regiment, since it has 3 maneuver battalions at its core. A BTG is exactly as good as its components are, it is a task organized formation or kampfgruppen. Most of the discussion on contractors and conscripts is rather strained by some strange notions about basic military organization and warfighting functions.

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                                    #####EOF##### China – Russia Military Analysis

                                    Tag: China

                                    Assessing Vostok-2018

                                    Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                    I’d like to close out coverage of Vostok 2018 with a brief summary and analysis of the exercise, which was written for Oxford’s CCW Russia Brief, Issue 3. I strongly recommend the issue briefs from Oxford’s changing character of war program, which feature some of the best experts on the Russian armed forces in the field.

                                    Russia’s annual strategic exercises offer an important window into the evolution of the Russian armed forces, their ability to mobilize, deploy, and command large groupings of forces, together with the latest capabilities. The recently held Vostok-2018 (September 11-17), which as the name suggests focused on the Russian Eastern Military District, offered an important deviation from the typically held command-staff strategic exercise which the Russian General Staff organises every September. In a standard exercise, an operational-strategic command (OSK) takes in forces from other districts and fields them in a particular strategic direction, organizing a hypothetical fight together with the General Staff in the theatre of military operations (TVD). But in 2018, Vostok was changed into strategic manoeuvers. Under this framework two military districts, Central and Eastern, divided into opposing forces to conduct manoeuvers in different strategic directions. China’s official involvement in the annual exercises, which is a first, made the event politically significant in Sino-Russian relations, and a mutually agreed upon political signal send by both sides to international observers.

                                    Unlike previous such exercises, Vostok-2010 and 2014, this event represents more of an “in-progress report” for the Russian armed forces. When he was first appointed Chief of General Staff in late 2012, Valery Gerasimov was dismayed with the Russian armed forces inability to move across the country and effectively engage in drills or training events at ranges distant from their home garrisons. The recently reformed military had become a permanent standing force, but it had little experience or credibility in being able to deploy to Russia’s borders in the event of conflict and successfully engage an adversary. The high tempo of snap readiness checks, drills, joint exercises, together with modernization investments under the State Armament Program, were meant to turn the Russian armed forces into a combat credible force, able to effectively deter large scale conventional conflict. Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than the Russian Far East, a vast region that is sparsely populated and lacks much transportation infrastructure.

                                    Vostok-2018 was also as an opportunity for political signalling, featuring a large review of forces and photo opportunities similar to that of Zapad-1981. Russian pronouncements that the exercise would feature 297,000 soldiers – which would have been fully a third of the entire Russian military – was meant to underscore the state’s resilience and undiminished military potential in the face of political and economic pressure from the United States.

                                    In reality, the exercise was rather smaller, probably not exceeding 50,000 participants (this is a guesstimate, use at your own risk) in the actual exercises, with most of the major events taking place at the Tsugol training range. The official numbers given likely represent the total forces on paper from the Central and Eastern Military Districts: often the Russian General Staff will count an entire brigade or division as having participated even when their contribution is only one unit. A large number of units were raised on alert on August 20th, in advance of the exercise, but few had any connection to the actual events. Official statements by Russian commanders also suggest that the exercise was much smaller in reality: Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), stated that 7,000 troops participated at Tsugol from his district. Together with aviation and airborne units sent, it is unlikely that the CMD’s involvement exceeded 15,000-20,000 soldiers.

                                    The reason for dramatically inflated figures for every Vostok exercise is straightforward: Moscow is unconcerned that announcing fantastical figures would engender a security dilemma in the region. Moreover, political agreements governing military exercises in Europe such as the Vienna Document have no jurisdiction east of the Ural mountains. As such, the Russian leadership can count unit participation however it likes, without stoking NATO fears. At the same time, including China in the exercise was a prudent measure to alleviate any inherent suspicions Beijing might have that these strategic manoeuvers were aimed at them, or a manifestation of Russian security apprehensions. Since most of the exercise events took place in Zabaykalsky Krai, a land-locked region bordering China and Mongolia, this was an important precaution. Moscow’s effort at engaging the Chinese military is quite clever, intended to foster greater partnership, engendering stronger military ties, while at the same time demonstrating to their strategic partners the capability of the Russian armed forces in an effort to bolster coercive credibility.

                                    Vostok featured elements of both contact and non-contact warfare, from a series of attack, defence and flanking manoeuvers by battalion tactical groups, to blunting massed aerospace attacks, and effecting precision strikes against critical infrastructure at operational depths. Going into the exercise Valery Gerasimov said he wanted to see non-standard solutions practiced, code for the Chief of General Staff not wishing to see Russian units arrive at ranges to execute pre-rehearsed manoeuvers, i.e. put on a five-day bit of military theatre for him and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu. It remains unclear whether or not he got what he wanted, but Shoigu indicated this type of exercise might be held every five years, pegged to implementation of the State Armament Program, the implication being that strategic manoeuvers would be used as a form of in-process review and reflection on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

                                    Although every strategic exercise is designed to be a stress test for the Russian armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, Vostok had four principal areas of focus: logistics, mobilization, command and control, and tactical innovation. Emphasis was placed on the logistics, combat service support, and combat engineer components of the Russian armed forces. Command and control of forces in combined arms manoeuver, along with integration with other services remains a prominent feature, as does experimentation with the force structure itself. The Russian military continues to work on integrating recon-strike and recon-fire contours, connecting targeting in real time from drones, soldiers or aircraft, with artillery fires at the tactical level or strike assets distributed among the services. There was also a mobilization component aimed at taking in reservists to help fill out combat service support units and integrating civilian authorities into the exercise under the model that ‘everyone fights’.

                                    Vostok was spread across five combined arms ranges, four air and air defence ranges, and several coastal regions in the Russian Far East. Ground force exercises featured large attacks with artillery and MLRS systems with targeting and battle damage assessments done via drone systems. River fording, bridging, masking of units with smoke and aerosol were all parts of the exercise to simulate the logistical difficulty of getting to the battlefield while under fire. Engineers also setup false targets, inflatable dummy units, practicing various forms of deception on the battlefield. The strategic nuclear component of the exercise involved flights by Tu-95MS bombers, which cut through the U.S. air defence identification zone, earning a free F-22 fighter escort before returning to fire cruise missiles at target ranges in Russia.

                                    Efforts at innovation could be seen in the attempt by the airborne forces to create a new type of air assault detachment, together with an airmobile reserve based on heavy transport helicopters and light vehicles. Colonel General Andrei Serduykov, commander of Russia’s airborne forces, was trying new things this year by assembling battalions from three independent air assault brigades to practice large scale heli-borne attacks, some involved as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two large transport Mi-26 helicopters in the action. The Russian airborne also conducted a sizable parachute drop, using 25 transports to deliver 700 soldiers and 51 BMD infantry fighting vehicles, while specialized light utility units were brought in as a ready reserve for the action. Russia’s Northern Fleet similarly brought a new force mix, including naval infantry and specialized units from its Arctic brigade, some of which conducted a raid in depth across as much as 270km of terrain.

                                    China’s participation included some 3,200 soldiers mounted on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs and self-propelled artillery, together with 6 aircraft and 24 helicopters. Interactions between Russian and Chinese forces at the tactical level, assuming any serious collaboration even took place, seemed of lower import than the utility of this event as a form of political signalling. China’s Minister of Defence, Wei Fenghe, highlighted the importance of Sino-Russian cooperation at the operational and strategic level, while Shoigu announced that they had agreed to hold exercises regularly in the future. In a subsequent interview, Shoigu referred to the Chinese participants as allies. While it is difficult to interpret Vostok, or any other exercise, as a proof of a budding Sino-Russian entente, it is clear the two countries seek to demonstrate that they do not see each other as a threat.

                                    While Western policymakers typically describe alliance formation as some sort of state-level dating, where relationships are formed based on trust, common values, similar political systems and so on, in reality this has little semblance to the history of how powers actually form alliances. Alliance formation behaviour takes place as a form of balancing behaviour in response to threats, therefore the only logical catalyst for a Sino-Russian entente is the threat posed by the United States, and the extent to which the two countries see their respective challenges as worth the risk and liability of closer cooperation. Having identified both countries as great power competitors in the National Defense Strategy, and practical measures to intensify the confrontation in economic and military domains, Washington has taken important steps to further enhance cooperation between its disparate adversaries.

                                    Vostok-2018 strategic manoeuvers illustrate that while much progress remains to be made in improving the capability and capacity of the Russian armed forces, the military as a whole is increasingly greater than the sum of its parts, and certainly much improved from its relatively raw state in 2012-2013. Meanwhile Russian policy has become rather more deft in managing their ‘strategic partnership’ with China, seeking to leverage military events as part of a boarder effort to slowly and incrementally pull the latter into a balancing entente against the United States.

                                     

                                    Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

                                    Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                    Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

                                    Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

                                    This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

                                    Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

                                    time to go home.jpg

                                    Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

                                    VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

                                    Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

                                    Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

                                    exercise table

                                     

                                    Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

                                    Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

                                    Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

                                    BTR-82As.jpg

                                    Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

                                    Egvekinot.JPG

                                    naval infantry 2.JPG

                                    Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

                                    Vostok 2018 Days 5-6 (September 15-16)

                                    Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                    Vostok 2018 Days 5 and 6

                                    The weekend was relatively quiet. Comparably few activities took place as the forces involved were either taking a break, or perhaps there was a media blackout compared to the information flowing about the first several days. For a brief period the MoD main website was down, which was unusual. However, other news sources which typically cover the exercises reflected a dearth of information for September 15-16. I’ve decided to group the events of both days into one post here. The main exercises over the weekend included another series of bombing raids by Russian aerospace forces, a motor rifle battalion assault at Tsugol, complex river crossing exercises supported by engineer and CBRN troops, and two naval exercises held by the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

                                    VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-22M3s conducted another series of air raids at a training range in Zabaikal, practicing bombing runs against various targets simulating an enemy air base. It reads like this was another unguided bombing exercise, dropping FAB-500s and 250s. The precision guided munitions tend to be reserved for Syria, so they tend not to waste them on exercises. Ten air crews were involved in the event, though unclear if they all had their own individual platforms, i.e. 10 bombers, or were rotated through a smaller number of aircraft.

                                    Tu-22M3.JPG

                                    Meanwhile Russian Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters took on the role of incoming enemy fighters. They approached the integrated air defenses setup by Eastern MD, and not did not respond to ground control requests for identification. Mig-31BM and Su-35s fighters were scrambled to intercept, simulating air combat at different ranges, including short range dog fighting. The Su-30SMs were defeated by Eastern MD’s air superiority fighters.

                                    Eastern MD – There was another motor rifle and armored assault at Tsugol, with T-62s setup as targets representing the opposing force. Several companies of T-72B1 tanks, in conjunction with BMP-2s conducted an attack across the range.

                                    Motor rifle and armored assault.JPG

                                    Meanwhile Russian military police units, mounted on Typhoon vehicles, detected and captured  a group of infiltrators who sought to gain access to the training range.

                                    MPs.JPG

                                    CBRN units setup smoke and aerosol cover for a river crossing exercise, where T-72 tanks forded the river with snorkels, while other vehicles were transported via specialized amphibious carriers. Engineer and sapper units established a pontoon bridge for tanks and BMPs to drive over. The exercise seems based around a motor rifle battalion, with helicopter support, effecting a river crossing both via bridge and in shallow places with its own means.

                                    Units positioned preparing to cross.JPG

                                    pontoon bridge.JPG

                                    Other exercises of note: Russia’s Ministry of Emergencies held a joint exercise with Chinese counterparts, simulating a ship collision at a bridge being constructed across the Amur River. The exercise consisted of a Chinese passenger ship colliding with a Russian ship working on the bridge. Both sides worked together to put out a fire on the Chinese ship, evacuate passengers, and rescue others from the water. Russian Be-200 firefighting aircraft and Mi-8s  belonging to the Ministry were involved, with about 300 people all together engaged in this exercise. I found the event interesting simply because it reflects another level of cooperation between Russian and Chinese ministries along the border outside of the military dimension.

                                    The Baltic Fleet has also been busy, though their activities doubtfully have anything to do with Vostok 2018. About 25 ships, 30 aircraft, helicopters, drones, and 50 pieces of equipment were involved in conducting an amphibious landing at Khmelevka. Russian Su-24 + Su-30SM fixed wing aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters conducted a strike against enemy positions, so that naval infantry units could then land and seize the beach. Ships involved included LSTs Aleksandr Shabalin, Korolev, Minsk, three smaller landing boats from project 21820, and support by three project 20380 corvettes (Stereguschiy). The landing force consisted of about 30 BTR-82A, which is consistent with what about 3 LSTs can carry, though at the same time they also air lifted several naval infantry units behind enemy lines – presumably via Ka-27 helicopters which is typically how these forces effect an amphibious assault.

                                    Northern Fleet – The Northern Fleet ran an anti-submarine warfare exercise, with its principal combatant Vice Admiral Kulakov (Udaloy-class) leading the submarine hunt. Their scenario involved using different systems to hunt for the submarine, such as onboard sonar and the ship’s Ka-27PL helicopter. Kulakov practiced torpedo and depth charge attacks, along with evading torpedo attacks fired by the opposing submarine.

                                    Ka-27 deploying dipping sonar

                                    dipping sonar.JPG

                                    Pacific Fleet – Naval Infantry conducted an assault to enable a larger amphibious force to land near the Klerk training range on Primoriye. This is an interesting exercise in that they were working together VKS Aerospace Forces, who supported their attack, along with ships from the Pacific Fleet, combat aviation, artillery, sappers, and air defense units. Supposedly the next phase of this exercise will involve an air assault brigade of VDV Airborne conducting a similar type of attack, though it seems things are winding down. The Eastern MD is already looking to an upcoming joint exercise with Mongolian troops under a different title.

                                    Some additional pictures of note:

                                    CBRN units treating tanks

                                    treating tanks.JPG

                                    Tank sanitation checkpoint

                                    sanitizing T-72s.JPG

                                    T-72 snorkeling

                                    Loch Ness T-72.JPG

                                     

                                    Vostok 2018 Day 4 (September 14)

                                    Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                    Vostok Day 4

                                    Most of the exercises are taking place at Tsugol and Telemba, but there was word today of various live fire events from a few of the other ranges. Elements of 5th CAA are at Bikinskiy, and the air force is doing most of its bombing runs at Mukhor-Kondui. More word from the two fleets, the Northern Fleet is exercising in the Bering Sea, while the Pacific Fleet has launched a surface action group together with support ships and a number of smaller vessels. Less news from the airborne on this day, but some interesting simulations among air defense forces, CBRN troops, and engineer units. Across the ranges where most of the forces are staged the day was taken up by artillery and MLRS fires, together with combat maneuvers by motor rifle battalions.

                                    VKS Aerospace Forces – At Tusgol, Russia employed A-50U (AWACS system) in conjunction with Mig-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-30SMs conducting combat air patrols and simulating intercepts. Meanwhile at Mukhor-Kondui, another  range with targets for the air force, Russia’s air force conducted several air strikes with mostly unguided munitions. Including about 30 aircraft consisting of Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, and Su-25s. Their target was a column of enemy armor and artillery on the march. Coordinates and targeting relayed by Su-24MP.

                                    Su-25s about to fire unguided rockets (Mukhor-Kondui)

                                    Su-25s.JPG

                                    Followed by bombing passes from Su-30SM and Su-24 bombers

                                    Su-30sm.JPG

                                    Some word on the earlier air strike with cruise missiles, IZ reported it as 4xTu-95MS and 6xTu-22M3 participating. The Tu-95MS flight in the first two days of the exercise clearly cut through the Alaska air identification zone for the United States, as F-22s were sent up to greet them. The need for air refueling during this flight now makes sense since they seemingly made a large lap before firing missiles at the target range.

                                    F-22 and Tu-95MS.JPG

                                    VDV Airborne – Seems they conducted an airborne drop of one battalion, together with a heliborne assault with soldiers repelling. I honestly can’t say if this took place on the 14th, or if the photos are from the 13th. Part of the problem is some nice people seem to have taken down the Russian MoD website making it a bit difficult to compare announcements and images from the two days.

                                    airborne repelling.jpg

                                    Eastern MD – CBRN troops simulated an emergency chemical cleanup whereby several railcars carrying dangerous/toxic chemicals spilled their load, presumably onto the roadway and the surrounding area. Supposedly about 1,500 CBRN troops, and 300 pieces of equipment are taking part in the exercises, using RHM-6 chemical detector systems, and RPM-2 radiological detectors. Engineer units also simulated a natural and/or man-made disaster, testing their ability to manage flooding, evacuation of the local population, dealing with unexploded ordnance, etc. About 350 soldiers listed for this one, with 80 pieces of equipment including excavators, cranes, floating transports, etc.

                                    At Telemba range, Col Tikhonov, commander of 76th Air Defense division, highlighted the use of air defense targets designed to simulate small radar profiles, i.e. low observation aircraft and cruise missiles. Not only did they use the typical dummy missiles, and conventional targets, but they wanted to replicate a large scale aerospace attack with cruise missiles. The addition of targets with small radar cross sections seems new  compared to previous exercises.

                                    At Tsugol there was a sizable artillery and MLRS live fire exercise, different types of self-propelled and towed artillery involved, together with BM-21 and BM-27 MLRS.

                                    2s3 firing.jpg

                                    Tsugol BM-27 firing.JPG

                                    At Bikinskyi range, in Khabarovsk, a motor rifle unit of the 5th CAA stopped an advancing opposing force. Air defense units assigned to them, including ZSU-23-4 shilka, and Igla manpads, were fired to simulate defending against enemy air power. Artillery units with BM-21 Grad were similarly engaged in supporting the defending motor rifle formation. All together at this range they are listing 200 pieces of equipment, and 1700 troops. The number suggests that this is a battalion tactical group, with short range air defense and MLRS units assigned to it.

                                    Elements of 5th CAA

                                    5th CAA.JPG

                                    This is rather small by the way, and I suspect at the end of all the announcements, if we add up all the troops listed as participating at the individual ranges over the period of these eight days, we’re going to have a hard time coming up not only with 300,000 but probably with anything approaching 50,000-70,000. Recalling we have 5 combined arms ranges, 4 air defense ranges, and two gulfs as the overall area of the exercise.

                                    tanks at Tsugol.jpg

                                    As an aside, there are several exercises, annual certification checks, and live fire drills going on in other military districts. At the same time, the Southern MD is hosting a sizable exercise with about 5,000 troops, including air defense, artillery, missile, and air force units. About 500 pieces of artillery, MLRS, listed, including BM-21, BM-27, BM-30, Tulpan 240mm mortar, Iskander-M, and several ships participating. About 20 fixed and rotary wing aviation involved in this exercise. Black Sea Fleet coastal defense forces (ground forces part of its army corps) held several smaller exercises of their own, simulating defense against diversionary forces attacking its bases. Dvornikov is placing emphasis on working out the recon-strike contour, command and control across his district for employing long range firepower, i.e. cruise missiles and the like at operational ranges. It seems he’s trying to bring experience from the Syrian war to the district.

                                    Pacific Fleet – Several ships from the fleet escorted a Russian squadron near the Sea of Okhotsk. Varyag (Slava-class guided missile cruiser), together with Bystruy (Sov destroyer), two  Udaloy class large anti-submarine warfare ships and other smaller vessels served as escorts to Irtysh, a hospital ship, and several LSTs. The SAG seems to consist of 2x Udaloy, 1x Sov, and 1xSlava-class with a few support ships and LSTs. The exercise involved changing formation, arraying the surface action group for air defense, signaling, C2, and anti-submarine warfare. Ka-27 helicopters carried onboard the larger combatants also participated in the exercise. All together about 15-20 ships from the Pacific Fleet are listed for this exercise. I say 15-20 because Russian MoD announcements can’t agree whether it was 15 or 20, depending on which one you read.

                                    Pacific SAG

                                    Pacific Fleet.JPG

                                    Northern Fleet – Elements of the Northern Fleet’s specialized Arctic brigade, which were dropped off two days ago on Chukotka, marched from their landing point to the Pacific coastline, i.e. they drove 270km on their articulated DT-10P vehicles over the course of two days. Along the way they practiced raiding enemy formations, some live fire drills, etc. This is an interesting exercise, noting that the small surface action group sent by the Northern Fleet has been traveling since August 8th, conducting multiple landings with both naval infantry and the arctic brigade detachment. The rest of the surface action group spent this day in the Bering Sea, practicing search and rescue operations. Their mission was to aid a ship in distress along the northern sea route. Kulakov (Udaloy-class) conducted search operations with its Ka-27 onboard helicopter, which then practiced evacuating individuals from the supposed vessel, together with a rescue party launched from the ship on small high speed boats. Meanwhile their large tug, Pamir, and the diesel-electric ice breaker Ilya Muromets, practiced firefighting at sea.

                                    Kulakov launching Ka-27

                                    Kulakov

                                    Ilya Muromets firefighting together with the large ocean going tug

                                    firefighting.JPG

                                    I would note that today the Russian MoD website appears to be down, and I would bet a good deal of money that it is likely due to a DDOS attack.

                                    Some additional photos of note:

                                    Russian and PLA forces coordinating something

                                    lost in translation

                                    The display signs at Tsugol – this seems to be the Chinese contingent section

                                    best friends forever.jpg

                                    Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)

                                    Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                    Russian and Chinese leadership at Tsygol range opened up Phase 2 of the exercise with a large review of forces. The optics were clearly meant to rekindle the images of Zapad-1981, with numerous vehicles and infantry arrayed in parade formation on the grounds of the range. Indeed the display was quite large, and it seemed clear by the number of Chinese tanks, SPA, wheeled and other vehicles that probably about 3,000 troops and several hundred pieces of equipment did actually come to join Russia in these strategic maneuvers. Judging by the reporting, it is likely most of the drills during Vostok are taking place at Tsygol and Telemba, i.e. it’s quite difficult to picture Vostok being all that large as an exercise. Right now, going off of fairly little (but still a lot more honest than 300,000), around 50,000 seems a much more reasonable number of participants.

                                    DigitalGlobe had good satellite photos of some of the parade grounds at the range and exercises for a different perspective.

                                    satellite

                                    Of course Putin came to look through binoculars, because it wouldn’t be a strategic exercise otherwise. Note unlike in Zapad, where Putin and Lukashenko were not together in the same command center, we can see the Chinese counterparts sitting further along the table.

                                    Putin came.JPG

                                    More photos can be found on BMPD. But here’s s sample of some of the gear Chinese brought with them.

                                    Chinese tanks.jpg

                                    Chinese forces.jpg

                                    As this is the opening of Phase 2, most of the activity was characterized by VDV air assaults, VKS bombing missions, combined arms artillery and motor rifle unit actions. Strong emphasis on employment of drones, integrated C2, and more ‘jointness’ so to speak between ground, airborne, and VKS forces. VDV seems to be conducted several force structure and air assault experiments, including with new light high mobility vehicles, creating a air mobile reserve, etc. Ground units are mostly doing what they do best, lots of artillery and MLRS fire, armored assault, etc.

                                    Vostok 2018 military exercise in Transbaikal Territory, Russia

                                    VDV Airborne – More than 700 soldiers and 51 vehicles (BMD-2) made a parachutte jump at Tsygol range. At the Belaya airfield near Irkutsk, a detachment of the Ulan-Ude air assault brigade loaded 25 Il-76MD transports. They were then air lifted ~1000km towards Zabaikal where they conducted a jump at 600 meters. The scenario was air assault and seizure of an enemy airfield. All together about 6000 VDV  and 900 pieces of equipment are taking part in Vostok, in earlier posts I mentioned these are units from 3 independent air assault brigades, and two additional special detachments.

                                    VDV Ulan Ude assault brigade.JPG

                                    As part of the scenario unfolding at Tsygol range, an air mobile battalion belonging to the 31st independent air assault brigade conducted an air assault on an enemy command center, with air support.  About 40 helicopters of Mi-8AMTSh were used (supposed capacity 26 soldiers), two Mi-26 helicopters, and more than 10 Mi-24 helicopters in support. They are billing this exercise as an experiment of a ‘new type’ of air assault detachment. There was also a mobile reserve in support of this assault, composed of light wheeled high mobility vehicles (pickups). Mi-26s delivered 8 of these light pickups, together with 4 armored Rys light vehicles equipped with Kornet ATGMs and Kord heavy machine guns.

                                    airborne ATVs.JPG

                                    VKS Aerospace Forces – About 40 bombers and strike fixed wing aircraft were used in an attack on opposing ground forces, key infrastructure, and staged reserves. Units involved fielded Tu-22M3, Su-34, Su-24, and Su-25SM strike aircraft. Air cover provided by Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters. Strikes were coordinated via ground based C2 system Strelets, and Orlan-10 drones.

                                    Tu-22M3.JPG

                                    Eastern MD – Other activities of note: CBRN units used smoke and aerosol covers on more than 60 sq km, covering moving units and critical infrastructure – equipment used includes TDA-3K smoke machines, and RP3-8x aerosols. Anti-tank units belonging to a battalion tactical group of motor rifle and artillery units simulated strikes against enemy armor and fortified positions with 130mm Shturm-S ATGMs and Konkurs-M. Sapper units plan to use not only UR-77 Meteorit, BMP-3M, but also Uran-6 and Uran-9 UGVs for demining.

                                    Tsygol Range – Seven artillery battalions created a rolling artillery barrage ahead of an advance, covering a line of ~3000 meters. A motor rifle battalion advanced, and there are photos of host of T-72B1 tanks engaged in a live fire exercise as part of this maneuver. They employed more than 150 pieces of artillery, including 2s3, 2s1, 2s19, Giatsint, and Pion. Meanwhile Iskander-M units fired two cruise missiles at critically important targets, at the same time a large artillery and MLRS barrage hit the opposing force. All together they employed 2 Iskander TELs, 52 MLRS systems, and 72 tube artillery. Targeting for the strike conducted via an air based system called Klever, with Su-24MP recon aviation, and Orlan-10 drones – they used live video feed for battle damage assessment. In one scenario, Russian and Chinese artillery units simultaneously attacked enemy forward command posts. Russian BM-27 Uragan were employed together with Chinese Type-81 MLRS.

                                    Motor rifle bttn.JPG

                                    Artillery units will also practice employing precision guided munitions called Krasnopol, these will be fired by MSTA-S and 2s3 Akatsiya, Granat-4 short range drones are to be used for targeting. Krasnopol is a 152mm semi-active laser guided munition which can be used by most self-propelled and towed artillery.

                                    life fire.jpg

                                    Of course a detachment of Terminator BMPT, heavy tank support vehicles will make another debut at Tsygol, undoubtedly in the hope that someone will buy them. They were first  featured in Zapad 2017 in desert camo paint, undoubtedly marketed towards a certain set of countries that like to buy equipment in such colors.

                                    Interesting photos emerged of drone companies, fielding both Orlan-10s, but also counter drone hand held weapons, that are worth noting.

                                    drone company.JPG

                                    counter drone gun.jpg

                                    Not much from the two fleets today, except that the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean is still there, and recently concluded a first time joint exercise with Russian VKS. A sizable grouping of ships and a few submarines remains there.

                                    Some additional photos of note:

                                    Parachute jump skeptic

                                    in airborne now.JPG

                                    Of course you can’t assault an enemy airbase without taking a photo first

                                    can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo.JPG

                                    And a time honored tradition emerging from modern exercises, people pointing at screens:

                                    pointing at screens.jpg

                                     

                                    Vostok 2018 – Day 2 (September 12)

                                    Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                    Day two is here, and I’m a bit behind in posting. Usually I get to these the night of. Photo-ops have begun, and there will be a large review of forces ala Zapad-1981 style, which I hope to cover later tonight. However, September 12 is still the preparatory phase. Special thanks for colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped me put some of this together.

                                    So far logistics and VDV seems to have the most interesting roles. The VDV commander is clearly making changes and experimenting with a few items in this exercise. Air defense and aerospace attack are taking place early, as are live fire launches for the navy. Much of the action seems to be planned for Tsygol, but Telemba range is seeing a lot of early activity.

                                    Shoigu and Fenghe – Minister of Defense Shoigu and his Chinese counterpart visited the command point setup by 29th CAA from the Eastern MD, together with the one setup by the PLA. Supposedly Wei Fenghe complimented the Russian side, stating that the Chinese field command point was simple whereas the Russian one was more solid in nature. Shoigu in turn remarked that much of this comes from Russian combat experience in recent conflicts, and they’ve also leveraged the integration provided by the national defense management center.

                                    Shoigu remarked that they’ve had several operations where the General Staff were able to directly control events in real time, and they’ve made great strides in C2 when it comes to controlling forces in a theater of military operations (TVD). The claim being that much of what is taking place in Tsygol can be controlled directly by the GS via the center in Moscow. No less interesting in this exchange is Fenghe’s supposed comment on the importance of Russian-Chinese military cooperation at the operational and strategic level. Shoigu then stated that they’ve agreed to hold exercises  of this sort regularly from now on.

                                    beginning of a beautiful friendship.

                                    VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-95MS took off from an air base in Eastern MD, launched cruise missiles from an altitude over 5000 meters at the range in Telemba (2000km away). Air cover was provided by Su-35s, and in-flight refueling by Il-78 (at that range Tu-95MS doesn’t need it so probably practice for strategic mission).

                                    ty95MC.png

                                    VDV Airborne – Cadets at Ryazan airborne school practiced loading different types of equipment onto Il-76MD aircraft as part of the strategic maneuvers. Serduykov seems to have included cadets and those in officer school in this exercise, which is a new development. The idea being to give those in late stages of education practical experience. According to the press, about 6000 airborne troops and 900 pieces of equipment from three units (mentioned in a previous post as 3 independent air assault brigades), and two detachments, are participating in Vostok. On Sept. 11 I saw discussion of three battalions being sent in total, one from each of these brigades, together with a separate comms detachment.

                                    VDV praciting loading.JPG

                                    At Tsygol, units from Ulyanovsk VDV air assault brigade will practice three different types of simultaneous assault, low altitude parachute, standard air assault, and assault without parachutes – repelling from helicopters (100-150m). They claim to be using as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters at the same time in this simulated attack, with two Mi-26 (that will carry quite a few VDV if true), gunship support provided by 8x Ka-52s and 14x Mi-24s. Supposedly Mi-26 helicopters will be used to transport VDV Tigr vehicles, recon ATVs, and in ‘airborne-transport’ configuration can carry about 82 soldiers.

                                    VDV drilling.JPG

                                    Eastern MD – At Telemeba air defense units from both VKS, and ground formations belonging to the Eastern and Central MD practiced air defense against massed aerospace attack, units employed include S-400, S-300, Buk, Tor, and Pantsir-S1. About 500 pieces of equipment and more than 1000 servicemen listed for this one.

                                    Engineer and sapper units – busy setting up pontoon bridges, river crossings, and practicing demining with UR-77 Meteorit, and BMP-3M demining variants. Meanwhile in Zabaikal, CBRN units from Central MD were working to cover air fields with smoke and aerosol to hide them from visual, infrared, and radar based detection. They used TDA-3 smoke/aerosol machines, which create cover at about 15 meters, covering 7 hectares worth of terrain.

                                    Engineers.JPG

                                    River crossing.jpg

                                    Electronic warfare – Russian forces plan to use the latest generation EW and drone systems during the exercise, including Silok-01, Zhitel (the second one is quite old actually). Their objective is to defend against drone attack. Silok in particular is advertised as a system for detecting drones, while Zhitel can jamm their sensors. Supposedly both have been tested in Syria.

                                    Russian Military Police used horses to patrol the area, and defend it from enemy reconnaissance units. Presumably they’re able to move much quieter  on horseback and sneak up on would be ‘diversionary-recon groups’

                                    Central MD – Tactical aviation from CMD rebased to Krasnoyarsk and Perm regions, the exercise simulates them launching on alert to avoid incoming aerospace attack at their air bases and shifting to forward air fields. Mig-31BMs setup a combat air patrol, launching ‘under fire’ and practiced taking out incoming cruise missiles.  Missile brigade units from 41st CAA in Sverdlovsk have moved via rail to Astrakhan, and will be firing Iskander-Ms as part of the exercise. Apparently they’ve already conducted simulated electronic launches in preparation – planned firing range is several hundred kilometers, i.e in that operational-tactical 300-500km range.

                                    Pacific Fleet – About 15 small anti-submarine ships, together Il-38 naval aviation and Ka-27PL helicopters conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise. Meanwhile 10 minesweeper ships practiced finding and destroying mines with contact and non-contact means. A surface action group consisting of one Sovremenny destroyer (Bystruiy) and two small missile boats launched three Moskit anti-ship missiles (looks like the destroyer did the firing) against a surface target at about 100km range.

                                    Moskit fire

                                    Northern Fleet -Seems to be busy navigating the ice on its way down to meet the Pacific Fleet. Kulakov’s small surface action group was on its way to Kamchatka, with ice breakers in the lead.

                                    nf4.PNG

                                    Interesting photos from this day:

                                    Gerasimov thinking of the choices he made in life that led to this exciting moment, undoubtedly he is paralyzed by the historic moment of a new Sino-Russian entente forming.

                                    Gerasimovn thinking.jpg

                                    Later on, trying to explain something to angry looking Shoigu (this is not possible since Shoigu knows everything).

                                    still angry.JPG

                                     

                                    Vostok 2018 – Day 1 (September 11)

                                    Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                    Vostok 2018 Day 1

                                    In Eastern MD: 5th, 29th, 35th, 35th combined arms armies (CAA) + 11th Air and Air Defense Army from EMD. In Central MD: 2nd and 41st CAAs + 14th Air and Air Defense Army. VDV and VKS are beginning to shift forces to their designated training ranges. In terms of logistics, they activated military and civilian elements of the transport network, including regional infrastructure belonging to the Ministry of Transport, other federal transportation agencies, trains, rail cars, rail beds, etc. 1,500 rail platforms, 50 transport air craft, and 60 or so various military units. The numbers sound incredibly round such that they’re probably ‘stylized’ but it paints a picture.

                                    This year there’s an emphasis on logistics, organizing forces and moving them large distances across Russia, which is sort of the major challenge in the Eastern/Central MD. Lots of distance, not a lot of infrastructure. Exercise announcements highlight efforts at jointness, having ground, naval and aerospace forces work together, along with combined arms maneuver. The picture I offer here is somewhat incomplete, as there are a few exercises taking place elsewhere, but here we will focus on what is being billed as part of Vostok 2018.

                                    Already there is interesting news of VDV experimenting with a new formation and air assault maneuver, whereas the Navy is practicing combined naval infantry and motor-rifle amphibious assault. A lot of information early on about setting integrated air defenses, high bandwidth comms networks, and various engineering preparations such as false targets.

                                    tanks

                                    Training range list:

                                    Combined arms ranges: «Цугол», «Бамбурово», «Радыгино», «Успеновский», «Бикинский»

                                    Air and Air Defense ranges: «Литовко», «Новосельское», «Телемба» и «Бухта Анна»,

                                    Maritime: Берингова и Охотского морей (seas), Авачинского и Кроноцкого заливов (gulfs off of Kamchatka).

                                    Airborne VDV – Not only are strategic maneuvers a deviation from the typical strategic command staff exercise, but there will also be some interesting force structure and combat maneuver experiments taking place. They plan to test an experimental VDV air assault formation during the exercise at Tsygol range, equipped with latest C2, and specialized equipment, to be used in some sort of air mobile assault variant. According to Col General A. Serduykov (head of VDV) this test will determine future tactics and overall development of VDV forces. Who is coming so far? One large battalion tactical group formation, composed of units from Ulan-Ude (11th), Ulyanovsk (31st), and Ussuriysk (83rd), and 38th independent VDV communications regiment. This is an interesting formation, if as reported, it consists of elements of three independent air-assault brigades.

                                    Mi-26 train

                                    Central MD – 2000 Motor riflemen are completing a march to Zabaikal with 500 pieces of equipment, including T-72B3, BMP-2, BM-21 Grad. They will be drilling at Tsygol, the range being used jointly with PLA units. A communications brigade from 2nd CAA Samara is also joining them, including 1000 troops and 300 pieces of equipment. More than 60 fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft are moving to Eastern MD as well, including Mi-26, Mi-24, and Mi-8AMTSH-V + about 30 fixed wing tactical aviation.

                                    Pantsir and targeting radar

                                    Eastern MD – They’ve setup an integrated air defense network, leveraging automated C2, and expect to test their ability to conduct air defense under jamming conditions. So far only mention of Pantsir-S1, S-300 and S-400 units. Communications units have setup more than 150 comm links, including a comm system running 2800km from Vladivostok to Anadyr, 3500km from Ulan-Ude to Petropavlovsk (9800000 sq  km total). Perhaps more interesting, they’ve setup a high bandwidth line running about 900km to connect other federal agencies/civil authorities to ensure closer coordination with the General Staff.

                                    Communications.JPG

                                    Combat service support (MTO) in Eastern MD – Lot’s of exciting statistics, 80 ammo and fuel dumps setup, 100 supply points, more than 2000 mechanics and specialists supporting training at Tsygol, etc. All in all, they claim that 36,000 MTO troops are involved in this exercise (seems inflated but then again what isn’t when it comes to Vostok).

                                    Engineers are busily setting up bouncy castles, otherwise known as the dreaded Russian ‘maskirovka.’ At every field range they will setup false targets, inflatable tanks, IFVs, air defenses, and fake Iskander units.

                                    Pacific Fleet – The Naval Infantry brigade based on Primorskiy Kray have moved to loading points, embarking onto three LSTs. They’re bringing BTR-82A, BMP-2, 2s1, and BM-21s. Their objective is to form an amphibious assault detachment, and of course seize Gotland Island from Primorskiy Kray (just kidding). Their real objective is to practice different types of amphibious landings, supported by smaller surface combatants from the Pacific Fleet.

                                    The Pacific Fleet has also launched a surface action group and what they’re calling a search strike group (might be a naval variant of recon strike). The fleet is fielding different types of strike groupings and anti-submarine groupings of ships. Initial goal is to practice air defense, command and control, and survival skills in the water. However, they expect to be taking out enemy surface action groups and submarines soon.

                                    LST loading gear.JPG

                                    Northern Fleet – Elements of NF have already made it to Chukotka, which means they’re going to be fighting the Pacific Fleet fairly soon. They’ve been traveling since August 8, taking breaks for different drills along the way. It seems they have three LSTs with naval infantry and units from the arctic motor-rifle brigade onboard. Apparently they conducted an amphibious assault on Chukotka, supported by fire from Kulakov (Udaloy-class), whereby the naval infantry first seized the beachead and the main body of forces then arrived via LST. Not much mention of other ships, hope they brought more than Kulakov along, but Eastern Med is probably sucking in a lot of available naval power. Marshall Ustinov (Slava-class) is heading the E. Med squadron instead of participating in these exercises.

                                    Arctic brigade unloading

                                     

                                    Chinese participation: 24x rotary wing consisting of 6x Mi-171, 9x Z-9, 9x Z-19 + 6  fixed wing aircraft (looks like JH-7) and an unknown number of ground troops at ~3200 total?

                                    Chinese

                                    Fun photos for our caption contest:

                                    Caption contest

                                    If you camo net the front of the TEL then nobody can see the launch tubes

                                    air defenses

                                    Vostok 2018 Strategic Maneuvers: Exercise plan

                                    Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                    It seems this year’s annual strategic command-staff exercise has been replaced by Strategic Maneuvers, which depending on your perspective is actually a higher level of exercise in the TVD (theater of military operations). Rather than having a OSK take charge of combat operations in a specific strategic direction, supported by units from other military districts, strategic maneuvers feature multiple military districts, and fleets – these are not held in a single strategic direction. Hence Vostok 2018 is not being done in the format of typical annual exercises rotating between the four main strategic directions.

                                    These pictures are from Gerasimov’s briefing last week – Youtube link to the briefing

                                    breakdown of the exercise East vs West

                                    Instead the participating units will divide into two ostensible opposing forces, divided into an Eastern and Western grouping of forces. Vostok 2018 will thus feature a form of strategic exercise much closer to those practiced in the older days of the Soviet Union, more like 1935-36. For example, in 1936 the Belarus Military District divided into Western and Eastern groupings of forces to practice maneuvers against each other. Those were undoubtedly useful exercises for the Red Army until the officers who learned something got purged 1936-38, but I digress.

                                    The two ‘teams’ so to speak will include the Central Military District + Northern Fleet, against the Eastern Military District + Pacific Fleet. Russia’s Airborne VDV, and Aerospace Forces VKS will have an important role, though unclear on how they will divide those assets between the two groupings. The exercise itself will last 11-17 September, although snap readiness checks have begun well in advance, as have preparations for MTO, and other supporting services. Perhaps best to bracket this as a August 20-September 17 timeline. Most of the action will be at five combined arms training ranges, four ranges for the Air Force and Air Defense units, the Sea of Okhotsk, Bering Sea, Avachinskiy Zaliv and Kronostkiy Zaliv (gulfs off Kamchatka).

                                    Exhibit A from the briefing (we can see units Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet engaging each other off of Kamchatka)

                                    Exercise scenario 2.jpg

                                    Map of forces involved

                                    District map

                                    In his recent briefing Gerasimov highlighted that these exercises are well within the budgetary scope of funds allocated to the MoD for annual training, and that no additional or supplementary spending was required for Vostok, i.e. people protesting pension reform need not blame the MoD for having large scale strategic maneuvers. This is where the inflated force size ‘297,000’ publicity sought by the MoD runs into the problem of being tone deaf given social spending reforms being protested in Moscow. My suspicion is that the number comes from counting all the units stationed in CMD and EMD, plus Northern and Pacific Fleet, and select airborne divisions participating. For every battalion fielded they will likely count the entire brigade, and for a few regiments an entire division, etc.

                                    Exercise plan

                                    exrecise scenario 3

                                    Phase 1 September 11-12: This phase is for planning and organization of forces to be involved, includes aligning command functions, and logistics.

                                    Phase 2 September 13-17: Exercise begins, and will include: training to conduct large scale air strikes, cruise missile defense, defense, offense, flanking and raiding maneuvers. In the Sea of Okhotsk, and the two gulfs mentioned above, forces will practice defending against aerospace attack, destroying surface action groups, and naval landing forces. Aviation will support offensive ground maneuvers, and coastal defense.

                                    Tsygol is singled out in particular, the scenario there will involve three combined arms formation from Eastern MD, together with Chinese and Mongolian forces, engaging in maneuvers against two combined arms armies from Central MD. At Tsygol they anticipate 25,000 Russian troops, 7,000 pieces of equipment, and 250 fixed wing/rotary wing aviation. Chinese forces we know to consist of ~3,200, 24 helicopters and 6 fixed aircraft. No numbers have been given for the Mongolian forces participating, but presumably they are quite small so there’s not much to boast about in this regard.

                                    Tsygol scheme of maneuver

                                    Gerasimov also highlighted that Vostok 2018 will feature wide scale use of drones, VDV parachute jumps, use of mobile brigades, making ‘non-standard decisions’ which I take to mean planning scheme of maneuver without assembling it from preplanned drills or plays, automated command and control, together with staff planning based on lessons from combat operations in Syria. The whole thing will end with a review of forces in the field, i.e. they plan to do a Zapad 1981 style photo op with all the vehicles and what not lined up, so it will probably seem quite impressive and scary.

                                    Perhaps more interesting is the increasing focus on logistics, mobilizing reserves to help fill out MTO units.

                                    MTO and reservists.jpg

                                    More photos from the brief can be found at BMPD.

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                                    #####EOF##### The Kerch strait naval skirmish – Russia Military Analysis

                                    The Kerch strait naval skirmish

                                    Michael Kofman7 Comments

                                    After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

                                    On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

                                    Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

                                    towing command ship

                                    On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

                                    One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

                                    Don ramming.jpg

                                    Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

                                    Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

                                    original

                                    Another shot

                                    Izumrud

                                    Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

                                    blocked strait.jpg

                                    After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

                                    Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

                                    damaged Berdyansk.jpg

                                    Ships parked at Kerch

                                    parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

                                    Some thoughts –

                                    The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

                                    Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

                                    That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

                                    Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

                                    12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

                                    7 thoughts on “The Kerch strait naval skirmish”

                                    2. You “forgot” the fact that the ukrainians dream of destroying the bridge. Quite relevant when discussing whether or not the russians should let the ukrainians paddle around the bridge. Furthermore you “forgot” the highly likely possibility of a ukrainian provocation in order to 1) impose martial law to clean out opposition 2) strengthen public support for the president 3) postpone the election 4) demonize Russia 5) “ping” USA/EU/NATO and hopefully receive moral, financial and military support.

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                                      • I think that’s all in the realm of political analysis and I try to stay away from that in this blog. Readers can make their conclusions, which I figure will be mostly rationalization, integrating interesting information such that it fits with their preexisting views and existing belief system.

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                                    4. A couple of minor points:
                                      1) Regarding whether the incident occurred in international waters, sovereignty over Crimea would determine whether territorial waters were Russian or Ukrainian territorial waters, but I don’t see how it would determine whether the waters were territorial or international.
                                      2) Regarding Ukraine’s declaration of martial law, everyone said it was intended to be an excuse to avoid the March elections (although I believe it was allowed to expire on schedule after 30 days), but it may simply have been an effort by Poroshenko to do something that would appear somewhat dramatic but would not be provocative enough to justify Russian retaliation. He didn’t have a lot of meaningful options.

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                                    5. First time reader here. I like your use of the phrase “Russian adhocracy.” Russia remains a mystery to most Westerners and certainly to Americans. While I am no expert on Russia, a bit of reading, particularly from astute observers, sheds some light on their actions and reasoning. Thanks for the astute article.

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                                      #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Michael Ossmann – 44CON

                                      Michael Ossmann

                                      default Twitter: @michaelossmann
                                      Website: ossmann.blogspot.com
                                      Michael Ossmann is a wireless security researcher who makes hardware for hackers. He founded Great Scott Gadgets in an effort to put exciting, new tools into the hands of innovative people.

                                      Michael has presented at:
                                      #####EOF##### daftojenta's Profile | WordPress.com Forums

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                                      #####EOF##### Zachary Cutlip – 44CON

                                      Zachary Cutlip

                                      default Twitter: @zcutlip
                                      Zachary Cutlip is a Senior Vulnerability Researcher with Tactical Network Solutions, LLC. At TNS, Zach develops exploitation techniques targeting embedded systems and network infrastructure in addition to co-instructing the Intro to Embedded Device Exploitation course. He has presented at Blackhat USA and DEF CON. Zach also created the Bowcaster exploit development framework. Before becoming a slacker, he spent six years in the US Air Force, parting ways at the rank of Captain. Zach has a bachelor’s degree from Texas A&M University and a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University.

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                                      #####EOF##### REST API Resources | Developer Resources

                                      REST API Resources

                                      Documentation → REST API Resources

                                      Welcome to the WordPress.com REST API. Below, you’ll find a full listing of all the available endpoints. As we add more endpoints, they will be automatically documented here and available through the Developer Console.

                                      If you’re not sure how to make calls to the API, you might want to check out the Getting Started guide or the walkthrough on authentication.

                                      For more information about a particular endpoint, click on its name under the Resource header. You’ll be taken to the endpoint’s documentation page, which includes what query parameters the endpoint will accept, what the JSON object’s parameters will be in the response, and an example query/response.

                                      This documentation is for our most recent version of the REST API, version 1.1. Documentation is still available for version 1 of the REST API.

                                      If you’re looking for the WordPress REST API that shipped as part of WordPress core in version 4.7, see its documentation.  Note that this API is also enabled on WordPress.com, but the URL structure on WordPress.com is slightly different than for self-hosted sites.  See this post for more details.

                                      Users

                                      View user information data such as username, name, email, blog, and Gravatar.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/sites/$site/users List the users of a site.
                                      POST/sites/$site/users/$user_id Update details of a user of a site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/users/login:$user_id Get details of a user of a site by login.
                                      POST/sites/$site/users/$user_ID/delete Deletes or removes a user of a site.
                                      GET/users/suggest Get a list of possible users to suggest for @mentions.
                                      GET/me Get metadata about the current user.
                                      GET/me/billing-history Get list of current user's billing history and upcoming charges.
                                      GET/me/settings/ Get the current user's settings.
                                      POST/me/settings/ Update the current user's settings.
                                      GET/me/preferences/ Get the current user's settings.
                                      POST/me/preferences/ Update the current user's preferences.
                                      POST/me/settings/password/validate Verify strength of a user's new password.
                                      GET/me/settings/profile-links/ Get current user's profile links.
                                      POST/me/settings/profile-links/new Add a link to current user's profile.
                                      POST/me/settings/profile-links/$slug/delete Delete a link from current user's profile.
                                      GET/me/connected-applications/ Get current user's connected applications.
                                      GET/me/connected-applications/$ID Get one of current user's connected applications.
                                      POST/me/connected-applications/$ID/delete Delete one of current user's connected application access tokens.
                                      GET/me/two-step Get information about current user's two factor configuration.
                                      POST/me/two-step/sms/new Sends a two-step code via SMS to the current user.
                                      GET/me/likes/ Get a list of the current user's likes.

                                      Sites

                                      View general site information and options.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/sites/$site/shortcodes/render Get a rendered shortcode for a site. Note: The current user must have publishing access.
                                      GET/sites/$site/shortcodes Get a list of shortcodes available on a site. Note: The current user must have publishing access.
                                      GET/sites/$site/embeds/render Get a rendered embed for a site. Note: The current user must have publishing access.
                                      GET/sites/$site/embeds Get a list of embeds available on a site. Note: The current user must have publishing access.
                                      GET/sites/$site Get information about a site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/page-templates Get a list of page templates supported by a site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/post-types Get a list of post types available for a site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/post-counts/$post_type Get number of posts in the post type groups by post status
                                      GET/sites/$site/widgets Retrieve the active and inactive widgets for a site.
                                      POST/sites/$site/widgets/new Activate a widget on a site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/wordads/settings Get detailed WordAds settings information about a site.
                                      POST/sites/$site/wordads/settings Update WordAds settings for a site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/wordads/earnings Get detailed WordAds earnings information about a site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/wordads/tos Get WordAds TOS information about a site.
                                      POST/sites/$site/wordads/tos Update WordAds TOS setting for a site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/wordads/stats Get WordAds stats for a site
                                      POST/sites/$site/wordads/approve Request streamlined approval to join the WordAds program.
                                      GET/me/sites Get a list of the current user's sites.
                                      POST/sites/$site/search Search within a site using an Elasticsearch Query API.
                                      GET/sites/$site/widgets/widget:$id Retrieve a widget on a site by its ID.
                                      POST/sites/$site/widgets/widget:$id Update a widget on a site by its ID.
                                      POST/sites/$site/widgets/widget:$id/delete Deactivate a widget on a site by its ID. Will delete if already deactivated.
                                      GET/sites/$site/headers/$theme_slug Get the custom header options for a site with a particular theme.
                                      GET/sites/$site/headers/mine Get the custom header options for a site.
                                      POST/sites/$site/headers/mine Set the custom header options for a site.

                                      Posts

                                      View and manage posts including reblogs and likes.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID Get a single post (by ID).
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID Edit a post.
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/slug:$post_slug Get a single post (by slug).
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/ Get a list of matching posts.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/new Create a post.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/delete Delete a post. Note: If the trash is enabled, this request will send the post to the trash. A second request will permanently delete the post.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/restore Restore a post or page from the trash to its previous status.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/delete Delete multiple posts. Note: If the trash is enabled, this request will send non-trashed posts to the trash. Trashed posts will be permanently deleted.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/restore Restore multiple posts.
                                      GET/me/posts Get a list of posts across all the user's sites.
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/likes/ Get a list of the likes for a post.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/likes/new Like a post.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/likes/mine/delete Unlike a post.
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/likes/mine/ Get the current user's like status for a post.
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/$post/subscribers/ Get a list of the specified post's subscribers.
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/$post/subscribers/mine Get subscription status of the specified post for the current user.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post/subscribers/new Subscribe current user to be notified of the specified post's comments.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post/subscribers/mine/delete Unsubscribe the current user from the specified post.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/reblogs/new Reblog a post.
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/reblogs/mine Get reblog status for a post.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post/related Search within a site for related posts.

                                      Comments

                                      View and manage a post's comments.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/sites/$site/comments/$comment_ID Get a single comment.
                                      POST/sites/$site/comments/$comment_ID Edit a comment.
                                      GET/sites/$site/comments/ Get a list of recent comments.
                                      GET/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/replies/ Get a list of recent comments on a post.
                                      POST/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID/replies/new Create a comment on a post.
                                      POST/sites/$site/comments/$comment_ID/replies/new Create a comment as a reply to another comment.
                                      POST/sites/$site/comments/$comment_ID/delete Delete a comment.
                                      GET/sites/$site/comment-counts Get comment counts for each available status
                                      GET/sites/$site/comment-history/$comment_ID Get the audit history for given comment
                                      GET/sites/$site/comments/$comment_ID/likes/ Get the likes for a comment.
                                      POST/sites/$site/comments/$comment_ID/likes/new Like a comment.
                                      POST/sites/$site/comments/$comment_ID/likes/mine/delete Remove your like from a comment.
                                      GET/sites/$site/comments/$comment_ID/likes/mine/ Get your like status for a comment.
                                      GET/kill-switch/comment-likes Kill comment likes

                                      Taxonomy

                                      View and manage a site's tags and categories.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/sites/$site/categories Get a list of a site's categories.
                                      GET/sites/$site/tags Get a list of a site's tags.
                                      GET/sites/$site/categories/slug:$category Get information about a single category.
                                      POST/sites/$site/categories/slug:$category Edit a category.
                                      GET/sites/$site/tags/slug:$tag Get information about a single tag.
                                      POST/sites/$site/tags/slug:$tag Edit a tag.
                                      GET/sites/$site/taxonomies/$taxonomy/terms/slug:$slug Get information about a single term.
                                      POST/sites/$site/taxonomies/$taxonomy/terms/slug:$slug Edit a term.
                                      GET/sites/$site/post-types/$post_type/taxonomies Get a list of taxonomies associated with a post type.
                                      GET/sites/$site/taxonomies/$taxonomy/terms Get a list of a site's terms by taxonomy.
                                      POST/sites/$site/categories/new Create a new category.
                                      POST/sites/$site/tags/new Create a new tag.
                                      POST/sites/$site/categories/slug:$category/delete Delete a category.
                                      POST/sites/$site/tags/slug:$tag/delete Delete a tag.
                                      POST/sites/$site/taxonomies/$taxonomy/terms/new Create a new term.
                                      POST/sites/$site/taxonomies/$taxonomy/terms/slug:$slug/delete Delete a term.

                                      Follow

                                      Follow and unfollow blogs.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/sites/$site/follows/ List a site's followers in reverse chronological order.
                                      POST/sites/$site/follows/new Follow a blog.
                                      POST/sites/$site/follows/mine/delete Unfollow a blog.
                                      GET/sites/$site/follows/mine Get blog following status for the current user.

                                      Sharing

                                      Connect social media services to automatically share new posts and manage sharing buttons on a site.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/sites/$site/sharing-buttons/ Get a list of a site's sharing buttons.
                                      POST/sites/$site/sharing-buttons Edit all sharing buttons for a site.
                                      GET/meta/external-services/ Get a list of third-party services that WordPress.com or Jetpack sites can integrate with via keyring.
                                      GET/meta/external-services/$service Get information about a single external service that WordPress.com or Jetpack sites can integrate with via keyring.
                                      GET/me/publicize-connections/ Get a list of publicize connections that the current user has set up.
                                      GET/me/publicize-connections/$publicize_connection_ID Get a single publicize connection that the current user has set up.
                                      POST/me/publicize-connections/$publicize_connection_ID Update a single publicize connection belonging to the current user.
                                      POST/me/publicize-connections/$publicize_connection_ID/delete Delete the specified publicize connection.
                                      GET/me/keyring-connections/ Get a list of all the keyring connections associated with the current user.
                                      GET/me/keyring-connections/$keyring_connection_ID Get a single Keyring connection that the current user has setup.
                                      POST/me/keyring-connections/$keyring_connection_ID/delete Delete the Keyring connection (and associated token) with the provided ID. Also deletes all associated publicize connections.
                                      GET/sites/$site/publicize-connections/ Get a list of publicize connections that are associated with the specified site.
                                      GET/sites/$site/publicize-connections/$publicize_connection_ID Get a single publicize connection that is associated with the specified site.
                                      POST/sites/$site/publicize-connections/$publicize_connection_ID Update a single publicize connection belonging to the specified site.
                                      POST/sites/$site/publicize-connections/new Create a new publicize connection that is associated with the specified site.
                                      POST/sites/$site/publicize-connections/$publicize_connection_ID/delete Delete the specified publicize connection.
                                      GET/meta/sharing-buttons Get a list of external services for which sharing buttons are supported.

                                      Freshly Pressed

                                      View Freshly Pressed posts from the WordPress.com homepage.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/freshly-pressed/ Get a list of Freshly Pressed posts. (Note: Freshly Pressed has been retired. Please visit https://discover.wordpress.com to get the best content published across our network.)

                                      Notifications

                                      View and manage a user's notifications.
                                      Resource Description
                                      POST/notifications/seen Set the timestamp of the most recently seen notification.
                                      POST/notifications/read Mark a set of notifications as read.

                                      Insights

                                      View analytics for your application.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/insights Get a list of stats/metrics/insights that the current user has access to.
                                      GET/insights/$slug Get raw data for a particular graph.

                                      Reader

                                      Manage and view a user's subscriptions to the WordPress.com Reader.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/read/menu/ Get default reader menu.
                                      GET/read/feed/$feed_url_or_id Get details about a feed.
                                      GET/read/sites/$site/posts/$post_ID Get a single post (by ID).
                                      GET/read/following/ Get a list of posts from the blogs a user follows.
                                      GET/read/liked/ Get a list of posts from the blogs a user likes.
                                      GET/read/tags/$tag/posts Get a list of posts from a tag.
                                      GET/read/tags Get a list of tags subscribed to by the user.
                                      GET/read/trending/tags Get a list of trending tags.
                                      GET/read/tags/$tag Get details about a specified tag.
                                      GET/read/tags/$tag/mine Get the subscribed status of the user to a given tag.
                                      POST/read/tags/$tag/mine/new Subscribe to a new tag.
                                      POST/read/tags/$tag/mine/delete Unsubscribe from a tag.
                                      GET/read/following/mine Get a list of the feeds the user is following.
                                      POST/read/following/mine/new Follow the specified blog.
                                      POST/read/following/mine/delete Unfollow the specified blog.
                                      GET/read/feed/ Get the ID and subscribe URL of one or more matching feeds by domain or URL.
                                      GET/read/recommendations/mine/ Get a list of blog recommendations for the current user.

                                      Stats

                                      View stats for a site.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats Get a site's stats
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/summary View a site's summarized views, visitors, likes and comments
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/top-posts View a site's top posts and pages by views
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/video/$post_id View the details of a single video
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/referrers View a site's referrers
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/clicks View a site's outbound clicks
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/tags View a site's views by tags and categories
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/top-authors View a site's top authors
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/comments View a site's top comment authors and most-commented posts
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/video-plays View a site's video plays
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/podcast-downloads View a site's podcast downloads
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/post/$post_id View a post's views
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/country-views View a site's views by country
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/followers View a site's followers
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/comment-followers View a site's comment followers
                                      POST/sites/$site/stats/referrers/spam/new Report a referrer as spam
                                      POST/sites/$site/stats/referrers/spam/delete Unreport a referrer as spam
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/publicize View a site's publicize follower counts
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/search-terms View search terms used to find the site
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/views/posts View the total number of views for each post.
                                      GET/sites/$site/stats/streak Get stats for Calendar Heatmap. Returns data with each post timestamp.

                                      Media

                                      Manage a site's media library.
                                      Resource Description
                                      POST/sites/$site/media/$media_ID/delete Delete a piece of media. Note: Media is deleted and not trashed.
                                      GET/sites/$site/media/$media_ID Get a single media item (by ID).
                                      POST/sites/$site/media/$media_ID Edit basic information about a media item.
                                      GET/sites/$site/media/ Get a list of items in the media library.
                                      POST/sites/$site/media/new Upload a new piece of media.
                                      POST/sites/$site/media/$media_ID/edit Edit a media item.

                                      Batch

                                      Batch several API GET requests into one.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/batch/ Run several GET endpoints and return them as an array.

                                      Videos

                                      View video information.
                                      Resource Description
                                      GET/videos/$guid Get the metadata for a specified VideoPress video.
                                      GET/videos/$guid/poster Get the poster for a specified VideoPress video.
                                      POST/videos/$guid/poster Upload and set a poster for a specified VideoPress video.
                                      #####EOF##### WordPress Plugins | WordPress.org

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                                      #####EOF##### Topic: fail to add instagram widget | WordPress.com Forums

                                      Need help? Check out our Support site, then

                                      en WordPress.com Forums › Support

                                      fail to add instagram widget

                                      • Author
                                        Posts
                                      • #3291629

                                        yuirislee
                                        Member

                                        I follow the instruction to add instagram widget in footbar but it failed…(i do log into my IG on another tab first)

                                        The blog I need help with is yuhsuanirislee.home.blog.

                                        #3291654

                                        neelgajjar
                                        Member

                                        Hi there,

                                        First Open a new tab > Login into your Instagram account.
                                        Then visit > My Site > Customize > Widget > Footer Sidebar > Add Instagram >
                                        Now Click on Publish > Now Click on Authorize Instagram Access > And then Page should reload.

                                        Please try these steps.

                                        Hope this helps! Let me know if you have any questions.
                                        Thanks!

                                        #3291663

                                        yuirislee
                                        Member

                                        Hello Neelgajjar,

                                        After I done this, it shows

                                        {“error_type”: “OAuthException”, “code”: 400, “error_message”: “There was an error with your request. Please try again.”}

                                        Do not know why it fail to authorize…

                                        #3291668

                                        neelgajjar
                                        Member

                                        I have added “modlook” tag for the staff assistance. You will get a reply soon from the staff

                                        #3291737

                                        supernovia
                                        Staff

                                        Hi @yuirislee, can you try these steps?

                                        From Chrome,

                                        1 – Open instagram in a tab. Log in. :)

                                        2 – Go to My Site > Customize > Widgets. Add an instagram widget.

                                        3 – Click publish *before* trying to click Authorize

                                        4 – Click Authorize

                                        If that does not work, let us know and we’ll offer another option. Cheers :)

                                        #3291785

                                        yuirislee
                                        Member

                                        Hello,

                                        Thank you for your suggestions. I tried it several times and it failed…
                                        got the same error message again..

                                        #3291864

                                        supernovia
                                        Staff

                                        Please check https://www.instagram.com/accounts/manage_access/ — do you see WordPress.com listed there?

                                        #3291907

                                        yuirislee
                                        Member

                                        No, it does not list here. I am not able to add Instagram as a widget on my page.

                                        I followed the instructions you provided but it does not work…

                                        What should I do next?

                                      • Author
                                        Posts

                                      You must be logged in to reply to this topic.

                                      #####EOF##### WordPress.com’s Parent Company Announces Happy Tools, a New Suite of Products for the Future of Work — The WordPress.com Blog

                                      WordPress.com’s Parent Company Announces Happy Tools, a New Suite of Products for the Future of Work

                                      Happy Schedule, our first offering, will help distributed teams manage employee schedules and customer support.

                                      April 1, 2019

                                      Matt Wondra

                                      Distributed teams, different geographies, and complex dynamics are redefining the modern workday. Soon, “job perks” like flexible hours and work-from-anywhere will become table-stakes benefits that every company needs to offer to stay competitive.

                                      WordPress.com’s parent company Automattic has long been ahead of this curve, growing a global software company of more than 850 people across 68 countries with no central office. Along the way, we’ve found that many business products are still locked into old assumptions about how a company runs, so we had to build our own internal tools to work the way we want. Now, we’re making these tools available to like-minded companies who need a better way to work.

                                      Today Automattic is announcing Happy Tools, a suite of products for the future of work. Each product in Happy Tools has been used internally at Automattic to grow our company.

                                      The suite is launching with Happy Schedule, a new take on workforce management. Designed to handle the complexities that come up when business goals are planned around real-world schedules, it helps you treat your employees like humans instead of resources. Using Happy Schedule, Automattic is able to plan 24/7 customer support while offering flexible working hours to our 300+ Happiness Engineers spanning many timezones.

                                      Happy Schedule helps you meet coverage goals across a distributed team.

                                      Happy Schedule is just the start. Over the coming years Automattic will release more of its internal applications into Happy Tools, with smart integrations between the products that make them even better when used together.

                                      We hope that by offering Happy Tools, even more forward-thinking companies will be able to move to a new way of working with customer support, internal communication, and people-management.

                                      You can get a 30-day free trial of Happy Tools when you sign up for a Happy Schedule demo at https://happy.tools.

                                      Missing out on the latest WordPress.com developments? Enter your email below to receive future announcements direct to your inbox. An email confirmation will be sent before you will start receiving notifications - please check your spam folder if you don't receive this.

                                      Join 57,723,128 other followers

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                                        #####EOF##### GUGI – Russia Military Analysis

                                        Tag: GUGI

                                        Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part 2 – 9M730?, Status-6, Klavesin-2R)

                                        Michael Kofman6 Comments

                                        Putin’s March 1st speech unveiled a host of new weapons currently under development. Some were previously known, or had been rumored to exist, but with sparse information about progress, while others were being tracked by those who follow military developments in Russia. Unfortunately, much of the media dismissed these announcements as a bluff intended for the consumption of domestic audiences ahead of the Presidential election, or selection, depending on how you view it. While Vladimir Putin may have exaggerated how far along these ‘fantastical’ weapons are, claiming successful tests, these are not figments of his imagination.

                                        He wasn’t bluffing – these weapons may all arrive sometime in the 2020s. Some we will meet in the early 2020s, others perhaps later that decade, as William Gibson liked to say “the future is already here, it’s just not evenly distributed.” In Part 1 I covered Kinzhal, R-28 Sarmat, and 4202, while in this section I plan to look at some of the even more interesting systems, including third strike weapons like Status-6, Klavesin-2R deep diving vehicle, and the nuclear powered cruise missile that raised so many eyebrows.

                                        The Nuclear Posture Review confirms many of these projects, stating, “Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.” That references 4202, R-28 Sarmat, and of course the now famous Status-6. What about the nuclear powered cruise missile? Former SecDef Ash Carter had a rather cryptic line in an article back in 2017, that perhaps we should look back upon and reflect, “Russia is investing in new ballistic missile submarines, heavy bombers, and the development of a new ICBM. These investments by themselves would not be novel, even if they necessitate continued, strong American deterrence. But they are also paired with novel concepts for how nuclear weapons could be used and some entirely new and even bizarre types of nuclear weapons systems…” Now let’s fast forward to March 1, 2018, and Putin’s presentation begins to make a bit more sense.

                                        As I will discuss in some detail below, most of these weapons are the stuff of science fiction from the 1950s and 1960s, back when science fiction writing was quite brilliant, and the Atomic age was in full swing. The U.S. and USSR considered, designed, and tested, all sorts of nuclear weapon concepts during the early 1950s and 1960s. Some ideas were ahead of the technology of their time, others were feasible but considered too crazy, provocative, or unnecessary. Part of what drove the resurrection of these concepts is Moscow’s desire to hedge against an uncertain future, and technology has changed. The feeling is not uncommon, since I took that notion literally from the language of our 2018 NPR, which also justifies its proposals in the need to ‘hedge against an uncertain future.’

                                        Image result for 1950s asimov

                                        Of course with such broad language once can advocate for all sorts of nuclear weapon programs, and sure enough, various industries in Russia seem to have sold the government on boutique weapons that will plus up Russia’s current deterrent. Moscow has thought to capitalize on some its comparative strengths, including nuclear energy technology, missile technology, and submarine designs, to develop what they believe will prove hedging weapons. These are in part in response to U.S. technological superiority in long range conventional fires, aerospace power, sustained U.S. investment in missile defense, and the desire to develop prompt global strike.

                                        Rumors about the coming missile defense review also suggest that it will be quite provocative, validating Russian concerns that missile defense is no longer just about North Korea and Iran, but instead aimed at Russian and Chinese capabilities as a matter of policy. Thus we embark on mutually assured spending.

                                        I don’t believe that Russia either needs these weapons to ensure the viability of its deterrent, or that their acquisition fundamentally changes anything in the military balance with the U.S. I’m equally skeptical that they offer any particular coercive effect, though I’m traditionally skeptical of the proposition that there is any efficacy to be found in nuclear powers using nuclear weapons for coercion. The history and theory just isn’t there to support that very much. What it does tell me is that Russia won’t be confident in its conventional capabilities for years to come, or ever, and continues to spend heavily on a nuclear offset, making the conventional and nuclear approaches to deterrence complementary – as in my mind they should be. That said, let’s get to the weapons.

                                        Novator’s newest creation – 9M730 (designation is a working theory until a better name comes)

                                        9m730 v2.JPG

                                        The nuclear powered missile with no name is probably designated 9M730, following after 9M728 (R-500) and 9M729 (SSC-8 INF violator). This is Ramm’s hypothesis based on the fact there is a 9M730 project out there and we know what the other cruise missiles in this series are. Given there is no name, for now 9M730 will do, and I suspect it will ultimately turn out that this is the project’s designation. Since Raduga makes air launched cruise missiles (Kh) it makes sense that this project would be one of Novator’s children, and Novator is quite good at what they do when it comes to cruise missiles. The idea behind the missile is to have special compartments where air is heated by a nuclear reactor to several thousand degrees, then thrust is created by ejecting the superheated air. Judging from the video shown there are four rear vents creating thrust for the missile.

                                        9m730.JPG

                                        Putin’s statement that it already passed a successful flight test in December 2017 doesn’t scan, but this empty bragging aside it seems the missile project is quite real and much further along than one would like. Additional reporting from A. Ramm’s article indicates the tests are being done in Nenoksa, Arkhangelsk firing it into the White Sea, although after talking to colleagues the images shown are from Novaya Zemlya. Testing it in the high north makes sense since it’s not the sort of thing anyone would want to test over mainland Russia, and it will likely end up being based there. Due to size and weight considerations a missile such as this would have an unshielded reactor, making it impossible for the weapon to fly without spreading radioactive particles. Furthermore, there were comments from sources familiar with the project that the missile is not being tested with a reactor, but rather an electrical power source to imitate the reactor they have constructed. A. Ramm, who has some good writing on this subject, missile testing is being supported by special Il-976 laboratory planes.

                                        Readers will undoubtedly recognize this concept as following in the footsteps of U.S. efforts to build a nuclear powered supersonic low altitude missile (SLAM), named project Pluto. From 1957-1964 the U.S. worked on a nuclear powered cruise missile, which would carry 16 nuclear munitions to targets in the USSR. The colossal amount of radiation it generated in flight was considered a feature at the time. However, even though a full scale reactor and engine were built, the project was canceled because the system was considered both highly problematic from an engineering standpoint and also provocative. The SLAM was nixed in 1964. Some believed it would motivate the Soviet Union to build a similar device, and all in all ballistic missiles were far less problematic. Well, it’s 2018, and while technology has clearly advanced substantially from 1964, humanity is an entirely different story.

                                        A nuclear powered cruise missile? Silly Russians, we would never have spent 8 years on such a reckless project.

                                        Project Pluto

                                        pluto engine

                                        I was skeptical as to whether this was far along, but here Pentagon came to the rescue. Pentagon officials, afraid that anyone finds out we might have some kind of ‘doomsday gap,’ let it be known that the missile in question has already gone through several flight tests in the Arctic and crashed in all of them. So we’re fine, because its not working yet… Also I think missiles typically crash and do not land, whether in testing or not, this is not a bug but a feature of missile technology. Crashing in testing is typical when working on a new missile design, particularly with a unique form of propulsion, but it was surprising to find out that Russia had already conducted several tests with a prototype.

                                        Image result for dr.strangelove doomsday gap

                                        Since the weapon has no name, I think we should consider calling it ‘prompt drunken strike,’ if anything based on the flight route shown in the video.

                                        Status-6 Ocean Multipurpose System

                                        Image result for статус-6

                                        Much of what is known about Status-6 appeared on 9 November 2015 during a meeting chaired by Putin on problems in the defense industry. Just as last week, the media was skeptical that this weapon was a bluff, together with the arms control community which is often doubtful when revelations are made about new nuclear weapons. Those are unhelpful confirmation biases, since both Status-6 and the 9M729 missile are turning out to be quite real. The system is now officially referenced in the NPR as a Russian strategic nuclear weapon program.

                                        status-6 slide.png

                                        The weapon as conceived will be a multipurpose nuclear powered torpedo, but the initial design is intended to destroy critical economic infrastructure along coastline. By all indications this project is well ahead of the nuclear powered cruise missile, and given the physical size of this weapon, nuclear power poses a much less daunting challenge to integrate. As conceived this will be a third strike countervalue weapon. This nuclear torpedo is meant for taking out U.S. coastal cities, and irradiating an entire area. The reason it comes 3rd is both mechanical, and in terms of function. It would take 35 minutes for ICBMs on a transpolar trajectory whereas this weapon might take days to reach the U.S. once fired, and it is not meant for counterforce targets, but instead to inflict unacceptable damage which historically was calculated as affecting the target’s GDP (people + infrastructure).

                                        city.JPG

                                        This is an innovative vengeance weapon, though I don’t believe it will have 100 mt as the warhead. Something much smaller will undoubtedly suffice to wipe out LA or San Francisco if need be and irradiate parts of the coast. The reason I mention Pacific cities is that a deep diving weapon doesn’t make as much sense coming from Russia via GIUK gap into the Atlantic, simply because of the depths and geographical choke points involved. Something to consider before people get started writing articles about the 6th Battle of the Atlantic. The Pacific on the other hand lends itself handily to deep diving autonomous weapons if they’re ‘fire and forget.’

                                        Does Russia truly needs this weapon to handle U.S. missile defenses? No, and it would be infinitely cheaper to just improve current strategic systems, which they’re also doing. However, need is often only loosely connected to what defense establishments procure. As I mentioned in Part 1, defense spending is at best ‘semi-rational’, representing numerous bureaucratic and domestic equities as much as actual threats and missions.

                                        It is also difficult to discuss Status-6 without mentioning the legacy of Andrei Sakharov’s famous T-15 torpedo, a Soviet project in 1951-1955. The design concept behind that 40 ton, 1500 mm torpedo, was as a first strike weapon, intended to deliver a large nuclear warhead to U.S. naval bases like Pearl Harbor, generating a destructive tsunami. The specialized submarine was called project 627, but back then Soviet General Staff decided that they had no need for such a system, and would be satisfied with a regular nuclear powered submarine. The technology to realize a mega nuclear torpedo was there, but T-15 was the wrong kind of crazy for its time. You can read more on the history of the T-15 from Norman Polmar’s timely piece.

                                        Maybe nuclear weapons are like fashion trends, they come back. Here is the old 627 with T-15 tube down the middle.

                                        t-15-image2.jpg

                                        According to the MoD slide, Status-6 can reach a depth of 1000 meters, speed up to 185 km per hour (100 knots), range up to 10,000 km, and is 1.6m in diameter. According to Putin’s statements it is excessively fast, deep diving, but also very quiet. This is nonsense, since underwater things can be fast, or they can be quiet, but they typically can’t be both. By all considerations this weapon is exceedingly loud if traveling at such speeds, and 100 knots seems somewhat an exaggeration. The video demonstrating its deployment showed project 09852 Belgorod, Russia’s most interesting submarine currently under construction, a heavily modified Oscar-II that will be the longest submarine in the world when it is completed. Belgorod should be able to carry these torpedoes internally, together with other undersea drones. The MoD slide from 2015 indicates that together with Belgorod, project 09851 Khabarovsk (another GUGI submarine laid down in 2014), will also deploy this torpedo.

                                        I got this from HI Sutton – don’t sue me HI.

                                        Pr_08952_pptSTRETCH.jpg

                                        Status-6, and similarly intriguing undersea weapon projects belong to Russia’s ‘other navy’ known as GUGI, or Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research. GUGI is responsible for fielding specialized submarines, oceanographic research ships, undersea drones, autonomous vehicles, sensor systems, and the like. Around mid-2000s there were some tidbits of information about an undersea drone program being tested. Then it became clear that the project involved a specialized barge, the supporting ship 20180 Zvezdochka, and GUGI’s specialized diesel submarine B-90 Sarov. For more reading on the various GUGI subs and covert underwater projects HI Sutton runs a good blog with various renderings.

                                        Here is what appears to be Status-6 container being loaded.

                                        Status-6 tube.jpg

                                        Based on the 2015 MoD slide, Status-6 is proceeding as a project in several phases, with the pilot system being completed by 2019, and testing 2019-2025. Although the nuclear drone probably doesn’t need much guidance, since cities don’t move around, there will need to be a command and control system built if this weapon is to have a conventional variant for wiping out carriers. I’m skeptical of the ‘carrier strike’ option shown in video during Putin’s speech, just because queuing is a perpetual problem for Russian forces, and it’s hard to see how a deep sea traveling weapon could get course correction from something above water. Hitting moving targets at sea is not so simple, especially over great distances, and with a weapon that is loudly steaming ahead in deep waters. More than likely Russia may try to deploy nuclear powered sensor or communications stations under the sea, as some of Rubin’s design projects suggest, to create the infrastructure for such a weapon. Besides the C2 infrastructure, Status-6 will still have to await the two GUGI submarines designed to carry it.

                                        Klavesin-2R-PM Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

                                        Klavesin-2M.jpg

                                        Klavesin is a creation of Rubin design bureau and ИПМТ ДВО РАН, Владивосток. The parameters of this underwater drone include: 6.5m length, 1m in diameter, 3700 kg weight, 50km range with a 2000 meter diving depth. This drone was also shown in the video being launched by Belgorod. The drone program is so super secret that some of the details regarding the vehicle could be found from Rubin’s public tender seeking a company to insure two of these drones for 48 million rubles. Seems they already have two of them, for Belgorod and another GUGI submarine that is already operational, BS-64 Podmoskovye.

                                        28379177_10159930236540462_5146440591197111008_n.jpg

                                        The 2R is, as one might suspect, a further evolution of the 1R variant, designed for oceanographic mapping, research, undersea photography, and probably some covert missions. Not much to add to this project except to say that it undoubtedly helps conduct undersea intelligence and reconnaissance missions for GUGI.

                                        fun times at GUGI

                                        Regarding the laser shown at the end of Putin’s talk, I’m not sure what it is yet, but looks like some kind of air/missile defense system by the module and platform. I’ve honestly not seen that weapon before and do not focus on lasers. They should show it more often.

                                        Laser.JPG

                                        Not keen on the controller. This feels like 1990s gaming.

                                        xbox controller.JPG

                                         

                                        Back to top
                                        #####EOF##### OAuth2 Authentication | Developer Resources

                                        OAuth2 Authentication

                                        Documentation → OAuth2 Authentication

                                        OAuth2 is a protocol that allows applications to interact with blogs on WordPress.com and self-hosted WordPress sites running Jetpack. The primary goal of OAuth is to allow developers to interact with WordPress.com and Jetpack sites without requiring them to store sensitive credentials. Our implementation also allows users to manage their own connections.

                                        If you are new to the world of OAuth, you can read more at http://oauth.net. If you are already familiar with OAuth, then all you really need to know about are the two authentication endpoints: the authorization endpoint and the token request endpoint. These endpoints are https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/authorize and https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/token

                                        The same endpoints are used for WordPress.com blogs and Jetpack sites. Before you begin to develop an application, you will need a client id, redirect URI, and a client secret key. These details will be used to authenticate your application and verify that the API calls being made are valid. You can create an application or view details for your existing applications with our applications manager.

                                        Receiving an Access Token

                                        To act on a user’s behalf and make calls from our API you will need an access token. To get an access token you need to go through the access token flow and prompt the user to authorize your application to act on their behalf.

                                        Access tokens can be requested per blog per user or as a global token per user. In addition to the global tokens, there are certain endpoints (e.g. likes and follows) where you can use a user’s token on any blog to act on their behalf.

                                        To begin, you will need to send the user to the authorization endpoint. Here’s an example request:

                                        https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/authorize?client_id=your_client_id&redirect_uri=&response_type=code&blog=1234

                                        Required parameters:

                                        • client_id should be set to your application’s client ID as found in the applications manager.
                                        • redirect_uri should be set to the URL that the user will be redirected back to after the request is authorized. The redirect_uri must match the one in the applications manager.
                                        • response_type can be “code” or “token”. “Code” should be used for server side applications where you can guarantee that secrets will be stored securely. These tokens do not expire. “Token” should be used for client-side applications. This is called “Implicit OAuth”.  Tokens currently last two weeks and users will need to authenticate with your app once the token expires. Tokens are returned via the hash/fragment of the URL.

                                        Optional parameters:

                                        • blog  You may pass along a blog parameter (&blog=) with the URL or blog ID for a WordPress.com blog or Jetpack site. If you do not pass along a blog, or if the user does not have administrative access to manage the blog you passed along, then the user will be prompted to select the blog they are granting you access to.
                                        • scope, if specified, can be set as “global” or “auth”. If omitted, the authorization token will only grant you access to a single blog. You may request global scope (&scope=global) to access all blogs that the user has access to on WordPress.com, including any Jetpack blogs they have connected to their WordPress.com account. If you are specifying the scope as global then you should omit the blog parameter. The auth scope (&scope=auth) will grant you access to the /me endpoints only, and is primarily used for WordPress.com Connect.

                                        Server / Code Authentication

                                        The redirect to your application will include a code which you will need in the next step. If the user has denied access to your app, the redirect will include ?error=access_denied. Once the user has authorized the request, they will be redirected to the redirect_url. The request will look like the following: https://developer.wordpress.com/?code=cw9hk1xG9k

                                        This is a time-limited code that your application can exchange for a full authorization token. To do this you will need to pass the code to the token endpoint by making a POST request to https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/token.

                                        $curl = curl_init( 'https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/token' );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_POST, true );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, array(
	'client_id' => your_client_id,
	'redirect_uri' => your_redirect_url,
	'client_secret' => your_client_secret_key,
	'code' => $_GET['code'], // The code from the previous request
	'grant_type' => 'authorization_code'
) );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
$auth = curl_exec( $curl );
$secret = json_decode($auth);
$access_key = $secret->access_token;

                                        You are required to pass client_id, client_secret, and redirect_uri for web applications. These parameters have to match the details for your application, and the redirect_uri must match the redirect_uri used during the Authorize step (above). grant_type has to be set to “authorization_code”. code must match the code you received in the redirect. If everything works correctly and the user grants authorization, you will get back a JSON-encoded string containing the token and some basic information about the blog:

                                        {
    "access_token": "YOUR_API_TOKEN",
    "blog_id": "blog ID",
    "blog_url": "blog url",
    "token_type": "bearer"
}

                                        You now have an access token which should be stored securely with the blog ID and blog URL. This access token allows your application to act on the behalf of the user on this specific blog. For an alternative example, check out our Node implementation.

                                        Testing an application as the client owner

                                        As the client owner, you can authenticate with the password grant_type, allowing you to skip the authorization step of authenticating, instead logging in with your WordPress.com username and password. Note that if you are using 2-step authentication (highly recommended), you will need to create an application password to be able to use the password grant_type.

                                        $curl = curl_init( 'https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/token' );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_POST, true );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, array(
    'client_id' => your_client_id,
    'client_secret' => your_client_secret_key,
    'grant_type' => 'password',
    'username' => your_wpcom_username,
    'password' => your_wpcom_password,
) );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
$auth = curl_exec( $curl );
$auth = json_decode($auth);
$access_key = $auth->access_token;

                                        As noted above, this is only available to you as the owner of the application, and not to any other user. This is meant for testing purposes only.

                                        Client/Implicit Oauth

                                        Once the user authenticates their blog, they will be redirected back to your application. The token and user information will be included in the URL fragment.

                                        https://developer.wordpress.com/#access_token=YOUR_API_TOKEN&expires_in=64800&token_type=bearer&site_id=blog_id

                                        This token will allow you to make authenticated client-side calls using CORS/AJAX requests. The token currently only lasts two weeks. Use the expires_in fragment to detect when you should prompt for a refresh.

                                        Validating Tokens

                                        It can be helpful to be able to validate the authenticity of a token, specifically that it belongs to your application and the user you are authenticating. This is especially necessary when sending a token over the wire (e.g. mobile application sending token as login credentials to an API). To verify a token, use the `/oauth/token-info` endpoint, passing in the `token` and your `client_id`:

                                        https://public-api.wordpress.com/oauth2/token-info?client_id=your_client_id&token=your_token

                                        If the token provided was not authorized for your application, the endpoint will return an error. If the token is valid, you will get a JSON-encoded string with the user ID and scope of the token:

                                        {
    "client_id": "your client ID",
    "user_id": "user ID",
    "blog_id": "blog ID",
    "scope": "scope of the token"
}

                                        Making an API call

                                        Our API is JSON-based. You can view all of the available endpoints at our API documentation. You can also make API calls with our legacy XML-RPC API. In order to make an authenticated call to our APIs, you need to include your access token with the call. OAuth2 uses a BEARER token that is provided in an Authorization header.

                                        <!--?php
$access_key = 'YOUR_API_TOKEN';
$curl = curl_init( 'https://public-api.wordpress.com/rest/v1/me/' );
curl_setopt( $curl, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, array( 'Authorization: Bearer ' . $access_key ) );
curl_exec( $curl );
?-->

                                        The above example would return information about the authenticated user.

                                        jQuery.ajax( {
    url: 'https://public-api.wordpress.com/rest/v1/sites/' + site_id + '/posts/new',
    type: 'POST',
    data: { content: 'testing test' },
    beforeSend : function( xhr ) {
        xhr.setRequestHeader( 'Authorization', 'BEARER ' + access_token );
    },
    success: function( response ) {
        // response
    }
} );

                                        The above example would create a new post. You can make similar calls to the other available endpoints.

                                        #####EOF##### Phil Huggins – 44CON

                                        Phil Huggins

                                        default
                                        Phil is a Vice President in the Stroz Friedberg Security Science practice responsible for London and International engagements. Phil has nearly 20 years experience across most jobs in security and focuses on advising large financial institutions and regulators on cyber resilience.Phil has presented at:
                                        #####EOF##### View: Non-support topics | WordPress.com Forums

                                        Need help? Check out our Support site, then

                                        #####EOF##### Social Media Überwachung: BfV Präsident Maaßen instrumentalisierte vor dem Innenausschuss den mutmaßlich „linksextremistischen“ Twitter Account „Hamburger Linie“ | Machtelite

                                        Social Media Überwachung: BfV Präsident Maaßen instrumentalisierte vor dem Innenausschuss den mutmaßlich „linksextremistischen“ Twitter Account „Hamburger Linie“

                                        Von / / "Revolution Chemnitz", false flag, G 20, Maaßen, NSU, Rassismus, Terrorismus, Twitter
                                        #####EOF##### Cookie Policy | WordPress.org

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                                        #####EOF##### Zapad 2017 – Russia Military Analysis

                                        Tag: Zapad 2017

                                        What actually happened during Zapad 2017

                                        Michael Kofman6 Comments

                                        I covered Zapad 2017 extensively on this blog, in a day by day account back in September. The goal was to create a resource for the community, something everyone could look back to in their analysis for background. Recently I’ve been motivated to write a short analysis of Zapad, and why both before and after the exercise a lot of coverage got it wrong. There are important takeaways from this exercise, but as always, sensational accounts muddy the waters, and they regularly lead to people learning things that are not true.

                                        German newspaper Bild recently published an amazing article, claiming that according to ‘two Western intelligence’ sources, Russia sought to invade the Baltics, Poland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and bomb Germany, along with a host of other unsubstantiated claims. I wish to thank them, since their fantastical account of Zapad 2017 is the inspiration for this actual account of Zapad 2017. While it may be general knowledge that Zapad is historically an exercise aimed at a contingency with NATO, much of what Bild claimed is not only untrue, it simply does not make military sense. However, before we get to Bild’s ‘alternative history’ of what happened that is now being passed around twitter like so much other received wisdom, let’s discuss what truly took place this September.

                                        T-80s of 1st Tank Guards Army

                                        Zapad is typically a two-phase scenario, where the proximate cause of conflict between Russia and NATO is Belarus (since Zapad-1999 when they began running these exercises again). The exercise often features a Russian defense against the supposed intervention, then horizontal and vertical escalation, followed by a substantial counter-attack against NATO. The purpose of the exercise is for the General Staff and national leadership to test the country’s ability to mobilize for a general war, gain experience in training and commanding the newly reformed armed forces, and in the big picture improve its coercive diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States by making clear Russia’s capability and resolve to use force if it’s core interests are challenged.

                                        All those things held true this year, but the actual size of the exercise was much smaller than anticipated, both across Russia, and in the immediate Baltic region. Not 100,000 or any of the other inflated accounts suggesting similar numbers. As Gen. Ben Hodges (just retired), had noted the exercise was somewhere north of 40,000. According to Igor Sutyagin at RUSI 48,000 to be exact, with maybe 23,000 in the areas noted for Zapad exercises. I differ with his account slightly, as I think it was perhaps no more than 45,000 across Russia, while the immediate region should include the Baltic and exercises by the Northern Fleet.

                                        The chief difference is really a narcissism of small differences – whether or not you factor in exercises in the Eastern MD, and foreign deployed troops in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, Transnistria, etc. Subtract 3,000 listed for the exercise on Sakhalin and you’re probably at about 45,000. There were parallel exercises and annual checks scheduled for that time of year and it’s rather debatable what was part of the Zapad scenario versus what coincided. What is clear is that there are no credible sources out there arguing that the exercise was a massive test of a Russian invasion of NATO, or that 100,000 troops participated in the event (note I said credible).

                                        Zapad 2017 was seemingly not only smaller than anticipated, it was likely smaller than expected in Russia as well, judging by the fact that the number of rail wagons ordered seemed to exceed the amount used by a considerable margin. That is, the original planning back in 2016 might have been for a larger event. Some explained this with a theory that Russia’s General Staff intended to send more forces to Belarus and was somehow turned away. There is nothing to support this version of events. Instead it is very likely that canned exercise press releases were pushed out, for units that at some point were nixed in planning, which may reveal earlier variations that never came to pass (along with the logistical planning for them).

                                        For example, it may have been that the entire 1st Tank Guards Army was supposed to show at some point early in the planning (our press informed us of this dreaded army looming), but actually only select units participated in the exercise. The same goes for entire VDV divisions, which actually only contributed a handful of battalions. Unfortunately Russia’s official press is quite terrible, announcing a lot more on the day to Belarus than there actually was, and people frequently attribute malice to what is typically malpractice.

                                        BMPs on railcars.jpg

                                        One possible reason Zapad 2017 was smaller this year is that it did not involve a major counter-attack against NATO forces, with a large scale deployment of 2nd echelon forces into the fight, which might come from Central MD. Although the 90th Tank Division did train as part of the exercise separately, it seems on the whole this event was focused on other matters, and in that way perhaps differs from Zapad 2013. It is also not a general fight against NATO, but a coalition of NATO members backed by the U.S. A distinction with a difference. So the fight was aimed at Poland, Lithuania, and the U.S. in support, based on the lead-in scenario for the exercise (bordering NATO states meddling in Belarus).

                                        I will offer a cursory summary of the phases, although details on what happened during those days can be found in earlier entries on this blog.

                                        Phase One, September 14-16:

                                        • Airlift of support crews and personnel to forward airbases. VDV Airborne drops to defend against lead elements of NATO forces in Baltic region. VKS movements to forward bases near theater of operations with fighters and long range aviation Tu-22M3. Air defense exercises to defend against incoming enemy aircraft and cruise missiles.
                                        • Russian ground forces loaded up and got under way by rail, strong focus on logistics and support units to get armor and mechanized units moving.
                                        • Railway troops, CBRN troops, signal troops, and other supporting units among MTO had a central role in ensuring the movement of Russian forces under simulated fire and cover from adversary ISR.
                                        • Russian Navy defended against incoming cruise missile strikes. They were tasked with getting out of port under aerosol screens, then deployed for ASW, and air defense. Their mission was to take out enemy submarines, and prepare to defend maritime approaches against surface action groups/amphibious landings.
                                        • Southern and Central Military District’s held concurrent drills on the essentials, including logistics, communications, air defense, along with artillery, armored warfare, and reconnaissance.

                                        Phase Two, September 17-20:

                                        • Russia’s General Staff worked to setup a unified battle space 600km wide, under a single combined (or joint) command, that would control the forces in the theater. As they took in units from combined arms armies, the big challenges were coordinating material support, provisions, and communication among these forces, with an effort to establish a common operating picture, along with command and control of different types of forces on the battlefield (combined arms warfare).
                                        • Russian ground forces sought to integrate combat aviation for close support, drones for ISR, electronic warfare units, and air power on the battlefield, together with the traditional artillery and mechanized warfare.
                                        • There was a strong emphasis on recon-strike complex, how to connect drones to artillery, working out the kill chain for both area of effect and long range precision weapons. These are new tools in the toolkit, proliferating across brigades, but there’s much work to be done in actually aligning capabilities and learning how to use them on the battlefield.
                                        • The conflict presumed early horizontal escalation, where Russia would have to defend in multiple theaters against enemy cruise strikes and aerospace attacks (of course only the U.S. global force poses as an opponent with such capabilities). Russian units worked to repair rail bridges, communications, and internal lines of communications assuming that they might be taken out.
                                        • Russian units formed into BTGs of varying sizes, reinforced with VDV troops. Some focused on defending Kaliningrad, or Pechenga for example to the North. Others conducted raids against the enemy behind their lines. Russian forces simulated pushing a NATO coalition out of Belarus, but the size and scale of this exercise was more modest than anticipated. Probably they planned to punch through to Kaliningrad, but that’s just a general assumption (what else would they do?)
                                        • Airstrikes against NATO airbases and other key infrastructure are almost a given in the Baltic region, given the size of the exercise and the scenario, but the offensive nature of the exercise seemed limited in scope.
                                        • The more robust role of the Russian Navy was on display, taking out surface action groups with ships, submarines, and coastal defense cruise missiles. The exercises in the Arctic region were also notable, showing Russia expects enemy forces to be a problem on New Siberian Islands, Kotelny, and other areas under the purview of the Joint-Arctic Command. Zapad featured a lot of counter-sabotage exercises, and defense against raids by enemy special forces.

                                        The exercise demonstrated some core elements of Russian planning for long range conventional strikes with SRBMs and ground launched cruise missiles. This is both part of a conventional warding strike, and likely NSNW employment for escalation control. Russian medium bombers had a role on the last day, but strategic bombers were not involved according to announcements. There may have been a pair of Tu-95MS doing their typical flight past Norway on the last day, but this is not an uncommon occurrence.

                                        I’m highly skeptical that long range aviation had any sort of nuclear attack mission in this exercise, especially since it makes little sense for them, or that the ICBM tests were truly a part of it given the nuclear forces exercise came later in the fall, i.e. all those things were tested and demonstrated to the West on a grander scale after Zapad. The strategic nuclear exercise traditionally follows the combined strategic exercise later in the year. Since Zapad-1999, Russia has on and off included nuclear signaling with strategic bomber aviation, but the intent behind it was to make a point to the United States. This is not a conversation Russia is having with Europe, but one it is having with Washington, since Russia principally sees NATO as a platsdarm for the projection of U.S. military power.

                                        The fables of Russian bombers attacking this or that are often told after Russian exercises, typically by politicians, such as the supposedly simulated Tu-22M3 nuclear strike on Sweden from Zapad 2013, which also never made sense, and was not substantiated by anything. If anyone had a nuclear mission in this exercise it was likely the missile brigades belonging to ground forces.

                                        R-500 launch 3.jpg

                                        Given the fear and panic spread in some circles ahead of Zapad, Russia needed fairly little to bolster its coercive credibility in being willing to use force, and follow through with conventional or nuclear escalation. That being said, the message was quite clear about Russian readiness and resolve were there to be a crisis in Belarus. In this respect Zapad was a success perhaps before it even began.

                                        Now let’s get to Bild. This is what Bild thinks happened according to ‘two Western intelligence analysts.’ We can venture some guesses as to what country they’re from on the basis of how they saw these events unfold. This version of Zapad 2017 seems to be Putin’s operation #YOLO

                                        25626264_1274803402623570_743372553755317428_o.jpg

                                        Unfortunately Bild’s account can only help further bolster Russia’s credibility and the mythologized capability of it’s armed forces. Here is what Bild wrote on the basis of mysterious intelligence sources:

                                        • Russian Tu-95MS bombing runs around Norway to strike Germany. Why would bombers with long range ALCMs have to fly anywhere near Europe to launch at Germany and Netherlands? They can fire from behind Moscow. That’s what 2,500km+ range cruise missiles are for. Actually they can hit Germany just fine without bombers too. In any case, there were stories of RAF Typhoons scrambling to intercept Russian planes off of Scotland but its unclear what they were, and it is very unlikely if they were bombers, that their mission was to “bomb” Germany (they don’t carry bombs). Russian bombers and other aircraft visit that part of airspace rather frequently, and are regularly intercepted by NATO aircraft.
                                        • Russian units from Kaliningrad invading Poland. The BTG formed here with VDV reinforcements focused on defense, although it would be interesting to see the op plan for invading all of Poland with 1200 men. The same goes for Sweden and Finland. The 6th Army is basically a defensive Army Corps, so it’s somewhat dubious as to what it has on hand to invade Finland with. Russian units in Pechenga (Northern Fleet) formed a large BTG for defense, but its somewhat incredible to imagine an invasion of Scandinavia with a handful of soldiers, and no actual objective. There’s nothing strategic there to invade (no offense Scandinavian colleagues).
                                        • Russian amphibious landings to seize harbors and ports. Russian Naval Infantry does practice landings, but with an old LST fleet and tiny lift capacity, it’s hardly in the cards nor is it truly their mission. If you can capture a Baltic city with 8 APCs then they have a good chance of doing it, otherwise its problematic. Amphibious assault is not really something Russian forces are well setup to do. Frankly, amphibious anything is not really their forte. Meanwhile the VDV airborne had a much more humble presence than expected, perhaps 4-5 battalions took part from different divisions.
                                        • Cruise missile strikes against infrastructure, if simulated, were done by the two R-500 launches during the exercise, that is via ground based systems. There were also simulated fires from old Tochka-U which are being retired. Although Russia can deliver similar fires via sea and air launched missiles as well. Syria saw a good deal of action at the same time as Zapad 2017.
                                        • Finally, the proposition that Russia practiced an invasion of the Baltics, Poland and Scandinavia, while fighting the rest of NATO, with about 23,000-25,000 troops is at face value somewhat ridiculous. Zapad 2017 is about a high end fight with NATO, but it’s quite clear what the exercise is and isn’t. There was no invasion of Norway, or Sweden, or Poland, or bombing of the Netherlands, or any of the other alt-history Bild got from its friendly intelligence analysts. Senior officials in U.S. and NATO saw nothing of the sort described in Bild’s apocalyptic fantasy.

                                        This was the Russian amphibious landing exercise in the Baltic Sea:

                                        LST landing

                                        Bild’s account of what happened during Zapad 2017 seems closer to this picture below:

                                        Image may contain: one or more people

                                        The Zapad exercise historically has a defensive and offensive component, as all strategic-operational exercises should, but 2017 appeared more limited in scale when it came to the ground force offensive/counterattack. Undoubtedly Russian forces crushed NATO in Belarus and saved Kaliningrad, but the rest of it seemed pretty conservative. Instead a strong emphasis was placed on fundamentals and functional areas of development: mobility and logistics, networking and communications, connecting ISR to fires, integrating aviation with ground attack, defense against aerospace attack, queuing and kill-chain development for long range fires, etc. For details you can look back to the day by day coverage in this blog from September.

                                        As for what happened during Zapad 2017 according to twitter, and Bild, I can best illustrate using the imaginative renderings of Jakub Różalski –

                                        Image may contain: one or more people, people standing, cloud, sky and outdoor

                                        1-5hgu2vPsYahRRpuZOa5CXA

                                        Zapad watch – summary of ‘post exercise’ exercises (the Zapad hangover)

                                        Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                        Zapad is over, but exercises and drills go on across Russia, like an echo bouncing across the military districts. In this final blog entry on Zapad I’ll give a sense of what the Russian military has been doing since Zapad officially ended. Most of these exercises are not part of Zapad 2017, but as always, it’s a bit hard to tell. Some seem like a continuation on the very same theme, perhaps for 2nd echelon forces or those that couldn’t get their training done during the week of the event. This is the final blog entry on Zapad – covering this exercise was mildly exhausting.

                                        Russia’s Fleets had a few interesting exercises and live fire drills even though the main event had ended. Central and Southern MDs are quite active with large scale air defense and artillery exercises. Thousands of Russian troops are still at ranges in the far east, Siberia, North Caucasus and southern Russia.

                                        A host of naval infantry, spetsnaz and special designation support units are conducting drills geared towards their specific mission sets and there is a wave of exercises across bases outside Russian territory, including: Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Tajikistan.

                                        Western MD – A few photos of Russian units heading back.

                                        BMPs on railcars

                                        Il-76

                                        Some interesting announcements cropped up after the last day of Zapad:

                                        Western MD – There was a special command and control training with topographic and geodesic support units (sounds like those controlling satellites) for providing navigation at different levels to Russian forces. More interestingly, in the ‘strategic direction’ (suppose northwest) they worked out how to ensure the accuracy of missile units and artillery. They also worked on detecting jamming sources and how to adjust satellite navigation guidance for said jamming. About 250 servicemen involved all together. Sorry the translation is somewhat awkward given the terms involved, but this may have been one of the technically more important exercises and of course no photos available for something like this.

                                        Southern MD – There’s a large scale air defense and artillery exercise ongoing at two ranges, Kaputsin Yar and Yeysky (near Rostov-on-Don).  An artillery battalion from a motor rifle brigade garrisoned in Volgograd were drilling at the training range Prydboi. This ‘division’ of artillery employed MSTA-S in support of a motor rifle battalion. Drones were used in the exercise, including to simulate enemy drones to which the artillery division had to react, i.e. quickly pack up from firing position and get themselves road mobile. Around 500 servicemen and 100 piece s of artillery took part. The exercise will conclude with 120mm Hosta mortar fires and Tornado-G MLRS. A sniper unit is training at the same range, about 50 men total, together with a Spetz recon team.

                                        Snipers

                                        At Kaputsin Yar, Russian air defense units from their base in Abkhazia ran live fire exercises with OSA-AKM, Strela-10M, and Igla MANPADS. About 300 servicemen and 30 pieces of equipment listed. Total it seems 1500 men and 400 pieces of equipment running air defense drills in Southern MD.

                                        Eastern MD – As drills continue in this district, Spetsnaz units in Khabarovsk conducted raids against two enemy camps. They arrived via Mi-8AMTSh helicopters, and were retrieved after a 10km march. Meanwhile in Zabaykalsky Krai (by Mongolia) Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters provided air cover for the insertion of airborne units. The Su-30SMs practiced dog fighting and dealing with various forms of electronic warfare.

                                        At the Joint Sea 2017 exercise with China’s PLAN the two sides worked on submarine rescue with Bester-1 and LR-7 submersible vehicles.

                                        Central MD – More than 500 artillerymen are currently running live fire exercises in Orenburg at the Totskoye range. They located the target with drones and then concentrated fires with BM-21 Grad, MSTA-S and other types of artillery. About 120 pieces of equipment total. Meanwhile in Western Siberia a S-400 unit is conducting live fire exercises against incoming enemy missile strikes.

                                        Tajikistan – Artillerymen from Russia’s base in Tajikistan destroyed a terrorist convoy carrying weapons. They detected them with Zastava drones, locating the supposed convoy of cars, and then opened up with 120mm Sani mortars.

                                        Tajikistan

                                        Transnistria – Not to be left out of the war, Russian units ran some live fire drills in this long frozen conflict, with about 350 servicemen and 30 pieces of equipment involved. The machinery looked rather dated and worn, older BTRs and BRDMs. Still the ‘peacekeeping’ unit gave it their go to demonstrate that a battalion of Russian forces was still alive and quite operational in this breakaway region.

                                        Don’t forget about us, we’re still peacekeeping.

                                        Transnistria 2

                                        Caspian Flotilla – Naval Infantry belonging to the flotilla (two battalions) hit the mountain training range of Adanak in Dagestan for some exercises in reconnaissance with the KRYS ‘Strelets’ system. About 600 naval infantrymen and some Nona self-propelled mortars were involved. They were working out integration between identifying targets with the personal kit system, relaying them to supporting mortar artillery using the same system, and then servicing the target.

                                        CF Marines

                                        Baltic Fleet – Select units of 11th Corps still have some work to do, practicing for ‘counter-terrorism’ drills. I’m not sure when the last incident of terrorism occurred in Kaliningrad but one suspects it’s a low probability event. In reality they were working on dealing with infiltrators, who had seized Russian army uniforms and were seeking to take over key technical facilities on the base, i.e. enemy special forces units. Seems they sorted out NATO, but there are still a few scenarios to be worked out regarding adversary SOF. The exercise is relatively small, about 150 servicemen and 20 pieces of equipment, including some drones, and high speed boats.

                                        Baltic Fleet.jpg

                                        The Baltic Fleet’s S-400 units may have only held electronic launches during Zapad. Now they are moving to Ashylyk range in Astrakhan for live fire exercises against high altitude, low altitude, maneuverable and ballistic targets. The scenarios are meant to recreate combat conditions, force the batteries to camouflage, displace, and work under enemy suppression. Quite possibly the reason for this is that the Baltic region right now is filled to the brim with various ISR and intel collection assets from different countries due to all the exercises picking up every wave and particle recordable – so perhaps they wished to do some S-400 launches away from so many prying eyes. About 200 servicemen and 20 pieces of equipment are involved according to the official announcement.

                                        North Fleet – In the course of exercises in the Barents, White and Laptev Seas (also New Siberian Islands) the fleet fired 13 different types of missiles from ships, submarines and CDCMs.  The Fleet’s commander, Vice Admiral Nikolai Evmenov explained that the scenarios modeled existing and possible threats. Meanwhile on Kotelny archipelago it kind of wasn’t over. The specialized Arctic brigade made a landing via LST Kondopoga. The units included several BTR-80s, MT-LBTs, and Vityaz all terrain vehicles. After the landing, four platoons mimicked an assault to seize a strategic height on the island.

                                        North Fleet invades Kotelny

                                        Peter the Great’s surface action group still had some work left on the way home. Orel, the Oscar-II SSGN and Peter the Great (Kirov-class) held some interesting duels in the Barents Sea. Peter the Great worked on ASW, and fired its ‘Vodopad’ ASROC system, while the Oscar practiced torpedo attacks.

                                        (looks like Dmitri Donskoy is out there with them)

                                        Northern Fleet

                                        Notable photos:

                                        Necessity is the mother of invention (is there anything exercise balls can’t do?)

                                        exercise ball

                                        PLAN Teamwork

                                        Chinese marines

                                        Zapad watch – summary of day seven (last day)

                                        Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                        The final day of Russia’s Zapad 2017 exercise just concluded. It’s over now….or is it? No, seriously, it’s probably over. Russian units in Belarus and Leningrad Oblast had a final go at it and then began to pack up their bags for a return trip to their garrisons. Although weather continued to be poor, there were some interesting moments on the last day, from VDV assaults to Tu-22M3 bomber flights over the Baltic and Norwegian Sea. Russia’s long range aviation also began waking up for some joint tests with air defense units. And an RS-24 road mobile ICBM launch, which is probably neither here nor there.

                                        BLUF: The Russian Navy and Air Force remained active, shooting down cruise missiles, and running simulations with ground based air defenses. VDV began preparations for return flights back to base. Logistics units of various types, particularly railway troops, communications, radar, and CBRN continued specialized technical drills. Not all is quiet on the Central and Eastern Front though. Readiness checks, inspections, and some fresh exercises suggest that while Zapad is over the busy training regimen will continue for Russian forces into October. Some of these may be connected to Zapad, while others not.

                                        MSTA-S.JPG

                                        Also Lithuania didn’t get invaded and Belarus seems like it will be ok

                                        Meanwhile it’s unclear if the RS-24 Yars launches (12th and 20th) have anything at all to do with this as part of an escalation dynamic or just RVSN working off its own schedule for missile tests. Probably both, the first launch was likely RVSN doing its own testing and the second one is an open question mark – could be terminal phase of Zapad.

                                        The exercise aside, there were other more important things on the minds of Russia’s General Staff. In Syria Jabhat al-Nusra launched an attack north of Hama which endangered a platoon of Russian MPs operating in the area together with KSO special forces. Rumor has it that most of the available rotary and fixed wing aviation Russia had available in Syria was called in to repel the attack, preventing encirclement. Russia’s MoD blamed US intelligence services for instigating the Nusra assault. From the sound of it, the last day of Zapad almost got too exciting as the real war in Syria made its presence felt.

                                        Belarus

                                        Borisovsky range – Lukashenko came to observe the final day of the exercise, but there was no joint photo op between him and V. Putin since they were at different ranges. The optics of collaboration and integration with Belarus were missing the personal touch. Quite possibly it was at one or the other leader’s decision not to have a joint review of forces.

                                        It’s all great but where’s my ally? (In all seriousness probably Lukashenko doesn’t want to be seen with Putin so he can play the role of ‘unwilling ally’ and maintain options for dealing with the West)

                                        Lukashenko

                                        Russia

                                        Training continued at Luzhsky (Luga), and around Pskov, but Kaliningrad’s range Pravdinsky seemed to wrap things up.

                                        Russian Tu-22M3 bombers conducted flights over the Baltic and Norwegian Sea, during which they were greeted by US, Belgian, Finnish, and Swedish fighters.

                                        At Plesetsk Cosmodrome a RS-24 YARS roadmobile ICBM was launched from a Krona shelter targeting the Kura test range on Kamchatka. Zapad seems to be book ended by two RS-24 ICBM launches, a silo-based test on September 12th, and a road-mobile launch on September 20th. The connection between Zapad and these missile tests is unclear. The first launch on September 12th was supposedly delivering a newer type of reentry vehicle (or decoy?)

                                        Yars-M-20170920.png

                                        Another interesting exercise on this day: Russia’s air force practiced responding to terrorists hijacking a civilian airliner out of Moscow and redirecting it north (maybe Swedish insurgents). Two Su-27s on alert responded while Russia’s ground based air defenses tracked then plane and prevented it from leaving Russian airspace.

                                        VDV Airborne – 76th Division crossed a river in their BMD vehicles and then assaulted enemy positions from behind enemy lines near Pskov. After this decisive action NATO units surrendered. Meanwhile, after completing the final day of drills, the VDV battalion airlifted into Kaliningrad reported to be preparing for departure back to their garrison. Looks like they’re packing up to go home. However it was not the best conclusion to the exercise for the VDV branch. The commander of Russia’s VDV was involved in a terrible automotive accident near Murmansk, and was taken to the hospital with serious injuries, along with aides who were in the vehicle with him.

                                        VDV river crossing

                                        Heading home

                                        VDV returning from Kaliningrad

                                        VKS Aerospace Forces – Su-35s in Telemba (Buryatia in eastern Siberia) shifted to an airbase in Zabaykalky Krai took on incoming enemy cruise missiles. Russia used Kh-55 target practice missiles, launched by Tu-95MS strategic bombers, as targets for air defenses at Telemba. Yes Russian strategic bomber aviation woke up to get itself in the game. This is taking place in the Eastern MD but seems to be a VKS + LRA exercise. Might be more strategic bomber drills to come, after all nuclear exercise season tends to follow in October.

                                        Russia’s Aerospace Forces are heading back to their airbases. Well, not everyone, clearly Tu-22M3s had a busy day. Altogether the list of fixed wing and rotary aviation involved includes: Su-35s, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM, Mig-29SMT, Mi-28N, Mi-35, Mi-8, Ka-52. Special mention has been made throughout about how bad the weather was during the second half of the exercise.

                                        VKS returning

                                        Central MD – In Chelyabinsk there is an inspection of the 90th Armored Division (by the border  with Kazakhstan). Apparently 25-29 September there will be an exercise held in Chebarkyl, which may be the Central MD’s continuation of ‘Zapad related training.’

                                        Eastern MD – Spetsnaz units in Khabarovsk Krai were lifted by Mi-8 AMTSh helicopters together with gear and then parachuted in to assault an enemy camp, then deployed for ambush behind enemy lines.

                                        Khabarovsk VVO

                                        Air defense units began an exercise focused on radar detection and tracking in Amur and Primoriye. They’re fielding Nebo and Nebo-SVU radars to detect, identify and track various types of targets. Part of the scenario is looking for sources of jamming and integrating the operating picture between two different air defense zones within the Eastern MD. It comes off like they’re working on dealing with low observation aircraft, because that’s the sort of thing radars of this type are good for. About 500 servicemen involved.

                                        radar screen.jpg

                                        Southern MD – Looks like enemy forces blew up a rail link in Kransodar and specialized technical units must respond to repair it. Railway troops, a CBRN unit, and other brigade elements completed a 200km march to the site, with 1000 servicemen and 200+ pieces of specialized equipment. Enemy forces were present in the area as well to complicate matters, and they had to practice air defense on the way.

                                        railway troops SMD.jpg

                                        Communications technicians created one information network across in N. Caucasus, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Armenia, and much of the Southern MD. Satellite and radio stations exchanged data while being suppressed by EW from enemy drones (probably Leer-3). Encrypted systems include Redut-2YS, MK VKS, and mobile radio stations R-166, R-419-L. About 3500 servicemen and more than 700 various pieces of equipment took part.

                                        Russian units in Abkhazia, together with Abkhaz armed forces, destroyed enemy command posts as part of a recon-strike exercise. At the training ranges Nagvaloy and Tsabal artillery units practiced with 2s3 Akatsya, D-30 122mm towed artillery, and 120mm Sani mortars. BM-21 Grads were deployed, together with drones for targeting and recon. Data from drones was integrated via Strelets (individual soldier system) and artillery systems to deliver on short notice artillery strikes to identified targets. The point of the exercise was to workout integration between reconnaissance and the strike part of the equation. About 500 servicemen took part and 100 pieces of equipment.

                                        Northern Fleet – Out in the Barents the surface action group led by Peter the Great (Kirov-class), together with Marshal Ushakov (Soveremenny-class), defended against a massed enemy air attack with anti-ship cruise missiles (though the targets were fired at a rate of one per minute so not exactly a massed salvo). They were backed by Mig-31s, shooting down six cruise missile targets in total launched by small missile boards (RM-120). The scenario had two phases: in the first Russian ships used their air defenses in collaboration with air support. A few were hit by S-300 Fort, one by Uragan, and two by R-33 air-to-air missiles. Phase two was close in weapons defense, involving one RM-120 target and two decoys to imitate missiles.

                                        Meanwhile in the Arctic, Severomorsk (Udaloy-class) conducted live fire exercises, employing surface to air missiles (Kinzhal), CWIS guns, artillery, and even the troops onboard unloaded RPGs into floating targets. Pantsir-S1 (Arctic variants) practiced against various targets. The head of the Russian Navy, Adm Vladimir Korolev is personally visiting the Northern Fleet. According the MoD that’s a wrap for the North Fleet and they should be turning around for home.

                                        Severomorsk launching Kinzhal

                                        Severomorsk.jpg

                                        Arctic Pantsir air defense

                                        Arctic Pantsir-S1.jpg

                                        P-15 Termit missile launched by Rubezh coastal defense system

                                        Termit.JPG

                                        Baltic Fleet – 11th Corps is standing down and returning to their garrisons according to the MoD. Ships are due back in Baltiysk.

                                        Black Sea Fleet – An artillery regiment of the 22nd Army Corps (BSF) is conducting artillery and air defense drills at the Opuk training range. Elements of the separate naval infantry brigade are also involved in this exercise. About 50 pieces of equipment were noted, self-propelled artillery, BM-21 Grad, and Strela-M10 short range air defense systems. The BSF’s Su-24M naval aviation squadron played enemy aviation.

                                        OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

                                        Caspian Flotilla – Starting inspection and preparations across the flotilla’s ships in advance of a large exercise expected in October. Looks like they will have a busy training schedule after Zapad.

                                        Pacific Fleet – Chinese marines are drilling in counter-terrorism at Russia’s Gornostay range, first phase of their joint exercise with PLAN for the coming week.

                                        Russian forces in the Baltic region are beginning to return home, but the op tempo of exercise will continue into Central and Eastern MD. There may be further air defense, radar, and LRA exercises. General purpose ground forces in districts many time zones away from the scenario will continue repelling a conventional adversary as though they are part of the larger fight. Nuclear escalation was not an obvious part of the exercise, but definitely pre-nuclear deterrence was featured in R-500 launches. A more serious analysis to come – this is just a wrap up of the last day.

                                        Notable Photos:

                                        The Army’s strategic resource on the move (mobile kitchen)

                                        the most important vehicle - kitchen

                                        This

                                        run faster

                                        Plotting which of these kids to leave in Belarus

                                        Mr. Burns

                                        Zapad watch – summary of day six

                                        Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                        We’ve almost made it, only one day to go. What could possibly go wrong? Seriously speaking though, other exercises starting up in the Far East suggest that some drills will continue past the September 20th date. Key activities:

                                        • VDV conducted air drop, raiding, and airbase assault
                                        • Kaliningrad repelled an enemy attack with a task organized BTG
                                        • Russia’s Navy fought off surface action groups and amphibious landings in the Barents with ship borne, submarine, and CDCM launches
                                        • Ground forces employed Iskander-K (R-500)
                                        • Eastern MD went on alert in preparation for a larger ground force exercise while Central MD’s Tajikistan base also began to run drills
                                        • VKS were busy intercepting enemy airpower and incoming cruise missiles

                                        BLUF: Russian forces transitioned from simulated to actual strikes and offensive operations. R-500 GLCM was launched from Leningrad Oblast in Western MD. All in all, there was a healthy demonstration of Russia’s long range precision guided munitions, submarine, ship, coastal defense and ground launched. Horizontal escalation could be seen in the Eastern and Central MD. Scenarios unfolded expecting strikes in Central MD, and Eastern MD troops prepared for a large scale exercise in their district to repel ground forces.

                                        Belarus

                                        Osipovichsky range – Russian and Belarusian ground forces stopped NATO’s advance at the range, 4th Division’s newest motor rifle regiment continues the fight with T-80BV tanks. Artillery units engaged with Tornado-G, MSTA-S, Giatsint, BM-21 Grad. Belarus used Mi-8MTV-5 to ferry Russian airborne units onto the battlefield. Mi-28Ns provided air support in repelling the enemy. Belarusian drones Busel and Berkyt were employed to recon and target enemy positions for their MLRS detachments using BM-30 Smerch and Polonez. Not all went to plan – the weather was terrible and there was a 30 minute operational pause between defense and counter-attack – apparently someone important had to arrive to see the latter part.

                                        T-80BV of 4th Division MRR

                                        Borisovsky – Various combined groupings including VDV, artillery and combat aviation had a day of fighting. Here 6th Tank BDE from 1st Guards Tank Army. Spetsnaz units were shown for the first time, and they highlighted the employment of KRUS ‘Strelets’ systems for navigation, reconnaissance and communication.

                                        Spez Borisovsky

                                        Western MD, where a lot of the action continues (and the occasional live fire accident)

                                        Luzhsky range – Everything was going well, until it wasn’t. A Ka-52 fired S-8 rockets near a crowd of observers. Unclear if it was a weapon malfunction or a judgment malfunction. Three people were hurt, plus a Leer-3 EW vehicle designed to command specialized Orlan drones.

                                        Here is a video of the stike: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=4DGQVkuJ1p8

                                        There’s a site with the helicopter’s gun camera http://www.yapfiles.ru/show/1756678/38dd695ae47ae3c0af890282b013b053.mp4.html

                                        Here is the Leer-3 afterwards.

                                        damaged Kamaz after Ka-52 strike

                                        Pantsir-S1 air defense units practiced against low flying targets, with a An-2 simulating enemies at 50m altitude and 200km speed. Aerosol and smoke cover provided by specialized CBRN support troops. MTO troops continued to do MTO things, lots of fascinating stats were provided on number of mobile kitchens setup, etc.

                                        Luzhsky range 2

                                        Iskander R-500 cruise missile launches. As promised, they went from electronically simulated strikes to actual launches of cruise missiles today. Luzhsky range same some solid escalation.

                                        R-500

                                        R-500 launch 3.jpg

                                        Electronic Warfare – Apparently for the first time in exercises EW troops deployed the RB-109A Bylina automatic control system that greatly increases the effectiveness of EW systems, and more importantly eliminates EW fratricide in terms one’s own comms systems. There’s not been much talk about what EW systems are actually being used, although Leer-3 drone EW system has been show multiple times.

                                        VKS Aerospace Forces – Mig-31BMs were busy intercepting incoming cruise missiles fired by enemy planes. They were also engaged in a large air defense operation, intercepting 30 enemy targets approaching the practice ranges in Leningrad Oblast.

                                        VDV Airborne – Another parachuting exercise took place at Strugi Krasniye near Pskov, conducted by the 76h Division based there. Looks like they dropped again near the range, perhaps a different battalion though – since this one had BMD-4Ms in it. Poor weather notwithstanding the drop was made at 800m, with about one battalion of 400 troops and 10 vehicles. After  landing they assaulted an enemy airfield. Then the units conducted a raid with BMD-4M and BTR-MD Rakushka, crossing a some water obstacle in the process (perhaps a small river), and overcoming the muddy ground in the area.

                                        VDV landing

                                        Yep that’s mud

                                        VDV raiding party

                                        Northern Fleet – Peter the Great (Kirov-class) launched five SS-N-19 anti-ship missiles in the Barents Sea at a simulated adversary, together with Admiral Ushakov, which fired a Moskit missile. Alongside the surface action group the live fire exercise was joined by Voronezh and Orel, two Oscar-II SSGNs. Ships in different positions converged missiles on targets at 200-300km range. The goal was to integrate a surface action group, SSGNs, and maritime aviation to service an enemy SAG at sea.

                                        Bastion-P complexes back at the tip of Teriberskiy also fired on enemy forces at sea – range 400km. Yes, that’s right, according to them it was 400km for a complex that officially has a range of 350km in anti-ship  roles 🙂 Bastion goes up to 450km but this supposedly is against surface targets in high-high flight profile trajectory which is not what they were testing. From Kotelniy Island, Rubezh fired two Termit missiles (vintage shorter range systems) at 50km range. An Udaloy class destroyer also conducted live fire drills in the same area. This was the “Arctic defense” part of the exercise. Official numbers for Northern Fleet participation are 5,000 troops and 300 pieces of equipment.

                                        Baltic Fleet/Kaliningrad – Pravdinsky range where most of the Baltic Fleet’s 11th Army Corps is drilling had its largest day of battle. BMD-2 vehicles suggest VDV was present in support of motor rifle units together with artillery. Orlan-10 and Grusha drones were employed throughout training, while naval aviation provided  support (Su-24 + Su-34). They also had Platforma-M combat UGVs. The mission was straightforward, they found a ‘diversionary group’ and had to march 60km to engage it. The forces were task organized with units from the motor rifle regiment, reinforced by artillery, and airborne units. After forcing a retreat, with Mi-24 helicopters and MLRS systems the enemy was chased down and destroyed.  Weather continued to be poor, nothing but rain.

                                        Baltic Fleet.jpg

                                        Bal coastal defense units engaged enemy ships with anti-ship missiles along with those fired by a Steregushchiy corvette. The coastal defense missile battery hit a target at sea, while one of the corvettes fired a Uran missiles (sea based variant of same Kh-35). Enemy forces  supposedly had jamming and EW. Unclear how that was simulated, perhaps another ship since they were also practicing EW at sea.

                                        BAL

                                        Black Sea Fleet – Admiral Grigorovich frigate and the fleet’s newest corvette, Vyshniy Volochek, put to sea for some sea trials and practiced air defense. Turks are visiting Novorossiysk with a LST for some sort of port of call.

                                        Southern MD – Logistics units in Abkhazia, at the Tsabal range, trained in deploying a modern mobile communications system (Redut) in mountainous terrain which allows one to setup a unified radio communications network. They practiced setting up 32m antenna masts to establish a 2 mbps/sec network. This is much lower bandwidth than what’s up at Western MD but still quite interesting. The soldiers worked to setup communications at different frequencies and video conferencing (wonder how well their VTC technology works, and if its anything like ours…). Around 300 servicemen and 100 pieces of specialized equipment took part. Some named pieces of kit include Artek station mounted on a BTR-80, satellite communications Liven on an Ural base, radiorelay L1 on Kamaz.

                                        southen MD Redut setup

                                        Eastern MD – About 3000 troops and 500 pieces of equipment are deploying various drills on Sakhalin. Their large scale exercise is just beginning it seems. The war finally spread to the far east, and they too must find enemy recon groups and prepare to defend against enemy ground forces. T-72B tanks, BM-27 Uragan, BM-21 Grad and Giatsint-S systems will be deployed. Drone support includes Orlan and Zastava, while air support consists of Su-25s and Mi-8AMTSh helicopters. Supposedly various flamethrower units will be used as well.  In Zabaykalsky Krai (borders Mongolia) Russian S-300 units began drills in defending key MoD infrastructure. About 200 servicemen and 40 pieces of equipment involved.

                                        Far East MD troops

                                        Central MD -Tajikistan suddenly came alive. Seems Russian soldiers from 201st based there were airlifted to seize the command post of enemy bandits/diversionary groups. CBRN troops deployed heavy smoke and aerosols to cover movement of forces. Meanwhile in Republic of Khakassia railway forces began training in bridge laying 4 bridges with a cumulative length of 1000m across a river.  The scenario is quite interesting, some naughty adversary fired PGMs and destroyed the railway bridge over the river Enisey. Hence about 1500 servicemen and 550 pieces of specialized equipment have been raised on alert to restore the railway link across the river. Interesting assumption that Russian interior lines of communication could be severed at this stage of the conflict and railway troops are ready to be summoned in order to restore them (could be US or China really that’s to blame).

                                        railway troops CMD

                                        Notable photos:

                                        Spetsnaz kill (element of surprise possibly ruined by photographer standing right there)

                                        the surprize attack might have been ruined by the photographer being present.jpg

                                        Foreign observers (is that a selfie moment in progress?)

                                        observers

                                        Zapad watch – summary of day five

                                        Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                        With phase two in full swing and Vladimir Putin now observing, there is action almost everywhere. The past few days have been lively, and somewhat hard to cover so in this post I’m summarizing some other MD’s events that were glossed over earlier.

                                        BLUF: Russian forces are having a conventional high end fight across a 600km front in the Western MD, fleets are defending against enemy amphibious landings, airborne units are doing more drops, missile regiments have started live fire exercises with you guessed it – missiles. So we have horizontal escalation to different fronts and vertical escalation with Russian forces launching SRBM/Cruise missile strikes. The Russian Navy is defending littorals and maritime approaches as expected, recons strike complex is being tested in support of artillery, while airborne and ground forces are working together in defeating concentrated enemy formations. Special designation and special purpose units are also quite active across the districts.

                                        Belarus

                                        Osipovichskiy Range: The new Motor Rifle Regiment (423rd) of the 4th Division (1st Guards Tank Army) is training here with armor, motorized infantry, artillery, and air defense units. Seems this regiment was snapped together with a T-80BV battalion supporting it (4th DIV still has T-80 variants). My understanding is that a 3rd maneuver regiment was added to this division as of last year and is slowly being manned and equipped. MTO and engineering units are busy with camouflage and fortifications, meanwhile the T-80s are running a tank carousel, i.e. shoot and scoot drills.T-80

                                        Another participant at this range is Belarus’ 120th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, they fielded armor, artillery and air defense in support of Russian forces. (4th Tank Division also seems to be in Syria supporting the push outside Deir-ez-Zor with pontoon bridges and logistics, so this unit is basically everywhere right now).

                                        smerch 2

                                        Borisovsky range is active too, but I gave it lots of coverage during the last post. Suffice to say they’re still winning over there and no doubt NATO forces are dying left and right.

                                        Western MD

                                        Luzhsky range (outside Luga) – As expected Putin came to Luzhsky range in Leningrad Oblast for the main event. There he took some lazy photo ops pretending to hold binoculars without looking at them, because they had large monitors setup in front of the glass showing the events, which were also taking place right in front of the window. Russian MoD brought out newer T-90M, T-80BVM upgrade and BMPT to show off in front of the leadership.

                                        Large monitor screens in front of the window somewhat block the binoculars, he’s just holding them seemingly annoyed for the photographer to take this photo op

                                        Putin and crew

                                        Not even faking it

                                        Putin and Gerasimov.JPG

                                        Su-24Ms did a large bombing run at the range, while Su-25s were busy killing enemy convoys. Su-24MP recon variants provided targeting data, along with drones. Mi-28Ns, Ka-52s and Mi-35M helicopters all had a busy day.

                                        Mi-28N at Luzhsky.JPG

                                        Russian forces practiced employing drones as part of a recon strike complex, including artillery recon systems such as Aistenok, targeting and communications system Strelets, along with artillery systems MSTA-B, MSTA-S, BM-21 Grad, and Sani. The goal was to practice command and control of different types of forces, together with EW and air defense units in support, while recon assets fed targeting data in real time. Seems they were using precision munitions too, Krasnopol and Smelchak.

                                        Lots of different types of units drilling at Luzhsky today and Strugi Krasniye (where the 76th Pskov seems to be). Sprut and Shturm-S tank destroyers got to do live fire exercises, along with Kornet ATGMs and Shmels with thermobaric rounds. Engineers practiced demining with UR-77 systems, while combat medics trained in evacuating the wounded from the field of battle. Russian and Belarusian MP units are guarding field command posts, defusing enemy IEDs and the like.

                                        Bridging and MTO

                                        At Kaputsin Yar in Astrakhan, news read that Iskander-M units ran combat launches at 480km range, hitting Makat fire range. In reality it seems to have been R-500 cruise missile variant.

                                        Units named so far as participating include 25th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, 138th Motor Rifle Brigade and 2nd Tamanskaya Division. About 600km wide front in terms of engagement according to Col-General Kartapolov, cdr of Western MD.

                                        T-90M and BMPT at Luzhsky

                                        T-90M and BMPT

                                        VDV (Airborne) – The big day has basically arrived, VDV Divisions from Tula, Ivanovo and Pskov which had been first raised on alert on the 14th began marches to training ranges and loading onto Il-76s. 76th had already been engaged and doing combat drops, while 98th was getting ready for a drop yesterday. Looks like they did an air drop in bad weather later during the day, rain and low altitude cloud cover. I would expect 400-450 troops per air drop + 9-10 vehicles based on the preparations reported previously. About 10 Il-76s employed, seems the drop zone was Luzhsky range. One battalion from each division is likely to do an air drop during this exercise.

                                        Before drop

                                        vdv airborne

                                        At the range

                                        VDV

                                        VKS (Aerospace Forces) – 6th Air and Air Defense Army had a lively day. Weather was bad, but Su-35s escorted Il-76s with VDV onboard to the drop zones. Combat aviation supported the airborne during their drop. Meanwhile Tu-22M3s practiced bombing runs against targets.

                                        Northern Fleet – Peter the Great’s (Kirov-class) surface action group with a Sovremenny destroyer ran live fire exercises defending against enemy forces attempting to land marines on Sredniy Peninsula (just north of Murmansk). Enemy marines also tried to land on Ribachi peninsula to seize strategically vital terrain, where they were met with Russian naval infantry. Apparently Russian units, formed as a reinforced battalion, had to travel 100km to engage the assaulting marines with Su-24Ms and Mi-8 helicopters in support. About 600 naval infantry, 12 BTR-82As, and several artillery  units  were involved. Drones were use to correct ship artillery fire.

                                        North Fleet Naval Inf.JPG

                                        Baltic Fleet – Russian naval infantry and special designation units were busy at Khmelevka range and defending against enemy landings. Some of Baltic Fleet’s naval infantry took positions on the beach, holding ground in Kaliningrad. They dug in with T-72B1 tanks, BMP-2s, tank destroyers and other hardware. Naval infantry also conducted an amphibious landing from LST’s with BTR-82As swimming ashore and Ka-27 helicopters unloading infantry on the beach. Seems to have been a lively scene, Mi-35Ms were overhead, lots of flares and smoke. Photos suggest some units were practicing mine laying just off the beach as well. At Pravdinsky range Spetz units were busy with tactical exercises taking out diversionary groups and ‘illegal armed formations,’ basically urban assault against  infiltrators in buildings. Everyone seems to be complaining that the weather was bad. CBRN troops were working on fighting chemical weapons on a floating platform just off the beach.

                                        Baltic Naval Infantry landing

                                        LST landing.jpg

                                        Defending force

                                        more naval infantry photos

                                        You can tell its raining (looks like B1/BA mix)

                                        Pravdinsky in the raine.jpg

                                        Black Sea Fleet – Outside Novorossiysk, in Tsemes Bay, the BSF nailed an enemy submarine (sorry Turkey). Apparently it tried to sneak in while enemy high speed boats were distracting the defending ships. The enemy submarine manage to land enemy divers, but specialized Russian PDSS diver units found them, meanwhile a small anti-submarine ship (Povorino) sunk the enemy submarine with depth charges. Situational awareness provided by Orlan-10 and Electron drones. BSF minesweepers and small missile boats (about 2) were also involved in various drills outside Sevastopol, minesweeping, artillery and missile fires, etc. Be-12 maritime patrol craft and Su-30SMs supported the operations.

                                        Eastern MD – In Khabarovsk the Eastern MD began some sort of ‘special tactical training’ with Spetz units. Seems they did an air drop by parachute and via Mi-8AMTsh helicopters at night. Probably a Spetsnaz unit. In Primorye, at Turgenevsky trange, specialized units in CBRN trained in dealing with chemical warfare. Apparently enemy diversionary groups got this far and had chemical weapons with them. Although part of the exercise seems to be dealing with potential chemical or ammonia leaks from a factory, evacuating civilians, clearing gases and chemicals, so it is perhaps oriented towards consequences of damage to industrial facilities. A host of specialized equipment being used: RHM-6, TMS-65U, ARS-14KM, and smoke machines for cover TDA-3 (the latter part is to cover the movement of ground forces). About one battalion, 500 men and 100 vehicles involved in this exercise.

                                        eastern md.jpg

                                        Southern MD (catching up on this one) – 8th Combined Arms Army, the latest CAA setup with Ukraine as its primary contingency, concluded its exercise at the Prydboi (Volgograd oblast) training range. The news is odd, says concluded but other info suggests the exercise is still ongoing. A mix of units including T-90A, BMP-3, MSTA-S, Tornado-G, and 120mm Hosta were involved. Drones were also an important part of the exercise, providing real time situational awareness to commanders, reconnaissance of routes for armored columns, etc. About 2000 men and 500 pieces of equipment were involved from motor rifle detachments of the Southern MD based in Rostov and Volgograd regions. Artillery units participating counted 500 men and 100 various systems.  Seems they’re wrapping up as the main piece  of Zapad is just launching, likely offset so as not to scare neighboring countries too much.

                                        Fairly large scale exercise with elements of the 49th CAA taking place, including Stavropol, Krasnodar regions, and Abkhazia. Motor Rifle units from a mountain brigade in Karachay-Cherkessia (Stavropol) had been drilling since September 15 at Zalenchyski range. Seems about 1300 men and 250 pieces of equipment listed, drilling with Olran-10 drones, EW companies, Spetz units, and specialized logistics detachments. They even used horses from the logistics unit, which apparently has 80 of them, to drag a Podnos mortar unit onto one of the mountains at 4000m altitude.

                                        Central MD – Air Defense Units have been practicing at Ashylyk in Astrakhan throughout the Zapad exercise, but it is somewhat co-mingled with the ‘Combat Commonwealth 2017’ exercise done with CIS members. A bit hard to tell which is which 🙂  Anyway in Tuva a mountain motor rifle brigade was concluding its exercises. They fielded a BTG against an enemy equipped with drones, EW, and other high end equipment. About 1000 men, 100 pieces of equipment were involved. This seems to be the light brigade in Central MD, based on Tigr vehicles.

                                        Chekessia

                                        Earlier on during the exercise at Totsk range in Orenburg artillery and armor units from Central MD ran live fire exercises with T-72B3 tanks and MLRS systems, about 2000 men and 400 pieces of equipment listed for that one. I hadn’t mentioned it earlier because those units in Orenburg were raised on alert 12th September, before Zapad started (sneaky sneaky) and hence was never part of my coverage. Meanwhile about 1000 men from an air defense units were drilling at Kaputsin Yar, with Tunguska, Buk-M2, Tor-M1 and Strela-10.

                                        tor-my_550

                                        Notable photos:

                                        Russian psychological eval unit torturing soldiers in preparation for exercise (looks like they’re picking out wall paint colors)

                                        physchological preparation

                                        Deputy commander of 3rd MRR 4th Division and his command kit (lots of colors)

                                        here is the tank battalion deputy commander

                                        Baltic Fleet CBRN unit (this looks like fun)

                                        21587290_1983295155246564_9000925600254627069_o

                                        Teenage angst in T-80BV

                                        not having the best day.jpg

                                        Zapad watch – summary of day four

                                        Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                        Phase Two of Zapad is upon us, i.e. the main stage of the exercise. Most of the designated forces have arrived at their ranges, dug in and started exercises. At sea simulated electronic fires took place, but will turn into actual launches in the coming days. Putin is coming on Monday to the live fire exercises in Leningrad Oblast (Luzhsky range outside Luga) so everyone has to look really good at whatever they’re doing tomorrow. Odds are the big show really kicks off when he gets there.

                                        BLUF: Russian ground forces spent the day fighting NATO formations, airborne units, and leveling things with artillery. Logistics units were busily setting up fuel dumps, comm systems, forward command posts and the like. Engineers and sappers worked on demining. The Navy got really busy, sinking NATO submarines in the Baltic and wiping out surface action groups in the Barents, while VKS and combat aviation provided close air support.

                                        Belarus

                                        Borisovsky Training Range (right outside Borisov in Belarus): Latest T-72B3s from 1st Guards Tank Army continued practice at the range, this is likely 6th Separate Tank Brigade and maybe elements of the 4th Kantemirovskaya Division. They wiped out remaining diversionary groups and of course crushed the enemy’s main forces. Other ranges, including Luzhsky, Pravdinsky, and Strugi Krasniye had similar tasks.

                                        T-72B3 + BMPs

                                        The Western MD’s independent MTO brigade (material technical support) setup a fuel dump at Borisovksy supposedly big enough for 120 tanker trucks (600 cubic meters of different fuel types).

                                        If you want to see what real maskirovka looks like when done by professionals, you have to check out the situation around Borisovsky. It’s quite impressive.

                                        BRM-1K recon vehicle (gold medal for camo job)

                                        BRM-1K recon

                                        Forests around the range full of polite looking people

                                        20170915_182631

                                        Waiting for NATO (sorry Veishnoria or whatever)

                                        Osipovichskiy Training Range (outside Asipovichy in Belarus): Russian detachments began taking up defensive positions, while sapper units practiced demining. Seems things are just getting started at this range, but probably will host live fire exercises from airborne and ground units in the coming days.

                                        (hope this photo is right, it’s what the MoD posted but that’s no guarantee of accuracy)

                                        BMDs at Osipovichskiy

                                        Western MD

                                        Luzhsky Training Range (at Luga): MSTA-S artillery and mortar units spent the day in live fire exercises at Luga. These appear to be from the artillery regiment assigned to the Tamanskaya Division (1st Guards Tank Army). Other equipment included MSTA-B and BM-21 Grad.

                                        Judging from the photos the weather was uncooperative.

                                        looks like rain

                                        Motor rifle units are practicing here as well, apparently they engaged and wiped out enemy airborne units after drawing them into a kill zone. In this scenario the NATO airborne units were mounted on high mobility but lightly armored equipment, meanwhile Russian forces consisted of a tank battalion and self-propelled artillery in support. It sounds like Operation Market Garden all over again and Russian forces got to play the role of the Panzer division.

                                        2nd Division practicing fires

                                        UAV units are also training at Luga, supposedly more than 30 systems have been employed for recon and ISR, particularly to provide targeting coordinates for artillery. Apparently aerostats, or unmanned balloons are also being used. Su-25s were overhead as well destroying enemy armored columns with Su-35s providing air cover. Seems mostly unguided rocket and gun fire.

                                        Drones

                                        Combat aviation took out over 20 enemy vehicles, helicopters training include Ka-52 and Mi-28N. Their job was recon and close air support. Same as Su-25s, training only listed unguided weapons – possibly saving money given there are three more days. Su-24s did some bombing runs at a range in Kaliningrad to wipe out enemy command points and other fixed targets.

                                        Some new command and control equipment is being tested out this time at Zapad, including a high bandwidth system (1MB-20GB). There was news early on a few days ago of logistics units setting up this communications system.

                                        VDV Airborne – VDV were busy setting field command posts and communications equipment for encrypted comms. Their range seems to be Strugi Krasniye near Pskov where the 76th is based.

                                        Raining here too

                                        VDV

                                        VKS Aerospace Forces – Ground based air defense and air superiority fighters were busy defending against enemy air strikes. S-400, S-300, Pantsir-S1 were working with radar systems Nebo, Kasta and Podlet, along with command and control system Fundament. Air cover provided by Mig-31, Su-35s, and Su-27 variants. Enemy forces as usual were simulated by Russian forces, including combat aviation. Apparently Tu-22M3 bombers practiced attack runs at low and high altitude. Seems this is taking place by Kaliningrad and likely the range near Luga.

                                        Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Peter the Great (Kirov-class guided missile cruiser) launched anti-ship missiles at an amphibious landing group in the Barents Sea (the actual enemy stand ins were tugs SB-523 and Nikolay Chiker). Targeting support provided by Il-38 from naval aviation and it seems a SSN was also around to finish off the enemy with torpedo attacks. For now strikes are being simulated electronically but supposedly live fire missile strikes are yet to come in the next 3 days.

                                        Two Oscar II SSGNs (Project 949A) ventured out and sunk an enemy surface action group in the Barents Sea. Scouting was first done by a diesel-electric Kilo (877) from the Kola Flotilla together with a Tu-142 long range maritime patrol aircraft. These were simulated fires with live fire exercises still to come, but the setup was interesting.

                                        Kirov

                                        Baltic Fleet – The Baltic Fleet had a good day, seems their Ka-27PL helicopters found and sunk an enemy submarine with depth charges – and then they supported the rest of the fleet in sinking another one. That’s two NATO submarines sunk in a day’s work.

                                        Southern MD – Ashylyk range near Astrakhan is hosting various air defense exercises although it’s unclear if they’re part of Zapad or another multinational event that’s supposed to take place called Combat Commonwealth 2017. Su-34s are also drilling overhead. Combat Commonwealth 2017 began on September 4th, with countries of the CIS including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia. These will feature air defense, aerospace forces and combat aviation.

                                        Eastern MD – PLA Navy ships arrived in Vladivostok in preparation for upcoming naval exercises with the Pacific Fleet which will take place 18-26 September. Phase one will be coastal defense and phase two at sea north of Hokkaido with 11 ships involved altogether.

                                        Notable photos:

                                        BMP-2 (someone went pro at maskirovka olympics)

                                        best maskirovka ever

                                        Artillery fire near Luga

                                        Luga artillery live fire

                                        MSTA-S being camouflaged (really strange looking trees)

                                        ugly trees

                                        T-90M and BMPT are making an appearance at the training range by Luga

                                        T-90M

                                        Zapad watch – summary of day three

                                        Michael Kofman5 Comments

                                        Well the good news is that phase one ended today and we’re all still here. The bad news is that means phase two starts tomorrow. Phase one is best summarized as the defensive component of the exercise. Russian forces spent their time sorting out command and control, deploying forces to theater and forming a regional combat grouping out of the different types of forces under their command, along with planning out strategic operations. I guess phase two is when they’re going to do NATO rotten.

                                        In phase one the VKS spent its time defending key civilian infrastructure, conducting reconnaissance, escorting rebasing long range aviation and taking down enemy cruise missiles in coordination with ground based air defense. Borisovksy and Osipovichesky practice ranges saw lots of action today, where  enemy diversionary groups were successfully taken out.

                                        The results of phase one are in: Russia and Belarus successfully defended against an attack from NATO members and inflicted high costs during the enemy’s advance. Phase Two will involve maneuver warfare and offensive operations to destroy adversary forces, along with a strong focus on logistics. The ranges hosting most of the live fire exercises include Borisovsky in Belarus and Luga in Leningrad Oblast (south of St Petersburg)

                                        BLUF: Russian forces spent their time conducting strikes with fixed wing and rotary aviation, armor and artillery units engaged the enemy, VDV was busy shooting down drones, logistics units and engineers had a lot of work supporting operations, and the Baltic Fleet sortied out to fight.

                                        VKS (Aerospace Forces) – Su-35s escorted Su-34s on strike missions. The Su-34s hit targets at Kingisep practice range, wiping out enemy armored formations and mechanized infantry. Su-24MPs did the recon ahead of the Su-34 strike package (which is odd given there are plenty of drones now to do this type of job). Seems this was an exercise chiefly with dumb unguided bombs, leveraging SVP-24 Gefest system for more accurate bombing with unguided munitions. Other VKS units spent their time dogfighting and striking enemy logistics units. Su-27s and Su-24s stood in for enemy forces. The Russian air superiority team included Su-27s, Su-35s, Su-30SMs and Mig-31s. Their target set ranged from enemy aircraft to cruise missiles.

                                        VDV (Airborne) – Detachments from the three divisions involved in Zapad were busy with air defense against enemy drones, namely the 76th at Pskov. Seems they shot down more than 40 drones with Strela-10M, Igla MANPADS and ZU-23 artillery. Other VDV units focused on command and control, setting up field units with Polet-K and Andromeda-D systems (based on BTR platforms). Supposedly 30 command vehicles were deployed during this phase, setting up comms in the 500-2000km range. VDV detachments from 106th Tula Division tried out new gear for the first time during an exercise, seems BMD-4M and BTR-MDM (Rakushka). No word on what the 98th was doing, but no doubt they’re winning somewhere.

                                        VDV command and control.jpg

                                        Seems another battalion of VDV is getting ready for airdrop, 400 soldiers and 10 vehicles aboard 10 Il-76s are getting ready according to the MoD.

                                        Meanwhile in Belarus

                                        At the Borisovsky range MSTA-S self-propelled artillery took up positions, while armored columns from 1st Tank Guards Army (likely 6th BDE) arrived to shoot things. Most of the action was at Osipovichsky and Borisovsky ranges, where diversionary-reconnaissance groups were being killed all day long. Supposedly the weather is less than amenable, but elements of the 1st Tank Army are at the training ranges as planned. Seems this is the first exercise where the latest variants of T-72B3 tanks are being tried out, presumably this is the upgrade with a better engine and sidescreens.

                                        MSTA-S.jpg

                                        MTO units (material-technical support) were busy setting up repair fields to restore damaged equipment at the live fire ranges in Belarus. Their job is to train in evacuating and repairing damaged tanks and mechanized equipment. The unit in question is the Western MD’s independent MTO brigade. Some of the gear includes KET-L, BTS-4, along with BZEM-K and TPM, along with MTO-UB-2 Ural. The MTO brigade brought mobile repair shops with it, equipped with BAKM 1040 BK cranes.

                                        MTO units.jpg

                                        Russian military police on BTR-82As practiced receiving surrenders of wounded enemy soldiers. NATO diversionary groups had a rough day at several points and had to give up.

                                        surrenders.JPG

                                        Western MD

                                        2nd Tamanskaya Division (1st Guards Tank Army) finally showed itself. It’s artillery regiment was at Luga  firing from MSTA-B towed artillery and BM-21 Grad MLRS. Iskander-M and older Tochka-U missile units were busy simulated electronic fires in Leningrad Oblast, presumably these are missile regiments from Kaliningrad which still has Tochka-U and Leningrad Oblast which was upgraded to Iskanders a long time ago. Their targets were massed enemy armor formations in the 30-100km range. Other artillery and mortar units involved in this live fire exercise employed 2S12 Sani mortars, 2B14 Podnos mortars, and Tornado MLRS.

                                        Engineer-sapper units were supplying drinking water using SKO-10 purifying stations, along with three square meals a day. This is apparently an accomplishment. Others were busy clearing mine fields ahead of the ground forces’ advance.  Meanwhile MTO units in Leningrad Oblast were practiced extraction and repair of damaged armor and mechanized equipment near the Luga firing range. Other duties included your run of the mill setting up field bases, ammo dumps, repair and overhaul facilities. They spent the day repairing T-72B3 tanks, BTR-82A APCs, and BMP-2 IFVs.

                                        Mi-35M, Ka-52, and Mi-8AMTSh helicopters from the combat aviation brigade were also at the Luga training range destroying enemy armor and equipment. S-400, S-300 and Pantsir-S1 systems were deployed to provide air defense in the region.

                                        Mi-35 at luga.jpg

                                        Not much word from other districts, somewhat drowned out by all the inane awards from the Army 2017 games. It seems Russia’s info operation sees Zapad 2017 and the Army games as on par in importance.

                                        Central MD – S-400 units moved out to Ashylyk range in Astrakhan near the border with Kazakhstan.

                                        Central MD S-400.jpg

                                        Baltic Fleet – 11th Army Corps had a lot on their hands in Kaliningrad. Some practiced urban assault and retaking positions held by diversionary groups. The T-72B1 equipped tank battalion rolled out to engage enemy forces supported by artillery detachments with 2S3 Akatsya, BM-21 Grads and towed artillery. The 11th Army Corps has somewhat antiquated equipment but it’s good enough.

                                        The Baltic Fleet’s minesweepers ventured out, including two project 12700 and three older project 10750s, to practice clearing contact and non-contact mines. Four Steregushchiy-class corvettes were busy with air defense drills. Russian Su-24s and Ka-27 helicopters served as simulated enemy targets. The corvettes ran short range live fire exercises and over the horizon drills against enemy coastal defenses that were beyond visual sight. About 20 ships of various classes sortied out from the Baltic Fleet, including the bigger corvettes, missile boats and minesweepers.

                                        Notable photos:

                                        Russia’s MoD started the day off by tweeting ‘good morning’ with this photo

                                        good morning vietnam.jpg

                                        Sappers clearing mines (I don’t know why but spacemen with flyswatters look funny)

                                        Zapad watch – summary of day two

                                        Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                        Day two of Zapad saw Russian forces continue to fight off air attacks and incoming cruise missiles, but logistics units were getting in place to enable force flow into Belarus. As the adage goes, amateurs talk tactics while professionals talk logistics. Day 2 events include:

                                        • engineers setting pontoon bridges
                                        • communications arrays going up to establish a common operating picture
                                        • smokescreens to cover ground movements
                                        • air power coordinated with ground based air defense in covering the ground force
                                        • the Navy practicing ASW, air defense, and counter sabotage
                                        • numerous live fire drills with artillery, armor, air defense and combat aviation

                                        Western MD

                                        Joint drills started in earnest between Russia and Belarus today. Armored and motor rifle battalions engaged in live fire exercises, tactical aviation and bombers flew overhead. A lot of ammo expended into targets at firing ranges. Belarus Air Force helped provide air cover for Russian ground units and armored formations moving into theater, run by a combined staff composed of officers from both countries. Part of the mission included recon flights over enemy formations.

                                        Most of the action right now is at the Luga (south of St Petersburg) range which is seeing lots of artillery fires. From self-propelled and towed artillery to TOS-1A and Grad MLRS, Russia’s artillery units are letting loose. The combat aviation brigade is practicing at the same range, Ka-52s along with other helicopters.

                                        (autobots assemble – activate tree camouflage)

                                        tanks and BREM.jpg

                                        Logistics

                                        Pontoon bridges are going up for armor to roll into Belarus. Engineers and sappers are building trenches, fortifications and setting up the logistics for ground forces to move in. CBRN troops put up an aerosol smokescreen at medium altitude near the Luga training field in an effort to cover troop movements. The screen covered a bridging operation (TMM-3 mechanical bridge) to defend against enemy air attack while forces were on the move.

                                        Comms troops setup a high bandwidth comm systems running around 1000km between Russia and Belarus. This part is particularly interesting, since it reflects how Russia plans to maintain command and control, shield communications, and create a common operating picture of the battlefield. So far the coverage shows systems that go down to the battalion rather than company/squad level.

                                        engineer troops.jpg

                                        VKS – Aerospace Forces

                                        Su-35s fighters escorted Tu-22M3 bombers to their forward airbases and have now arrived in Leningrad Oblast. Western MD’s lead in air power for this exercise seems to be 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army. As mentioned yesterday one Tu-22M3 ran off the runway and crashed.

                                        VDV – VDV units in Rys light armored vehicles conducted recon in force missions around Pskov. The 76th is supposed to deploy in Leningrad Oblast and Kaliningrad later on during this exercise.

                                        VDV on Rys.jpg

                                        Central MD – This district is not only taking part in Zapad but prepping for joint exercises with Uzbekistan in early October. Interestingly air defense units with S-300 are shifting to the far east, Telemba range in Buryatia, to conduct live fire exercises as part of Zapad.

                                        Eastern MD – Air defense units are headlong into live fire drills at Telemba, with 10 combat launches of later generation S-300 systems. Meanwhile Su-34 bombers from Khabarovsk are training in night time operations. Further east the air units based in Kamchatka have been raised on alert, with about 30 planes including Tu-142M3s, Mig-31BMs, and Il-38s conducting sorties.

                                        Puski-550-5.jpg

                                        Southern MD – Marines from the Caspian Flotilla held the line against enemy forces on the coast of Dagestan in time for airborne reinforcements. Not much info coming out of this district so far.

                                        Around the Fleets

                                        Northern Fleet – Units of the 14th Army Corps in Pechenga near Murmansk deployed several battalions from its motor rifle brigades for live fire exercises, defending against land and air attacks. This drill ran the gamut from T-72B3 tanks, artillery, MLRS, and infantry in trenches defending against an attacking ground force. About 1,500 troops were involved with 300 pieces of equipment. Peter the Great (Kirov-class) and Admiral Ushakov (Sovremenny-class) spent their time taking out incoming cruise missiles together with Mig-29K fighters operating from land.

                                        shoot em in the face.JPG

                                        Baltic Fleet – High speed boats and patrol ships worked with PDSS special diver units to battle enemy diversionary forces all day. Some PDSS divers stood in for the enemy, no doubt Navy SEALS, while the rest worked to defend against them. Corvettes were busy with air defense against incoming enemy aircraft.

                                        Pacific Fleet – A project 971 Akula SSN (Kuzbass) and project 667BDR Delta III SSBN (Ryazan) ran a mock torpedo duel. The Delta was looking to handle an attack by an adversary SSN penetrating the SSBN bastion. The Pacific Fleet will also hold drills with China September 26 after Zapad, both in Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk off the coast of Hokkaido. This is the second part of a naval exercise held in the Baltic Sea in July.

                                        On the lighter side

                                        It can’t be all gloom and doom. If you’re busy fighting NATO at the Luga firing range south of St. Petersburg then there’s good news, Russian armed forces setup a 100 person field movie theater to boost morale. I saw a photo of it and now can’t find it to post. And yes, there’s wi-fi so you can selfie every aspect of the exercise. There’s also a store to buy various Army kitsch – not sure what it looks like but probably “I defeated NATO in glorious existential battle for the motherland and all I got was this t-shirt.”

                                        Notable photos:

                                        Gerasimov calling SACEUR. (good photo for a ‘caption this’ contest)

                                        Gerasimov doing Gerasimov things.jpg

                                        CBRN troops totally covered, except the part between his gloves and sleeve. That guy is probably going to die to chemical weapons NATO doesn’t have.

                                        pxb troops

                                         

                                        Zapad watch – summary of day one

                                        Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                        Zapad is here! Well it actually arrived some days ago, as there were an awful lot of command post exercises and live fire drills already in recent weeks. Officially though this is the first day of Russian military armageddon –  so here is a quick and unvarnished roundup of some of the events taking place.

                                        On the 14th Russian armed forces were roused out of bed to fight an advanced conventional adversary with a pretty solid global force at their disposal. Phase one was supposed to be about handling diversionary groupings in Belarus, but suffice it to say things escalated pretty quickly. Day 1 activities include:

                                        • defending against air attack and numerous cruise missile strikes with ground based air defenses and tactical aviation
                                        • airlifting engineers and support crews to forward airfields ahead of aviation
                                        • getting armor loaded at rail hubs for transportation to Belarus
                                        • airdropping VDV units to defend against enemy recon elements
                                        • deploying screens and getting ships underway under incoming enemy fire
                                        • numerous live fire exercises for artillery units, air defense units, and the navy

                                        BLUF: As Russian forces prepared to deploy to the region they got hit with a sizable aerospace attack. Day one was about logistics, defending against a capable air power on different fronts, and engaging lead elements of the enemy force near Belarus.

                                        A word on sourcing: the information comes from official MoD briefings, releases, photos. The analysis is my own, listing what happened and explaining what it means. It is not derived or borrowed from other analysis. Occasionally I also found good photos from blogs of journalists who were physically at the exercise.

                                        VDV – Airborne

                                        The Airborne units involved so far include battalions from Pskov (76th), Tula (106th) and Ivanovo (98th). They were alerted Thursday morning, grabbed gear and fell out to meet airlift. So far maybe 2-3 battalions out of three airborne divisions are engaged. One battalion of 76th Pskov VDV, along with 10 BMD vehicles, had been airdropped into combat near Pskov. They prevented ‘diversionary groups’ from penetrating Russia’s borders in the region. This is supposed to be a vanguard action, taking out enemy recon units, and conducting reconnaissance-in-force. It’s unclear if the baddies are Latvian or Estonian, but supposedly the Russian airborne did a great job sabotaging the advance of their recon elements and reporting on larger formations behind enemy lines. Later on Russian airborne is supposed to deploy to Belarus and perhaps reinforce Kaliningrad as well.

                                        Airborne drop.jpg

                                        VKS – Aerospace Forces

                                        Tactical, combat, and long range aviation in the Western MD is preparing to rebase to forward airbases to participate in Zapad. This will include airfields in Belarus. About 20 flights so far on Il-76MD delivered engineers and support crews to forward air bases ahead of the actual aviation expected to arrive soon. Meanwhile much of the VKS is busy repelling air attacks and cruise missile strikes across Russia. Air defense units around St. Petersburg, most likely in the 6th CAA, were already conducting live fire drills to defend against an aerospace attack. Systems involved include S-400, S-300, and Pantsir-S1 short range air defense. Air defense units around Moscow were similarly engaged to repel air strikes and cruise missiles. This thing escalated rather quickly it seems. Russian radar crews practiced against enemy aircraft simulated by a range of Russian platforms, including: Su-34, Su-35, Tu-134, An-26, Mi-8 and Ka-52 helicopters.

                                        One Tu-22M3 was already lost in a crash in Kaluga Oblast near Belarus. They were clearly shifting long range aviation from Irkutsk, an airbase named Belaya to ‘forward base’ Shaikovka by Belarus and something went wrong upon landing. Photo at the end.

                                        A lot of stuff coming at VKS all day

                                        Pantsir.jpg

                                        Navy

                                        Some of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface combatants, including the nuclear powered missile cruiser Peter the Great and a Sovremenny destroyer (Admiral Ushakov), put to sea to escape incoming strikes. Several missile boats and minesweepers deployed to Kola Bay to fight diversionary groups. Russian ships used aerosol sprays to hide key naval facilities, although more than likely this was practice to cover the preparation and departure of other ships from satellites. Supposedly 20 or so surface combatants will take place in this week’s maneuvers, including up to 10 submarines and 20 support vessels. One task force of ships departed for the New Siberian Islands. Overall the Northern Fleet’s drills will involve approximately 5,000 personnel.

                                        The Baltic Fleet was in some serious danger, defending against an enemy who was conducting cruise missile strikes at a rate of seven hits per minute (this seems oddly slow actually). In defense of their comrades at sea the tiny naval aviation component launched Su-27s to shoot down incoming missiles and aircraft. Meanwhile S-300s and S-400s were providing long range air defense. The navy was also practicing air defense and simulating fires electronically. Russian Su-34s stood in for adversary aviation, and the exercise conditions were based around electronic jamming degrading the effectiveness of Russian air defense units.

                                        Army

                                        Elements of 1st Tank Guards Army began their march towards firing ranges in Belarus. The 6th Independent Tank Brigade, expected to participate in this exercise, was raised on alert and moved to a rail hub for loading. No official word on other regiments but elements of 2nd and 4th divisions are definitely expected to participate in this event. Once they’re moved by rail to Belarus the brigade’s first job is to arrive at a designated staging area and group with other regional forces into a task force.

                                        Other Military Districts

                                        Eastern MD – taking off from Khabarovsk Su-35s destroyed an enemy field camp and supplies. Not sure where this camp and supplies were, but this thing escalated horizontally pretty fast. As part of the operation they practiced evading enemy air defenses at different altitudes. An Iskander unit moved out to conduct live fire exercises at the Kaputsin Yar firing range. The day before artillery units were already in live fire training with self-propelled artillery (2s1 and 2s3) along with Tornado-G MLRS. VKS units are practicing with S-300 at a firing range in Telemba, jointly with Su-30SM fighters from Khabarovsk.

                                        Gvozdika firing line.jpg

                                        Central MD – More than 500 soldiers from special designation units, including Spetsnaz were raised on alert in Samara and moved out to hold exercises near Novaya Binardka. This particular set of drills will be observed by officers from Uzbekistan’s general staff. The day before it seems Caspian Flotilla marines were practicing at firing ranges in Dagestan. Their task is chiefly interdiction of enemy marine forces landing from the Caspian.

                                        CMD Spetz.jpg

                                        Southern MD – there was a large command post exercise on the 12th and several live fire exercises by ships of the BSF on September 7th. Not much news coming out of Southern MD but it will undoubtedly get more active. Some info coming out of Ukraine about bridging equipment being moved about in DNR/LNR territory – hard to nail down details though.

                                        Meanwhile in Syria

                                        Two project 636.3 Kilos fired Kalibr land attack cruise missiles into Syria. Combat firing at fixed targets in Syria seems to be the standard induction procedure for new Kilos arriving for service in the BSF. More surface combatants decamped from Sevastopol, heading to join the squadron in the Eastern Med.

                                        Notable photos:

                                        This guy doesn’t look like he’s having fun yet. (76th airdrop near Pskov)

                                        BMD drop.jpg

                                        These guys had too much fun already. (Tu-22M3 bomber in lawndart configuration)

                                        Tu-22M3.jpg

                                        Comments and corrections are welcome. This is meant to be a rough summary of some of the activities taking place.

                                         

                                         

                                        WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU’RE EXPECTING ZAPAD 2017

                                        Michael Kofman5 Comments

                                        My latest article on the upcoming Zapad 2017 exercise on War on the Rocks

                                        Don’t be surprised if in the coming days you increasingly hear the word Zapad echoing across media outlets and the blogosphere as though it were a category five hurricane, or an apocalyptic event approaching. Zapad, meaning “West” in Russian, is the Russian military’s annual strategic exercise, scheduled to commence on Sept. 14. Such capstone training events have been held on a quadrennial rotation since 1999 between four strategic directions, including Vostok (Eastern), Tsentr (Central), and Kavkaz (Caucasus). As anticipated, Zapad 2017 will take place in the Baltic region, held jointly with Belarus, and led by forces based in Russia’s Western Military District.

                                        The ongoing confrontation between Russia and the United States, together with the exercise’s geographical focus, makes this a particularly significant event. Large-scale Russian exercises have always imparted a sense of foreboding, yet the reaction to Zapad 2017 is especially sensational this year. The Center for European Policy Analysis has even created a dedicated website with a countdown clock as though awaiting doomsday. Ahead of Zapad rolls a strong wave of anxiety among NATO members, senior officials, and the Russia-watcher community. Such exercises call for vigilance and caution, but panic is unwarranted.

                                        Ironically, much as the leaders of NATO members dislike Russia’s deployment of forces along their borders, the exercise should be treated as an opportunity. Zapad 2017 is happening whether NATO likes it or not, and Russia will keep holding this exercise every four years, just as the Soviet Union had a penchant for running major exercises in the fall. In truth, Western observers are bound to learn much from this event about Russia’s ability to deploy combat formations to the region, the current state of Russia’s armed forces, and how Moscow intends to leverage military power to shape Western decision-making in the event of a crisis. The conduct of the exercise may even help validate, or invalidate, some of the current thinking in NATO on how to deter Russia.

                                        Ultimately the exercise is a test of what  Russia calls  “strategic deterrence,” an integration of military, non-military, and nuclear capabilities to shape adversary decision-making from crisis to actual conflict. Although small countries are naturally anxious when large neighbors flex their muscles, in reality this entire affair is about Moscow establishing coercive credibility with Washington, and in that respect it is quite effective. Zapad is part of one long conversation on deterrence and compellence facilitated by the Russian General Staff.

                                        Read more on the site.

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                                        Tag: Eastern MD

                                        Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

                                        Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                        Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

                                        Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

                                        This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

                                        Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

                                        time to go home.jpg

                                        Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

                                        VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

                                        Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

                                        Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

                                        exercise table

                                         

                                        Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

                                        Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

                                        Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

                                        BTR-82As.jpg

                                        Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

                                        Egvekinot.JPG

                                        naval infantry 2.JPG

                                        Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

                                        Chebarkul and Chukotka – a tale of two new divisions

                                        Michael Kofman5 Comments

                                        In a previous post I had not discussed that alongside the three announced divisions around Ukraine, Russia’s General Staff also planned a fourth in Chelyabinsk oblast.  This division has at times been announced as part of “Russia’s response to NATO” though its location naturally tells us otherwise given it is right across the border from Kazakhstan.  First news of it came in late January 2016. Adding to the spread of divisions is the recent announcement on August 23rd from a Ministry of Defense meeting that there is another division in the works for 2018.  A press report from the recently held meeting revealed that the General Staff intends to form a coastal defense division on Chukotka.

                                        I’ve compiled the history and background of these changes from a few news announcements, including posts from colleagues and other blogs on the subject, such as bmpd, eagle_rost, and one of the better takes out there written by Aleksei Ramm on Defence.ru

                                        7th Armor Brigade’s T-72B tanks

                                        2803756_original.jpg

                                        The 7th Independent Armor Brigade in Chebarkul (Chelyabinsk oblast) will be converted into a division – this unit is part of the Central Military District. This brigade is one of the two remnants of the 15th Tank Division, which was moved back to Russia form Czechoslovakia in 1991.  Later in 2004 the division was disbanded, leaving two regiments that would become the core of a new division, the 34th, headquartered in Ekaterinburg.  During the 2009 reforms, which led to the consolidation, displacement or disbanding of numerous units across Russia, all divisions were turned into brigades.  Hence the 34th was broken into two brigades, the 28th Motor Rifle which stayed in Ekaterinburg, and the 7th Armor in Chebarkul.  The region hosts a sprawling military base not far from the border with Kazakhstan.

                                        The division’s structure will include the following elements: 1 motor rifle regiment, 1 self-propelled artillery regiment, 1 air defense ‘division’, a reconnaissance and an engineering battalion, along with several supporting units of smaller size.  It was not officially stated, but we should venture an assumption that the tanks of the 7th will be included in a tank regiment as part of the new division.  Suffice it to say, this does not match a six regiment Soviet division, though it looks close to the 2nd or 4th half divisions which also have two regiments.  In Aleksei Ramm’s view, because this unit only has one motor rifle regiment and an air defense ‘division’ in place of a full regiment, it is simply an expanded combined arms brigade.  It’s chief accomplishment is a larger staff and a substantially larger artillery compliment than a normal brigade would have.  There is no timetable for completing this unit formation, but I suspect late 2017 is a good date to go by given the timetable for the other divisions announced.

                                        A recap of why Russia is recreating divisions: The concept is to have an organization with the staff and logistics base that would allow brigades to send tactical battalion groups to the front, making the division a  management rung  below that of the combined arms army, i.e. Military District -> Combined Arms Army -> Division HQ-> regiment or battalion tactical group.  Brigades are too small to take in battalions from other brigades and command or support them.  Hence divisions may prove the most useful tell of where the Russian military expects the need for task organized formations.  Russia’s force structure remains in an experimental state, absorbing the experiences of the last two years, but its becoming clear that brigades remain the force generating component while divisions are the task organizing command and support structure for expected contingencies.

                                        Turning to the far east – a new division on Chukotka is a bit of a surprise since it is about as remote piece of real estate for a base as one can find in Russia.  This will not be a combined arms division, but likely a coastal defense unit integrating various missile fires and artillery units under one command.  The principal motivation was the decision back in July 2015 to create a unified coastal defense system from Primorye to the Arctic.  It’s objective is to effect “sea control” (or in reality sea denial) over the littorals by Kuril Islands, the Bering Strait, and defend Russia’s ballistic missile submarines stationed in the Pacific Fleet.  Of note, two of Russia’s new Borei-class SSBNs have arrived to start replacing the rather ancient Delta IIIs stationed there.

                                        Abandoned military base at Gydim.  Photo from basov chukoka.

                                        2-4

                                        According to the announcement the Pacific fleet had conducted a survey from April to June of this year of two Kuril islands for suitability to host garrisons, namely Matua and Paramushir.  It’s unclear how that statement connects to the formation of the division in Chukotka, except that it will likely extend coastal defense from the Kurils all the way to the Bering Strait.  Russia has already invested heavily in reinforcing the A2/AD systems on the Kuril Islands since that chain forms the outer boundary of the SSBN bastion in the Pacific.

                                        Another photo of abandoned ‘Gydim’ an unofficial name of the military town by Anadyr where once nuclear warheads were stored, presumably in summer time, when it is more ‘cheerful’ (my implication is not that Gydim will be reactivated, or Anadyr will once more help host the division, but simply to speak to the efficacy of establishing bases in these remote regions).  Photo from Alexander Belenkiy’s blog.

                                        LR2014.06-RUS.87-Gudym-31.jpg

                                        Some history offered by bmpd blog on Russian military presence in Chukotka: under Stalin in 1947-53 Chukotka hosted the 14th Army, but this unit was disbanded promptly after his death.  Subsequently in the 1980s the 99th motor rifle division was based here, although it was only manned at cadre levels.  That unit was eventually disbanded in 1994.  A Russian military base in Gydim has become a ghost town, like many other Soviet towns and bases sprawling across the country’s less inhabitable regions.  It is an attraction for photo adventurers who are drawn to abandoned buildings and Soviet military infrastructure.  Photos of what was left of Russian military presence on Chukotka are illustrative of how expensive, and arguably wasteful, establishing a sizable contingent there would be.

                                        Although it may have a stronger rationale than the string of bases in the Arctic, this plan seems to entail burying substantial money into the snow.  Those stationed on Chukotka will be able to reflect positively only on the fact that they were not stationed on Novaya Zemlya.  More than likely this new coastal defense division will also be presented as ‘Russia’s answer to NATO’ and in Western press be characterized as militarization of the Far East.  In reality it will further integrate various artillery and missile units in the region, and perhaps extend the A2/AD layer north of the Kuril island chain towards the Bering strait.

                                        Recommended: Aleksei Ramm’s piece here, BMPD piece on the division in Chebarkul and Chukotka,  also eagle rost. Russian defense policy is always a good read.

                                         

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                                        #####EOF##### Making Your E-Commerce Website More Mobile-Responsive
                                        Go Own Your Passion. Boost Your Business.

                                        Making Your E-Commerce Website More Mobile-Responsive

                                        Now that your e-commerce website is up and running, you’ll want to make every effort to optimize the experience for the growing number of customers who will find you via mobile. Global mobile data traffic is projected to increase nearly sevenfold by 2021, and much of that is dedicated to shopping.

                                        A responsively designed website that’s optimized for sales success can significantly impact your bottom line. Let’s take a closer look at how you reap those benefits.

                                        What is a “mobile-responsive experience”?

                                        While “mobile-friendly” approaches include keeping image sizes down or maximizing page load speeds —remember, 53 percent of mobile shoppers will abandon a website if it doesn’t load in just three seconds — a mobile-responsive design alters the website’s look according to the device being used to view it.

                                        As your website adjusts to the screen size, certain things become more prominent. The call-to-action buttons — such as “buy now” or “sign up” — stand out, design is more minimalist, and headlines and copy are treated differently.

                                        Google has been prioritizing mobile-responsive sites in search results since 2015, so if you’re not mobile-responsive, your customers may struggle to find you.

                                        How to optimize an e-commerce website for mobile

                                        1. Test the mobile checkout process

                                        Got an online store? Get friends and family to go through the journey to purchase and give feedback. The most frustrating things in a mobile checkout process include requiring registration and an unclear process for amending the basket, so keep that in mind when testing. Remember to test out the process on several different devices, too.

                                        2. Top navigation is your friend

                                        What works beautifully on a desktop doesn’t necessarily translate well on mobile, including your navigation. The “hamburger menu” (those three lines at the top that expand to the full menu) is designed to maximize the screen and simplify the user journey.

                                        Mobile homepage and menu

                                        3. Don’t forget the searching and browsing experience

                                        Best practice for user experience in mobile e-commerce is to give the user two avenues to purchase: search or browse.

                                        Eco-friendly cup-maker Joco makes the browsing experience vibrant, adding images of their products into that mobile menu.

                                        Joco cups mobile homepage and menu

                                        The Jack Rudy Cocktail Co. does something similar, but it takes the visual one step further by adding on-brand pencil drawings. You can still scroll through the actual product images, if you’d prefer.

                                        Jack Rudy Cocktail Company mobile shop page

                                        4. Bring users to your mobile group

                                        Not everyone is ready to buy when they land on your e-commerce mobile website; the trick is to keep them on the hook while they mull over the purchase. Mobile groups are emerging as one way to keep in contact.

                                        Add click-to-text to your business website or online store using a plugin like WP SMS, and ask users to join your mobile group, offering incentives like discounts. Many customers won’t pick up the phone but will happily text questions.

                                        How a mobile e-commerce website can boost sales

                                        Making your e-commerce site more friendly to mobile users doesn’t need to be difficult — and it can improve sales. WordPress.com makes it possible to optimize your e-commerce mobile website and ensure it’s responsive to your users’ needs. There are several options for selling things online using your site — from a simple payments button to a fully functioning e-commerce platform using WooCommerce — all tailored to both your store’s needs and the needs of your potential customers.

                                        With a little care and attention, you’ll have your customers buying in no time.


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                                        #####EOF##### Gender Balance is a Business Issue — The WordPress.com Blog

                                        Photo by Dennis Magati from Pexels

                                        Gender Balance is a Business Issue

                                        On gender balance, diversity, and inclusion at Automattic.

                                        March 8, 2019

                                        Deborah Beckett

                                        Today is International Women’s Day! We’d like to celebrate it by highlighting gender balance and how important it is to us here at Automattic. While gender balance in itself is definitely something worth pursuing for ethical reasons, we also strongly believe that it makes good business sense.

                                        As our CEO Matt Mullenweg said in his recent TED talk, we believe that talent and intelligence are equally distributed throughout the world, but that opportunity is not. As a distributed company with 850+ people in over 69 countries, we’ve seen that the world is pretty big, and that talent and intelligence are definitely not limited by geography, race, gender, or sexual orientation.

                                        Being a distributed company gives us the opportunity to hire talented people like Valentina, a team lead in Spain who uses smart scheduling to have a high impact with her team at work and with her family at home. If we had a more traditional work setup requiring staff to come into brick and mortar offices every day, we would likely miss out on valuable contributions from people like Val.

                                        Another great example of diversity making better business sense for us is Khyati, a Happiness Engineer in Mumbai, India. If we only hired in the US, we would not have the benefit of Khyati’s understanding of the needs of users in her part of the world, and we would also need to require overnight shifts from staff in North America to support those same users.

                                        While the benefits of a distributed workforce are clear, the path to getting there is less so. Most traditional recruiting methods like job boards, career fairs, and recruiting agencies are focused on specific locations. How do you get the word out that you’re looking to hire… all over the world?

                                        Recruiting additional support staff to work with our customers in the Asia-Pacific region has been a high priority for several years. This has led us to holding events in person in select cities and advertising on regional job boards like Seek in Australia and Jobstreet in the Philippines. We were surprised to find that as we increased our recruiting, the rate of applications from women in the region was actually dropping over time. It’s not that fewer women were applying overall, but as awareness of the position grew, many more men than women were learning about the job and submitting applications.

                                        We realized that if we wanted to hire staff with a gender balance that reflects our customers, we’d need to actively reach out to women in this region. We did this though Workshops for Women that we held in person over 2018 in India and Singapore. For 2019 we decided to go virtual and offer an online course for women in the region to level up in their WordPress troubleshooting and customer support skills. In partnership with Support Driven, Automattic offered a six-week course on user support. We enrolled 24 women in our pilot version of the course, which just finished its initial run.

                                        Automattic is committed to diversity and inclusion in our approach to gender balance. This tweet sums up why both are important:

                                        Why isn’t recruiting for diversity enough? What does inclusion even mean?

                                        The typical entrepreneur is a white male in his 30s from a wealthy background, according to entrepreneur.com. As small companies grow, founders are likely to build their teams by recruiting from their personal networks. These networks usually consist of people with similar backgrounds to the founders. Having the longest tenure, these same initial hires are the people who take on leadership roles and make decisions about product development, company culture, and who else to hire. The result is that even when companies genuinely want to attract diverse talent, the company’s top leadership has already been established from a group of very similar people. The true benefits of a diverse workforce can’t be achieved without the contributions of diverse staff at every level.

                                        It’s clear then that hiring is only part of the D&I picture. While we’re always working on recruiting a workforce that reflects the diversity of our global user base, we are also keen on creating equal opportunities for career advancement internally. As a part of these efforts, we took inspiration from Laura Hogan’s fantastic post on sponsorship, and recently set up an internal sponsorship program that matched senior female Happiness Engineers from across the division, with junior counterparts in Asia. As our hiring efforts in Asia only scaled up in the last few years, many of our colleagues there do not have women in their immediate leadership.

                                        This sponsorship program gives less-tenured women frequent access to women in leadership and other senior positions within our Happiness division, so they can see first-hand what it’s like being a leader. This sponsorship program aligns with our belief that representation matters — if you see someone like you in a position of leadership, you are more likely to feel empowered to work towards that same position yourself.

                                        We are indeed entering an exciting period of history where the world expects balance, and as one of the largest distributed companies around, we are proud to be leading the way in creating the workplace of tomorrow, a workplace that is better balanced by default. We’re always looking for more great people to join our team. Check out all of our open positions here!

                                        Missing out on the latest WordPress.com developments? Enter your email below to receive future announcements direct to your inbox. An email confirmation will be sent before you will start receiving notifications - please check your spam folder if you don't receive this.

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                                        11 Comments

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                                        1. JanBeek Mar 8th at 8:03 pm

                                          I believe this statement is particularly true, “ if you see someone like you in a position of leadership, you are more likely to feel empowered to work towards that same position yourself.” I know it was true in my case when in 1965 I was interested in moving from teacher to principal in my school district, but there wasn’t a female school principal in my knowledge base. Even as I applied for a teacher position in 1962, I was asked by the superintendent, “Why do you want a job? You have a husband. Why don’t you stay home and start your family?” We have come a long way since then, but we have a long way to go. Thank God for companies like yours that work for gender equality and seek out talented, capable people in all walks of life. I appreciate your efforts. Bless you! 👌🏽👍🏽

                                          Liked by 17 people

                                          • chineloanikpeogechukwugmailcom Mar 11th at 9:09 pm

                                            Jan you’re absolutely right. I really still don’t understand why anyone would think women should stay home and “start a family”. For goodness sake a family can’t be started with just one person, otherwise what’s the essence of two people coming together? A man equally should join hands in “starting the family” and women on the other hand can join hands in providing for family. Sometimes it isn’t just work for survival for us, sometimes it is passion, talent, true dreams that needs to come true.
                                            I love that you said things are changing for the right, I hope this generation can make it even better.

                                            Liked by 6 people

                                        2. ozwisdom Mar 8th at 10:03 pm

                                          I use my WordPress blog to promote hope and strong women, strictly a labor of love and not for profit. The more we support them, the more the world will heal. Thanks for giving your support.

                                          Liked by 15 people

                                        3. thoughtsnlifeblog Mar 8th at 10:11 pm

                                          Interesting i had no clue of the D&I initiative, and diverse work model, i happy to know this especially being. A wordpress customer and a women. Thank you for sharing.

                                          Liked by 13 people

                                        4. Nomadic Sunflower Mar 9th at 1:03 pm

                                          This is pretty amazing and very empowering. I had no idea that there was a company out there that does this. Indeed, seeing someone similar to your background (in many different ways) does give you hope to obtain a position that you might not otherwise think you would ever have the opportunity to participate in. Well done!!

                                          Liked by 11 people

                                        5. Kristie Konsoer Mar 9th at 6:16 pm

                                          I think it’s a true statement from @mialoira that diversity leaves when inclusion isn’t done effectively. It goes far back to early education. As a former educator, our classrooms are as diverse as ever. I believe diversity makes us stronger. However, many of our children do not feel included. Conversations of equity in learning are leading to actions that can provide not only more equitable gender balance in businesses, but a more equitable balance in diversity at work as well.

                                          Liked by 7 people

                                        6. stelorafedie101blog Mar 10th at 9:51 am

                                          Diversity is really astounding. We have an innate talents to show to the world and help build up a better organization/ community. Thank you for sharing!

                                          Like

                                        7. maddiecook0002 Mar 11th at 2:57 am

                                          This is such a great post. I agree that diversity is nothing without inclusion and it is great to see businesses spearheading this message! This is an awesome sponsorship program that is empowering and a step in the right direction for equality!

                                          Liked by 3 people

                                        8. mogsya Mar 11th at 9:01 am

                                          Hi. Having just read through your post I also didn´t realise you existed. It´s a good job you do as even today your type of organisation needs to exist. I left school in 1969. Prior to leaving at a jobs/careers talk I was asked what I wanted to do. I replied I wanted to be an architect. I didn´t know any female architects and both the careers adviser and my head of school (an all girls school) persuaded me that women didn´t become architects. I believed them. I finally got as near my dream job as I could when I was 40 yrs old. I worked for the local govt planning office and helped people to get their plans put through the council system. Only one of the senior planners was a woman with more of a younger age. I wished I was more self believing back then but I learned that sometimes you have to be more positive in life. It just took me a long time to appreciate this. Thank you for sharing you post and I truly hope that you can inspire the young women of today. Best wishes to you.

                                          Liked by 2 people

                                        9. jenaenichols Mar 12th at 2:21 am

                                          I absolutely loved this post! I agree that diversity and inclusion should go hand-in-hand with one another. Your insight that companies should branch further than the network they are in is spot on. Thank you for an inspiring read.

                                          Liked by 2 people

                                        10. Khanak Mar 15th at 5:47 pm

                                          This is a wonderful read! Diversity and inclusion NEED to mix, and I love the initiative you took to set up the internal sponsorship program. A little act like this can make a huge impact in the workplace!

                                          Liked by 2 people

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                                          #####EOF##### Pentlaya
                                          search previous next tag category expand menu location phone mail time cart zoom edit close #####EOF##### Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17) – Russia Military Analysis

                                          Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

                                          Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                          Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

                                          Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

                                          This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

                                          Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

                                          time to go home.jpg

                                          Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

                                          VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

                                          Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

                                          Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

                                          exercise table

                                           

                                          Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

                                          Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

                                          Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

                                          BTR-82As.jpg

                                          Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

                                          Egvekinot.JPG

                                          naval infantry 2.JPG

                                          Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

                                          2 thoughts on “Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)”

                                          1. This is my first time reading. I see that you work for CNA. I used to work at CNA in the Chicago office. I am intrigued to know how a scientific research guy working for a huge Reinsurance Co comes to know specifics about Russian Military. You have a follower. Please let me know more about you.

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                                            #####EOF##### Al-Shayrat – Russia Military Analysis

                                            Tag: Al-Shayrat

                                            U.S. Cruise Missile Strikes in Syria – Brief Analysis

                                            Michael Kofman13 Comments

                                            I’m going to skip the policy analysis and work on the facts of this strike and the Russian response. The al-Shayrat airbase was chosen because according to U.S. sources on April 4th a Syrian Su-22 deployed some kind of munition with chemical weapons.  On April 6th two U.S. destroyers fired 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the base, although technically it was 61 since one failed to launch and had to be replaced, while another missile ditched into the sea (60 planned – 1 launch fail, + 1 replacement, -1 malfunction resulting in sudden conversion into torpedo). The official story is that 59 hit targets.

                                            What did the missiles hit? This base hosted two squadrons of Su-22M3/M4 bombers and one squadron of Mig-23ML/MLD fighters. For those who don’t know, these are legacy aircraft from the Soviet Union, long retired in Russia. If memory serves Su-22s were taken out of service in the Russian air force back in 1998, but are still flying in Poland.  These squadrons were distributed in three different parts of the airbase, and it looks like the missiles hit two out of three sectors. As a consequence they got 5 Su-22M3s, 1 Su-22M4, and 3 Mig-23ML fighters for a total of 9 aircraft destroyed (Pentagon claimed 20, but so far we can only count 9, then subsequently in a recent press release the Pentagon changed the story to 20% of Syrian air power destroyed.) The squadron of Su-22s located in the northwest of the base seems largely untouched, which is why one of the planes was shown on video launching from the base within the same day.

                                            Photo of Syrian Air Base with markings for the three squadrons (found on BMPD)

                                            Additionally the missiles took out a SA-6 radar site (Kub), some ground equipment, and what was first described as a M-600 missile launcher (Iranian produced SRBM). Bunkers, fuel, ammunition and general stores were also hit. Although there were early rumors on twitter suggesting that there were visible containers of chemical weapons, these proved to be nonsense, and were actually generic containers for cluster munitions and other types of ordnance (twitter experts best experts). The runway was left untouched since it is quite long, simple to repair, and plugging cruise missiles into runways is not the most efficient use of the weapon.

                                            What wasn’t there? Su-24Ms that Russia had recently handed over to Syria, which are much more capable than the aging Su-22 bombers, and actual Russian aircraft. Back in April 2016 this base was being used as a forward operating strip for Russian attack helicopters during an earlier phase in the campaign. Supposedly some Russian personnel were at this facility, but that story increasingly sounds like a guesstimate.

                                            Destroyed Mig-23ML

                                            Russian air defense

                                            The short answer is that their air defenses were meant to defend Russian forces, not Syrian assets, and probably not armed to take on a 60 cruise missile salvo anyway. The primary Russian fear was that a country like Turkey or someone else might hit concentrated Russian assets in Latakia. From their positions these air defenses probably had little to no chance of hitting cruise missiles meant for a different airbase, and the U.S. likely routed the strike package in such a way so as to make it impossible.

                                            There is an often spotted S-400 system at Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia, together with Pantsir-S1 short range air defense and medium range point defense Buk systems (not many photos of the Buk but supposedly its there). The common depiction of the S-400s capabilities is also pretty inaccurate.  For one, it does not have a 400km range missile (the 40N6). That long range missile has never been seen in operation, nor a new canister for it, which suggests it’s still not ready for prime time. So the actual maximum range is 250km, which still makes it a great system, but cuts down on the imaginary 400km firing ring. Furthermore the system is at the airbase, and there is a mountain range running north to south just east of Latakia, so naturally the radar is going to have a hard time seeing most of eastern Syria – and the Russians have admitted as much in their own press.

                                            S-400 at al-Hmeimim Airbase

                                            Last year Russia deployed a S-300v4 to Tartus (often confused for S-300VM or Antey-2500). This system is designed for intercepting missiles and large aircraft at long ranges. Unlike the S-400, which does not have a 400km range missile, this one actually does though it’s not designed for cruise missile interception. However, unlike the S-400 which is regularly seen in pictures and satellite imagery, the S-300v4 remains elusive, either because nobody is looking at Tartus or because it’s moving about.  Either way it was doubtfully well placed to do anything about this strike.

                                            In either case, these systems and their attending short range brethren might do well if cruise missiles were fired at them or close to them, but not at some other facility, especially if they hug the ground and use terrain masking. It’s possible Russian electronic warfare systems might have affected the guidance system, but these would have to have powerful ranges and why give away many of the system’s technical capabilities on behalf of the Syrians? Hence Russian air defenses, despite being painted as a giant red circle in news coverage are actually quite limited in what they can do against cruise missiles fired from an unknown point, headed on an unknown trajectory and towards a target they’re not intended to defend.

                                            Update: posted flight path of cruise missile strike from Russia’s Izvestia – not vouching at all for veracity, but good map showing how the strike package may have been directed specifically away from air defenses. I would not use this as a hard source on the flight path.

                                            No automatic alt text available.

                                            Closing out with a Fateh-110/M600 missile launcher at the airbase that’s seen better days. There is some debate on whether its really a Pantsir-S1. Syrian mod Fateh looks very similar in chassis to the Pantsir-S1, but on Pantsir jacks are behind 2nd wheels set whereas Fateh 1st, and the destroyed vehicle’s jacks are clearly behind the first axle.

                                            C84KgDBWsAE0rYj

                                            Thanks to coverage from diana_mihailova and BMPD blogs, also easiest place to get access to damage photos.

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                                            #####EOF##### WordPress.com Apps - Desktop Apps

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                                            #####EOF##### ST's Profile | WordPress.com Forums

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                                            #####EOF##### Krista Stevens | Discover
                                            Krista Stevens
                                            I'm a runner, reader, writer, and editor.
                                            Filter

                                            1. “In a real way, the trauma wiped the slate clean for me mentally. And that’s when I started the process of teaching myself to take myself seriously. By extension, I could start to take other black women seriously.” –Dr. Tressie McMillan Cottom
                                              Interviews
                                              Guernica
                                              by Roxane Gay
                                            2. Photography
                                              Andrew Boyle
                                              Just Another Photo Blog
                                              by Andrew Boyle
                                            3. Matthew Bremner: Journalist

                                              From Vice to Men’s Journal and more, read the work of Scottish journalist Matthew Bremner at his personal site.
                                              Journalism
                                            4. Getting the Most out of our Business Concierge Service

                                              Learn how to get the most out of one-to-one support at your Business Concierge sessions.
                                              Education
                                              Photo by Christina Morillo from Pexels.
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                                            5. Book sniffing note: Slanguage, by Bernard Share

                                              At Sesquiotica, James Harbeck revels in the memories of the scents of his books: “The way books smell matters.”
                                              Books
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                                              by James Harbeck
                                            6. As we grow old

                                              A beautiful poem on aging and and wisdom by Senator Murray Sinclair, former chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: As we grow old / the ground we walk on / rises up / so that, / as each of those few moments / left to us / pass by…
                                              Poetry
                                              Mizana Gheezhik (Sen. Murray Sinclair)
                                              by Senator Murray Sinclair
                                            7. Art
                                              BUMBLING TOURIST
                                              by hollyGS
                                            8. The Ugly History of Beautiful Things: Pearls

                                              Born from irritation and intrusion, luminous and complex, surprisingly durable: pearls are rich with symbolism and saturated with pain.
                                              Essay
                                              Illustration by Jacob Stead
                                              Longreads
                                              by Katy Kelleher
                                            9. No Tokens

                                              “No Tokens is a journal celebrating work that is felt in the spine.” Run entirely by women and non-binary individuals, No Tokens is dedicated to featuring the words and artwork of all voices of the past, present, and future.
                                              Writing
                                            10. The Screaming Hairy Armadillo of Yore

                                              TwilightBeasts digs into the evolution of armadillos, revealing the existence of the pink fairy armadillo, the screaming hairy armadillo, as well as a species so large it used huge claws to create burrows in rock. Yes, rock.
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                                            11. Acts of Faith

                                              If I am lost in the blowing grasses, / If I wander from the path, / I am in your hands, time. / And in them there is a stillness, / Where light become animate, / And tactile, / Like little lost pieces of a former self.
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                                            12. Celebrating International Women’s Day: Stories By Fantastic Women

                                              These five excellent reads deserve your attention.

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                                            13. National Pie Week: Pie-Off in Special Collections

                                              In celebration of National Pie Week, the staff of Special Collections at the University of St Andrews used recipes from antique cookbooks to make sweet and savory pies for a potluck pie-off.
                                              Cooking
                                              Recipe for Venison Pasty from the Edwards family cookbook (c. 1800)
                                              Echoes from the Vault
                                              by St Andrews Special Collections
                                            14. I’ve been thinking

                                              Teri Carter recalls her grandmother’s disfigurement and Otto Warmbier’s death as she considers those who abuse their power and the true meaning of liberty.
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                                              by Teri Carter
                                            15. Back Home

                                              “My body / is my home, / but I shuttered it / awhile back, / and I’ve hovered nearby / like a tangled kite, / a drunken bird.”
                                              Poetry
                                              VAGABOND CITY
                                              by Julia Travers
                                            #####EOF##### Sea of Azov – Russia Military Analysis

                                            Tag: Sea of Azov

                                            The Kerch strait naval skirmish

                                            Michael Kofman7 Comments

                                            After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

                                            On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

                                            Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

                                            towing command ship

                                            On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

                                            One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

                                            Don ramming.jpg

                                            Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

                                            Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

                                            original

                                            Another shot

                                            Izumrud

                                            Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

                                            blocked strait.jpg

                                            After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

                                            Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

                                            damaged Berdyansk.jpg

                                            Ships parked at Kerch

                                            parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

                                            Some thoughts –

                                            The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

                                            Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

                                            That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

                                            Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

                                            12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

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                                            #####EOF##### Joe Goodings – 44CON

                                            Joe Goodings

                                            default
                                            Joe Goodings is a professional problem solver in information, process, and communications areas as relates to ICT.
                                            He started using technology at an early age as a hobby and has now made a career out of it.Highlights have included analysing and programming software for the British legal system; running some of the first courses on ‘what is the internet and what can it do’ for a further education college; and setting up some of the first internet connections and implementing its use; sending pictures from a camera 1 mile via pre 802.11b wifi connection; introducing SAN storage and virtualization to an NGO, and all the time keeping all the systems and the people safe and secure.

                                            Over the last 17 years he has been using technology to further the aims of the third sector and sharing his experiences wherever possible.

                                            Joe has presented at:
                                            #####EOF##### Tag "Customization"
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                                            #####EOF##### Topic: Forums and Support in Other Languages (not English) | WordPress.com Forums

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                                            en WordPress.com Forums › Support

                                            Forums and Support in Other Languages (not English)

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                                            #####EOF##### Three New WordPress.com Color Schemes — The WordPress.com Blog

                                            Three New WordPress.com Color Schemes

                                            We’ve launched three new color schemes to customize your WordPress.com dashboard!

                                            April 3, 2019

                                            Caroline Moore

                                            Your website’s dashboard should be as welcoming to you as your website’s home page is to your visitors. One way to do that? Customize your WordPress.com dashboard with color schemes.

                                            Today, you’ve got three new options for adding a little behind-the-scenes zing: introducing Powder Snow, Nightfall, and Sakura, designed especially for you by our Art Director, Eriko Kawakami.

                                            Whether you prefer the gentle monotone of Powder Snow, the darker and soothing colors of Nightfall, or the vibrant, cherry-blossom-inspired Sakura, we hope you’ll find a look you love.

                                            As part of our commitment to inclusive design, the new palettes are optimized for contrast and increased legibility. Whichever color scheme you choose, your dashboard will be stylish and readable.

                                            Here’s how to customize your color scheme:

                                            1. On your desktop, sign in to the WordPress.com account that you’d like to customize.
                                            2. Click your account avatar in the upper right corner.
                                            3. Select Account Settings
                                            4. Select one of the options under Dashboard Color Scheme
                                            5. Click Save Account Settings to apply the change
                                            Screenshot of the Account Settings page showing color schemes.
                                            My dashboard, using the Nightfall color scheme.

                                            More color schemes are coming, and we want your feedback! What colors do you want to see in your WordPress.com dashboard?

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                                            17 Comments

                                            1. Rita Apr 3rd at 6:07 pm

                                              Thank you for updating. I totally agree color schemes are very important. It gives new life and energy.👍

                                              Liked by 4 people

                                            2. Kaffah Apr 3rd at 6:09 pm

                                              Getting ready for the nightfall scheme! 👍

                                              Liked by 5 people

                                            3. edochie99 Apr 3rd at 6:14 pm

                                              I want a bright color on my Dashboard

                                              Liked by 2 people

                                            4. Grandmaslamp Apr 3rd at 6:23 pm

                                              Caroline I LOVE this! Thank you for an awesome tip!!!!

                                              Liked by 2 people

                                            5. northie Apr 3rd at 6:26 pm

                                              I’m very pleased you listened to the comments we made when you released the first two colour schemes. I like neither of those. I’m off to try the other three. 🙂

                                              Liked by 1 person

                                            6. whippetwisdom Apr 3rd at 7:06 pm

                                              A lovely selection, thank you for adding these – I’m going with the nightfall scheme too 💜

                                              Like

                                            7. hritika1808 Apr 3rd at 7:06 pm

                                              Well that’s some exciting update! The new color schemes would definitely bring new energy and enthusiasm amongst both bloggers and reader’s.

                                              Like

                                            8. Jean-Pierre Apr 3rd at 7:17 pm

                                              I want a pastel color on my Dashboard Thank you

                                              Liked by 1 person

                                            9. Thiago Apr 3rd at 7:42 pm

                                              I loved Nightfall!

                                              Liked by 1 person

                                            10. Karandi Apr 3rd at 7:42 pm

                                              Could you actually just let us modify the existing colour schemes rather than adding more?

                                              Liked by 2 people

                                            11. Liz Apr 3rd at 7:47 pm

                                              I made a suggesting this year that was took up quickly. But unfortunately, someone switched it back and it really helped me.
                                              My suggestion was that when I was on my dashboard and clicked on the bell icon when new notifications shown was to make the unread a shade darker than what it is. As I say, this was quickly changed accordingly when I suggested and now been taken back. I love these colour options and out of them one I would use as well as classic, but it still needs to be a shade darker for the unread, to make it easy for me to tell the difference.

                                              Liked by 1 person

                                            12. simonmbrooks Apr 3rd at 7:50 pm

                                              OM gosh, I love te deep blue. It makes my dash pop and so much nicer to work with. Thanks!

                                              Liked by 1 person

                                            13. Giraffee Girl Apr 3rd at 7:54 pm

                                              I love all the colors 🙂 ❤

                                              Like

                                            14. Thiago Apr 3rd at 7:58 pm

                                              I can not find the new color schemes in thes desktop app.

                                              Liked by 2 people

                                            15. karinhaarblog Apr 3rd at 8:15 pm

                                              Nice 😃

                                              Like

                                            16. floatinggold Apr 3rd at 8:17 pm

                                              It seems like whoever is coming up with those color pairings is either color blind, or has absolutely no idea which colors go together (and which ones clash). Or both. Sticking to the lesser of those evils.

                                              Liked by 3 people

                                            17. The Nerdy Bipolar Mama Apr 3rd at 8:39 pm

                                              Do you know if this can be done on a phone through chrome?

                                              Liked by 1 person

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                                              #####EOF##### Sergei Skorobogatov – 44CON

                                              Sergei Skorobogatov

                                              default
                                              Dr Sergei Skorobogatov is a Senior Research Associate at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory and a member of the Security Group. He has background in chemistry, physics and electronics, he received Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from the University of Cambridge in 2005. His research interests include hardware security analysis of smartcards, microcontrollers, FPGAs and ASICs. He pioneered optical fault injection attacks in 2001, which have influenced major rethink within semiconductor industry on the security protection of ICs and forced introduction of new evaluation procedures and countermeasures. His latest research involved substantial improving of side-channel attacks and optical fault injection attacks. He is a member of Program Committees in several major worldwide conferences on hardware security of semiconductor chips such as CHES, HOST, FDTC, COSADE and CARDIS.

                                              Sergei has presented at:

                                              • 44CON 2012: Hardware security resilience to low-cost attacks

                                               
                                              #####EOF##### Developing WordPress, Jetpack, and Calypso on ChromeOS | Developer Resources

                                              Developing WordPress, Jetpack, and Calypso on ChromeOS

                                              Posted on by goldsounds

                                              Today I was travelling to meet my team in Mexico City (one of the many perks of working at Automattic), and I decided to see if I could set up a functional development environment on my new Google Pixelbook.

                                              It’s quite a capable machine (Core i5, 8GB RAM) – not quite Macbook-Pro-level, but powerful enough. Plus it has great battery life, touch and pen support, a beautiful keyboard, Android app support and other really nice things. You can even run Android studio on it.

                                              So, without further ado – let’s see if we can develop Jetpack and Calypso on ChromeOS! As a bonus, we will add ngrok so that our WordPress instance can be viewed by anyone on the internet.

                                              These instructions assume you have some familiarity with Linux and the vi editor. Feel free to adapt them to develop your own WordPress plugin or node app.

                                              Basic Setup

                                              Enable “Linux Mode” on ChromeOS

                                              ChromeOS supports running Linux in a container – but only on Pixelbooks right now, and only on the “developer channel”. Just follow these instructions.

                                              Once you’ve installed Linux, you simply get a Terminal icon in your App drawer. Clicking it boots Linux and opens a Bash shell. Woohoo!

                                              This Linux is a lightly customized version of Debian 9 (Stretch). Most of the customizations are to support the Wayland display server for the Linux container.

                                              As always with Linux, it’s worth doing an sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get upgrade to make sure everything is up-to-date.

                                              Also you should know that the network address for the Linux container is “penguin.linux.test”. Cute 🙂

                                              Install an Editor

                                              Installing Visual Studio Code

                                              This is my preferred editor. You can follow the Debian (Stretch) instructions on the VS Code web page.

                                              Once you have install VS Code, you can edit the files in any directory using the command code /path/to/directory.

                                              Developing Calypso

                                              For the unfamiliar, Calypso is the user interface of WordPress.com. It’s a beautiful, fast and responsive replacement for wp-admin, which talks to your site via the WordPress.com APIs. It’s built using node, with a user interface powered by React.

                                              Clone wp-calypso

                                              I personally put my repositories in a folder called `workspace` under my home directory.

                                              mkdir workspace
cd workspace
git clone git@github.com:Automattic/wp-calypso.git

                                              Install NVM

                                              We need this in order to build Calypso.

                                              sudo apt-get install build-essential libssl-dev
curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/creationix/nvm/v0.33.11/install.sh | bash

                                              Follow any prompts from the install script, including installing Node 10.

                                              Let’s run Calypso!

                                              cd wp-calypso 
npm run start

                                              Now open http://calypso.localhost:3000/ and behold your beautiful WordPress interface 🙂

                                              Install WordPress and connect Jetpack

                                              Installing WordPress

                                              The Debian Wiki has official instructions, which I have summarized here with light customizations.

                                              As you may know, WordPress has just three dependencies: PHP, Curl and MySQL (aka MariaDB).

                                              sudo apt-get install wordpress curl apache2 mariadb-server
sudo mysql_secure_installation

                                              Follow the prompts to set a MySQL root password and disable remote access.

                                              Now let’s create an Apache configuration:

                                              sudo vi /etc/apache2/sites-available/wp.conf

                                              I have taken the following config from the Debian instructions, but set the ServerName to “penguin.linux.test” (the default address for the VM) and add a ServerAlias directive with something like “myspecialsite.ngrok.io”. This will allow us to connect Jetpack later, when we install ngrok.

                                              Here’s my config:

                                              <VirtualHost *:80>
        ServerName penguin.linux.test
        ServerAlias goldsoundschrome.ngrok.io
        ServerAdmin webmaster@example.com
        DocumentRoot /usr/share/wordpress

        Alias /wp-content /var/lib/wordpress/wp-content
        <Directory /usr/share/wordpress>
            Options FollowSymLinks
            AllowOverride Limit Options FileInfo
            DirectoryIndex index.php
            Require all granted
        </Directory>
        <Directory /var/lib/wordpress/wp-content>
            Options FollowSymLinks
            Require all granted
        </Directory>

        ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log
        CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined

</VirtualHost>

                                              Now let’s disable the default site and enable our wp site in Apache:

                                              sudo /usr/sbin/a2dissite 000-default
sudo /usr/sbin/a2ensite wp
sudo systemctl reload apache2

                                              Since we’ll only be running one site (for now) let’s create/edit the default WordPress config file, where the WordPress debian package expects to find it.Also note that contrary to the Debian WP instructions, the a2dissite and a2ensite commands need to be prefixed with /usr/sbin:

                                              sudo vi /etc/wordpress/config-default.php
                                              <?php
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');
define('DB_USER', 'wordpress');
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'password');
define('DB_HOST', 'localhost');
define('WP_CONTENT_DIR', '/var/lib/wordpress/wp-content');
define('FS_METHOD', 'direct');
?>

                                              Be sure to change the password to something more secure 🙂

                                              Also note that we added define('FS_METHOD', 'direct'); so that we can update plugins using the regular WordPress update mechanism – otherwise WordPress will prompt you for an FTP password whenever you update.

                                              You will also need to change the ownership of the wp-content directories so that Apache can write to them:

                                              sudo chown -R www-data:www-data /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content

                                              Now create a one-time SQL script for creating the DB (remember to match the password here to the one in the config file above).

                                              CREATE DATABASE wordpress;
GRANT SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE,CREATE,DROP,ALTER
ON wordpress.*
TO wordpress@localhost
IDENTIFIED BY 'password';
FLUSH PRIVILEGES;

                                              Now load the file to create our database:

                                              sudo cat ~/wp.sql | sudo mysql --defaults-extra-file=/etc/mysql/debian.cnf

                                              The command should complete without errors.

                                              To confirm that the DB was created, load up the MySQL command line:

                                              sudo mysql --defaults-extra-file=/etc/mysql/debian.cnf

MariaDB [(none)]> show databases;
+--------------------+
| Database |
+--------------------+
| information_schema |
| mysql |
| performance_schema |
| wordpress |
+--------------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)

MariaDB [(none)]>

                                              Hooray! Ok – now you should be able to go to http://penguin.linux.test in your browser and see the famous 5 minute install! Follow the prompts and you have WordPress running. Yay!

                                              Install wp-cli

                                              Follow the instructions at https://wp-cli.org/#installing to install wp-cli

                                              Now make sure we create a www-data-owned directory for wp-cli to do caching, otherwise you’ll get warnings about that:

                                              sudo mkdir /var/www/.wp-cli
sudo chown www-data:www-data /var/www/.wp-cli

                                              Once you’re done, you should be able to cd to /usr/share/wordpress and run commands like this:

                                              sudo -u www-data wp plugin install --activate jetpack

                                              Reinstall default plugin and theme

                                              At this point, we can remove the old akisment and twentyseventeen symlinks and use wp-cli to install them again (so they can be auto-updated).

                                              sudo rm /var/lib/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/akismet
sudo rm /var/lib/wordpress/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeencd /usr/share/wordpress
sudo -u www-data wp theme install --activate twentyseventeen
sudo -u www-data wp plugin install --activate akismet

                                              In order to connect Jetpack, our WordPress install needs to be accessible on the internet. To do this, I use ngrok.

                                              Installing ngrok

                                              Head to https://ngrok.com/download and copy the link to the latest Linux amd64 build, then unzip it.

                                              In my case, the commands were:

                                              wget https://bin.equinox.io/c/4VmDzA7iaHb/ngrok-stable-linux-amd64.zip
unzip ngrok-stable-linux-amd64.zip
sudo mv ngrok /usr/local/bin/

                                              Now we need to activate ngrok. If you head to ngrok.io and log in, then you should be able to copy the “Connect your account” command (careful of that leading ./) and activate your ngrok install.

                                              ngrok authtoken blahblahblahblahtokentokentoken

                                              Assuming you successfully authenticated, you should now be able to launch ngrok using the subdomain you specified in your ServerAlias command in the Apache config:

                                              ngrok http -subdomain=goldsoundschrome 80

                                              Now go to http://goldsoundschrome.ngrok.io and see your site!

                                              There’s one wrinkle here – if you attempt to authenticate or connect to your site externally, it will redirect to penguin.linux.test.

                                              Luckily the wp command we installed earlier gives us an easy way to change all the domain-related settings:

                                              cd /usr/share/wordpress
wp search-replace penguin.linux.test goldsoundschrome.ngrok.io

                                              Now head to http://goldsoundschrome.ngrok.io/wp-admin (or whatever your address is) and log in, then follow the prompts to set up Jetpack.

                                              Woohoo!

                                              Observations / Thoughts

                                              This actually works pretty well. Developing on my Pixelbook feels really fast and snappy (and it’s not the highest-end model, either). I honestly didn’t notice an enormous difference between the Pixelbook and my Macbook Pro in terms of performance.

                                              Display scaling issues for Linux apps need to be tuned – some are teeny-tiny (xterm), some are middling (Visual Studio Code) and some are normal-sized (GTK apps like the Package Manager).

                                              Overall, it’s a perfectly functional system for developing WordPress plugins, themes, and node apps. It has tons of battery life, great security, and thanks to the Linux mode it has access to all the useful software you can think of.

                                              Enjoy!

                                              ***

                                              Daniel Walmsley is a Team Lead at Automattic, mainly working on partnerships. He loves working from home in beautiful Nevada City.

                                              5 thoughts on “Developing WordPress, Jetpack, and Calypso on ChromeOS”

                                              Comments are closed.

                                                #####EOF##### Defense Budget – Russia Military Analysis

                                                Tag: Defense Budget

                                                DIA’s ‘Russia Military Power’ – A Missed Opportunity

                                                Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                                DIA’s recently released report on Soviet Russia Military Power is an interesting offering. In the 1980s, it’s forerunner titled Soviet Military Power served two purposes: first highlight the Soviet threat (typically exaggerating it to make a strong argument for defense spending) and second inform the public discussion on Soviet capabilities. This report does some of the former, and a bit of the latter. Disappointingly it is of lower production quality, lacking many of the maps, graphics, and photos that Soviet Military Power came with (my favorites among the old graphics were big manly Soviet ICBMs drawn next to very small American ICBMs). Thus, the report already achieves a part of it’s mission: demonstrating why we need more funding for higher quality reports on Russian Military Power.

                                                Soviet Military Power 1983 (this is how you do it right)

                                                missile envy capture

                                                Soviet Military Power had no footnotes, and did not identify which agency had produced it, while this report has hundreds of footnotes to Russian authors, journalists, and even wikipedia. In this respect it is not distinguishable from other think tank products on the Russian military, and some respects compares poorly to Sweden’s FOI reports titled “Russian Military Capability” in terms of information offered. Below I discuss the better parts of the report, what it gets wrong, and key issues to consider when thinking about Russian military power.

                                                On the whole the report seems a misspent opportunity. It offers some interesting bits of knowledge on the contemporary history of Russian armed forces, reforms, and current thinking on doctrine. However, one cannot read this product and walk away with an appreciable knowledge on the size, disposition, or capabilities of Russian armed forces. Those worried about a high end fight in the Baltics, or anywhere else for that matter, are best off reading FOI’s work or that of informed blogs in order to understand Russia’s order of battle, force posture, and the like.

                                                The report presents vignettes, deep dives into subjects like Russia’s gas turbine production, yet nothing in terms of a functional order of battle. You may learn that a VDV division now has a company of T-72 tanks, but not how many troops are in the VDV and where they’re based. What can Russia really do? What does it plan to do? Does it have the forces to realize these ambitions, etc. remain open ended questions. This report has a a lot of sporadic information on what is happening, but is quite poor in explanations for why any of these changes, procurement, or deployments have taken place.

                                                The Good:

                                                • The report does a great job summarizing Russian threat perceptions, much of which is established knowledge, but nonetheless there is a solid review of recent doctrines, statements, etc. Here we can read about the besieged fortress mentality, general perception that the U.S. is trying to conduct regime change in Russia’s near abroad, and looking for the opportunity to do so in Moscow, along an acknowledged state of confrontation. Russia sees the U.S. as seeking to contain it and punish it for pursuing an independent foreign policy.
                                                • There is a decent review of the transition which Russian armed forces underwent after the collapse of the USSR, reforms of 2008-2012, and some of the concepts discussed from the 1990s into the early 2000s and today. Unfortunately, much of the information seems dated, and the report’s coverage stops being actual as we get to 2014-2015 in terms of delving into important changes ongoing in the Russian military and identifying the factors driving them.
                                                • Capabilities and doctrines are covered in an informed manner. It is difficult to find this gamut of information brought together elsewhere in terms of other publications, and without a panicky tone, which has become customary in any discussion on Russian doctrine.

                                                 

                                                The not-so-good:

                                                • One can find little on the actual size of Russian armed forces, and ground force numbers cite IISS annual Military Balance publication, which is notoriously wrong in terms of order of battle. Hence this is a report on Russia Military Power that offers a dearth of information on the basic size and disposition of Russian armed forces today. The nature of Russia’s military power, where it is concentrated, and against whom, remains an open question at the end of this report. There are no ranges for capabilities, forces marked on the board, or much else that demonstrates what has changed in recent years.

                                                Where are the ranges of things? (from 1981)

                                                Capture IRBM now we're cooking.JPG

                                                • There is no discussion of Russia’s tier one special forces (KSO) and the addition of this SOF toolkit in 2012 to Russia’s military, while the overall numbers on current Spetsnaz appear greatly inflated at 20,000-30,000, when there are better figures out there in publications. Other trends in the expanding force structure, such as addition of logistics units, are glossed over.
                                                • Important information that would prove quite useful to anyone trying to understand the current state of Russian armed forces is missing across the board. One cannot discern from the writing what Russia’s main battle tank actually is (hint it’s the T-72B3), how many tanks they have today, or the current numbers in terms of Su-30SM, Su-35S, or Su-34 acquisition for the air force. The true disposition of Russian air defense, meaning how many units have S-400,or upgraded S-300PMU2, or S-300V4 variants, is also missing. Indeed the entire air defense section is quite glib for a military that depends so much on integrated air defense in order to operate, and potentially counter what it sees as the U.S. preferred way of war.

                                                Here is what this info might look like based on the 1981 edition:

                                                production numbers capture

                                                • How sustainable is Russia’s force? What is the share of conscripts to contractors? The relevance and impact of demographic trends over the medium and long term on the available pool of manpower is notably absent. Russia has been successful in increasing the share of contract servicemen in its armed forces relative to conscripts, at an overall force size somewhere between 900,000-930,000 today depending on figures – these are the more important indicators to observe in terms of Russian military power. However there is also plenty of statistical cheating, so it would be useful for DIA to offer some sort of data point not footnoted to wikipedia or IISS on the state of Russian armed forces.
                                                • Defense budget is given short shrift, and some of the information is poorly interpreted. From the allegedly ‘real 30% cut in defense spending’ 2016-2017 which was covered extensively on this blog and by others (this 30% cut is not a thing), the budget went from 3.16 trillion to 2.84 trillion, and the endless propensity to count Russian spending in 2017 USD. For example Russia’s original state armament program 2011-2020 was listed at ~660 billion USD (in 2011 figures), but looking backwards with the much devalued currency exchange rate of today, it is converted into less than half that. This is a terrifyingly common mistake, going back in time to recalculate Russia’s defense spending in dollars. Of course the USD figure is irrelevant either way, since Russia does not buy its equipment from the U.S., and given spending adjusted for PPP the purchasing power of that budget is much higher than what Western countries get out of their budgets.
                                                • The conversation on deterrence generalized thinking in Russia and equally in the West. There is no history offered on the evolution of Russian views of deterrence, coercion, or escalation. The information presented lacks context, particularly in recent years. What is the reason for adoption of one particular strategy or another, and the driving factors in Russian thinking on this subject moving forward? What’s missing: a conversation on current Russian thinking on deterrence in conflict, escalation control, and which U.S. capabilities influence their decision making, etc. Why does Russia have the strategy it does, and how is it evolving?
                                                • The section on indirect action and strategic deterrence is a confounding mix of jargon, terms, and buzzwords, i.e. it reads like it was written by a government agency. “Indirect action is a component of Russia’s strategic deterrence policy developed by Moscow in recent years. Its primary aim is to achieve Russia’s national objectives through a combination of military and non-military means while avoiding escalation into a full blown, direct, state-to-state conflict. Drawing on a combination of facets from Russia’s whole-of-government or interdepartmental strategy and overt or covert military means, indirect action seeks to exploit weaknesses and fissures in target countries in order to fulfill Moscow’s desired national goals.” We need to get ‘whole of government’ out of the government lexicon in terms of describing either our own or someone else’s approaches.

                                                Things that are kind of wrong (a few samples):

                                                • Report describes Russia’s space program as formidable when in reality it is one of the biggest disasters in Russia’s industry, in terms of production quality, number of launches, ability to sustain satellite networks, etc.  The early warning satellite network went down years back and they’ve only just managed to get a second launch detection satellite up in recent month out of a desired ten – this is just one example. Note all Proton-M rockets grounded over defective engines back in January. The coming state armament program GPV 2018-2025 intends to address some of these well publicized problems in Russia’s space program.

                                                Numbers without context are difficult to analyze. Is this number of satellites how many they need to sustain a functional network? How are recent launches doing? What is the average number of years a Russian satellite can stay up? Oh, and how is the new satellite early warning network going? (figures from the report below)

                                                Capture 2

                                                • Report suggests Russian acquisition is investing in out-of-area operations. There is nothing to substantiate that besides long range strike capability. Russia is not investing in the sea lift, logistics sustainment, a blue water navy, or other capacities for combat operations distant from its borders. Equally there is nothing to indicate a preparation for the occupation of other countries, an operational reserve, or other capacity to operate “out of area” – of course we should note that Russia’s area is quite vast but in general the armed forces are clearly setup for fights ‘across the street’ more so than anything else.
                                                • There is no coverage of ground force restructuring from brigades to divisions, including three new divisions based around Ukraine, one across the border from Kazakhstan, a new Combined Arms Army in the Southern Military District, etc. Information on brigades, and battalion tactical groups seems woefully dated in terms of the lessons Russian ground forces learned in Ukraine and how they intend to fight a high-end contingency. Is Russia really going to use battalion tactical groups in a fight with a peer adversary, or are the new divisions an indicator of larger formations to come? Also the new divisions seem to have different TOE depending on which ones you’re looking at, some are bigger than others.
                                                • Report’s numbers are internally inconsistent in terms of order of battle, for example long range aviation is listed as 16 Tu-160, 60 Tu-95, and 50 Tu-22 bombers (this adds up to 126) and on the same page the report lists Russia as having 141 bombers. It’s hard to cite a report that can’t keep its numbers straight. There is no mention of Su-34 or Su-24 bombers and the air force ORBAT section is literally incomprehensible. Another example: report says there are 40 active reserve and maneuver brigades + 8 divisions for a total of 350k ground troops. At 4,500 per brigade as suggested in the report (which is wrong but ok), that’s about 180,000 troops in brigades which leaves 170,000 in 8 maneuver divisions – a number that is completely impossible. It’s unclear how 40 brigades and 8 divisions add up to 350,000 ground troops – is that counting VDV units or not? Lots of basic math problems in this report (too many for comfort).

                                                Here is a sample page from the new DIA report (note the bomber numbers in text versus table)

                                                DIA mil report numbers capture

                                                This is what ORBATs could look like, from 1981:

                                                this is what ORBATs look like

                                                Things to consider when ruminating on Russian Military Power:

                                                • The shifting focus first away from Russian ground forces in 2008-2014, and then back to larger ground force formations and the VDV after the conflict with Ukraine, which will  likely be reflected in the GPV 2018-2025, i.e. more cash for ground forces compared to the previous armament program. A trend first away from land power to investing in other services, and then back to land power and larger unit formations after 2014.

                                                Remember all the new divisions and ground force formations being created post-2014, and units shifted back to where they were prior to the 2008-2012 reforms:

                                                • An understanding of where Russia stands in terms of its ability to conduct non-contact warfare, mass long range fires with precision guided weapons, and some sense of the stockpile. How far is it on the path to achieving non-nuclear deterrence, i.e. conventional deterrence with its forces, both in terms of defense and ability to strike peer adversaries. The role of cyber, EW, information operations in a unified concept of coercion or deterrence, etc.
                                                • Evolution of Russian air defense and aerospace forces, rhetoric versus reality in terms of capabilities and rate of modernization. How Russia’s General Staff views its ability to defend against Western air power and their confidence level given pace of modernization on air defense being a viable deterrent.
                                                • Russia’s nuclear arsenal modernization, role of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and emphasis on different elements of the triad, or more honestly ‘quad’ which is a better way to assess Russian nuclear forces.

                                                With DIA’s Russian Military Power out one can only hope that Russia will release its own response, which during the Cold War was called “Whence the threat to peace,” so that we can return to that old familiar publication tit for tat. Bottom line, this is not a bad start, but on the whole DIA’s publication greatly lags it’s predecessor, and raises more questions than answers when it comes to Russian military power.

                                                The Russian Defense Budget and You

                                                Michael Kofman8 Comments

                                                IHS Janes’s story “Russia announces deepest budget cuts since 1990s” got a lot of attention this week, claiming the Russian defense budget will be reduced by $1 trillion rubles or 25%. It is also wrong and has a bombastic headline to boot.  Here is a concise assessment of Russia’s defense budget, the cuts, and the reasons.

                                                Bottom line, the Russian defense budget is going from 3.09 trillion RUB in 2016, to 2.84 trillion RUB in 2017, a reduction of ~7%, which about 1-2% harsher than announced in October of last year. The original estimate for the 2017-2019 budget plan was a 6% reduction over that period of defense spending. The cuts amount to about 250 billion RUB. Including planned cuts for the coming two years, the 3 year average is still a ~6% reduction.

                                                The Russian defense budget is undergoing a sequester to tamp down growth, but is not experiencing large scale cuts, especially relative to other federal departments who were dealt 10% reductions.

                                                The defense budget in 2016 was 3.09 trillion RUB. However, Russia had a problem with debt in the defense industrial complex. Manufacturers had been withdrawing commercial loans to cover the costs of production (i.e. they must have been producing on IOUs from the MoD), but this resulted in financing costs, and those costs were being carried over into the price of equipment being produced. This was no small issue, the interest rate + inflation resulted in some notable costs to the manufacturers, and financing this debt was having a waterfall effect on the state armament program.

                                                Eventually the ministry of finance had to pay them down, so in December 2016 they made a onetime payment of 700 billion RUB to clear this debt (though some sources average it up to 800 billion). Added to 3.09 budgeted, this brought the overall amount spent on national defense to ~3.9 trillion RUB in 2016. Statistically, that resulted in a spike of spending to 4.7% of GDP, but in reality an important chunk was this singular debt payment.

                                                The budget figures announced for 2017 reduce the budget by 7%, to 2.84 trillion. Janes did the following math, 3.9 trillion – 2.84 = 1 trillion RUB reduction or -25%.  To put it mildly, that is not the right interpretation of what is happening. The annual planned reduction is really just north of 200 billion RUB.

                                                The future planned reductions are much smaller at 3.2% in 2018, and 4.8% for 2019. This would amount to 3% and 2.8% of GDP respectively, and perhaps 17% of the government budget. Though the figures do not include other spending on national security. My understanding is that these were based on really low oil prices of 40/barrel as well.

                                                However, based on the past two years the defense budget is probably going to be reduced by less. 2015 saw only a 3.8% reduction, and 2016 a 5% reduction, relative to much louder announcements. Meaning, we should expect MoD to claw back some % points from Ministry of Finance planning. Here IHS Janes also seems to indicate that the 2017 defense budget is the first significant reduction after a period of extended growth, when in reality it is the 3rd straight year of budget reductions, and when everything is reconciled, the degree to which it is a reduction is debatable.

                                                We should note there is always inflation, which is a tax on everything, and it is steadily eating away at the budget. The real sequester is the inflation rate that the budget must absorb.

                                                I would add that by spending to reduce the defense sector’s debt, the MoD in reality has also reduced its procurement costs for the future so it’s unclear how the 7% reduction in the budget plays out relative to likely lower purchase prices since the budget is no longer forced to absorb financing costs for these debts. In conclusion, the Russian defense budget will remain very much alive, while the state armament program will continue to truck along with reduced expectations.

                                                NOTE: I edited this article from originally saying the 2015 budget was 3.07 tril to 3.09 tril – with minor adjustments that follow, but the conclusions remain.

                                                Because budget and spending figures are not that exciting, below I offer a photo of our chief budget analyst, my dog Ivan.

                                                Ivan

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                                                #####EOF##### Luke Jennings – 44CON

                                                Luke Jennings

                                                default
                                                Luke Jennings is a principal security consultant with MWR Labs in the UK and spends a lot of his time conducting penetration tests against enterprise environments and advising on effective security controls against contemporary threats across a range of industry sectors.

                                                He also enjoys conducting new security research and presenting it at cool conferences around the world. Of particular interest to him are technologies that can result in entire enterprise networks being compromised and that cannot be fixed with a simple patch. This can be seen with regard to his previous work developing the windows access token manipulation tool “Incognito” and attacking enterprise deployment solutions in order to facilitate entire network compromises.

                                                Luke has presented at:

                                                • 44CON 2013: Hack the Gibson – Exploiting Supercomputers

                                                https://vimeo.com/109380795
                                                #####EOF##### Conan Dooley – 44CON

                                                Conan Dooley

                                                default Twitter: @conandooley
                                                Conan Dooley currently works as a Security Analyst at Bishop Fox. Before he took the dive into consulting, he was the Technical Engineer and Volunteer Director at Black Hat.

                                                When he’s not working, you’ll find him welding, machining, riding motorcycles, building fish tanks, reading, writing, and taking things apart in an attempt to make the world a better place.

                                                Conan has presented at:

                                                • 44CON 2014:  Lessons Learned from Black Hat’s Infrastructure: The Tweets Must Flow
                                                #####EOF##### aleksandraotocka6523's Profile | WordPress.com Forums

                                                Need help? Check out our Support site, then

                                                #####EOF##### Motor rifle – Russia Military Analysis

                                                Tag: Motor rifle

                                                Russia’s New Divisions in the West

                                                Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                On January 12th Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the formation of three new divisions.  These are not a response to U.S. force deployments in Europe, NATO’s exercises, or the prospect of new multinational battalions in the Baltic states.  The thinking in Russia’s General Staff appears to be about a Ukrainian and Belorussian contingency, namely a second and more intense war with Ukraine or perhaps a color revolution in Belarus.  The map of where these new units will be formed is quite telling: Yelnya, Bogychar and Novocherkassk.  While NATO is busy discussing deterrence, reassurance, resolve, Russia has Ukraine on it’s mind and is implementing long discussed plans to permanently base units on Ukraine’s borders.

                                                From Vedomosti:

                                                default-1ue8

                                                What we know about the new divisions is that they be formed on the basis of existing brigades, likely not composed of new units but generated from forces already deployed in the Western Military District.  The divisions are promised to number 10,000 strong and were announced piecemeal between 2014-2016, formations to be based largely on garrisoned or newly formed independent brigades already in those regions.

                                                1.) Bogychar, Voronezh Oblast.  This division will likely be formed on the basis of the 1st Independent Armored Brigade (not to be confused with 1st Tank Army), which will assume the legacy of the 10th Armor Division a unit that during the reforms was converted in 2009 into the 262nd military base.  The 9th independent motor rifle brigade may contribute units to this division because in February 2015 it shifted elements to Bogychar from Dzerzhinsk.  The plans for this division were first revealed in July 2015.  In September 2015 plans were also announced to build a military garrison in Belogorod for a yet undisclosed unit to be housed there, close to Ukraine’s northern border.

                                                2.) Yelnya, Smolensk Oblast.  The plans for this division were announced back in November 2014.  In September 2015 it was said that a newly formed motor rifle brigade will return to Yelnya, where there once used to be the 144th motor rifle division withdrawn from Germany.  That unit was disbanded in 1998 and converted into a military warehouse base.  It’s possible the new unit will assume the legacy of the 144th and become the core of the announced division. Early July of 2015 the MoD announced that this motor rifle division will be formed by June of 2017 (optimistically) and be assigned to the 1st Tank Guards Army.  It’s structure will be a classic 6 regiment build, 3 motor rifle, 1 armor, 1 artillery, 1 air defense and the rest support units.

                                                3.) Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.  This division is likely to be based on the 33rd Independent Motor Rifle Brigade shifted from Maikop to Rostov.  This particular division will be named after the 150th Idritsk-Berlin Division, famous for raising the flag over the Reichstag in 1945.

                                                strelbi_tankisty-14

                                                4th Kantemirovskaya Division training

                                                The Return

                                                The steady change in force posture 2013-2016 is an important overall development among Russian ground forces.  During the 2008-2012 Serdyukov military reforms, Russia reduced the number of armor and motor rifle battalions from 50 to 22 around Moscow in the Western Military District.  Most forces from Ukraine’s borders were almost completely withdrawn during the reforms, such as the 10th Armor Division that may be restored in part in Bogychar, Voronezh.

                                                Since 2013 Russia has seen the partial return of disbanded or relocated units to the Western Military District largely based South West of Moscow near Belarus and Ukraine.  Additional brigades were created for the 20th Army, then the 1st Tank Army was formed, and following the war in Ukraine some units were brought north from the Southern Military District.  According to Sergei Shoigu’s announcement this year 30 military units have been brought back to the region, though their basing seems largely distant from NATO’s borders.  The recent history of the Western Military District can likely be divided into two periods 2009-2013, a time of demobilization and relocation of units away from Russia’s Western borders, and 2013-2016 the return of heavy ground forces in part driven by the conflict with Ukraine.

                                                The most logical reason for bringing these units back is the Russian experience of having to put together Battalion Tactical Groups in early 2014 when deploying on Ukraine’s borders.  This was an improvised effort, combining the staff’s of 20th and 58th armies to plan out the deployments, which put together several powerful strike groups on Ukraine’s borders.  Despite their success, the process exposed two obvious problems for Russia’s Western MD.  First, Russia lacked permanently based units near Ukraine’s and Belarus’ borders, fully equipped with supporting elements allowing them to sustain a deployment.  The second was the absence of a larger formation that could take in battalions from other military districts and command them in the field, i.e. no divisional structure.  This made rotating units from Central MD and Eastern MD in the fight harder from a command perspective.  With three new divisions, Russia can now send battalion sized units to those commands, have them sort out logistics and support, or in a larger war serve as the center piece in a task organized strike group.

                                                There and back again: divisions to brigades to divisions

                                                What does this mean for the Russian army as a whole?  The return of divisions could be seen in line with the general walking back of Serdyukov’s reorganization, given the return of air regiments and divisions in the Air Force, back from air bases.  Similarly Shoigu restored the 4th Kantemirovskaya Armor Division and the 2nd Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division, although both are honorary division names brought back for their historical legacy.  In reality these are half divisions in the Western Military District formed around two regiments each, composing the 1st Tank Army (announced though yet to be created).  However, thinking that divisions are back in the Russian military and brigades are out is an incorrect assessment.

                                                Russia is not sticking wholly with brigades or switching back to divisions, instead looking at a mixed force structure.  In some ways this may be reminiscent of the U.S. Marine Corps which has brigades and battalions, divisions and regiments all within one service.  A very ‘hybrid’ organization in the parlance of modern military discourse, i.e. an eclectic mix of formations and groupings.

                                                One of the unanswered questions is whether these divisions will truly be based more on a Soviet division structure, composed of four combined arms regiments and a much larger combination of supporting units.  If so, it will take quite a bit of equipment and existing units to form them.  Alternatively, they are likely to look like the 4th and 2nd division, formed around two regiments and a host of supporting units.  These would be in effect expanded brigades, with division level command staff and larger supporting units (artillery, air-defense, etc.)

                                                Thanks to a number of sources: BMPD, Vedomosti, Gazeta RU, Topwar.ru, EagleRost, Defence.ru and others.

                                                 

                                                 

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                                                #####EOF##### Ukraine Navy – Russia Military Analysis

                                                Tag: Ukraine Navy

                                                The Kerch strait naval skirmish

                                                Michael Kofman7 Comments

                                                After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

                                                On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

                                                Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

                                                towing command ship

                                                On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

                                                One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

                                                Don ramming.jpg

                                                Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

                                                Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

                                                original

                                                Another shot

                                                Izumrud

                                                Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

                                                blocked strait.jpg

                                                After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

                                                Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

                                                damaged Berdyansk.jpg

                                                Ships parked at Kerch

                                                parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

                                                Some thoughts –

                                                The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

                                                Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

                                                That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

                                                Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

                                                12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

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                                                #####EOF##### Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north – Russia Military Analysis

                                                Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

                                                Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

                                                Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

                                                PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

                                                PD-50 sinking.jpg

                                                Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

                                                PD-50 on a good day

                                                PD-50 dry dock

                                                According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

                                                Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

                                                Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

                                                That looks like it may be the crane

                                                Crane.jpg

                                                A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

                                                Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

                                                Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

                                                As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

                                                This is PD-50 now

                                                PD-50 gone

                                                The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

                                                3 thoughts on “Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north”

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                                                  #####EOF##### WordPress.com
                                                  #####EOF##### Darren Fuller – 44CON

                                                  Darren Fuller

                                                  default Twitter: @ukfully
                                                  Darren is a UK based security consultant with over eight years full time penetration testing experience.With nearly twenty years in the IT industry Darren spent a number of years working with Lotus Notes and Domino both as a Lotus developer/administrator and system administrator running Domino on AIX.Darren is a Lotus Principal certified professional (lapsed!) and has been using Lotus Notes since V3 on OS/2.

                                                  Darren has presented at:

                                                  • 44CON 2012: Toppling Domino – Testing security in a Lotus Notes environment.

                                                   
                                                  #####EOF##### Three New WordPress.com Color Schemes — The WordPress.com Blog

                                                  Three New WordPress.com Color Schemes

                                                  We’ve launched three new color schemes to customize your WordPress.com dashboard!

                                                  April 3, 2019

                                                  Caroline Moore

                                                  Your website’s dashboard should be as welcoming to you as your website’s home page is to your visitors. One way to do that? Customize your WordPress.com dashboard with color schemes.

                                                  Today, you’ve got three new options for adding a little behind-the-scenes zing: introducing Powder Snow, Nightfall, and Sakura, designed especially for you by our Art Director, Eriko Kawakami.

                                                  Whether you prefer the gentle monotone of Powder Snow, the darker and soothing colors of Nightfall, or the vibrant, cherry-blossom-inspired Sakura, we hope you’ll find a look you love.

                                                  As part of our commitment to inclusive design, the new palettes are optimized for contrast and increased legibility. Whichever color scheme you choose, your dashboard will be stylish and readable.

                                                  Here’s how to customize your color scheme:

                                                  1. On your desktop, sign in to the WordPress.com account that you’d like to customize.
                                                  2. Click your account avatar in the upper right corner.
                                                  3. Select Account Settings
                                                  4. Select one of the options under Dashboard Color Scheme
                                                  5. Click Save Account Settings to apply the change
                                                  Screenshot of the Account Settings page showing color schemes.
                                                  My dashboard, using the Nightfall color scheme.

                                                  More color schemes are coming, and we want your feedback! What colors do you want to see in your WordPress.com dashboard?

                                                  Missing out on the latest WordPress.com developments? Enter your email below to receive future announcements direct to your inbox. An email confirmation will be sent before you will start receiving notifications - please check your spam folder if you don't receive this.

                                                  Join 57,724,310 other followers

                                                  17 Comments

                                                  1. Rita Apr 3rd at 6:07 pm

                                                    Thank you for updating. I totally agree color schemes are very important. It gives new life and energy.👍

                                                    Liked by 4 people

                                                  2. Kaffah Apr 3rd at 6:09 pm

                                                    Getting ready for the nightfall scheme! 👍

                                                    Liked by 5 people

                                                  3. edochie99 Apr 3rd at 6:14 pm

                                                    I want a bright color on my Dashboard

                                                    Liked by 2 people

                                                  4. Grandmaslamp Apr 3rd at 6:23 pm

                                                    Caroline I LOVE this! Thank you for an awesome tip!!!!

                                                    Liked by 2 people

                                                  5. northie Apr 3rd at 6:26 pm

                                                    I’m very pleased you listened to the comments we made when you released the first two colour schemes. I like neither of those. I’m off to try the other three. 🙂

                                                    Liked by 1 person

                                                  6. whippetwisdom Apr 3rd at 7:06 pm

                                                    A lovely selection, thank you for adding these – I’m going with the nightfall scheme too 💜

                                                    Like

                                                  7. hritika1808 Apr 3rd at 7:06 pm

                                                    Well that’s some exciting update! The new color schemes would definitely bring new energy and enthusiasm amongst both bloggers and reader’s.

                                                    Like

                                                  8. Jean-Pierre Apr 3rd at 7:17 pm

                                                    I want a pastel color on my Dashboard Thank you

                                                    Liked by 1 person

                                                  9. Thiago Apr 3rd at 7:42 pm

                                                    I loved Nightfall!

                                                    Liked by 1 person

                                                  10. Karandi Apr 3rd at 7:42 pm

                                                    Could you actually just let us modify the existing colour schemes rather than adding more?

                                                    Liked by 2 people

                                                  11. Liz Apr 3rd at 7:47 pm

                                                    I made a suggesting this year that was took up quickly. But unfortunately, someone switched it back and it really helped me.
                                                    My suggestion was that when I was on my dashboard and clicked on the bell icon when new notifications shown was to make the unread a shade darker than what it is. As I say, this was quickly changed accordingly when I suggested and now been taken back. I love these colour options and out of them one I would use as well as classic, but it still needs to be a shade darker for the unread, to make it easy for me to tell the difference.

                                                    Liked by 1 person

                                                  12. simonmbrooks Apr 3rd at 7:50 pm

                                                    OM gosh, I love te deep blue. It makes my dash pop and so much nicer to work with. Thanks!

                                                    Liked by 1 person

                                                  13. Giraffee Girl Apr 3rd at 7:54 pm

                                                    I love all the colors 🙂 ❤

                                                    Like

                                                  14. Thiago Apr 3rd at 7:58 pm

                                                    I can not find the new color schemes in thes desktop app.

                                                    Liked by 2 people

                                                  15. karinhaarblog Apr 3rd at 8:15 pm

                                                    Nice 😃

                                                    Like

                                                  16. floatinggold Apr 3rd at 8:17 pm

                                                    It seems like whoever is coming up with those color pairings is either color blind, or has absolutely no idea which colors go together (and which ones clash). Or both. Sticking to the lesser of those evils.

                                                    Liked by 3 people

                                                  17. The Nerdy Bipolar Mama Apr 3rd at 8:39 pm

                                                    Do you know if this can be done on a phone through chrome?

                                                    Liked by 1 person

                                                  Please do not use these comments for asking questions, support, or bug reporting. Use the forums or support contact form for that.

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                                                    #####EOF##### Rafal Los – 44CON

                                                    Rafal Los

                                                    default Twitter: @whiterabbit

                                                    Website: hp.com/go/white-rabbit
                                                    Rafal Los, Chief Security Evangelist for Hewlett-Packard Software, combines nearly 15 years of subject-matter expertise in information security with a critical business risk management perspective.  From technical research to building and implementing enterprise application security programs, Rafal has a track record with organizations of diverse sizes and verticals.  He is a featured speaker at events around the globe, and has presented at events produced by OWASP, ISSA, Black Hat,  and SANS among many others. He stays active in the community by writing, speaking and contributing research, representing HP in OWASP, the Cloud Security Alliance and other industry groups. His blog, Following the White Rabbit, with his unique perspective on security and risk management has amassed a following from his industry peers, business professionals, and even the media and can be found at http://hp.com/go/white-rabbit.

                                                    Rafal has presented at:

                                                    • 44CON 2012: House of cards – How not to collapse when bad things happen
                                                    • 44CON 2012 (Workshop): SecBiz Workshop – Bridging the Security/Business Gap
                                                    #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Sharing Button Creation | Developer Resources

                                                    Sharing Button Creation

                                                    Documentation → Sharing Button Creation

                                                    You may have already seen our Sharing buttons, which allow users to easily share their content on other services. If you run a service which is not currently supported in our list of default options, you might like to help users set up your service as a sharing option on their blog. We offer a simple inbound link option which will trigger the service creation process for a user, requiring them to click a single button to confirm the addition of your button.

                                                    Get A Base URL

                                                    Before you can create an inbound link, you will need to gather the URL of the specific blog for which the user would like to add your sharing button.

                                                    1. If you’re an OAuth2 partner, you can get a listing of a users blogs via XML-RPC request, then provide them with a simple, clickable list.
                                                    2. If you are not using OAuth, or don’t want to require your users to connect, you can just offer a text field where you have them enter their URL (make sure you validate it, add the “http://” etc).

                                                    Once you have the base URL, you can construct a complete link into our sharing services.

                                                    Creating The Link

                                                    The link you need to create goes directly to the Settings > Sharing option within wp-admin, and looks something like this:

                                                    https://SUBDOMAIN.wordpress.com/wp-admin/options-general.php?page=sharing&amp;create_new_service=true&amp;name=YOUR-SERVICE-NAME&amp;url=YOUR-SHARING-URL&amp;icon=YOUR-SERVICE-ICON

                                                    All of the values in capital letters should be replaced with appropriate substitutions:

                                                    • SUBDOMAIN: The name of the specific blog to which this button will be added.
                                                    • YOUR-SERVICE-NAME: A user-facing label for your button. Appears on the actual button in text-only or text+icon modes. Must be URL-encoded.
                                                    • YOUR-SHARING-URL: The URL to trigger a “share” action on your service. Include the variables detailed in the dialog to pass specific information (%post_title% etc). Must be URL-encoded.
                                                    • YOUR-SERVICE-ICON: The URL to a 16x16px icon to show as part of your button. Must be URL-encoded.

                                                    When a user clicks on a link such as this, they will be taken to the Settings > Sharing page within their wp-admin, and be presented with a screen such as this:

                                                    All they need to do is click the “Create Share Button” button at the bottom of the screen and the new button will be created. Their page will reload and then they can drag the new service into the “Enabled Services” section to display it on their blog.

                                                    #####EOF##### Geoff White – 44CON

                                                    Geoff White

                                                    default Twitter: @geoffwhite247
                                                    Website: www.channel4.com/news/geoff-white
                                                    Geoff White is the technology journalist for Channel 4 News – his exclusives have exposed everything from fraud in the internet dating industry to high-tech theft methods targeting luxury cars.

                                                    His focus is on data protection, privacy, e-crime and cybersecurity.

                                                    Geoff has presented at:

                                                    • 44CON 2014: Why TV news gets tech security wrong – and why it matters
                                                    #####EOF##### Documentation | Developer Resources

                                                    Documentation

                                                    Getting started with WordPress.com development is easy. We provide a REST Application Programming Interface (API) that uses the OAuth2 protocol for authentication.

                                                    Building code that will use the WordPress.com API? Create a new client application, read up on API basics or dive right in to the endpoint documentation.

                                                    In addition to the REST API, we also support many third-party integrations & partnerships. Check out the topics below for more details.

                                                    Browse by Topic

                                                    REST API

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                                                    Embeds for your App

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                                                    Ecosystem

                                                    Data

                                                    #####EOF##### Close My Account — Support — WordPress.com

                                                    Support

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                                                    Close My Account

                                                    Closing your account deletes all of the sites you own and all their contents. After a few weeks, the data will be entirely purged from our system and at this point the process cannot be reversed.

                                                    Table of Contents

                                                    Alternatives to Closing an Account
                                                    Cancel purchases first
                                                    Usernames cannot be re-used after closure
                                                    Account Restoration

                                                    You can permanently close your WordPress.com account from the bottom of your Account Settings screen:

                                                    Close account section of the Manage Account screen

                                                    This not only shuts down your username, it deletes all the sites you own and all their contents. After a few weeks, this data will be entirely purged from our servers and the process cannot be reversed. Therefore, please be certain you want to cancel your entire WordPress.com presence before proceeding.

                                                    If you do not see the “Close your account permanently” option, this means you have an active plan or domain on your account. You can cancel/delete these through the Manage Purchases section of your account.

                                                    Alternatives to Closing an Account

                                                    You may also consider less drastic steps:

                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                    Cancel purchases first

                                                    If you have a WordPress.com plan or other upgrade, you will need to cancel active purchases before you can close your account. This can be done on the Manage Purchases of your account. Some sites on our Business plan may need to contact support to complete an account closure.

                                                    Learn more about managing purchases as well as cancelling and removing subscriptions from your account here.

                                                    WooCommerce.com also affected

                                                    WordPress.com accounts are also used to manage WooCommerce.com purchases, tickets and subscriptions. Therefore, closing your account may close off your access to WooCommerce assets. You can check the information in your WooCommerce.com dashboard for your account, before you close, to ensure you are not unintentionally deleting something you want to keep.

                                                    Gravatar.com also affected

                                                    WordPress.com accounts are also used to manage your Gravatar at Gravatar.com. Closing your WordPress.com account will also result in the removal of your Gravatar.com account. As a result, any Gravatar images currently displayed with your profile or comments you have made in the past will be removed.

                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                    Usernames cannot be re-used after closure

                                                    While all data associated with an account is removed during a closure, the username is blocked from being registered again, in order to prevent impersonation.

                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                    Account Restoration

                                                    It is possible to reverse an account closure for the first 30 days after an account is closed. If you realize you closed your account in error, please contact us immediately. We will be able to assist you in reopening your account during this 30 day window. Once the 30 days have passed, all of your sites and account data are purged and cannot be restored.

                                                    Please note that during this 30 day window your account data persists, which means that you cannot use your account email address to sign up for a new WordPress.com account. Once the 30 days are up and your account is purged, your email will be freed to use with a new account.

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                                                    #####EOF##### WordPress.com
                                                    #####EOF##### Payment Methods — Support — WordPress.com

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                                                    Methods of Payment

                                                    For payment, we accept:

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                                                    We cannot accept:

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                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                    Adding or Changing a Credit Card

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                                                    • Scroll down to the Manage Your Credit Cards section and click Add Credit Card
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                                                    add-credit-card

                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                    Payments Using a PayPal Account

                                                    Purchases on WordPress.com can also be done using a PayPal account

                                                    • You can only connect your PayPal account the first time you’re purchasing an upgrade, or when you’re renewing your upgrade.
                                                    • Because payments for WordPress.com subscriptions are recurring, you will still need a backup funding source (for example, a verified credit card number or bank account) connected to your PayPal account, even if you have funds in that account.

                                                    When your upgrade is coming to expiration, you’ll see a red Renew Now button in your Manage Purchases page, just like this one:

                                                    capture-decran-2016-09-09-a-12-16-52

                                                    Go ahead and click the Renew Now button and you’ll be able to renew your upgrade using your PayPal account:

                                                    capture_decran_2016-09-09_a_12_17_28

                                                    There are some countries that PayPal will not accept payments from. If you have a credit or debit card registered to an address in one of those countries, you will be unable to use your PayPal account to pay.

                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                    Additional Local Payment Methods

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                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                    Edit Payment Details

                                                    You can review and update your payment information from the Purchases page.

                                                    These steps require signing into your WordPress.com account. If you don’t remember your password and need to recover your login details to access WordPress.com, please read the Account Recovery

                                                    1. Go to your Profile (avatar at the top right of your WordPres.com dashboard → Manage Purchases.

                                                    2. From the Purchases tab, select the upgrade you wish to update to show the details for that purchase. Click on the Edit Payment Method button in order to review and update your payment information.

                                                    Screen Shot 2015-11-24 at 10.06.01

                                                    If your credit card is close to expiring then you may also see a notice at the top of the page and can click the link to update your payment information from there.

                                                    If you aren’t currently subscribed to the purchase, the Edit Payment Method button won’t be available and the purchase will stop working shortly after expiration.

                                                    You can subscribe to the purchase once again, store your payment information, and add an additional year to the purchase by clicking on Renew Now in the blue notice at the top.

                                                    Screen Shot 2015-11-24 at 10.12.18

                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

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                                                    Where can I change my stored credit card details?

                                                    You can change your credit card details for a purchase by selecting that purchase from the Manage Purchase page. Then choose “Edit Payment Method”.

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                                                    You can see your billing history in the Billing History page.

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                                                    Will my purchase renew automatically?

                                                    Your WordPress.com plans and any domains you add to your sites are based on a yearly subscription that renews automatically about one month prior to expiration. You can cancel at any time if you don’t want your subscription to renew.

                                                    How can I get a refund? 

                                                    We will refund any purchase within the first 30 days, with the exception of domain registrations. Domain registrations can be refunded within the first 48 hours after purchase.

                                                    If you are within the cancellation period, you can request a cancellation and refund from the Manage Purchases page. Otherwise, please contact support.

                                                    You will be refunded to the same payment method you used for your purchase. After processing, refunds usually take about 5-10 business days to appear on your statement.

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                                                    #####EOF##### Inner Workings of My Mind | Just another WordPress.com weblog

                                                    What it means to become British

                                                    I’m not sure where to start. So much is happening in my life these days.

                                                    Yesterday, for example, I pledged allegiance to Queen Elizabeth II.

                                                    As if pledging allegiance to a single human being, a non-elected monarch at that, wasn’t enough, to become a British citizen I also had to pledge allegiance to Charles.

                                                    Charles?? Seriously??

                                                    I had to pledge allegiance to all of Elizabeth’s successors and heirs. No matter how horrible or evil they might turn out?? Some of you might like that Meghan Markle, but I’m keeping a close eye on that one and her progeny.

                                                    Am I the only person who sees something terribly wrong about all this?

                                                    Not that I didn’t do it. I did it. I pledged my allegiance. And, as I explained to my personal trainer this morning in the midst of all my moaning and groaning—because of the heavy lifting but more because I was explaining the process of becoming a British citizen to my now fellow Brit—my word is my honor. I mean honour. (more…)

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                                                    Giving context to loneliness

                                                    I don’t know where to start. But I’m afraid this is going to be a messed up, emotional blog post. I wouldn’t be sharing these thoughts if I hadn’t come to the conclusion that I’m not alone even though I feel very very alone. I’m sharing in case this makes someone out there feel a little bit better. I’m sharing because sharing helps me work through my own thoughts, even though I worry that it makes me appear desperate and needy, which I sort of am anyways. But I’m going to stop giving a fuck about what other people might think of me for a little bit. I need to write.

                                                    It’s hard to sum up what an issue really is. It’s difficult to give problems, lots of them, that all come with personal and social contexts, a title that other people will understand.

                                                    But let’s call this one loneliness.

                                                    It’s a desperate loneliness. It’s the kind of loneliness that probably puts people off you. That’s how desperate it is.

                                                    It’s a loneliness that often expresses itself as: Oh, how I wish I had a friend I could call up and say, “Meet you at the movies at 6pm tonight?” But that’s not really it. That’s not the source of the loneliness. The story of the loneliness is so much more complex. (more…)

                                                    West Highland Way: A Spur of the Moment Challenge

                                                    Distance: 96.5 miles

                                                    Elevation gain: about 3,500 meters

                                                    Difficulty: Depends on your fitness, how much you’re carrying, and how many days you

                                                    IMG_3836

                                                    Rannuch Moor, which we walked across on day four, was my favorite part of our journey.

                                                    do it in. I’m moderately fit (these days I run three days a week, have two one-hour sessions a week of weight training at the gym, and go to two boxing classes a week). I found walking around 30 to 35 kilometers for each of our five days on the Way while carrying a 12kg backpack very challenging but, in the end, doable. I’d recommend training specifically for the walk by doing long hikes while load-carrying several weeks beforehand.

                                                    Start: Milngavie, Scotland

                                                    End: Fort William, Scotland

                                                    —————————————————————————————————————————–

                                                    Tom, my personal trainer, asked me sometime in December if my husband Colin and I had plans to do anything interesting over Christmas.

                                                    “Yes! We’ve decided to walk the West Highland Way,” I responded enthusiastically.

                                                    “Why would anyone do that?” he asked, partially in jest.

                                                    “I don’t know. It’s just something to do. It’s just a walk,” I said. “Anyone can walk.” Ha! Little did I know what was to come.

                                                    “And whose idea was this?” I’m sure he was expecting the answer to be me. But this time it wasn’t me coming up with the crazy ideas.

                                                    “Colin. He asked me towards the end of November if I’d like to walk the West Highland Way over Christmas. I asked him what’s that? He said it was a 96-mile walk over five days. I said, ‘Ok.’”

                                                    “Rosie and I never have those kinds of conversations,” Tom joked. Tom, by the way, is a really badass personal trainer. But he likes to make fun of me and all the crazy challenges I keep coming up with for myself.

                                                    But that really was how our West Highland Way walk came about. It was a spur of the moment suggestion from my husband at the end of November. I said yes. And that was that.

                                                    Had I known what we were up against, I might have put in a bit more training in preparation for it. (more…)

                                                    Lessons forgotten and wisdom long-gone

                                                    In the summer of 2009, while climbing Africa’s highest mountain, I learned a valuable life lesson: Don’t think about trying to reach the summit ahead. Just think about putting that left foot, in this moment, in front of your right foot. “Can you do that?” I’d ask myself. “Yes. I can,” I’d reply. “Then just do that for now,” I’d say. That’s how I eventually got myself to the summit, 5,895 metres above sea level (with A LOT of encouragement from the very kind people in our group).

                                                    Somewhere along the line, I seem to have forgotten that valuable lesson of being in the moment and not worrying about what lies far ahead.

                                                    My 30s were a really difficult time in my life, with lots of personal and career turmoil. I became determined to change things and, as what I thought was the ultimate result, I became a wise woman sometime in my 40s. I thought I had figured things out. I knew what needed to be done to get myself out of a bad place and into a good one. I had learned so many valuable lessons. I could even pass those lessons onto others.

                                                    Where that all went by the time I reached the end of my 40s I have absolutely no idea. I seem to have regressed an infinite amount of regression. I’m back to living in turmoil, not really because my personal or career lives have any issues in them. They are both very stable at the moment. But in my head, a tornado is happening. A huge, earth-shattering, ear-splitting tornado. (more…)

                                                    Poppy the Cat

                                                    I have scratch marks in various places on my carpet, little paw prints on my windowsill, IMG_0065and a specially laid out fleece on my couch.

                                                    And I don’t even have a cat.

                                                    But a cat definitely has me.

                                                    The first time I met the cat, it was meowing on my windowsill. I was worried it was lost so I opened the window and it casually walked in.

                                                    I posted a picture of the cat on our local community Facebook page, asking if anyone had lost one.

                                                    Several people thought it was theirs. One was certain it was theirs and asked me to make sure not to feed it because it was on medication. By the end of the day, when we established where that person lives in relation to me, we decided her cat couldn’t have wandered as far off as I live.

                                                    The cat wandered about my living room a bit, then placed itself at one end of the couch and went to sleep. I was really tired that day, so I eventually had a nap myself. When we woke up, Cat signaled to me it was time to leave, I opened the window, and it was gone.

                                                    I didn’t see it again for about two weeks. (more…)

                                                    Post-race depression? Breaking the cycle

                                                    I wonder if I’m onto something.

                                                    athlete bike black and white cycle

                                                    Photo by Pixabay on Pexels.com

                                                    I’ve been experiencing a general lack of motivation for many months that has had a serious impact on my ability to train.

                                                    At least that is what I thought until a few days ago. I was on my way to my therapist, who I’ve been going to now for a few months to help me figure out what to do about my bouts of anxiety and low mood. I have spent the last few months telling her about almost anything but my lack of motivation regarding sport. I’m sure I mentioned it a couple of times as a passing comment but not much more. While driving to my appointment, I was thinking about what the topic of this next session should be. And I thought maybe it was time to talk about my lack of motivation, as evidenced by my almost complete lack of desire to swim, bike, and run.

                                                    It was that last sentence that got me thinking. I’m not lacking motivation in general. I don’t lack motivation regarding my work, for example. I don’t lack motivation to go to my personal training sessions at the gym. I actually enjoy going to see Tom, partially because I like the challenge and I like feeling strong, and partially because he’s funny and makes me laugh, albeit usually at myself. Tom, for example, thought it was absolutely HILARIOUS that I’d like to work as a bodyguard. I think it’s hilarious that he thinks it’s hilarious. I’ll show you yet, Tom!

                                                    Back to depression.

                                                    That very short inner discussion made me realize that I’m not lacking motivation generally. There is something inside of me that has become very anti-triathlon. (more…)

                                                    A jihad against jihad (struggle)

                                                    I have been spending the past few months learning about the long-lasting effects of trauma. Everyone goes through traumas in their lives. I had always thought that I managed myself through my traumas quite well. If each trauma had happened alone, it is possible that I would have been able to get through each individual one without it having too much of an effect on me. But one trauma followed another followed another, and I am now seeing how their cumulative effects have been too much for me, no matter how strong I am and have been, to deal with them without them having a significant impact on my self.

                                                    I have suffered for a great many years from bouts of undiagnosed depression and anxiety. I emphasise the word undiagnosed. I use those two words because they are the only words I know to describe my states of being.

                                                    In the past month, I have come to realize that I lack the ability to express a range of emotions that would be considered normal in other people. It is almost as if I developed some sort of a protective mechanism against feeling happy, sad, angry, excited, afraid, or even loving or hateful. Instead, I repress these feelings as they start to emerge, with the result of two main feelings taking over: anxiety or depression. Instead of feeling happy or excited, I get anxious. Instead of feeling angry or sad, I get depressed.

                                                    This has highlighted to me a concept that is very ingrained within me: the concept of the personal “jihad” or the internal struggle. (more…)

                                                    Battling self through a half Ironman: A superman like no other

                                                    “Of COURSE, you can do this,” I told myself. “Not only can you do this, you can beat your

                                                    110913_OHH18_MB_001510

                                                    One second before crossing the finish line and breaking down into an ugly sob about how hard that race was.

                                                    time from last year.”

                                                    That’s how I convinced myself to stand at the start line of a half-Ironman distance event called the Outlaw Holkham Half in Norfolk (1.8km swim, 90km bike, 21km run) with very little relevant training.

                                                    I registered for the event last year, shortly after finishing my Ironman last September in a time that surpassed any of my expectations. Since then, I travelled frequently, fasted the month of Ramadan, went through a few bouts of therapy-worthy depression and anxiety, and lacked a general motivation to put in the necessary time to train for a half Ironman-distance event. So with a month to go before the event, I was telling myself that I might as well just pull out. I hadn’t trained for it and it was ridiculous to even give it a try.  (more…)

                                                    Eid and feeling very foreign

                                                    I feel Eid is a particularly difficult holiday for me these days.

                                                    We have two big religious holidays in Islam. They are both called Eid. One lasts for three days and follows fasting the month of Ramadan. The other lasts for four days and happens towards the end of the annual Pilgrimage. The Eid following Ramadan is a particularly happy one for me because it signifies going back to eating, drinking and sleeping the way I normally do. On the first day of Eid in my family, we’d go to my father’s house first thing in the morning. My sister would have inflated a ridiculous number of balloons and left them all over the house. She’d have lights and decorations everywhere. There would be a corner where she placed presents for everyone, and we’d arrive carrying presents for everyone as well. They’d all be placed in the corner and we’d then spend about half an hour opening them all up and getting excited about what was waiting for us and what we found. My father would always give every single one of us some money. We’d then spend about three hours arguing about which restaurant to go to for lunch. And to solve this annual dilemma, we always ended up going to Chili’s, because it’s the only place that the children ever wanted to go to. In the evening, we’d  visit members of my ex-husband’s extended family. Our children would get money gifts from everyone and would come out of the day very rich. Over the period of the next two days, we’d visit more family and sometimes friends. It’s not all that unlike how many people celebrate Christmas, although things vary from one family to another. Many people, for example, use the days off to spend Eid on Egypt’s north coast.

                                                    Since I’ve come to the UK, Eid just seems to be getting more and more difficult. (more…)

                                                    The trap that is Egypt

                                                    Egypt is a country that has me completely messed up in the head.

                                                    77F2FC79-AEA7-4063-BBCE-0D2E2CAF90FE

                                                    This is my “office” view as I work from my laptop today.

                                                    I have so many conflicting feelings about it.

                                                    I was in Egypt less than a month ago visiting family. But only a few days after returning to the UK, I decided to jump on a plane and come back. Ramadan started, my friends were all posting about the accompanying festivities, and I was missing it all. I hadn’t spent Ramadan in Egypt for several years.

                                                    When I told my therapist that I’d be missing a session because I wanted to go back to Egypt, she asked me what it was about Ramadan in Egypt that I missed. I had spent most of the session telling her about real-life problems I was facing and I was fine. But the minute I started describing what it was like to stand in the balcony at the time of the sunset call to prayer, when all the craziness of Cairo’s streets suddenly disappears, it all goes quiet, and people are in their homes with their families and friends around tables full of food and love, I broke down in tears.

                                                    Even my therapist’s face showed pain on my behalf. “Oooh. You’re homesick,” she said. (more…)

                                                    #####EOF##### Central MD – Russia Military Analysis

                                                    Tag: Central MD

                                                    Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

                                                    Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                                    Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

                                                    Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

                                                    This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

                                                    Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

                                                    time to go home.jpg

                                                    Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

                                                    VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

                                                    Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

                                                    Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

                                                    exercise table

                                                     

                                                    Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

                                                    Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

                                                    Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

                                                    BTR-82As.jpg

                                                    Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

                                                    Egvekinot.JPG

                                                    naval infantry 2.JPG

                                                    Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

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                                                    #####EOF##### New Book (3): Russian Political War: moving beyond the hybrid | In Moscow's Shadows

                                                    New Book (3): Russian Political War: moving beyond the hybrid

                                                    RPW-cover

                                                    The third of my crop of books out this month is Russian Political War: moving beyond the hybrid from Routledge, a study of what I think we should be talking about instead of ‘hybrid war’ (let alone the mythical ‘Gerasimov Doctrine‘). It builds off my earlier report, Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? to argue that while the Russian military – like everyone else – is looking at the opportunities in non-kinetic means to prepare the battlefield (after all, has any war not been ‘hybrid’?), the real challenge the West faces is different. The current campaign being waged against the West is not a preparation for eventual military conflict, but rather a wholly non-military campaign that echoes ‘political war’ as described by George Kennan at the start of the Cold War, and which has its spiritual home and command and control centre within the Presidential Administration and Russia’s civilian national security elites.

                                                    7 Comments
                                                    by Mark Galeotti on February 19, 2019  •  Permalink
                                                    Posted in Book Review, Russian Military, Russian Politics, Security

                                                    Posted by Mark Galeotti on February 19, 2019

                                                    https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2019/02/19/new-book-3-russian-political-war-moving-beyond-the-hybrid/

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                                                    7 Comments

                                                    1. Allan Mustard

                                                       /  February 19, 2019

                                                      I need a Kindle edition, please!  My library already costs $9,000 each time to haul across the world every time I move (I’m a diplomat)!  Moving my Kindle is much cheaper!

                                                      Reply

                                                    2. Allen Hingston

                                                       /  February 19, 2019

                                                      I’d love to read it but at $66 CAD on Mazon.ca it is out of my reach

                                                      Reply

                                                      • Mark Galeotti

                                                         /  February 19, 2019

                                                        I must confess that this is one of many reasons why I am gravitating away from the traditional academic publishers whose model seems based on selling a few, expensive copies to libraries, etc.

                                                        Reply

                                                    3. umland

                                                       /  February 19, 2019

                                                      Reblogged this on Andreas Umland.

                                                      Reply

                                                    4. Mark Galeotti

                                                       /  February 21, 2019

                                                      For those of you who asked, I’ve just heard that it will in due course be available as an ebook, although we don’t yet know when

                                                      Reply

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                                                      #####EOF##### Atte Kettunen – 44CON

                                                      Atte Kettunen

                                                      default Twitter: @attekett
                                                      Atte Kettunen is a security researcher at the Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG). His main fields of interest are automation of software security testing and web browser fuzzing. In 2011-2013 he has successfully fuzzed Firefox and Chromium and found dozens of vulnerabilities in them.

                                                      Atte has presented at:

                                                      • 44CON 2013: Browser bug hunting – Memoirs of a last man standing

                                                      https://vimeo.com/109380793
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                                                      #####EOF##### Konflikte & Sicherheit – Kriege, Krisen & Konflikte im 21. Jahrhundert

                                                      F-35: High-tech stealth fighter jet or $1.5 trillion disaster?

                                                      This image or file is a work of a U.S. Air Force Airman or employee, taken or made as part of that person's official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the image or file is in the public domain in the United States.

                                                      It is the most expensive military aircraft procurement program in the world: the F-35 Lightning II. Lockheed Martin is developing it for the US Air Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Marine Corps (USMC) as part of the Joint Strike Fighter program, a 5th generation jet fighter to replace the F-16 Falcon, F-18 Hornet, … Weiterlesen F-35: High-tech stealth fighter jet or $1.5 trillion disaster? →

                                                      Werbeanzeigen

                                                      Vortrag zu (letalen) autonomen Waffensystemen beim CISG an der Universität Bonn

                                                      Weitgehend unbemerkt von der breiten Öffentlichkeit vollzieht sich ein revolutionärer Wandel in der Kriegsführung. (Letale) autonome Waffensysteme, kurz „(L)AWS“, erobern mehr und mehr die Gefechtsfelder aktueller Konflikte. So wie das Maschinengewehr den Ersten und der Kampfpanzer den Zweiten Weltkrieg prägten und diese globalen Konflikte nachhaltig beeinflussten, so werden Drohnen und Kampfroboter mit Hilfe künstlicher Intelligenz … Weiterlesen Vortrag zu (letalen) autonomen Waffensystemen beim CISG an der Universität Bonn →

                                                      F-35: Hightech Kampfjet oder 1,5 Billionen US$ Desaster?

                                                      This image or file is a work of a U.S. Air Force Airman or employee, taken or made as part of that person's official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the image or file is in the public domain in the United States.

                                                      Es ist das teuerste Beschaffungsprogramm für Kampfflugzeuge in der Militärgeschichte: F-35 Lightning II, so der offizielle Name, ist das von der Firma Lockheed Martin für die US Air Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) und das US Marine Corps (USMC) im Zuge des Joint Strike Fighter Programms gemeinsam entwickelte Tarnkappen-Mehrzweckkampfflugzeug der 5. Generation, das die F-16 Falcon, … Weiterlesen F-35: Hightech Kampfjet oder 1,5 Billionen US$ Desaster? →

                                                      Wie kämpft die Bundeswehr in 10 Jahren?

                                                      Die Bundeswehr hat ein Thesenpapier mit dem Titel "Wie kämpfen Landstreitkräfte künftig?" für das Parlament und die Regierung vorgelegt und sich darin mit der Frage beschäftigt, wie sich die Kriegsführung der Bundeswehr vor dem Hintergrund der "fehlenden Masse" an Gerät und Soldaten, den Mitteln des Cyber-Krieges im Internetzeitalter, der Satellitenaufklärung, der rasanten Entwicklung von Drohnen … Weiterlesen Wie kämpft die Bundeswehr in 10 Jahren? →

                                                      „A2AD“-Zone, was verbirgt sich hinter diesem Schlagwort?

                                                      Spätestens seit der Besetzung der Halbinsel Krim durch russische Truppen 2014 ist das Verhältnis der NATO zu Moskau angespannt. Politiker und Militärs mussten nach 20 Jahren der Auslandseinsätze und Friedenssicherung gegen drittklassige Gegner sowie der "Aushöhlung" der europäischen Armeen als Beitrag an der "Friedensdividende" erkennen, dass Russland vom Partner zum mehr als ebenbürtigen Gegner mutiert … Weiterlesen „A2AD“-Zone, was verbirgt sich hinter diesem Schlagwort? →

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                                                      #####EOF##### Hypersonic boost-glide – Russia Military Analysis

                                                      Tag: Hypersonic boost-glide

                                                      Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system

                                                      Michael Kofman6 Comments

                                                      I’ve recently put out an article on Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system in the well known Russian journal The New Times, under the title “ЧТО ВСЕ-ТАКИ ПУТИН ПОДАРИЛ РОССИЯНАМ НА НОВЫЙ ГОД,” but for those interested, please find the unedited English version below, which hopefully covers the subject in some depth.

                                                      Earlier in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced at his annual address to the federal assembly that a Russian hypersonic boost-glide system, named Avangard, would start entering serial production. Subsequently on December 26th, 2018 Russian officials claimed that they had successfully conducted a test from the Dombarovsky missile site, to the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 3,760 miles away. Russia’s president proudly announced that the system as a wonderful ‘New Year’s gift’ to Russia. According to Putin’s statement, the hypersonic glide vehicle is able to conduct intensive maneuvers at speeds in excess of Mach 20, which would render it “invulnerable” to any existing or prospective missile defenses. In this article I will briefly explore the logic behind Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, recent claims of technological accomplishment, and the strategic implications of deploying such weapon systems.

                                                      Despite rather questionable public statements about the technical characteristics of this weapon system, a number of which appear inconsistent, it is clear that Russian military science has made considerable advancements along one of the most sophisticated axis of weapons research. While claims pertaining to the readiness of this system to enter serial production, and operational service, are probably exaggerated, the more important questions are conceptual. More than likely Russia will be able to deploy a hypersonic boost glide system in the 2020s, perhaps alongside other hypersonic weapons projects, but the promise of this technology was always at the tactical-operational level of war, not strategic. This was never considered a ‘game changer’ as a system for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. If anything, Russia has invested a substantial amount of money, and years of research, in overdoing its strengths. Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of ‘Russian national achievement’ for domestic audiences, it’s unclear if this weapon system truly answers Russia’s strategic challenges in the coming decades. The question is not whether it works, or when it will work, but does it even matter?

                                                      Hypersonic boost glide weapons function by using a multi-stage ballistic missile as the boost phase, throwing a vehicle into near earth orbit, which then descends and begins gliding at hypersonic speeds along the edge of the atmosphere. As the vehicle descends back to earth, it pulls upwards, and begins skimming the atmosphere in a ‘glide’ phase, before diving downwards onto its target at the terminal phase. Russia has spent years developing this technology under a project referenced as Object 4202, which married a series of  experimental hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Yu-71, with a liquid fueled ICBM УР-100УНТТХ (NATO designation SS-19 mod 2 Stiletto). This system builds on the Soviet Union’s extensive research into hypersonic weapons programs , including work on a hypersonic-boost aircraft named «Спираль», a modified S-200V surface-to-air missile under the project name Холод, and hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as Kh-80 and Kh-90 GELA (гиперзвуковой экспериментальный летательный аппарат).

                                                      kh-90 gela
                                                      Kh-90 GELA
                                                      kholod
                                                      Kholod
                                                      spiral
                                                      Spiral

                                                      Although claimed successes in testing may have come as a surprise in 2018, in truth Russian officials have been announcing tests of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle, using the УР-100УНТТХ missile, as far back as the strategic nuclear forces exercise in 2004. Hence, this particular system has been in publicly acknowledged development for at least 14 years, and the glide vehicle itself for quite a few years beforehand. The booster, УР-100 (SS-19), is a 105 ton liquid fueled silo-based missile, which together with the boost glide vehicle payload proved too long for a standard silo. Hence this system is being tested in a modified R-36M2 silo (SS-18 Satan), and although it is being developed with the УР-100, it is meant for the much heavier liquid fueled missile currently in testing, RS-28 Sarmat. While the question of boost method may seem a technicality, the boosting mechanism is actually quite deterministic of the strategic role this weapon can play, as I will discuss a bit later in this article.

                                                      However, the principal challenges with this system have little to do with the decades established technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or boosting objects into near earth orbit. Hypersonic boost glide vehicles, if successful, represent a major breakthrough in material sciences, as the object must be able to withstand incredibly high temperatures with the payload and guidance system intact. Although impossible to verify, Russian announcements can often be categorized as ‘true lies,’ impressive sounding figures that have some factual basis, but are inevitably inaccurate. The proposition that the vehicle can reach mach 27 is likely true only during the brief return phase, when it is falling back to earth like a rock from near earth orbit, prior to beginning its hypersonic glide at the edges of the atmosphere. The vehicle itself will have considerably different speeds during the pull-up, glide, and dive to target phase, while having to endure incredible temperatures.

                                                      Below are a few graphical illustrations available on the web

                                                      explainer 1explainer 2explainer 3

                                                      In U.S. testing of an analogous system in 2011, Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2), the vehicle was able to sustain glide at mach 20 speeds for three minutes, enduring a temperature of 3500 Fahrenheit. These figures track with Russian statements on temperatures experienced, but the actual speeds and altitudes at which the Russian vehicle is able to glide, and whether the systems actually survive this experience, remain a mystery. Although Russia’s defense sector seems to have made progress on this weapon system, claims that it is ready for serial production, or operational deployment in the near future, should be treated with educated skepticism. Ironically, the most significant potential breakthrough is in material sciences, not in building a seemingly scary strategic weapon.

                                                      Yet the rationale for Avangard seems less than straightforward when compared to other Russian hypersonic weapons programs, including the Tsirkon 3M22 scramjet hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic missile. Those are operational depth systems able to deliver meaningful conventional or nuclear payloads to shape the military balance in a theater of military operations. They can offset U.S. conventional superiority, and pose genuine challenges in conventional warfare. What does Avangard do for Russia that existing silo-based, road-mobile, air-launched, and submarine launched missiles cannot?

                                                      supposed image of the vehicle (draped on the right)

                                                      The Avangard system is best seen as one element in an expensive Russian strategy to develop technological hedges for a security environment perhaps 20-30 years from now where the United States might deploy a cost effective missile defense system, making a percentage of Russia’s nuclear deterrent vulnerable to interception. To be clear, there is no missile defense system now, or on the horizon, able to intercept Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Modern ICBMs can come with multiple reentry vehicles and numerous penetration aids or false targets, creating a complex ‘threat cloud’ that would make interception an improbable business. Nonetheless, ever since the Bush administration chose in 2002 to exit the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russian leadership has been concerned that the United States could eventually devalue the deterrence provided by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

                                                      Russia’s General Staff worries that a vast arsenal of long range conventional cruise missiles, paired with a semi-viable missile defense, would pose major challenges for their calculations to ensure the ability of Russian nuclear forces to deliver ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tailored’ damage in the coming decades. The 1972 ABM Treaty was not just a cornerstone of Cold War arms control, but fundamental to Russian military thinking on strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability at the strategic level. Ever since June 1941, Soviet, and subsequently Russian, military thought has been wracked by the possibility of a disarming first strike, and the need to position Russian forces along a strategy of ‘counter-surprise.’

                                                      However, unlike other expensive strategic projects, such as the Poseidon nuclear powered torpedo, Avangard does not contribute to a survivable second strike. Thus there are a few ways to interpret the actual purpose of this weapon. The first is as a retaliatory-meeting strike system to attack high-value targets, i.e. civilian targets with political or economic significance, which will provide some insurance for a counter value strike. The second is that it is a first strike weapon against hard to penetrate targets. Since Avangard is silo based, designed for heavier liquid fueled ICBMs, in the event of strategic attack the boosting missile would not be survivable. It must be fired either first, or in a “launch under attack” scenario, when Russia has confirmed a U.S. launch, but the missiles have not yet impacted.

                                                      Avangard may be designed to give Russia’s RVSN the ability to penetrate hard targets, getting around missile defenses, and leveraging greater accuracy to take out well-hardened facilities. That said, from a nuclear warfighting standpoint, this makes Avangard a somewhat specialized, but expensive strategic nuclear weapon. Given how few of these systems Russia is likely to be able to afford, the weapon may offer some targeting advantages, but at a high price relative to the benefits. Another possibility is that this is not a system to get around future missile defenses, but a first strike system to be used specifically against missile defenses, clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even if more accurate and survivable in flight, Avangard is a questionable investment when compared to the numerous road-mobile ICBM systems Russia fields today, including Topol-M and Rs-24 Yars (but then the logic for Russia’s SSBN program is also somewhat circumspect).

                                                      This slideshow requires JavaScript.

                                                      Perhaps in the future, Avangard will be deployed on a road-mobile launcher, but as conceived, this system adds little to Russia’s existing large strategic nuclear arsenal. An expensive insurance policy that in no way alters the strategic nuclear balance either today or tomorrow, which is why the reaction in Washington has been so muted. If anything, the United States should thank Russia for investing money in such super weapons, instead of buying large quantities of conventional precision guided munitions.

                                                      Moscow has sought to leverage Avangard and similar novel systems to sell the notion of a qualitative arms race to Washington, D.C., hoping to establish a bilateral agenda for summits. Yet while the world is genuinely witnessing a renewed period of nuclear modernization, with qualitatively new or novel weapon systems in development, there is no arms race in progress. The major nuclear powers of today are pursuing distinctly divergent strategies, concepts, and requirements behind their nuclear weapons programs, rather than racing which each other for superiority. This is why Avangard, if completed and deployed, is unlikely to alter strategic military balance or elicit any meaningful response from Washington, D.C.

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                                                      #####EOF##### Raytheon – 44CON

                                                      Raytheon

                                                      raytheonRaytheon has more than 30 years of experience securing some of the world’s most critical and sensitive programmes and systems. We work in some of the most demanding cyber security and intelligence environments in the world and bring our customers the capabilities and cyber business change to ensure they stay ahead of threats. We look at ways organisations can actively disrupt the command and control of an adversary within their domain; the focus is not purely on a layered defence.

                                                      Through sponsorship of the UK Cyber Challenge, Raytheon is investing in the future of the cyber security industry in the UK.

                                                      In the UK, Raytheon specialises in:

                                                      Data Loss Prevention: We are leaders in user end-point monitoring and file content checking. Our Sureview and Integrity range are used in UK and US commercial and government organisations to prevent fraud, espionage and accidental data leaks.
                                                      Advanced Malware Mitigation: We developed our own behaviour-based capability to detect and prevent targeted attacks.
                                                      Secure Information Sharing: Our cross-domain or multi-layered security products enable our customers to share important information across multiple networks and Impact Levels.
                                                      Cyber Services: We embed our expertise into our customers’ organisations.

                                                      Want to learn more about how Raytheon protects its customers? Come and visit us on our stand during 44CON 2013.

                                                      #####EOF##### The WordPress.com Blog

                                                      Three New WordPress.com Color Schemes

                                                      We’ve launched three new color schemes to customize your WordPress.com dashboard!

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                                                      WordPress.com’s Parent Company Announces Happy Tools, a New Suite of Products for the Future of Work

                                                      Happy Schedule, our first offering, will help distributed teams manage employee schedules and customer support.

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                                                      Electric Literature Moves to WordPress — Here’s How an Indie Publisher Thrives on the Open Web

                                                      Lessons from 10 years of publishing essays and fiction.

                                                      March 25, 2019 / 4

                                                      Mark Armstrong

                                                      Gender Balance is a Business Issue

                                                      On gender balance, diversity, and inclusion at Automattic.

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                                                      Join WordPress.com for an International Women’s Day Livestream Panel

                                                      On International Women’s Day this Friday, WordPress.com parent company Automattic is hosting four outstanding women tech leaders for a livestreamed conversation about professional advancement, technology, and mutual support as we strive for equity in the workplace. It’s happening Friday, March 8 at 6 pm UTC / 1 pm ET / …

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                                                      Free Domain Privacy Protection

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                                                      Introducing Six New Business-Oriented Themes

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                                                      Announcing Newspack by WordPress.com — A New Publishing Solution for News Organizations

                                                      We’re teaming up with Google, Lenfest, Civil funder ConsenSys, and Knight to develop a next-generation publishing platform.

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                                                      Customize Your WordPress.com Dashboard

                                                      We’re happy to announce new improvements to your WordPress.com dashboard for a more accessible and customized experience. From your desktop, you can now customize your dashboard by choosing one of our two new color schemes, Classic Bright for a fresh modern feel and Classic Blue as the standard you’ve known …

                                                      January 8, 2019 / 115

                                                      Courtney Burton Doker

                                                      Introducing the 2019 ‘Anything Is Possible’ List

                                                      WordPress.com’s inaugural New Year’s list celebrates the people and organizations who are using the web to make the world a better place.

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                                                      Mark Armstrong

                                                      New Theme: Twenty Nineteen

                                                      Meet Twenty Nineteen, the brand new WordPress default theme.

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                                                      #####EOF##### Electric Literature Moves to WordPress — Here’s How an Indie Publisher Thrives on the Open Web — The WordPress.com Blog

                                                      Electric Literature Moves to WordPress — Here’s How an Indie Publisher Thrives on the Open Web

                                                      Lessons from 10 years of publishing essays and fiction.

                                                      March 25, 2019

                                                      Mark Armstrong

                                                      Electric Literature launched 10 years ago in Brooklyn, New York, as a quarterly print journal with a mission to make literature more relevant, exciting, and inclusive. And today they’re celebrating the launch of a new website on WordPress, at electricliterature.com.

                                                      Surviving (and thriving) for ten years as an independent publisher is no small feat. Over the years the nonprofit organization has grown its online audience — with offerings like Recommended Reading and The Commuter — while expanding its membership of readers who help fund its work. The website is free to everyone and relies on the generosity of its community to donate to the site and support its mission.

                                                      How does an indie website make its business work in 2019? We talked with Electric Lit’s Executive Director Halimah Marcus about some of the lessons they’ve learned in the past 10 years.

                                                      Slow and Steady Growth Can Be a Very Good Thing

                                                      Sometimes raising a lot of money from investors means you’ll grow fast — but also burn out sooner. “Slow and steady growth has been important to our longevity thus far. Ten years for some companies isn’t that long, but ten years for an indie online magazine is quite long. We’ve seen many of our peers close during that time and also many publications that were much better funded and larger than us as well.”

                                                      Focus On Your Mission

                                                      Marcus and company made a deliberate decision early to become a nonprofit with a mission to support writers. “That was an interesting discussion. For the most part I think it was the right decision, although there are many different ways to look at this question. We were definitely a mission-driven organization. With Recommended Reading we partner with other magazines and indie presses and publications to promote their work and to give an online platform to many stories that have never been published online and never would be published online.

                                                      “It was our goal to build a literary ecosystem, to showcase how diverse it was and to give access to it. There was nothing about what we were doing that was about making money [laughs]. Becoming a nonprofit to be mission-driven, to be able to have access to grant opportunities, to be able to solicit donations and make those tax-deductible was going to be important for our financial model.” As a nonprofit, Electric Literature receives funding from foundations including the Amazon Literary Partnership, the New York State Council on the Arts, and the National Endowment for the Arts — an important source of funding for a publisher when revenue from online advertising can fluctuate dramatically from month to month.

                                                      Memberships (and Your Members) Matter

                                                      Direct funding from readers makes a big difference for the business. Electric Literature does not paywall its essays or fiction — the site is totally free and readers have an option to donate or subscribe with a recurring monthly payment.

                                                      Its membership program hit some bumps when it briefly moved it to Medium — the platform switched its membership model in 2018 and Electric Literature was one of several publishers who were left scrambling. Marcus’s advice? Think carefully about who you let between you and your readers — it’s very hard to regain subscribers after you’ve lost them.

                                                      Most important of all is making sure those who do donate to your publication feel special. “I think the lesson that I’m always learning and figuring out how to do better is to make those people who have shown you that they care about your publication and that they’re invested in it feel included and appreciated. Make sure they know who they can talk to if they have a question or if they just want to make a comment or they have a problem. That’s something that is so important.”

                                                      Make Your Home on the Web Your Own

                                                      “You’ll see that on the new website the look is very vibrant and positive and is pulled through every article and every space. Icons inspired by electrical symbols such as signals and inverters are a part of the design we were able to bring through. It’s important to be able to have control over what our product looks like. Our editorial vision is now able to extend to the way the work is presented and what it looks like.”

                                                      For more on Electric Lit’s new site, check out Marcus’s letter to readers.

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                                                      4 Comments

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                                                      1. chineloanikpeogechukwugmailcom Mar 25th at 5:03 pm

                                                        Well, it’s quite inspiring to read posts like this one; to know one can grow and develop in writing or similar career.

                                                        Marcus is absolutely right with his advice on how to treat followers; I’ve been overwhelmed since joining the WordPress community, there are these feelings of belonging and ownership owning my site and communicating with other bloggers.

                                                        Although I have been here for about three weeks or less and I feel helpless with some customizations necessary on my blog site, but reading this post, I’m confident that I’d get it all right someday soon.

                                                        Congratulations to Electric Literature.

                                                        Liked by 11 people

                                                      2. Ihagh G. T. Mar 25th at 9:59 pm

                                                        👍👍👍… inspiring post, especially the longevity—10 years—which which includes some other ingredients…I can see a lesson for passionate site owners: their peers ending business, especially when the initial dream was to stay in business without ever leaving. What might have halted them? Well, that would be a story for another day.

                                                        Certainly, longevity will bring about many many subscribers/membership. passionate people already have passion, so the watchwords I can perceive from your post are: “persistence, positivity and patience”—and we will get there.

                                                        Liked by 7 people

                                                      3. overbee Mar 26th at 12:45 pm

                                                        Your mission is a very important one! Keep up the great work and thank you for the inspiration.

                                                        Liked by 6 people

                                                      4. Sarahmente Mar 26th at 1:08 pm

                                                        It’s fantastic to read that Electric Literature has been so successful while remaining true to its mission. A real inspiration to us all 🙂

                                                        Liked by 7 people

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                                                        #####EOF##### Dai Davis – 44CON

                                                        Dai Davis

                                                        default
                                                        Dai Davis is a Technology Lawyer. He holds Masters degrees in both Physics and Computer Science. He is a Chartered Engineer and Member of the Institution of Engineering and Technology. Dai has consistently been recommended in the Legal 500 and in Chambers Guides to the Legal Profession. Having been national head of Intellectual Property Law and later national head of Information Technology law at Eversheds for a number of years, Dai is now a partner in his own specialist law practice, Percy Crow Davis & Co.

                                                        Although he is based in Leeds, he has clients throughout the country and also works out of Manchester, Birmingham and London on a regular basis. Dai advises clients on intellectual property in Information Technology products, and all types of computer and technology law issues including such topical matters as Open Source, IT Security and Cloud Computing issues. He is primarily a non-contentious lawyer, specialising in advising on commercial agreements relating to software and technology products, including outsourcing agreements, web-related contracts and data protection. A further “super specialism” that Dai has practised for over two decades is high-tech product safety and product recall, including the law relating to CE Marking.

                                                        Dai has presented at:
                                                        #####EOF##### Ben Gatti – 44CON

                                                        Ben Gatti

                                                        default Twitter: @benjaminog
                                                        Born to hippies in the late 60’s, grew up in California and taught himself electronics and software, travelled the World in the 90’s, married abroad, and settled in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he works as an independent software slacker.

                                                        Ben has presented at:

                                                        • 44CON 2013: Best Practices and the Future of Adaptive Authentication
                                                        • 44CON 2013 (workshop): Colossus: The First Computer to Crack a Cipher
                                                        • 44CON 2012: Cryptanalysis Of The Enigma Machine
                                                        #####EOF##### Elcomsoft – 44CON

                                                        Elcomsoft

                                                        elcomsoftEstablished in 1990, ElcomSoft Co. Ltd (Elcomsoft) is a privately owned company headquartered in Moscow, Russia. Since 1997, ElcomSoft has been serving the needs of businesses by delivering corporate security and IT audit products. The company helps law enforcement, military and intelligence agencies in criminal investigations with its wide range of computer forensics products. ElcomSoft tools and products are used by most of the Fortune 500 corporations, multiple branches of the military all over the world, governments and all major accounting companies.

                                                        ElcomSoft helps its customers unlock valuable information protected with lost and forgotten passwords. Hundreds of thousands of passwords are lost every year, with confidential documents becoming completely unavailable even to their rightful owners. ElcomSoft offers a range of consumer and enterprise-grade tools allowing its customers to gain access to password-protected documents, archives and locked-out accounts in many popular products.

                                                        Visit us at https://secquest.co.uk/ and see how we can help you.

                                                        #####EOF##### Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces – Russia Military Analysis

                                                        Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

                                                        Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                        Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

                                                        —————————————————————————————————————————————–

                                                        The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

                                                        Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

                                                        The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

                                                        can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

                                                        And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

                                                         

                                                        This slideshow requires JavaScript.

                                                        Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

                                                        There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

                                                        VDV praciting loading

                                                        Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

                                                        Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

                                                        airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

                                                        Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

                                                        Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

                                                        These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

                                                        The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

                                                        T62 vdv.jpg
                                                        VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

                                                        Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

                                                        But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

                                                        4 thoughts on “Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces”

                                                        1. Thank you for your articles. I’ve spent a few hours enjoying your material about Vostok 2018 and the VDV. Your analysis is balanced, well-informed and free of pro and anti Russia hysteria common through most of the open source Russian watcher community.

                                                          Denis Mokrushin (twower blog) has tracked announcements from the Russian MoD about kontraktnik numbers over the last few years. He notes that it seems they have hit a wall at just under 400,000 contract soldiers. At the same time, the number of draftees seems to be declining slightly even though Russia has passed the worst of its demographic black hole. How are they staffing these new units? Also, can you comment on the recent announcement that the land forces are staffing 1 of 3 BTGs with draftees and keeping them away from front line combat?

                                                          Like

                                                          Reply

                                                          • There is not a demographic problem but a choice on where to spend money. Contracts are simply a question of money, if they wanted more contractors they could have them. However, with 3-5% spending sequester they have to make choices between force size, readiness, and capability.

                                                            Draftees are declining to plan, since they want to get to a sustainable number somewhere around 220-230k. The short answer is that they will create tiered formations at 100-90-80% staffing and have to eat the manpower that way. Golts is wrong on this, predicting some return to cadre formations. Large divisions do not need 100% staffing and can be setup under mobilization model to take people in during period of threat. So I think the short answer to this question is mobilization.

                                                            USSR had a great system for mobilization, and not so great system of command and control. The Russian military now has a great system for command and control, but largely destroyed Soviet mobilization model – no operational reserve, etc. This was always one of the unfinished pieces from the mil reforms.

                                                            As I understand it, a brigade is only supposed to force generate 2 BTGs anyway, and the rest is its reserve. This announcement does not tell us much and I’m skeptical of official statistics, although it is useful to see that they think of the force in BTG counts and are structuring it less on number of brigades/divisions but mostly on the basis of force generation potential (unlike NATO which focuses on defense spending and excel spreadsheets that wont fight). The conscripts are there to be recruited as contractors at the end of their year. However we don’t know in a 6 regiment division how many battalions are supposed to be contract vs conscript, though we can glean that Russians don’t intend to send conscripts to fight in the initial period of war.

                                                            Liked by 1 person

                                                            Reply

                                                            • Thank you for that. How many soldiers does a BTG have? Around 1,000? If so, then 2 BTGs generated from each brigade is not that much larger than a Soviet regiment. Although, a BTG is likely much better trained and equipped than a regiment. How did they come up with the idea of a BTG in the first place?

                                                              Like

                                                            • 800-1200 depending, some can go up to 1500. A brigade is realistically a super sized regiment, since it has 3 maneuver battalions at its core. A BTG is exactly as good as its components are, it is a task organized formation or kampfgruppen. Most of the discussion on contractors and conscripts is rather strained by some strange notions about basic military organization and warfighting functions.

                                                              Liked by 1 person

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                                                          #####EOF##### The WordPress.com Blog

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                                                          #####EOF##### News – Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP

                                                          VIP News

                                                          Updates and features about our platform, services, and partners, as well as stories and events from across the enterprise WordPress community.

                                                          A group of women from ONA's Women Leadership Academy posing in front of a brick wall.

                                                          March 2019 VIP Roundup

                                                          The WordPress team recently celebrated another major milestone with the release of WordPress 5.1, alongside news that the platform now […]

                                                          Read more

                                                          Freedom to innovate: VIP at Change Forum 2019

                                                          Product managers gathered in London to share lessons learned about audience engagement and growth whilst leading product teams.

                                                          Read more
                                                          Thirteen orange lego people nestled in the snow holding a black sign that reads 'VIP Launch'

                                                          February VIP Roundup

                                                          After a brief stint away for the holidays, 2019 is off with a bang (or, a shake, for the VIP […]

                                                          Read more

                                                          Human Made’s approach to Gutenberg? Don’t repeat yourself.

                                                          Libby Barker, a Senior Project Manager, and K. Adam White, a Senior Developer, both from Human Made, spoke about their […]

                                                          Read more

                                                          Bringing AMP and Gutenberg Readiness to Setka

                                                          By Ryan Sholin on
                                                          Posted in Case Studies, Community, Events & Training, News, PresentationsTagged ,

                                                          How the Setka Editor team built AMP compatibility into their custom post design tool

                                                          At our latest enterprise WordPress meetup in New York on November 13, Katya Bazilevskaya, Cofounder and CEO at Setka, talked about building the Setka Editor to be Gutenberg-ready and AMP-ready. The Setka Editor is a powerful tool for building beautiful longform stories out of building blocks, all optimized for mobile with full Google AMP integration.

                                                          The Setka team transformed WordPress galleries, javascript libraries, and even animations into AMP-ready HTML elements, speeding up mobile load times and giving users a lightning-fast experience.

                                                          Modern CSS approaches available in AMP help cut down on time to First Meaningful Paint, and Setka users are seeing the difference.

                                                          Watch Katya’s talk:

                                                          BigWP is our enterprise WordPress meetup series, that brings together developers, business leads, and product people who work with high-scale WordPress applications every day. To be the first to find out about the next enterprise WordPress event in New York, join the meetup group. You’ll find groups for other cities there as well.

                                                          Find all of the talks in the November’s BigWP playlist.

                                                          WordPress.com VIP Invests in The News Project

                                                          By Nick Gernert on
                                                          Posted in News

                                                          At WordPress.com VIP, we’ve worked closely with journalists since the very beginning of our service. From our earliest clients, news organizations were an integral part of WordPress’s growth from an open-source blogging platform to a technology that now powers more than 32% of all sites on the web.

                                                          Since that time, VIP has grown into an enterprise publishing platform that now boasts a customer list including some of the biggest news organizations in the world — CBS, Time.com, and News Corp., to name a few — to global brands like Microsoft, Airbnb, Capgemini, and Capital One.

                                                          But in this difficult business climate for news organizations, we want to double down on our commitment to journalism and a free (and sustainable) press. Today VIP is announcing that it has made a significant investment in The News Project, a new WordPress-based platform founded by Merrill Brown, the veteran digital news executive who helped launch MSNBC.com.

                                                          In addition to VIP’s financial investment, The News Project will be powered by VIP’s platform, with a goal of serving medium-sized digital news organizations around the world. You can read more about TNP’s vision here.

                                                          Along with VIP’s existing platform for large publishers and brands, Automattic’s funding of the new Newspack initiative with Google and other partners (announced yesterday), our own in-house media properties Longreads and The Atavist (bringing the best narrative storytelling to WordPress), and even the individual work of reporters like 12-year-old Hilde Lysiak, we are deeply committed to the sustainability of news organizations, large and small, around the world.  

                                                          We’re thrilled to work with Merrill and his team on this shared vision. For more information, go to thenewsproject.net.

                                                          Push Notifications at Scale at the New York Post

                                                          By Ryan Sholin on
                                                          Posted in Case Studies, Community, Events & Training, News, PresentationsTagged

                                                          How The New York Post uses WordPress to manage push notifications for a busy newsroom

                                                          Remy Stern, Chief Digital Officer at the New York Post, our hosts at BigWP NYC on November 13, led off the presentations with an explanation on how they use WordPress.com VIP to send thousands and thousands of push notifications, email alerts, and to control their breaking news alerts on the web, too.

                                                          Why use WordPress to manage notifications? It’s the central tool for workflow in their newsroom, and reduces the risk of errors by keeping things in one familiar system with a consistent user experience. As a bonus, that helps things move quickly.

                                                          “Speed really matters when you’re sending out breaking news push notifications.”

                                                          Maropost, Urban Airship, and even Apple News are all in the notifications mix for the New York Post, all managed from inside their WordPress admin.

                                                          Watch Remy’s talk in full:

                                                          BigWP is our enterprise WordPress meetup series, that brings together developers, business leads, and product people who work with high-scale WordPress applications every day. To be the first to find out about the next enterprise WordPress event in New York, join the meetup group. You’ll find groups for other cities there as well.

                                                          Find all of the talks in the November BigWP playlist.

                                                          Client Spotlight: Kurator at News Corp Australia

                                                          By Dave Coustan on
                                                          Posted in News, Publisher Spotlight

                                                          Peek behind the scenes with the WordPress team at News Corp Australia

                                                          We have had the pleasure of working with News Corp Australia (NCA) since early 2015. Today they host 21 sites with us, including market leaders News.com.au, Foxsports.com.au, and TheAustralian.com.au.

                                                          For NCA, WordPress represents one important application among others, within a complex and powerful systems architecture that predated their migration. They run their own massive content database and API (CAPI) and also use Méthode for print publishing. The smart ways they have integrated their existing components into WordPress as they migrated their flagship publications to it are a testament to their development vision and execution. They also point to one of WordPress’ great strengths. Its flexibility allows enterprise organizations with existing infrastructure to adapt and evolve with WordPress over time, rather than requiring a complete systems overhaul and mass migration all at once.

                                                          News Corp Australia Site Production Platform WordPress team
                                                          The SPP team at News Corp Australia

                                                          Kurator Lite is one of those powerful custom-built tools that NCA uses to bring external resources to authors and editors working in WordPress. After catching a glimpse of Kurator Lite in action, I chatted with Juan Zapata, head of the WordPress group, the Site Production Platform (SPP) team at News Corp Australia, to hear more about its history, how it works, and what’s in the pipeline for the SPP team.

                                                          You shared a really cool video that shows how an author or editor in WordPress at News Corp Australia can use Kurator Lite to work with all these different assets and content from all over the company. It looks like a really impressive piece of workflow. Tell me about its history.

                                                          Juan Zapata: Before we moved on to WordPress VIP we had two different platforms running. One was called FatWire, which was Oracle-based, for print and digital. The other one is Méthode, for print editions of newspapers. There was a disconnect between digital and print in which a user had to create the categories in both systems to be able to have them running correctly. This gap drove the company to create something to bridge the two.

                                                          That’s where the need for Kurator came about, a tool that manages whole sections of content in both. It’s a tool to help editorial tell the story a bit more easily and share it within these 2 worlds. After Kurator the team built Kurator Lite, which is that small panel you see in the video. That allows you to see the sections or the categories that you can assign to multiple stories. Then they embedded that thing into FatWire. And the same functionality was embedded into Méthode.

                                                          What year was that?

                                                          I started at News Corp Australia in 2015, and I think that project started in 2013.

                                                          How many publications and asset sources does Kurator search?

                                                          Kurator is basically an interface on our database, which is called CAPI, for Content API. At this stage, it has six million stories, last time I heard, like a month ago. The stories are syndicated across multiple sites, so it is basically a massive search on our database.

                                                          Really massive. So there was Kurator and you had versions of it implemented in these two CMS systems, FatWire and Méthode. Tell me about the WordPress implementation.

                                                          We decided, ‘okay, editors already know how to use this tool. Editors already are familiar with these interfaces. Let’s also embed it into WordPress, where they are managing digital publications.’ That’s the video that you saw in which you can basically find stories, search by section, drag and drop those assets from an external database, which is not within WordPress. Then WordPress will grab them and import them to be displayed and curated.

                                                          How recently was that embed for WordPress made available? When did the team finish that?

                                                          That needed to be done ASAP as we implemented WordPress…It went live at the end of 2015, so it had to be ready by that time because they need to be able to manage stories or curate stories within WordPress. They need to be able to search the stories that are not in WordPress to be able to import them and organize them and display that within the WordPress template. That had to go straight out.

                                                          The News Corp Australia Content API has over 6 million stories

                                                          How does it work? Can you walk me through some of the ways that an editor or an author would use it as they’re creating a story?

                                                          We tried to keep it as simple as possible. There are two ways of interacting with this thing. One of them is to rank or put collections into WordPress. Within WordPress, we created a custom post type that is a collection of items, of stories, of promos or whatever you want in there. It’s a collection of posts, basically.

                                                          You can go and open an interface for Kurator in your right panel. Then you search for whatever story you want. You drag it and drop it. You drop it into your container of the collection in that case. Then you can rank your collection in any place or your story in any part of the collection. It can be in the first location of that collection.

                                                          Then that collection is rendered in the website, for example, in the front page. It will be like the main stories in there. They can drop main stories in there directly, so they manage that concept of collections in there for that one. One way of doing it is through ranking stories into collections. You can open your Kurator panel, drag and drop, and pull your story directly in there.

                                                          The other way authors use Kurator Lite is, when you’re creating a story, basically you have your WordPress story in there. You create your title, your body. Within News Corp, we have the concept of containers. Container One is…if I translate that into WordPress, that will be your thumbnail image or your picture image. When you open the article page at the top you’ll see your featured image.

                                                          We have extended that functionality a little bit. What you can drop in there is multiple images and even videos. To keep it simple you just open your Kurator window on the right side, and then search for the image and then drop it into Container One. We have also extended this capability to the body of the article using this as oEmbeds elements.

                                                          Finally, we have something that is called Container Two right at the bottom, which is a container for related articles, things that you may be interested in that are related to these articles that you’re creating. The same functionality works there. You drag and drop and put it into that container. We tried to keep it as easy as possible as it helps to manually curate content.

                                                          The drag and drop looks really nice in the video. How does that work?

                                                          It took us a while to develop because the Kurator panel is an iframe. What we have to do is behind the scenes when you click on a drag event, it extends or puts a div that extends across the whole visible area of your editor. When you drag out of your iframe (visually as you are still within it), it starts sending post messages to that parent window, telling it, “Look, I’m in this position of that massive element.” Then it will be able to identify what to highlight behind the scenes.

                                                          Because there was no easy way of offering drag and dropping functionality between two iframes, we came with this approach. It’s all done through post messages going back and forth. Once you drop it, it sends another post message saying, “I drop it in this location.” Then we’ll add it and trigger the whole thing that is happening there.

                                                          It’s not the best implementation today because nowadays there are various different tools available that we can implement it with. There is now a way that we have figured out of integrating directly into WordPress, instead of using an iframe, but we tried to keep it as close as possible as it was implemented in the previous system because it was a known interaction and a business requirement. We knew what we were going to do in there at the time, basically, instead of going and trying different stuff with WordPress. But now we know a way of integrating more directly with WordPress, which will come later on.

                                                          What else does the full Kurator application do? What features are you most proud of?

                                                          Kurator does section management. If we translate that into WordPress terms, that will be category management. You can create categories in there. It does very good as it displays syndication rules in a very natural way. Kurator does not syndicate per se, but it has the rules of syndication. You can create a section within Kurator, and that section will say, “Okay, when somebody selects this specific section, I have to put it in this website in this category, in this other website in this category, in this website in this category.” It will tell CAPI, “You have to publish this information into all these sites.”

                                                          That’s one of the fantastic features that Kurator has in there, section management and syndication management.

                                                          The other one, of course, is Kurator Lite, which is for searching assets. That’s the part that’s integrated into WordPress.

                                                          The other one is legal kill. The whole concept of legally killing an asset is to remove it from any website as soon as possible for legal reasons. You say, “I want to legal kill this item,” but the problem is that the asset has been syndicated to multiple sites. You cannot say, “Yeah, it’s deleted from all the sites,” until you get confirmation from all the sites. To accomplish this Kurator verifies all the sites that it has been syndicated to and starts pulling information from there to see if everything was successful depending on the information that it has. It stays there until it finishes. If there is an error, it will notify people about it. It’s a very robust platform built in Node.js with AngularJS. It’s very interesting. It’s completely separate to WordPress, completely separate to CAPI. It’s its own beast.

                                                          How much of a team supports Kurator?

                                                          It’s three people. It’s a very small team. It was built long ago, and the core of it hasn’t needed to be touched since then. They built it as a plugin system – one plugin is search. Another plugin is the legal kill functionality. Another plugin is the section management piece. That core thing, they haven’t touched it since they built it. That’s how well they built it. It was a very good engineering task that they did in there for that one. Yeah. At this stage, it’s three people maintaining it.

                                                          Tell me about the SPP team, what does your team do and how do you work?

                                                          Within the company, we are the core team that powers WordPress and the teams that all the other product teams developed. We are responsible for ingesting content from our content API, CAPI into WordPress, getting that synced correctly in WordPress, Developing and maintaining our own editor and supporting theme developers with extra plugins within other functions of the team.

                                                          We are 4 WordPress PHP developers, 2 testers, and 1 automation tester, who is also a developer.

                                                          We actually have 52 different plugins that allow us to do a lot of stuff in our system within WordPress. To name some we have CAPI sync which controls the translation and ingestion of content to WordPress, Authoring which allows editors to create content within WordPress with all the different containers and integrations, Kurator integration, CHP integration which is our archive of images not hosted within WordPress, Legal Kill, Draft Post, Expire Post, Site Migration, I can go on…The list is massive.

                                                          What’s coming up on the SPP roadmap?

                                                          One big one is, we removed the previous liveblogging functionality that we were using, which was with a third party. We are bringing it into WordPress using VIP’s Liveblog plugin. We have been rolling that out this last month. Now we’re rolling out AMP support for live blogging which I’m really keen and looking forward to getting it out. Also, we are working on migrating to VIP Go to which our plugins need a bit of massaging but nothing that worries me.

                                                          That’s great. What kinds of use cases around News Corp is live blogging used for mostly? Is it sports? Is it entertainment?

                                                          Almost everything. Sports is the main one that you will see in there, but they have rolling stories around every morning that says, “Things that you need to know today.” Think of it like a live coverage story. They’re just churning stories in there into the Liveblog, and that appears in your homepage saying, “Things that you need to know today. This happened, or this happened yesterday.” They change that every 10 minutes, every 15 minutes. It’s like a live blogging functionality, but they use it in that part of the site. That’s used every day.

                                                          Political applications as well, they use it. Catastrophic events, like fires. Anything that needs a live blog, but basically the two main ones are sports, and then daily things that are happening in the city.

                                                          To learn more about our work with News Corp Australia, check out this case study. 

                                                          November Enterprise WordPress Roundup

                                                          By Rachel Zick on
                                                          Posted in Monthly Roundup, News

                                                          At the risk of early December overshadowing an exciting November, we have to lead off with the biggest headline from the WordPress community in years. Just last week we all celebrated the completion of months of design, development, and refinement: the release of WordPress 5.0 featuring the new block editor! And add to that the release of AMP for WordPress version 1.0, as well as an open source theme based on Big Bite’s new platform for Amnesty International, all in just the past several days. There was a whole lot of November before that, including a BigWP event in New York and launches for Indian Express, Thrive Global, Boston Herald, National University, and SheKnows. Read on and we’ll bring you up to speed with notes from across the enterprise WordPress community.

                                                           

                                                          Matt Mullenweg discussed the release and next phases of WordPress 5.0 in his annual State of the Word address at WordCamp US. (Photo by Val Vesa.)

                                                          WordPress 5.0 Arrives

                                                          • The future of WordPress is here!  Congratulations to the core team and all of the colleagues, partners, and community members who made the WordPress 5.0 release a reality. VIP clients, check the Lobby for all the details on deployment at VIP and next steps.
                                                          • Project lead Matt Mullenweg’s State of the Word (full video) at WordCamp US outlined the next phases of the Gutenberg project, including customization outside the post/page, collaborative editing, workflows, and multilingual innovations.
                                                          • Our own Simon Dickson runs down highlights from the State of the Word as relates to the enterprise WordPress community.
                                                          • Jeffrey Paul, core contributor and team lead at XWP, composed this WordPress 5.0 Field Guide to help you navigate the ins and outs of the new release. 
                                                          Hand holding cube with the letter A
                                                          First annual Automattic Design Award winners were announced at WordCamp US last week (photo by finalist Ahmad Awais).

                                                          News and Releases

                                                          • Nashville welcomed WordCamp US, the largest WordCamp in North America, last week. Check out WCUS on Twitter for conference photos, session takeaways, and lively post-event chatter.
                                                          • Also at WordCamp US, Automattic announced the winners for the first-ever Automattic Design Award! See the full list on the award website. 
                                                          • BigWP NYC brought our friends at the New York Post, Setka, 10up, and Human Made together along with a packed house. Topics included integrating plugins with AMP, decoupled WordPress architecture for the enterprise, and more. Stay tuned for videos from the talks, coming soon. 
                                                          • When PMC acquired Rolling Stone, they turned to XWP and VIP to bring the beloved brand’s digital experience up to date. The Make WordPress Marketing team just published XWP’s case study documenting the collaboration. 
                                                          • Congrats to the AMP project on the release of version 1.0 of the official AMP Plugin for WordPress.
                                                          • rtCamp worked with the Indian Express team to revamp their flagship website on VIP. Their Gutenberg Fields Middleware plugin, which makes it easier to create custom Gutenberg blocks, is now compatible with WordPress 5.0. And more than a dozen rtCampers attended WordCamp Ahmedabad as proud sponsors and volunteers.
                                                          • K. Adam shared some techniques Human Made are using to bring familiar React-ecosystem developer conveniences to their Gutenberg work.
                                                          • 10up teamed up with StoryCorps for a poignant Google Doodle tribute honoring Veteran’s Day in the US. 
                                                          • Alley wrote about applying scrum techniques beyond the development team. 
                                                          • Big Bite took their latest work building a new block editor-ready platform for Amnesty International one step further. Their new open source theme makes some of those tools available for any organization to use. 
                                                          • Hello partnered with Coral Robots to tackle the $2B robot industry. CEO and Creative Director David Lai published a piece about the lack of Asian American mentors in the design agency world. 
                                                          • Inpsyde is offering an Advent calendar of helpful blog posts to celebrate the season. Here’s the first post of several in the series.
                                                          • Trew Knowledge relaunched Hip2Save on VIP, giving them a refreshed interface and new community features.
                                                          • XWP released the BigCommerce for WordPress plugin and shared their take on why tech companies should invest in WordPress.  
                                                          • Rasmus Lerdorf, inventor of PHP, turned 50 on November 22.

                                                          Platform Notes

                                                          • As mentioned above, WordPress 5.0 has been released! VIP clients, you will experience no immediate change to your publishing experience. Check out the Lobby for notes on next steps and working with the Gutenberg plugin as the project moves on to next phases. 
                                                          • Domains have come to the VIP Dashboard. Currently a simple list of domains mapped to your environment, VIP has big plans for its future functionality.
                                                          • VIP CLI was updated to 1.2.1:
                                                            •  We now display a preview for vip sync which details the backup date/time being synced and the search/replace to be performed.
                                                            • We now display the primary domain, instead of the *.go-vip.co domain in and vip app list.
                                                            • More details here.
                                                          • Jetpack was updated to 6.8.1 (Lobby post for VIP clients).
                                                          • VIP MU plugins updates include: 
                                                            • The Query Monitor update from 3.0 to 3.1.1 includes lots of changes such as a logger, accessibility fixes, and bug fixes. This release also introduces a Dark Mode.
                                                            • Fixes and optimizations for purging file URLs from our cache. 

                                                          Spotlight

                                                          The Dekode team in their Oslo office

                                                          Dekode, based in Oslo, Norway, is the leading enterprise WordPress agency in the Nordics. They blend design, development, and strategy work to build cost-effective, self-sustaining solutions for enterprise clients like Tidal, Facebook, and the Norwegian government. Read more about what they’re building in our latest partner profile.

                                                          Upcoming Events

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                                                          • Speaker applications are open until January 7 for the first-ever WordCamp Nordic coming to Helsinki March 7-9.  
                                                          • Fancy a warmer clime? Join IRE and NICAR in Newport Beach, CA on March 7-9 for their annual conference devoted to data journalism. 

                                                          State of the Word 2018 and Enterprise WordPress

                                                          By Simon Dickson on
                                                          Posted in News

                                                          Last week saw the release of WordPress 5.0, the project’s first major update in a little over a year. It’s most notable for the addition of the new Gutenberg editor component, which introduces blocks as the new mental model for WordPress content management.

                                                          In his 2018 State Of The Word speech, project lead Matt Mullenweg told attendees at WordCamp US that the pace of change would remain high. Gutenberg, he explained, was only the start of a process to address some fundamental problems in the software’s overall user experience.

                                                          Here’s our selection of key highlights for VIP clients and the enterprise WordPress community.

                                                          WordPress is all-in on blocks

                                                          Blocks have been designed to be predictable and tactile. They can cope with the full range of functionality expected of any WordPress site: they can be simple, like a text block, or as rich as an entire e-commerce interface.

                                                          They reflect the reality of HTML structure, making it (finally!) possible to meet user expectations on things like copy-and-paste from applications like word processors. But as developers we’re able to simplify their presentation, make their function readily apparent to users, and make them reusable across the interface.

                                                          Already we’ve seen an explosion of creativity within the community. Creators of well-established plugins have made early efforts to adapt their interfaces to exploit the potential of blocks: Matt specifically highlighted the popular Yoast SEO and AMP plugins, which provide feedback on a block-by-block basis. And new plugins are being created, bringing structured content into the editor area without the clumsy use of shortcodes.

                                                          We’re also seeing the growth of libraries, toolkits and tutorials, making it easier than ever for developers to surface complex functionality or embed external services within the authoring experience. It won’t take long for users to expect to find a block for every purpose.

                                                          Matt Mullenweg, State Of The Word 2018

                                                          Blocks will break out of the text box

                                                          Matt confirmed that the next challenge for Gutenberg is to take the same block concept beyond post content. He showed examples of how blocks might replace what we currently know as ‘widgets’ and ‘menus’. Configuration would take place within the WordPress admin area, in the Customizer – or perhaps even inline, on the front end.

                                                          Development of phase two will take place, as before, in plugin form – giving developers plenty of visibility into the process, and plenty of time for experimentation and testing.

                                                          Key enterprise functionality ahead

                                                          Matt also shared his thinking for the third and fourth phases of the Gutenberg initiative, both with particular appeal to large scale professional content publishers.

                                                          Phase three is set to focus on collaboration and workflows. It is likely to include content locking based on blocks, rather than pages as now. This will be especially valuable to newsrooms working on breaking stories: we know many of our clients already have elaborate workarounds to allow journalists to work on different parts of the same article simultaneously.

                                                          Matt admitted: “One of the reasons that copy-and-paste from Google Docs to Gutenberg is so good, is that when I’m writing a post that I’m going to collaborate on, Google Docs is better for that. But if we can integrate these workflows directly into WordPress, we can integrate them with user systems, we can integrate them with revisions, and we can allow them to be fully extensible in a way that a SaaS service will never, ever be.”

                                                          Phase four will finally bring an official way for WordPress to support multilingual publishing. Numerous proven approaches already exist, of course. But the lack of a canonical solution within WordPress core is often cited as a weakness, and existing solutions often cannot guarantee to be compatible with other plugins and services.

                                                          Both these phases, proposed for 2020 and beyond, are likely to have implications for existing solutions, including plugins created and recommended by VIP. We’re excited to contribute our experience in these areas to the core initiatives, and encourage all of our clients to get involved as well. Feedback and participation from VIP clients provided the core team with critical insights during phase one, and those insights become even more pertinent as the team takes on the next areas of focus.

                                                          Enterprise takeaways in brief

                                                          • The next phases of the Gutenberg project will continue to take place in plugin form. This will allow enterprise teams to test and adopt new functionality gradually as it comes out, and evaluate it in the context of existing workflows and customizations.
                                                          • Phase two will focus on admin elements outside of pages and posts, further simplifying and streamlining the experience for users.
                                                          • Phase three will focus on collaboration and workflows, which will be particularly useful for busy newsrooms as well as brand and product teams.
                                                          • The fourth phase will take on multilingual publishing, bringing a canonical solution into core.

                                                          There are lots of ways for you to participate in the project! Whether directly through the many points of entry outlined on Make.WordPress.org, by sharing a private demonstration and feedback session with us at your offices, or simply by testing and working with the new features as they are developed, you can play a critical role in the project’s success.

                                                          Photos courtesy of: Brian Peat, Jen Hooks, Val Vesa. Thank you!

                                                          Ready to get started?

                                                          Drop us a note.

                                                          No matter where you are in the planning process, we’re happy to help, and we’re actual humans here on the other side of the form. 👋 We’re here to discuss your challenges and plans, evaluate your existing resources or a potential partner, or even make some initial recommendations. And, of course, we’re here to help any time you’re in the market for some robust WordPress awesomeness.

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                                                          #####EOF##### FSB Border Guard – Russia Military Analysis

                                                          Tag: FSB Border Guard

                                                          The Kerch strait naval skirmish

                                                          Michael Kofman7 Comments

                                                          After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

                                                          On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

                                                          Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

                                                          towing command ship

                                                          On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

                                                          One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

                                                          Don ramming.jpg

                                                          Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

                                                          Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

                                                          original

                                                          Another shot

                                                          Izumrud

                                                          Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

                                                          blocked strait.jpg

                                                          After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

                                                          Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

                                                          damaged Berdyansk.jpg

                                                          Ships parked at Kerch

                                                          parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

                                                          Some thoughts –

                                                          The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

                                                          Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

                                                          That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

                                                          Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

                                                          12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

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                                                          #####EOF##### Valerie Thomas – 44CON

                                                          Valerie Thomas

                                                          default Twitter: @hacktress09
                                                          Valerie Thomas is a Senior Information Security Consultant for Securicon LLC that specializes in social engineering and physical penetration testing. She is also coauthor of – Building A Security Awareness Program. After obtaining her bachelor’s degree in Electronic Engineering, Valerie led information security assessments for the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) before joining private industry. Throughout her career, Valerie has conducted penetration tests, vulnerability assessments, compliance audits, and technical security training for executives, developers, and other security professionals. Additionally, Valerie has presented and trained at multiple BSides events, Derbycon, Black Hat, Defcon, HackMiami, and several other conferences.

                                                          Valerie has presented at:

                                                          • 44CON 2014:  Social Engineering Your Own – Developing An Awareness Training Program That Actually Works
                                                          #####EOF##### WordPress.com
                                                          #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Russian Strategy – Russia Military Analysis

                                                          Tag: Russian Strategy

                                                          Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine

                                                          Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                                          RAND Corporation has published a report for which I was the lead author and principal investigator back in the summer of 2015. The project included contributions from several other researchers. This work has spent a long time in the making since much of the research was done in 2015.  I hope the report will expand existing knowledge on what happened in early months of the conflict in Ukraine, both during the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of conflict in the Donbas. You can find the full report on RAND’s website here.

                                                          Abstract and Key Findings from the report’s cover page below

                                                          This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February–March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February–late May 2014). It examines Russia’s approach, draws inferences from Moscow’s intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere.

                                                          These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia’s operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia’s operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances — political, historical, geographical, and military — that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia’s military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented — and perhaps ill-conceived — effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation.

                                                          This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia’s armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere.

                                                          Key Findings

                                                          Russia’s Operation to Annex Crimea Represented Decisive and Competent Use of Military Force in Pursuit of Political Ends

                                                          • Russia was able to seize the territory of a neighboring state with speed and mobility.
                                                          • The political maneuvering on the peninsula during the invasion suggests that it may have been launched without a predetermined political outcome in mind.
                                                          • Russia likely sought to seize Crimea, and then evaluated its political options depending in part on how the intervention was received at home and abroad.

                                                          Russia’s Operations in Crimea Benefited from a Series of Highly Favorable Circumstances That Makes It Difficult to Replicate

                                                          • These included political, historical, geographical, linguistic, and military advantages in the region that have only partial analogues elsewhere in the former Soviet republics.
                                                          • The confined geography of the peninsula, the proximity of Crimea to Russia, and its existence as a separate political unit within Ukraine gave Russia leverage.
                                                          • Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was nearby, with legitimate transit routes that could be leveraged for a covert operation.

                                                          Russian Leaders Are Likely to Consider Eastern Ukraine to Be a Strategic Success but an Unsuccessful Operation

                                                          • Russia’s efforts in Eastern Ukraine proved to be a series of improvisations in response to resistance and friction when the initial political warfare effort foundered.
                                                          • The lessons of Eastern Ukraine are rather mixed, demonstrating the limits of low-cost asymmetrical approaches even against a relatively weak and vulnerable state.
                                                          • Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation.

                                                          A COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO RUSSIA’S USE OF FORCE: MEASURE TWICE, INVADE ONCE

                                                          Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                          My latest article examining Russian use of force, published on War on the Rocks.

                                                          —————————————————————–

                                                          In the 20th century, the Soviet military’s penchant for area of effect artillery and armored firepower had earned it the reputation of a large hammer always in search of nails.  This popularized impression stuck with Russia long after the Soviet Union’s demise, but today’s Kremlin employs military power in a much more nuanced manner to pursue its objectives.  In recent conflicts, Russia has demonstrated a keen understanding of how to apply this instrument of national power to achieve desired political ends, doling out force in prescribed doses in the quest for decisive leverage.  Although Russian military power remains a blunt force instrument, the state wields it more like a rapier, demonstrating discretion and timing.

                                                          In a previous article on the key pillars of Russian strategy, I argued that Moscow favors an emergent strategy based on “fail fast and fail cheap” approaches. The Russian military itself has a long way to go in terms of modernization, but conversely, America’s political leadership needs to reexamine how great powers, with far fewer resources, use the so-called “big stick” to get the job done.  The unipolar world order appears to be rapidly melting, while great powers are back on the agenda.  When it comes to use of force by peer rivals contesting America’s interests, it is only going to get harder from here on out.

                                                          The United States may not wish to emulate Russian approaches, but American strategists should certainly study then.  Those who fail to learn from the experience of others must inevitably gain it at personal cost.  As Mark Twain  is said to have remarked, “The man who does not read has no advantage over the man who cannot read.”  To take another step along the journey of understanding Russian strategy, I explore how Russia changes facts on the ground, compels its adversaries, and achieves much of this on the cheap.  The goal is to examine Russian use of force and draw lessons for an era when American use of power must become judicious, timely, and better married to something that resembles political objectives.

                                                          Read the rest here.

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                                                          #####EOF##### Military Power – Russia Military Analysis

                                                          Tag: Military Power

                                                          Zapad watch – summary of ‘post exercise’ exercises (the Zapad hangover)

                                                          Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                          Zapad is over, but exercises and drills go on across Russia, like an echo bouncing across the military districts. In this final blog entry on Zapad I’ll give a sense of what the Russian military has been doing since Zapad officially ended. Most of these exercises are not part of Zapad 2017, but as always, it’s a bit hard to tell. Some seem like a continuation on the very same theme, perhaps for 2nd echelon forces or those that couldn’t get their training done during the week of the event. This is the final blog entry on Zapad – covering this exercise was mildly exhausting.

                                                          Russia’s Fleets had a few interesting exercises and live fire drills even though the main event had ended. Central and Southern MDs are quite active with large scale air defense and artillery exercises. Thousands of Russian troops are still at ranges in the far east, Siberia, North Caucasus and southern Russia.

                                                          A host of naval infantry, spetsnaz and special designation support units are conducting drills geared towards their specific mission sets and there is a wave of exercises across bases outside Russian territory, including: Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Tajikistan.

                                                          Western MD – A few photos of Russian units heading back.

                                                          BMPs on railcars

                                                          Il-76

                                                          Some interesting announcements cropped up after the last day of Zapad:

                                                          Western MD – There was a special command and control training with topographic and geodesic support units (sounds like those controlling satellites) for providing navigation at different levels to Russian forces. More interestingly, in the ‘strategic direction’ (suppose northwest) they worked out how to ensure the accuracy of missile units and artillery. They also worked on detecting jamming sources and how to adjust satellite navigation guidance for said jamming. About 250 servicemen involved all together. Sorry the translation is somewhat awkward given the terms involved, but this may have been one of the technically more important exercises and of course no photos available for something like this.

                                                          Southern MD – There’s a large scale air defense and artillery exercise ongoing at two ranges, Kaputsin Yar and Yeysky (near Rostov-on-Don).  An artillery battalion from a motor rifle brigade garrisoned in Volgograd were drilling at the training range Prydboi. This ‘division’ of artillery employed MSTA-S in support of a motor rifle battalion. Drones were used in the exercise, including to simulate enemy drones to which the artillery division had to react, i.e. quickly pack up from firing position and get themselves road mobile. Around 500 servicemen and 100 piece s of artillery took part. The exercise will conclude with 120mm Hosta mortar fires and Tornado-G MLRS. A sniper unit is training at the same range, about 50 men total, together with a Spetz recon team.

                                                          Snipers

                                                          At Kaputsin Yar, Russian air defense units from their base in Abkhazia ran live fire exercises with OSA-AKM, Strela-10M, and Igla MANPADS. About 300 servicemen and 30 pieces of equipment listed. Total it seems 1500 men and 400 pieces of equipment running air defense drills in Southern MD.

                                                          Eastern MD – As drills continue in this district, Spetsnaz units in Khabarovsk conducted raids against two enemy camps. They arrived via Mi-8AMTSh helicopters, and were retrieved after a 10km march. Meanwhile in Zabaykalsky Krai (by Mongolia) Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters provided air cover for the insertion of airborne units. The Su-30SMs practiced dog fighting and dealing with various forms of electronic warfare.

                                                          At the Joint Sea 2017 exercise with China’s PLAN the two sides worked on submarine rescue with Bester-1 and LR-7 submersible vehicles.

                                                          Central MD – More than 500 artillerymen are currently running live fire exercises in Orenburg at the Totskoye range. They located the target with drones and then concentrated fires with BM-21 Grad, MSTA-S and other types of artillery. About 120 pieces of equipment total. Meanwhile in Western Siberia a S-400 unit is conducting live fire exercises against incoming enemy missile strikes.

                                                          Tajikistan – Artillerymen from Russia’s base in Tajikistan destroyed a terrorist convoy carrying weapons. They detected them with Zastava drones, locating the supposed convoy of cars, and then opened up with 120mm Sani mortars.

                                                          Tajikistan

                                                          Transnistria – Not to be left out of the war, Russian units ran some live fire drills in this long frozen conflict, with about 350 servicemen and 30 pieces of equipment involved. The machinery looked rather dated and worn, older BTRs and BRDMs. Still the ‘peacekeeping’ unit gave it their go to demonstrate that a battalion of Russian forces was still alive and quite operational in this breakaway region.

                                                          Don’t forget about us, we’re still peacekeeping.

                                                          Transnistria 2

                                                          Caspian Flotilla – Naval Infantry belonging to the flotilla (two battalions) hit the mountain training range of Adanak in Dagestan for some exercises in reconnaissance with the KRYS ‘Strelets’ system. About 600 naval infantrymen and some Nona self-propelled mortars were involved. They were working out integration between identifying targets with the personal kit system, relaying them to supporting mortar artillery using the same system, and then servicing the target.

                                                          CF Marines

                                                          Baltic Fleet – Select units of 11th Corps still have some work to do, practicing for ‘counter-terrorism’ drills. I’m not sure when the last incident of terrorism occurred in Kaliningrad but one suspects it’s a low probability event. In reality they were working on dealing with infiltrators, who had seized Russian army uniforms and were seeking to take over key technical facilities on the base, i.e. enemy special forces units. Seems they sorted out NATO, but there are still a few scenarios to be worked out regarding adversary SOF. The exercise is relatively small, about 150 servicemen and 20 pieces of equipment, including some drones, and high speed boats.

                                                          Baltic Fleet.jpg

                                                          The Baltic Fleet’s S-400 units may have only held electronic launches during Zapad. Now they are moving to Ashylyk range in Astrakhan for live fire exercises against high altitude, low altitude, maneuverable and ballistic targets. The scenarios are meant to recreate combat conditions, force the batteries to camouflage, displace, and work under enemy suppression. Quite possibly the reason for this is that the Baltic region right now is filled to the brim with various ISR and intel collection assets from different countries due to all the exercises picking up every wave and particle recordable – so perhaps they wished to do some S-400 launches away from so many prying eyes. About 200 servicemen and 20 pieces of equipment are involved according to the official announcement.

                                                          North Fleet – In the course of exercises in the Barents, White and Laptev Seas (also New Siberian Islands) the fleet fired 13 different types of missiles from ships, submarines and CDCMs.  The Fleet’s commander, Vice Admiral Nikolai Evmenov explained that the scenarios modeled existing and possible threats. Meanwhile on Kotelny archipelago it kind of wasn’t over. The specialized Arctic brigade made a landing via LST Kondopoga. The units included several BTR-80s, MT-LBTs, and Vityaz all terrain vehicles. After the landing, four platoons mimicked an assault to seize a strategic height on the island.

                                                          North Fleet invades Kotelny

                                                          Peter the Great’s surface action group still had some work left on the way home. Orel, the Oscar-II SSGN and Peter the Great (Kirov-class) held some interesting duels in the Barents Sea. Peter the Great worked on ASW, and fired its ‘Vodopad’ ASROC system, while the Oscar practiced torpedo attacks.

                                                          (looks like Dmitri Donskoy is out there with them)

                                                          Northern Fleet

                                                          Notable photos:

                                                          Necessity is the mother of invention (is there anything exercise balls can’t do?)

                                                          exercise ball

                                                          PLAN Teamwork

                                                          Chinese marines

                                                          Zapad watch – summary of day seven (last day)

                                                          Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                                          The final day of Russia’s Zapad 2017 exercise just concluded. It’s over now….or is it? No, seriously, it’s probably over. Russian units in Belarus and Leningrad Oblast had a final go at it and then began to pack up their bags for a return trip to their garrisons. Although weather continued to be poor, there were some interesting moments on the last day, from VDV assaults to Tu-22M3 bomber flights over the Baltic and Norwegian Sea. Russia’s long range aviation also began waking up for some joint tests with air defense units. And an RS-24 road mobile ICBM launch, which is probably neither here nor there.

                                                          BLUF: The Russian Navy and Air Force remained active, shooting down cruise missiles, and running simulations with ground based air defenses. VDV began preparations for return flights back to base. Logistics units of various types, particularly railway troops, communications, radar, and CBRN continued specialized technical drills. Not all is quiet on the Central and Eastern Front though. Readiness checks, inspections, and some fresh exercises suggest that while Zapad is over the busy training regimen will continue for Russian forces into October. Some of these may be connected to Zapad, while others not.

                                                          MSTA-S.JPG

                                                          Also Lithuania didn’t get invaded and Belarus seems like it will be ok

                                                          Meanwhile it’s unclear if the RS-24 Yars launches (12th and 20th) have anything at all to do with this as part of an escalation dynamic or just RVSN working off its own schedule for missile tests. Probably both, the first launch was likely RVSN doing its own testing and the second one is an open question mark – could be terminal phase of Zapad.

                                                          The exercise aside, there were other more important things on the minds of Russia’s General Staff. In Syria Jabhat al-Nusra launched an attack north of Hama which endangered a platoon of Russian MPs operating in the area together with KSO special forces. Rumor has it that most of the available rotary and fixed wing aviation Russia had available in Syria was called in to repel the attack, preventing encirclement. Russia’s MoD blamed US intelligence services for instigating the Nusra assault. From the sound of it, the last day of Zapad almost got too exciting as the real war in Syria made its presence felt.

                                                          Belarus

                                                          Borisovsky range – Lukashenko came to observe the final day of the exercise, but there was no joint photo op between him and V. Putin since they were at different ranges. The optics of collaboration and integration with Belarus were missing the personal touch. Quite possibly it was at one or the other leader’s decision not to have a joint review of forces.

                                                          It’s all great but where’s my ally? (In all seriousness probably Lukashenko doesn’t want to be seen with Putin so he can play the role of ‘unwilling ally’ and maintain options for dealing with the West)

                                                          Lukashenko

                                                          Russia

                                                          Training continued at Luzhsky (Luga), and around Pskov, but Kaliningrad’s range Pravdinsky seemed to wrap things up.

                                                          Russian Tu-22M3 bombers conducted flights over the Baltic and Norwegian Sea, during which they were greeted by US, Belgian, Finnish, and Swedish fighters.

                                                          At Plesetsk Cosmodrome a RS-24 YARS roadmobile ICBM was launched from a Krona shelter targeting the Kura test range on Kamchatka. Zapad seems to be book ended by two RS-24 ICBM launches, a silo-based test on September 12th, and a road-mobile launch on September 20th. The connection between Zapad and these missile tests is unclear. The first launch on September 12th was supposedly delivering a newer type of reentry vehicle (or decoy?)

                                                          Yars-M-20170920.png

                                                          Another interesting exercise on this day: Russia’s air force practiced responding to terrorists hijacking a civilian airliner out of Moscow and redirecting it north (maybe Swedish insurgents). Two Su-27s on alert responded while Russia’s ground based air defenses tracked then plane and prevented it from leaving Russian airspace.

                                                          VDV Airborne – 76th Division crossed a river in their BMD vehicles and then assaulted enemy positions from behind enemy lines near Pskov. After this decisive action NATO units surrendered. Meanwhile, after completing the final day of drills, the VDV battalion airlifted into Kaliningrad reported to be preparing for departure back to their garrison. Looks like they’re packing up to go home. However it was not the best conclusion to the exercise for the VDV branch. The commander of Russia’s VDV was involved in a terrible automotive accident near Murmansk, and was taken to the hospital with serious injuries, along with aides who were in the vehicle with him.

                                                          VDV river crossing

                                                          Heading home

                                                          VDV returning from Kaliningrad

                                                          VKS Aerospace Forces – Su-35s in Telemba (Buryatia in eastern Siberia) shifted to an airbase in Zabaykalky Krai took on incoming enemy cruise missiles. Russia used Kh-55 target practice missiles, launched by Tu-95MS strategic bombers, as targets for air defenses at Telemba. Yes Russian strategic bomber aviation woke up to get itself in the game. This is taking place in the Eastern MD but seems to be a VKS + LRA exercise. Might be more strategic bomber drills to come, after all nuclear exercise season tends to follow in October.

                                                          Russia’s Aerospace Forces are heading back to their airbases. Well, not everyone, clearly Tu-22M3s had a busy day. Altogether the list of fixed wing and rotary aviation involved includes: Su-35s, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM, Mig-29SMT, Mi-28N, Mi-35, Mi-8, Ka-52. Special mention has been made throughout about how bad the weather was during the second half of the exercise.

                                                          VKS returning

                                                          Central MD – In Chelyabinsk there is an inspection of the 90th Armored Division (by the border  with Kazakhstan). Apparently 25-29 September there will be an exercise held in Chebarkyl, which may be the Central MD’s continuation of ‘Zapad related training.’

                                                          Eastern MD – Spetsnaz units in Khabarovsk Krai were lifted by Mi-8 AMTSh helicopters together with gear and then parachuted in to assault an enemy camp, then deployed for ambush behind enemy lines.

                                                          Khabarovsk VVO

                                                          Air defense units began an exercise focused on radar detection and tracking in Amur and Primoriye. They’re fielding Nebo and Nebo-SVU radars to detect, identify and track various types of targets. Part of the scenario is looking for sources of jamming and integrating the operating picture between two different air defense zones within the Eastern MD. It comes off like they’re working on dealing with low observation aircraft, because that’s the sort of thing radars of this type are good for. About 500 servicemen involved.

                                                          radar screen.jpg

                                                          Southern MD – Looks like enemy forces blew up a rail link in Kransodar and specialized technical units must respond to repair it. Railway troops, a CBRN unit, and other brigade elements completed a 200km march to the site, with 1000 servicemen and 200+ pieces of specialized equipment. Enemy forces were present in the area as well to complicate matters, and they had to practice air defense on the way.

                                                          railway troops SMD.jpg

                                                          Communications technicians created one information network across in N. Caucasus, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Armenia, and much of the Southern MD. Satellite and radio stations exchanged data while being suppressed by EW from enemy drones (probably Leer-3). Encrypted systems include Redut-2YS, MK VKS, and mobile radio stations R-166, R-419-L. About 3500 servicemen and more than 700 various pieces of equipment took part.

                                                          Russian units in Abkhazia, together with Abkhaz armed forces, destroyed enemy command posts as part of a recon-strike exercise. At the training ranges Nagvaloy and Tsabal artillery units practiced with 2s3 Akatsya, D-30 122mm towed artillery, and 120mm Sani mortars. BM-21 Grads were deployed, together with drones for targeting and recon. Data from drones was integrated via Strelets (individual soldier system) and artillery systems to deliver on short notice artillery strikes to identified targets. The point of the exercise was to workout integration between reconnaissance and the strike part of the equation. About 500 servicemen took part and 100 pieces of equipment.

                                                          Northern Fleet – Out in the Barents the surface action group led by Peter the Great (Kirov-class), together with Marshal Ushakov (Soveremenny-class), defended against a massed enemy air attack with anti-ship cruise missiles (though the targets were fired at a rate of one per minute so not exactly a massed salvo). They were backed by Mig-31s, shooting down six cruise missile targets in total launched by small missile boards (RM-120). The scenario had two phases: in the first Russian ships used their air defenses in collaboration with air support. A few were hit by S-300 Fort, one by Uragan, and two by R-33 air-to-air missiles. Phase two was close in weapons defense, involving one RM-120 target and two decoys to imitate missiles.

                                                          Meanwhile in the Arctic, Severomorsk (Udaloy-class) conducted live fire exercises, employing surface to air missiles (Kinzhal), CWIS guns, artillery, and even the troops onboard unloaded RPGs into floating targets. Pantsir-S1 (Arctic variants) practiced against various targets. The head of the Russian Navy, Adm Vladimir Korolev is personally visiting the Northern Fleet. According the MoD that’s a wrap for the North Fleet and they should be turning around for home.

                                                          Severomorsk launching Kinzhal

                                                          Severomorsk.jpg

                                                          Arctic Pantsir air defense

                                                          Arctic Pantsir-S1.jpg

                                                          P-15 Termit missile launched by Rubezh coastal defense system

                                                          Termit.JPG

                                                          Baltic Fleet – 11th Corps is standing down and returning to their garrisons according to the MoD. Ships are due back in Baltiysk.

                                                          Black Sea Fleet – An artillery regiment of the 22nd Army Corps (BSF) is conducting artillery and air defense drills at the Opuk training range. Elements of the separate naval infantry brigade are also involved in this exercise. About 50 pieces of equipment were noted, self-propelled artillery, BM-21 Grad, and Strela-M10 short range air defense systems. The BSF’s Su-24M naval aviation squadron played enemy aviation.

                                                          OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

                                                          Caspian Flotilla – Starting inspection and preparations across the flotilla’s ships in advance of a large exercise expected in October. Looks like they will have a busy training schedule after Zapad.

                                                          Pacific Fleet – Chinese marines are drilling in counter-terrorism at Russia’s Gornostay range, first phase of their joint exercise with PLAN for the coming week.

                                                          Russian forces in the Baltic region are beginning to return home, but the op tempo of exercise will continue into Central and Eastern MD. There may be further air defense, radar, and LRA exercises. General purpose ground forces in districts many time zones away from the scenario will continue repelling a conventional adversary as though they are part of the larger fight. Nuclear escalation was not an obvious part of the exercise, but definitely pre-nuclear deterrence was featured in R-500 launches. A more serious analysis to come – this is just a wrap up of the last day.

                                                          Notable Photos:

                                                          The Army’s strategic resource on the move (mobile kitchen)

                                                          the most important vehicle - kitchen

                                                          This

                                                          run faster

                                                          Plotting which of these kids to leave in Belarus

                                                          Mr. Burns

                                                          Zapad watch – summary of day six

                                                          Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                          We’ve almost made it, only one day to go. What could possibly go wrong? Seriously speaking though, other exercises starting up in the Far East suggest that some drills will continue past the September 20th date. Key activities:

                                                          • VDV conducted air drop, raiding, and airbase assault
                                                          • Kaliningrad repelled an enemy attack with a task organized BTG
                                                          • Russia’s Navy fought off surface action groups and amphibious landings in the Barents with ship borne, submarine, and CDCM launches
                                                          • Ground forces employed Iskander-K (R-500)
                                                          • Eastern MD went on alert in preparation for a larger ground force exercise while Central MD’s Tajikistan base also began to run drills
                                                          • VKS were busy intercepting enemy airpower and incoming cruise missiles

                                                          BLUF: Russian forces transitioned from simulated to actual strikes and offensive operations. R-500 GLCM was launched from Leningrad Oblast in Western MD. All in all, there was a healthy demonstration of Russia’s long range precision guided munitions, submarine, ship, coastal defense and ground launched. Horizontal escalation could be seen in the Eastern and Central MD. Scenarios unfolded expecting strikes in Central MD, and Eastern MD troops prepared for a large scale exercise in their district to repel ground forces.

                                                          Belarus

                                                          Osipovichsky range – Russian and Belarusian ground forces stopped NATO’s advance at the range, 4th Division’s newest motor rifle regiment continues the fight with T-80BV tanks. Artillery units engaged with Tornado-G, MSTA-S, Giatsint, BM-21 Grad. Belarus used Mi-8MTV-5 to ferry Russian airborne units onto the battlefield. Mi-28Ns provided air support in repelling the enemy. Belarusian drones Busel and Berkyt were employed to recon and target enemy positions for their MLRS detachments using BM-30 Smerch and Polonez. Not all went to plan – the weather was terrible and there was a 30 minute operational pause between defense and counter-attack – apparently someone important had to arrive to see the latter part.

                                                          T-80BV of 4th Division MRR

                                                          Borisovsky – Various combined groupings including VDV, artillery and combat aviation had a day of fighting. Here 6th Tank BDE from 1st Guards Tank Army. Spetsnaz units were shown for the first time, and they highlighted the employment of KRUS ‘Strelets’ systems for navigation, reconnaissance and communication.

                                                          Spez Borisovsky

                                                          Western MD, where a lot of the action continues (and the occasional live fire accident)

                                                          Luzhsky range – Everything was going well, until it wasn’t. A Ka-52 fired S-8 rockets near a crowd of observers. Unclear if it was a weapon malfunction or a judgment malfunction. Three people were hurt, plus a Leer-3 EW vehicle designed to command specialized Orlan drones.

                                                          Here is a video of the stike: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=4DGQVkuJ1p8

                                                          There’s a site with the helicopter’s gun camera http://www.yapfiles.ru/show/1756678/38dd695ae47ae3c0af890282b013b053.mp4.html

                                                          Here is the Leer-3 afterwards.

                                                          damaged Kamaz after Ka-52 strike

                                                          Pantsir-S1 air defense units practiced against low flying targets, with a An-2 simulating enemies at 50m altitude and 200km speed. Aerosol and smoke cover provided by specialized CBRN support troops. MTO troops continued to do MTO things, lots of fascinating stats were provided on number of mobile kitchens setup, etc.

                                                          Luzhsky range 2

                                                          Iskander R-500 cruise missile launches. As promised, they went from electronically simulated strikes to actual launches of cruise missiles today. Luzhsky range same some solid escalation.

                                                          R-500

                                                          R-500 launch 3.jpg

                                                          Electronic Warfare – Apparently for the first time in exercises EW troops deployed the RB-109A Bylina automatic control system that greatly increases the effectiveness of EW systems, and more importantly eliminates EW fratricide in terms one’s own comms systems. There’s not been much talk about what EW systems are actually being used, although Leer-3 drone EW system has been show multiple times.

                                                          VKS Aerospace Forces – Mig-31BMs were busy intercepting incoming cruise missiles fired by enemy planes. They were also engaged in a large air defense operation, intercepting 30 enemy targets approaching the practice ranges in Leningrad Oblast.

                                                          VDV Airborne – Another parachuting exercise took place at Strugi Krasniye near Pskov, conducted by the 76h Division based there. Looks like they dropped again near the range, perhaps a different battalion though – since this one had BMD-4Ms in it. Poor weather notwithstanding the drop was made at 800m, with about one battalion of 400 troops and 10 vehicles. After  landing they assaulted an enemy airfield. Then the units conducted a raid with BMD-4M and BTR-MD Rakushka, crossing a some water obstacle in the process (perhaps a small river), and overcoming the muddy ground in the area.

                                                          VDV landing

                                                          Yep that’s mud

                                                          VDV raiding party

                                                          Northern Fleet – Peter the Great (Kirov-class) launched five SS-N-19 anti-ship missiles in the Barents Sea at a simulated adversary, together with Admiral Ushakov, which fired a Moskit missile. Alongside the surface action group the live fire exercise was joined by Voronezh and Orel, two Oscar-II SSGNs. Ships in different positions converged missiles on targets at 200-300km range. The goal was to integrate a surface action group, SSGNs, and maritime aviation to service an enemy SAG at sea.

                                                          Bastion-P complexes back at the tip of Teriberskiy also fired on enemy forces at sea – range 400km. Yes, that’s right, according to them it was 400km for a complex that officially has a range of 350km in anti-ship  roles 🙂 Bastion goes up to 450km but this supposedly is against surface targets in high-high flight profile trajectory which is not what they were testing. From Kotelniy Island, Rubezh fired two Termit missiles (vintage shorter range systems) at 50km range. An Udaloy class destroyer also conducted live fire drills in the same area. This was the “Arctic defense” part of the exercise. Official numbers for Northern Fleet participation are 5,000 troops and 300 pieces of equipment.

                                                          Baltic Fleet/Kaliningrad – Pravdinsky range where most of the Baltic Fleet’s 11th Army Corps is drilling had its largest day of battle. BMD-2 vehicles suggest VDV was present in support of motor rifle units together with artillery. Orlan-10 and Grusha drones were employed throughout training, while naval aviation provided  support (Su-24 + Su-34). They also had Platforma-M combat UGVs. The mission was straightforward, they found a ‘diversionary group’ and had to march 60km to engage it. The forces were task organized with units from the motor rifle regiment, reinforced by artillery, and airborne units. After forcing a retreat, with Mi-24 helicopters and MLRS systems the enemy was chased down and destroyed.  Weather continued to be poor, nothing but rain.

                                                          Baltic Fleet.jpg

                                                          Bal coastal defense units engaged enemy ships with anti-ship missiles along with those fired by a Steregushchiy corvette. The coastal defense missile battery hit a target at sea, while one of the corvettes fired a Uran missiles (sea based variant of same Kh-35). Enemy forces  supposedly had jamming and EW. Unclear how that was simulated, perhaps another ship since they were also practicing EW at sea.

                                                          BAL

                                                          Black Sea Fleet – Admiral Grigorovich frigate and the fleet’s newest corvette, Vyshniy Volochek, put to sea for some sea trials and practiced air defense. Turks are visiting Novorossiysk with a LST for some sort of port of call.

                                                          Southern MD – Logistics units in Abkhazia, at the Tsabal range, trained in deploying a modern mobile communications system (Redut) in mountainous terrain which allows one to setup a unified radio communications network. They practiced setting up 32m antenna masts to establish a 2 mbps/sec network. This is much lower bandwidth than what’s up at Western MD but still quite interesting. The soldiers worked to setup communications at different frequencies and video conferencing (wonder how well their VTC technology works, and if its anything like ours…). Around 300 servicemen and 100 pieces of specialized equipment took part. Some named pieces of kit include Artek station mounted on a BTR-80, satellite communications Liven on an Ural base, radiorelay L1 on Kamaz.

                                                          southen MD Redut setup

                                                          Eastern MD – About 3000 troops and 500 pieces of equipment are deploying various drills on Sakhalin. Their large scale exercise is just beginning it seems. The war finally spread to the far east, and they too must find enemy recon groups and prepare to defend against enemy ground forces. T-72B tanks, BM-27 Uragan, BM-21 Grad and Giatsint-S systems will be deployed. Drone support includes Orlan and Zastava, while air support consists of Su-25s and Mi-8AMTSh helicopters. Supposedly various flamethrower units will be used as well.  In Zabaykalsky Krai (borders Mongolia) Russian S-300 units began drills in defending key MoD infrastructure. About 200 servicemen and 40 pieces of equipment involved.

                                                          Far East MD troops

                                                          Central MD -Tajikistan suddenly came alive. Seems Russian soldiers from 201st based there were airlifted to seize the command post of enemy bandits/diversionary groups. CBRN troops deployed heavy smoke and aerosols to cover movement of forces. Meanwhile in Republic of Khakassia railway forces began training in bridge laying 4 bridges with a cumulative length of 1000m across a river.  The scenario is quite interesting, some naughty adversary fired PGMs and destroyed the railway bridge over the river Enisey. Hence about 1500 servicemen and 550 pieces of specialized equipment have been raised on alert to restore the railway link across the river. Interesting assumption that Russian interior lines of communication could be severed at this stage of the conflict and railway troops are ready to be summoned in order to restore them (could be US or China really that’s to blame).

                                                          railway troops CMD

                                                          Notable photos:

                                                          Spetsnaz kill (element of surprise possibly ruined by photographer standing right there)

                                                          the surprize attack might have been ruined by the photographer being present.jpg

                                                          Foreign observers (is that a selfie moment in progress?)

                                                          observers

                                                          Zapad watch – summary of day five

                                                          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                          With phase two in full swing and Vladimir Putin now observing, there is action almost everywhere. The past few days have been lively, and somewhat hard to cover so in this post I’m summarizing some other MD’s events that were glossed over earlier.

                                                          BLUF: Russian forces are having a conventional high end fight across a 600km front in the Western MD, fleets are defending against enemy amphibious landings, airborne units are doing more drops, missile regiments have started live fire exercises with you guessed it – missiles. So we have horizontal escalation to different fronts and vertical escalation with Russian forces launching SRBM/Cruise missile strikes. The Russian Navy is defending littorals and maritime approaches as expected, recons strike complex is being tested in support of artillery, while airborne and ground forces are working together in defeating concentrated enemy formations. Special designation and special purpose units are also quite active across the districts.

                                                          Belarus

                                                          Osipovichskiy Range: The new Motor Rifle Regiment (423rd) of the 4th Division (1st Guards Tank Army) is training here with armor, motorized infantry, artillery, and air defense units. Seems this regiment was snapped together with a T-80BV battalion supporting it (4th DIV still has T-80 variants). My understanding is that a 3rd maneuver regiment was added to this division as of last year and is slowly being manned and equipped. MTO and engineering units are busy with camouflage and fortifications, meanwhile the T-80s are running a tank carousel, i.e. shoot and scoot drills.T-80

                                                          Another participant at this range is Belarus’ 120th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, they fielded armor, artillery and air defense in support of Russian forces. (4th Tank Division also seems to be in Syria supporting the push outside Deir-ez-Zor with pontoon bridges and logistics, so this unit is basically everywhere right now).

                                                          smerch 2

                                                          Borisovsky range is active too, but I gave it lots of coverage during the last post. Suffice to say they’re still winning over there and no doubt NATO forces are dying left and right.

                                                          Western MD

                                                          Luzhsky range (outside Luga) – As expected Putin came to Luzhsky range in Leningrad Oblast for the main event. There he took some lazy photo ops pretending to hold binoculars without looking at them, because they had large monitors setup in front of the glass showing the events, which were also taking place right in front of the window. Russian MoD brought out newer T-90M, T-80BVM upgrade and BMPT to show off in front of the leadership.

                                                          Large monitor screens in front of the window somewhat block the binoculars, he’s just holding them seemingly annoyed for the photographer to take this photo op

                                                          Putin and crew

                                                          Not even faking it

                                                          Putin and Gerasimov.JPG

                                                          Su-24Ms did a large bombing run at the range, while Su-25s were busy killing enemy convoys. Su-24MP recon variants provided targeting data, along with drones. Mi-28Ns, Ka-52s and Mi-35M helicopters all had a busy day.

                                                          Mi-28N at Luzhsky.JPG

                                                          Russian forces practiced employing drones as part of a recon strike complex, including artillery recon systems such as Aistenok, targeting and communications system Strelets, along with artillery systems MSTA-B, MSTA-S, BM-21 Grad, and Sani. The goal was to practice command and control of different types of forces, together with EW and air defense units in support, while recon assets fed targeting data in real time. Seems they were using precision munitions too, Krasnopol and Smelchak.

                                                          Lots of different types of units drilling at Luzhsky today and Strugi Krasniye (where the 76th Pskov seems to be). Sprut and Shturm-S tank destroyers got to do live fire exercises, along with Kornet ATGMs and Shmels with thermobaric rounds. Engineers practiced demining with UR-77 systems, while combat medics trained in evacuating the wounded from the field of battle. Russian and Belarusian MP units are guarding field command posts, defusing enemy IEDs and the like.

                                                          Bridging and MTO

                                                          At Kaputsin Yar in Astrakhan, news read that Iskander-M units ran combat launches at 480km range, hitting Makat fire range. In reality it seems to have been R-500 cruise missile variant.

                                                          Units named so far as participating include 25th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, 138th Motor Rifle Brigade and 2nd Tamanskaya Division. About 600km wide front in terms of engagement according to Col-General Kartapolov, cdr of Western MD.

                                                          T-90M and BMPT at Luzhsky

                                                          T-90M and BMPT

                                                          VDV (Airborne) – The big day has basically arrived, VDV Divisions from Tula, Ivanovo and Pskov which had been first raised on alert on the 14th began marches to training ranges and loading onto Il-76s. 76th had already been engaged and doing combat drops, while 98th was getting ready for a drop yesterday. Looks like they did an air drop in bad weather later during the day, rain and low altitude cloud cover. I would expect 400-450 troops per air drop + 9-10 vehicles based on the preparations reported previously. About 10 Il-76s employed, seems the drop zone was Luzhsky range. One battalion from each division is likely to do an air drop during this exercise.

                                                          Before drop

                                                          vdv airborne

                                                          At the range

                                                          VDV

                                                          VKS (Aerospace Forces) – 6th Air and Air Defense Army had a lively day. Weather was bad, but Su-35s escorted Il-76s with VDV onboard to the drop zones. Combat aviation supported the airborne during their drop. Meanwhile Tu-22M3s practiced bombing runs against targets.

                                                          Northern Fleet – Peter the Great’s (Kirov-class) surface action group with a Sovremenny destroyer ran live fire exercises defending against enemy forces attempting to land marines on Sredniy Peninsula (just north of Murmansk). Enemy marines also tried to land on Ribachi peninsula to seize strategically vital terrain, where they were met with Russian naval infantry. Apparently Russian units, formed as a reinforced battalion, had to travel 100km to engage the assaulting marines with Su-24Ms and Mi-8 helicopters in support. About 600 naval infantry, 12 BTR-82As, and several artillery  units  were involved. Drones were use to correct ship artillery fire.

                                                          North Fleet Naval Inf.JPG

                                                          Baltic Fleet – Russian naval infantry and special designation units were busy at Khmelevka range and defending against enemy landings. Some of Baltic Fleet’s naval infantry took positions on the beach, holding ground in Kaliningrad. They dug in with T-72B1 tanks, BMP-2s, tank destroyers and other hardware. Naval infantry also conducted an amphibious landing from LST’s with BTR-82As swimming ashore and Ka-27 helicopters unloading infantry on the beach. Seems to have been a lively scene, Mi-35Ms were overhead, lots of flares and smoke. Photos suggest some units were practicing mine laying just off the beach as well. At Pravdinsky range Spetz units were busy with tactical exercises taking out diversionary groups and ‘illegal armed formations,’ basically urban assault against  infiltrators in buildings. Everyone seems to be complaining that the weather was bad. CBRN troops were working on fighting chemical weapons on a floating platform just off the beach.

                                                          Baltic Naval Infantry landing

                                                          LST landing.jpg

                                                          Defending force

                                                          more naval infantry photos

                                                          You can tell its raining (looks like B1/BA mix)

                                                          Pravdinsky in the raine.jpg

                                                          Black Sea Fleet – Outside Novorossiysk, in Tsemes Bay, the BSF nailed an enemy submarine (sorry Turkey). Apparently it tried to sneak in while enemy high speed boats were distracting the defending ships. The enemy submarine manage to land enemy divers, but specialized Russian PDSS diver units found them, meanwhile a small anti-submarine ship (Povorino) sunk the enemy submarine with depth charges. Situational awareness provided by Orlan-10 and Electron drones. BSF minesweepers and small missile boats (about 2) were also involved in various drills outside Sevastopol, minesweeping, artillery and missile fires, etc. Be-12 maritime patrol craft and Su-30SMs supported the operations.

                                                          Eastern MD – In Khabarovsk the Eastern MD began some sort of ‘special tactical training’ with Spetz units. Seems they did an air drop by parachute and via Mi-8AMTsh helicopters at night. Probably a Spetsnaz unit. In Primorye, at Turgenevsky trange, specialized units in CBRN trained in dealing with chemical warfare. Apparently enemy diversionary groups got this far and had chemical weapons with them. Although part of the exercise seems to be dealing with potential chemical or ammonia leaks from a factory, evacuating civilians, clearing gases and chemicals, so it is perhaps oriented towards consequences of damage to industrial facilities. A host of specialized equipment being used: RHM-6, TMS-65U, ARS-14KM, and smoke machines for cover TDA-3 (the latter part is to cover the movement of ground forces). About one battalion, 500 men and 100 vehicles involved in this exercise.

                                                          eastern md.jpg

                                                          Southern MD (catching up on this one) – 8th Combined Arms Army, the latest CAA setup with Ukraine as its primary contingency, concluded its exercise at the Prydboi (Volgograd oblast) training range. The news is odd, says concluded but other info suggests the exercise is still ongoing. A mix of units including T-90A, BMP-3, MSTA-S, Tornado-G, and 120mm Hosta were involved. Drones were also an important part of the exercise, providing real time situational awareness to commanders, reconnaissance of routes for armored columns, etc. About 2000 men and 500 pieces of equipment were involved from motor rifle detachments of the Southern MD based in Rostov and Volgograd regions. Artillery units participating counted 500 men and 100 various systems.  Seems they’re wrapping up as the main piece  of Zapad is just launching, likely offset so as not to scare neighboring countries too much.

                                                          Fairly large scale exercise with elements of the 49th CAA taking place, including Stavropol, Krasnodar regions, and Abkhazia. Motor Rifle units from a mountain brigade in Karachay-Cherkessia (Stavropol) had been drilling since September 15 at Zalenchyski range. Seems about 1300 men and 250 pieces of equipment listed, drilling with Olran-10 drones, EW companies, Spetz units, and specialized logistics detachments. They even used horses from the logistics unit, which apparently has 80 of them, to drag a Podnos mortar unit onto one of the mountains at 4000m altitude.

                                                          Central MD – Air Defense Units have been practicing at Ashylyk in Astrakhan throughout the Zapad exercise, but it is somewhat co-mingled with the ‘Combat Commonwealth 2017’ exercise done with CIS members. A bit hard to tell which is which 🙂  Anyway in Tuva a mountain motor rifle brigade was concluding its exercises. They fielded a BTG against an enemy equipped with drones, EW, and other high end equipment. About 1000 men, 100 pieces of equipment were involved. This seems to be the light brigade in Central MD, based on Tigr vehicles.

                                                          Chekessia

                                                          Earlier on during the exercise at Totsk range in Orenburg artillery and armor units from Central MD ran live fire exercises with T-72B3 tanks and MLRS systems, about 2000 men and 400 pieces of equipment listed for that one. I hadn’t mentioned it earlier because those units in Orenburg were raised on alert 12th September, before Zapad started (sneaky sneaky) and hence was never part of my coverage. Meanwhile about 1000 men from an air defense units were drilling at Kaputsin Yar, with Tunguska, Buk-M2, Tor-M1 and Strela-10.

                                                          tor-my_550

                                                          Notable photos:

                                                          Russian psychological eval unit torturing soldiers in preparation for exercise (looks like they’re picking out wall paint colors)

                                                          physchological preparation

                                                          Deputy commander of 3rd MRR 4th Division and his command kit (lots of colors)

                                                          here is the tank battalion deputy commander

                                                          Baltic Fleet CBRN unit (this looks like fun)

                                                          21587290_1983295155246564_9000925600254627069_o

                                                          Teenage angst in T-80BV

                                                          not having the best day.jpg

                                                          Zapad watch – summary of day four

                                                          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                          Phase Two of Zapad is upon us, i.e. the main stage of the exercise. Most of the designated forces have arrived at their ranges, dug in and started exercises. At sea simulated electronic fires took place, but will turn into actual launches in the coming days. Putin is coming on Monday to the live fire exercises in Leningrad Oblast (Luzhsky range outside Luga) so everyone has to look really good at whatever they’re doing tomorrow. Odds are the big show really kicks off when he gets there.

                                                          BLUF: Russian ground forces spent the day fighting NATO formations, airborne units, and leveling things with artillery. Logistics units were busily setting up fuel dumps, comm systems, forward command posts and the like. Engineers and sappers worked on demining. The Navy got really busy, sinking NATO submarines in the Baltic and wiping out surface action groups in the Barents, while VKS and combat aviation provided close air support.

                                                          Belarus

                                                          Borisovsky Training Range (right outside Borisov in Belarus): Latest T-72B3s from 1st Guards Tank Army continued practice at the range, this is likely 6th Separate Tank Brigade and maybe elements of the 4th Kantemirovskaya Division. They wiped out remaining diversionary groups and of course crushed the enemy’s main forces. Other ranges, including Luzhsky, Pravdinsky, and Strugi Krasniye had similar tasks.

                                                          T-72B3 + BMPs

                                                          The Western MD’s independent MTO brigade (material technical support) setup a fuel dump at Borisovksy supposedly big enough for 120 tanker trucks (600 cubic meters of different fuel types).

                                                          If you want to see what real maskirovka looks like when done by professionals, you have to check out the situation around Borisovsky. It’s quite impressive.

                                                          BRM-1K recon vehicle (gold medal for camo job)

                                                          BRM-1K recon

                                                          Forests around the range full of polite looking people

                                                          20170915_182631

                                                          Waiting for NATO (sorry Veishnoria or whatever)

                                                          Osipovichskiy Training Range (outside Asipovichy in Belarus): Russian detachments began taking up defensive positions, while sapper units practiced demining. Seems things are just getting started at this range, but probably will host live fire exercises from airborne and ground units in the coming days.

                                                          (hope this photo is right, it’s what the MoD posted but that’s no guarantee of accuracy)

                                                          BMDs at Osipovichskiy

                                                          Western MD

                                                          Luzhsky Training Range (at Luga): MSTA-S artillery and mortar units spent the day in live fire exercises at Luga. These appear to be from the artillery regiment assigned to the Tamanskaya Division (1st Guards Tank Army). Other equipment included MSTA-B and BM-21 Grad.

                                                          Judging from the photos the weather was uncooperative.

                                                          looks like rain

                                                          Motor rifle units are practicing here as well, apparently they engaged and wiped out enemy airborne units after drawing them into a kill zone. In this scenario the NATO airborne units were mounted on high mobility but lightly armored equipment, meanwhile Russian forces consisted of a tank battalion and self-propelled artillery in support. It sounds like Operation Market Garden all over again and Russian forces got to play the role of the Panzer division.

                                                          2nd Division practicing fires

                                                          UAV units are also training at Luga, supposedly more than 30 systems have been employed for recon and ISR, particularly to provide targeting coordinates for artillery. Apparently aerostats, or unmanned balloons are also being used. Su-25s were overhead as well destroying enemy armored columns with Su-35s providing air cover. Seems mostly unguided rocket and gun fire.

                                                          Drones

                                                          Combat aviation took out over 20 enemy vehicles, helicopters training include Ka-52 and Mi-28N. Their job was recon and close air support. Same as Su-25s, training only listed unguided weapons – possibly saving money given there are three more days. Su-24s did some bombing runs at a range in Kaliningrad to wipe out enemy command points and other fixed targets.

                                                          Some new command and control equipment is being tested out this time at Zapad, including a high bandwidth system (1MB-20GB). There was news early on a few days ago of logistics units setting up this communications system.

                                                          VDV Airborne – VDV were busy setting field command posts and communications equipment for encrypted comms. Their range seems to be Strugi Krasniye near Pskov where the 76th is based.

                                                          Raining here too

                                                          VDV

                                                          VKS Aerospace Forces – Ground based air defense and air superiority fighters were busy defending against enemy air strikes. S-400, S-300, Pantsir-S1 were working with radar systems Nebo, Kasta and Podlet, along with command and control system Fundament. Air cover provided by Mig-31, Su-35s, and Su-27 variants. Enemy forces as usual were simulated by Russian forces, including combat aviation. Apparently Tu-22M3 bombers practiced attack runs at low and high altitude. Seems this is taking place by Kaliningrad and likely the range near Luga.

                                                          Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Peter the Great (Kirov-class guided missile cruiser) launched anti-ship missiles at an amphibious landing group in the Barents Sea (the actual enemy stand ins were tugs SB-523 and Nikolay Chiker). Targeting support provided by Il-38 from naval aviation and it seems a SSN was also around to finish off the enemy with torpedo attacks. For now strikes are being simulated electronically but supposedly live fire missile strikes are yet to come in the next 3 days.

                                                          Two Oscar II SSGNs (Project 949A) ventured out and sunk an enemy surface action group in the Barents Sea. Scouting was first done by a diesel-electric Kilo (877) from the Kola Flotilla together with a Tu-142 long range maritime patrol aircraft. These were simulated fires with live fire exercises still to come, but the setup was interesting.

                                                          Kirov

                                                          Baltic Fleet – The Baltic Fleet had a good day, seems their Ka-27PL helicopters found and sunk an enemy submarine with depth charges – and then they supported the rest of the fleet in sinking another one. That’s two NATO submarines sunk in a day’s work.

                                                          Southern MD – Ashylyk range near Astrakhan is hosting various air defense exercises although it’s unclear if they’re part of Zapad or another multinational event that’s supposed to take place called Combat Commonwealth 2017. Su-34s are also drilling overhead. Combat Commonwealth 2017 began on September 4th, with countries of the CIS including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia. These will feature air defense, aerospace forces and combat aviation.

                                                          Eastern MD – PLA Navy ships arrived in Vladivostok in preparation for upcoming naval exercises with the Pacific Fleet which will take place 18-26 September. Phase one will be coastal defense and phase two at sea north of Hokkaido with 11 ships involved altogether.

                                                          Notable photos:

                                                          BMP-2 (someone went pro at maskirovka olympics)

                                                          best maskirovka ever

                                                          Artillery fire near Luga

                                                          Luga artillery live fire

                                                          MSTA-S being camouflaged (really strange looking trees)

                                                          ugly trees

                                                          T-90M and BMPT are making an appearance at the training range by Luga

                                                          T-90M

                                                          Zapad watch – summary of day three

                                                          Michael Kofman5 Comments

                                                          Well the good news is that phase one ended today and we’re all still here. The bad news is that means phase two starts tomorrow. Phase one is best summarized as the defensive component of the exercise. Russian forces spent their time sorting out command and control, deploying forces to theater and forming a regional combat grouping out of the different types of forces under their command, along with planning out strategic operations. I guess phase two is when they’re going to do NATO rotten.

                                                          In phase one the VKS spent its time defending key civilian infrastructure, conducting reconnaissance, escorting rebasing long range aviation and taking down enemy cruise missiles in coordination with ground based air defense. Borisovksy and Osipovichesky practice ranges saw lots of action today, where  enemy diversionary groups were successfully taken out.

                                                          The results of phase one are in: Russia and Belarus successfully defended against an attack from NATO members and inflicted high costs during the enemy’s advance. Phase Two will involve maneuver warfare and offensive operations to destroy adversary forces, along with a strong focus on logistics. The ranges hosting most of the live fire exercises include Borisovsky in Belarus and Luga in Leningrad Oblast (south of St Petersburg)

                                                          BLUF: Russian forces spent their time conducting strikes with fixed wing and rotary aviation, armor and artillery units engaged the enemy, VDV was busy shooting down drones, logistics units and engineers had a lot of work supporting operations, and the Baltic Fleet sortied out to fight.

                                                          VKS (Aerospace Forces) – Su-35s escorted Su-34s on strike missions. The Su-34s hit targets at Kingisep practice range, wiping out enemy armored formations and mechanized infantry. Su-24MPs did the recon ahead of the Su-34 strike package (which is odd given there are plenty of drones now to do this type of job). Seems this was an exercise chiefly with dumb unguided bombs, leveraging SVP-24 Gefest system for more accurate bombing with unguided munitions. Other VKS units spent their time dogfighting and striking enemy logistics units. Su-27s and Su-24s stood in for enemy forces. The Russian air superiority team included Su-27s, Su-35s, Su-30SMs and Mig-31s. Their target set ranged from enemy aircraft to cruise missiles.

                                                          VDV (Airborne) – Detachments from the three divisions involved in Zapad were busy with air defense against enemy drones, namely the 76th at Pskov. Seems they shot down more than 40 drones with Strela-10M, Igla MANPADS and ZU-23 artillery. Other VDV units focused on command and control, setting up field units with Polet-K and Andromeda-D systems (based on BTR platforms). Supposedly 30 command vehicles were deployed during this phase, setting up comms in the 500-2000km range. VDV detachments from 106th Tula Division tried out new gear for the first time during an exercise, seems BMD-4M and BTR-MDM (Rakushka). No word on what the 98th was doing, but no doubt they’re winning somewhere.

                                                          VDV command and control.jpg

                                                          Seems another battalion of VDV is getting ready for airdrop, 400 soldiers and 10 vehicles aboard 10 Il-76s are getting ready according to the MoD.

                                                          Meanwhile in Belarus

                                                          At the Borisovsky range MSTA-S self-propelled artillery took up positions, while armored columns from 1st Tank Guards Army (likely 6th BDE) arrived to shoot things. Most of the action was at Osipovichsky and Borisovsky ranges, where diversionary-reconnaissance groups were being killed all day long. Supposedly the weather is less than amenable, but elements of the 1st Tank Army are at the training ranges as planned. Seems this is the first exercise where the latest variants of T-72B3 tanks are being tried out, presumably this is the upgrade with a better engine and sidescreens.

                                                          MSTA-S.jpg

                                                          MTO units (material-technical support) were busy setting up repair fields to restore damaged equipment at the live fire ranges in Belarus. Their job is to train in evacuating and repairing damaged tanks and mechanized equipment. The unit in question is the Western MD’s independent MTO brigade. Some of the gear includes KET-L, BTS-4, along with BZEM-K and TPM, along with MTO-UB-2 Ural. The MTO brigade brought mobile repair shops with it, equipped with BAKM 1040 BK cranes.

                                                          MTO units.jpg

                                                          Russian military police on BTR-82As practiced receiving surrenders of wounded enemy soldiers. NATO diversionary groups had a rough day at several points and had to give up.

                                                          surrenders.JPG

                                                          Western MD

                                                          2nd Tamanskaya Division (1st Guards Tank Army) finally showed itself. It’s artillery regiment was at Luga  firing from MSTA-B towed artillery and BM-21 Grad MLRS. Iskander-M and older Tochka-U missile units were busy simulated electronic fires in Leningrad Oblast, presumably these are missile regiments from Kaliningrad which still has Tochka-U and Leningrad Oblast which was upgraded to Iskanders a long time ago. Their targets were massed enemy armor formations in the 30-100km range. Other artillery and mortar units involved in this live fire exercise employed 2S12 Sani mortars, 2B14 Podnos mortars, and Tornado MLRS.

                                                          Engineer-sapper units were supplying drinking water using SKO-10 purifying stations, along with three square meals a day. This is apparently an accomplishment. Others were busy clearing mine fields ahead of the ground forces’ advance.  Meanwhile MTO units in Leningrad Oblast were practiced extraction and repair of damaged armor and mechanized equipment near the Luga firing range. Other duties included your run of the mill setting up field bases, ammo dumps, repair and overhaul facilities. They spent the day repairing T-72B3 tanks, BTR-82A APCs, and BMP-2 IFVs.

                                                          Mi-35M, Ka-52, and Mi-8AMTSh helicopters from the combat aviation brigade were also at the Luga training range destroying enemy armor and equipment. S-400, S-300 and Pantsir-S1 systems were deployed to provide air defense in the region.

                                                          Mi-35 at luga.jpg

                                                          Not much word from other districts, somewhat drowned out by all the inane awards from the Army 2017 games. It seems Russia’s info operation sees Zapad 2017 and the Army games as on par in importance.

                                                          Central MD – S-400 units moved out to Ashylyk range in Astrakhan near the border with Kazakhstan.

                                                          Central MD S-400.jpg

                                                          Baltic Fleet – 11th Army Corps had a lot on their hands in Kaliningrad. Some practiced urban assault and retaking positions held by diversionary groups. The T-72B1 equipped tank battalion rolled out to engage enemy forces supported by artillery detachments with 2S3 Akatsya, BM-21 Grads and towed artillery. The 11th Army Corps has somewhat antiquated equipment but it’s good enough.

                                                          The Baltic Fleet’s minesweepers ventured out, including two project 12700 and three older project 10750s, to practice clearing contact and non-contact mines. Four Steregushchiy-class corvettes were busy with air defense drills. Russian Su-24s and Ka-27 helicopters served as simulated enemy targets. The corvettes ran short range live fire exercises and over the horizon drills against enemy coastal defenses that were beyond visual sight. About 20 ships of various classes sortied out from the Baltic Fleet, including the bigger corvettes, missile boats and minesweepers.

                                                          Notable photos:

                                                          Russia’s MoD started the day off by tweeting ‘good morning’ with this photo

                                                          good morning vietnam.jpg

                                                          Sappers clearing mines (I don’t know why but spacemen with flyswatters look funny)

                                                          Zapad watch – summary of day two

                                                          Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                                          Day two of Zapad saw Russian forces continue to fight off air attacks and incoming cruise missiles, but logistics units were getting in place to enable force flow into Belarus. As the adage goes, amateurs talk tactics while professionals talk logistics. Day 2 events include:

                                                          • engineers setting pontoon bridges
                                                          • communications arrays going up to establish a common operating picture
                                                          • smokescreens to cover ground movements
                                                          • air power coordinated with ground based air defense in covering the ground force
                                                          • the Navy practicing ASW, air defense, and counter sabotage
                                                          • numerous live fire drills with artillery, armor, air defense and combat aviation

                                                          Western MD

                                                          Joint drills started in earnest between Russia and Belarus today. Armored and motor rifle battalions engaged in live fire exercises, tactical aviation and bombers flew overhead. A lot of ammo expended into targets at firing ranges. Belarus Air Force helped provide air cover for Russian ground units and armored formations moving into theater, run by a combined staff composed of officers from both countries. Part of the mission included recon flights over enemy formations.

                                                          Most of the action right now is at the Luga (south of St Petersburg) range which is seeing lots of artillery fires. From self-propelled and towed artillery to TOS-1A and Grad MLRS, Russia’s artillery units are letting loose. The combat aviation brigade is practicing at the same range, Ka-52s along with other helicopters.

                                                          (autobots assemble – activate tree camouflage)

                                                          tanks and BREM.jpg

                                                          Logistics

                                                          Pontoon bridges are going up for armor to roll into Belarus. Engineers and sappers are building trenches, fortifications and setting up the logistics for ground forces to move in. CBRN troops put up an aerosol smokescreen at medium altitude near the Luga training field in an effort to cover troop movements. The screen covered a bridging operation (TMM-3 mechanical bridge) to defend against enemy air attack while forces were on the move.

                                                          Comms troops setup a high bandwidth comm systems running around 1000km between Russia and Belarus. This part is particularly interesting, since it reflects how Russia plans to maintain command and control, shield communications, and create a common operating picture of the battlefield. So far the coverage shows systems that go down to the battalion rather than company/squad level.

                                                          engineer troops.jpg

                                                          VKS – Aerospace Forces

                                                          Su-35s fighters escorted Tu-22M3 bombers to their forward airbases and have now arrived in Leningrad Oblast. Western MD’s lead in air power for this exercise seems to be 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army. As mentioned yesterday one Tu-22M3 ran off the runway and crashed.

                                                          VDV – VDV units in Rys light armored vehicles conducted recon in force missions around Pskov. The 76th is supposed to deploy in Leningrad Oblast and Kaliningrad later on during this exercise.

                                                          VDV on Rys.jpg

                                                          Central MD – This district is not only taking part in Zapad but prepping for joint exercises with Uzbekistan in early October. Interestingly air defense units with S-300 are shifting to the far east, Telemba range in Buryatia, to conduct live fire exercises as part of Zapad.

                                                          Eastern MD – Air defense units are headlong into live fire drills at Telemba, with 10 combat launches of later generation S-300 systems. Meanwhile Su-34 bombers from Khabarovsk are training in night time operations. Further east the air units based in Kamchatka have been raised on alert, with about 30 planes including Tu-142M3s, Mig-31BMs, and Il-38s conducting sorties.

                                                          Puski-550-5.jpg

                                                          Southern MD – Marines from the Caspian Flotilla held the line against enemy forces on the coast of Dagestan in time for airborne reinforcements. Not much info coming out of this district so far.

                                                          Around the Fleets

                                                          Northern Fleet – Units of the 14th Army Corps in Pechenga near Murmansk deployed several battalions from its motor rifle brigades for live fire exercises, defending against land and air attacks. This drill ran the gamut from T-72B3 tanks, artillery, MLRS, and infantry in trenches defending against an attacking ground force. About 1,500 troops were involved with 300 pieces of equipment. Peter the Great (Kirov-class) and Admiral Ushakov (Sovremenny-class) spent their time taking out incoming cruise missiles together with Mig-29K fighters operating from land.

                                                          shoot em in the face.JPG

                                                          Baltic Fleet – High speed boats and patrol ships worked with PDSS special diver units to battle enemy diversionary forces all day. Some PDSS divers stood in for the enemy, no doubt Navy SEALS, while the rest worked to defend against them. Corvettes were busy with air defense against incoming enemy aircraft.

                                                          Pacific Fleet – A project 971 Akula SSN (Kuzbass) and project 667BDR Delta III SSBN (Ryazan) ran a mock torpedo duel. The Delta was looking to handle an attack by an adversary SSN penetrating the SSBN bastion. The Pacific Fleet will also hold drills with China September 26 after Zapad, both in Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk off the coast of Hokkaido. This is the second part of a naval exercise held in the Baltic Sea in July.

                                                          On the lighter side

                                                          It can’t be all gloom and doom. If you’re busy fighting NATO at the Luga firing range south of St. Petersburg then there’s good news, Russian armed forces setup a 100 person field movie theater to boost morale. I saw a photo of it and now can’t find it to post. And yes, there’s wi-fi so you can selfie every aspect of the exercise. There’s also a store to buy various Army kitsch – not sure what it looks like but probably “I defeated NATO in glorious existential battle for the motherland and all I got was this t-shirt.”

                                                          Notable photos:

                                                          Gerasimov calling SACEUR. (good photo for a ‘caption this’ contest)

                                                          Gerasimov doing Gerasimov things.jpg

                                                          CBRN troops totally covered, except the part between his gloves and sleeve. That guy is probably going to die to chemical weapons NATO doesn’t have.

                                                          pxb troops

                                                           

                                                          Zapad watch – summary of day one

                                                          Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                                          Zapad is here! Well it actually arrived some days ago, as there were an awful lot of command post exercises and live fire drills already in recent weeks. Officially though this is the first day of Russian military armageddon –  so here is a quick and unvarnished roundup of some of the events taking place.

                                                          On the 14th Russian armed forces were roused out of bed to fight an advanced conventional adversary with a pretty solid global force at their disposal. Phase one was supposed to be about handling diversionary groupings in Belarus, but suffice it to say things escalated pretty quickly. Day 1 activities include:

                                                          • defending against air attack and numerous cruise missile strikes with ground based air defenses and tactical aviation
                                                          • airlifting engineers and support crews to forward airfields ahead of aviation
                                                          • getting armor loaded at rail hubs for transportation to Belarus
                                                          • airdropping VDV units to defend against enemy recon elements
                                                          • deploying screens and getting ships underway under incoming enemy fire
                                                          • numerous live fire exercises for artillery units, air defense units, and the navy

                                                          BLUF: As Russian forces prepared to deploy to the region they got hit with a sizable aerospace attack. Day one was about logistics, defending against a capable air power on different fronts, and engaging lead elements of the enemy force near Belarus.

                                                          A word on sourcing: the information comes from official MoD briefings, releases, photos. The analysis is my own, listing what happened and explaining what it means. It is not derived or borrowed from other analysis. Occasionally I also found good photos from blogs of journalists who were physically at the exercise.

                                                          VDV – Airborne

                                                          The Airborne units involved so far include battalions from Pskov (76th), Tula (106th) and Ivanovo (98th). They were alerted Thursday morning, grabbed gear and fell out to meet airlift. So far maybe 2-3 battalions out of three airborne divisions are engaged. One battalion of 76th Pskov VDV, along with 10 BMD vehicles, had been airdropped into combat near Pskov. They prevented ‘diversionary groups’ from penetrating Russia’s borders in the region. This is supposed to be a vanguard action, taking out enemy recon units, and conducting reconnaissance-in-force. It’s unclear if the baddies are Latvian or Estonian, but supposedly the Russian airborne did a great job sabotaging the advance of their recon elements and reporting on larger formations behind enemy lines. Later on Russian airborne is supposed to deploy to Belarus and perhaps reinforce Kaliningrad as well.

                                                          Airborne drop.jpg

                                                          VKS – Aerospace Forces

                                                          Tactical, combat, and long range aviation in the Western MD is preparing to rebase to forward airbases to participate in Zapad. This will include airfields in Belarus. About 20 flights so far on Il-76MD delivered engineers and support crews to forward air bases ahead of the actual aviation expected to arrive soon. Meanwhile much of the VKS is busy repelling air attacks and cruise missile strikes across Russia. Air defense units around St. Petersburg, most likely in the 6th CAA, were already conducting live fire drills to defend against an aerospace attack. Systems involved include S-400, S-300, and Pantsir-S1 short range air defense. Air defense units around Moscow were similarly engaged to repel air strikes and cruise missiles. This thing escalated rather quickly it seems. Russian radar crews practiced against enemy aircraft simulated by a range of Russian platforms, including: Su-34, Su-35, Tu-134, An-26, Mi-8 and Ka-52 helicopters.

                                                          One Tu-22M3 was already lost in a crash in Kaluga Oblast near Belarus. They were clearly shifting long range aviation from Irkutsk, an airbase named Belaya to ‘forward base’ Shaikovka by Belarus and something went wrong upon landing. Photo at the end.

                                                          A lot of stuff coming at VKS all day

                                                          Pantsir.jpg

                                                          Navy

                                                          Some of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface combatants, including the nuclear powered missile cruiser Peter the Great and a Sovremenny destroyer (Admiral Ushakov), put to sea to escape incoming strikes. Several missile boats and minesweepers deployed to Kola Bay to fight diversionary groups. Russian ships used aerosol sprays to hide key naval facilities, although more than likely this was practice to cover the preparation and departure of other ships from satellites. Supposedly 20 or so surface combatants will take place in this week’s maneuvers, including up to 10 submarines and 20 support vessels. One task force of ships departed for the New Siberian Islands. Overall the Northern Fleet’s drills will involve approximately 5,000 personnel.

                                                          The Baltic Fleet was in some serious danger, defending against an enemy who was conducting cruise missile strikes at a rate of seven hits per minute (this seems oddly slow actually). In defense of their comrades at sea the tiny naval aviation component launched Su-27s to shoot down incoming missiles and aircraft. Meanwhile S-300s and S-400s were providing long range air defense. The navy was also practicing air defense and simulating fires electronically. Russian Su-34s stood in for adversary aviation, and the exercise conditions were based around electronic jamming degrading the effectiveness of Russian air defense units.

                                                          Army

                                                          Elements of 1st Tank Guards Army began their march towards firing ranges in Belarus. The 6th Independent Tank Brigade, expected to participate in this exercise, was raised on alert and moved to a rail hub for loading. No official word on other regiments but elements of 2nd and 4th divisions are definitely expected to participate in this event. Once they’re moved by rail to Belarus the brigade’s first job is to arrive at a designated staging area and group with other regional forces into a task force.

                                                          Other Military Districts

                                                          Eastern MD – taking off from Khabarovsk Su-35s destroyed an enemy field camp and supplies. Not sure where this camp and supplies were, but this thing escalated horizontally pretty fast. As part of the operation they practiced evading enemy air defenses at different altitudes. An Iskander unit moved out to conduct live fire exercises at the Kaputsin Yar firing range. The day before artillery units were already in live fire training with self-propelled artillery (2s1 and 2s3) along with Tornado-G MLRS. VKS units are practicing with S-300 at a firing range in Telemba, jointly with Su-30SM fighters from Khabarovsk.

                                                          Gvozdika firing line.jpg

                                                          Central MD – More than 500 soldiers from special designation units, including Spetsnaz were raised on alert in Samara and moved out to hold exercises near Novaya Binardka. This particular set of drills will be observed by officers from Uzbekistan’s general staff. The day before it seems Caspian Flotilla marines were practicing at firing ranges in Dagestan. Their task is chiefly interdiction of enemy marine forces landing from the Caspian.

                                                          CMD Spetz.jpg

                                                          Southern MD – there was a large command post exercise on the 12th and several live fire exercises by ships of the BSF on September 7th. Not much news coming out of Southern MD but it will undoubtedly get more active. Some info coming out of Ukraine about bridging equipment being moved about in DNR/LNR territory – hard to nail down details though.

                                                          Meanwhile in Syria

                                                          Two project 636.3 Kilos fired Kalibr land attack cruise missiles into Syria. Combat firing at fixed targets in Syria seems to be the standard induction procedure for new Kilos arriving for service in the BSF. More surface combatants decamped from Sevastopol, heading to join the squadron in the Eastern Med.

                                                          Notable photos:

                                                          This guy doesn’t look like he’s having fun yet. (76th airdrop near Pskov)

                                                          BMD drop.jpg

                                                          These guys had too much fun already. (Tu-22M3 bomber in lawndart configuration)

                                                          Tu-22M3.jpg

                                                          Comments and corrections are welcome. This is meant to be a rough summary of some of the activities taking place.

                                                           

                                                           

                                                          Russian Military Buildup in the West: Fact Versus Fiction

                                                          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                          A short article looking at the focus of Russian military modernization, the original appeared on the Russia Matters site of Harvard’s Belfer Center.

                                                          As Russia’s annual strategic exercise, titled Zapad-2017, approaches, media reports (and plenty of Western officials) have contended that Moscow is engaged in a military buildup along NATO’s borders, with particular trepidation over security considerations in the Baltics. Ironically, Russia’s military modernization and force structure expansion had been ignoring the Baltic region until only recently. Despite provocative air and naval activity concentrated in the area, Russian forces based there are principally defensive, and aging to boot. There are indicators that a change in the size and strength of Russian forces is inevitable, but it will be gradual, in part informed by what forces NATO chooses to deploy.

                                                          Moscow’s chief fixation of late has been establishing large unit formations along Ukraine’s borders, an expansion of the footprint in Crimea and upgrades to military equipment distributed across the country’s five military districts. Having achieved some success under the previous state armament program, the Russian General Staff is shifting its attention to the Baltic region, slowly but surely upgrading the antiquated forces based there and deliberating a larger military presence.

                                                          Russia’s military has been undergoing transformation since 2008 to compensate for a prolonged period of divestment and rot in the armed forces after the collapse of the USSR. This process was driven by military reforms launched in late 2008 and a modernization program begun in 2011 (a new one is due to be announced soon for 2018-2025). Russia’s force structure continues to evolve and expand, and the armed forces steadily acquire modernized or new capabilities. Change is a constant—new formations and a hurricane of announcements, only a fraction of which are ever implemented.

                                                          The modernization program launched in 2011 focused investment on Russia’s air force, navy and strategic nuclear forces, to the detriment of the army. Until 2014 Russia was not procuring like a Eurasian land power and was largely reducing the number of deployed formations on Ukraine’s and NATO’s borders to position them elsewhere. The war with Ukraine turned these initial plans upside down and has subsequently proven the driving factor behind changes in Russia’s force posture. (Nonetheless, today the Southern Military District, encompassing the North Caucasus, still maintains greater readiness than any forces abutting NATO.)

                                                          Conflict with Ukraine reawakened the national leadership to the likelihood of a large-scale war on the western front in the medium to long term. To deal with a constant rotation of forces in Ukraine, and to maintain conventional superiority over Ukrainian forces in the long term, Russia refocused its energy to that border or what Russian leadership calls the “southwest strategic direction.” Russia’s General Staff began to bring back all the units originally moved off Ukraine’s borders during the early years of the reforms. This included the 20th Army, along with other units. The next step was reestablishing the 1st Tank Guards Army west of Moscow and setting up the headquarters for a new 8th Combined Arms Army in the Southern Military District.

                                                          Spanning an arc from the border with Belarus to Rostov-on-Don in the south, Russia is setting up three new divisions, each of which is formally to have six regiments and an ultimate end strength toward 10,000 (although they will likely be undermanned for years to come). Supporting these divisions are several brigades, airfields and combat aviation. The 8th Army is there to be the primary threat to Ukrainian armed forces, and perhaps to coordinate troop rotation in support of separatists in the Donbas if the conflict continues several years out.

                                                          The current wave of modernization is similarly prioritizing units near Ukraine, especially Crimea, which saw a substantial expansion of Russia’s military presence after Moscow annexed and absorbed a significant percentage of what were previously Ukrainian forces on the peninsula. Russian planning is driven by a strategy to deter Ukraine from believing it can retake the Donbas, looking chiefly five to 10 years into the future. The intent is to keep the country in a vise with permanently garrisoned forces along its borders running north to south. Russian forces may even withdraw entirely from Ukraine once this much larger force just across the border is complete.

                                                          In the interim, the Baltic region was given only a modicum of attention, with few forces, terrible readiness and fairly dated equipment. Indeed, as recently as last summer the entire Baltic Fleet and ground force command staff was fired, and with seemingly good cause.

                                                          There has been, and remains, little to indicate that Russia is especially concerned with the Baltic region when compared to the situation further south. Despite bombastic rhetoric about NATO aggression, hostility and the like, Russia’s military has not prioritized the Baltic relative to other areas. Remarkably there is much more attention and energy being spent on expensive military infrastructure in the Arctic with a dubious cost-benefit proposition, as opposed to the supposedly existential struggle between Russia and its historic Cold War adversary to the West.

                                                          That being said, in 2017 the bow wave of modernization across Russia’s armed forces is steadily making its way from the units positioned around Ukraine to those in the Baltic region, and further north. New fighters, missile regiments, air defense systems and combat aviation are either in the process of being deployed or will be in the coming years. Meanwhile, the force structure continues to expand, with plans to add two tank battalions to the airborne division in Pskov, near Estonia, for example, while other adjustments may see the military footprint of the 11th Army Corps in Kaliningrad grow, along with the 14th Army Corps in the Northern Fleet. Although Russia remains fixated on building divisions around Ukraine, it is trying to balance this with the need for manpower to fill other units. The state armament program is pumping out equipment such that slowly but surely even lower-priority areas receive upgraded capabilities.

                                                          Russia’s vision for dealing with U.S. military power is less ground-force-based and more founded in integrated air defenses combined with long-range conventional strike power and nuclear weapons. Here Russia is working on improving its arsenal of cruise missiles and the capacity to inflict conventional damage at standoff ranges, rather than build large formations bordering NATO. Moscow understands that the U.S. has an incredible technological advantage in aerospace power, and thus has prioritized air defense, electronic warfare and other capabilities intended to deny NATO its preferred way of waging war from the air.

                                                          The various units around Ukraine can of course travel if need be to Belarus and the Baltic, and in the upcoming exercise some of them will demonstrate exactly that—their ability to move into Belarus as part of a planned operation. The logistics and resources available to realize such plans on a large scale do require some time, preparation and practice. In reality these units can only generate a percentage of their strength on short notice, especially if the maneuver forces are composed of contract-staffed personnel.

                                                          When it comes to its force posture in the Baltic region, Moscow is playing it slow—moving about capabilities to threaten and engaging in military activity that generates headlines, while the actual presence remains largely defensive in nature. This too will change in the coming years. More S-400s, Iskander-Ms, better tanks, tactical aviation, logistics units and everything else Russia’s state armament program has to offer has either begun arriving or will deploy to the Baltic region by 2020.

                                                          The Russian plan is perhaps much less a buildup and more a slow cooking of the overall military presence. Arguably NATO is doing the very same thing along its eastern flank. Gradualism is the name of this game, and if it is not carefully managed, nobody should be surprised if some years from now the Baltic region finds itself host to a force bidding contest.

                                                           

                                                          WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU’RE EXPECTING ZAPAD 2017

                                                          Michael Kofman5 Comments

                                                          My latest article on the upcoming Zapad 2017 exercise on War on the Rocks

                                                          Don’t be surprised if in the coming days you increasingly hear the word Zapad echoing across media outlets and the blogosphere as though it were a category five hurricane, or an apocalyptic event approaching. Zapad, meaning “West” in Russian, is the Russian military’s annual strategic exercise, scheduled to commence on Sept. 14. Such capstone training events have been held on a quadrennial rotation since 1999 between four strategic directions, including Vostok (Eastern), Tsentr (Central), and Kavkaz (Caucasus). As anticipated, Zapad 2017 will take place in the Baltic region, held jointly with Belarus, and led by forces based in Russia’s Western Military District.

                                                          The ongoing confrontation between Russia and the United States, together with the exercise’s geographical focus, makes this a particularly significant event. Large-scale Russian exercises have always imparted a sense of foreboding, yet the reaction to Zapad 2017 is especially sensational this year. The Center for European Policy Analysis has even created a dedicated website with a countdown clock as though awaiting doomsday. Ahead of Zapad rolls a strong wave of anxiety among NATO members, senior officials, and the Russia-watcher community. Such exercises call for vigilance and caution, but panic is unwarranted.

                                                          Ironically, much as the leaders of NATO members dislike Russia’s deployment of forces along their borders, the exercise should be treated as an opportunity. Zapad 2017 is happening whether NATO likes it or not, and Russia will keep holding this exercise every four years, just as the Soviet Union had a penchant for running major exercises in the fall. In truth, Western observers are bound to learn much from this event about Russia’s ability to deploy combat formations to the region, the current state of Russia’s armed forces, and how Moscow intends to leverage military power to shape Western decision-making in the event of a crisis. The conduct of the exercise may even help validate, or invalidate, some of the current thinking in NATO on how to deter Russia.

                                                          Ultimately the exercise is a test of what  Russia calls  “strategic deterrence,” an integration of military, non-military, and nuclear capabilities to shape adversary decision-making from crisis to actual conflict. Although small countries are naturally anxious when large neighbors flex their muscles, in reality this entire affair is about Moscow establishing coercive credibility with Washington, and in that respect it is quite effective. Zapad is part of one long conversation on deterrence and compellence facilitated by the Russian General Staff.

                                                          Read more on the site.

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                                                          #####EOF##### Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces – Russia Military Analysis

                                                          Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

                                                          Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                          Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

                                                          —————————————————————————————————————————————–

                                                          The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

                                                          Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

                                                          The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

                                                          can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

                                                          And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

                                                           

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                                                          Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

                                                          There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

                                                          VDV praciting loading

                                                          Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

                                                          Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

                                                          airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

                                                          Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

                                                          Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

                                                          These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

                                                          The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

                                                          T62 vdv.jpg
                                                          VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

                                                          Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

                                                          But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

                                                          4 thoughts on “Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces”

                                                          1. Thank you for your articles. I’ve spent a few hours enjoying your material about Vostok 2018 and the VDV. Your analysis is balanced, well-informed and free of pro and anti Russia hysteria common through most of the open source Russian watcher community.

                                                            Denis Mokrushin (twower blog) has tracked announcements from the Russian MoD about kontraktnik numbers over the last few years. He notes that it seems they have hit a wall at just under 400,000 contract soldiers. At the same time, the number of draftees seems to be declining slightly even though Russia has passed the worst of its demographic black hole. How are they staffing these new units? Also, can you comment on the recent announcement that the land forces are staffing 1 of 3 BTGs with draftees and keeping them away from front line combat?

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                                                            Reply

                                                            • There is not a demographic problem but a choice on where to spend money. Contracts are simply a question of money, if they wanted more contractors they could have them. However, with 3-5% spending sequester they have to make choices between force size, readiness, and capability.

                                                              Draftees are declining to plan, since they want to get to a sustainable number somewhere around 220-230k. The short answer is that they will create tiered formations at 100-90-80% staffing and have to eat the manpower that way. Golts is wrong on this, predicting some return to cadre formations. Large divisions do not need 100% staffing and can be setup under mobilization model to take people in during period of threat. So I think the short answer to this question is mobilization.

                                                              USSR had a great system for mobilization, and not so great system of command and control. The Russian military now has a great system for command and control, but largely destroyed Soviet mobilization model – no operational reserve, etc. This was always one of the unfinished pieces from the mil reforms.

                                                              As I understand it, a brigade is only supposed to force generate 2 BTGs anyway, and the rest is its reserve. This announcement does not tell us much and I’m skeptical of official statistics, although it is useful to see that they think of the force in BTG counts and are structuring it less on number of brigades/divisions but mostly on the basis of force generation potential (unlike NATO which focuses on defense spending and excel spreadsheets that wont fight). The conscripts are there to be recruited as contractors at the end of their year. However we don’t know in a 6 regiment division how many battalions are supposed to be contract vs conscript, though we can glean that Russians don’t intend to send conscripts to fight in the initial period of war.

                                                              Liked by 1 person

                                                              Reply

                                                              • Thank you for that. How many soldiers does a BTG have? Around 1,000? If so, then 2 BTGs generated from each brigade is not that much larger than a Soviet regiment. Although, a BTG is likely much better trained and equipped than a regiment. How did they come up with the idea of a BTG in the first place?

                                                                Like

                                                              • 800-1200 depending, some can go up to 1500. A brigade is realistically a super sized regiment, since it has 3 maneuver battalions at its core. A BTG is exactly as good as its components are, it is a task organized formation or kampfgruppen. Most of the discussion on contractors and conscripts is rather strained by some strange notions about basic military organization and warfighting functions.

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                                                            #####EOF##### Yannick Formaggio – 44CON

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                                                            Yannick is a french passionate IT security researcher at Istuary Innovation Group. He graduated from Bordeaux 1 University (France) with a master of science in Cryptography and IT Security in 2010. He worked 4 years as a subcontracting IT Security consultant for Airbus and Thales groups. He then moved to Vancouver where he works for Istuary as an IT Security researcher since January 2015. His main focus is the software vulnerability research using fuzzing techniques.

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                                                            #####EOF##### Southern MD – Russia Military Analysis

                                                            Tag: Southern MD

                                                            New Russian Divisions and other units shifting to Ukraine’s borders – second look with updates

                                                            Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                                            Bill Gertz’s article alleging that there were “40,000” troops massing on Ukraine’s borders inspired me to take another look at where the three planned divisions, and other unit movements stand right now.  There is quite a bit of activity and leadership announcements as part of the Russian shift to what Shoigu calls the “southwestern strategic direction.”  Essentially, a containment ring is being built circumscribing Ukraine, including large unit formations in permanent garrisons to serve as a quick reaction force in the event of a conventional war.

                                                            Some plans dating back to 2014 have already been realized, most are in progress, and several announcements are only now getting under way with completion timelines set for late 2017.  I’m underlining dates because certain people misread the May post in this blog, and I suspect other blogs on this topic, and then said that all these announced units were already in position – they are not.

                                                            At the moment Russia does not have 40,000 troops massing on Ukraine’s borders, but principally Russia’s General Staff seems to have Ukraine in mind.  The changes in force posture are designed to deal with medium-long term scenarios rather than the current conflict.  This is a large force that can effect conventional deterrence by denial, and if need be compellence, in a future crisis with Ukraine.

                                                            The reason for moving the 20th Army HQ back, resurrecting the 1st Tank Army, and creating a host of new units on Ukraine’s borders is fairly straightforward.  During the chaotic reforms 2009-2011 numerous units were consolidated or cut from the Western MD.  Others were moved further south or east.  In 2014 Russia had to improvise a combined staff of 20th and 58th Armies to put together two task forces on Ukraine’s borders.  That may have worked in February-April 2014, but its far from optimal, and simply will not do in a contingency where Russian forces need to intervene again.  Ukraine’s military is far larger in size and more capable relative to the hollowed out paper force that existed in spring of 2014.

                                                            Russian staff likely fears a ‘Croatia scenario’ whereby  Ukraine cordons off the separatist republics and then builds up an army large enough to wipe them out in a few years.  With three divisions, plus several brigades, organized under two combined arms armies (CAA) headquartered nearby, they figure it will deter future Ukrainian leaders from such adventurism.  It also places Ukraine in a geographic vice, running from Yelnya to Crimea.  It is not feasible that Ukraine will build an army capable of attacking Donbass and holding Russian units on so many fronts.  The units required to attempt an ATO 2.0 (now with a real army) would leave no defenders for other vectors of Russian attack.  Each division will be a self-sustaining strike force, ensuring that Kiev does not feel confident in the ability to retake the separatist regions through force.

                                                            A breakdown of the plans:

                                                            1.)  10th Armored Division (presumed) in Bogychar (Voronezh oblast) – When 20th Combined Arms Army moved from Mulino in Nizhegorod Oblast to Voronezh, so did 9th Motor Rifle Brigade from Dzerzhinsk to Bogychar.  This began in February 2015.  I wrote in May of this year that 1st Independent Armored Brigade will likely assume the legacy of 10th Armored Division, a move announced in July 2015.

                                                            10th Armor served in Easter Germany during the Cold War and returned in 1991.  In 2009 this division was turned into the 262nd Military Storage and Repair Base during the Serduykov period of consolidation and knocking down units in Western MD.  That base has a large stockpile and it looks like the 1st Armored Brigade will be needing it to become the 10th Armored Division.  All the divisions are likely to have a classic Soviet six regiment structure.  This unit will take into 2017  to form. So, this is a case of there and back again for the Russian army. Between 2009-2016 the process flow has been: 10th Div -> 262nd Base -> 1st Bde -> 10th Div.

                                                            Here  is a nice photo of the 262nd base in Bogychar.  It’s going to get busy with 9th Bde and a new division there.

                                                            262nd base bogychar

                                                            2.) 144th Motor Rifle Division in Yelnya (Smolensk oblast) – The plans for this unit were essentially announced back in 23 November 2014, and in September 2015 it was confirmed that a newly formed independent motor rifle brigade will return to Yelnya.  The 144th motor rifle division was once based here after being withdrawn from Estonia, disbanded in 1998, and converted into a military warehouse base.  A new unit will assume the legacy of the 144th and become the core of the announced division.

                                                            Early July of 2015 the MoD announced that this motor rifle division will be formed by second half of 2017 and be assigned to the 1st Tank Guards Army.  Second half of 2017 is optimistic since according to one paper the total military personnel expected by summer of 2017 is 6,000, of which 3,600 will be contract and officers.  It goes without saying that 6,000 is less than the 10,000 promised.  Not quite enough to fill six regiments of 3 motor rifle , 1 armor, 1 artillery, 1 air defense and the rest support units.  The expectation for 2016  is two battalions will arrive, and become two regiments in 2017, with plans to have an active tank field range by then.

                                                            The photo below is just north of Yelnya. It is a snapshot from Yandex.ru, which I checked, but the actual image I borrowed from an Infonapalm post.

                                                            Yelnya new base forming

                                                            3.) 28th Motor Rifle Brigade in Klintsy (Bryansk Oblast), this unit is in the process of moving from Ekateriburg (Central MD) to the town of Klintsy, with lead elements arriving May 30, 2016.  A widely shared government tender, issued June 28th of this year, has shown the planned structure of the base, for what looks like a newly formed unit designated to be the 488th Motor Rifle Regiment.  This may well be the base of the division since typical Russian units are organized as brigade/battalion.  Perhaps the division itself will be headquartered further north in Yelnya, but with regiments as far south as Klintsy.  The work is slated for completion in Summer of 2017, so more than likely this unit will be stood up piecemeal over the coming year.

                                                            0_113de82_68975f8e_orig.jpg

                                                            Which army gets what division? TASS news agency claimed that the Yelnya division will be assigned to the 1st Tank Army, but other sources suggested the unit in Klintsy, which forms the first regiment of this division,  will belong to 20th CAA.  This makes more sense, and it would be logical for the 10th Armored Division to go to 1st Tank Army, except for the fact that in the 1990s it was part  of the 20th CAA.  Back then the 20th was based in Voronezh and if Shoigu decides to ‘set right what Serduykov once set wrong’ then all must be put back in its place.

                                                            4.) 23rd Motor Rifle Brigade in Valuyki (Belgorod oblast) – This unit is moving from Samara in the Central MD as well, to a base planned to be completed by November 2016.  A government tender issued indicates that the construction is slated for 3,500 soldiers (size fits).  The brigade is composed of the following battalions: one armored, three motor rifle, two self-propelled artillery, one rocket artillery, two air defense and a host of supporting units.

                                                            This is the Valuyki base under construction.

                                                            Valuyki

                                                            Below is a satellite shot of the facility being built.

                                                            Vakuyki google earth image

                                                            5.) 150th Division near Novocherkassk (Rostov Oblast) –  This division was rumored to be based on the 33rd Independent Motor Rifle Brigade, but it is also said it will be formed anew without building off of an existing brigade.  This particular division will be named after the 150th Idritsk-Berlin Division, famous for raising the flag over the Reichstag in 1945.  The 33rd Bde belongs to the 49th Army in Southern MD, however the contract servicemen were moved from Maikop to Novocherkassk, so it resides in two locations at the same time.  According to the timetable, the housing for this division is being thrown up quickly using modular construction, but it too is not planned to be finished until sometime in 2017.  Whether or not the 33rd will be subsumed into this division is an outstanding question, my view is that inevitably Russia will have to consume that brigade if they are to come up with 10,000 soldiers to staff a six regiment division.

                                                            The thing is some news reports also suggested Millerovo as one of the locations for a part of this division, Novocherkassk and Millerovo are not that close to each other.  It is still unknown how spread out this division will be in Rostov oblast. This photo was widely circulated in April 2016 of a deputy minister inspecting housing construction for the division.  No timeline for when it will be ready, but given the photo’s date its safe to assume they’ve not materialized the division out of thin air between April and August.

                                                            Novocherkassk house inspection generals

                                                            This could be another shot of a base being built for the division, complete with soccer fields.

                                                            One of the bases in Rostov region.jpg

                                                            6.) Millerovo Airbase (Rostov Oblast) – The airbase has been around for years. Close to the Ukrainian border, and well positioned to provide air support to the ground units in the region. In December 2014 Millerovo saw the restoration of the 31st Fighter Regiment with Mig-29 variants.  Following October 2015 the unit is being upgraded to much more capable Su-30SM, a heavy multirole fighter.  The 31st has received 20 new Su-30SMs, which is no small feat given they’re in high demand across the air force and aerospace forces.  Today the base likely houses ~60 fighters, including 20 Su-30Sm, 32 Mig-29, and a mix of Su-27 variants.

                                                            During various times the base has hosted a fair bit of ground equipment.  There is a motorized battalion assigned to it but at times satellite footage shows it hosting a decent ground contingent.  I’ve also noticed what looks like a 3D low bandwidth surveillance radar planted there on google earth, a Nebo 55G6 (Tall Rack).  No doubt has a good look over Ukrainian skies, and decent visibility on ‘low visibility’ aircraft.

                                                            Millerovo March 2014 – fairly clear.

                                                            Millerovo wide shot March 2014

                                                            Millerovo August 2015 with a larger footprint being taken up by ground units.

                                                            Millerovo wide shot August 2015

                                                            Millerovo runway shot from March 2016 (Janes paid for AirBus sat footage)

                                                            Millerovo march 9 2016.jpg

                                                            7.) Rostov region bases – The region is packed with military bases, but a few in particular are quite vast, including staging bases for units arriving to the region and going on rotation.  Some call this Rostov One.  I’m unsure of where the title came from.

                                                            Large base/staging area between Golovinka and Vodino – this is about one third of it in the shot from google on October 2014.  The base is so large that it would take three images to do it justice.  This area was setup promptly during the start of conflict with Ukraine for self explainable reasons.  Nothing was here in late 2013 except green fields according to google earth.

                                                            staging base 3.jpg

                                                            Up close you will find a variety of units camped out there.  In this shot we have towed artillery, but there’s plenty of MLRS, and various armored vehicle types as well.

                                                            Up close of Rostov one

                                                            Persianovsky, northeast of Novocherkassk is one of many bases in the Rostov region, which hosts training fields, and numerous military equipment storage areas.  This facility has been mentioned in recent articles, erroneously, because a look on google earth shows its been here for years and has not substantially expanded.  I don’t quite understand why it is making headlines.

                                                            Persianovsky, Rostov.jpg

                                                            Conclusion: There has been a large force shift in the southwestern direction for Russia, and incidentally, nothing comparable to speak of in the Baltic region or Kaliningrad. Today most of these plans are progressing, although some announcements are only now being realized with construction tenders.  Most of the units are at least a year out from being stood up or completing their transfer to the region.  By the second half of 2017 many of the units should be in place, though likely not at full strength.  Russian leaders speak of these divisions frequently in the press, framing them as a  response to “NATO’s build up”, but its quite clear these plans long in motion before any of NATO’s recent initiatives and their purpose has little to nothing to do with the Alliance.

                                                            This is a network of garrisons designed to deter Ukraine from believing it could win a limited conventional war some years down the line.  The concept is centered around creating strike groups under the organizational framework of divisions.  Each formation is designed to handle an assault in their sector, taking in other units as necessary and supporting them in the fight.  With two CAAs, Russia intends to ring Ukraine sufficiently so as not to be concerned with the question of what a mid-long term high end fight might look like should a different leader arrive in Kiev and choose to retake the separatist regions by force.  The revival of these forces in Western and Southern MD is a permanent insurance policy for Moscow.

                                                            Special thanks to the other blogs that compile news and information, in particular for this blog: BMPD and Russian Defense Policy.  Some Ukrainian sources were helpful as well.

                                                            THE CRIMEAN CRISIS AND RUSSIA’S MILITARY POSTURE IN THE BLACK SEA

                                                            Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                            My article for War on the Rocks covering the Crimean incident and Russian exercises.  The full piece can be found here.

                                                            ————————

                                                            There’s something afoot in the Black Sea basin. Last week Moscow accused Ukraine of attempting a terrorist attack in Crimea, alleging that a firefight took place on August 7 and 8 between a supposed team of infiltrators and border guards of the FSB, Russia’s internal security service. The details of the incident remain murky. It was clear that something had happened when Russia closed a key crossing point on the peninsula early last week, internet providersblocked web access in northern Crimea, and rumors swirled of military movements as a state of emergency was imposed by security services.

                                                            Some have rushed to judgment, claiming this is an elaborate pretext for a renewed invasion of Ukraine, but so far these fears seem out of step with the evidence we have. If Russia is preparing to escalate its involvement anywhere, it is likely in Syria – not Ukraine. The Kremlin does have something in mind though. This mini-crisis in Crimea appears to be part of a larger political game with the West over Ukraine set to unfold in the coming months.

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                                                            #####EOF##### Divisions – Russia Military Analysis

                                                            Tag: Divisions

                                                            New Russian Divisions and other units shifting to Ukraine’s borders – second look with updates

                                                            Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                                            Bill Gertz’s article alleging that there were “40,000” troops massing on Ukraine’s borders inspired me to take another look at where the three planned divisions, and other unit movements stand right now.  There is quite a bit of activity and leadership announcements as part of the Russian shift to what Shoigu calls the “southwestern strategic direction.”  Essentially, a containment ring is being built circumscribing Ukraine, including large unit formations in permanent garrisons to serve as a quick reaction force in the event of a conventional war.

                                                            Some plans dating back to 2014 have already been realized, most are in progress, and several announcements are only now getting under way with completion timelines set for late 2017.  I’m underlining dates because certain people misread the May post in this blog, and I suspect other blogs on this topic, and then said that all these announced units were already in position – they are not.

                                                            At the moment Russia does not have 40,000 troops massing on Ukraine’s borders, but principally Russia’s General Staff seems to have Ukraine in mind.  The changes in force posture are designed to deal with medium-long term scenarios rather than the current conflict.  This is a large force that can effect conventional deterrence by denial, and if need be compellence, in a future crisis with Ukraine.

                                                            The reason for moving the 20th Army HQ back, resurrecting the 1st Tank Army, and creating a host of new units on Ukraine’s borders is fairly straightforward.  During the chaotic reforms 2009-2011 numerous units were consolidated or cut from the Western MD.  Others were moved further south or east.  In 2014 Russia had to improvise a combined staff of 20th and 58th Armies to put together two task forces on Ukraine’s borders.  That may have worked in February-April 2014, but its far from optimal, and simply will not do in a contingency where Russian forces need to intervene again.  Ukraine’s military is far larger in size and more capable relative to the hollowed out paper force that existed in spring of 2014.

                                                            Russian staff likely fears a ‘Croatia scenario’ whereby  Ukraine cordons off the separatist republics and then builds up an army large enough to wipe them out in a few years.  With three divisions, plus several brigades, organized under two combined arms armies (CAA) headquartered nearby, they figure it will deter future Ukrainian leaders from such adventurism.  It also places Ukraine in a geographic vice, running from Yelnya to Crimea.  It is not feasible that Ukraine will build an army capable of attacking Donbass and holding Russian units on so many fronts.  The units required to attempt an ATO 2.0 (now with a real army) would leave no defenders for other vectors of Russian attack.  Each division will be a self-sustaining strike force, ensuring that Kiev does not feel confident in the ability to retake the separatist regions through force.

                                                            A breakdown of the plans:

                                                            1.)  10th Armored Division (presumed) in Bogychar (Voronezh oblast) – When 20th Combined Arms Army moved from Mulino in Nizhegorod Oblast to Voronezh, so did 9th Motor Rifle Brigade from Dzerzhinsk to Bogychar.  This began in February 2015.  I wrote in May of this year that 1st Independent Armored Brigade will likely assume the legacy of 10th Armored Division, a move announced in July 2015.

                                                            10th Armor served in Easter Germany during the Cold War and returned in 1991.  In 2009 this division was turned into the 262nd Military Storage and Repair Base during the Serduykov period of consolidation and knocking down units in Western MD.  That base has a large stockpile and it looks like the 1st Armored Brigade will be needing it to become the 10th Armored Division.  All the divisions are likely to have a classic Soviet six regiment structure.  This unit will take into 2017  to form. So, this is a case of there and back again for the Russian army. Between 2009-2016 the process flow has been: 10th Div -> 262nd Base -> 1st Bde -> 10th Div.

                                                            Here  is a nice photo of the 262nd base in Bogychar.  It’s going to get busy with 9th Bde and a new division there.

                                                            262nd base bogychar

                                                            2.) 144th Motor Rifle Division in Yelnya (Smolensk oblast) – The plans for this unit were essentially announced back in 23 November 2014, and in September 2015 it was confirmed that a newly formed independent motor rifle brigade will return to Yelnya.  The 144th motor rifle division was once based here after being withdrawn from Estonia, disbanded in 1998, and converted into a military warehouse base.  A new unit will assume the legacy of the 144th and become the core of the announced division.

                                                            Early July of 2015 the MoD announced that this motor rifle division will be formed by second half of 2017 and be assigned to the 1st Tank Guards Army.  Second half of 2017 is optimistic since according to one paper the total military personnel expected by summer of 2017 is 6,000, of which 3,600 will be contract and officers.  It goes without saying that 6,000 is less than the 10,000 promised.  Not quite enough to fill six regiments of 3 motor rifle , 1 armor, 1 artillery, 1 air defense and the rest support units.  The expectation for 2016  is two battalions will arrive, and become two regiments in 2017, with plans to have an active tank field range by then.

                                                            The photo below is just north of Yelnya. It is a snapshot from Yandex.ru, which I checked, but the actual image I borrowed from an Infonapalm post.

                                                            Yelnya new base forming

                                                            3.) 28th Motor Rifle Brigade in Klintsy (Bryansk Oblast), this unit is in the process of moving from Ekateriburg (Central MD) to the town of Klintsy, with lead elements arriving May 30, 2016.  A widely shared government tender, issued June 28th of this year, has shown the planned structure of the base, for what looks like a newly formed unit designated to be the 488th Motor Rifle Regiment.  This may well be the base of the division since typical Russian units are organized as brigade/battalion.  Perhaps the division itself will be headquartered further north in Yelnya, but with regiments as far south as Klintsy.  The work is slated for completion in Summer of 2017, so more than likely this unit will be stood up piecemeal over the coming year.

                                                            0_113de82_68975f8e_orig.jpg

                                                            Which army gets what division? TASS news agency claimed that the Yelnya division will be assigned to the 1st Tank Army, but other sources suggested the unit in Klintsy, which forms the first regiment of this division,  will belong to 20th CAA.  This makes more sense, and it would be logical for the 10th Armored Division to go to 1st Tank Army, except for the fact that in the 1990s it was part  of the 20th CAA.  Back then the 20th was based in Voronezh and if Shoigu decides to ‘set right what Serduykov once set wrong’ then all must be put back in its place.

                                                            4.) 23rd Motor Rifle Brigade in Valuyki (Belgorod oblast) – This unit is moving from Samara in the Central MD as well, to a base planned to be completed by November 2016.  A government tender issued indicates that the construction is slated for 3,500 soldiers (size fits).  The brigade is composed of the following battalions: one armored, three motor rifle, two self-propelled artillery, one rocket artillery, two air defense and a host of supporting units.

                                                            This is the Valuyki base under construction.

                                                            Valuyki

                                                            Below is a satellite shot of the facility being built.

                                                            Vakuyki google earth image

                                                            5.) 150th Division near Novocherkassk (Rostov Oblast) –  This division was rumored to be based on the 33rd Independent Motor Rifle Brigade, but it is also said it will be formed anew without building off of an existing brigade.  This particular division will be named after the 150th Idritsk-Berlin Division, famous for raising the flag over the Reichstag in 1945.  The 33rd Bde belongs to the 49th Army in Southern MD, however the contract servicemen were moved from Maikop to Novocherkassk, so it resides in two locations at the same time.  According to the timetable, the housing for this division is being thrown up quickly using modular construction, but it too is not planned to be finished until sometime in 2017.  Whether or not the 33rd will be subsumed into this division is an outstanding question, my view is that inevitably Russia will have to consume that brigade if they are to come up with 10,000 soldiers to staff a six regiment division.

                                                            The thing is some news reports also suggested Millerovo as one of the locations for a part of this division, Novocherkassk and Millerovo are not that close to each other.  It is still unknown how spread out this division will be in Rostov oblast. This photo was widely circulated in April 2016 of a deputy minister inspecting housing construction for the division.  No timeline for when it will be ready, but given the photo’s date its safe to assume they’ve not materialized the division out of thin air between April and August.

                                                            Novocherkassk house inspection generals

                                                            This could be another shot of a base being built for the division, complete with soccer fields.

                                                            One of the bases in Rostov region.jpg

                                                            6.) Millerovo Airbase (Rostov Oblast) – The airbase has been around for years. Close to the Ukrainian border, and well positioned to provide air support to the ground units in the region. In December 2014 Millerovo saw the restoration of the 31st Fighter Regiment with Mig-29 variants.  Following October 2015 the unit is being upgraded to much more capable Su-30SM, a heavy multirole fighter.  The 31st has received 20 new Su-30SMs, which is no small feat given they’re in high demand across the air force and aerospace forces.  Today the base likely houses ~60 fighters, including 20 Su-30Sm, 32 Mig-29, and a mix of Su-27 variants.

                                                            During various times the base has hosted a fair bit of ground equipment.  There is a motorized battalion assigned to it but at times satellite footage shows it hosting a decent ground contingent.  I’ve also noticed what looks like a 3D low bandwidth surveillance radar planted there on google earth, a Nebo 55G6 (Tall Rack).  No doubt has a good look over Ukrainian skies, and decent visibility on ‘low visibility’ aircraft.

                                                            Millerovo March 2014 – fairly clear.

                                                            Millerovo wide shot March 2014

                                                            Millerovo August 2015 with a larger footprint being taken up by ground units.

                                                            Millerovo wide shot August 2015

                                                            Millerovo runway shot from March 2016 (Janes paid for AirBus sat footage)

                                                            Millerovo march 9 2016.jpg

                                                            7.) Rostov region bases – The region is packed with military bases, but a few in particular are quite vast, including staging bases for units arriving to the region and going on rotation.  Some call this Rostov One.  I’m unsure of where the title came from.

                                                            Large base/staging area between Golovinka and Vodino – this is about one third of it in the shot from google on October 2014.  The base is so large that it would take three images to do it justice.  This area was setup promptly during the start of conflict with Ukraine for self explainable reasons.  Nothing was here in late 2013 except green fields according to google earth.

                                                            staging base 3.jpg

                                                            Up close you will find a variety of units camped out there.  In this shot we have towed artillery, but there’s plenty of MLRS, and various armored vehicle types as well.

                                                            Up close of Rostov one

                                                            Persianovsky, northeast of Novocherkassk is one of many bases in the Rostov region, which hosts training fields, and numerous military equipment storage areas.  This facility has been mentioned in recent articles, erroneously, because a look on google earth shows its been here for years and has not substantially expanded.  I don’t quite understand why it is making headlines.

                                                            Persianovsky, Rostov.jpg

                                                            Conclusion: There has been a large force shift in the southwestern direction for Russia, and incidentally, nothing comparable to speak of in the Baltic region or Kaliningrad. Today most of these plans are progressing, although some announcements are only now being realized with construction tenders.  Most of the units are at least a year out from being stood up or completing their transfer to the region.  By the second half of 2017 many of the units should be in place, though likely not at full strength.  Russian leaders speak of these divisions frequently in the press, framing them as a  response to “NATO’s build up”, but its quite clear these plans long in motion before any of NATO’s recent initiatives and their purpose has little to nothing to do with the Alliance.

                                                            This is a network of garrisons designed to deter Ukraine from believing it could win a limited conventional war some years down the line.  The concept is centered around creating strike groups under the organizational framework of divisions.  Each formation is designed to handle an assault in their sector, taking in other units as necessary and supporting them in the fight.  With two CAAs, Russia intends to ring Ukraine sufficiently so as not to be concerned with the question of what a mid-long term high end fight might look like should a different leader arrive in Kiev and choose to retake the separatist regions by force.  The revival of these forces in Western and Southern MD is a permanent insurance policy for Moscow.

                                                            Special thanks to the other blogs that compile news and information, in particular for this blog: BMPD and Russian Defense Policy.  Some Ukrainian sources were helpful as well.

                                                            Russia’s New Divisions in the West

                                                            Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                            On January 12th Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the formation of three new divisions.  These are not a response to U.S. force deployments in Europe, NATO’s exercises, or the prospect of new multinational battalions in the Baltic states.  The thinking in Russia’s General Staff appears to be about a Ukrainian and Belorussian contingency, namely a second and more intense war with Ukraine or perhaps a color revolution in Belarus.  The map of where these new units will be formed is quite telling: Yelnya, Bogychar and Novocherkassk.  While NATO is busy discussing deterrence, reassurance, resolve, Russia has Ukraine on it’s mind and is implementing long discussed plans to permanently base units on Ukraine’s borders.

                                                            From Vedomosti:

                                                            default-1ue8

                                                            What we know about the new divisions is that they be formed on the basis of existing brigades, likely not composed of new units but generated from forces already deployed in the Western Military District.  The divisions are promised to number 10,000 strong and were announced piecemeal between 2014-2016, formations to be based largely on garrisoned or newly formed independent brigades already in those regions.

                                                            1.) Bogychar, Voronezh Oblast.  This division will likely be formed on the basis of the 1st Independent Armored Brigade (not to be confused with 1st Tank Army), which will assume the legacy of the 10th Armor Division a unit that during the reforms was converted in 2009 into the 262nd military base.  The 9th independent motor rifle brigade may contribute units to this division because in February 2015 it shifted elements to Bogychar from Dzerzhinsk.  The plans for this division were first revealed in July 2015.  In September 2015 plans were also announced to build a military garrison in Belogorod for a yet undisclosed unit to be housed there, close to Ukraine’s northern border.

                                                            2.) Yelnya, Smolensk Oblast.  The plans for this division were announced back in November 2014.  In September 2015 it was said that a newly formed motor rifle brigade will return to Yelnya, where there once used to be the 144th motor rifle division withdrawn from Germany.  That unit was disbanded in 1998 and converted into a military warehouse base.  It’s possible the new unit will assume the legacy of the 144th and become the core of the announced division. Early July of 2015 the MoD announced that this motor rifle division will be formed by June of 2017 (optimistically) and be assigned to the 1st Tank Guards Army.  It’s structure will be a classic 6 regiment build, 3 motor rifle, 1 armor, 1 artillery, 1 air defense and the rest support units.

                                                            3.) Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.  This division is likely to be based on the 33rd Independent Motor Rifle Brigade shifted from Maikop to Rostov.  This particular division will be named after the 150th Idritsk-Berlin Division, famous for raising the flag over the Reichstag in 1945.

                                                            strelbi_tankisty-14

                                                            4th Kantemirovskaya Division training

                                                            The Return

                                                            The steady change in force posture 2013-2016 is an important overall development among Russian ground forces.  During the 2008-2012 Serdyukov military reforms, Russia reduced the number of armor and motor rifle battalions from 50 to 22 around Moscow in the Western Military District.  Most forces from Ukraine’s borders were almost completely withdrawn during the reforms, such as the 10th Armor Division that may be restored in part in Bogychar, Voronezh.

                                                            Since 2013 Russia has seen the partial return of disbanded or relocated units to the Western Military District largely based South West of Moscow near Belarus and Ukraine.  Additional brigades were created for the 20th Army, then the 1st Tank Army was formed, and following the war in Ukraine some units were brought north from the Southern Military District.  According to Sergei Shoigu’s announcement this year 30 military units have been brought back to the region, though their basing seems largely distant from NATO’s borders.  The recent history of the Western Military District can likely be divided into two periods 2009-2013, a time of demobilization and relocation of units away from Russia’s Western borders, and 2013-2016 the return of heavy ground forces in part driven by the conflict with Ukraine.

                                                            The most logical reason for bringing these units back is the Russian experience of having to put together Battalion Tactical Groups in early 2014 when deploying on Ukraine’s borders.  This was an improvised effort, combining the staff’s of 20th and 58th armies to plan out the deployments, which put together several powerful strike groups on Ukraine’s borders.  Despite their success, the process exposed two obvious problems for Russia’s Western MD.  First, Russia lacked permanently based units near Ukraine’s and Belarus’ borders, fully equipped with supporting elements allowing them to sustain a deployment.  The second was the absence of a larger formation that could take in battalions from other military districts and command them in the field, i.e. no divisional structure.  This made rotating units from Central MD and Eastern MD in the fight harder from a command perspective.  With three new divisions, Russia can now send battalion sized units to those commands, have them sort out logistics and support, or in a larger war serve as the center piece in a task organized strike group.

                                                            There and back again: divisions to brigades to divisions

                                                            What does this mean for the Russian army as a whole?  The return of divisions could be seen in line with the general walking back of Serdyukov’s reorganization, given the return of air regiments and divisions in the Air Force, back from air bases.  Similarly Shoigu restored the 4th Kantemirovskaya Armor Division and the 2nd Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division, although both are honorary division names brought back for their historical legacy.  In reality these are half divisions in the Western Military District formed around two regiments each, composing the 1st Tank Army (announced though yet to be created).  However, thinking that divisions are back in the Russian military and brigades are out is an incorrect assessment.

                                                            Russia is not sticking wholly with brigades or switching back to divisions, instead looking at a mixed force structure.  In some ways this may be reminiscent of the U.S. Marine Corps which has brigades and battalions, divisions and regiments all within one service.  A very ‘hybrid’ organization in the parlance of modern military discourse, i.e. an eclectic mix of formations and groupings.

                                                            One of the unanswered questions is whether these divisions will truly be based more on a Soviet division structure, composed of four combined arms regiments and a much larger combination of supporting units.  If so, it will take quite a bit of equipment and existing units to form them.  Alternatively, they are likely to look like the 4th and 2nd division, formed around two regiments and a host of supporting units.  These would be in effect expanded brigades, with division level command staff and larger supporting units (artillery, air-defense, etc.)

                                                            Thanks to a number of sources: BMPD, Vedomosti, Gazeta RU, Topwar.ru, EagleRost, Defence.ru and others.

                                                             

                                                             

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                                                            #####EOF##### Qualys – 44CON

                                                            Qualys

                                                            qualys

                                                            Qualys, Inc. (NASDAQ: QLYS) is a pioneer and leading provider of cloud security and compliance solutions with over 6,700 customers in more than 100 countries, including a majority of each of the Forbes Global 100 and Fortune 100. The QualysGuard Cloud Platform and integrated suite of solutions help organizations simplify security operations and lower the cost of compliance by delivering critical security intelligence on demand and automating the full spectrum of auditing, compliance and protection for IT systems and web applications. Founded in 1999, Qualys has established strategic partnerships with leading managed service providers and consulting organizations including Accuvant, BT, Dell SecureWorks, Dimension Data, E-Cop, Fujitsu, HCL, NTT, Symantec, Verizon and Wipro. The company is also a founding member of the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) and a Premium Corporate Member of OWASP. For more information, please visit www.qualys.com.

                                                             

                                                            #####EOF##### Matt Mullenweg: State of the Word 2015 – WordPress.tv
                                                            Home » WordCampTV»WordCamp US 2015

                                                            Matt Mullenweg: State of the Word 2015

                                                            5 responses on “Matt Mullenweg: State of the Word 2015”

                                                            1. Paul Stonier
                                                              December 7, 2015 at 10:01 am | Reply

                                                              Term Meta deserves more applause. I’m pumped. Well done, team and thank you.

                                                              Liked by 4 people

                                                            2. aucklandmeetup
                                                              December 16, 2015 at 2:52 pm | Reply

                                                              Great presentation as always from Matt. I especially liked the parts about APIs (fast forward to 30min). Has immense opportunities for businesses especially and will look at this for several clients in the new year. . Take WordPress to the next level.

                                                              Like

                                                            3. Mayo
                                                              January 3, 2016 at 12:00 am | Reply

                                                              We need volunteer for making complete subtitle for this video. It makes from shorthand data which was used for live streaing, and is still missing a lot of words. Thanks! :
                                                              http://amara.org/ja/videos/sNmtHk73o4OQ/en/1189308/

                                                              Like

                                                            4. Reynald
                                                              March 30, 2016 at 9:45 am | Reply

                                                              I use WP as an application framework for most of my projects, I’d love to hear what his plans are to build on to those lego blocks.

                                                              Like

                                                            5. VacationsOnEarth.net
                                                              May 10, 2016 at 1:29 am | Reply

                                                              Thank you. I thoroughly enjoyed watching and listening to all the incredible advice you give from previous years and for the future of WordPress. Learning WordPress and everything it can do has been an amazing journey for me and I’ll make sure to learn more about JavaScript this year. I’d love to one day be part of your Automattic team! All the very best Matt and thank you once again.

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                                                            Published

                                                            December 7, 2015

                                                            Celebrates the accomplishments of the last year, and look forward to more good things to come as Matt Mullenweg delivers the “State of the Word” from WordCamp US 2015.

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                                                              #####EOF##### Don A. Bailey – 44CON

                                                              Don A. Bailey

                                                               Don A.Bailey Twitter: @DonAndrewBailey
                                                              Website: www.capitolhillconsultants.com
                                                              I’m donb. I love research. Particularly? Cellular, embedded, distributed, and swarm systems. I’m also obsessed with biometrics and the narrowing gap between digital and physical technology. I write exploits. I travel. I snowboard. Let’s grab a beer!

                                                              Don has presented at:

                                                              • 44CON 2017: The Internet of Us
                                                              • 44CON 2014:  Chopping Down Mountains
                                                              • 44CON 2013: Breaking Bad Programs
                                                              #####EOF##### budget – Russia Military Analysis

                                                              Tag: budget

                                                              The Durability of Russian Military Power: Moscow’s Prospects for Sustaining Direct Competition

                                                              Michael Kofman6 Comments

                                                              My issue brief as part a series run by the Changing Character of War Centre at Oxford, assessing the durability of Russian military power. I recommend their centre’s website for some great Russia mil analysis. This briefing in particular focuses on manpower, materiel, and funding. I tackle the issue of whether Russia is able to sustain a competition with the United States, and the extent to which it will be able to sustain the military as an effective instrument of national power despite the many problems the country faces. I’ve found that some of the discourse on this subject, particularly with respect to manpower/demographics, could be better informed by data, and merits a closer look.

                                                               

                                                              Political analysis in the West retains a strong bias towards measuring state influence and status according to economic foundations of power, yet Russia has demonstrated that military power remains an important instrument in international politics. Having enacted a period of military reform 2008-2012 and financed a sustained program of modernization, Russian foreign policy is increasingly underwritten either by the use of force, or threat of force, as part and parcel of coercive diplomacy. Though much attention is drawn today to indirect competition, it is Russia’s successful resurrection of military power which enables the country to ‘bench press’ above its weight in the international arena. Indeed, indirect competition is often messy, indecisive, and ineffectual without the weight of conventional military power supporting it.

                                                              While observers are cognizant of the resurrection of Russian military power, there remains, however, a considerable debate as to its durability. Simply put, many believe that demographic, economic and industrial trends are against Russia – the country will not be able to sustain this level of direct competition. Yet there is little to suggest, looking ten years out and even beyond, that Russia will suffer from those severe shortages of either manpower, money or materiel which would reduce Russia’s ability to underwrite its foreign policy. On the contrary, Russian demographic trends reflect only an increasing availability of manpower for the growing force, a sustainable defence budget in terms of spending, and a modernization program that will suffice to arm the force well into the 2020s. It can go on, and it will.

                                                              Much of the conversation on Russian demographics is simply ill informed. A decline of birth rates throughout the 1990s lasted until 1999. Russia suffered through a decade of declining health standards, fertility, falling birth rates, and emigration. Despite the decline in numbers of 18 year olds available for service, Russian armed forces expanded from perhaps around 700,000 in 2011 to over 900,000 in 2017. The contract share of the force swelled to as much as 380,000, or more than 50% of the enlisted force. Russian birth rates increased year on year from 2000 until 2015. This means that men born in 2000 will be of service age this year, 2018, and the pool of men aged 18-27 should increase every year from now until 2032.

                                                              Russia’s birth rate – World Bank

                                                              world-bank-rf-birthrates.jpg

                                                              Birth rates are hardly the only indicator responsible for growing manpower availability in Russia. The draft board, Voenkomat, has also helped clean up corruption in the number of health exclusions granted to those seeking to dodge service. In the past, many Russians would spontaneously become unhealthy upon turning 18. But with health exclusions revised, and the rampant buying of disqualifications now attended to, the amount of those deemed unfit had declined to only about 23% in 2016 according to head of the General Staff’s Mobilization Directorate Colonel General Tonkoshkurov. Russia’s chief military prosecutor, Valery Petrov, stated more recently in 2018 that overall draft evasion is down by about 30% from the corrupt heydays of the past. Beyond reductions in draft dodging, increases in pay, growing public respect for the armed forces, and overall improving conditions in the military have all had a positive effect on recruitment. Starting in 2018, a change in the conscription law now offers draftees the option of one year conscript service or two years under contract with better terms.

                                                              General demographics trends offer a complex picture of Russia’s future. Russian life expectancy actually reached a record high in 2017, and fertility rates are closing in on those in the United States, up from 1.157 in 1999 to 1.75 in 2016 (U.S. was at 1.8). Russia suffers from three principal problems in demographics: the demographic echo from the disastrous 1990s which will return to haunt Moscow in the mid-2030s, a declining workforce which is losing perhaps 600,000 per year in retirements, and the recent economic recession which slowed birth rates 2015-2017 (even despite generous state sponsored family programmes) which will have knock on effects years from now. Russia’s main problem is not so much the size of its population, but its productivity. Nevertheless, because Russia remains the primary labour market for the former Soviet Union, and is host to a large pool of immigrant labour, it does have answers readily available for the present decline in the labour force. Despite all these challenges, therefore, Russia’s current population is much healthier of late, with the longest lifespan witnessed, and manpower availability is likely to see sustained increases into the mid 2030s.

                                                              Fertility rates comparison – World Bank

                                                              Fertility rates WB
                                                              A steady decline in US fertility rate meets a rise in Russian fertility rate prior to the econ crisis

                                                              From a materiel standpoint, it is also difficult to observe looming shortages. The previous State Armament Program 2011-2020 was meant to jumpstart the defence industry, and effectively provided for a dramatic increase in the modernization rating of Russian equipment from 15% in 2010 to almost 60% in 2017 (according to official figures). That program’s achievements merit briefly recounting, as they include the acquisition of 418 aircraft for tactical aviation, 3 combat aviation brigades and 6 combat aviation regiments, 16 air defence regiments of S-400, more than 70 radars of various types for VKS Aerospace forces, 10 Iskander-M brigade sets, completion of Russia’s early warning radar network, 55 military satellites launched into orbit, 12 new regiments of Yars road-mobile ICBMs deployed, more than 3,000 modernized ground force vehicles, 3 new SSBNs and 2 new 4th generation SSGNs, together with diesel-electric submarines, corvettes, and auxiliary ships. This list includes upgrades in more specialized fields, including electronic warfare brigades and companies, new command and control systems to enable recon-strike and fires, together with more than 1800 drones acquired across services.

                                                              The funds spent by 2017 doubtfully exceed 50-60% of the original 19 trillion RUB allocated. Thus the new state armament program 2018-2027, at another 19 trillion RUB, plus 1 trillion for infrastructure, and 3 trillion for other security services, represents a sustained investment. Albeit with reduced purchasing power, the new state armament program will focus on areas neglected, or perhaps ‘jump started’ by its predecessor. These include large-scale acquisition of precision guided munitions, long-range standoff cruise missiles, transport aviation, bomber modernization, expansion of artillery, armour, and missile formations in the ground forces, more capable drones, and next generation tech like hypersonic weapons.

                                                              Even in Russia’s lagging industry, shipbuilding, one can see that core sectors of competence such as submarine construction remain capable of producing some of the most sophisticated platforms available. Russia currently has 11 nuclear powered submarines laid down, and is able to build a diesel-electric submarine in 18 months, with a division of 6 currently in production for the Pacific Fleet. Despite a messy divorce from Ukraine’s defence sector, the material is not only there to sustain Russian military modernization, but the production rates are more than sufficient even in troublesome sectors.

                                                              In other areas, such as the ground forces, the conflict in Ukraine and Syria has illustrated that Russian ‘good enough’ is can deal with the country’s military requirements for the coming decade. Modernized Soviet platforms are able to beat any former Soviet republic on Russia’s borders. Possessing them at high readiness, and large numbers, means Russia can effectively impose its will on neighbours or coerce them in a crisis. If anything, most of the challenges faced by Moscow are self-imposed, such as the decision to expand the ground force structure so quickly that it will inherently suffer in readiness and mobility. The defence industry has shown itself capable of producing current generation technology such that Russia has a viable path towards conventional deterrence vis-a-vis the United States, meanwhile less advanced elements of the Russian military are more than suitable for compellence in local and regional conflicts.

                                                              Assuming levels of economic growth at 1.5%, there is little to suggest that Russia cannot sustain this level of military expenditure, which will amount to no more than 4% of GDP. Meanwhile Russian spending on national defence will likely hover at around 2.8% of GDP, as the defence budget is only seeing modest cuts relative to other sections of the budget. The fact that oil prices are 50% above the $40 per barrel mark which the government used to underpin its budget expectations is yet another indicator that the economic outlook for defence spending is considerably better than usually appreciated. While the defence budget may still have fat to trim, coming off of historic highs in 2014, there is less urgency in spending on procurement after major gaps have been filled in 2011-2017, and the defence industry revitalized in the process. Adjusted for purchasing power parity, Russia remains just behind Germany as the second largest GDP in Europe. Although it is technically a middle income country, Russia’s raw GDP hides considerable purchasing power when it comes to defence spending and the ability to sustain its armed forces.

                                                              On the basis of macro indicators such as manpower, materiel, and money, therefore, Russia is positioned to sustain its policies, even if this means a prolonged confrontation well into the 2020s, and perhaps 2030s. More importantly, Moscow’s ability to leverage military power as one of the more decisive instruments in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives should be clearly understood. Russia can retain the current degree of military activity, snap readiness tests, large strategic exercises, expeditionary operations in Syria, and a rotating presence in Ukraine. The challenges Russia faces are consequential, often resulting in cycles of stagnation and mobilization, but they are not deterministic, as has historically been the case for this particular power.

                                                              The Collapsing Russian Defense Budget and Other Fairy Tales

                                                              Michael Kofman6 Comments

                                                              Posted today on Russia Matters, a project by Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.  Below is my latest piece in response to the headlines generated by SIRPI’s trends in military expenditure report alleging a 20% reduction in Russian military expenditure in 2017.

                                                              One can only observe with bemusement the growth in size, readiness and modernization of Russia’s armed forces when juxtaposed against recent news stories reporting a 20-percent decline in Russian defense spending from 2016 to 2017, described as the first notable cut since 1998. It is seemingly impossible for both trends to be real. Indeed, Russian defense spending is alive and well, with cuts limited to single digits. The announcement about its steep decline by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, was erroneous. Changes in Russia’s handling of defense funding have led SIPRI and, before it, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly to misreport the reduction. Now, for the second time in as many years, the miscalculation is proliferating across major media outlets.

                                                              The main source of the error is readily identifiable, arcane though it may be: In 2016 the Russian government started paying off defense-sector debt that had piled up over the years, which created the illusion of much higher spending on national defense and, accordingly, a subsequent decline the following year. Before this, the Defense Ministry (MoD) had managed to rack up close to a trillion rubles in debt to defense contractors, who had been producing equipment on credit borrowed from various banks. The MoD was paying the interest on these loans and the Russian leadership was none too happy about it. After the government decided to pay down the debt, the Finance Ministry provided 792 billion rubles for this purpose, a figure that seemed to boost 2016 defense spending from its actual 3.09 trillion rubles to 3.8 trillion. (Subsequently another 186 billion rubles was spent in 2017 on paying down debt, making the spending appear higher for that year as well.) According to the MoD, this measure saved 130 billion rubles in interest alone.

                                                              Another change disrupting the continuity of Russian defense-spending data, adopted by the government in 2017, was to tighten up controls on funding left over in the hands of the defense sector when it was unable to deliver weapons on time. Prior to this, the defense industry was allowed to build up stockpiles of money advanced for armaments that had not been produced as scheduled. Furthermore, some defense enterprises were clever enough to collect interest on these large advances, which sat in their accounts. At the end of the year, about 250-300 billion rubles ended up trapped in this manner, and the MoD had a hard choice to make: either further finance incomplete orders, and therefore reward delinquency, or return the money to the government budget and potentially lose it. To solve the matter, the MoD will now pull unspent funding back to the government budget under the condition that it will be reissued, and roll over payments into the following year. This means that some portion of each year’s budget (perhaps 5 percent or so) will flow into the next year.

                                                              In making its calculations SIPRI also converted the outsized budget figures from 2016 into U.S. dollars, which exacerbated the impression of a dramatic decline in defense spending in 2017. Measuring Russia’s defense budget in dollars is analytically unhelpful, since Russia’s defense sector doesn’t buy much of anything in dollars. Thus, the resulting figures are distorted by changes in currency exchange rates, and they are not adjusted for purchasing power parity. Ultimately, several percentage points in SIPRI’s alleged decline were likely due to currency devaluation, which is almost completely irrelevant to the matter in question.

                                                              While we are in fact witnessing a steady decline of Russian defense spending as a percentage of GDP, defense cuts in absolute terms have been modest at best. Official spending on defense dropped by about 8 percent from 2016 to 2017, from 3.09 trillion rubles to 2.84 trillion, and the defense budget was only scheduled for cuts averaging 5-6 percent over the three-year period of 2017-2019. (The numbers in this article reflect official defense spending, not total military expenditure, which might include funding for other militarized services like the border guards and Interior Ministry troops, or military pensions, which could add another trillion rubles to the bottom line.) Actual reductions in military spending began in 2015, by about 5 percent. Economic factors certainly played a role—primarily Russia’s recession and the drop in oil prices—but perhaps more important were the geopolitical factors: loss of access to certain defense articles imported from the West and the messy divorce from Ukraine’s defense sector. Due to the war with Ukraine, Russia’s defense industry could not buy components from its long-time partner across the border; this, in turn, delayed production and left the Russian Defense Ministry with less materiel to buy, while the funds to pay for it sat in government coffers instead of getting spent.

                                                              Russia’s defense expenditures are not a coherent data set and have become easy to get lost in given the changes that have taken place. Nonetheless, it is especially frustrating to see the narrative of “slashed military spending due to economic woes” resurface now, since the same miscalculation was made last year by Jane’s, which reported a 25-percent reduction in Russian defense spending from 2016 to 2017 based on Moscow’s advance announcement of planned expenditures. Jane’s later acknowledged the mistake and took down its original story, but by that time the sensational figure had already been reported widely in the news media.

                                                              Although it is impossible to know in advance how much will be spent in 2018, it is already looking like this year’s anticipated 5 percent reduction is unlikely to materialize. Instead of the planned 2.768 trillion rubles, the Russian budget’s defense chapter has already been amended to 2.953, a 6.7-percent increase; this higher 2018 figure likely includes carryover payments for armament procurement in 2017. Hence defense spending in 2018 is unlikely to decline, but the Russian leadership still intends to see military expenditure reduced as a share of GDP. Planned spending on national defense was envisioned at 2.815 trillion for 2019 and 2.807 trillion for 2020—also hardly a steep cut, and current performance suggests actual numbers will prove higher.

                                                              Moreover, despite a reduction in Russia’s purchasing power, the new state armament program for 2018-2027 is quite substantial for the defense sector, especially considering the amount of modernization and procurement of new equipment already accomplished under the previous one. The latest program allocates considerable resources for additional procurement. It is configured in a 19+1+3 formula, with 19 trillion rubles for the armed forces, 1 trillion in infrastructure spending and another 3 trillion for other security services, such as the National Guard. The previous program of 2011-2020 was valued at close to 19 trillion rubles (plus infrastructure investment), about half of which was spent by 2017, at a rate that might average 1.35 trillion per year.

                                                              Thus, Russian defense spending and procurement is in for a sustained trim, but the reductions are fairly minor in comparison to the sensational headlines. Moscow has long declared its intentions to halt the growth in defense spending and reduce military expenditure as a share of GDP over time. Given the complexity of Russia’s defense budget, and a data set that lacks continuity, the best thing one can do is tread with care when it comes to pronouncements.

                                                              Because budget work is kind of lackluster and doesn’t offer much in terms of photos, I’m attaching this picture of Ivan, our lead analyst of budget analytics and kibble.

                                                              Ivan director of budget analytics and kibble

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                                                              #####EOF##### Aus Chap #1 – Sydney Saunter | Art Aims

                                                              Aus Chap #1 – Sydney Saunter

                                                              Posted on by

                                                              Straya-Header
                                                              (                                                              Aus Chap. = ‘Australian Chapter’ [of my life; of this journal; or Aus Chap = my bf.)

                                                              #1 /  SYDNEY SAUNTER /
                                                              May – Aug 2018

                                                              This blog post has been sitting in my drafts with a title, a few edited pictures and a blinking cursor since early-May. At the time of titling it, I was living out my two-month plan to visit my boyfriend in Sydney (from the end of March) with a flight scheduled home for late May. However, the title should rather stand as “Sydney Snowball” as things escalated pretty quickly since then to me pushing the flight back to July, applying for a long-term visa and booking a one way ticket back from South Africa in September.

                                                              Passport-mock
                                                              So that’s the low down if you’ve been sceptically following my seemingly never-ending holiday Down Under on Instagram (and now in SA, as it’s already August and I’ve delayed this post by a whole country…). Maybe you were thinking that I seemed way too comfortable and had                                                               surely overstayed that flimsy 3-month tourist visa, and wtf…bought a car there?! Yip, yip and yip. (I’m on a bridging visa now btw – if any authorities are reading this).

                                                              Dollars

                                                              But to start from the beginning, this was my first time going to Australia. I left SA end of  March just a month after returning from my year in Korea to experience a new country, making it my forth country to be in for 2018 (Korea, Japan, SA and now Aus). 

                                                              ^ at the time of that post, it was A$1=R9.08. Today (25/08) it’s R10.45. 😦

                                                              Coins
                                                              ^ The coin proportions feel so off. Cents vs dollars.

                                                              During my stay, however, no one offered me shrimp on the barbie, I hadn’t noticed kangaroo steak on any menu, I’d seen ONE man dressed like Crocodile Dundee (in the mall, and very out of place) and yes, a lot of people do say ‘mate’. And ‘fair dinkum’. And go to the ‘dunny’ to pee.

                                                              vegemite1.jpg

                                                              Ah, Vegemite! This stuff has been around for 95 years, and I didn’t know it was such a thing in Aus thing till I got there. I’ve tried it, but Bovril all the way for me, thanks. Although the smoothie bar, Boost Juice recently released a Vegemite Smoothie . It also has banana, chocolate and yoghurt and other good stuff in it too though, so all good – I guess I’ll have to give it a go.

                                                              TOURISTY THINGS:Sydney-Opera-House

                                                              What’s Sydney without its iconic Opera House? Ok, quite a lot from what I’ve since found out but it’s obviously top of the list of the first things to see when you get there. Although it’s an impressive building, I was actually more impressed by its location at Circular Quay, with its flurry of ferries and the magnificent Harbour Bridge stretching across in the background. The Royal Botanic Gardens are right there too, offering a scenic and peaceful meander through the beautifully kept gardens right next to the water. I have yet to find Mrs Macquarie’s Chair which apparently is at the point that offers some of the best views of the harbour.

                                                              I arrived in Australia in March with a stronger idea of what the outback might look like than the cities, and when imaging Sydney I just saw the Opera House and Bondi Beach. Klaar. So I was very pleasantly surprised to find that the architecture (particularly in the CBD, older areas) is beautifully Victorian and Edwardian styled (and many more).

                                                              Cathedral
                                                              The first time walking in the city while passing statues, parks, old-style detailed buildings and lampposts I felt like I could be in London. This style fades out the further you go from the city centre unfortunately, but it’s beautiful and impressive every time I go into the city.

                                                              ZOO ZOO KANGAROO:ZooIt took me over a month after I arrived to finally see a kangaroo for the first time ever. A MONTH! And we had to go to the zoo to do so. Guess they don’t roam the streets like expected (this is a joke). The Taronga Zoo is across the harbour from the Opera House, so you can catch a ferry to the other side, which I really enjoyed. This also allows for the zoo, in particular the giraffes (not just because of their long necks), to have an impressive view of the Opera House, the bridge and the city skyline from across the water. I also got to see some koalas, wombats, echidnas and Tasmanian Devils for the first time.
                                                              P.s. Almost R500 for a day ticket into the zoo…

                                                              PUBLIC TRANSPORT:

                                                              Opal

                                                              I find figuring out an unfamiliar country’s public transport system rather exciting, but also a bit overwhelming and frustrating. In Sydney, the trains (which are double decker) are really reliable/on time, but I’ve found the buses can be a bit hit or easily missed. And not quite cheap either. 

                                                              ROADTRIPPIN’:COastal

                                                              One weekend we decided to take a road trip south of Sydney along the coast in a general direction and see where we ended up. We stumbling upon quiet and beautiful viewpoints above the ocean, whale watching points (the whales were on winter break though), a blow hole in the rocks and small holiday towns with quirky shops and paths along the water’s edge with pelicans and stingrays. On the return trip just before taking the road home, we found a detour along a “Tourist Drive Route 9”. And suddenly we were snaking along a narrow road among green rolling hills and farm lands filled with cows while the sun slowly began to retreat on our spontaneous day out of the city.

                                                              Straya-map2

                                                              VIVID SYDNEY: the light show
                                                              This is a yearly festival that lights up the city (in and around the Circular Quay area and a few places beyond) with light installations, music and food events. This extends to The Rocks which is the historic and touristy precinct with restaurants, bars and shops in the old buildings along cobbled roads and through old archways. Very English feeling.

                                                              vivid.jpgParticularly impressive (as well as the many tall buildings being lit up with moving colourful displays) is the whole of the Opera House’s exterior painted in light and moving images that change designs often. You can get a great view of it from the other side of the quay. Despite the rain on the night we chose to go, we saw a lot and enjoyed it. Because we live far south, we had booked a hotel a short walk from the main event so we could enjoy the festivities till late. And by late, we found out is only 11pm when bars start closing. 11pm. During a festival period in the main part of a huge city…?

                                                              INCREASED MOBILITY:
                                                              Living in the spread out suburbs means that running simple errands or going to the mall takes double the time and planning when you don’t have a car and need to rely on the bus which comes once an hour. And so, after much scouring on car sites online and used-dealerships in person, my little baby was found hidden among many cars. I’ve had a car crush on the Fiat 500 since 2011 when I first saw it in a series I was watching at the time. And now she’s miiiiine 😀
                                                              Car

                                                              FYI: I can drive with my SA license as long as it’s current and has no suspensions etc. 

                                                              CHAPTER #2 to follow once I return/move to Sydney at the end of September and get some adventures going. 

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                                                              27 thoughts on “Aus Chap #1 – Sydney Saunter”

                                                              1. Awesome post! We’ve also had a quick holiday in Sydney last year in time for my husband’s 45th birthday. It’s as if our minds had been synchronised somehow (if the idea doesn’t freak anyone out). Your version is way better, creative, artistic, artsy, interesting, and more than what I’ve been planning to post, though. Awesome! Thank you for sharing.

                                                                Liked by 2 people

                                                                Reply

                                                              2. Probably off topic — but I really enjoyed the depictions of the journaling! I only recently decided to totally customize my agenda/journal and it’s been cool exploring what I like and what I don’t in terms of design. Cool post!

                                                                Liked by 3 people

                                                                Reply

                                                              7. Wow! Great post. I’ve always wanted to visit Aus. (especially since my own name is Sydney ^_^). I like hearing of your own personal travel there and getting an insight on what possibly to expect if I were to travel there one day.

                                                                Liked by 2 people

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                                                                #####EOF##### Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13) – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)

                                                                Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                                                Russian and Chinese leadership at Tsygol range opened up Phase 2 of the exercise with a large review of forces. The optics were clearly meant to rekindle the images of Zapad-1981, with numerous vehicles and infantry arrayed in parade formation on the grounds of the range. Indeed the display was quite large, and it seemed clear by the number of Chinese tanks, SPA, wheeled and other vehicles that probably about 3,000 troops and several hundred pieces of equipment did actually come to join Russia in these strategic maneuvers. Judging by the reporting, it is likely most of the drills during Vostok are taking place at Tsygol and Telemba, i.e. it’s quite difficult to picture Vostok being all that large as an exercise. Right now, going off of fairly little (but still a lot more honest than 300,000), around 50,000 seems a much more reasonable number of participants.

                                                                DigitalGlobe had good satellite photos of some of the parade grounds at the range and exercises for a different perspective.

                                                                satellite

                                                                Of course Putin came to look through binoculars, because it wouldn’t be a strategic exercise otherwise. Note unlike in Zapad, where Putin and Lukashenko were not together in the same command center, we can see the Chinese counterparts sitting further along the table.

                                                                Putin came.JPG

                                                                More photos can be found on BMPD. But here’s s sample of some of the gear Chinese brought with them.

                                                                Chinese tanks.jpg

                                                                Chinese forces.jpg

                                                                As this is the opening of Phase 2, most of the activity was characterized by VDV air assaults, VKS bombing missions, combined arms artillery and motor rifle unit actions. Strong emphasis on employment of drones, integrated C2, and more ‘jointness’ so to speak between ground, airborne, and VKS forces. VDV seems to be conducted several force structure and air assault experiments, including with new light high mobility vehicles, creating a air mobile reserve, etc. Ground units are mostly doing what they do best, lots of artillery and MLRS fire, armored assault, etc.

                                                                Vostok 2018 military exercise in Transbaikal Territory, Russia

                                                                VDV Airborne – More than 700 soldiers and 51 vehicles (BMD-2) made a parachutte jump at Tsygol range. At the Belaya airfield near Irkutsk, a detachment of the Ulan-Ude air assault brigade loaded 25 Il-76MD transports. They were then air lifted ~1000km towards Zabaikal where they conducted a jump at 600 meters. The scenario was air assault and seizure of an enemy airfield. All together about 6000 VDV  and 900 pieces of equipment are taking part in Vostok, in earlier posts I mentioned these are units from 3 independent air assault brigades, and two additional special detachments.

                                                                VDV Ulan Ude assault brigade.JPG

                                                                As part of the scenario unfolding at Tsygol range, an air mobile battalion belonging to the 31st independent air assault brigade conducted an air assault on an enemy command center, with air support.  About 40 helicopters of Mi-8AMTSh were used (supposed capacity 26 soldiers), two Mi-26 helicopters, and more than 10 Mi-24 helicopters in support. They are billing this exercise as an experiment of a ‘new type’ of air assault detachment. There was also a mobile reserve in support of this assault, composed of light wheeled high mobility vehicles (pickups). Mi-26s delivered 8 of these light pickups, together with 4 armored Rys light vehicles equipped with Kornet ATGMs and Kord heavy machine guns.

                                                                airborne ATVs.JPG

                                                                VKS Aerospace Forces – About 40 bombers and strike fixed wing aircraft were used in an attack on opposing ground forces, key infrastructure, and staged reserves. Units involved fielded Tu-22M3, Su-34, Su-24, and Su-25SM strike aircraft. Air cover provided by Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters. Strikes were coordinated via ground based C2 system Strelets, and Orlan-10 drones.

                                                                Tu-22M3.JPG

                                                                Eastern MD – Other activities of note: CBRN units used smoke and aerosol covers on more than 60 sq km, covering moving units and critical infrastructure – equipment used includes TDA-3K smoke machines, and RP3-8x aerosols. Anti-tank units belonging to a battalion tactical group of motor rifle and artillery units simulated strikes against enemy armor and fortified positions with 130mm Shturm-S ATGMs and Konkurs-M. Sapper units plan to use not only UR-77 Meteorit, BMP-3M, but also Uran-6 and Uran-9 UGVs for demining.

                                                                Tsygol Range – Seven artillery battalions created a rolling artillery barrage ahead of an advance, covering a line of ~3000 meters. A motor rifle battalion advanced, and there are photos of host of T-72B1 tanks engaged in a live fire exercise as part of this maneuver. They employed more than 150 pieces of artillery, including 2s3, 2s1, 2s19, Giatsint, and Pion. Meanwhile Iskander-M units fired two cruise missiles at critically important targets, at the same time a large artillery and MLRS barrage hit the opposing force. All together they employed 2 Iskander TELs, 52 MLRS systems, and 72 tube artillery. Targeting for the strike conducted via an air based system called Klever, with Su-24MP recon aviation, and Orlan-10 drones – they used live video feed for battle damage assessment. In one scenario, Russian and Chinese artillery units simultaneously attacked enemy forward command posts. Russian BM-27 Uragan were employed together with Chinese Type-81 MLRS.

                                                                Motor rifle bttn.JPG

                                                                Artillery units will also practice employing precision guided munitions called Krasnopol, these will be fired by MSTA-S and 2s3 Akatsiya, Granat-4 short range drones are to be used for targeting. Krasnopol is a 152mm semi-active laser guided munition which can be used by most self-propelled and towed artillery.

                                                                life fire.jpg

                                                                Of course a detachment of Terminator BMPT, heavy tank support vehicles will make another debut at Tsygol, undoubtedly in the hope that someone will buy them. They were first  featured in Zapad 2017 in desert camo paint, undoubtedly marketed towards a certain set of countries that like to buy equipment in such colors.

                                                                Interesting photos emerged of drone companies, fielding both Orlan-10s, but also counter drone hand held weapons, that are worth noting.

                                                                drone company.JPG

                                                                counter drone gun.jpg

                                                                Not much from the two fleets today, except that the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean is still there, and recently concluded a first time joint exercise with Russian VKS. A sizable grouping of ships and a few submarines remains there.

                                                                Some additional photos of note:

                                                                Parachute jump skeptic

                                                                in airborne now.JPG

                                                                Of course you can’t assault an enemy airbase without taking a photo first

                                                                can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo.JPG

                                                                And a time honored tradition emerging from modern exercises, people pointing at screens:

                                                                pointing at screens.jpg

                                                                 

                                                                2 thoughts on “Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)”

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                                                                  #####EOF##### Bruce Wynn OBE FBCS CITP – 44CON

                                                                  Bruce Wynn OBE FBCS CITP

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                                                                  Bruce has more than 34 years of experience across the Royal Air Force’s communications, computer and information systems fields, embracing the operational, technical and intelligence communities within UK defence. (i.e. he was a FED in Blackhat terms!)

                                                                  Since retiring from the RAF in 2004, Bruce has served as an external consultant to a number of commercial organisations (from blue-chip/Fortune 100 to SMEs), as well as to government departments, on both sides of the Atlantic. He serves on the Advisory Board of several ‘cyber’ companies, including two on the West Coast of the USA, one on the East Coast, and one in Florida!

                                                                  He focuses on cyber and informatics, including being engaged as a Cyber Advisor to the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research (Global) as well as a formal ‘visiting scientist’. His portfolio also includes support to the US Navy Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Study Group addressing ‘The Convergence of Sea Power and Cyber Power’. He is a regular (including as a contributor, facilitator and master-class tutor) at Cyber events around the world, including BlackHat, DefCon, bSides, 44Con and 44Cafe which, in the last 12 months, have taken in Kuala Lumpur, Brno, Warsaw, Rome, Berlin, Prague, University of Southern Maine, San Diego, Baltimore, Oak Ridge Tennessee, Las Vegas and London.

                                                                  He is a senior Fellow of the British Computer Society, a Chartered (and practicing!) Information Technology Professional, and has been appointed by the Queen as an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.

                                                                  Bruce has presented at:

                                                                  • 44CON 2013 (workshop): Cyber Defence or Defending the Business?
                                                                  #####EOF##### 4202 – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                  Tag: 4202

                                                                  Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part 1 – Kinzhal, Sarmat, 4202)

                                                                  Michael Kofman5 Comments

                                                                  Vladimir Putin’s speech on March 1st revealed a number of seemingly new or emerging weapon systems, some of which were known to be in testing, while others may come as somewhat a surprise. However, most of these ‘new weapons’ are long running projects, systems thought to be in development, or testing. Some had not shown themselves in quite some time, while others have never been seen, although there were reports of their tests in public releases or official statements. The weapons represent a mix of hypersonic missiles, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, traditional ballistic missile projects, and third strike vengeance weapons on the basis of Russian advancements in nuclear technology. Here I will briefly cover Kinzhal, R-28 Sarmat, and ‘4202’ – the rest of the more fantastical weapons will come in Part 2.

                                                                  But first, a brief comment on the overall presentation. The speech itself felt like a “послание” in more than one meaning of that word for those who speak Russian. It was certainly a ‘challenge accepted’ message from VVP, in part responding to the NDS and NPR. After a good run through new and seemingly fantastical capabilities, VVP returned to the subject of Russia’s military doctrine, nuclear policy, and the like. So, aside from domestic politics, there is a fair bit of coercive diplomacy in the message, from talking about the capabilities themselves, to Russian resolve, and concluding with assurances that all will be well if nobody gets into it with Russia. Moscow understands the audience well: nothing gets the attention of U.S. policymakers like nuclear weapons, and there is one person in particular in Washington who is readily impressed by videos of missiles. The graphics were not exactly Lord of the Rings quality, but what can you do, Russian MoD has to live with budget reductions since 2015.

                                                                  This was my overall impression listening to the speech and the vision it offered.

                                                                  Deathstar Russia

                                                                  Now, back to the missiles. A number of the more futuristic projects can only be characterized as semi-rational, in the sense that a fair bit of defense procurement is semi-rational. There was a need to support various design bureaus, Russia’s nuclear energy industry, and a long standing narrative about the need to penetrate a missile defense system the U.S. does not have (and probably after 30 years of copious amounts of funding still won’t have, because Russia is hardly the only country that suffers from semi-rational defense spending).

                                                                  There is no way to intercept Russian ICBMs, and with the upgrades to penetration aids they’re already implementing, Russia can ensure the viability of its deterrent for decades to come. This is not to mention recently deployed air launched cruise missiles like Kh-101/102. The ticket price of upgrading strategic nuclear weapons for better penetration, i.e. the offense, is just incredibly lower than the cost of trying to mount any viable defense. Statements on the various projects on March 1st can best be summarized as true lies, that is their stages of development are likely exaggerated, but none of what was said qualifies as science fiction either.

                                                                  Mainstream media coverage, and experts quoted have been rather dismissive of Putin’s presentation. That is an unfortunately common but foolhardy reaction, and its almost habitual. Observers are right to say that these technologies will take considerable time to test and deploy, but what some may not recall, because investment in Russian military analysis took a vacation 1992-2014, is actually when testing and development for these weapons began. The narrative of a sanctioned, economically weak and decaying Russia tends to prevail, but it comes with blinders on the issue of military technology. Yes, they can do this, and much of this may become reality in the 2020s. Recall awhile ago when Russian MoD leaked a slide on Status-6, many observers thought it was a PR stunt, and some kind of bluff, until it showed up in the NPR. Some thought T-14 Armata was a bluff, and made of cardboard, that ‘often wrong, but never in doubt list’ of expert dismissals is fairly long.

                                                                  Aeroballistic Missile Kinzhal – the air Iskander

                                                                  Kinzhal

                                                                  The shown missile is a substantially modified version of the Iskander SRBM, with Mig-31 serving as the boost phase, providing a high  altitude launch at supersonic speeds (recommend A. Ramm and Bogdanov for good reading). This is far from the first missile design to leverage Mig-31s performance in speed, takeoff weight, ceiling and combat range. Kinzhal is an operational-tactical complex, able to reach hypersonic speeds, a 2000 km range – although some suggest it is closer to 1500 km. According to official statements this missile can reach mach 10 and can conduct high-G maneuvers on terminal approach. I’m skeptical of the former, that is it likely can do mach 10 at early stages of flight, but then reduce speed for terminal maneuvers. The latter makes sense, because OTK 9M723 Iskander SRBM was designed to make random maneuvers in order to make its flight path difficult to intercept.

                                                                  Kinzhal is quite shorter, with smaller control surfaces, and a narrower nose. Gen Sergei Surovikin, head of Aerospace Forces (VKS) said the designation for this missile is Kh-47M2 (although earlier forum sources put it as (9-С-7760 – missile, 9-А-7660 – complex). Iskander, referenced as 9M723, can reach 350-450 km depending on payload, if launched at supersonic speeds from high altitude it stands to reason that a modified variant can achieve a substantially increased range. VKS should be happy since Mig-31s are technically under their service arm, and one of the few types of aviation they actually control. This gives them a new standoff weapon, and better chances at an anti-ship mission.

                                                                  Kinzhal is new, but according to A. Ramm and others, the concept initially surfaced 8 years ago. It has since then been mentioned by experts like Pyotr Bukowski in 2017. Given Iskander-M is considered to be a dual-capable replacement for Tochka-U, though its principal mission is conventional, there is ample reason to believe that the same nuclear warhead can be deployed on Kinzhal. Guidance is an interesting question, supposedly it can actively home on targets, and has scene matching as well. How that comes together at hypersonic speeds is a question, but more than likely this weapon is capable of very complex flight profiles. At least it is advertised with different seeker heads, one for traditional air-to-ground work, and the other as an anti-ship weapon.

                                                                  Readers will recall that Raduga’s Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback) aeroballistic missile from 1980s was allegedly quite fast, perhaps reaching Mach 5. Kinzhal might have more power than the original Iskander too. Russia’s MoD has plans to upgrade the current Iskander-M, improving range, so a Iskander-M2 is in the offing already for the ground forces.

                                                                  Kinzhal anti-ship.JPG

                                                                  I’m skeptical of the claim that this weapon has already begun combat duty in the Southern MD, which sounds like a ‘true lie,’ but it is probably the closest to operational deployment among weapons mentioned. One should not be surprised to see this in Syria at some point. Rumor has it the new GPV 2018-2027 plans to upgrade up to 50 Mig-31s to carry this missile. If anything, this weapon is ideally suited for the Pacific theater, where many Mig-31s are based, and in the anti-ship role, as it will prove incredibly difficult to intercept. I will add, there’s been no news of Tsirkon (a hypersonic cruise missile in development) since last year, principally for the anti-ship role. In 2017 everyone was advertising their goods to get funding in the new GPV, but since then Tsirkon has gone a bit quiet.

                                                                  Added another photo after more videos came out.

                                                                  Кинж

                                                                   

                                                                  R-28 Sarmat – heavy ICBM replacement for R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18)

                                                                  Sarmat 2.jpg

                                                                  R-28 Sarmat is a liquid fueled heavy ICBM designed to have high throw weight, deploying multiple warheads and numerous penetration aids. Although often touted as being a 200 ton replacement for SS-18, there’s a lot of conflicting information, some of it suggesting that its actually much closer to the weight of the SS-19, that is towards 100 tons. Earlier information suggested this was a 106 ton missile with a throw weight of 4350 kg. As a silo-based ICBM, SS-18 could deploy 10 warheads, but was designed and produced by Yuzhmash in Ukraine SSR. Hence Russia had an obvious problem, not only is this aging missile fielding a substantial percentage of the currently deployed force under New START, but it was still serviced and maintained by Yuzhmash.

                                                                  Currently, Sarmat is about 2 years behind schedule based on the contract initially signed in 2011. The last ejection test was in late December 2017, which seems to have gone successfully, with two more planned for early 2018. Sarmat features prominently in the new state armament program so there’s every reason to believe that it will be completed sooner rather than later, but in the end this is rocket science, not basket weaving. Suffice it to say, this missile is nowhere near serial production or operational readiness. Problems in Russian industry when it comes to missiles, rockets, and space lift, tend to stem less from S&T and more from production quality of complex components. This was at the heart of Bulava’s spotty test record. I’m also skeptical of the south pole trajectory shown in Putin’s address, implying it could be a fractal orbital weapon. In the end, we have to wait for the actual parameters of the missile to become public (100t or 200t ?), because Russian officials have a long established problem with numbers – whether lies, truth, or self-PR, rarely does anyone in Russia give the same figures for anything.

                                                                  Capture

                                                                  Sarmat is possibly the least interesting item shown during the weapons menagerie. More puzzling is that little has been said about RS-26 Rubezh, which has stayed out of the news for some time after initially being tested as an ICBM and classified as such. Russian MoD needs to do a ‘where are they now’ catch up segment on some of these systems.

                                                                  Gerasimov’s face during Sarmat video expresses how I felt.

                                                                  Gerasimov's face during talk of Sarmat

                                                                  Avangard or 4202 hypersonic boost-glide weapons

                                                                  During the address, Vladimir Putin said that they couldn’t show the actual video of the rocket being used, and hence the name reference to Avangard is rather confusing. Avangard was a project mentioned back in 2011 by Serduykov and some sources incorrectly suggested it was based on a modified RS-24, which was made by MIT, whereas 4202 has been a well known hypersonic boost-glide program and is regularly mentioned as being tested on УР-100УНТТХ, which is made by NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The video during Putin’s presentation shows UR-100 (SS-19 Stiletto) as expected, besides being associated with 4202 – this ICBM also forms the basis for two successful space lift variants ‘Rokot’ and ‘Strela.’ The concept involves using an ICBM to boost a vehicle to near orbital speed, then it descents and adjusts flight profile at some altitude where there is still minimal atmospheric resistance into a sustained hypersonic glide, with the terminal phase being dive to target.

                                                                  Borrowing this graphic

                                                                  HTV-2.jpg

                                                                  First mention of Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, and tests using UR-100, actually goes back to large scale RVSN exercise in 2004.  This, like Kinzhal in 2008, is to give the reader some indicator as to how long these programs have been in progress so as to remove any confusion about the proposition that VV Putin ran out of things to claim and is now making all this up. USSR had ideas about hypersonic vehicles back in mid-1980s, so this is hardly a new concept.  N. Surkov has a good article on the program here, adding that 4202’s flight control system was made in Ukraine, and needed replacing after the war. According to Surkov the vehicle is boosted to 100 km altitude and then glides down, perhaps at 5-7 km per second, those could be just official stats though, just like when Shoigu liberated 500,000 sq km of Syria.

                                                                  The idea behind 4202 is Russia’s version of Prompt Global Strike, except this system is intended to be an air defense penetrator carrying a strategic nuclear warhead. The vehicle being tested is analogous to U.S. Hypersonic Test Vehicle 2. Russia’s military continues to imagine a distant future where BMD is able to intercept their second strike, and therefore sees value in an expensive program to deliver nuclear weapons via a boost-glide vehicle. Although this threat perception is not too different from our oft advocated need for a new B-21 stealth bomber, since the current $2 billion B-2 is going to be defeated in some future where stealth is no longer viable. How Russians talk about the capabilities of U.S. missile defense to justify programs, and how Americans talk about Russian integrated air defense when it comes to B-21 and LRSO, has quite a bit in common.

                                                                  obj 4202

                                                                  A. Ramm has one of the best articles with details on 4202. A R-36M2 silo (listed as object 370) is being used to test 4202 (the complex is often referenced as A35-71. The UR-100 in question, together with 4202 on top of it, fits into this R-36 silo because it is designed for a missile that is 7 meters longer. Earlier mention of Avangard on a RS-24 based missile seems incorrect, unless this is a different system altogether, but in my view 4202 and Avangard are the same. Ultimately R-28 Sarmat is the most logical carrier for this hypersonic vehicle. UR-100 is the current test missile for 4202, while Yars or Topol lack the throw weight for such a weapon, but because UR-100 is too old, it means that R-28 Sarmat is the only perspective ICBM ‘booster’ for this weapon when/if it is completed. Before anyone chimes in that these things take a long time to develop, remind them that R-28 contract was signed 2011, and 4202 began testing 2004. So perhaps we will be seeing both by the mid-2020s?

                                                                  Bottom line: there remains a strong emphasis on non-contact warfare, particularly tactical operational and operational-strategic weapons, along with dual-capable standoff systems. Even if the rationale of U.S. missile defense doesn’t hold much logic behind it, Russian leadership continuously thinks about a future where their strategic deterrent is somehow compromised, and this threat concept is rather convenient to justify a host of next generation technology programs, delivery systems and the like. Where there is capability in long range precision guided munitions the short coming often ends up being capacity. These are not bluffs, the question is less whether they can make it work and more of ‘how many can they afford.’ The upcoming GPV 2018-2027 will focus on increasing munition stocks and bringing to fruition several new standoff missiles – Kinzhal is just one among several projects. More in part 2 on Dr. Strangelove weapons.

                                                                  Beyond the bad graphics, there is a real vehicle somewhere in testing, though it likely has a long way to go.

                                                                  4202 video.JPG

                                                                  In one brief graphic its even dodging numerous missiles that appear to be GBI interceptors, so there are two fantasies playing out in this image

                                                                  past gbi

                                                                  Comments and suggestions are welcome.

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                                                                  #####EOF##### Force Structure – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                  Tag: Force Structure

                                                                  Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

                                                                  Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                                  Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

                                                                  —————————————————————————————————————————————–

                                                                  The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

                                                                  Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

                                                                  The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

                                                                  can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

                                                                  And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

                                                                   

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                                                                  Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

                                                                  There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

                                                                  VDV praciting loading

                                                                  Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

                                                                  Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

                                                                  airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

                                                                  Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

                                                                  Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

                                                                  These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

                                                                  The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

                                                                  T62 vdv.jpg
                                                                  VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

                                                                  Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

                                                                  But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

                                                                  Russian Military Buildup in the West: Fact Versus Fiction

                                                                  Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                  A short article looking at the focus of Russian military modernization, the original appeared on the Russia Matters site of Harvard’s Belfer Center.

                                                                  As Russia’s annual strategic exercise, titled Zapad-2017, approaches, media reports (and plenty of Western officials) have contended that Moscow is engaged in a military buildup along NATO’s borders, with particular trepidation over security considerations in the Baltics. Ironically, Russia’s military modernization and force structure expansion had been ignoring the Baltic region until only recently. Despite provocative air and naval activity concentrated in the area, Russian forces based there are principally defensive, and aging to boot. There are indicators that a change in the size and strength of Russian forces is inevitable, but it will be gradual, in part informed by what forces NATO chooses to deploy.

                                                                  Moscow’s chief fixation of late has been establishing large unit formations along Ukraine’s borders, an expansion of the footprint in Crimea and upgrades to military equipment distributed across the country’s five military districts. Having achieved some success under the previous state armament program, the Russian General Staff is shifting its attention to the Baltic region, slowly but surely upgrading the antiquated forces based there and deliberating a larger military presence.

                                                                  Russia’s military has been undergoing transformation since 2008 to compensate for a prolonged period of divestment and rot in the armed forces after the collapse of the USSR. This process was driven by military reforms launched in late 2008 and a modernization program begun in 2011 (a new one is due to be announced soon for 2018-2025). Russia’s force structure continues to evolve and expand, and the armed forces steadily acquire modernized or new capabilities. Change is a constant—new formations and a hurricane of announcements, only a fraction of which are ever implemented.

                                                                  The modernization program launched in 2011 focused investment on Russia’s air force, navy and strategic nuclear forces, to the detriment of the army. Until 2014 Russia was not procuring like a Eurasian land power and was largely reducing the number of deployed formations on Ukraine’s and NATO’s borders to position them elsewhere. The war with Ukraine turned these initial plans upside down and has subsequently proven the driving factor behind changes in Russia’s force posture. (Nonetheless, today the Southern Military District, encompassing the North Caucasus, still maintains greater readiness than any forces abutting NATO.)

                                                                  Conflict with Ukraine reawakened the national leadership to the likelihood of a large-scale war on the western front in the medium to long term. To deal with a constant rotation of forces in Ukraine, and to maintain conventional superiority over Ukrainian forces in the long term, Russia refocused its energy to that border or what Russian leadership calls the “southwest strategic direction.” Russia’s General Staff began to bring back all the units originally moved off Ukraine’s borders during the early years of the reforms. This included the 20th Army, along with other units. The next step was reestablishing the 1st Tank Guards Army west of Moscow and setting up the headquarters for a new 8th Combined Arms Army in the Southern Military District.

                                                                  Spanning an arc from the border with Belarus to Rostov-on-Don in the south, Russia is setting up three new divisions, each of which is formally to have six regiments and an ultimate end strength toward 10,000 (although they will likely be undermanned for years to come). Supporting these divisions are several brigades, airfields and combat aviation. The 8th Army is there to be the primary threat to Ukrainian armed forces, and perhaps to coordinate troop rotation in support of separatists in the Donbas if the conflict continues several years out.

                                                                  The current wave of modernization is similarly prioritizing units near Ukraine, especially Crimea, which saw a substantial expansion of Russia’s military presence after Moscow annexed and absorbed a significant percentage of what were previously Ukrainian forces on the peninsula. Russian planning is driven by a strategy to deter Ukraine from believing it can retake the Donbas, looking chiefly five to 10 years into the future. The intent is to keep the country in a vise with permanently garrisoned forces along its borders running north to south. Russian forces may even withdraw entirely from Ukraine once this much larger force just across the border is complete.

                                                                  In the interim, the Baltic region was given only a modicum of attention, with few forces, terrible readiness and fairly dated equipment. Indeed, as recently as last summer the entire Baltic Fleet and ground force command staff was fired, and with seemingly good cause.

                                                                  There has been, and remains, little to indicate that Russia is especially concerned with the Baltic region when compared to the situation further south. Despite bombastic rhetoric about NATO aggression, hostility and the like, Russia’s military has not prioritized the Baltic relative to other areas. Remarkably there is much more attention and energy being spent on expensive military infrastructure in the Arctic with a dubious cost-benefit proposition, as opposed to the supposedly existential struggle between Russia and its historic Cold War adversary to the West.

                                                                  That being said, in 2017 the bow wave of modernization across Russia’s armed forces is steadily making its way from the units positioned around Ukraine to those in the Baltic region, and further north. New fighters, missile regiments, air defense systems and combat aviation are either in the process of being deployed or will be in the coming years. Meanwhile, the force structure continues to expand, with plans to add two tank battalions to the airborne division in Pskov, near Estonia, for example, while other adjustments may see the military footprint of the 11th Army Corps in Kaliningrad grow, along with the 14th Army Corps in the Northern Fleet. Although Russia remains fixated on building divisions around Ukraine, it is trying to balance this with the need for manpower to fill other units. The state armament program is pumping out equipment such that slowly but surely even lower-priority areas receive upgraded capabilities.

                                                                  Russia’s vision for dealing with U.S. military power is less ground-force-based and more founded in integrated air defenses combined with long-range conventional strike power and nuclear weapons. Here Russia is working on improving its arsenal of cruise missiles and the capacity to inflict conventional damage at standoff ranges, rather than build large formations bordering NATO. Moscow understands that the U.S. has an incredible technological advantage in aerospace power, and thus has prioritized air defense, electronic warfare and other capabilities intended to deny NATO its preferred way of waging war from the air.

                                                                  The various units around Ukraine can of course travel if need be to Belarus and the Baltic, and in the upcoming exercise some of them will demonstrate exactly that—their ability to move into Belarus as part of a planned operation. The logistics and resources available to realize such plans on a large scale do require some time, preparation and practice. In reality these units can only generate a percentage of their strength on short notice, especially if the maneuver forces are composed of contract-staffed personnel.

                                                                  When it comes to its force posture in the Baltic region, Moscow is playing it slow—moving about capabilities to threaten and engaging in military activity that generates headlines, while the actual presence remains largely defensive in nature. This too will change in the coming years. More S-400s, Iskander-Ms, better tanks, tactical aviation, logistics units and everything else Russia’s state armament program has to offer has either begun arriving or will deploy to the Baltic region by 2020.

                                                                  The Russian plan is perhaps much less a buildup and more a slow cooking of the overall military presence. Arguably NATO is doing the very same thing along its eastern flank. Gradualism is the name of this game, and if it is not carefully managed, nobody should be surprised if some years from now the Baltic region finds itself host to a force bidding contest.

                                                                   

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                                                                  #####EOF##### Post-Quantum – PQChat – 44CON

                                                                  Post-Quantum – PQChat

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                                                                  At Post-Quantum we specialise in offering post-quantum secure solutions. Our PQChat Enterprise secure messaging system uses our Never-The-Same technology based on the Robert McEliece cryptosystem.

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                                                                  Our system uses true end-to-end encryption, it cannot decrypt your data and does not upload your address book. Our target customers are enterprises which face constant cyber threats from all directions.

                                                                   

                                                                  #####EOF##### 09162018 Ulan-ude – Russia Military Analysis

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                                                                  #####EOF##### Forum: Ideas | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                  #####EOF##### WordPress.com
                                                                  #####EOF##### Neil Kettle – 44CON
                                                                  #####EOF##### Topic: Unable to customize themes | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                  en WordPress.com Forums › Support

                                                                  Unable to customize themes

                                                                  • Author
                                                                    Posts
                                                                  • #3291001

                                                                    noteliaanis
                                                                    Member

                                                                    There’s seem to be a bug or something in the system. Can’t customize my themes. It came out scrypted

                                                                    The blog I need help with is koevlihalev.wordpress.com.

                                                                    #3291065

                                                                    lizkarkoski
                                                                    Staff

                                                                    Howdy –

                                                                    Please grab a screen shot of what you’re seeing when clicking on My Sites – Customize That can get added here through a third party like droplr or snag.gy. Just paste the link in the reply.

                                                                    This will help us understand exactly what you are seeing.

                                                                    I’d also suggest testing it from a different browser to see if you are getting the same result.

                                                                    #3291532

                                                                    noteliaanis
                                                                    Member

                                                                    http://imgur.com/EC3D5q7

                                                                    I’ve tried using other browsers but it still shows this

                                                                    #3291847

                                                                    supernovia
                                                                    Staff

                                                                    Thanks @noteliaanis. Can you let us know what operating system you’re using? It looks like maybe an iPad — if so, can you tell us what iOS version?

                                                                    Do you have anything that could be blocking page styles or scripts, particularly across browsers?

                                                                    Also can you confirm which other browsers you’ve tested, and get screenshots from those?

                                                                    Lastly (sorry for all the questions) are you rotaing the tablet when this happens? Does rotating make any difference?

                                                                    Thanks in advance for sending this extra info so we can help sort this out.

                                                                    #3291918

                                                                    noteliaanis
                                                                    Member

                                                                    Hi, my iPad is on iOS 12.1.4 and I am not aware of anything that may block the page styles or scripts. But previously i have had no problem customizing the themes on the app. Not sure why recently I couldn’t

                                                                    I’ve tried on safari and chrome but it came out like this http://imgur.com/a/GmN6Cj3

                                                                    Also tried rotating it but it didn’t make any difference

                                                                    Thank you

                                                                    #3291995

                                                                    fstat
                                                                    Staff

                                                                    Hi there,

                                                                    I tested the Customizer on both Safari and Chrome on an iPad running the latest iOS version and it loads without any issues.

                                                                    This suggests an issue with Safari’s web rendering engine that’s also used on Chrome for iOS. Please visit the following page and check if JavaScript is properly enabled:

                                                                    https://enable-javascript.com/

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                                                                  #####EOF##### Simple Payments Block — Support — WordPress.com

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                                                                  Blocks »Simple Payments Block

                                                                  The Simple Payments block lets you add a payment button to any post or page, and immediately start taking PayPal payments for physical products, digital goods, or donations.

                                                                  Block Interface
                                                                  Editing the Form
                                                                  Styling The Payments Button
                                                                  Classic Editor Instructions
                                                                  Adding a Widget
                                                                  Collecting Payments

                                                                  To use the Simple Payments block, your site needs to have an active WordPress.com Premium or Business plan.

                                                                  In order to add a Simple Payments block, click on the Block Inserter icon.

                                                                  You can also type /simple and hit enter in a new paragraph block to add one quickly.

                                                                  Detailed instructions on adding blocks can be found here.

                                                                  Block Interface

                                                                  Each block has its own block-specific controls that allow you to manipulate the block right in the editor.

                                                                  The Simple Payments block offers the more option control by default. Once you add an image, icons to edit or trash the image will appear.

                                                                  Simple-Payments-Block-Toolbar

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                                                                  Editing the Form

                                                                  When you first add the Simple Payments block, a few fields will be loaded for you to fill in as shown below.

                                                                  1. Upload or select an image from the media gallery.
                                                                  2. Enter the name of the item you are selling.
                                                                  3. Enter a brief description of the item.
                                                                  4. Select your currency and enter the price (without a currency symbol).
                                                                  5. Select whether to allow people to buy more than one of the item at once.
                                                                  6. Enter your PayPal email address.

                                                                  The email address you enter will determine where PayPal sends payments for the items sold or donations collected. Double-check the email address you enter to be sure it is valid and belongs to you! You will also need a free PayPal account linked to your bank account to claim any payments you receive.

                                                                  This is how the product will look on the actual site:

                                                                  Simple-Payments-Block-Result

                                                                  That’s it. You are ready to sell!

                                                                  You can add as many Simple Payments buttons as you like to your page by repeating the process above.

                                                                  Read about collecting payments here.

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                                                                  Styling The Payments Button

                                                                  For information on how to style aspects of the button, please see our Simple Payments styling page.

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                                                                  #####EOF##### Celebrating International Women’s Day: Stories By Fantastic Women | Discover

                                                                  Celebrating International Women’s Day: Stories By Fantastic Women

                                                                  Feature by
                                                                  Photo by Chelsi Peter from Pexels

                                                                  March 8th is International Women’s Day, a day set aside to celebrate women, their rights, and their contributions to the world. In honor of this auspicious day, we bring you five excellent reads by women from our sister site Longreads.

                                                                  Queens of Infamy by Anne Thériault

                                                                  Illustration by Louise Pomeroy

                                                                  Court intrigue? Palace hijinks? Poison? You’ll find all three and more in Anne Thériault’s excellent series, Queens of Infamy, in which Anne explores the lives of history’s most adorably diabolical monarchs. Here’s a tasty sample from Queens of Infamy: Joanna of Naples:

                                                                  Are you the sort of person who loves a high court drama with plenty of devious intriguing? Is learning about grisly murders one of your guilty pleasures? Do you get a voyeuristic thrill out of tracking the rise and fall of royal romances? What about plagues? Do you like plagues? If you are currently clutching your chest and muttering “yes, yes, a thousand times yes,” then: a) sick, and b) keep reading. We’re about to take a deep dive into the life of Joanna I of Naples, and shit’s about to get really, really real.

                                                                  Living With Dolly Parton by Jessica Wilkerson

                                                                  Listen to Jessica Wilkerson read an abridged version of “Living With Dolly Parton” on The Longreads Podcast.

                                                                  Mark Humphrey / AP, Illustration by Katie Kosma

                                                                  Jessica Wilkerson grew up listening to and loving the music of country star Dolly Parton — and she still does, to this day. When Jessica wanted to learn more about her idol, she decided to dig a bit deeper into Dolly’s business ventures. She found that asking tough questions came at a cost.

                                                                  The love for Dolly that I learned was one without doubt. To question one’s devotion to Dolly Parton is to turn the world upside-down. Indeed, it is to question one’s investment in, and rehearsals of, mythologies of whiteness, which are rarely spoken, rarely noted as white. “Whiteness is an orientation that puts certain things within reach,” Sara Ahmed writes. Dolly Parton was crucial to my own orientation.

                                                                  Because my grandma is right — inquiry is seductive — I needed to question Dolly Parton’s meaning in my and our lives.

                                                                  I needed to confront Dolly Parton’s blinding, dazzling whiteness.

                                                                  The Unforgiving Minute by Laurie Penny

                                                                  Getty, CSA Images/Mod Art Collection

                                                                  On behalf of women the world over, Laurie Penny is ticked off and she’s not going to take it any more — it being a world where some men think it’s OK to abuse their power when it comes to sex. A new world order is forming and Laurie Penny is narrating the play-by-play.

                                                                  Men who believe they cannot change are already being shown up every day by the growing number of their fellow male humans who have changed, who are changing. We can rewrite the sexual script of humanity. We’ve done it before.

                                                                  Unfortunately, we are in one of those rare and curious moments where we have to do something unfair and hurtful in order to answer decades of pain and injustice. We didn’t want to have to make an example of anyone. We tried to ask nicely for our humanity and dignity. We tried to put it gently. Nobody gave a shit. Now that there are consequences, now that there is finally, for once, some sort of price to pay for treating women like interchangeable pieces of flesh and calling it romance, you’re paying attention.

                                                                  This is what happens when women actively place their own needs first. The whole damn world freaks out. I don’t blame you for freaking out right now. I’m freaking out. I didn’t expect this to happen so fast.

                                                                  The Difference Between Being Broke and Being Poor by Erynn Brook

                                                                  Illustration by Emily Flake

                                                                  According to a report by the United Nations and the World Bank, “between the age of 20 and 34 years, women are more likely to be poor than men.” In this poignant essay illustrated by Emily Flake, Erynn Brook recalls having to carefully calculate the cost of her groceries to ensure her small budget covered her purchases.

                                                                  Survival. Food. Rushing through the grocery store trying not to look at the things you can’t afford. Seeing pasta on sale and welling up because it meant you have an extra $2 to work with that week. Being afraid of messing up the math and not having a dime “just in case.”

                                                                  Bundyville by Leah Sottile

                                                                  Illustration by Zoë van Dijk

                                                                  Cliven Bundy and his sons led two armed standoffs against the federal government and beat them twice in court. The Bundys and their supporters see themselves as Patriots fighting government overreach. Others see them as domestic terrorists rallying extremists and conspiracy theorists to their side. In this four-chapter investigation created in partnership with Oregon Public Broadcasting, reporter Leah Sottile seeks the truth. Bundyville is also available as a seven-part podcast.

                                                                  There’s Bundy’s version of himself: a rebel cowboy father of 14 and grandfather of 66 who believes the government is determined to either kill him or put him behind bars for life, while also stealing his livelihood.

                                                                  Then there’s the government’s version of Bundy: a vigilante capable of summoning an army eager and ready to revolt against the federal government.

                                                                  ***

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                                                                  March 7, 2019Inspiration
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                                                                    #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Michelle Weber | Discover
                                                                    Michelle Weber
                                                                    Senior editor, Longreads. Chief Semicolon Advocate, WordPress.com. Professional writer, editor, napper, and dog-snorgler. Knows you are, but what is she?
                                                                    Filter
                                                                    1. Entre Nous: Tressie McMillan-Cottom

                                                                      In Barb magazine, founder Marcelle Karp has a wide-ranging conversation with author and professor Tressie McMillan Cottom, on the South, black feminism, being a little petty, and much more.
                                                                      Authors
                                                                      Entre Nous: Tressie McMillan-Cottom – BARB
                                                                    2. Deadland

                                                                      The Salton Sea, California’s largest lake, is a dying ecosystem — but it has a strange and sad beauty, and residents who hang on.
                                                                      Environment
                                                                      Suebob's Red Stapler
                                                                    3. How to Write a Country Music Song: A Lesson from a Nashville Hit-Maker

                                                                      “The contemporary production of country music may be the purview of the rich and famous, but its origins come out of life in the heartland, from the shadows of desperation, poverty, and longing, from dark clouds with silver-linings, and from a humble self-awareness that is all too rare in America today.”
                                                                      Music
                                                                      The Statesider
                                                                    4. Choosing a Color Palette? It’s For the Birds (Literally!)

                                                                      Dithering over what colors to use for your new website? Take a screen break and go for a walk — nature has a beautiful selection of pre-made color palettes waiting for you.
                                                                      Design
                                                                      Feature
                                                                      by
                                                                    5. An Honest Living

                                                                      Steve Salaita spent 21 years in academia, a committed and passionate professor. Then he got fired. Now he drives a school bus, “one of the few institutions in the United States that protects the powerless from the depredations of commerce. “
                                                                      Academia
                                                                      Steve Salaita
                                                                    6. MOLD

                                                                      From cellular agriculture to 3D food printing, entomophagy to beautifully designed tableware (and why it makes your meal taste better), MOLD spotlights the ideas that will revolutionize how we produce, prepare and eat food in the years to come.
                                                                      Design
                                                                    7. Red Pepper

                                                                      Red Pepper is London-based magazine and website of left politics and culture. “We seek to be a space for debate on the left, a resource for movements for social justice, and a home for open-minded anti-capitalists.”
                                                                      Feminism
                                                                    8. Love Is Love Is Love

                                                                      Valentine’s Day is a few days away, and with it the deluge of flowers and candy. But as these bloggers and sites show us, there are lots of ways — and people — to love.
                                                                      Animals
                                                                      Feature
                                                                      by
                                                                    9. Photography
                                                                      My best photos of 2018 – Endlessly Restless
                                                                      by Ellie Hopgood
                                                                    10. An Open Letter to Thin People Who Feel Infringed on by Fat People on Airplanes

                                                                      “What you want is for us to be weighed at the airport. Your thought is that we should be asked to pay more, and you should be asked to pay less, because you have been successful in your pursuit of thinness. “I eat salads,” you hiss at fat passengers like Norma. I also eat salads, […]
                                                                      Personal Essay
                                                                      Fluffy Kitten Party
                                                                      by lindagerhardt
                                                                    11. Modern Farmer

                                                                      Blending hands-in-dirt service, soulful inspiration, and whip-smart reporting, Modern Farmer understands that a tomato is never just a tomato – it’s also a political, and deeply personal, statement about who we want to be and the world we hope to live in.
                                                                      Food
                                                                    12. Animals
                                                                      Explorers
                                                                      by Christopher Michael
                                                                    13. ‘If I was waiting for confidence to write, I’d still be waiting’

                                                                      Online mag gal-dem sits down with writer and cultural critic Roxane Gay: “Bodies rarely follow rules. We all live in bodies that are complicated, and we should create space for that unruliness instead of always trying to discipline it.”
                                                                      Authors
                                                                      gal-dem
                                                                      by Micha Frazer-Carroll
                                                                    14. The 21st Century Is Old Enough To Legally Drink

                                                                      “I’ve never taken coke or, to my knowledge, had a helicopter doing surveillance on me. Yet, merely because I watched Goodfellas at an impressionable age, and several times since, every time I see a helicopter I feel like I’m on coke and the helicopter is doing surveillance on me.”
                                                                      Personal Musings
                                                                      Tom Cox
                                                                      by Tom Cox
                                                                    15. Photo Essay
                                                                      Abbie Trayler-Smith
                                                                    #####EOF##### Rafael Dominguez Vega – 44CON

                                                                    Rafael Dominguez Vega

                                                                    default Twitter: @mwrlabs

                                                                    Website: labs.mwrinfosecurity.com
                                                                    Rafa works in the UK as a Security Consultant and Security Researcher for MWR InfoSecurity. He enjoys testing “out of the ordinary” technology and is particularly interested in embedded devices and hardware hacking. He has previously presented innovative research on topics such as USB drivers exploitation and Smart card hacking at various well known security conferences.

                                                                    Rafael has presented at:

                                                                     
                                                                    #####EOF##### Log In — WordPress.com
                                                                    #####EOF##### Create a visual brand that channels what your business stands for.
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                                                                    Browsing category Web Design  —  Create a visual brand that channels what your business stands for.

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                                                                    #####EOF##### S/M des tages | Schwerdtfegr (beta)

                                                                    S/M des tages

                                                                    Veröffentlicht von 124c41 am

                                                                    BIG BROTHER IS HACKING YOU!

                                                                    Rein vorsorglich möchten wir Sie darüber informieren, dass Ihr Account zu einer kleinen Gruppe von Accounts gehört, die Ziel eines staatlich motivierten Hackerangriffs geworden sein könnte. Das bedeutet, dass die Hacker möglicherweise mit einer Regierung in Verbindung stehen. Wir vermuten, dass Daten und Informationen wie zum Beispiel Email-Adressen, IP-Adressen und Telefonnummern ausspioniert werden sollten

                                                                    Ich wünsche euch auch weiterhin viel spaß bei diesen ganzen S/M-webseits¹, diesen STASI-akten zum selberschreiben!

                                                                    Schneller nachtrag:

                                                                    Hier ist die zwitscherchen-liste von Jens Kubieziel mit den ihm bekannten betroffenen zwitscherchen-nutzern [link geht natürlich zum zwitscherchen]. Wer ebenfalls vom staatlichen häcking dort betroffen ist oder jemanden kennt, der vom staatlichen häcking betroffen ist, bitte bei Jens Kubieziel melden! Wie das geht? Entweder im oben verlinkten blog nachschauen oder übers zwitscherchen machen.

                                                                    Noch ein nachtrag:

                                                                    Bei „the verge“ gibts einen längeren artikel (in englisch) mit etwas mehr informazjon.

                                                                    Nachtrag 13. dezember, 18:00 uhr

                                                                    Im blog von Anne Roth (ebenfalls betroffen) gibt es einen längeren deutschen text. Mit der originalmäjhl in deutscher wie in englischer sprache, die anscheinend wirklich von twitter kommt. Und mit einer menge spekulazjon, was das ist und was das soll.

                                                                    ¹S/M ist meine abk. für „social media“. Aus gründen.

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                                                                    A New Year, A New Outlook, And A Portrait

                                                                    We’re already into our third week of 2016 and I feel like I’ve barely had a chance to stop and think, or even reflect on the year that was.

                                                                    At the start of 2015, I made a few achievable goals both personally and photographically. This being a photo blog, I’ll stick to my photographic goals. It would be the start of my first full year in a new city… having moved the previous summer. I wanted to get out and meet people, and decided to use photography as a means to do so. I also wanted to push my creative limits with the following goals in mind: shoot more photos; print more photos; make portraits of strangers; get published; shoot a wedding.

                                                                    The last goal was a long shot and I had no idea how I would achieve it, especially considering that I wasn’t going to market myself as a wedding photographer.

                                                                    Without dragging you through a long and detailed recap of my 2015 experiences, I’ll try to update you on my results.

                                                                    1. Shoot more photos – Yes. I shot nearly thirty thousand images throughout 2015 between family, friends and strangers.
                                                                    2. Print more photos – No. While I did print some images, I didn’t print nearly as many as I would have liked. I’ll work on that in 2016.
                                                                    3. Make portraits of strangers – Yes. I connected with a number of people in Ottawa last year, and stumbled on a journey of documenting chefs. I’m still working on the series in 2016, but if you haven’t seen the series yet, feel free to brows my past posts. One was even Freshly Pressed!
                                                                    4. Get Published – No… well, almost. Through my chef series I have been working on a couple of other projects. One that I’m really proud of will launch in the spring and I’ll be able to share it with you then. I’m still hoping to make it into a magazine this year though.
                                                                    5. Shoot a wedding – Yes! Out of nowhere, a pair of friends called me up to ask if I’d be their photographer. I loved the experience and desperately want to do it again.

                                                                    Perhaps I’ll share my 2016 goals with you sometime soon. For now, I’ll share a portrait of a really cool guy I recently met as a result of my photography efforts. This is Michael, he’s the really rad head chef at one of (actually two of) the best restaurants in the city. He’s also a huge music lover.

                                                                    Happy New Year everyone!

                                                                    michael radford

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                                                                    Weekly Photo Challenge: Victory (Portrait of Top Chef Canada Winner)

                                                                    I have been absent from the Weekly Photo Challenge for quite a while, but Krista’s tales of hard work and determination inspired me to dive back in this week with a true mark of victory!

                                                                    rene rodriguez

                                                                    I recently had the opportunity to meet and shoot the winner of Top Chef Canada, Rene Rodriguez, owner of Navarra Restaurant in downtown Ottawa. Rene has an amazing look; we share a love of U2; and after hearing that he purchased a motorcycle with some of his contest winnings, I decided to try to model our shoot after a Rolling Stone cover.

                                                                    Keeping things simple, I shot Rene and his bike in the alley behind his restaurant using a two-light setup. I placed one speed light in a shoot-through umbrella as the main light, and added a second speed light as a kicker to add a rim (or highlight) for some depth and separation.

                                                                    I had two setups in mind, one featuring Rene front and centre, with his bike behind him and slightly out of focus, and the second with Rene on his bike. I am really happy with the results of the shoot, and even added some coloured gels for interest, but unfortunately I can’t show you the images from this shoot as they are part of a project to be released next spring. However, I can show you a portrait I took of our victorious chef against a fence at the end of the shoot.

                                                                    The portrait above uses the same two-light setup, an umbrella as the key (or main) light on camera left, and a bare head flash at camera right to add a slight kiss of light on Rene’s left cheek and down his left arm to help separate him from the background.

                                                                    Rene was a great subject, and obviously very used to having his photo taken since winning Top Chef Canada in 2014. The culinary scene is truly an amazing scene to be a part of, and I have really enjoyed working with a number of different chefs this year. I look forward to working with some more that I have lined up over the next few months.

                                                                    Kai-Lii & Jared’s Hart House Wedding | Toronto

                                                                    I am so excited to finally share this post of Jared and Kai-Lii’s wedding. Not only was I honoured to be asked to document their amazingly memorable day, but they’re two dear friends who have added a richness to my life I think few people are capable of, and they mean so much to me.

                                                                    jared and kai-lii

                                                                    Their wedding was held at Hart House, the beautiful and historic centre of the University of Toronto. Completed in 1919, the Gothic Revival design of Hart House makes you feel like you’re walking through Hogwartz.

                                                                    This was my first time photographing a wedding, and though Jared and Kai-Lii liked my other work, I wasn’t sure that street photography and portraiture qualified me for the job. With that, I took a photojournalistic approach to the day and gave it my best. I began the day with the ladies as they had their hair and makeup done in uptown Toronto with the wonderful staff at Green Beauty Salon. I then headed back downtown to meet Jared and the boys at Axe and Hatchet in Yorkville and capture them getting ready before heading to the venue.

                                                                    Mixed with Scottish and Estonian traditional elements, the ceremony, reception and food made for the most entertaining and fun wedding I had ever been to, including serving Estonian beer and the bride and groom being serenaded by the attendees after the ceremony.

                                                                    Congratulations Kai-Lii and Jared, it was an amazing day and I can’t wait to see the next chapter of your lives unfold together.

                                                                    kai-lii and jared

                                                                    kai-lii and jared

                                                                    kai-lii and jared

                                                                    kai-lii and jared

                                                                    kai-lii and jared

                                                                    kai-lii

                                                                    kai-lii and jared

                                                                     

                                                                    Showcasing Ottawa’s Farmers & Chefs at Harvest Table 2015

                                                                    A couple of weeks ago, I had the pleasure of photographing one of Ottawa’s signature food events, Savour Ottawa’s Harvest Table. A collaborative initiative between Just Food; the City of Ottawa; and Ottawa Tourism, Savour Ottawa aims to bring together local farmers, restaurants and retailers to to form partnerships that help sustain the local food economy.

                                                                    untitled-553

                                                                    Taking place in the historic and beautifully renovated Horticulture Building at Lansdowne Park, this year’s Harvest Table hosted more than two hundred and fifty guests, who enjoyed local beer and wine, and a delicious feast prepared by an all-star cast of some of the area’s top chefs.

                                                                    If you’ve been following my blog this year, you’ll know that food and the food scene around Ottawa are very near and dear to my heart. I feel honoured to have been asked to take part and document this wonderful day. And if this post inspires you, I’d love to hear what your favorite dish, or wine, or restaurant is in the comments below.

                                                                    #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Mastering ARM TrustZone with the USB Armory – 44CON

                                                                    Mastering ARM TrustZone with the USB Armory

                                                                    Presented By: Andrea Barisani
                                                                    The ARM® TrustZone® technology, in contrast to traditional TPMs, allows developers to engineer custom trusted platform modules by enforcing domain separation, between the “secure” and “normal” worlds, that propagates throughout System on a Chip (SoC) components, and therefore not only limited to the CPU core. Students will gain first hand experience on the low level concepts and ARM assembly required to audit and utilize implementations of the TrustZone® technology.

                                                                    The 1 day course will take place on the 9th September 2015, before 44CON London 2015.

                                                                    Course Outline
                                                                    USB armory description & setup
                                                                    TZ concepts & overview
                                                                    Evaluating SoC security features
                                                                    Evaluating hardware vendor specific TZ implementations
                                                                    Evaluating software domain separation effectiveness
                                                                    Implementing secure set-up of TZ domains
                                                                    Developing a sample TZ application
                                                                    Target Audience
                                                                    The class is an intermediate level class targeted at IT security professionals interested in learning details about the security feature of ARM architectures. The class is ideal for hardware and software pentesters interested in gaining in depth knowledge of the security architecture of ARM based mobile and embedded devices protected by TrustZone.

                                                                    Student requirements
                                                                    Basic knowledge of the ARM architecture its instruction set and assembly language is preferred but not required. Students shall be prepared to install drivers and/or software if required.

                                                                    Hardware and Software Requirements
                                                                    The training material will be accessed and executed on the USB armory itself, running Debian. In order to connect to the USB armory a modern Linux distribution, MAC OS X or Windows (7 or more) is sufficient. A working USB port is required.

                                                                    Students will be provided with:

                                                                    one USB Armory MK I device w/microSD card
                                                                    USB to serial converter
                                                                    and course slides and materials.
                                                                    About the trainer
                                                                    Andrea Barisani is an internationally known security researcher. Since owning his first Commodore-64 he has never stopped studying new technologies, developing unconventional attack vectors and exploring what makes things tick…and break. His experiences focus on large-scale infrastructure administration and defense, forensic analysis, penetration testing and software development, with more than 14 years of professional experience in security consulting. Being an active member of the international Open Source and security community he contributed to several projects, books and open standards. He is now the founder and coordinator of the oCERT effort, the Open Source Computer Security Incident Response Team. He has been a speaker and trainer at BlackHat, CanSecWest, DEFCON, Hack In The Box, PacSec conferences among many others, speaking about TEMPEST attacks, SatNav hacking, 0-days, OS hardening and many other topics.

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                                                                    #####EOF##### Naval Aviation – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                    Tag: Naval Aviation

                                                                    Russian Navy Part 4: Naval Aviation Taking Flight Again…Slowly

                                                                    Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                    This if the fourth and final installment of my article series with Norman Polmar, the last issue focuses on Russian naval aviation.

                                                                    Naval aviation is perhaps the component of the Russian Navy most frequently ignored and difficult to analyze. The air group aboard Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, which recently conducted combat sorties over Syria, is only a small part of the country’s overall naval aviation force. While the carrier’s deployment to the eastern Mediterranean in late 2016 made world-wide headlines, the rest of Russian naval aviation is undergoing a revival.

                                                                    Russian carrier aviation currently is based on a single ship, the Admiral Kuznetsov. When she sailed from the Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean last fall with several major surface combatants in company, the carrier’s air group consisted of: ten Su-33 Flanker- D’s, five newer MiG-29 Fulcrums, and an assortment of Ka-27 Helix antisubmarine helicopters and Ka-31 Helix airborne early warning helicopters. Several of the new naval variants of the Ka-52K Katran attack helicopters also were on board the carrier during operations off Syria. The Su-33 Flanker-D is primarily an air superiority, all-weather fighter, capable of carrying a variety of unguided bombs. The MiG-29K multirole fighter, meant to be the Su-33’s replacement, carries laser and electro-optical-guided precision munitions.

                                                                    The Admiral Kuznetsov’s combat debut off Syria in November went relatively poorly. The ship has a notoriously faulty pressure-fired boiler system and is underpowered, belching black smoke as she sails. As a consequence of her limited top speed and ski-jump design, aircraft takeoff weights were constrained. The carrier air group’s greatest limitation, however, is not technical but human. Russia reportedly has more planes than carrier-qualified pilots. Early in operations off Syria, a MiG-29K reportedly suffered an engine problem, lost power, and crashed into the sea. The pilot survived. Three weeks later a Su-33 broke an arresting cable on landing and rolled off the deck for a second aircraft loss. The air group subsequently transferred to the Russian air base in Syria. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that more than 400 sorties were flown from the carrier while off Syria, more realistic estimates place the number closer to 150.

                                                                    The Admiral Kuznetsov’s main role has always been “status projection” or political presence rather than power projection. Russia retained the ship and sustained a nascent carrier aviation component for the appearance of being a major naval power. The aircraft carrier, with embarked fixed-wing fighter/attack aircraft, is a type of capital ship that few countries possess, conferring a degree of prestige on any nation able to send one to sea.

                                                                    Kuznetsov on its Syrian deployment

                                                                    3620644_original

                                                                    After her Mediterranean deployment, the Admiral Kuznetsov entered a multiyear overhaul and modernization at the massive Sevmash shipyard at Severodvinsk in northern Russia. While in the yard, the carrier will receive a modernization package, focusing on the flight deck, arresting gear and air craft handling components of the ship. Speculation remains on whether or not more serious problems will be addressed such as the ship’s notoriously troublesome propulsion.

                                                                    The Russian government periodically announces plans for new carrier construction. Beginning in 1967, when the missile cruiser-helicopter carrier Moskva joined the fleet, the Nikolayev shipyard on the Black Sea produced a second ship of that type, followed by four vertical/short take-off and landing carriers of the Kiev class, and then two “conventional” aircraft carriers of the Riga class, one of which is the Admiral

                                                                    Kuznetsov. Although only one of those eight ships today remains under the Russian flag, a Kiev-class carrier now serves as India’s Vikramaditya, and the Admiral Kuznetsov’s sister ship serves as the Chinese Liaoning. Any future Russian carrier construction is expected to take place at the Sevmash yard in northern Russia, as Nikolayev is now in Ukraine.

                                                                    The real “teeth” of Russian naval aviation are land-based aircraft, and this is where interesting changes are in progress. Each of the four Russian fleets has a dozen or more Su-24 Fencers—variable-swept-wing attack aircraft intended for the maritime strike role and capable of carrying Kh-31 and Kh-35 air-to surface missiles. These workhorses are being replaced by a new generation of strike aircraft: the Su-30SM, a heavy, multirole fighter attack aircraft, reportedly with a six-ton payload. Already in service with the Black Sea Fleet, the aircraft began to be delivered to the Baltic and Northern Fleets in late 2016. These planes will likely be configured to carry the air launched versions of the advanced SSN-26 anti-ship missile as well as older anti-ship missiles now in service, offering substantial advancement over previous strike aircraft.

                                                                    The Su-34 Fullback will also take part in the naval strike role. Derived from the Su-27 Flanker airframe, it is a capable, long-range aircraft, perhaps better classified as a medium bomber.

                                                                    Russia’s principal aircraft in the strike role are the 60 or more Soviet-era Tu-22 Backfire medium bombers. During tumultuous military reforms in 2009, the Russian General Staff transferred the Tu-22 Backfires from the Navy—where they probably were not being well maintained—to the Long-Range Aviation (LRA) component of the Air Force. They remain under LRA control although still are assigned the anti-ship maritime strike role. They carry the infamous truck-size Kh-22 (NATO AS-4 Kitchen) missile and its upgraded variant, the Kh-32. Backfire bombers carried out combat missions over Syria in 2015 and 2016,dropping unguided bombs, a secondary role for which they were not well suited, but one that nonetheless shows there is still a functioning LRA component in the Russian air arsenal.

                                                                    Tu-22 with Kh-22 missiles

                                                                    tu-22-backfire-c

                                                                    In addition to strike aircraft, Russia retains several large Tu-142 Bear-F long-range, antisubmarine aircraft, derived from the venerable Tu-95 Bear platform. The Tu-142s are undergoing modernization, as only a few remain operational in the fleets. They occasionally have been spotted over Syrian coastal waters. Similarly, Il-38 May maritime patrol and submarine hunting aircraft are being upgraded to the    Il-38N configuration with the Novella system, a high-resolution radar, and other new equipment. The Mays are being prioritized for the Pacific Fleet along with the updated Tu-142s. From ships, the antisubmarine role is conducted by Ka-27 Helix helicopters carried on Russian cruisers and destroyers that remain operational, along with newer frigates designed to replace them.

                                                                    It is difficult to discuss Russian naval aviation without mentioning the saga of Russia’s 2010 deal with France to buy two large, Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. These would have been highly capable, multirole ships for the Russian Navy, modified for larger Ka-27 and Ka-52K helicopters. The deal was scuttled in 2014 following the Russian annexation of Crimea, which resulted in Western sanctions and a political climate that made going forward with the deal impossible for France. After more than a year of discussions, Russia and France amicably parted ways, with the ships being sold to a mutually acceptable third party—Egypt—with funds provided by Saudi Arabia. Moscow made out like a proverbial bandit, recouping its initial deposit of 800 million Euros and doubling its money in rubles when converting at the 2015 exchange rates. Meanwhile Russian funds invested in developing the Ka-52K also were recovered because Egypt bought the Russian helicopters separately for its new ships.

                                                                    One element of Russian naval aviation often overlooked by Western analysts is its non-strategic nuclear arsenal. Post-Soviet Russia inherited some 20,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. While that number has been reduced by more than 75 percent, according to Russian statements, it still leaves a notable number of tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of the Russian Navy and Air Force.

                                                                    Overall, Russian naval aviation might be a small force, but it too is benefiting from a bow wave of modernization across the Russian military. Though mainly shore based, it retains viable capabilities for conventional and nuclear combat.

                                                                    Reprinted with permission from the U.S. Naval Institute. Copyright U.S. Naval Institute.

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                                                                    Only Showing Seven Entries Under Each Category

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                                                                    • #3291914

                                                                      unnormalweb
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                                                                      I’m using the radcliffe theme, which is fine apart from when i create a category as a link, only 7 related entries are shown, but I want all entries to be listed, is this possible or is it a limitation of the specific theme?

                                                                      The blog I need help with is brownvoid.wordpress.com.

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                                                                    #####EOF##### How to Track Site Visits Using UTM Codes
                                                                    Go Own Your Passion. Boost Your Business.

                                                                    How to Track Site Visits Using UTM Codes

                                                                    Whether you’re launching a social media campaign or refreshing your site with new content, online visitors can come from dozens of sources.

                                                                    With all these different channels, it can be hard to pinpoint your best sources of referral traffic and whether you’re getting a return on investment for all of your marketing and outreach efforts.

                                                                    That’s where UTM codes can help — using UTM codes allow for better track site visits. Here’s an overview of why you should take advantage of them and how to get started.

                                                                    What are UTM codes?

                                                                    UTM codes are codes you can add to the end of a URL that allow Google Analytics to provide more detailed information about sources of referral traffic and campaign performance.

                                                                    UTM codes include three main parameters: campaign source, campaign medium, and campaign name. Campaign source can include search engines like Google and social media sites like Facebook or Twitter — or even another website or blog. It basically indicates where your traffic is coming from for a given campaign or piece of content.

                                                                    Campaign medium describes the type of campaign, such as an email campaign, or newsletter that brings traffic to your website. The campaign name indicates which specific campaign or marketing initiative generates traffic to your site.

                                                                    For example, let’s say you do a winter promotion for a specific product line, creating a UTM code such as “utm_campaign= 2019 winter promotion” and adding it to the end of a URL will tell you that visitors came to your site as a result of clicking this specific link.

                                                                    How UTM codes help you track campaign performance

                                                                    That’s just one example of how UTM codes are useful. You can also use these codes to track social media engagement, email campaigns, display ads, blogs, keyword terms, and anything else that involves people clicking on links from elsewhere on the web to land on your site.

                                                                    For example, when you add a UTM code to a blog post link that you promote on Facebook, you’ll get metrics for how many people clicked on the link and came to your site as a result. You can do the same thing for links you include in an email blast or newsletter. If you offer special discounts or promotions, or create a downloadable e-book that will help you generate leads, adding UTM codes to these links within your email or social media promotions will help you determine which channel or platform gives you the best return — and which one may not be worth the effort.

                                                                    When it comes to metrics and marketing, UTM codes are particularly useful to gauge ad performance. Display ads can take up a lot of your marketing budget, but if you find out certain types of display ads perform better, such as ads with a more vibrant image, you may decide to redirect your valuable time and resources to making more ads that actually convert.

                                                                    How to begin using UTM codes

                                                                    You can use several tools to create UTM codes. Google Campaign URL Builder is a free tool that will create individual codes for you once you enter information such as the website URL, campaign source, campaign medium, campaign name, and a few other details.

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                                                                    If you have a WordPress Business plan, you can take advantage of plugins like Easy UTM tracking with a contact form or UTM for Feeds. Just log into your account and click on the “Plugins” link in your left sidebar. From there, enter “UTM” in the search bar to find relevant plugins.

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                                                                    Understanding your website’s traffic

                                                                    It’s not enough to launch a site and hope people will come. You have to promote your content. But to be effective, you need to understand where to invest your time. UTM codes allow you to make more informed, data-driven decisions about how you promote your site. There are plenty of tools out there to help you create UTM codes and attract even more visitors.


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                                                                    #####EOF##### Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                    Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

                                                                    Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                                    On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

                                                                    Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

                                                                    PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

                                                                    PD-50 sinking.jpg

                                                                    Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

                                                                    PD-50 on a good day

                                                                    PD-50 dry dock

                                                                    According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

                                                                    Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

                                                                    Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

                                                                    That looks like it may be the crane

                                                                    Crane.jpg

                                                                    A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

                                                                    Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

                                                                    Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

                                                                    As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

                                                                    This is PD-50 now

                                                                    PD-50 gone

                                                                    The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

                                                                    3 thoughts on “Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north”

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                                                                      #####EOF##### Dan Tentler aka. Viss – 44CON

                                                                      Dan Tentler aka. Viss

                                                                      thumb_viss-portrait Twitter: viss
                                                                      Website: carbondynamics.co

                                                                      Dan Tentler is the founder and CEO of The Phobos Group, a boutique information security services company. Previously a co-founder of Carbon Dynamics, and a security freelancer under the Aten Labs moniker, Dan has found himself in a wide array of different environments, ranging from blue team, to red team, to purple team, to “evil hacker for a camera crew”. When not obtaining shells or explaining against how to get shelled, Dan enjoys FPV racing, homebrewing, and internet troublemaking.

                                                                      Dan has presented at:

                                                                      • 44CON 2014: Hot or not, the hacker way
                                                                      • 44CON 2013:  Building Antibodies – The Phishing program at Twitter.
                                                                      #####EOF##### Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                      Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

                                                                      Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                                      Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

                                                                      —————————————————————————————————————————————–

                                                                      The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

                                                                      Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

                                                                      The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

                                                                      can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

                                                                      And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

                                                                       

                                                                      This slideshow requires JavaScript.

                                                                      Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

                                                                      There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

                                                                      VDV praciting loading

                                                                      Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

                                                                      Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

                                                                      airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

                                                                      Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

                                                                      Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

                                                                      These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

                                                                      The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

                                                                      T62 vdv.jpg
                                                                      VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

                                                                      Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

                                                                      But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

                                                                      4 thoughts on “Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces”

                                                                      1. Thank you for your articles. I’ve spent a few hours enjoying your material about Vostok 2018 and the VDV. Your analysis is balanced, well-informed and free of pro and anti Russia hysteria common through most of the open source Russian watcher community.

                                                                        Denis Mokrushin (twower blog) has tracked announcements from the Russian MoD about kontraktnik numbers over the last few years. He notes that it seems they have hit a wall at just under 400,000 contract soldiers. At the same time, the number of draftees seems to be declining slightly even though Russia has passed the worst of its demographic black hole. How are they staffing these new units? Also, can you comment on the recent announcement that the land forces are staffing 1 of 3 BTGs with draftees and keeping them away from front line combat?

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                                                                        • There is not a demographic problem but a choice on where to spend money. Contracts are simply a question of money, if they wanted more contractors they could have them. However, with 3-5% spending sequester they have to make choices between force size, readiness, and capability.

                                                                          Draftees are declining to plan, since they want to get to a sustainable number somewhere around 220-230k. The short answer is that they will create tiered formations at 100-90-80% staffing and have to eat the manpower that way. Golts is wrong on this, predicting some return to cadre formations. Large divisions do not need 100% staffing and can be setup under mobilization model to take people in during period of threat. So I think the short answer to this question is mobilization.

                                                                          USSR had a great system for mobilization, and not so great system of command and control. The Russian military now has a great system for command and control, but largely destroyed Soviet mobilization model – no operational reserve, etc. This was always one of the unfinished pieces from the mil reforms.

                                                                          As I understand it, a brigade is only supposed to force generate 2 BTGs anyway, and the rest is its reserve. This announcement does not tell us much and I’m skeptical of official statistics, although it is useful to see that they think of the force in BTG counts and are structuring it less on number of brigades/divisions but mostly on the basis of force generation potential (unlike NATO which focuses on defense spending and excel spreadsheets that wont fight). The conscripts are there to be recruited as contractors at the end of their year. However we don’t know in a 6 regiment division how many battalions are supposed to be contract vs conscript, though we can glean that Russians don’t intend to send conscripts to fight in the initial period of war.

                                                                          Liked by 1 person

                                                                          Reply

                                                                          • Thank you for that. How many soldiers does a BTG have? Around 1,000? If so, then 2 BTGs generated from each brigade is not that much larger than a Soviet regiment. Although, a BTG is likely much better trained and equipped than a regiment. How did they come up with the idea of a BTG in the first place?

                                                                            Like

                                                                          • 800-1200 depending, some can go up to 1500. A brigade is realistically a super sized regiment, since it has 3 maneuver battalions at its core. A BTG is exactly as good as its components are, it is a task organized formation or kampfgruppen. Most of the discussion on contractors and conscripts is rather strained by some strange notions about basic military organization and warfighting functions.

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                                                                        #####EOF##### Announcing Newspack by WordPress.com — A New Publishing Solution for News Organizations — The WordPress.com Blog

                                                                        Announcing Newspack by WordPress.com — A New Publishing Solution for News Organizations

                                                                        We’re teaming up with Google, Lenfest, Civil funder ConsenSys, and Knight to develop a next-generation publishing platform.

                                                                        January 14, 2019

                                                                        Mark Armstrong

                                                                        Over the past 15 years, WordPress has grown to become the world’s most popular publishing platform for the open web — and it’s especially true for news organizations. Through WordPress.com and our enterprise service WordPress.com VIP, we’re proud to host sites for some of the most trusted names in journalism — from Time.com and CNN to FiveThirtyEight and Quartz, as well as individual sites for reporters and bloggers all around the globe.

                                                                        Today we’re excited to announce funding for a new platform, Newspack by WordPress.com, aimed at small- and medium-sized news organizations. Google, through the Google News Initiative, is taking the lead in backing the project and has committed $1.2 million. Other funders include The Lenfest Institute for Journalism, which is contributing $400,000; ConsenSys, the venture studio backing Civil Media, which is contributing $350,000; and The John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, which is contributing $250,000. An additional $200,000 from a fifth source is expected to be contributed toward the project later this month.

                                                                        News organizations interested in being part of the pilot launch can go to newspack.blog to learn more.

                                                                        With many local news organizations struggling to find sustainable models for journalism, we’re seeing a need for an inexpensive platform that provides the technology and support that lets news organizations build their businesses and focus on what they do best — providing critical reporting for their communities. Our hope with Newspack is to give them a platform where they can continue to focus on what they do best, while we focus on providing world-class technology and support across their editorial and business operations.

                                                                        In addition to WordPress.com parent Automattic, partners in the project include Spirited Media, which operates local digital news sites in Denver, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh, and News Revenue Hub, a spinoff of Voice of San Diego, which provides revenue solutions for digital publishers.

                                                                        For more information, and to sign up for email updates, go to Newspack.blog.

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                                                                          #####EOF##### Blondie Showcase | WordPress.org

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                                                                          #####EOF##### Jayson E. Street – 44CON

                                                                          Jayson E. Street

                                                                          default Twitter: @jaysonstreet

                                                                          website: f0rb1dd3n.com
                                                                          Jayson E. Street is the author of the book “Dissecting the hack: The F0rb1dd3n Network” plus creator of the site http://dissectingthehack.comHe’s also spoken at DEFCON, BRUCON, UCON & at several other ‘CONs & colleges on a variety of Information Security subjects.

                                                                          His life story can be found on Google under “Jayson E. Street”.

                                                                          He’s a highly carbonated speaker who has partaken of Pizza from Beijing to Brazil. He does not expect anybody to still be reading this far but if they are please note he was chosen as one of Time’s persons of the year for 2006

                                                                          Jayson has presented at:

                                                                          • 44CON 2012: Securing the Internet: YOU’re doing it wrong (An INFOSEC Intervention)
                                                                          #####EOF##### Topic Tag: Topics - missing posts | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                          #####EOF##### Yasen – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                          Tag: Yasen

                                                                          The Yasen-class submarine (year four of sea trials)

                                                                          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                          Yasen-class submarine, named Severodvinsk, firing land attack cruise missiles and analysis below:

                                                                           

                                                                          The Yasen-class submarine is Russia’s next generation multipurpose SSN, which also packs an anti-ship or land attack missile package. Supposedly this new generation submarine is a much quieter design than the improved Akula or Victor classes.  Some allege that it may be as quiet as Western analogues, but I see that as the lesser of two issues.  The more important question is about the submarine’s acoustic properties relative to the ambient noise of the ocean, since submarines are not detected in relation to another submarine, but based on how loud they are compared to the water they’re in.  If the Yasen is truly much quieter, it could pose a cost imposition curve problem, making it overly expensive to detect in large bodies of water.

                                                                          The Yasen-class is typically considered analogous to the U.S. Seawolf-class, a sophisticated and expensive multipurpose submarine that was built in the latter years of the Cold War, capable of conducting missile strikes, sub hunts, and defending the SSBN fleet.  Only three Seawolf class submarines were built, with the collapse of the USSR that submarine proved overly expensive for a mission that was increasingly a lower priority.

                                                                          Below is a chart made by one individual (a Polish blogger), that purports to show the different levels of noise output among the subs.  However, I make no claims to its veracity.  In fact I promise you it is not correct.  Frankly, it is difficult to imagine anyone having access to information on how quiet this submarine is.

                                                                          2000px-sub_noise_comparison_eng-svg

                                                                          (Taken off wikipedia and also used by FAS)

                                                                           

                                                                          Arms Control Wonk made this one, which gives the Yasen-class less credit.

                                                                          349

                                                                          The first ship of this class is the Severodvinsk, laid down in 1993, and left moribund for years due to lack of funding.  Eventually she was launched in the Fall of 2011 and ran into a range of difficulties with the propulsion system and acoustic characteristics.  Supposedly the system could not produce enough power and according to one fellow expert it had an absurdly loud depth measuring system.  This submarine is also quite expensive, perhaps at $1.5 billion, it comes in at almost double the cost of the new SSBNs and potentially unaffordable across the proposed line of eight vessels in the class.

                                                                          This initial submarine was designated Project 885 and has spent an amazing 4 years in sea trials, going on 5 this year.  It is an artisan design.  Given the complexity, every ship of this class is liable to be somewhat different and have its own properties.  This month the Severodvinsk has finally begun weapons testing – shown above firing a Kalibr land attack cruise missile.  This indicates it is close to getting operational status, assuming everything checks out, and the myriad of propulsion, reactor and acoustic problems have likely been resolved.  However, it can also mean that no matter what this first ship in the class will be declared operational, defects and all.  Supposedly she will carry either the larger Oniks or Kalibr multi-purpose missiles in 8 vertical launch tubes and pack 10 torpedo tubes (8×650 and 2×533).

                                                                          mtcbr03

                                                                          Based on the modernized design of the first ship, four more have been laid down designated Project 885M, and two more ordered (7 so far), with the hope of producing a total of eight.  Unfortunately the timeline for completing them has been pushed to the right this year, to 2023, due to production capacity and budget issues.  The new eight ballistic missile submarines SSBNs, Borei-class, have also been delayed until 2021, and I suspect both ship types will slide further to the right of expected delivery dates.  Three of the eight Borei’s have been completed so far.  There are doubts in analytical circles that either production line will be fully completed, though the SSBN’s have natural priority over the SSNs.  When it comes to Russian ship production always bet on delays.

                                                                          Below is a readout of their current state and expected completion dates, translated from colleagues at BMPD:

                                                                          – order. 161 (lead ship of the class 885M) “Кazan”, completed 67,5%
                                                                          expected date – December 2017

                                                                          – order. 162 (1st serial production ship) “Novosibirsk”, completed 35,5%, launch date – December 2018, expected date – December 2019

                                                                          – order. 163 “Krasnoyarsk”, completed 19,3% launch date – December 2018.
                                                                          Expected date – December 2020.

                                                                          – order. 164 “Аchangelsk”, completed 4,7%, launch date – December 2019.
                                                                          Expected date – December 2021.

                                                                          – order. 165, (no name) completed 0,6%
                                                                          To be laid down – July 2016., launch date – December 2020.
                                                                          Expected date – December 2022.

                                                                          – order. 166, (no name) completed 0,3%
                                                                          To be laid down – July 2017., launch date – December 2021.
                                                                          Expected date – December 2023.

                                                                          I have doubts that more than six Yasen-class submarines will be built due to the economic crisis impact on the state armament program.  Officially it will cost nothing to lay down #165 and #166 while it is unlikely funds will be invested in their construction until the financial situation becomes more stable.

                                                                          Despite this submarine’s high cost, and the production output limitations of Russia’s shipbuilding industry, the Yasen still represents the most sophisticated submarine fielded by a non-Western power.  How sophisticated remains the subject of extensive speculation. Soviet submarines could dive deeper and run faster, with more innovative hull designs, but they were incredibly loud and easy to track.  With the move towards a quieter design, Russia’s submarine force may at best be one fifth the size of its Soviet predecessor (perhaps operationally one tenth), but it could end up closing the technological gap in silence, which is key to dominance in the underwater domain.

                                                                           

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                                                                          #####EOF##### Martyn Ruks – 44CON

                                                                          Martyn Ruks

                                                                          default
                                                                          Martyn Ruks is Technical Director at MWR InfoSecurity and has over 10 years experience in the field of information security testing and research. Martyn has previously conducted a number of security research projects resulting in the production of a number of testing tools and white papers. These projects have covered subjects as diverse as Networking protocols for IBM Mainframes, WebSphere MQ and the retro topic of networking for BBC Micros. His previous work has resulted in him being asked to present his findings at a number of renowned security conferences in the UK, US and Europe. Martyn has recently been working on the security of LTE networks, which is the commonly used name for the new 4G mobile networks.

                                                                          Martyn has presented at:

                                                                           
                                                                          #####EOF##### Topic Tag: oxygen | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                          #####EOF##### The Kerch Strait skirmish: a Law of the Sea perspective – Russian Military Reform
                                                                          by

                                                                          The Kerch Strait skirmish: a Law of the Sea perspective

                                                                          The following article was published as a Strategic Analysis piece by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. It’s an expansion of some of the themes mentioned in a piece I co-authored with Michael Kofman for the Monkey Cage in the immediate aftermath of the Kerch Strait skirmish.

                                                                          The November 25 naval skirmish between Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Kerch Strait was significant first and foremost as an open military confrontation between the two countries’ armed forces. But it also highlighted the fraught legal status of the strait and the Azov Sea, a status that Russia has been exploiting in recent months to exert political and economic pressure on Ukraine.

                                                                          A slow march to confrontation

                                                                          The confrontation began months before the recent events that brought the conflict to worldwide attention. In March 2018, Ukrainian border guard vessels detained a Russian fishing vessel in the Azov Sea for violating exit procedures from the “temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”, namely from Crimea. The crew of that vessel remained in detention for several months, until they were exchanged in October for Ukrainian sailors. The captain of the Russian ship remains in Ukraine and is facing prosecution for illegal fishing and “violation of the procedure for entry and exit from the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”. Since that incident, Russia has retaliated by detaining several Ukrainian fishing vessels.

                                                                          In May, Russia also began to regularly hold Ukrainian commercial ships for inspection before allowing them to pass through the Kerch Strait. The initiation of this inspection regime largely coincided with the opening of a road and rail bridge across the strait. Russia claimed that the inspections were required to ensure the safety and security of the bridge at a time when some Ukrainians had publicly threatened to attack the bridge. The delays caused by the inspection regime, together with ship height restrictions caused by the bridge, have led to a 30 percent reduction in revenues at Ukraine’s commercial ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, raising fears that Russia is trying to strangle the economy of eastern Ukraine.

                                                                          In the same period, Russia also began to build up its naval presence in the Azov Sea, with at least three missile ships based there since summer 2018. Reports indicate that Russia plans to set up a full-fledged flotilla in the Azov in the near future. Ukraine has also strengthened its naval presence in the region, placing several armoured boats in Berdyansk and seeking to expand the base there.

                                                                          The transfer of ships from Odesa to Berdyansk that caused the skirmish was part of this effort. Ukraine had moved naval ships through the Kerch Strait as recently as September 2018, but these ships were not armed. In that case, the ships were allowed to pass through without incident, although they were closely followed by Russian border guard vessels. The passage of two armoured boats through the strait in late November was thus the first attempt by the Ukrainian Navy to bring armed ships through the Kerch Strait since tensions began to mount and the bridge was completed in spring 2018.

                                                                          The legal background

                                                                          The status of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait is regulated by a bilateral treaty that was signed by Russia and Ukraine in 2003. According to the terms of the treaty, the sea is considered to be internal waters for both countries, and both Ukrainian and Russian commercial and military ships have the right of free passage through the strait. Furthermore, the treaty does not specify any particular advance notice procedures for passage through the strait. Foreign commercial ships are allowed to pass through the strait and enter the sea if they are heading to or from a Ukrainian or Russian port. Military ships belonging to other countries may be allowed passage if they are invited by one of the signatories to the treaty, but only with the agreement of the other signatory. In 2015, Russia unilaterally adopted a set of rules requiring ships passing through the strait to give advance notification to the Russian authorities, ostensibly to assure safety of navigation. These rules have not been accepted by Ukraine.

                                                                           

                                                                          Please follow this link to read the rest of the article.

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                                                                          #####EOF##### Ravishankar Borgaonkar – 44CON

                                                                          Ravishankar Borgaonkar

                                                                          default Twitter: @raviborgaonkar
                                                                          Website: www.isti.tu-berlin.de/…
                                                                          Ravishankar works as a Senior Researcher in Security in the Telecommunications Department at Technical University Berlin. His research themes are related to mobile telecommunication and involved security threats. This ranges from GSM/UMTS/LTE network security to end-user device security. Previously, he was involved in the investigation of weaknesses in the femtocell security architecture at TU Berlin. Further, he discovered USSD code vulnerabilities in Android devices. Ravishankar’s research has previously been presented at the Black Hat, Hack In The Box, Ruxcon, Troopers, T2, and HES.

                                                                          Ravishankar has presented at:

                                                                          • 44CON 2014:  Darshak: how to turn your phone into a low cost IMSI catcher device
                                                                          #####EOF##### Lit Lovers, Rejoice: Electric Literature Moves to WordPress | Discover

                                                                          Lit Lovers, Rejoice: Electric Literature Moves to WordPress

                                                                          Feature by

                                                                          Indie publisher Electric Literature recently launched their new website on WordPress. “You’ll see that on the new website the look is very vibrant and positive and is pulled through every article and every space,” said executive director Halimah Marcus, who chatted with us in an interview at The WordPress.com Blog. The design is modern and reader-friendly, and icons — inspired by electrical symbols — reflect its community’s love for books, writing, and ideas. Ready to explore the new Electric Lit? Dive into these five recent reads.

                                                                          Liking Books Is Not a Personality

                                                                          Hannah McGregor explores the history of book consumption, the invention of “bookishness,” and the outrage over Marie Kondo’s suggestion that books are just things.

                                                                          We could pull apart the xenophobia, racism, orientalism, and classism at work in these critiques all day, but I want to focus on how self-identified bookish people reacted to the association of books with clutter, the demotion of these objects from sacred to banal — or, maybe more accurately, the insistence that they are no more sacred than any other objects. 

                                                                          What If You Can’t Afford “A Room of One’s Own”?

                                                                          Sandra Newman writes openly about financial insecurity — being homeless, being perennially broke, and writing while poor.

                                                                          I’ve still almost never had a room of my own with a door that locks, as Woolf says I must have to write. Until I was 40, I never earned the minimum amount Woolf tells me I must earn — £500 a year, or roughly $40,000 in 2019 dollars. In some years, I don’t earn that now. I still think of anyone with no realistic fear of homelessness as rich.

                                                                          But I’ve written eight books.

                                                                          Dave Eggers Thinks Privacy Is Dead

                                                                          Frances Yackel interviews author Dave Eggers about his new novel, The Parade; economic imperialism; and privacy and the future of social media.

                                                                          Younger people, those under 20, aren’t using Facebook at all, and that’s a good indicator for the planet. There is, rightfully, almost universal distrust of Facebook, because their culture is not one built on trust or respect for users, and yet billions still willingly give the company much of their most personal information. High schoolers, though, have altered their behavior radically — they want to communicate with friends, but directly, using WhatsApp, for example. The movement is away from public sharing and into more private communication. Consumers’ behavior and preferences will drive what happens with social media in the next five-ten years, and I dearly hope the teens will lead it all into more sane territory.

                                                                          How Do You Even Get Started Writing a Book?

                                                                          At “The Blunt Instrument,” the site’s advice column for writers, a Denver-based writer named Ben asks if there’s a correct way to write a book, and how and when to approach a publisher. Guest columnist John Cotter responds.

                                                                          You’ll notice there’s one thing I haven’t talked about so far, and that’s actually writing your book. This is the part of the business that happens alone, in the quiet of your home or the library or a coffee shop. You don’t have to work on your book every day, but if you never work on your book, then your book will never be written. About this part of the process I’ll give you one piece of advice: writing is like dreaming. What I mean is you don’t fall asleep the moment your head touches the pillow each night, and even if you do you don’t start dreaming right away. Give yourself twenty minutes or whatever to dally, strike out with false starts, read a little poetry, play a Cat Power song or two while you stare at the tree outside. It takes time.

                                                                          7 Unstable Narrators in Fiction

                                                                          In this reading list, Marina Benjamin, author of Insomnia, discusses seven unreliable narrators in literature, from Elena Ferrante’s The Days of Abandonment to Roland Torpor’s The Tenant.

                                                                          Ferrante is wonderful at women falling apart, painting the inside of their heads as crazed thoughts whirr, and almost convincing you with their bizarre rationalizations. Taut, tense, and full of very human pathos,Days of Abandonment is a superb study in altered states of being.

                                                                          Looking for more to read? Visit Electric Literature.

                                                                          Go to the website

                                                                           

                                                                          7 Comments

                                                                          5. Nice Selections, from electric literature. Actually all the blogs need proper attention and continuous effort, and the concepts / ideas play important role in the success of any blog.
                                                                            I am Sad after reading —– “Sandra Newman”.

                                                                            Liked by 5 people

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                                                                            #####EOF##### Behrang Fouladi – 44CON

                                                                            Behrang Fouladi

                                                                            default
                                                                            Behrang Fouladi works as a Security Researcher at SensePost. He has been involved in vulnerability research and code reverse engineering since 2003. He completed his MSc in Information Security at The Royal Holloway University of London with a focus on Smart Cards. His current research interests are Machine-to-Machine (M2M), secure elements and embedded systems.

                                                                            Behrang has presented at:

                                                                            • 44CON 2013: Honey I’m Home!! – Hacking Z-Wave Home Automation Systems.
                                                                            • 44CON 2012: Inside .NET smart card operating system
                                                                            #####EOF##### Shay Chen – 44CON

                                                                            Shay Chen

                                                                            default Twitter: @sectooladdict
                                                                            Website: sectooladdict.blogspot.com
                                                                            Shay Chen is the CTO of Hacktics, an advanced security center of Ernst & Young.

                                                                            As a victim of the law of familiarity, a decade of exposure to common vulnerabilities was enough to shift his focus to abnormal hacking methodologiesand new attack vectors.

                                                                            He is also a prominent blogger and researcher, and is responsible for many security publications, including new application-level attacks, testing methodologies and open source projects.

                                                                            In the recent years, as the co-author of the platforms “Diviner” and “WAVSEP”, he was involved in the publication of several large-scale researches in the field of automated security scanners.

                                                                            Shay is an experienced speaker, has been instructing a variety of information security courses for the past 8 years, and had multiple appearances in international conferences, including Blackhat, Hacktivity, AppSecUSA and others.

                                                                            Shay has presented at:

                                                                            • 44CON 2013: Net Havoc – Manipulating Properties of Dormant Server Side Web Controls

                                                                            https://vimeo.com/109380787
                                                                            #####EOF##### Be Proactive About Intellectual Property Protection | Lediamedia

                                                                            Be Proactive About Intellectual Property Protection

                                                                            · by · in social-media. ·

                                                                            The wake of SOPA debates (and protest) has reignited interest in intellectual property. Do you know how to protect yours?

                                                                            As technology continues to improve, thieves are finding new and more creative ways to steal data and digital property from others.

                                                                            Instead of waiting around for the next SOPA to be debated (and potentially passed), I choose to be proactive and learn how to protect myself. I’ve done some research and unearth five useful tips to help all of us protect our intellectual property.

                                                                            First things first. 

                                                                            What is Intellectual Property?

                                                                            According to Stopfakes.gov, intellectual property is any innovation, commercial or artistic, or any unique name, symbol, logo or design used commercially. Intellectual property is protected by:

                                                                            • patents on inventions;
                                                                            • trademarks on branding devices;
                                                                            • copyrights on music, videos, patterns and other forms of expression;
                                                                            • trade secrets for methods or formulas having economic value and used commercially

                                                                            Below are four ways to protect your intellectual property. 

                                                                            Be Smart about Publication

                                                                            Do not publish sensitive or secret materials online where search engines and the entire world can easily find and copy it. Digital materials that are published online should, at a minimum, contain your unique watermark or other identifying markings. A watermark can be extremely useful if ownership of an item is later disputed.

                                                                            • Watermarks should be placed on anything you don’t want being used without credit. That includes samples, photos, etc.
                                                                            • Watermark software (many are free and can be accessed with a Google search) easily creates watermarks that are nearly invisible to the user and are critical for resolving any infringement disputes.
                                                                            • I suggest establishing company policies and requiring all employees to sign confidentiality agreements to prohibit them from disclosing or publishing your intellectual property without permission (or watermark).

                                                                            Computer and Network Security

                                                                            Not publishing sensitive documents online doesn’t necessarily mean you’re out of the woods. Security holes in any network (hard wired or wireless) can be a hacker’s dream — and Anonymous has been on a roll lately.  Secure your wireless network, password protect your computer(s) and sensitive documents, and install anti-virus software and firewalls.

                                                                            • It’s always a good idea to password protect any documents that contain sensitive material.
                                                                            • Do not allow unknown users to connect to your network.
                                                                            • Keep your anti-virus software updated and run checks regularly. (Or you could buy a Mac, which doesn’t seem to have that pesky virus problem.)

                                                                            Apply for Protection

                                                                            Make the first move to protect your intellectual property by applying for protection. First and foremost, research the difference between trademarks, patents, and copyrights. Each will have different requirements and require specific documentation.

                                                                            • Clearly display any patent, copyright, or trademark notices on your website and any other legally protected documents. Make it clear that your material is not free for use, duplication, or redistribution without permission.
                                                                            • Be sure to enforce any violations. There is no point in buying a copyright if you aren’t going to enforce it!
                                                                            • Copyscape is a great free tool that searches the web for duplicate content. Use it!

                                                                            Be Clear about Licensing Permissions

                                                                            Clearly state any licensing rights, terms, and conditions of use for your intellectual property on your website. If you choose to “lease” your intellectual property (with permission of course), state your licensing policies in your Terms of Use and get licensing agreements in writing.

                                                                            One response to “Be Proactive About Intellectual Property Protection”

                                                                            1. Copyright holders like movie studios can also invoke a "private right of action" against just about any company that does business with a website that copyright holders believe to be involved in copyright infringement. Copyright holders can demand that payment processors to cutoff the flow of money to a website or that search engines eliminate links to it.

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                                                                            #####EOF##### PMC – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                            Tag: PMC

                                                                            U.S. Strikes and Russian PMC Casualties in Syria – Fact vs Fiction

                                                                            Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                                            It’s become common knowledge that a U.S. strike took out an advancing column of Syrian forces on February 7th in defense of SDF positions east of Deir ez-Zor, and more likely to protect U.S. SOF embedded with them. Since then the story of Russian casualties among supporting PMCs (mercenaries belonging to private military companies) has proliferated across the internet and newspaper articles, with many of the facts and figures inaccurate. I’ve seen 100 dead, 200 dead, 600 dead, dozens, hundreds, scores of dead, and so on and so forth. Unfortunately Russian casualties, troops participating in military exercises, or similar such events have a large “applied internet multiplier” whereby they increase several fold depending on the source. By current figures many of those involved in the fighting February 7-8 were killed at least twice, if not multiple times.

                                                                            Due to a lack of credible information serious newspapers are citing some Russian businessman, a Syrian commander, and all sorts of other conflicting sources. The contradictory stories are reminiscent of Akira Kurosawa’s famous film Rashomon, where every character has their own often self-serving narrative about the same event. After a journalist called this morning to inquire whether it is true that U.S. airpower took out 20% of Russian ground forces in Syria it seems time for something sensible to be written on the matter. I’m updating this a bit as better information comes out.

                                                                            Based on the information available at the time I wrote that actual casualties among PMCs in this episode are likely somewhere on the order of 13-15 dead and a relatively equal number wounded. Initial reporting seemed closer to a dozen than dozens. The casualties  from this strike are spread between a Syrian unit known as ISIS Hunters (~20 KIA) and the bulk among SAA units which seemed to include some percentage of local fighters from the area (these numbers might be around 40 or more). There was word of a Syrian brigadier killed as well along with the SAA soldiers. More than likely this was an unit from Syria’s 5th Assault Corps supported by PMCs. The 13-15 PMC casualties are also not all necessarily Russian, but thus far all the confirmed dead are. A good number seem to be Cossacks, and many are fighters who previously were part of separatist formations in the Donbas, either directly on behalf of DNR or under contract as mercs.

                                                                            I am very biased towards conservative assessments based on the information that can be confirmed, and makes sense, i.e. I prefer starting low and working my way up. In this case it seems that the less probable event was true, the number of Wagner mercenaries killed was much higher than I initially thought.

                                                                            On Feb 16 I updated the count after more information and some additions from fighting February 10th. The better number increasingly looked like ~40 dead and 70 wounded as in MK article. I’m more inclined towards MK numbers in this graphic than any of the other figures, but it is still too low an estimate. Those are figures for combined casualties, referencing 3 companies of Wagner involved in support of Syrian forces. Of these the number of PMCs killed and wounded is probably more than a dozen but doubtfully exceeds 30-40 (or so I thought). Today the more realistic number is somewhere between 100-200 killed in that engagement.

                                                                            MK article here: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/02/13/pogibli-40-raneny-72-istochnik-v-chvk-vagnera-utochnil-poteri.html

                                                                            A good source comparison chart to figure out where all these numbers are coming from can be found here: https://chervonec-001.livejournal.com/2227259.html

                                                                            This is a photo of ISIS Hunters holding a funeral following the strike

                                                                            ISIS Hunters funeral

                                                                            The KIA count may go up depending on the fate of the wounded. There is a general assumption based on the evidence that the few PMCs killed belong to Wagner ChVK, as Wagner is the principal mercenary group fighting in support of SAA in Syria. As is often the case, facts point to a much less exciting and sensational story behind the headlines.

                                                                            According to DoD statements, and those by SecDef Mattis, the attacking force approximated ‘300 pro-regime forces’ in a surprise push towards SDF positions on February 7. Thus, the fantastic figures of hundreds dead, including Igor Girkin’s 644, can be safely thrown out the window. Somewhere on the order of 200 dead is also improbable unless the numbers for those attacking were much higher than being reported by the American side. The U.S. would have to kill literally everyone involved, and that seems quite a reach for typical rules of engagement. But it seems the numbers were somewhere 100-200 after all, that is the reporting from Russia and numerous sources suggest the U.S. intentionally under reported Russian PMC casualties in this fight. Either that, or the additional fighters died from poor morale after seeing the strike.

                                                                            Later on, DoD statements elaborated that the attack came evening of Feb 7th, and it included a ‘dismounted battalion sized element’ which was turned back. So this is somewhere on the order of 300-500 attacking but they only had contact with a part of the force. The difference in the numbers between Mattis’ initial 300 and LTG Harrigan’s battalion is in the leading half of the battalion, which dismounted (200-300), that U.S. forces struck and most of the casualties were among this element.

                                                                            Since LTG Harrigan indicated the attack was not unexpected, and they observed the buildup for some time (https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1441080/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-lieutenant-general-harrigian-via-teleco/), it explains better how so many assets were involved in beating back the assault – MQ-9, F-15E, F-22, even B-52 and AC-130. B-52 in particular would take some time to arrive on station. This suggests the U.S. knew the attack was coming, and they told the Russians they knew, and the action went forward anyway.

                                                                            This episode appears to have taken place around Al-Tabiyeh east of Deir ez-Zor. Syrian forces began an attack on SDF positions, with armor and artillery. Then U.S. forces made contact with Russian MoD to deconflict, and after being told there were no Russian soldiers there, which by all accounts there were not, they struck the advancing units. So, initially I thought total casualties were probably less than 100 with a approximately 40 SAA, 20 ISIS Hunters, and 13-15 PMC split (although unclear if SAA losses include ISIS Hunters losses in which case it might even more conservative). Now looking back, that was grossly conservative. Somewhere between 100-200 were killed, many of them Wagner fighters, that is more than the 42-70 estimate from the MK story.

                                                                            The exact reason for why this episode took place is naturally unclear, but it may be connected to the overall friction between Syrian forces wanting to seize energy infrastructure, gas and oil, from SDF forces. The latter took it from ISIS, and of course need the resources, just as the Syrian regime needs the money to sustain a rump state. There are also Russian interests there looming in the background, among people interested in contracts handling Syrian energy extraction post-conflict, and hoping that PMCs can secure potential energy cash cows. This episode may be due to poor coordination, deliberate probing, or as often happens in war – a confluence of events yields compound risk as mistakes and misjudgments stack.

                                                                            From higher altitude, the U.S. has a strategy to maintain presence in Syria via SDF, and Russia has a strategy to make the regime as viable as possible financially, while pushing U.S. proxies further east. Astride the war between Turkey and Kurds playing out in Afrin, the war between Israel and U.S. vs Iranian presence in the south, this is technically Syria’s war #3 which involves Russian forces backing SAA to retake more of Idlib and gain ground east of Deir ez-Zor.

                                                                            P.S. Behind this tale is another looming story about some Syrian T-72 that was taken out by a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone in defense of SDF positions and embedded U.S. advisers (internet can’t decide if its Russian or Soviet made). Actually on the video available it first looked more like a T-90, supplied by Russia to Syria’s 5th Assault Corps. There is an object right of the gun that looks like a Shtora system than IR illuminator from T-72BA – but this was not the case. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/13/us-mq-9-reaper-takes-out-russian-t-72-tank-syria.html (I got this photo from the same article)

                                                                            Looking at it some more later the V barrier on the front seems to point to T-72M, which is the more probable answer. This is is from Feb 10 fighting.

                                                                            DoD video shows a U.S Air Force Reaper strike on a Russia-made T-72 tank. (Screen shot of DoD video)

                                                                            We stand by to find out from the internet whether this particular tank was filled with hundreds of Russian PMCs or personally driven by Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.

                                                                            Figures compiled from a few news sources like Novaya Gazeta, Meduza, etc. some blog sources that are ‘pro-Russian’ but fairly well informed on the situation in Syria, work put out by CIT, other journalists/experts currently working the issue)

                                                                            https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/02/13/75496-oshibka-ili-predatelstvo

                                                                            https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/02/12/139439-cit-uznala-imena-pogibshih-v-sirii-boytsov-chvk-vagnera

                                                                            MK might have the best sources: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/02/13/pogibli-40-raneny-72-istochnik-v-chvk-vagnera-utochnil-poteri.html

                                                                            Oryx probably took number of dead and did standard 3x wounded multiplier, which makes sense.

                                                                             

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                                                                            #####EOF##### Regarding Accessibility in Gutenberg – Make WordPress Core

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                                                                            Matias Ventura 3:18 pm on October 18, 2018  

                                                                            Regarding Accessibility in Gutenberg

                                                                            There have been some important questions and concerns about accessibility in the upcoming new editor. First and foremost, it goes without saying that work on these areas is never finished and we can always go a step further in improving the experience for all users of WordPress. That is a big part of the project’s core mission. We need to continue to develop close feedback loops with different users interacting through their preferred tools to make sure what we build is relevant to their experiences.

                                                                            A large amount of work and effort has gone in building mechanisms necessary to make the editor accessible for a wide user base, some of which will be highlighted in this post. For example, it is entirely possible right now to recreate the “demo post” that comes with the Gutenberg plugin using the keyboard. In many ways, these tools are better and more sophisticated than what we offer in the current editor.

                                                                            There are bugs, of course, and rough edges to still address. From release to release these have been refined and iterated by many people and I want to thank all of them for their hard work. There are about 270 tickets closed specifically labeled “accessibility,” and around 90 more that remain open, so we still need your help. The goal is to make this experience as seamless as possible for all users, so if you are encountering an issue, please share it so it can be addressed.

                                                                            Let’s go over some of the accessibility related capabilities that exist right now in the new editor…

                                                                            The cropping is a bit too tight on the video and doesn’t show the “regions” in all its crystal clarity

                                                                            Region Navigation

                                                                            Gutenberg introduces a mechanism for navigating across the major regions of the application with a simple keyboard shortcut that cycles through them — header, content, sidebar, publish flow are included. A user can press “Control + `” or “Alt + Shift + n” (this can vary based on keyboard configuration) to focus the different areas at any time. This is an entirely new addition to WordPress with the hope of streamlining navigation without a pointer device.

                                                                            Keyboard Shortcuts

                                                                            There is a wide array of keyboard shortcuts available to help access different functionality. These are built in a way that can be extended and integrated in testing flows. A panel listing most of the shortcuts can be accessed from the menu at the top of the editor or by pressing “Ctrl + Alt + h”. Tooltips used throughout the application also display their corresponding shortcuts when available. They range from editor functionality (save, undo, etc), to formatting options (adding links, italics, etc), to inserting new blocks (just type “/” on a new line), to navigation and selection of blocks. Keyboard shortcuts are contextual to the OS and displayed as such in tooltips and menus.

                                                                            (Note: All keyboard shortcuts listed are available in Windows. MacOS includes these shortcuts but with different combinations; see the keyboard shortcuts panel in Gutenberg to see them all.)

                                                                            Block Navigation

                                                                            The main mechanism for traversing blocks is using the arrow keys. There is also a Block Navigation panel that allows keyboard users to quickly navigate through blocks without having to tab through their controls or flow through their contents.

                                                                            Slash Command and Insertion

                                                                            It’s important to be able to add new blocks and manipulate them with ease without leaving the keyboard. There is a very convenient shortcut (“/”) to add new blocks. There are also shortcuts for adding a new block before or after the current block. If there are ideas on how to surface these better and contextually to users, please chime in!

                                                                            Toolbar and Sidebar

                                                                            Main block tools are grouped in the toolbar, while secondary actions are often deferred to the sidebar panel and both can be accessed through keyboard navigation. The sidebar can be toggled with a single keyboard command (“Shift + Command + ,“). The toolbar — whether it’s docked at the top of the block or at the top of the editor — can be accessed with “Alt + F10”. Using the arrow keys, all focusable areas of a block can be navigated to (including things like the optional caption field for an image or an embed, or the source of a quote).

                                                                            High-Contrast Mode

                                                                            We’ve worked hard to fix edge cases for users of high-contrast mode in Windows, to ensure users with vision issues that require high-contrast mode do not encounter bugs when using Gutenberg.

                                                                            Components

                                                                            Gutenberg is built using JavaScript components that are published on NPM and these components can be re-used by third-party blocks. This presents the potential for raising the bar for accessibility across the ecosystem; when improvements are made to accessibility in Gutenberg, third-party blocks using our large list of components get these improvements without needing to update their code. This is a way to scale accessibility thinking beyond what can be controlled in core.

                                                                            These components not only reduce the overhead of having to replicate UI controls and solutions, but also ensure consistency. Consistency is important so that learned behaviours can be transferred and interactions work as expected. Many of these components have built-in accessibility mechanisms, from things like containing focus within dropdown menus or modals, arrow navigation of menu items, to supporting and automatically assigning aria properties when possible. In combination with guidelines and tests, it can help ensure the editor and its extensions remain accessible to users beyond what core offers.

                                                                            Helping the User Create Accessible Content

                                                                            The editor also introduces helpful messages to the end user when using color combinations that might have contrast issues (it also takes font sizes into account for readability measurement) or when adding heading elements in the wrong order (like an h4 following an h2, for example). This is also a new addition that has the potential of both helping users learn and produce accessible content for their viewers, expanding WordPress’s commitment to web standards. These tools are also available for reuse by third-party developers in their own blocks.

                                                                            Furthermore, the controlled nature of blocks means that the final HTML generated can remain semantic and accessible for viewers.

                                                                            Autoformatting

                                                                            To speed up the process of content creation, there are quick formatting shortcuts that can be used when starting new lines. For example, using an asterisk followed by a space would automatically create a list block while using “##” would create a heading block.

                                                                            Audible Messages

                                                                            Included in the WordPress/a11y npm package is a speak function that allows developers to announce changes in the UI for users with visual impairments. Adding speech commands to a JavaScript-heavy application like Gutenberg ensures users with visual impairments have changes in the UI announced to them. Our speech utilities include the ability to specify how assertive the speech should be, so users are alerted to important UI changes immediately. (Example: sidebar settings change)

                                                                            Aria properties are also used throughout the application to inform about the purposes and meaning of controls and actions. This is an ongoing process that has benefited tremendously from the help of people like @afercia with a lot of experience in testing with different screenreaders and their intricacies (JAWS and NVDA, MacOS VoiceOver). It’s also a good place to lend a hand if you are familiar with them.

                                                                            Automated End-to-End Tests

                                                                            We have the ability to run and automate a full editor session in a browser. Using this, we can test a sequence of operations with the keyboard and validate the results. This will allow the editor to continue to improve while making sure things remain accessible and don’t regress interaction-wise. As an example: we test Block Navigation entirely with the keyboard and no mouse controls to ensure it is fully usable by keyboard users. This hasn’t been a well communicated capability, but it’s a great area for contributors to get involved with.

                                                                            Speaking of such tests, this is a fully automated test that replicates the “demo” post using keyboard commands:

                                                                            This is an automated test. It’d be great to see more of these tests covering a wide range of interactions and real use cases

                                                                            Current Issues and Improvements

                                                                            The above is a partial picture of what is currently in place. There is still work to do, and I’m confident we’ll be able to get there together. The following are some of the pending bug fixes and ongoing improvements on multiple fronts, many of which are landing in the next releases:

                                                                            There’s also work to be done in better exposing many of these tools to end-users, specially around non-obvious keyboard navigation commands.

                                                                            Huge thanks to everyone that has tested and contributed issues related to accessibility. It helps tremendously.

                                                                            All in all, there is a significant volume of accessibility-specific tools and functionalities included in the plugin that already surpass comparable capabilities in the Classic Editor. This was the result of the work of multiple people’s collaboration that I hope continues to evolve and improve. It hasn’t always been easy among the product challenges and the new technologies involved and we need to collaborate better — communication is something that we need to always nurture and foster.

                                                                            — Thanks to @lonelyvegan for collaborating on this post and the ongoing work.


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                                                                            #####EOF##### O eterno valor da privacidade (Bruce Schneier) | A música de Hudson Lacerda

                                                                            O eterno valor da privacidade (Bruce Schneier)

                                                                            “Se você não está fazendo nada de errado, o que tem a esconder?” Bruce Schneier retruca: “Privacidade não tem a ver com esconder algo errado.”

                                                                            Autor: Bruce Schneier
                                                                            Publicado inicialmente em Wired
                                                                            18 de maio de 2006
                                                                            Tradução: Hudson Lacerda (20 de agosto de 2015)
                                                                            Original: https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2006/05/the_eternal_value_of.html

                                                                            Danish translation | French translation [#1] | French translation [#2] | German translation | Italian translation | Japanese translation | Spanish translation

                                                                            A réplica mais comum contra quem defende a privacidade — apresentada por aqueles que são a favor de checagem de documentos, câmeras, bases de dados, mineração de dados e outras medidas de segurança por atacado — é esta linha: “Se você não está fazendo nada de errado, o que você tem a esconder?”

                                                                            Algumas respostas inteligentes: “Se não estou fazendo nada de errado, então você não tem motivo para me vigiar.” “Porque o governo define o que é errado, e vive mudando a definição.” “Porque você pode fazer algo de errado com minha informação.” Meu problema com tiradas como essas — por mais corretas que sejam — é que elas aceitam a premissa de que privacidade tem a ver com esconder algo errado. Não tem. A privacidade é um direito inerentemente humano e um pré-requisito para a manutenção da condição humana com dignidade e respeito.

                                                                            Dois provérbios expressam melhor a idéia: Quis custodiet custodes ipsos? (“Quem vigia os vigilantes?”) e “Poder absoluto corrompe absolutamente.”

                                                                            O Cardeal Richelieu compreendia o valor da vigilância, quando disse sua famosa frase: “Se me derem seis linhas escritas pela mão do homem mais honesto, acharei nelas algo que o leve ao cadafalso.” Vigie uma pessoa por tempo suficiente, e você encontrará alguma coisa para prendê-la — ou ao menos chantageá-la. A privacidade é importante porque, sem ela, haverá abuso da informação obtida por vigilância: para espiar, para vender a informação a marqueteiros e para espionar inimigos políticos — quaisquer que sejam eles no momento.

                                                                            A privacidade nos protege de abusos por aqueles que estão no poder, mesmo que não estejamos fazendo nada de errado no momento da vigilância.

                                                                            Não estamos fazendo nada de errado quando fazemos amor ou vamos ao banheiro. Não estamos deliberadamente ocultando nada quando procuramos lugares privados para refletir ou conversar. Mantemos diários secretos, cantamos na privacidade do chuveiro e escrevemos cartas a amores secretos e depois as queimamos. A privacidade é uma necessidade humana básica.

                                                                            Um futuro em que a privacidade sofresse constante assalto era tão estranho aos autores da Constituição que nunca lhes ocorreu declarar a privacidade como um direito explícito. A privacidade era inerente à nobreza do seu ser e sua causa. É claro que ser observado em sua própria residência não era razoável. Vigiar em si era um ato tão indecoroso que era algo inconcebível entre os cavalheiros da época. Você vigiava criminosos condenados, não cidadãos livres. Você mandava em sua própria casa. Isso é intrínseco ao conceito de liberdade.

                                                                            Afinal, se nós formos observados em todos os aspectos, estaremos constantemente sob ameaça de correção, julgamento, crítica, e até do plágio de nossas caraterísticas únicas. Tornaremos-nos crianças, acorrentadas sob olhos vigilantes, constantemente amedrontadas de que — seja agora ou num futuro incerto — as pegadas que deixamos atrás de nós retornem para nos envolver, por qualquer autoridade que aponte nossos atos então privados e inocentes. Perderemos nossa individualidade, porque tudo o que fazemos é observável e registrável.

                                                                            Quantos de nós já não paramos durante uma conversa, nos últimos quatro anos e meio, percebendo subitamente que poderíamos estar sendo bisbilhotados? Provavelmente foi uma conversa ao telefone, mas pode ter sido um e-mail ou uma troca de mensagens instantâneas ou uma conversa em praça pública. Talvez o assunto fosse terrorismo, ou política, ou o Islã. Paramos subitamente, momentariamente temerosos de que nossas palavras possam ser interpretadas fora de contexto, então rimos de nossa paranóia e continuamos. Mas nossa expressão já mudou, e nossas palavras são sutilmente alteradas.

                                                                            Essa é a perda de liberdade que encaramos quando nossa privacidade nos é tomada. Essa é a vida na antiga Alemanha Oriental, ou a vida no Iraque de Saddam Hussein. E é o nosso futuro, na medida em que permitirmos um olho permanentemente intrusivo voltado para nossas vidas pessoais, privadas.

                                                                            Muitas pessoas caracterizam erroneamente o debate como “segurança versus privacidade”. A escolha real é liberdade versus controle. Tirania é tirania, não importa se ela surge sob ameaça de ataque físico estrangeiro ou sob escrutínio constante de uma autoridade doméstica. Liberdade requer segurança sem intrusão, segurança somada a privacidade. Vigilância policial generalizada é a definição exata de um estado policial. E é por isso que devemos defender a privacidade, mesmo quando não temos nada a esconder.

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                                                                            17. My blog is located in a folder, and resolves to http://example.com/blog. How do I add the blog?
                                                                            18. Can I adjust the size of photos uploaded from the app?
                                                                            19. I can save posts to local drafts but can’t figure out how to publish to the blog — what do I need to do?
                                                                            20. How do I delete a blog?
                                                                            21. I get an “XML-RPC Service are disabled on your blog”. How I can enable them on my blog?
                                                                            22. My Host Blocks XML-RPC Access! How do I fix that?
                                                                            23. Can I use SSL to encrypt the App communication?
                                                                            24. I’m in China and I can’t login, I get an SSL error. What do I need to do?
                                                                            25. How to set up Stats via Jetpack?
                                                                            26. I can’t connect to my self-hosted site, what do I do?
                                                                            27. I get the error “Couldn’t Sync — Sorry, you cannot edit posts site.”
                                                                            28. How do I send in debug logs from the app?

                                                                            WordPress for Android

                                                                            1. How do I connect my site?
                                                                            2. What if I don’t have a site, or don’t remember my password?
                                                                            3. What is the Reader?
                                                                            4. How can I manage my site?
                                                                            5. How do I make a new Post?
                                                                            6. How do I make a new Page?
                                                                            7. Can I make my text fancy?
                                                                            8. How can I add an image?
                                                                            9. Where are the rest of the post options?
                                                                            10. Which version of WordPress does the App work with?
                                                                            11. Which Android devices will this work with?
                                                                            12. How do I enable XML-RPC access to my site?
                                                                            13. Can’t add my site to the app. What do I do?
                                                                            14. My Host Blocks XML-RPC Access! How do I fix that?
                                                                            15. Can I reduce mobile data usage when uploading pictures from the app?
                                                                            16. Can I use stats with a self-hosted site?
                                                                            17. Adding a site is taking a long time or times out. How do I fix that?
                                                                            18. Why do I get a “connection refused” error when on the stats tab?
                                                                            19. Can I use SSL to encrypt the App communication?

                                                                            WordPress.com Desktop App

                                                                            1. What is the WordPress.com Desktop app?
                                                                            2. Can I use it to edit my self-hosted WordPress website, or is it only for WordPress.com?
                                                                            3. How do I install this app?
                                                                            4. Mac OS X: Can I turn off the dock notification badge?
                                                                            5. I would like to report a bug. Where can I do that?
                                                                            6. Is the WordPress.com Desktop app open source?
                                                                            7. How do I uninstall the app?
                                                                            8. That answers all my questions! What’s next?

                                                                            WordPress.com Lightroom Plugin

                                                                            1. How do I install the Lightroom plugin?
                                                                            2. How do I export to my site?
                                                                            3. How do I connect my site?
                                                                            4. Can I use it on my self-hosted WordPress website?

                                                                            WordPress.com Add-on for Google Docs

                                                                            1. What is the WordPress.com Add-on for Google Docs?
                                                                            2. Can I use it to edit my self-hosted WordPress website, or is it only for WordPress.com?
                                                                            3. How do I install the Google Docs Add-on?
                                                                            4. How do I publish my draft?
                                                                            5. How do I uninstall the add-on?
                                                                            6. How can I choose which Google account the add-on gets added to?
                                                                            7. When I try to add my WordPress.org site I get an error saying “Someone may be trying to trick you into giving them access to your site.”

                                                                            WordPress for iOS

                                                                            Getting Started

                                                                            1. How do I connect my site?
                                                                              To access a site hosted with WordPress.com, log in with your WordPress.com credentials.

                                                                              To access a blog that is self-hosted, select “Add Self-Hosted Site,” then enter the username, password, and URL associated with that blog. (If your blog uses the Jetpack plugin, you can log in on the main screen with the WordPress.com username and password you used to set up Jetpack.) You can add additional blogs to your app at any time by selecting the “My Sites” icon and tapping the “+” icon in the top right. Each of these blogs can be managed independently through the app.
                                                                            2. What if I don’t have a site, or don’t remember my password?
                                                                              You can recover your WordPress.com password using the link just below the “Sign In” button, or register a new WordPress.com account by using the “Create Account” link at the bottom of the screen. If you don’t see the links, try hiding your keyboard.
                                                                            3. What is the Reader?
                                                                              In addition to access to your blog, you will see the WordPress.com Reader through the app. Your Reader displays all the posts from all the blogs you follow in the order they were published, with the most recent posts appearing at the top. You’ll see an excerpt and featured images from each one, and can tap to read the full post.
                                                                              iOS-iPad-Portrait-Reader
                                                                              You can also add blogs to your Reader, search and sort by tags, and much more! Select the ios-reader-icon icon in the bottom navigation bar to manage your Reader.
                                                                            4. How can I manage my site?
                                                                              Select the “My Sites” icon, and choose the site you are ready to manage to open your iOS Dashboard for that site. From here you can add or edit blog posts, pages, and comments. You also have Admin access for any sites where you are an Admin, and can view stats (for Jetpack and WordPress.com sites), edit general site settings, or access the Admin panel in a browser window.
                                                                            5. How do I make a new post?
                                                                              You can post at any time by selecting the ios-editor-icon icon in the bottom navigation bar. This will create a post on the last selected site; change which site you’re publishing to by selecting a site from the drop-down menu in top navigation bar. You can also create a post by selecting “Blog Posts” from your site’s iOS Dashboard, then tapping “+” icon in the upper right corner. Edit any post by selecting it from the “Blog Posts” screen.
                                                                            6. How do I make a new page?
                                                                              You can create a page by selecting “Pages” from your site’s iOS Dashboard, then tapping the “+” icon in the upper right corner. You can edit any page by selecting it from the “Pages” screen.
                                                                            7. Can I make my text fancy?
                                                                              While creating a post or page, you can add rich text inline using the buttons just above the keyboard. The default styles include bold, italics, strikethrough, hyperlink, unordered and ordered list, and blockquote. You can also toggle to the raw HTML if you’d like to add more robust styles in the code.
                                                                              iOS-iPad-rich-text
                                                                            8. How can I add an image?
                                                                              To add an image, tap the icon-add-media icon just above the keyboard. The app may ask you whether you want to allow it to have access to your photos — click “OK”. You can upload images or video, or add media from your site’s media library.
                                                                              style toolbar
                                                                            9. How do I edit image meta data?
                                                                              Once an image has fully uploaded, tap the image to bring up the “edit” overlay. Tap the image again to bring up the image details. You can edit the image’s title, caption, alt text, alignment, like, or size.
                                                                              edit image overlay
                                                                              edit image details
                                                                            10. Where are the rest of the post options?
                                                                              You can access additional post options like Save Draft, Categories, Featured Image, and more by tapping the options icon at the top right of the post screen. The options button looks like a little cog:
                                                                              style toolbar
                                                                            11. Which version of WordPress does the app work with?
                                                                              We make sure the app works with the current and two previous versions of WordPress. Earlier versions are not supported, but most features may still work.
                                                                            12. Which devices will this work with?
                                                                              The app works with any device that is running iOS version 10 or greater.
                                                                            13. When I try to add a self-hosted site, I get an “Unable to read the WordPress site on that URL” error message. What do I do?
                                                                              1. Ensure that you’ve typed in the URL correctly.
                                                                              2. If it’s correct, make sure XML-RPC services are enabled on the site.
                                                                              3. Verify that xmlrpc.php is functioning properly:
                                                                                1. Locate your RSD meta tag by viewing-source on your site. It will look similar to this:
                                                                                2. Next, follow the link, http://example.com/xmlrpc.php?rsd, and make sure it resolved to an XML file. Locate the WordPress API item: http://example.com/xmlrpc.php.
                                                                                3. Lastly, load that apiLink value into your browser. If everything is setup correctly, you should see this message: “XML-RPC server accepts POST requests only.”
                                                                              4. Go to the W3C Markup Validator and type in the URL of your WordPress site. If you get a response such as “… one or more bytes that I cannot interpret as UTF-8,” that is most likely what is causing the app to have trouble with your site.
                                                                              5. Switch your site to the default theme, deactivate any plugins, and try again, to help pin down where the problem is. If everything works, enable your theme and try again. If everything still works, reactivate each plugin one at a time reconnecting each time, until you find the one that is causing the breakage.
                                                                              6. Turn on the Debug Mode to enable the extended log format, and check the log file.
                                                                            14. I get a “Blog returned invalid data” error message. What do I do?
                                                                              1. A common issue that can cause errors is invalid characters. The easiest way to check is to go to the W3C Markup Validator and type in the URL of your WordPress site. If you get a response like “… one or more bytes that I cannot interpret as UTF-8,” that is most likely causing the app to have trouble with your site.
                                                                              2. Switch your site to the default theme, deactivate any plugins, and try again, to help pin down where the problem is. If everything works, enable your theme and try again. If everything still works, reactivate each plugin one at a time reconnecting each time, until you find the one that is causing the breakage.
                                                                            15. I get a “Precondition Failed” or “Forbidden” error message when I try to log in. What do I need to do?
                                                                              If you receive a “Precondition Failed” that is most likely a mod_Security issue discussed in this WordPress Support Forum discussion.Check with your hosting provider or system administrator to see if permissions or other issues are causing the error.
                                                                            16. I can’t upload photos/videos — I get a “Failed” error message. What do I need to do?
                                                                              If you’re running WordPress 2.9.2 or later please be sure to add the following lines to your root .htaccess file:php_value memory_limit 128M
                                                                              php_value upload_max_filesize 128M
                                                                              php_value post_max_size 128M
                                                                              php_value max_execution_time 120                                                                               (Additional info here.)
                                                                            17. My blog is located in a folder, and resolves to http://example.com/blog. How do I add the blog?
                                                                              Type in the full URL when adding the blog, in this case, example.com/blog.
                                                                            18. Can I adjust the size of photos uploaded from the app?
                                                                              You can choose whether to have photos resized for faster uploading and to save space on your site. On the “Me” screen, tap “App Settings” and adjust the “Max Image Upload Size” slider to set the maximum height and width for uploaded photos.
                                                                            19. I can save posts to local drafts but can’t figure out how to publish to the blog — what do I need to do?
                                                                              When you are ready to publish, change the status of the post (from the Settings screen) to “Published,” and then tap “Save.”
                                                                            20. How do I delete a blog?
                                                                              1. Select the “My Sites” icon in the bottom navigation bar
                                                                              2. For WordPress.com sites, tap “Edit” in top left of the screen and use the toggle switch on the right to show or hide the site.
                                                                              3. For self-hosted sites, select the site and go to “Settings.” Select “Remove Site” to remove the site from the app.
                                                                            21. I get an “XML-RPC Service are disabled on your blog”. How I can enable them on my blog?
                                                                              Note: As of WordPress 3.5, XML-RPC is enabled by default. The following settings only apply to 3.4 or lower.

                                                                              1. Go to your blog and log in (/wp-admin).
                                                                              2. In the sidebar, open Settings and then select Writing.
                                                                              3. Under Remote Publishing, check the XML-RPC protocol checkbox.
                                                                              4. Click Save Changes at the bottom of the page.
                                                                            22. My Host Blocks XML-RPC Access! How do I fix that?
                                                                              1. Rename your xmlrpc.php file to something different, but only change it after the ‘xmlrpc’. Ex: xmlrpc_wp.php.
                                                                              2. Install this plugin.
                                                                              3. Read the installation instructions and activate the plugin.
                                                                              4. Remove your blog from the app and re-add.
                                                                            23. Can I use SSL to encrypt the app communication?
                                                                              Yes. On WordPress.com sites, all communication (done over XML-RPC) is by default going to use an encrypted connection via SSL. For self-hosted WordPress sites with SSL enabled, WordPress 2.6.1 or later supports pointing the RSD information at the “https” version of xmlrpc.php, which creates an encrypted communication link with the app.
                                                                            24. I’m in China and I can’t log in — I get an SSL error. What do I need to do?
                                                                              The app tried to connect to your site using a secure connection (https://), but apparently WordPress.com is being blocked in China over https:// connections. You can add the site following the steps below:

                                                                              1. Tap the “Add Sites” button.
                                                                              2. Tap on “Add self-hosted WordPress site.”
                                                                              3. Insert the URL of your site, with an added ending: http://your-blog-name.wordpress.com/xmlrpc.php
                                                                              4. Insert your credentials and tap “Save.”
                                                                            25. How do I set up Stats via Jetpack?
                                                                              Jetpack is a plugin that connects to WordPress.com and enables awesome features like stats, powered by the WordPress.com cloud infrastructure. To view your self-hosted site’s stats:

                                                                              1. Install the Jetpack plugin on your site. To install, go to the Plugins > Add New in your dashboard, search for Jetpack, and click “Install Now.”
                                                                              2. Connect the plugin to a WordPress.com account. In the Jetpack tab in your dashboard, click the “Connect to WordPress.com” button and follow the directions.
                                                                              3. In the app, enter the credentials to the WordPress.com account connected to the Jetpack plugin. You can do this when prompted on the site’s Stats screen, or by logging in to that WordPress.com account in the app.
                                                                            26. I can’t connect to my self-hosted site. What do I do?
                                                                              If this guide to help you make the XMLRPC endpoint accessible didn’t help, you may be running a plugin that is blocking access.We have a running list of WordPress plugins that can break your site here: http://ios.forums.wordpress.org/topic/app-blocking-plugin-list?replies=1#post-5985. If you’re running any of these plugins, please disable them to see if that fixes the problem. If your plugin is not on the list but does make your site unreachable, please let us know and we’ll add it. Feel free to nudge the developers of the respective plugins to fix the connectivity issues!
                                                                            27. I get the error “Couldn’t Sync — Sorry, you cannot edit posts site.”
                                                                              This typically happens for one of two reasons:

                                                                              1. You doesn’t have sufficient privileges for that site. Your user role needs to be Author, Editor, or Administrator to be able to manage content in the app.
                                                                              2. You recently changed the URL associated with your site in the app, moved your website elsewhere, or changed your CMS.

                                                                              Solution: make sure you have the sufficient privileges on the site, Author or higher. Make sure the site URL in the app is correct by going to Settings and tap your site to edit it.

                                                                            28. How do I send in debug logs from the app?
                                                                              1. Open the app.
                                                                              2. Tap the “Me” icon in the bottom navigation bar.
                                                                              3. Tap “Help & Support.”
                                                                              4. Enable “Extra Debug.”
                                                                              5. Exit the app, re-open it, and try to perform the actions causing difficulty.
                                                                              6. Go back to the Help & Support screen.
                                                                              7. Tap “Activity Logs.”
                                                                              8. Tap “Current.”
                                                                              9. Tap the share button in the top right and select “Mail.”
                                                                              10. Email the logs to the recipient of your choice.

                                                                            WordPress for Android

                                                                            1. How do I connect my site?
                                                                              To access a site hosted with WordPress.com, log in with your WordPress.com credentials.
                                                                              Android-Tablet-WPcomLogin
                                                                              To access a site that is self-hosted, tap the “Add self-hosted site” link, then enter the username, password, and URL associated with that site. If your site is connected to Jetpack, you will also need to provide your WordPress.com login information to receive your Stats information.
                                                                              Android-Tablet-SelfHostedLogin
                                                                              Add additional sites to your app at any point by selecting the Android-MySites-Icon  icon, selecting “Switch Site,” and tapping the “+” icon in the top right. Each of these sites can be managed independently through the app.
                                                                              Android-Tablet-AddSite
                                                                            2. What if I don’t have a site, or don’t remember my password?
                                                                              You can recover your WordPress.com password using the link just below the “Sign In” button, or register a new WordPress.com account by using the “Create Account” link at the bottom of the screen. If you don’t see the links, try hiding your keyboard.
                                                                              Android-Tablet-WPcomLogin
                                                                            3. What is the Reader?
                                                                              In addition to access to your blog, you will see the WordPress.com Reader through the app. Your Reader displays all the posts from all the blogs you follow in the order they were published, with the most recent posts appearing at the top. You’ll see an excerpt and featured images from each one, and can tap to read the full post. You can access the Reader by selecting the Android-Reader-Icon icon.
                                                                              Android-Tablet-Reader
                                                                              You can also add blogs to your Reader, search and sort by tags, and much more! Select the Android-Reader-SettingsIcon icon in the upper-right corner to manage your Reader.
                                                                            4. How can I manage my site?
                                                                              To manage your site, tap the Android-MySites-Icon  icon to display the Android Dashboard, where you can choose the site you are ready to manage at the top of the menu. To switch sites, click the site title displayed at the top of the list. You can add or edit posts, pages, media and comments. You can also update themes, add an image or video, view stats, or go view your site in a browser. You may need to scroll down to see all of the options.
                                                                              Android-Tablet-MySitesDashboard
                                                                            5. How do I make a new post?
                                                                              Once you tap the Android-MySites-Icon icon and select your site, select “Blog Posts” in the Android Dashboard, then tap the Android-Editor-Icon icon in the bottom-right corner. You can edit any post by selecting it from the “Blog Posts” screen.
                                                                              Android-Tablet-BlogPosts
                                                                            6. How do I make a new page?
                                                                              Once you tap the Android-MySites-Icon icon and select your site, select “Pages” in the Android Dashboard, then tap the Android-Editor-Icon icon in the bottom-right corner. You can edit any page by selecting it from the “Pages” screen.
                                                                              Android-Tablet-Pages
                                                                            7. Can I make my text fancy?
                                                                              While working in a post or page, you can do basic text editing. Tap the icons located directly above the keyboard to add styling like bold, italics, underline, strikethrough, hyperlink, blockquotes, and the ‹more/› tag.
                                                                            8. How can I add an image?
                                                                              You can add images directly from your device, or from your site’s media library. From a post or page, tap the icon. You’ll have several options, including uploading from the device, choosing existing media, and even creating a new gallery!

                                                                              The “Capture” feature activates your device’s camera, while “Select … from gallery” allows you to choose media already stored on your device. You can also select existing media from your site’s media library or create a gallery of existing media.
                                                                            9. Where are the rest of the post options?
                                                                              You can access additional post options like Save Draft, Categories, Featured Image, and more by tapping the Post Settings icon at the top right of the post screen. The Post Settings button looks like a little cog:

                                                                            10. Which version of WordPress does the App work with?
                                                                              The app works with WordPress.com and WordPress 3.6 or higher.
                                                                            11. Which Android devices will this work with?
                                                                              The app will work on all phones running Android version 4.1 (Jelly Bean) or higher.
                                                                            12. How do I enable XML-RPC access to my site?
                                                                              Note: As of WordPress 3.5, you no longer need to enable XML-RPC access. While logged into your WordPress dashboard, select “Writing” under the “Settings” tab on the left. Scroll down to “Remote Publishing,” then check the box next to XML-RPC’ and save your changes.
                                                                            13. I can’t add my site to the app. What do I do?
                                                                              1. Ensure that you’ve typed in the URL correctly.
                                                                              2. If it’s correct, make sure XML-RPC services are enabled on the blog.
                                                                              3. Verify that xmlrpc.php is functioning properly:
                                                                                1. Locate your RSD meta tag by viewing-source on your site. It will look similar to this:
                                                                                2. Next, follow the link, http://example.com/xmlrpc.php?rsd, and make sure it resolved to an XML file. Locate the WordPress API item: http://example.com/xmlrpc.php.
                                                                                3. Load that apiLink value into your browser. If everything is set up correctly, you should see this message: “XML-RPC server accepts POST requests only.”
                                                                              4. Go to the W3C Markup Validator and type in the URL of your WordPress site. If you get a response like “… one or more bytes that I cannot interpret as UTF-8,” that is most likely what is causing the app to have trouble with your site.
                                                                              5. Switch your site to the default theme, deactivate any plugins, and try again, to help pin down where the problem is. If everything works, enable your theme and try again. If everything still works, reactivate each plugin one at a time reconnecting each time, until you find the one that is causing the breakage.
                                                                              6. Turn on Debug Mode to enable the extended log format, and check the log file.
                                                                            14. My Host Blocks XML-RPC Access! How do I fix that?
                                                                              1. Rename your xmlrpc.php file to something different, but only change the part after the ‘xmlrpc’. E.g.: xmlrpc_wp.php.
                                                                              2. Install this plugin.
                                                                              3. Read the installation instructions and activate the plugin .
                                                                              4. Remove your site from the app and re-add it.
                                                                            15. Can I reduce mobile data usage when uploading pictures from the app?
                                                                              From your site’s dashboard in the app, select “Settings,” then enable the “Optimize Images” setting. When this setting is ON, and you’re on a mobile data connection, pictures will be resized to 3000px wide before uploading.
                                                                            16. Can I view stats from a self-hosted site?
                                                                              Yes! If you install Jetpack, you can enable stats for your self-hosted site. After installing the plugin, tap the “Stats” button in the app and enter your new WordPress.com login when prompted.
                                                                            17. Adding a site is taking a long time or times out. How do I fix that?
                                                                              Adding a site is dependent on the speed of your Internet connection, so if you have a very weak signal or a slow EDGE connection, try again when you are in 3G/4G or Wi-Fi mode.
                                                                            18. Why do I get a “connection refused” error when on the stats tab?
                                                                              If you’ve installed an ad blocker app such as AdFree Android, it will block your connection to stats.wordpress.com. You will need to edit the /system/etc/hosts file on your device and remove all entries that have stats.wordpress.com to get it working again.
                                                                            19. Can I use SSL to encrypt the App communication?
                                                                              Yes. On WordPress.com sites, all communication (done over XML-RPC) is by default going to use an encrypted connection via SSL. For self-hosted WordPress sites with SSL enabled, WordPress 2.6.1 or later supports pointing the RSD information at the “https” version of xmlrpc.php, which creates an encrypted communication link with the app.

                                                                            WordPress.com Desktop app

                                                                            1. What is the WordPress.com Desktop app?

                                                                              The WordPress.com desktop app puts WordPress.com in your dock or taskbar. Use it to focus on your content and design with no other browser tabs to distract you, or to keep your sites readily accessible. The app is powered by the same technology that runs WordPress.com.

                                                                            2. Can I use it to edit my self-hosted WordPress website, or is it only for WordPress.com?

                                                                              To edit your self-hosted WordPress (.org) website, you need to install the Jetpack plugin, which you can do with these instructions.

                                                                              Once Jetpack is installed and connected to a WordPress.com account, make sure the Jetpack Manage module is enabled.

                                                                              Now you can sign in to the app using the WordPress.com account Jetpack is connected to, and you can find your self-hosted site under the “My Sites” section.

                                                                            3. How do I install this app?

                                                                              On a Mac:
                                                                              • Download the app from the homepage.
                                                                              • Open the downloaded DMG file. You will see a WordPress.com icon, and an Applications folder shortcut on the right.
                                                                              • Drag the WordPress.com icon into the Applications folder.
                                                                              • Open the Applications folder, and open the WordPress app.
                                                                              • If you’d like to keep the app in your dock, right-click the app icon in the dock as the app is running, and select Options → Keep in Dock.
                                                                              On Windows:
                                                                              • Download the app installer from the homepage.
                                                                              • Open the installer, and follow the instructions.
                                                                              • Once the app is installed, you can double-click the app icon on your desktop.
                                                                              • If you’d like your app to be in your taskbar, you can drag the icon from the desktop to your taskbar.
                                                                              On Linux:
                                                                              • Download the app for your flavor of Linux on the homepage.
                                                                              • Open the downloaded file, and follow the instructions.

                                                                            4. Mac OS X: Can I turn off the dock notification badge?

                                                                              Yes. Open the app, and then open the WordPress.com → Preferences in the application menu on your desktop. Now you can uncheck Show notification badge.

                                                                            5. I would like to report a bug. Where can I do that?

                                                                              The best place to report a bug is the GitHub issues tracker for the WordPress Desktop project, but before you report a bug there, we kindly ask that you make sure the bug is specific to the app and not the WordPress.com website itself. If it’s a bug on the WordPress.com website, please report it in the GitHub issues tracker for that.

                                                                            6. Is the WordPress.com app open source?

                                                                              Yes. The WordPress desktop app is licensed under GNU General Public License v2 (or later).

                                                                            7. How do I uninstall the app?

                                                                              On Windows, you can uninstall using the system “Add or Remove Software.”

                                                                              On Mac OS X, you can uninstall by moving WordPress.com app from Applications to the Trash. To remove all settings you can use this WordPress.com Uninstall script for Mac.

                                                                            8. That answers all my questions! What’s next?

                                                                            WordPress.com Lightroom Plugin

                                                                            1. How do I install the Lightroom plugin?

                                                                              • Download the plugin.
                                                                              • Unzip the plugin file.
                                                                              • From Lightroom, open the plugin manager (File menu, then Plugin manager).
                                                                              • Click add in the bottom left corner of the plugin manager .plugin_manager
                                                                              • Navigate to where the plugin was unzipped and select the plugin.
                                                                              • The plugin is now installed.

                                                                            2. How do I export to my site?

                                                                              • Select your photos in Lightroom.
                                                                              • Click the export button .stage2
                                                                              • Ensure that WordPress.com is selected from the export dialog.stage3
                                                                              • Ensure your site has been connected (see below).
                                                                              • Ensure your site is selected from the dropdown list.stage4
                                                                              • Click export.

                                                                            3. How do I connect my site?

                                                                              The first time you use the plugin (see ‘how do I export to my site,’ above) you will need to authorize the connection to your account.

                                                                              • Click the login button.login
                                                                              • Approve the connection in your browser.

                                                                              You will be taken back to Lightroom once approved.

                                                                            4. Can I use it on my self-hosted WordPress website?

                                                                              To upload to your self-hosted WordPress (.org) website, you need to install the Jetpack plugin, which you can do by following the instructions here.

                                                                              Once Jetpack is installed and connected to a WordPress.com account, make sure the Jetpack Manage module is enabled.

                                                                            WordPress.com Add-on for Google Docs

                                                                            1. What is the WordPress.com Add-on for Google Docs?

                                                                              Compose a document in Google Docs and send it directly to any WordPress.com or Jetpack powered WordPress.org site as a draft post.

                                                                              Instead of copying and pasting from Google Docs to WordPress and losing your images and formatting in the process, this add-on makes it easy to compose in Google Docs and publish to WordPress with formatting intact and images uploaded properly.

                                                                              After installing the add-on, you’ll be able to open WordPress.com for Google Docs in any Google Doc and connect your sites.

                                                                            2. Can I use the add-on to edit my self-hosted WordPress website, or is it only for WordPress.com?

                                                                              To edit your self-hosted WordPress (.org) website, you need to install the Jetpack plugin, which you can do by following the instructions here.

                                                                              Once Jetpack is installed and connected to a WordPress.com account, make sure the Jetpack Manage module is enabled.

                                                                              Now you can sign in to the app using the WordPress.com account Jetpack is connected to, and you can find your self-hosted site under the “My Sites” section.

                                                                            3. How do I install the Google Docs Add-on?

                                                                              1. Go to the add-on page in Google’s webstore.
                                                                              2. Click the blue + button to add it to your account.
                                                                              3. You will be taken to a new Google document. Click the “Add-ons” menu, then “WordPress.com for Google Docs”, then “Open.”
                                                                              4. The sidebar will open, and you can click the “Authorize” button to begin adding sites.

                                                                            4. How do I publish my draft?

                                                                              To publish a draft, make sure that you have clicked the “Save Draft” button. A preview link will show up under the button. Click that link to preview the post on your site.

                                                                              Once you have verified that the post is displayed correctly in your theme, click the “Edit” link on your site to go to the WordPress editor. There, you will be able to add categories, tags, and publish.

                                                                            5. How do I uninstall the add-on?

                                                                              • Inside Google Docs, choose the Add-ons menu, then “Manage Add-ons…”
                                                                              • The add-on window will open. Click the “Manage” button next to WordPress.com for Google Docs, then “Remove.”

                                                                            6. How can I choose which Google account the add-on gets added to?

                                                                              If you have multiple Google accounts, you can make sure that the add-on is added to the correct account by following these steps:

                                                                              • Go to Google Docs.
                                                                              • In the upper-right corner, make sure that you have the correct account selected.
                                                                              • Open an existing document or create a new one.
                                                                              • Go to the “Add-ons” menu, choose “Get add-ons…” and search for “Automattic.”
                                                                              • Click the blue + button to add it to your account.

                                                                            7. When I try to add my WordPress.org site I get an error saying “Someone may be trying to trick you into giving them access to your site.”

                                                                              This could be caused by one of several issues. Try this to figure out what the issue is and resolve it:

                                                                              • Make sure you are running the latest version of the Jetpack plugin.
                                                                              • Temporarily disable all plugins except for Jetpack and try again. If that works you can re-enable the plugins once you are connected.
                                                                              • If you are using Cloudflare, try temporarily disabling it while you connect your site. Once your site is connected to the add-on, you can re-enable it.
                                                                              • If your site uses HTTPS, your hosting company may be “double-encoding” some of the values being passed. To test this, go to http://your-site/?%40 (change your-site to the URL of your WordPress.org site). If your browser changes the URL to https://your-site/?%2540 (note that ?%40 changed to ?%2540) you need to contact your hosting company.
                                                                              • If you are still having issues, please visit Jetpack Support.
                                                                            #####EOF##### Status-6 – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                            Tag: Status-6

                                                                            Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part 2 – 9M730?, Status-6, Klavesin-2R)

                                                                            Michael Kofman6 Comments

                                                                            Putin’s March 1st speech unveiled a host of new weapons currently under development. Some were previously known, or had been rumored to exist, but with sparse information about progress, while others were being tracked by those who follow military developments in Russia. Unfortunately, much of the media dismissed these announcements as a bluff intended for the consumption of domestic audiences ahead of the Presidential election, or selection, depending on how you view it. While Vladimir Putin may have exaggerated how far along these ‘fantastical’ weapons are, claiming successful tests, these are not figments of his imagination.

                                                                            He wasn’t bluffing – these weapons may all arrive sometime in the 2020s. Some we will meet in the early 2020s, others perhaps later that decade, as William Gibson liked to say “the future is already here, it’s just not evenly distributed.” In Part 1 I covered Kinzhal, R-28 Sarmat, and 4202, while in this section I plan to look at some of the even more interesting systems, including third strike weapons like Status-6, Klavesin-2R deep diving vehicle, and the nuclear powered cruise missile that raised so many eyebrows.

                                                                            The Nuclear Posture Review confirms many of these projects, stating, “Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.” That references 4202, R-28 Sarmat, and of course the now famous Status-6. What about the nuclear powered cruise missile? Former SecDef Ash Carter had a rather cryptic line in an article back in 2017, that perhaps we should look back upon and reflect, “Russia is investing in new ballistic missile submarines, heavy bombers, and the development of a new ICBM. These investments by themselves would not be novel, even if they necessitate continued, strong American deterrence. But they are also paired with novel concepts for how nuclear weapons could be used and some entirely new and even bizarre types of nuclear weapons systems…” Now let’s fast forward to March 1, 2018, and Putin’s presentation begins to make a bit more sense.

                                                                            As I will discuss in some detail below, most of these weapons are the stuff of science fiction from the 1950s and 1960s, back when science fiction writing was quite brilliant, and the Atomic age was in full swing. The U.S. and USSR considered, designed, and tested, all sorts of nuclear weapon concepts during the early 1950s and 1960s. Some ideas were ahead of the technology of their time, others were feasible but considered too crazy, provocative, or unnecessary. Part of what drove the resurrection of these concepts is Moscow’s desire to hedge against an uncertain future, and technology has changed. The feeling is not uncommon, since I took that notion literally from the language of our 2018 NPR, which also justifies its proposals in the need to ‘hedge against an uncertain future.’

                                                                            Image result for 1950s asimov

                                                                            Of course with such broad language once can advocate for all sorts of nuclear weapon programs, and sure enough, various industries in Russia seem to have sold the government on boutique weapons that will plus up Russia’s current deterrent. Moscow has thought to capitalize on some its comparative strengths, including nuclear energy technology, missile technology, and submarine designs, to develop what they believe will prove hedging weapons. These are in part in response to U.S. technological superiority in long range conventional fires, aerospace power, sustained U.S. investment in missile defense, and the desire to develop prompt global strike.

                                                                            Rumors about the coming missile defense review also suggest that it will be quite provocative, validating Russian concerns that missile defense is no longer just about North Korea and Iran, but instead aimed at Russian and Chinese capabilities as a matter of policy. Thus we embark on mutually assured spending.

                                                                            I don’t believe that Russia either needs these weapons to ensure the viability of its deterrent, or that their acquisition fundamentally changes anything in the military balance with the U.S. I’m equally skeptical that they offer any particular coercive effect, though I’m traditionally skeptical of the proposition that there is any efficacy to be found in nuclear powers using nuclear weapons for coercion. The history and theory just isn’t there to support that very much. What it does tell me is that Russia won’t be confident in its conventional capabilities for years to come, or ever, and continues to spend heavily on a nuclear offset, making the conventional and nuclear approaches to deterrence complementary – as in my mind they should be. That said, let’s get to the weapons.

                                                                            Novator’s newest creation – 9M730 (designation is a working theory until a better name comes)

                                                                            9m730 v2.JPG

                                                                            The nuclear powered missile with no name is probably designated 9M730, following after 9M728 (R-500) and 9M729 (SSC-8 INF violator). This is Ramm’s hypothesis based on the fact there is a 9M730 project out there and we know what the other cruise missiles in this series are. Given there is no name, for now 9M730 will do, and I suspect it will ultimately turn out that this is the project’s designation. Since Raduga makes air launched cruise missiles (Kh) it makes sense that this project would be one of Novator’s children, and Novator is quite good at what they do when it comes to cruise missiles. The idea behind the missile is to have special compartments where air is heated by a nuclear reactor to several thousand degrees, then thrust is created by ejecting the superheated air. Judging from the video shown there are four rear vents creating thrust for the missile.

                                                                            9m730.JPG

                                                                            Putin’s statement that it already passed a successful flight test in December 2017 doesn’t scan, but this empty bragging aside it seems the missile project is quite real and much further along than one would like. Additional reporting from A. Ramm’s article indicates the tests are being done in Nenoksa, Arkhangelsk firing it into the White Sea, although after talking to colleagues the images shown are from Novaya Zemlya. Testing it in the high north makes sense since it’s not the sort of thing anyone would want to test over mainland Russia, and it will likely end up being based there. Due to size and weight considerations a missile such as this would have an unshielded reactor, making it impossible for the weapon to fly without spreading radioactive particles. Furthermore, there were comments from sources familiar with the project that the missile is not being tested with a reactor, but rather an electrical power source to imitate the reactor they have constructed. A. Ramm, who has some good writing on this subject, missile testing is being supported by special Il-976 laboratory planes.

                                                                            Readers will undoubtedly recognize this concept as following in the footsteps of U.S. efforts to build a nuclear powered supersonic low altitude missile (SLAM), named project Pluto. From 1957-1964 the U.S. worked on a nuclear powered cruise missile, which would carry 16 nuclear munitions to targets in the USSR. The colossal amount of radiation it generated in flight was considered a feature at the time. However, even though a full scale reactor and engine were built, the project was canceled because the system was considered both highly problematic from an engineering standpoint and also provocative. The SLAM was nixed in 1964. Some believed it would motivate the Soviet Union to build a similar device, and all in all ballistic missiles were far less problematic. Well, it’s 2018, and while technology has clearly advanced substantially from 1964, humanity is an entirely different story.

                                                                            A nuclear powered cruise missile? Silly Russians, we would never have spent 8 years on such a reckless project.

                                                                            Project Pluto

                                                                            pluto engine

                                                                            I was skeptical as to whether this was far along, but here Pentagon came to the rescue. Pentagon officials, afraid that anyone finds out we might have some kind of ‘doomsday gap,’ let it be known that the missile in question has already gone through several flight tests in the Arctic and crashed in all of them. So we’re fine, because its not working yet… Also I think missiles typically crash and do not land, whether in testing or not, this is not a bug but a feature of missile technology. Crashing in testing is typical when working on a new missile design, particularly with a unique form of propulsion, but it was surprising to find out that Russia had already conducted several tests with a prototype.

                                                                            Image result for dr.strangelove doomsday gap

                                                                            Since the weapon has no name, I think we should consider calling it ‘prompt drunken strike,’ if anything based on the flight route shown in the video.

                                                                            Status-6 Ocean Multipurpose System

                                                                            Image result for статус-6

                                                                            Much of what is known about Status-6 appeared on 9 November 2015 during a meeting chaired by Putin on problems in the defense industry. Just as last week, the media was skeptical that this weapon was a bluff, together with the arms control community which is often doubtful when revelations are made about new nuclear weapons. Those are unhelpful confirmation biases, since both Status-6 and the 9M729 missile are turning out to be quite real. The system is now officially referenced in the NPR as a Russian strategic nuclear weapon program.

                                                                            status-6 slide.png

                                                                            The weapon as conceived will be a multipurpose nuclear powered torpedo, but the initial design is intended to destroy critical economic infrastructure along coastline. By all indications this project is well ahead of the nuclear powered cruise missile, and given the physical size of this weapon, nuclear power poses a much less daunting challenge to integrate. As conceived this will be a third strike countervalue weapon. This nuclear torpedo is meant for taking out U.S. coastal cities, and irradiating an entire area. The reason it comes 3rd is both mechanical, and in terms of function. It would take 35 minutes for ICBMs on a transpolar trajectory whereas this weapon might take days to reach the U.S. once fired, and it is not meant for counterforce targets, but instead to inflict unacceptable damage which historically was calculated as affecting the target’s GDP (people + infrastructure).

                                                                            city.JPG

                                                                            This is an innovative vengeance weapon, though I don’t believe it will have 100 mt as the warhead. Something much smaller will undoubtedly suffice to wipe out LA or San Francisco if need be and irradiate parts of the coast. The reason I mention Pacific cities is that a deep diving weapon doesn’t make as much sense coming from Russia via GIUK gap into the Atlantic, simply because of the depths and geographical choke points involved. Something to consider before people get started writing articles about the 6th Battle of the Atlantic. The Pacific on the other hand lends itself handily to deep diving autonomous weapons if they’re ‘fire and forget.’

                                                                            Does Russia truly needs this weapon to handle U.S. missile defenses? No, and it would be infinitely cheaper to just improve current strategic systems, which they’re also doing. However, need is often only loosely connected to what defense establishments procure. As I mentioned in Part 1, defense spending is at best ‘semi-rational’, representing numerous bureaucratic and domestic equities as much as actual threats and missions.

                                                                            It is also difficult to discuss Status-6 without mentioning the legacy of Andrei Sakharov’s famous T-15 torpedo, a Soviet project in 1951-1955. The design concept behind that 40 ton, 1500 mm torpedo, was as a first strike weapon, intended to deliver a large nuclear warhead to U.S. naval bases like Pearl Harbor, generating a destructive tsunami. The specialized submarine was called project 627, but back then Soviet General Staff decided that they had no need for such a system, and would be satisfied with a regular nuclear powered submarine. The technology to realize a mega nuclear torpedo was there, but T-15 was the wrong kind of crazy for its time. You can read more on the history of the T-15 from Norman Polmar’s timely piece.

                                                                            Maybe nuclear weapons are like fashion trends, they come back. Here is the old 627 with T-15 tube down the middle.

                                                                            t-15-image2.jpg

                                                                            According to the MoD slide, Status-6 can reach a depth of 1000 meters, speed up to 185 km per hour (100 knots), range up to 10,000 km, and is 1.6m in diameter. According to Putin’s statements it is excessively fast, deep diving, but also very quiet. This is nonsense, since underwater things can be fast, or they can be quiet, but they typically can’t be both. By all considerations this weapon is exceedingly loud if traveling at such speeds, and 100 knots seems somewhat an exaggeration. The video demonstrating its deployment showed project 09852 Belgorod, Russia’s most interesting submarine currently under construction, a heavily modified Oscar-II that will be the longest submarine in the world when it is completed. Belgorod should be able to carry these torpedoes internally, together with other undersea drones. The MoD slide from 2015 indicates that together with Belgorod, project 09851 Khabarovsk (another GUGI submarine laid down in 2014), will also deploy this torpedo.

                                                                            I got this from HI Sutton – don’t sue me HI.

                                                                            Pr_08952_pptSTRETCH.jpg

                                                                            Status-6, and similarly intriguing undersea weapon projects belong to Russia’s ‘other navy’ known as GUGI, or Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research. GUGI is responsible for fielding specialized submarines, oceanographic research ships, undersea drones, autonomous vehicles, sensor systems, and the like. Around mid-2000s there were some tidbits of information about an undersea drone program being tested. Then it became clear that the project involved a specialized barge, the supporting ship 20180 Zvezdochka, and GUGI’s specialized diesel submarine B-90 Sarov. For more reading on the various GUGI subs and covert underwater projects HI Sutton runs a good blog with various renderings.

                                                                            Here is what appears to be Status-6 container being loaded.

                                                                            Status-6 tube.jpg

                                                                            Based on the 2015 MoD slide, Status-6 is proceeding as a project in several phases, with the pilot system being completed by 2019, and testing 2019-2025. Although the nuclear drone probably doesn’t need much guidance, since cities don’t move around, there will need to be a command and control system built if this weapon is to have a conventional variant for wiping out carriers. I’m skeptical of the ‘carrier strike’ option shown in video during Putin’s speech, just because queuing is a perpetual problem for Russian forces, and it’s hard to see how a deep sea traveling weapon could get course correction from something above water. Hitting moving targets at sea is not so simple, especially over great distances, and with a weapon that is loudly steaming ahead in deep waters. More than likely Russia may try to deploy nuclear powered sensor or communications stations under the sea, as some of Rubin’s design projects suggest, to create the infrastructure for such a weapon. Besides the C2 infrastructure, Status-6 will still have to await the two GUGI submarines designed to carry it.

                                                                            Klavesin-2R-PM Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

                                                                            Klavesin-2M.jpg

                                                                            Klavesin is a creation of Rubin design bureau and ИПМТ ДВО РАН, Владивосток. The parameters of this underwater drone include: 6.5m length, 1m in diameter, 3700 kg weight, 50km range with a 2000 meter diving depth. This drone was also shown in the video being launched by Belgorod. The drone program is so super secret that some of the details regarding the vehicle could be found from Rubin’s public tender seeking a company to insure two of these drones for 48 million rubles. Seems they already have two of them, for Belgorod and another GUGI submarine that is already operational, BS-64 Podmoskovye.

                                                                            28379177_10159930236540462_5146440591197111008_n.jpg

                                                                            The 2R is, as one might suspect, a further evolution of the 1R variant, designed for oceanographic mapping, research, undersea photography, and probably some covert missions. Not much to add to this project except to say that it undoubtedly helps conduct undersea intelligence and reconnaissance missions for GUGI.

                                                                            fun times at GUGI

                                                                            Regarding the laser shown at the end of Putin’s talk, I’m not sure what it is yet, but looks like some kind of air/missile defense system by the module and platform. I’ve honestly not seen that weapon before and do not focus on lasers. They should show it more often.

                                                                            Laser.JPG

                                                                            Not keen on the controller. This feels like 1990s gaming.

                                                                            xbox controller.JPG

                                                                             

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                                                                            #####EOF##### NATO – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                            Tag: NATO

                                                                            WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU’RE EXPECTING ZAPAD 2017

                                                                            Michael Kofman5 Comments

                                                                            My latest article on the upcoming Zapad 2017 exercise on War on the Rocks

                                                                            Don’t be surprised if in the coming days you increasingly hear the word Zapad echoing across media outlets and the blogosphere as though it were a category five hurricane, or an apocalyptic event approaching. Zapad, meaning “West” in Russian, is the Russian military’s annual strategic exercise, scheduled to commence on Sept. 14. Such capstone training events have been held on a quadrennial rotation since 1999 between four strategic directions, including Vostok (Eastern), Tsentr (Central), and Kavkaz (Caucasus). As anticipated, Zapad 2017 will take place in the Baltic region, held jointly with Belarus, and led by forces based in Russia’s Western Military District.

                                                                            The ongoing confrontation between Russia and the United States, together with the exercise’s geographical focus, makes this a particularly significant event. Large-scale Russian exercises have always imparted a sense of foreboding, yet the reaction to Zapad 2017 is especially sensational this year. The Center for European Policy Analysis has even created a dedicated website with a countdown clock as though awaiting doomsday. Ahead of Zapad rolls a strong wave of anxiety among NATO members, senior officials, and the Russia-watcher community. Such exercises call for vigilance and caution, but panic is unwarranted.

                                                                            Ironically, much as the leaders of NATO members dislike Russia’s deployment of forces along their borders, the exercise should be treated as an opportunity. Zapad 2017 is happening whether NATO likes it or not, and Russia will keep holding this exercise every four years, just as the Soviet Union had a penchant for running major exercises in the fall. In truth, Western observers are bound to learn much from this event about Russia’s ability to deploy combat formations to the region, the current state of Russia’s armed forces, and how Moscow intends to leverage military power to shape Western decision-making in the event of a crisis. The conduct of the exercise may even help validate, or invalidate, some of the current thinking in NATO on how to deter Russia.

                                                                            Ultimately the exercise is a test of what  Russia calls  “strategic deterrence,” an integration of military, non-military, and nuclear capabilities to shape adversary decision-making from crisis to actual conflict. Although small countries are naturally anxious when large neighbors flex their muscles, in reality this entire affair is about Moscow establishing coercive credibility with Washington, and in that respect it is quite effective. Zapad is part of one long conversation on deterrence and compellence facilitated by the Russian General Staff.

                                                                            Read more on the site.

                                                                            The ABCs of Russian Military Power: A Primer for the New Administration

                                                                            Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                            My latest article in TNI summarizing key aspects of Russian military power and the balance in Europe.

                                                                            The current confrontation in U.S.-Russia relations, and increasing antagonism in the relationship, makes it difficult to separate structural changes in the European security environment from politically charged sources of conflict. Yet these changes have been profound, dating back to Russian military reforms launched in late 2008. They have serious implications for the new U.S. administration. The principal factors are Russia’s revival of the military as an instrument of national power, the unsettled war in Ukraine, and NATO’s changing posture to counter a perceived threat from Moscow’s machinations.

                                                                            Seeking an improved, or perhaps simply more stable, relationship with Russia from a “position of strength” requires understanding the new military balance in Europe, the evolution of Russia’s military capabilities, and its evolving force posture. Independent of whether the proximate causes of hostility in U.S.-Russian relations are resolved, or there is a change in the broader atmospherics of the relationship, the United States must develop a strategy and policy for dealing with Russia, grounded not in optimism but in hard military realities. The previous administration suffered from a severe rhetoric-to-strategy gap, contesting Russia politically but losing strategically.

                                                                            It would be safe to assume that distrust will continue to dominate NATO-Russia relations, and that even if interactions on the whole may improve—arguably, they cannot worsen—they may not produce concrete results in short order. A fact-based approach to the security situation in Europe should inform further changes in U.S. force structure and posture. Unfortunately, for the past two years discourse on this subject has been only marginally informed by reality, with policy advocacy and agendas driving analysis of the Russian military threat. Debate has often taken place either in a fact-free zone, or with new information overconsumed by a policy establishment long unaccustomed to dealing with Russia as a serious adversary. The United States has not been winning the geopolitical confrontation with Russia of late; nor has it come up with a vision for how to change the dynamics in this adversarial relationship.

                                                                            Like its predecessor, the new administration will have to formulate its Russia policy in the aftermath of a crisis in European security; this is an opportunity either to make fresh mistakes, or to get things right. To succeed, the administration must base its strategy not on individual capabilities that Russia has, the individual concerns of proximate NATO members, or the designs of different constituencies within the U.S. policy establishment, but on a coherent understanding of the security dynamics in Europe and Russian military power.

                                                                            Russia Has Been Busy

                                                                            The Russian military that the United States faces in 2017 is not the poorly equipped and uncoordinated force that invaded Georgia in August of 2008. This is why the magnitude and potential impact of the current crisis is far greater than that inherited by the Obama administration in 2009. Following reforms launched in October 2008, and a modernization program in 2011 valued at $670 billion, the armed forces have become one of Russia’s most reliable instruments of national power. Russia disbanded the useless mass-mobilization army of the Soviet Union, consolidated what was worthwhile, and reconstituted a much smaller, but more capable force. The overall size of Russia’s armed forces continues to increase, numbering over nine hundred thousand today, while the state armament program continues to replace aging equipment throughout the force with new or modernized variants.

                                                                            The reform process and a stable infusion of much-needed capital have restored war-fighting potential to the Russian military, though incomplete, and unevenly applied to the force. Moscow’s ability to sustain this spending is very much in question, faced with low oil prices, economic recession and Western sanctions. However, Russia has made the choice to defend defense spending and enact cuts elsewhere. Reductions will be made to the procurement program, but Moscow will maintain spending on nuclear modernization and long-range standoff weapons, trying to sustain the force at current levels In reality, loss of access to key components from Ukrainian and European defense industries created the most serious setbacks to Russian defense modernization (delays of about five to seven years in 2014).

                                                                            Russia’s defense budget steadily climbed from to a peak of 4.2 percent of GDP in 2015. Since then, it has been in relative decline, though likely to remain above 3.7 percent, well beyond the spending levels of America’s European allies. This level of expenditure is probably unsustainable for the Russian budget, inevitably forcing its leadership to choose between weapons procurement, operations and the quality of personnel. However, the inertia of the current modernization program will have lasting effects well into the 2020s.

                                                                            Bottom line, Russia can sustain this military with judicious reductions, and even if the funding base collapses, the dramatic turnaround in its armed forces is not a temporary bounce that the United States must ride out. Russia’s General Staff has been focused on drilling the force with snap readiness checks, joint exercises, large movements and annual operational-strategic exercises. From its air force to the nuclear-powered submarines of its navy, the Russian military has quickly clawed back operational readiness not seen since the 1990s.

                                                                            You can read the rest here.

                                                                            THE EXPENSIVE PRETZEL LOGIC OF DETERRING RUSSIA BY DENIAL

                                                                            Michael KofmanLeave a comment
                                                                            This article was published on War on the Rocks (June 23, 2016)

                                                                            The question of how to best deter Russia looms large over the upcoming NATO Summit hosted in Warsaw.  If this week’s news is anything to go by, the annual NATO gathering promises to be an eventful one.  Germany’s Foreign Minister Steinmeier recently ridiculed the alliance’s BALTOPS exercise as “saber rattling,” while U.S. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus defended the event.  The chief proposal for enhancing NATO deterrence on the table this year is the establishment of four multinational battalions to rotate through the Baltics, but NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Soltenberg said there was no “immediate threat against any NATO country from the East,” implying that despite being branded as a deterrent this is more about reassurance.  The past two weeks in the run up to the summit makes one wonder, what exactly are we doing here?

                                                                            In my critical essay last month, I challenged the current thinking on NATO’s deterrence problems in the East, taking on prominent advocates for deploying U.S. forces in the Baltic in the quest of strengthening deterrence.  Part of that article took aim at RAND’s wargame and similar arguments from deterrence proponents like Elbridge Colby.  The goal of that article was to take one-sided policy advocacy, rarely the stuff of good decision-making, and turn it into a more substantive discussion.  In this essay, I circle back to the problem of fixing NATO deterrence and the policy implications, with a crystallized and hopefully better distilled approach to the argument.

                                                                            When discussing NATO force structure, it is crucial to decide whether one can truly attain deterrence by denial. I argue that this is a fool’s errand.  The fear of a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic is simply the latest conventional wisdom, following on the foot heels of equally wrongheaded concerns that Russia would create a land bridge to Crimea in 2014 and 2015. In my view, improving deterrence by punishment is not just the smarter approach, but also the only feasible option NATO has available.

                                                                            So where do we go from here?  At first glance these perspectives are diametrically opposed.  However, a closer reading of deterrence proponents’ arguments reveals to me that we are largely in agreement on the basics.  Proponents of bolstering, enhancing, or increasing the robustness of NATO’s deterrence in the Baltics are fixated on conventional deterrence by denial.  Their intent is in the right place, but their ideas for how to solve this problem are not.  In the process of defending their views, they concede all my principal points on the nature of the fight and its problems.  The difference is then in the analysis and consequently the policy recommendations.

                                                                            The rest can be found at http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/the-expensive-pretzel-logic-of-deterring-russia-by-denial/

                                                                            4000 NATO troops in the Baltics? Headlines vs reality.

                                                                            Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                            image

                                                                            If you read the article below, it would seem at first 4,000 troops are being added to those stationed in the Eastern Member Flank States (Poland + Balts)  http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-allies-preparing-to-put-four-battalions-at-eastern-border-with-russia-1461943315

                                                                            How the news got 4000 from 4 battalions is a puzzle, since battalions are typically not 1000 strong or uniform in size from different countries/service/unit types.  They can range from 600-1000+ depending on the country and type of unit.  In reality it looks like NATO will not be sending 4 separate battalions, but likely forming multi-national battalions, perhaps together with local forces or a mix of European ones.  This would mean a military contingent with political significance, but substantially reduced military value.

                                                                            With two European (German and French) battalions and two American battalions spread out between Poland and the Baltic states, the likely proposal is really for two solid American battalions to deploy to the Baltic states, perhaps as part of the newly added Armored Combat Brigade Team.  These will not be additional, but part of this third brigade already promised to deploy to Europe.  Meanwhile Germany and France are liable to send company sized elements, mixing in their units with those of others.

                                                                            Supposedly the defense ministers have approved the proposal in concept, but the details will not be presented and voted on until the NATO summit in Warsaw later this year.  Hence the actual additional force set to deploy to Eastern Europe remains a question mark.  Meanwhile mixing-in and chunking up the forces with Poland makes this of little to no military significance from a Russian perspective.  Indeed it may be difficult for NATO allies themselves to discern what they’re actually getting.  The underlying intent may be to increase the presence of other NATO countries in the Baltic states, particularly those belonging to nuclear powers, but it is not clear how this is tied to any theory of deterrence vis-a-vis Russia.In discussions with Russian experts, it seems Moscow only cares about US forces in theater, finding little to no relevance in the forward deployment of German or French forces.

                                                                            However, Moscow is concerned about American deployment creep, and the steady drumbeat in D.C. for more boots on the ground to bolster conventional deterrence.  With the $3.4 billion European Reassurance Initiative, the U.S. is now funding three combat brigade teams in Europe, a number which may see an increase.  Where U.S. forces are deployed geographically can have  an impact on Russian vulnerability considerations in Kaliningrad, or in the case of much larger recommendations such as RAND’s proposal for 7 brigades, St. Petersburg as well.

                                                                            Back to top
                                                                            #####EOF##### Zé's Profile | WordPress.com Forums

                                                                            Need help? Check out our Support site, then

                                                                            #####EOF##### Gutenberg – WordPress plugin | WordPress.org
                                                                            Download

                                                                            Gutenberg

                                                                            By Gutenberg Team

                                                                            Description

                                                                            Gutenberg is more than an editor. While the editor is the focus right now, the project will ultimately impact the entire publishing experience including customization (the next focus area).

                                                                            Discover more about the project.

                                                                            Editing focus

                                                                            The editor will create a new page- and post-building experience that makes writing rich posts effortless, and has “blocks” to make it easy what today might take shortcodes, custom HTML, or “mystery meat” embed discovery. — Matt Mullenweg

                                                                            One thing that sets WordPress apart from other systems is that it allows you to create as rich a post layout as you can imagine — but only if you know HTML and CSS and build your own custom theme. By thinking of the editor as a tool to let you write rich posts and create beautiful layouts, we can transform WordPress into something users love WordPress, as opposed something they pick it because it’s what everyone else uses.

                                                                            Gutenberg looks at the editor as more than a content field, revisiting a layout that has been largely unchanged for almost a decade.This allows us to holistically design a modern editing experience and build a foundation for things to come.

                                                                            Here’s why we’re looking at the whole editing screen, as opposed to just the content field:

                                                                            1. The block unifies multiple interfaces. If we add that on top of the existing interface, it would add complexity, as opposed to remove it.
                                                                            2. By revisiting the interface, we can modernize the writing, editing, and publishing experience, with usability and simplicity in mind, benefitting both new and casual users.
                                                                            3. When singular block interface takes center stage, it demonstrates a clear path forward for developers to create premium blocks, superior to both shortcodes and widgets.
                                                                            4. Considering the whole interface lays a solid foundation for the next focus, full site customization.
                                                                            5. Looking at the full editor screen also gives us the opportunity to drastically modernize the foundation, and take steps towards a more fluid and JavaScript powered future that fully leverages the WordPress REST API.

                                                                            Blocks

                                                                            Blocks are the unifying evolution of what is now covered, in different ways, by shortcodes, embeds, widgets, post formats, custom post types, theme options, meta-boxes, and other formatting elements. They embrace the breadth of functionality WordPress is capable of, with the clarity of a consistent user experience.

                                                                            Imagine a custom “employee” block that a client can drag to an About page to automatically display a picture, name, and bio. A whole universe of plugins that all extend WordPress in the same way. Simplified menus and widgets. Users who can instantly understand and use WordPress — and 90% of plugins. This will allow you to easily compose beautiful posts like this example.

                                                                            Check out the FAQ for answers to the most common questions about the project.

                                                                            Compatibility

                                                                            Posts are backwards compatible, and shortcodes will still work. We are continuously exploring how highly-tailored metaboxes can be accommodated, and are looking at solutions ranging from a plugin to disable Gutenberg to automatically detecting whether to load Gutenberg or not. While we want to make sure the new editing experience from writing to publishing is user-friendly, we’re committed to finding a good solution for highly-tailored existing sites.

                                                                            The stages of Gutenberg

                                                                            Gutenberg has three planned stages. The first, aimed for inclusion in WordPress 5.0, focuses on the post editing experience and the implementation of blocks. This initial phase focuses on a content-first approach. The use of blocks, as detailed above, allows you to focus on how your content will look without the distraction of other configuration options. This ultimately will help all users present their content in a way that is engaging, direct, and visual.

                                                                            These foundational elements will pave the way for stages two and three, planned for the next year, to go beyond the post into page templates and ultimately, full site customization.

                                                                            Gutenberg is a big change, and there will be ways to ensure that existing functionality (like shortcodes and meta-boxes) continue to work while allowing developers the time and paths to transition effectively. Ultimately, it will open new opportunities for plugin and theme developers to better serve users through a more engaging and visual experience that takes advantage of a toolset supported by core.

                                                                            Contributors

                                                                            Gutenberg is built by many contributors and volunteers. Please see the full list in CONTRIBUTORS.md.

                                                                            FAQ

                                                                            How can I send feedback or get help with a bug?

                                                                            We’d love to hear your bug reports, feature suggestions and any other feedback! Please head over to the GitHub issues page to search for existing issues or open a new one. While we’ll try to triage issues reported here on the plugin forum, you’ll get a faster response (and reduce duplication of effort) by keeping everything centralized in the GitHub repository.

                                                                            How can I contribute?

                                                                            We’re calling this editor project “Gutenberg” because it’s a big undertaking. We are working on it every day in GitHub, and we’d love your help building it.You’re also welcome to give feedback, the easiest is to join us in our Slack channel, #core-editor.

                                                                            See also CONTRIBUTING.md.

                                                                            Where can I read more about Gutenberg?

                                                                            Reviews

                                                                            Gutenbug is Terrible

                                                                            Gutenbug is terrible. Nothing works properly. It's not intuitive at all. There's a reason why the classic editor plugin has 4 million installs.

                                                                            No thanks

                                                                            This should be a plugin available for people who want it ONLY, not something I have to use yet another plugin to disable. No thanks.

                                                                            pure garbage

                                                                            the workflow on this thing is impossible, I have a 4k screen that I develop websites on and you only use what 800 pixels of it for my workflow? Thank you NOT

                                                                            Nada amigable y molesto

                                                                            Me parece que es poco intuitivo, si nos damos cuenta los que estan a favor son personas que tienen mucho conocimiento y no es malo saber, pero, ¿Que pasa con los principiantes? Su experiencia no es mucha con este tipo de editores, hay herramientas que aun no estan listas para un cambio tan drastico como este y por lo tanto pueden pasar meses para ver algunos de nuestros plugins favoritos trabajar bien sobre este editor. No considero que el editor sea algo necesario, solo me permite manejar las cosas por bloques cosa que es algo molesto y poco util, hay funciones que bien las puede hacer un plugin. El aspecto visual para mi es demasiado molesto y no puedo distingir un bloque del otro. El editor clasico es bastante secillo, totalmente expandible, intuitivo y para los principiantes como para los expertos es muy familiar al software de oficina. Creo que gutenberg se estaria retorciendo en su tumba si viera su nombre sobre este editor. Mi punto es que el cambio no debio de ser tan drastico, almenos para mi fue una bofetada ya que muchos de mis complementos dejaron de funcionar y para muchos desarrolladores de la comunidad fue una pesadilla ver como sus herramientas quedaban fuera y claro muchos ya no dan soporte y otros aun tratan por sobrevivir al cambio. afortunadamente optaron por dejar el editor clasico como plugin.
                                                                            Read all 2,655 reviews

                                                                            Contributors & Developers

                                                                            “Gutenberg” is open source software. The following people have contributed to this plugin.

                                                                            Contributors

                                                                            “Gutenberg” has been translated into 44 locales. Thank you to the translators for their contributions.

                                                                            Translate “Gutenberg” into your language.

                                                                            Interested in development?

                                                                            Browse the code, check out the SVN repository, or subscribe to the development log by RSS.

                                                                            Changelog

                                                                            For 5.4.0.

                                                                            Features

                                                                            Enhancements

                                                                            Bug Fixes

                                                                            Documentation

                                                                            Various

                                                                            Meta

                                                                            Ratings

                                                                            See all

                                                                            Support

                                                                            Issues resolved in last two months:

                                                                            26 out of 135

                                                                            View support forum

                                                                            #####EOF##### Theme Guide | Developer Resources

                                                                            Theme Guide

                                                                            The theme must meet all requirements in the WordPress.org theme review. Along with this, it must also meet the following criteria.

                                                                            Code

                                                                            • Use WordPress functionality and features first, if available (This includes Jetpack features for WordPress.com).
                                                                            • No frameworks or options frameworks.
                                                                            • No external, non-Automattic (Jetpack, Gravatar, etc.) APIs.
                                                                            • WordPress.com themes should always use the latest WordPress features.
                                                                            • Do not include code that won’t run on WP.com. This includes any code for compatibility and the use of IS_WPCOM.
                                                                            • Use filters to modify the output of template tags, if available.
                                                                            • Use client-side feature detection, rather than server side browser detection.
                                                                            • Themes must not directly access PHP super globals.
                                                                            • No output buffering.
                                                                            • No custom fields or post meta boxes.
                                                                            • No removing or modifying Core hooks.
                                                                            • Footer credits must be located in footer.php and match the format found in Underscores

                                                                            JavaScript

                                                                            • Protect function and variable names from conflicts in the global namespace. Always use theme slug prefixes, or wrap code in an immediately invoked function expression (IFFE), like Underscores.

                                                                            HTML/CSS

                                                                            • All themes must use the HTML5 doctype and contain semantic markup.
                                                                            • Themes must be responsive and retina-ready.
                                                                            • Use !important and inline styles only as a last resort.
                                                                            • You can’t include code or scripts for extending support below IE9.

                                                                            Core Functionality and Features

                                                                            • All code and widgets must not replicate existing WordPress.com functionality.
                                                                            • Themes must support widgets.
                                                                            • Themes must support at least one Custom Menu.
                                                                            • No customizing /wp-admin.

                                                                            Documentation

                                                                            All premium themes released on WordPress.com have a showcase page and support documentation. Follow the documentation style guide to ensure that users have a clear understanding of a theme’s features, and where to get help.

                                                                            Language

                                                                            •  Provide context where appropriate.
                                                                            • Avoid common anti-patterns.
                                                                            • Themes must provide right-to-left styles.
                                                                            • Translators need to be able to deactivate web fonts that don’t support the character set of their language.
                                                                            • Translation strings should be escaped for improved security. See _s (Underscores)  for examples.

                                                                            Options and Settings

                                                                            • Only implement theme options through the Customizer.
                                                                            • Theme options must be in one section, entitled ‘Theme Options’.
                                                                            • No theme options should allow users to add scripts or styles.
                                                                            • Do not include any additional options for setting colors or fonts: these are handled on WordPress.com by our Custom Fonts and Custom Colors features.
                                                                            • Themes need to support Jetpack Infinite Scroll.

                                                                            Stylesheets and Scripts

                                                                            • Don’t hook HTML or Javascript into wp_head.
                                                                            • No minification; it’s impossible to audit, and WordPress.com has its own minification process.
                                                                            • The theme’s primary CSS must be in style.css.
                                                                            • Theme tags in style.css must be be lowercase with no spaces. Separate multiple-word tags with a dash. View a list of all allowable tags.
                                                                            • Line heights must be set to relative values, so that Custom Fonts work correctly.
                                                                            • Enqueue Google fonts using this format.

                                                                            Templates

                                                                            • Themes must respect the Template Hierarchy.
                                                                            • front-page.php must respect the user’s Settings → Reading → Front Page Displays value.
                                                                            • $content_width must be set to the theme’s default content width.
                                                                            • Use full loops in all templates. Just calling the_post() in a template like single.php or page.php is not enough. This is a great explanatory article.

                                                                            Queries

                                                                            • Themes must use WP_Query.
                                                                            • Don’t use unbounded queries. The posts_per_page parameter of WP_Query may not be set to -1. Also, the numberposts parameter of get_posts() (and similar functions) must have a positive value.
                                                                            • Themes must not modify the main query.

                                                                            Widgets

                                                                            • Prefix widget titles with the themename, ie. Theme Name: Widget Title.
                                                                            • Widget areas must not contain hardcoded widgets.
                                                                            • Visible links to feeds must not appear in themes. We suggest that site owners use the Follow Blog Widget on WordPress.com to allow their visitors to subscribe.

                                                                            Theme User Experience Requirements

                                                                            We’ve put together a list of theme user-experience requirements that make it easier for people to use WordPress themes. We call it the TUX List.

                                                                            Content

                                                                            • On sites with multiple authors, the author name should be displayed. Note: You can also choose display the author on sites with a single author. Reason: If a site has multiple authors then it’s useful for readers to see who wrote each post.
                                                                            • Themes must support both categories and tags in some capacity. Reason: Users see these in the admin areas, so they expect to see them on their site’s front end.
                                                                            • Add support for Jetpack’s Content Options to the fullest extent possible. Reason: Users want to be able to change and customize what appears for each post/page.

                                                                            Header

                                                                            • Show the site title and tagline by default. Reason: Both site title and tagline can always be hidden via the Customizer, so hiding one by default makes for a confusing user experience.

                                                                            Layout

                                                                            • If the site does not have a sidebar or the sidebar has no widgets, the content line length should adjust. Reason: Long line lengths are an issue for readability.
                                                                            • If a layout normally has two columns or more with widgets, the layout should adjust to a single column if a user has not added widgets to the sidebar, without displaying an empty column. Reason: This gives users flexibility to have a single-column layout without needing a page template or theme option. If a user wants widgets only on specific pages, they can use the Widget Visibility tool.

                                                                            Menus

                                                                            • Menu labels should specify the location and, if the theme supports more than one, its position, like Header Top, Header Bottom, Footer, etc. Reason: Without this, users are unable to know which menu refers to what area.
                                                                            • Menu locations should take the format of menu-1, menu-2, etc. Reason: Consistency across themes means that a user can switch themes and not have to reassign their menu to the theme’s menu location. It also allows easier readability in code.
                                                                            • Social menu should be called Social Menu. Reason: Consistency on theme switching, which again means that the site displays the user’s social menu even after changing themes.
                                                                            • Drop-down menus should have an arrow indicating the direction in which the menu opens. Reason: Without an arrow, it’s hard to know if an item has a sub-menu.
                                                                            • Mobile menus should have a hamburger icon and the label Menu. Reason: Users can consistently see the same mobile menu indicator and don’t have to learn a new icon or word each time they switch a theme.

                                                                            Pagination

                                                                            • Single-post navigation should display “next / previous” and show the post title. This also means consistent translations for translators. Reason: Users can easily know they’re looking at pagination and the experience is consistent.

                                                                            Post Formats

                                                                            • A theme does not need to support any post formats unless the theme is a “Tumblog”- style theme, in which case the theme should support all available post formats. Reason: Users only expect post formats from Tumblog-type themes.

                                                                            Posts

                                                                            • Excerpts should be followed by a “Continue Reading” link. Reason: Provides a consistent experience for users.
                                                                            • Do not use the_content_more_link filter to customize Read more link text. Reason: this prevents users from customizing the More tag.

                                                                            Sticky posts

                                                                            • Provide a clear indication that sticky posts are different from normal posts. For example, add some text or other clear indicator to differentiate sticky posts. Also, they should not display the date. Reason: A post if sticky should have some indication of its stickiness, otherwise it’s a surprise to find it at the top.

                                                                            Templates

                                                                            • All templates should be in a folder called templates. Reason: Reviewers can see at a glance which templates are available, decreasing review time and improving code legibility.
                                                                            • Portfolio template should be called portfolio-page.php.
                                                                            • Full-width template should be called full-width-page.php.
                                                                            • Grid template should be called grid-page.php.
                                                                            • Testimonials template should be called testimonials-page.php.
                                                                            • Food menus template should be called food-menus-page.php.
                                                                            • Guestbook template should be called guestbook-page.php.
                                                                            • Contributors template should be called contributors-page.php.
                                                                            • Front-page template should be called front-page.php.

                                                                            Reason: Consistent template naming helps reduce setup time after a theme switch and also decreases review time.

                                                                            Widgets

                                                                            • Keep widget names descriptive of their location, ie. Sidebar, Footer, etc. Reason: Users can more easily find them and know what area they refer to.
                                                                            • Widget IDs should take the format of sidebar-1, sidebar-2, etc. Reason: Consistency across themes means that a user can switch themes and not have to reassign their widgets to the theme’s widget locations. It also allows for easier readability in code.

                                                                            Color Annotations

                                                                            • Add 6 featured color palettes.
                                                                            • Ensure you have at least one light-on-dark palette and one dark-on-light palette. Reason: At least two color palettes must be accessible.
                                                                            • Use standard color names for color palettes whenever possible, picking the strongest accent/accents, and add comment for translators. Reason: Vague/clever palette names often cause confusion for translators.

                                                                            Along with these we also recommend the following items.

                                                                            #####EOF##### Poetry | Discover
                                                                            Poetry Filter
                                                                            1. A year of haiku about my kids.

                                                                              “It turns out the nightly parenting haiku is not only Minimum Viable Creativity, but also an opportunity to journal milestones every night without having to figure out what to say.” This post from 2017 at Unlikely Words compiles a year of haiku from a parent.
                                                                              Parenting
                                                                              Photo by Lum3n.com from Pexels
                                                                              A year of haiku about my kids.
                                                                            2. As we grow old

                                                                              A beautiful poem on aging and and wisdom by Senator Murray Sinclair, former chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: As we grow old / the ground we walk on / rises up / so that, / as each of those few moments / left to us / pass by…
                                                                              Poetry
                                                                              Mizana Gheezhik (Sen. Murray Sinclair)
                                                                              by Senator Murray Sinclair
                                                                            3. An interview with Ohio Poet Laureate Dave Lucas

                                                                              “Too many of us seem to have been taught that poems are supposed to be solved, some ‘deeper meaning’ discovered and extracted like a vein of ore from a mine. If we can’t find ‘it’ . . . we feel inadequate.” Rebecca Moon Ruark interviews Dave Lucas on her blog, Rust Belt Girl.
                                                                              Interviews
                                                                              Rust Belt Girl
                                                                              by Rust Belt Girl
                                                                            4. Acts of Faith

                                                                              If I am lost in the blowing grasses, / If I wander from the path, / I am in your hands, time. / And in them there is a stillness, / Where light become animate, / And tactile, / Like little lost pieces of a former self.
                                                                              Poetry
                                                                              Serpent Box
                                                                              by serpentbox
                                                                            5. Back Home

                                                                              “My body / is my home, / but I shuttered it / awhile back, / and I’ve hovered nearby / like a tangled kite, / a drunken bird.”
                                                                              Poetry
                                                                              VAGABOND CITY
                                                                              by Julia Travers
                                                                            6. Insomnia

                                                                              “I try to wash away the sleepiness / from my insomnia laden eyes / pick a fresh sheet of paper / spread clean water till it sheens / like fresh snow on a sunny day / clean and load the brushes with colours…”
                                                                              Art
                                                                              Photo by Zaksheuskaya from Pexels.
                                                                              Cafe Dissensus Everyday
                                                                              by Tikuli
                                                                            7. winter storm: haiku

                                                                              winter storm – / a train without a whistle / blows past the house
                                                                              Poetry
                                                                              Ontheland
                                                                              by Janice
                                                                            8. Remembering Mary Oliver

                                                                              Three visual artists pay tribute to the late poet.

                                                                              Poetry
                                                                              © Rachel Giese Brown
                                                                              Feature
                                                                              by
                                                                            9. Ten Poems about Travel

                                                                              No matter where your journey takes you in 2019, what better way to kick it off than with 10 travel-themed poems, lovingly collected by the editors at JSTOR Daily?
                                                                              Inspiration
                                                                              JSTOR Daily
                                                                              by The Editors
                                                                            10. If You Want to Get Along, Trapped in the Matrix, and One Too Many Incidents

                                                                              “Daylight hurts like the memory / of more flexible structures, but night / inserts its stainless prongs and feels / for the organs most at risk.” An excerpt from one of three poems by William Doreski, published in the winter 2018 issue of The Coachella Review.
                                                                              Journals & Magazines
                                                                              The Coachella Review
                                                                              by William Doreski
                                                                            11. Don’t Be Like Me: Take the Help, Dummy

                                                                              “Soon enough—a few weeks, a few months—and the poem seems to me like a cardboard cutout of a puppy: inauthentic, inflexible, lacking in depth or life. I don’t know why this is, but I hate it.” At The Gloria Sirens, Katie Riegel encourages other poets to be humble and willing to accept help.
                                                                              Inspiration
                                                                              The Gloria Sirens
                                                                              by Katie Riegel
                                                                            12. Alabaster

                                                                              “Alabaster” appears in poet Stephanie L. Harper’s chapbook “This Being Done”: “I am a pink rose petal’s pale glow / black ash tamped in furrows / between the breaths of the living…”
                                                                              Poetry
                                                                              SLHARPERPOETRY
                                                                              by Stephanie L. Harper
                                                                            13. Maurice Scully

                                                                              At the online home of Irish poet Maurice Scully, you’ll find links to published works in PDF format and recordings of his poetry readings.
                                                                              Art
                                                                            14. For the Love of Haiku

                                                                              Check out these five poets who favor the form.

                                                                              Poetry
                                                                              Feature
                                                                              by
                                                                            15. Early Bird Special

                                                                              unlike the midnight special / there are no songs / to celebrate the early bird special / no IHOPian bard, / no poet laureate of the blue plate / no bargain basement Dylan / no cut price Cohen / to extol the digestive / and economic benefits / of getting an early start.
                                                                              Poetry
                                                                              Photo by Julian Jagtenberg
                                                                              Stopdraggingthepanda
                                                                              by sdtp33
                                                                            #####EOF##### WordPress.com
                                                                            #####EOF##### WordPress.com Firehose | Developer Resources

                                                                            WordPress.com Firehose

                                                                            Documentation → WordPress.com Firehose

                                                                            WordPress publishers and visitors produce thousands of new posts and comments every hour. With the addition of IntenseDebate comments, this is a lot of data. These content streams are available in three real-time formats from redundant servers. These streams are intended for partners like search engines and market intelligence providers who would like to ingest a real-time stream of new content from a wide spectrum of publishers.

                                                                            Get Access

                                                                            We’ve partnered with two leaders in real-time data analytics, please contact them for full access to the Firehose feeds:

                                                                            • Socialgist: Your complete data stream platform.
                                                                            • DataSift: Extract insights from a universe of human-created data.

                                                                            Feeds

                                                                            • Posts Firehose: the Posts Firehose is a stream of posts—averaging 1 million/day—from the tens of millions of websites published on WordPress.com. Posts are also available for Jetpack-powered WordPress(.org) sites, through a separate feed.
                                                                            • Comments Firehose: the Comments Firehose streams hundreds of thousands of comments every day from WordPress.com and our IntenseDebate commenting platform. Comments are also available for Jetpack-powered WordPress(.org) sites, through a separate feed.
                                                                            • Likes Firehose: the Likes Firehose streams engagement data from WordPress.com’s “like” feature.

                                                                            Feed Formats

                                                                            • PubSub: An extension of the popular Jabber/XMPP instant messaging protocol. WordPress.com operates a Jabber service at im.wordpress.com that allows all WordPress.com users to subscribe to the blogs of their choice and receive instant notification of new items. However, the full streams are access-controlled.
                                                                            • JSON Stream: A stream of JSON formatted data delivered over HTTP. You can view a very limited sample stream by using curl in a terminal:
                                                                              • Posts: curl xmpp.wordpress.com:8008/posts.json
                                                                              • Comments: curl xmpp.wordpress.com:8008/comments.json
                                                                            • XML Stream: Delivers the same pubsub-style XML streams by the much simpler mechanism of an HTTP GET request. This makes implementing the streams as simple as can be. You can view a very limited sample stream by using curl in a terminal:
                                                                              • Posts: curl xmpp.wordpress.com:8008/firehose.xml
                                                                              • Comments:  curl xmpp.wordpress.com:8008/gusher.xml

                                                                            Firehose Terms of Service

                                                                            By using Firehose or accessing Firehose data, you agree to these terms and all other operating rules, policies, and procedures that may be published from time to time by Automattic (collectively, the “Agreement”). This Agreement contains, among other things, warranty disclaimers, and liability limitations.

                                                                            Permitted Uses. You may use Firehose to search, display, analyze, retrieve, and view the data provided to you through the Firehose. You may also use the WordPress.com name or logos and other brand elements that Automattic makes available in order to identify the source of the information, provided the use doesn’t suggest any endorsement by Automattic. You agree to comply with all applicable privacy laws and regulations, and will post and adhere to a privacy policy that does not modify, supersede, or be inconsistent with the Automattic Privacy Policy.

                                                                            Prohibited Uses. If you use Firehose, you agree not to:

                                                                            • Engage in, encourage, or facilitate activity that is malicious or illegal under applicable law.
                                                                            • Interfere with, disrupt, or attack any service or network, including Automattic’s.
                                                                            • Republish the content, provide any third parties with access to Firehose or Firehose data, or enable any third parties to distribute Firehose data.
                                                                            • Substantially replicate products or services offered by Automattic, or create a competing service, such as by creating a separate publishing platform.
                                                                            • Display, distribute, or otherwise make available content or data to governmental entities for intelligence gathering or surveillance purposes.
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                                                                            • Modify, decompile, reverse engineer, or otherwise alter or seek to derive the trade secrets and other inherent intellectual property of the Automattic APIs.
                                                                            • Use the Firehose or Firehose Data to (i) to create or enable any app, website, tool, or other mechanism that is, or enables, or operates in conjunction with, any malware, spyware, adware, other malicious programs or code, or (ii) in any manner that would violate any applicable law or governmental regulation.
                                                                            • Cache or store personal data or user passwords.
                                                                            • Use Firehose content or data to profile, or create profiles of, individuals, or directly target individuals with advertisements or other messages.

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                                                                            WordPress 5.0 “Bebo”

                                                                            Posted December 6, 2018 by Matt Mullenweg. Filed under Releases.

                                                                            Say Hello to the New Editor

                                                                            We’ve made some big upgrades to the editor. Our new block-based editor is the first step toward an exciting new future with a streamlined editing experience across your site. You’ll have more flexibility with how content is displayed, whether you are building your first site, revamping your blog, or write code for a living.

                                                                            Building with Blocks

                                                                            The new block-based editor won’t change the way any of your content looks to your visitors. What it will do is let you insert any type of multimedia in a snap and rearrange to your heart’s content. Each piece of content will be in its own block; a distinct wrapper for easy maneuvering. If you’re more of an HTML and CSS sort of person, then the blocks won’t stand in your way. WordPress is here to simplify the process, not the outcome.

                                                                            We have tons of blocks available by default, and more get added by the community every day. Here are a few of the blocks to help you get started:

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                                                                            Prefer to stick with the familiar Classic Editor? No problem! Support for the Classic Editor plugin will remain in WordPress through 2021.

                                                                            The Classic Editor plugin restores the previous WordPress editor and the Edit Post screen. It lets you keep using plugins that extend it, add old-style meta boxes, or otherwise depend on the previous editor. To install, visit your plugins page and click the “Install Now” button next to “Classic Editor”. After the plugin finishes installing, click “Activate”. That’s it!

                                                                            Note to users of assistive technology: if you experience usability issues with the block editor, we recommend you continue to use the Classic Editor.

                                                                            Check out the Classic Editor

                                                                            This release is named in homage to the pioneering Cuban jazz musician Bebo Valdés.

                                                                            The Squad

                                                                            This release was led by Matt Mullenweg, along with co-leads Allan Cole, Anthony Burchell, Gary Pendergast, Josepha Haden Chomphosy, Laurel Fulford, Omar Reiss, Daniel Bachhuber, Matías Ventura, Miguel Fonseca, Tammie Lister, Matthew Riley MacPherson. They were ably assisted by the following fabulous folks. There were 423 contributors with props in this release. Pull up some Bebo Valdés on your music service of choice, and check out some of their profiles:

                                                                            Aaron Jorbin, Abdul Wahab, Abdullah Ramzan, Abhijit Rakas, Adam Silverstein, afraithe, Ahmad Awais, ahmadawais, Airat Halitov, Ajit Bohra, Alain Schlesser, albertomedina, aldavigdis, Alex Kirk, Alex Sanford, Alex Shiels, Alexander Babaev, Alexander Botteram, alexis, Alexis Lloyd, Amanda Rush, amedina, Andrés, Andrea Fercia, Andrea Middleton, Andrei Lupu, andreiglingeanu, Andrew Duthie, Andrew Munro, Andrew Nevins, Andrew Ozz, Andrew Roberts, Andrew Taylor, andrewserong, Andy Peatling, Angie Meeker, Anna Harrison, Anton Timmermans, ArnaudBan, Arshid, Arya Prakasa, Asad, Ashar Irfan, Asvin Balloo, Atanas Angelov, Aumio, Bappi, bcolumbia, Ben Lowery, Benjamin Eyzaguirre, Benjamin Zekavica, benlk, Bernhard Kau, Bernhard Reiter, betsela, Bhargav Mehta, Birgir Erlendsson (birgire), Birgit Pauli-Haack, bobbingwide, boblinthorst, Boone Gorges, Brady Vercher, Brandon Kraft, Brandon Payton, Brent Swisher, Brianna Privett, briannaorg, Bronson Quick, Brooke., Burhan Nasir, Caleb Burks, CantoThemes, cathibosco, Chetan Prajapati, Chetan Satasiya, chetansatasiya, Chouby, Chris Lloyd, Chris Runnells, Chris Van Patten, chriskmnds, Christian Sabo, Christoph Herr, Claudio Sanches, coderkevin, Copons, courtney0burton, Crisoforo Gaspar, Csaba (LittleBigThings), csabotta, Daniel James, Daniel Richards, danielhw, daniloercoli, Danny Cooper, Darren Ethier (nerrad), davemoran118, David Binovec, David Cavins, David Herrera, David Kennedy, David Ryan, David Sword, David Trower, Davide 'Folletto' Casali, davidherrera, Davis, dciso, Dennis Snell, Derek Smart, designsimply, Devin Walker, Devio Digital, dfangstrom, Dhanendran, Diego de Oliveira, diegoreymendez, dingo-d, Dion Hulse, Dixita Dusara, Dixita Dusara Gohil, Dominik Schilling, Donna Peplinskie, Drew Jaynes, dsawardekar, dsifford, Duane Storey, Eduardo Pittol, Edwin Cromley, ehg, ElectricFeet, Elio Rivero, Elisabeth Pointal, Ella Iseulde Van Dorpe, elrae, enodekciw, ephoxjames, ephoxmogran, Eric Amundson, ericnmurphy, etoledom, Evan Mullins, fabiankaegy, fabs_pim, faishal, Felix Arntz, Florian Simeth, foobar4u, foreverpinetree, Frank Klein, fuyuko, Gabriel Maldonado, Garrett Hyder, Gary Jones, Gary Thayer, garyjones, Gennady Kovshenin, George Olaru, George Stephanis, georgeh, Gerhard Potgieter, gnif, goldsounds, Grappler, Greg Raven, Grzegorz Ziółkowski, Gustavo Bordoni, gwwar, Hardeep Asrani, hblackett, Helen Hou-Sandi, Hendrik Luehrsen, herbmiller, Herre Groen, Hugo Baeta, hypest, Ian Belanger, Ian Dunn, ianstewart, idpokute, Igor, imath, Imran Khalid, intronic, Ipstenu (Mika Epstein), Irene Strikkers, Ismail El Korchi, israelshmueli, J.D. 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                                                                              #####EOF##### Antti Levomäki – 44CON

                                                                              Antti Levomäki

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                                                                              Antti Levomäki has been working since 2004 at R&D of Finnish Cyber Security Company Stonesoft. For the last five years he has focused on researching evasion techniques against network security products and writing testing tools. Previous duties include writing attack and application signatures for Stonesoft network security products.

                                                                              Mr. Levomäki holds a Master Of Computer Science degree from the University of Helsinki and is currently pursuing a PhD at the Aalto University.

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                                                                              • 44CON 2013: Signatureless Breach Detection Under The Microscope

                                                                              https://vimeo.com/109380800
                                                                              #####EOF##### The Kerch strait naval skirmish – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                              The Kerch strait naval skirmish

                                                                              Michael Kofman7 Comments

                                                                              After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

                                                                              On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

                                                                              Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

                                                                              towing command ship

                                                                              On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

                                                                              One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

                                                                              Don ramming.jpg

                                                                              Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

                                                                              Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

                                                                              original

                                                                              Another shot

                                                                              Izumrud

                                                                              Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

                                                                              blocked strait.jpg

                                                                              After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

                                                                              Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

                                                                              damaged Berdyansk.jpg

                                                                              Ships parked at Kerch

                                                                              parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

                                                                              Some thoughts –

                                                                              The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

                                                                              Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

                                                                              That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

                                                                              Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

                                                                              12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

                                                                              7 thoughts on “The Kerch strait naval skirmish”

                                                                              2. You “forgot” the fact that the ukrainians dream of destroying the bridge. Quite relevant when discussing whether or not the russians should let the ukrainians paddle around the bridge. Furthermore you “forgot” the highly likely possibility of a ukrainian provocation in order to 1) impose martial law to clean out opposition 2) strengthen public support for the president 3) postpone the election 4) demonize Russia 5) “ping” USA/EU/NATO and hopefully receive moral, financial and military support.

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                                                                                • I think that’s all in the realm of political analysis and I try to stay away from that in this blog. Readers can make their conclusions, which I figure will be mostly rationalization, integrating interesting information such that it fits with their preexisting views and existing belief system.

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                                                                              4. A couple of minor points:
                                                                                1) Regarding whether the incident occurred in international waters, sovereignty over Crimea would determine whether territorial waters were Russian or Ukrainian territorial waters, but I don’t see how it would determine whether the waters were territorial or international.
                                                                                2) Regarding Ukraine’s declaration of martial law, everyone said it was intended to be an excuse to avoid the March elections (although I believe it was allowed to expire on schedule after 30 days), but it may simply have been an effort by Poroshenko to do something that would appear somewhat dramatic but would not be provocative enough to justify Russian retaliation. He didn’t have a lot of meaningful options.

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                                                                              5. First time reader here. I like your use of the phrase “Russian adhocracy.” Russia remains a mystery to most Westerners and certainly to Americans. While I am no expert on Russia, a bit of reading, particularly from astute observers, sheds some light on their actions and reasoning. Thanks for the astute article.

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                                                                                #####EOF##### Shipbuilding – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                                Tag: Shipbuilding

                                                                                Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

                                                                                Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                                                On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

                                                                                Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

                                                                                PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

                                                                                PD-50 sinking.jpg

                                                                                Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

                                                                                PD-50 on a good day

                                                                                PD-50 dry dock

                                                                                According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

                                                                                Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

                                                                                Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

                                                                                That looks like it may be the crane

                                                                                Crane.jpg

                                                                                A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

                                                                                Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

                                                                                Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

                                                                                As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

                                                                                This is PD-50 now

                                                                                PD-50 gone

                                                                                The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

                                                                                Russia’s Fifth-Generation Sub Looms

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                Taking a break for a quick  dive into Naval matters, this is a repost of my article on Russia’s next generation submarine program which came out in the USNI Proceedings issue this month.

                                                                                Like the Soviet Navy before it, the Russian Navy’s true power lies in its submarine force. Although recovering from a prolonged period of limited investment and confined activity, the various nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSNs), guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), and ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) Russia inherited from the Soviet Union make it a capable adversary in the undersea domain. If Russia is to remain a relevant player beneath the waves in the 2020s and 2030s, however, it will have to substantially recapitalize its aging submarine force in the coming decade.

                                                                                Fortunately for Russia’s submariners, reinvigorating submarine construction has been one of the visible accomplishments of the Russian Navy’s modernization program for 2011–2020. Russia has built three new SSBNs of the Borei class (Project 955) and recently launched the second SSGN in the Yasen class (Project 885M)—an upgraded version of the well-known Severodvinsk—and it intends to build five more Borei-class SSBNs by 2021 and another four or five SSGNs of the Yasen class by 2023. Yet, these two classes of submarines only partially answer the Admiralty’s problem of how to replenish the Russian submarine force and replace ships set for retirement by 2030.

                                                                                Looking over the horizon, the Russian Ministry of Defense already has commissioned a program to develop the fifth-generation submarine that will replace most of its old Soviet platforms. With the Yasen, this fifth-generation submarine will be one of the principal adversaries faced by the U.S. Navy, perhaps as soon as the late 2020s. The broad outlines of this program, called “Husky,” already are known. The concept had been discussed as far back as 2013-2014, although the requirements and design contract were not issued until August 2016, with a conceptual design expected by late summer 2018.

                                                                                Russia’s famous Malakhit design bureau—author of the Victor, Alfa, Akula, and Yasen classes—has been given the lead for this project. The fifth-generation submarine is a unified design: the fore and aft sections will be common, along with key systems inside the pressurized hull. Modules introduced into the hull will split the program into three variants: a cheap-to-produce SSN, a more capable SSGN, and possibly an SSBN. This “joint strike submarine” is intended to take advantage of technologies that spent years in development and testing during the tumultuous design (and redesign) history of the Yasen class.

                                                                                Russia seeks to leverage the pain and experience in realizing the Yasen class to design a more cost-effective platform. The vision is a cheap and modular Yasen derivative, with a few technological enhancements. Building a common platform is not easy, but it is hardly a stretch for Russia’s shipbuilding industry. Keep in mind the first SSBNs in the Borei class and the first Yasen class have much more in common than it might seem. These boats incorporated hulls and systems originally intended for Akula III-class SSNs that the Soviet Union planned to complete in the 1990s before halting production; they were adapted to create these fourth-generation submarines.

                                                                                The Husky program’s first mission is to produce a design that is a de facto smaller and cheaper Yasen, weighing in at 4,000-6,000 tons compared to the Severodvinsk’s current 9,000. Improved composites and new polymers are supposed to be used throughout, further reducing the ship’s acoustic signature. Power, propulsion, control, and sonar are supposed to be shared across the three variants. The Russian Navy’s priority is a cost-effective SSN, with a construction time of four to four and a half years, so that it can produce 15-20 submarines. SSGN variants will incorporate a vertical launch system (VLS) payload module. SSBN variants could be built in the latter years of the program, contingent on what happens with the New START arms control treaty.

                                                                                While Malakhit is working on the design, Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation is investing in modernizing the equipment necessary to build the fifth-generation submarine. Other companies and state-owned enterprises, such as the Krylov State Research Center, are improving composites with the hope of integrating them into the submarine’s construction when it is laid down sometime in the mid-2020s.

                                                                                The design contract for this next-generation submarine is driven by the practical need to replace the aging mix of Oscar IIs, Akulas, Sierras, and Victor IIIs. The Soviet-era boats currently in the fleet include Delta III SSBNs, soon due for retirement, and Delta IVs that have another 10–12 years of life. Some of these submarines will be well past their useful service lives by the end of 2020s, and the cost of modernizing them would be exorbitantly high because Soviet submarines were not meant to be upgraded so much as discarded every 30 years. Although they have not been used much during recent years, these simply are not the ships the Russian Navy wants to be sailing in the 2030s.

                                                                                The Russian Navy’s other ambition is to consolidate the disparate SSN and SSGN classes into a few multipurpose designs. That is where the Husky program comes in, though its real name should be “cheaper Yasen.” For now, Russia is likely to substantially upgrade four of eight Oscar II SSGNs and at most four to six of the ten Akulas currently in service. This will extend their service lives, replace some key systems, and dramatically improve their strike package with SS-N-26 and SS-N-27 missiles. Victor IIIs probably will be scrapped. Modernization of the Sierra class has been suspended, and there is no urgency in upgrading it because the submarine’s titanium hull can last a long time.

                                                                                As a consequence, by 2030 Russia will need to retire 11-13 SSNs and SSGNs. These will be made up for by six or seven new Yasen-class SSGNs, but the Yasen is expensive, slow to build, and not meant for production in large quantities. This submarine is the single most costly item in the current modernization program, estimated at somewhere between $1.5 billion and $3 billion a piece. This may seem a bargain compared to the cost of U.S. submarines, but it is taxing the Russian procurement budget. The Russian Navy hopes the Husky program will erase the remaining deficit in ship numbers at a much lower operating cost relative to the price of maintaining a diverse and aging fleet.

                                                                                How realistic are Russia’s ambitions for a fifth-generation submarine? Typical of ship requirements, the Russian Navy wants the fifth-generation submarine to do it all, do it better and cheaper, and be faster and easier to build. Taking into account the technological sophistication of the Yasen class and the production capacity at Russia’s principal nuclear submarine shipyard, Sevmash, it is fair to say that the knowhow and production capacity exist. In fact, Russian submarine construction has been on a positive trend line for several years now.

                                                                                Russia currently has 12 nuclear-powered submarines laid down or in various phases of construction. Even if there are further delays in the Borei and Yasen programs, there is no reason a fifth-generation submarine cannot be laid down by the mid-2020s. Indeed, if there are delays, the Russian Ministry of Defense likely will abridge the Yasen program in favor of this new cheaper variant with similar performance. An SSBN derivative is less realistic. The Borei class is capable of replacing the Delta IIIs and Delta IVs. Also, the Rubin design bureau—not Malakhit—historically has been responsible for SSBN development, and Russia’s defense industry might not be so keen on a common SSN/SSGN/SSBN platform. When all is said and done, the Malakhit design bureau probably will produce a versatile SSN/SSGN design for the Russian Navy.

                                                                                Time will reveal what Russia’s fifth-generation submarine design will look like, but early contours of the future already are visible. The brainchild of the Husky program will become one of the U.S. Navy’s principal adversaries in the undersea domain in the 2030s, and the Russian Ministry of Defense has begun working on making that future a reality.

                                                                                Reprinted with permission from the U.S. Naval Institute.  Copyright Proceedings Magazine, U.S. Naval Institute

                                                                                Why the Russian Navy Is a More Capable Adversary Than It Appears

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                New article originally appearing in The National Interest on Russia’s Navy. Co-authored with my colleague Jeffrey Edmonds.

                                                                                Russia still depends on the remnants of a blue-water navy inherited from the Soviet Union, but a new force is slowly rising to take its place both above and beneath the waves. This navy will be different, with a strategy of its own. The United States should not fear the Russian Navy, but it should respect and study what Moscow is trying to do with its naval forces. Failure to understand an adversary’s capabilities, and the logic behind them, is a good way to someday become unpleasantly surprised by them. Learning from that kind of experience usually comes at the expense of lives.

                                                                                Imagine in a not so distant future a group of Russian Kalibr missiles closes in on a U.S. destroyer at supersonic speed, sprinting to target in their terminal phase. In this moment the captain will find little comfort in the stack of articles behind him arguing that the Russian Navy is no more. That Russia had spent so little on the corvettes that fired this salvo, and the United States so much on the ship about to receive it, will leave a great deal to reflect upon in the aftermath.

                                                                                Analysis of Russian military capabilities tends to either portray the Russian military as a giant or as though it were on the verge of disappearance. These narratives trend towards the factually incorrect and profoundly unhelpful. This is why we study adversaries: to understand their strategy, doctrine, and the capabilities they’re investing in so as not to speak nonsense to power, but instead offer sound analysis and perspective.

                                                                                The modern Russian Navy is not designed to compete with the U.S. Navy, but instead to counter it, and to support the strategy of a twenty-first-century Eurasian land power. Russia may be far less powerful than the Soviet Union, but it remains a great power nonetheless, with a military capable of achieving overmatch on its borders. Russia’s armed forces are strong enough to impose substantial costs in a conflict, and the country fields a capable nuclear arsenal that it won’t shy from using. The Russian Navy plays an important role in that strategy, and should not be overlooked despite its shortcomings.

                                                                                The Russian Vision

                                                                                Things would be simpler were Russia engaged in a futile attempt to compete with U.S. Navy, overspending on ships it can’t afford, pursuing missions that make little sense given the country’s geographical position and economic constraints. The recently signed Russian Naval Doctrine through 2030 makes bold claims about Russia’s desire to maintain the status of the world’s second naval power. While the Russian nuclear submarine force still holds second place in capability, and its ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet in particular, there is no shipbuilding plan to turn the navy into a global competitor with the United States or China.

                                                                                Such pronouncements reflect the tradition of Russian leaders looking to the navy for status projection on the international arena, as a prominent symbol that Russia is a great power, able to show the flag far from its geographical confines. We need to look skeptically at official statements designed to make the Russian Navy feel more secure about its relevance (and budget), instead analyzing the strategy and procurement driving changes in the force. The Russian Navy is coalescing around four principal missions: defense of Russia’s maritime approaches and littorals, long-range precision strike with conventional and nuclear weapons, power projection via the submarine force, and defense of the sea-based nuclear deterrent carried aboard Russian SSBNs.

                                                                                Alongside these missions is the traditional requirement for naval diplomacy for which Russia will always keep a few capital ships, even if they are as unlucky and unreliable as the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier. Upholding Russia’s status in international politics is one of the Russian Navy’s most important roles. Status projection might rank on par with power projection. Indeed, during the hard times of the 1990s and 2000s, the Russian Navy did little other than flag waving trips and ports of call. Naval diplomacy, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, remains one of its chief tasks.

                                                                                The Russian vision is to build a navy that can successfully keep the United States at arm’s length and integrate with layers of defenses, long-range anti-ship missiles, ground based aviation, submarines, coastal cruise-missile batteries and mines. In this manner Russia wishes to deny the United States access from the sea and make forced entry operations costly. Next, the Russian Navy is increasingly positioned to conduct long-range attacks with conventional weapons against fixed infrastructure targets, and plays an important role in nuclear escalation if called upon. The latest doctrine explicitly states the navy’s role in both long-range conventional fires and nonstrategic nuclear-weapons delivery as a means of deterring adversaries and shaping their decisionmaking in a crisis. While the numbers of current cruise-missile shooters may be relatively small, the next state armament program, GPV 2018–2025, intends to spend more on the missile count.

                                                                                Russia’s demands for power projection are quite low. Its armed forces don’t play away games, and are geared towards fighting just across the street. That’s where Russia’s core interests and priorities lie. As such, long-range aviation can handle missile strikes at considerable distances from the country’s borders. The submarine force, however, simply has to help defend SSBN bastions and present a credible threat to the United States. This is of course easier said than done, but Russia is probably by far the most technologically sophisticated adversary the United States faces in the undersea domain. Incidentally it also has the world’s second largest nuclear-powered submarine force.

                                                                                How the Russians Plan to Get There

                                                                                Russia began with a corvette and frigate construction program—in part because it’s what the shipyards could reliably build—in the hopes of moving on to larger ship classes later. This was a logical approach to reviving the shipbuilding industry, the worst of Russia’s defense-industrial enterprises.

                                                                                That said, there’s much more to these ships than meets the eye. One thing the Russians have learned is that one does not need a lot of tonnage to pack a potent missile system. The surface combatant force is not being organized around platforms, but around an integrated family of capabilities. These include vertical launching system (VLS) cells with Oniks (SS-N-26), Kalibr (SS-N-27A/30), Pantsir-M for point defenses, Redut VLS cells for air defense, and Paket-NK anti-torpedo systems. Larger ships will carry Poliment-Redut air defense, phased array radar and be more versatile in the roles they can perform. A Russian corvette comes with a seventy-six-millimeter gun or a one-hundred-millimeter gun, close-in weapon systems (CIWS) and typically eight VLS cells. These ships tend to be low endurance, but the firepower-to-price ratio is a bargain, and they can comfortably do their job while just outside port.

                                                                                Russian frigates, both the Admiral Grigorovich-class (four thousand tons) and the new Admiral Gorshkov-class (5,400 tons) ran into trouble because they depended on Ukrainian gas turbines. Cut off in 2014, Russia was set back five to seven years with engines for just three Grigorovich frigates and two Gorshkovs. Since then, Russia’s defense industry has already restored the ability to repair gas turbines and built the testing facility to develop its own design. The delay cost Russia’s shipbuilding program about five years, but it spurred a crash effort to produce an indigenous gas turbine, which seems to be making rather good progress.

                                                                                Similar problems encountered with the cutoff of German MTU diesel engines, used in some of the new corvettes, were worked around with domestic analogues or Chinese variants. Russia’s shipbuilding program is through the worst of the delays caused by sanctions and the breakdown of defense cooperation with Ukraine. The shipbuilding industry as a whole has been going through a difficult recovery period, having taken a twenty-five-year hiatus, but it would be wrong to assess this unpleasant past as inherently representative of the future. For example, Russia has been building a large new shipyard in the east, called Zvezda, with the assistance of the Chinese. Intended for commercial production, this shipyard just installed a 1,200-ton crane, which is a necessity for modular construction and no small leap for Russian shipbuilding.

                                                                                Older Ships Can Kill Too

                                                                                Currently held views on Russia’s naval capabilities are decidedly dated. In reality, Russia’s Navy has probably not seen operational tempo and readiness levels like this since the mid 1990s. Russian ships, including notoriously unreliable ones like the Sovremenny-class destroyer, are conducting increasingly longer voyages, while the force as a whole is spending much more time at sea than in the two preceding decades. A large part of the fleet is still Soviet inheritance, requiring tug boats to escort small groups, but this supposedly rusting navy is maintaining presence while the submarine force is also no less active. Nowhere is that more visible than in the resurrection of the Black Sea Fleet after the annexation of Crimea and the constant rotation of ships through the Eastern Mediterranean. The oft-unacknowledged truth is that the Russian Navy is a lot more operational now than it has been in many years.

                                                                                The surface combatant force remains an eclectic mix of legacy Soviet platforms serving alongside new frigates and corvettes. Over 30 percent of the Soviet-era ships are receiving major modernization programs, but a good deal will be phased out in the 2020s. Russia will likely keep the Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers for quite longer, as flagships and status bearers, especially when Admiral Nakhimov completes its expensive modernization. Beyond that, much of the inherited Soviet force is expendable, especially the ancient tank landing ship (LST) fleet, which is hardly required for expeditionary operations and needs little to no modernization. Russia supplied the bulk of the tonnage for its operations in Syria with four used Turkish cargo ships that it probably bought at a pittance—so much for the Russian Navy being unable to sustain expeditionary operations without dedicated capacity. Necessity is not always the mother of procurement, sometimes organizations innovate.

                                                                                Russia couldn’t get the frigates it wanted, and so it is doubling down on larger and larger corvettes until the engine problem is solved. When it comes to ship classes much can get lost in translation. Often when Russians say “corvette” they mean the firepower of a frigate, and when they say “frigate” they mean the firepower of a destroyer. There are also signs that older Soviet ship classes, like Udaloy-class anti-submarine destroyers, will be armed with Kalibr VLS cells. This would adapt Soviet hulls to better serve the strategy and vision behind the new navy Russia is trying to build, and thus extend their utility.

                                                                                However, the Russian surface force still suffers from “distributed classality,” a disease inherited from the Soviet Union. Its chief symptom is building too many different ship classes with too few ships in each class. This, of course, is not a problem but a feature of Russian procurement, since it allows the Ministry of Defense to keep shipyards busy and employed building countless corvette variants, most of which will feature the same families of weapon systems. Part of the problem is also that the Russian Navy is learning what it wants—and what works—by building three to four ships in a class and then determining that changes should be made. The transition, like all remodeling jobs, is messy and will continue to look this way into the 2020s.

                                                                                The Russian Navy Looks Best Underwater

                                                                                Like the Soviet fleet, the Russian Navy’s best ships are submarines. This force is perhaps one fifth the size of its Soviet predecessor. Russia’s SSN roster includes ten Akulas, eight Oscars, three Victor IIIs, and perhaps three Sierras. The SSBN fleet has six Delta IVs and three Delta IIIs, along with three of the eight new Borei-class being built. The diesel-electric force consists of fourteen Project 877 kilos, six improved Project 636.3 kilos in the Black Sea Fleet, with another six being built for the Pacific Fleet.

                                                                                While some of these submarines will begin to age into the 2020s and 2030s, several have had life extension and modernization packages already applied, and most have seen little in terms of operations through much of the 1990s and 2000s. Currently, a number of Russia’s SSNs and SSGNs are sitting in slipways receiving upgrades. Many of these subs have not been ridden very hard, and given Russian naval strategy centered on defending maritime approaches, they don’t have to venture far from home. Some believe that Russia’s submarine fleet is quickly approaching the end of its collective life span by 2030 and can’t be replaced in time. On the off chance they’re completely wrong, anyone thinking about forced-entry operations, or an easy trip into a Russian SSBN bastion, should probably bring life rafts.

                                                                                Russia plans to upgrade some Akulas and Oscars, perhaps half, with new systems and missiles. In the case of the Oscar SSGNs, the conversion will produce a seventy-two missile package, with Kalibr or Oniks loaded. The rest will be retired, probably leaving Russia with four to six Akulas, four Oscars and no Victor IIIs by 2030. Sierra-class submarines will stay on since their titanium hulls are likely to outlive most of the readers of this article. Meanwhile Russia is building five more Borei-class SSBNs, and is completing the second ship of the Yasen-class SSGN (known in the United States as Severodvinsk-class), the Kazan. The Kazan (Project 885M) is an improved version of the Severodvinsk and the true lead ship in this class. Five more have been laid down, although given the submarine’s high cost, Russia is unlikely to build all of them, and might cap the class at a total of six or seven.

                                                                                Despite the problems in Russian shipbuilding, submarine construction has actually fared quite well. Russia can produce a diesel-electric Kilo in about eighteen months, and can complete an order of six quite quickly. The entire diesel-electric fleet could be replaced with upgraded Project 636.3 submarines in eight to ten years. These submarines are cheap, quiet and can range much of the critical infrastructure in Europe with their Kalibr missiles. Success with air-independent propulsion continues to elude Russian engineers, but the 677 Lada-class is still going ahead in limited production as a tentative improvement on the Kilo.

                                                                                The eight new SSBNs are due to be completed by 2021, and seven Yasen-class SSGNs by 2023. Assuming these deadlines slip to the right, as they always do, it would probably still leave Russia with eight new SSBNs and six advanced SSGNs by the mid-2020s. The refit packages on Akulas and Oscars will make Russia’s submarine fleet more multipurpose and versatile, allowing the same ships to perform new missions.

                                                                                In the interim, Russia is designing a fifth-generation submarine that will serve as the base for a new SSN, SSGN and follow-on SSBN. These ships are intended to be modular, and the SSN variant particularly cheap to produce. Russia currently has twelve nuclear-powered submarines in construction or laid down. Not all are being worked on, but it’s evident that Russia can build quite a few nuclear-powered submarines at the same time. Assuming the first fifth-generation submarines are laid down by 2023–2025, Russia could begin recapitalizing retiring Soviet submarines by early 2030s. Most likely the Russian Navy will have thirteen less SSNs and SSGNs by 2030, made up for by six new Yasen-class SSGNs along with whatever additional submarines are built between 2025–2030.

                                                                                The Yasen-class is of special note, since it is integral to Russia’s strategy of holding the U.S. homeland at risk in the event of a conflict. According to official statements, the submarine is the most technologically advanced adversary the United States faces in the undersea domain. Yes, Russia can only afford to build a handful, but this should bring little comfort and no cause for cheer. A single Yasen-class in the Atlantic can deliver thirty-two nuclear-tipped Kalibr missiles to the east coast. This is not a submarine one needs to have in large numbers.

                                                                                Russia also has another navy, the one less heard from, called the General Directorate of Undersea Research (GUGI). This fleet has special purpose submarines based on modified Soviet designs, like the Podmoskovye Delta-stretch SSBN. Some are meant as motherships for smaller submarines, others perhaps to deploy drones, new weapon systems, or engage in innovative forms of undersea interdiction. Belgorod, a modified Oscar II, is currently under construction for this fleet as well. You may not spend much time thinking about GUGI, but GUGI is probably thinking about you.

                                                                                Looking over the Horizon

                                                                                The Russia’s defense industry still has plenty of problems to work through, from dysfunctional air-defense systems that struggle with integration, to air-independent propulsion that refuses to work. Nevertheless, there are interesting trends afoot based on the past several years of shipbuilding. Russian ship classes are staying the same in name, but the ships themselves are getting bigger. Note the Stereguichy corvette started at 2,200 tons when it was Project 20380, then it became 2,500 tons as Project 20385 (Gremyashchiy), and then it was laid down for 3,400 tons when modified to Project 20386 (Derzky). Similarly, rather than build some obscene nuclear-powered seventeen-thousand-ton destroyer, the Russian Navy seems set to expand the Gorshkov frigate class into a “super” Gorshkov. This might become a pocket destroyer, with one thousand to two thousand additional tons of displacement and more firepower. Corvette designs are also shifting towards “heavy” corvettes in the 3,500–4,000 ton range.

                                                                                At first glance the Russian Navy appears to be the loser in the upcoming state armament program, soon to be announced in September. In reality, it will lose fairly little. The inane super projects like nuclear-powered destroyers and LHDs were unfunded, saving the Russian Navy from its occasional indulgence of maritime power megalomania, and instead focusing it on more pragmatic spending. Russia’s frigate program will continue once the gas-turbine problem is solved, but likely with a substantial redesign. The countless new systems introduced with the Gorshkov class all need to be worked out anyway.

                                                                                In the interim the Russian Navy will remain a mess, but one that is slowly being cleaned up. The “kalibrzation” of the Russian Navy will continue, more Kalibr missile shooters, larger magazines and higher missile counts in storage. Russia will continue pumping out diesel and nuclear-powered submarines and refitting some of the existing Soviet platforms with current generation offensive systems as a cost-saving measure.

                                                                                While the coming years will be spent on system integration and working out the problems in shipbuilding, new generation weapon systems—like hypersonic missiles—are already in development. For all its woes, the Russian Navy is actually in better shape than it ever has been in the post–Cold War period. Today ships and submarines are staffed entirely by contract servicemen, with conscripts used for shore duties. On the whole this is a service trying to recover from some of the worst decades in its history, but the Russian admiralty has room for cautious optimism.

                                                                                There are still plenty of deficits to point to, but the Russian Navy isn’t going anywhere; when you look at the trend lines over the near to midterm, they are actually positive. Russia is building a navy that makes sense for its strategy. It is transitioning to a green-water force by design, while retaining and investing in capabilities that will allow it to deter or threaten stronger maritime powers for decades to come. So the next time you hear that the Russian Navy is disappearing, Russia is running out of people, out of money, or out of business, and want to test this theory, just remember to pack a life raft.

                                                                                Shipbuilding updates from Russia’s naval salon (МВМС-2017)

                                                                                Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                                                Last week Russia concluded its annual international naval salon in St. Petersburg. Below I offer some quick takes on the likely implications for Russian shipbuilding, new classes, modifications to current ship classes, etc.

                                                                                First the shipbuilding illness that Russia’s Navy inherited from the USSR, which I call ‘distributed classality,’ looks set to continue. This is a procurement disease whose symptoms include building numerous ship classes, in small batches, with similar missions and displacement. Project numbers are produced in series of 2-4 ships prior to radically changing the ship design, or launching a new ship class of similar type. The Russian Navy’s frigate and especially corvette construction program has honorably continued this tradition.

                                                                                Russia’s corvettes and frigates are set to get bigger in order to accommodate larger magazines and more weapon systems. The general direction is heavier corvettes and frigates, with modifications in existing designs and some new ‘heavy’ variants afoot.

                                                                                Corvettes:

                                                                                There is a new ‘heavy corvette’ design in the works (project 23800) displacing well over 2000 tons, probably more towards 3500-4000. This is probably the consequence of a general dissatisfaction with the performance and characteristics of the Steregushchiy-class corvette (project 20380) which began at 2200 tons. We should recall the current trajectory of this corvette design. The first ship of the modified project 20385 Gremyashchiy, originally meant to use German MTU engines, was just recently launched at around 2500 tons. Meanwhile project 20386 Derzky which includes substantial redesign and a ‘stealthy’ look was laid down for an estimated 3400 tons displacement.

                                                                                Derzky render:

                                                                                The debate on whether Russia needs any more ships in the 2000 ton displacement range continues, and while the experience of ship designs from early and mid-2000 may indicate that it clearly does not, Russian shipyards need to build something. Keep in mind current smaller corvette/missile boat classes in the 800-1500 ton range include Buyan-M, Bykov large patrol ships, and the more promising Karakurt (project 22800).

                                                                                Karakurt looks like a better and more compact design of what Buyan-M was supposed to be, with two currently under construction, and yet Zelenodolsk is still building 4 more Buyan-Ms.

                                                                                Apparently Krilovsky design bureau presented a fantastical design for yet another 2000 ton corvette called Briz. This ship would make 30 knots, pack a 100mm gun, 32 short + 16 long air defense missiles, and 24 Kalibr/Oniks land attack missiles in VLS tubes, along with Paket anti-submarine torpedoes. There’s nothing to dislike except that its somewhat impossible to have all these features, and a helicopter to boot, in a 2000 ton displacement corvette. The ship design is no doubt based on new physical principles to have so many capabilities and a displacement smaller than the base Steregushchiy-class.

                                                                                ‘Briz’ corvette infographic (because Russia needs another corvette)

                                                                                Frigates:

                                                                                Just as the current corvette classes are too small, and are getting bigger, the same goes for frigates. The absence of gas turbines from Ukraine stalled out Gorshkov-class frigate production at two, and created an opportunity for further expansion of the design to the ‘Super-Gorshkov.’ That suggests there will be 2-4 Gorshkov-class frigates in this series, and then something new that’s at least 1000 tons larger. The Gorshkov redesign is a problem turned into a feature in Russian naval procurement. Super-Gorshkov is moving forward as a reality, perhaps going up as high as 7000-8000 tons in displacement.

                                                                                This would substantially expand the current Gorshkov design and raise questions as to whether or not Russia really needs a new destroyer. In truth, the upcoming state armament program GPV 2018-2025 is probably not going to fund a single Leader-class, but it may pay for several ‘super-Gorshkovs’ which could be considered a cheaper, more practical, and less exuberant platform that will still have potent capabilities (once they get air defenses to work).

                                                                                Gorshkov Frigate (Poliment-Redut air defense doesn’t work yet)

                                                                                Amphibious model ships:

                                                                                It seems the Navy is narrowing its prospective fleet of amphibious ships, all of which currently exist in plastic model form, down to two amphibious variants: a 15,000 ton LPD that will be able to operate in the Arctic, and a larger up to 35,000 ton universal amphibious assault ship. Several variants have been disclosed, including ‘Priboi’ and ‘Lavina’ as a sample of the potential projects proposed. Priboi is expected to cost 40 billion RUB, displace 14,000 tons, and have a deck capable of carrying 8 helicopters. Meanwhile Lavina is larger in the 23,000-24,000 ton range, carrying 16 helicopters. However it’s unclear whether either of these designs are in the final two being examined by the Russian Navy.

                                                                                Lavina LHD model

                                                                                [Warship] Russia's own 'Mistral' Amphibious Assault Ship, complete with Blackjack and Hookers: Introducing the "Lavina"-class LPD Concept. - [1417 x 812]

                                                                                Officials continue to announce that something will be laid down and built towards the end of GPV 2018-2025. My suspicion is that work on these ships is backloaded towards the mid-2020s and at best something would be laid down five years from now.

                                                                                Info above gathered from several blogs and accounts of what was presented at the salon, including from Constantin Bogdanov’s at Lenta.ru

                                                                                Russian Navy Part 3: Impressive Beneath the Waves

                                                                                Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                                                                Third installment in my article series with Norman Polmar on the Russian Navy for the USNI Proceedings Magazine.

                                                                                The modern Russian Navy, similar to its Soviet predecessor, looks best underwater. Russia’s fitful attempts to revive its surface fleet could leave some observers unimpressed, but such criticism misses the point that the country’s current naval power largely resides in its subma­rine force.

                                                                                Russia has retained the industrial ca­pacity and knowhow to produce capable submarines. Today the navy is recapital­izing its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, which has the highest naval priority, modernizing its nuclear-powered guided-missile and at­tack submarine (SSGN/SSN) force, and still pumping out venerable diesel-electric submarines (SS), which are upgraded to launch land-attack missiles.

                                                                                In 2015, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov (now retired), lauded a 50 percent in­crease in submarine patrols, but this fresh life comes from a force that had been largely missing from the world’s oceans in the preceding 15 years. Russia’s op­erational submarine force consists of an estimated: 12 SSBNs, 8 SSGNs, 11 SSNs, and 20 SSs. There also are several spe­cial-purpose nuclear and diesel-electric submarines.

                                                                                While this undersea force is but a frac­tion of the Soviet strength during the Cold War—which approached 400 (largely die­sel) submarines in the 1960s—the current emphasis on submarine development and construction is readily evident.

                                                                                After the collapse of the Soviet Union, submarine production slowed and then came to a halt. The first prototype Yasen-class SSGN—the Severodvinsk—was laid down in 1993 and the first Borey-class SSBN—the Yuri Dolgorukiy—in 1996, but construction on both ceased soon after. In the decade or more of that hiatus, both sub­marines were extensively redesigned, and when they belatedly went to sea they were very different from their original designs.

                                                                                Prior to the arrival of the first Borey, Russia’s sea-based deterrent consisted of three Delta III and six Delta IV submarines plus one Typhoon in limited service as a missile test ship. The Delta IIIs, completed between 1979 and 1982, are outdated and have seen relatively little time at sea com­pared to their U.S. counterparts.

                                                                                Three Borey-class SSBNs have been completed. The Aleksander Nevskiy and Vladimir Monomakh are now in the Pa­cific Fleet, while the Yuri Dolgorukiy is in service with the Northern Fleet. Five additional Borey SSBNs are under con­struction, all scheduled to enter service by 2021, although construction delays are common. These ships each carry 16 solid-fuel Bulava missiles, given the NATO des­ignation SS-N-32. The missile itself had a troublesome development history largely due to production quality issues, but de­spite several test failures it has been de­clared operational since 2013. The Bulava is reported to sacrifice range and warhead payload for increased survivability against ballistic missile defenses.

                                                                                Russia has not announced the scrapping of any Delta IIIs, but its strategic forces are now significantly above the 1,550 de­ployed nuclear warhead count agreed to under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Re­duction Treaty. This limit must be met by February 2018, and likely will require the decommissioning of several older SSBNs.

                                                                                The lead unit of the Yasen class SSGNs—the Severodvinsk—represents the most advanced undersea adversary now faced by the U.S. Navy. Launched nearly two decades after being laid down, she was extensively redesigned and is Russia’s first truly multipurpose submarine. The Severodvinsk is capable of antisubmarine, antiship, and land-attack missions. Among the more interesting features are a large bow sonar dome for the Irtysh-Amfora sonar system and an amidships battery of eight vertical-launch cells that can carry 32 Kalibr (SS-N-27/30 Sizzler) or Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile) cruise missiles. These antiship and land-attack weapons are par­ticularly significant after Russian surface ships and submarines fired long-range mis­siles into Syria in 2016.

                                                                                The Severodvinsk, lead ship of Yasen-class

                                                                                xlarge_yasen

                                                                                The Severodvinsk spent more than two years on sea trials, reportedly hav­ing significant propulsion and noise-level problems that delayed her commission­ing. Subsequent submarines of this design have been modified with changes said to include a different sonar arrangement. Six are reported to be under construction.

                                                                                Russia’s older SSGNs—the Oscar II se­ries—are receiving facelifts, with several undergoing modernization. Some of the Oscars will have their existing 24 missile tubes for the P-700 Granit (SS-N-19) mis­sile refitted to carry 72 Kalibr or P-800 Oniks missiles. The Granit missile was principally an anticarrier weapon. Armed with the latest missiles, the Oscar II will be more versatile.

                                                                                Now in development is a new Rus­sian “hunter-killer” submarine. This SSN will have the primary role of countering Western SSBNs. The new SSN is prob­ably a significant program, but very little is known about it other than construction is slated to begin in the near future.

                                                                                An Oscar-II class SSGN

                                                                                oscar-ii

                                                                                While all nuclear submarine construc­tion is now undertaken at the massive Severodvinsk shipyard in northern Russia, four other shipyards are producing diesel-electric Kilo submarines. There are sev­eral variants of the Kilo, first completed in December 1980. More than 20 were built for Soviet/Russian service, and about 40 units were built for export to Algeria, China, India, Iran, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam. An improved version, known as Project 636.3, is one of the defense in­dustry’s most popular exports, carrying the export variant of the Kalibr antiship and land-attack missile. Russia recently completed an order of six for Vietnam.

                                                                                Six improved Kilo submarines are being added to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which is being revived at a remarkable pace. An identical squadron has been promised to the Pacific Fleet by 2021. One Kilo fired Kalibr missiles at targets in Syria as part of the Russian air-ground-naval interven­tion in the Syrian civil war.

                                                                                The construction of modernized Kilos continues in part because of the Russian failure to produce a submarine with an ef­fective air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. Three submarines of the Lada class were begun, but after difficulties with the AIP plant only the lead unit, the Sankt Peterburg, was completed in 2010—with conventional diesel-electric propulsion. She now is in the Northern Fleet. The two unfinished Lada-class sub­marines are scheduled for completion in 2018 and 2019, but the class as a whole has been a failure. It is unclear what Rus­sia ultimately will do with Sankt Peter­burg’s sister ships once finished. Hopes for an AIP submarine now are being placed on the Kalina class, a new design likely to employ AIP, about which little is known publicly.

                                                                                The continuation of non-nuclear sub­marines offers several benefits to Russia: the ability to conduct operations in re­stricted waters where nuclear submarines are impractical (Baltic and Black seas); coastal defense missions; and special op­erations where larger, nuclear submarines are not required and could be considered a liability; as well as ease of production compared to nuclear submarines. Armed with land-attack missiles, cheaper diesel submarines can range the European and Asian theaters while staying relatively close to home waters. They also are easy to produce and a good source of hard cur­rency for Russia’s shipbuilding industry.

                                                                                Beyond combat submarines, there is another Russian submarine force that answers to its own command. The Navy’s General Directorate of Under­sea Research (GUGI) maintains several special-purpose undersea craft. Some are conversions of older submarines, such as the Delta “stretch” SSBN designs, while others are new construction units. These special-purpose submarines—nuclear and diesel-electric—are employed in several roles, including supporting submarine weapon and systems development; con­ducting deep-ocean antisubmarine proj­ects; and mapping and possibly interdict­ing seafloor fiber-optic cable networks. Some of GUGI’s submarines serve as mother ships for deep divers such as the “Losharik” special-purpose subma­rine. Others may deploy underwater drones with nuclear warheads such as the recently revealed “Status-6” weapon, which will be carried externally. Many press reports credit the Status-6 with incredibly high speed, long range, and a multi-megaton warhead—claims that likely are unrealistic. But even if those performance figures are off significantly, it still will be an innovative weapon and need to be countered.

                                                                                Podmoskovye, a modified Delta-stretch SSBN, designed to dock smaller submersibles in the bottom half of the hull.

                                                                                podmoskovye

                                                                                Russia’s submarine fleet may be a dwarf force compared to its Soviet predecessor and even its contemporary U.S. Navy adversary, but it is still the heart of the navy’s combat capability. Its SSBN replacement program con­tinues apace, while new SSGN/SSN designs promise to test the dominance the U.S. Navy has grown accustomed to in the undersea domain. Given the troubled state of the Russian economy, it is difficult to predict how long the country can sustain the current levels of construction and readiness, but for now this force has been imbued with fresh life. Russian submarines produced in this decade will shape the underwater military balance well into the 2030s.

                                                                                Reprinted with permission from the U.S. Naval Institute. Copyright U.S. Naval Institute.

                                                                                Russian Navy: Part 2 – One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?

                                                                                Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                                                The second installment of my series with Norman Polmar.  This article originally appeared in the January edition of the Proceedings Magazine.

                                                                                The surface combatants in today’s Russian Navy are an eclectic mix of mostly Soviet-era designs built in the 1980s and early 1990s—from guided-missile cruisers to a host of small missile boats, frigates, corvettes, and legacy flotsam inherited by the five fleets.

                                                                                The Russian Navy still has “capital ships”—including the nuclear-powered battle cruiser Petr Velikiy and the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov, which recently made her combat debut off Syria. Similarly, three Slava-class missile cruisers are in service, as well as at least two operational Sovremenny-class destroyers, and eight Udaloy-class large antisubmarine ships. But after this short listing of major warships, one begins to count the smaller, lesser ships and craft. Two Neustrashimyy-class frigates in the Baltic and a pair of Krivak frigates assigned to the Black Sea Fleet bring up the rear guard, together with two newer Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates and three of the Admiral Grigorovich design. Perhaps another 60 corvettes, patrol boats, and missile boats—many with advanced missiles—round out the current surface forces. Thus sails the remnants of the massive, ocean-going fleet built by Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov.

                                                                                For the past two decades, the Russian Navy’s principal purpose has been status projection, showing the flag to demonstrate Russia as a great power outside its land boundaries. Squadrons of two or three ships—sometimes including the Petr Velikiy—typically would undertake port visits or exercises, always with a tanker and a tug in escort, given the frequency of breakdowns among Soviet-era ships.

                                                                                Indeed, some of today’s Russian Navy ships are akin to floating naval museums: the Smetlivyy, a Kashin-class guided-missile destroyer, launched in 1968, is still in service. Despite being overhauled in the 1990s, she impresses no one. Russia’s amphibious ships also suffer from aging. The Ivan Gren-class tank landing ships (LSTs), intended to replace the aging Alligator and Ropucha classes, so far number only one ship, with only one other yet laid down. The first ship of the class took 12 years from laying the keel to entering service. The Alligators and Ropuchas now vary in age from 25 to nearly 50 years. Remarkably, with life extensions and modernization, these LSTs remain in service and are supporting Russian forces fighting in Syria. They should not be underestimated. In fact, five landing ships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet demonstrated the ability to land a battalion during exercises in Crimea as recently as September 2016. The two French-built Mistral-class helicopter-carrying landing ships (LHAs) were embargoed after the Russian seizure of Crimea and have been sold to Egypt.

                                                                                The Russian Navy’s vision for next-generation warships began with corvette and frigate construction programs—in part because they are ships Russian shipyards still can produce in significant numbers—and then moves on to larger ships in the next decade. However, large, nuclear-powered destroyers of the so-called Lider class, promised to be laid down in 2019, are unlikely to be completed in the 2020s, if at all. Such projects are announced regularly to domestic applause, but they are likely to remain on paper for a decade if not longer.

                                                                                The restoration of the Russian surface fleet has met with harsh realities. First, about one-half of the Soviet shipyards building warships were “relocated” outside of the country when the Soviet regime fell in 1991. No different from the rest of Russia’s defense industry, shipbuilding has survived in large part on export orders from other countries. Ships being built for foreign navies, as well as those for domestic service, have suffered long delays and cost overruns. Some shipyards worked slowly in the hope of extending work, while their prominent owners embezzled funds and often fled the country.

                                                                                Russia also was entirely dependent on Ukraine for gas turbines for large ship propulsion, a legacy of the integrated defense industry of the Soviet Union. When ties were broken after the Russian seizure of the Crimea in 2014, Russia found itself in possession of engines for only two Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates and three Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates then under construction. Other ships of these classes were left with empty engineering spaces.

                                                                                Lead ship of the class Admiral Grigorovich below.

                                                                                Admiral_Grigorovich-class_frigate_project_11356_Russia_1.jpg

                                                                                Russia’s solution to this predicament has been to delay both frigate lines awaiting future indigenous turbine production, expected no sooner than 2018, and to sell existing Grigorovich hulls to India as part of a large arms deal, with the expectation that Ukraine will supply India with its gas turbines. Domestic frigate (and larger ship) production will stall while Russia tries to develop domestic gas turbines. In the meantime, the only new surface combatants at the Navy’s piers will be corvettes and lesser craft.

                                                                                Another problem—how to repair gas turbines traditionally overhauled in Ukraine—has been partially solved by the Russian firm Novik, located in Samara on the Volga River. Novik has completed maintenance and repair on a Neustrashimmy-class frigate. There may be a line of ships waiting for such overhauls, especially given the current, high operational tempo. Western sanctions following the Crimea seizure also have taken their toll, cutting off supplies of German MTU diesel engines for some corvettes and forcing a shift to less reliable domestic engines.

                                                                                The State Armament Program, announced in 2011, breathed new life into Russian shipbuilding. Valued at 20 trillion rubles at the time ($670 billion), the program allocated roughly one-quarter of its expenditure to military shipbuilding, but delays are likely to continue as the gas turbine and diesel propulsion issues are being solved. The Russian Navy’s near-term vision is sacrificing displacement and endurance to build smaller warships with families of advanced defensive and offensive systems. They are a philosophical break from specialization to smaller, multipurpose designs stressing flexibility and long-range offensive firepower. Russian frigates and corvettes either already feature these weapons or are under construction with them integrated into the design. These ships combine highly capable antiship and land-attack missiles fired from vertical-launch cells that can house all Kalibr (NATO designation SS-N-27/30) missile variants or Oniks missiles (NATO designation SS-N-26 Strobile).

                                                                                Larger displacement ships feature the Poliment-Redut surface-to-air missile (still in testing), while smaller ships will employ the short-range Pantsir-M variant. Close-in weapon systems have been upgraded, and many ships come with Paket-NK for the antisubmarine/antitorpedo roles. Now in development is the Tsirkon family of hypersonic missiles, planned for deployment on the modernized Petr Velikiy and Admiral Nakhimov and other future ships.

                                                                                Thus, the smaller warships joining the Russian fleet can conduct strikes across Europe, or range hostile ships at great distances. Although their individual magazines may be limited, these ships are easily massed. A typical Russian corvette displacing roughly 1,000 tons is armed with 100-mm and 30-mm guns, eight vertical-launch cells, and advanced electronic warfare and sensor packages.

                                                                                There are interesting additions to the Russian fleet of oceanographic research ships that regularly conduct “research” near Western underwater infrastructure and communication cables. The 5,200-ton Yantar oceanographic research ship was completed in 2013 and is reported to be equipped with two deep submergence vehicles. The Vishnaya-class 3,470-ton intelligence collector Viktor Leonov visited Cuba in 2015, just as U.S.-Cuban relations were undergoing major changes. Plans to construct armed icebreakers with antiship missiles may produce a unique, hybrid ship class. Meanwhile, Russia has not expanded naval sealift—instead reflagging commercial ships as needed.

                                                                                Yantar research ship below.

                                                                                Although reinvigorated, and relatively well-funded at this time, Russia’s Navy will retain one foot in its Soviet past at least through the 2020s. Its transformative vision is not without merit, but it is threatened by delays, outdated shipyards, shortages of engines, and other problems. The abundance of new ship designs demonstrates the Russian Navy continues to suffer from the Soviet disease of distributed “classality,” the inability to produce more than a few warships of any given type before moving on to another design, leading to a diverse and difficult-to-maintain force.

                                                                                Despite its limitations, the Russian Navy has a viable vision for its future—not as the major blue water fleet that was Admiral Gorshkov’s Cold War goal—but as a force that can show the flag in distant waters and support Russian political-military interests in bordering seas.

                                                                                Reprinted with permission from the U.S. Naval Institute. Copywrite U.S. Naval Institute.

                                                                                Toward Smaller Ships and Professional Sailors

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                This article appeared in the December 2016 edition of the Proceedings magazine which I co-authored with Norman Polmar.  Norman is a long time writer and analyst for the U.S. Navy, in particular on the subject of Russian submarines.  This is part 1 of a series on the Russian Navy.

                                                                                A quarter century after the end of the Cold War the old Soviet Navy is steadily disappearing from view and a very different Russian fleet is starting to take its place. Once a challenge on the high seas to the U.S. Navy, today Russia’s surface combatant force is becoming a “green water” force. As Russia steadily retires old Soviet ships, its young replacements are smaller, multipurpose, and with new capabilities. Yet Russia’s vision for a new fleet also is in trouble, beset by construction problems, delays, corruption, and lost years caused by a dependency on gas turbines from Ukraine. Only in submarine construction is there a bright picture, but here, too, there are important questions.

                                                                                In terms of capital ships, today the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) has one aircraft carrier (the Admiral Kuznetsov— currently at sea off the coast of Syria), the sole survivor of an ambitious carrier program initiated in the 1960s. Similarly, only one of the four nuclear-propelled battle cruisers of the Kirov class currently is in service (the Petr Velikiy), although a second (the Admiral Nakhimov) is undergoing major modernization costing more than $2 billion. These ships are legacies, now intended for showing the flag and status projection, demonstrating Russia still is a great power on blue waters.

                                                                                The Kuznetsov continues to suffer engineering problems, evidenced by plumes of black smoke recently seen coming from her stacks. After her current deployment to the Mediterranean, she will begin a multi-year overhaul and modernization that leaves Russia without an aircraft carrier ready for sea. Of the three Slava-class missile cruisers, typically two are available at any time while one is in long-term overhaul. Hence the Moskva and Varyag of that class have taken shifts commanding Russia’s naval squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean, leaving the Pacific Fleet without a proper cruiser-type flagship. The third ship of the class under Russian colors, the Marshal Ustinov, is scheduled to leave the Zvyozdochka Shipyard in Severodvinsk in early 2017 and may go to the Pacific Fleet.

                                                                                Admiral Kuznetsov strike group near Norway on its way down to the Eastern Med, November 2016

                                                                                3641704_original

                                                                                Beyond these “capital ships,” the Russian surface fleet has a small assortment of destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, and auxiliary ships. This situation persists despite the Russian leadership’s disproportionate attention and affection for the navy, especially given that the country is a major—and historically dominant—Eurasian land power. This belief in the importance of naval power dates to the time of Peter the Great (tsar of Russia from 1682 to 1725). Today President Vladimir Putin sees his navy as a means of projecting great power status and garnering attention of world leaders.

                                                                                Meanwhile the Russian General Staff believes the RFN has an important role in securing maritime approaches and the vulnerable littorals on the country’s periphery, and in providing new strike options with land-attack cruise missiles. Even Russia’s dated fleet of amphibious ships and landing craft trains to shift troops around the nation’s vast borders and practices landings, as recently as during exercises in Crimea in September 2016. The Alligator and Ropucha classes of landing ships have been integral to the “Syrian Express,” Russia’s supply line from the Black Sea to support the Assad regime and to provide the logistics train for the Russian ground and air intervention in Syria.

                                                                                During the campaign in Syria, a new generation of Russian Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles, launched from small corvettes, frigates, and diesel-electric submarines, have made their “combat” debut. These ships and submarines are multipurpose platforms, tied more to specific families of weapon systems such as Kalibr and P-800 Oniks (NATO designation SSN-26 Strobile) strike missiles, along with the Poliment-Redut air defense system, which is still in development.

                                                                                Buyan-M class corvette firing Kalibr-nk land attack cruise missiles in 2016

                                                                                Following the seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, the Russian government proceeded with plans to resurrect the largely moribund Black Sea Fleet. Thus this dying naval command has been revived with an influx of new corvettes, submarines, naval infantry, aviation, and coastal defense forces. Together with the Caspian Sea Flotilla, the Black Sea Fleet has had a discernible impact on the Syrian campaign, providing missile attacks as well as local air defense off the port of Tartus.

                                                                                The recent announcement that Russian troops and aviation units will be “permanently” based in Syria further enhances the significance of Tartus and the navy’s logistic support. Meanwhile, from his Crimea headquarters, the Black Sea Fleet commander can confidently project control over most of the Black Sea. With the arrival of a new series of diesel-electric submarines this fleet will increasingly make its presence felt in the Eastern Mediterranean.

                                                                                The men and (a few) women who sail on board Russian navy ships and submarines are increasingly professionals. Gone are the three-year conscripts who formed the enlisted force on board Russian ships. Today the “Red Fleet” is manned primarily by career officers and warrants (the equivalent of senior petty officers in Western navies), and “contract” enlisted men. The few women who serve on board ships are assigned to civilian-manned auxiliary ships (akin to the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command); other women serve in billets of the shore establishment and headquarters staffs.

                                                                                The pay, service conditions, and benefits for naval personnel exponentially have improved since the launch of military reforms in late 2008. Indeed, the most important qualitative improvement across the fleet is the new generation of better trained and better-paid naval personnel. A regular regimen of exercises, drills, and snap checks keep this smaller force at a much higher state of operational readiness than its predecessors.

                                                                                Where is the Russian navy heading? Russia’s shipyards are building submarines, corvettes, and frigates because those are the ships they can produce. These new surface ships—and submarines—are sufficient for controlling the waters of Russia’s periphery. Construction of cruisers, destroyers, and large frigates is at a standstill at this time, primarily because in the past the Russian navy’s gas turbine engines were supplied by Ukraine. While Russian factories are now developing naval gas turbine engines, existing ship designs will require major modifications for their installation.

                                                                                Launch of Admiral Essen, a project 11356 frigate, in Kaliningrad.  This ship is now on active service with the Black Sea Fleet.

                                                                                Significant electronic and navigation gear provided by Western firms is no longer available because of sanctions imposed by Western governments after the Russian takeover of Crimea. The breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 left several key shipyards in newly independent Ukraine and other countries. Of particular importance was the carrier-building facility at Nikolayev in the Ukraine. Significantly, all four submarine construction yards and their suppliers remained within Russian territory.

                                                                                The current Russian navy, a mix of legacy Soviet vessels and new smaller ship classes, is ill suited for long-range operations, and there appears to be no planning for them—at this time. Most of the new surface ships have short endurance and are not designed for long-range operations. Large Soviet platforms, like the nuclear cruiser Petr Velikiy, can still undertake impressive voyages, such as the deployment to South Africa and the Caribbean in 2008. The principal missions of Russia’s surface forces, however, are to prevent the U.S. Navy from approaching Russia’s borders, defend strategic missile submarine bastions, provide alternative land-attack options for the increasingly joint military force, and support Russian “overseas interests” in adjacent areas, at this time in the Middle East.

                                                                                The Russian navy faces limitations in the short term, and it is difficult to foresee what the distant future will hold. The Russian economy shrank in 2015 and will likely stagnate in the near future under continued low oil prices and its long running structural inadequacies. Russia does, on the other hand, retain key shipyards and highly competent surface ship and submarine design bureaus. Given time and funding, the ingredients exist to grow the fleet into a more capable force. Russia’s naval traditions, and the historic interest of its leaders in the maritime domain suggest the St. Andrew’s flag will continue to fly over Russia’s regional seas, and, possibly in the future, the distant seas.

                                                                                Reprinted with permission from the U.S. Naval Institute. Copywrite U.S. Naval Institute.

                                                                                 

                                                                                 

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                                                                                Tag: Surface Combatants

                                                                                Russian Navy: Part 2 – One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?

                                                                                Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                                                The second installment of my series with Norman Polmar.  This article originally appeared in the January edition of the Proceedings Magazine.

                                                                                The surface combatants in today’s Russian Navy are an eclectic mix of mostly Soviet-era designs built in the 1980s and early 1990s—from guided-missile cruisers to a host of small missile boats, frigates, corvettes, and legacy flotsam inherited by the five fleets.

                                                                                The Russian Navy still has “capital ships”—including the nuclear-powered battle cruiser Petr Velikiy and the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov, which recently made her combat debut off Syria. Similarly, three Slava-class missile cruisers are in service, as well as at least two operational Sovremenny-class destroyers, and eight Udaloy-class large antisubmarine ships. But after this short listing of major warships, one begins to count the smaller, lesser ships and craft. Two Neustrashimyy-class frigates in the Baltic and a pair of Krivak frigates assigned to the Black Sea Fleet bring up the rear guard, together with two newer Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates and three of the Admiral Grigorovich design. Perhaps another 60 corvettes, patrol boats, and missile boats—many with advanced missiles—round out the current surface forces. Thus sails the remnants of the massive, ocean-going fleet built by Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov.

                                                                                For the past two decades, the Russian Navy’s principal purpose has been status projection, showing the flag to demonstrate Russia as a great power outside its land boundaries. Squadrons of two or three ships—sometimes including the Petr Velikiy—typically would undertake port visits or exercises, always with a tanker and a tug in escort, given the frequency of breakdowns among Soviet-era ships.

                                                                                Indeed, some of today’s Russian Navy ships are akin to floating naval museums: the Smetlivyy, a Kashin-class guided-missile destroyer, launched in 1968, is still in service. Despite being overhauled in the 1990s, she impresses no one. Russia’s amphibious ships also suffer from aging. The Ivan Gren-class tank landing ships (LSTs), intended to replace the aging Alligator and Ropucha classes, so far number only one ship, with only one other yet laid down. The first ship of the class took 12 years from laying the keel to entering service. The Alligators and Ropuchas now vary in age from 25 to nearly 50 years. Remarkably, with life extensions and modernization, these LSTs remain in service and are supporting Russian forces fighting in Syria. They should not be underestimated. In fact, five landing ships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet demonstrated the ability to land a battalion during exercises in Crimea as recently as September 2016. The two French-built Mistral-class helicopter-carrying landing ships (LHAs) were embargoed after the Russian seizure of Crimea and have been sold to Egypt.

                                                                                The Russian Navy’s vision for next-generation warships began with corvette and frigate construction programs—in part because they are ships Russian shipyards still can produce in significant numbers—and then moves on to larger ships in the next decade. However, large, nuclear-powered destroyers of the so-called Lider class, promised to be laid down in 2019, are unlikely to be completed in the 2020s, if at all. Such projects are announced regularly to domestic applause, but they are likely to remain on paper for a decade if not longer.

                                                                                The restoration of the Russian surface fleet has met with harsh realities. First, about one-half of the Soviet shipyards building warships were “relocated” outside of the country when the Soviet regime fell in 1991. No different from the rest of Russia’s defense industry, shipbuilding has survived in large part on export orders from other countries. Ships being built for foreign navies, as well as those for domestic service, have suffered long delays and cost overruns. Some shipyards worked slowly in the hope of extending work, while their prominent owners embezzled funds and often fled the country.

                                                                                Russia also was entirely dependent on Ukraine for gas turbines for large ship propulsion, a legacy of the integrated defense industry of the Soviet Union. When ties were broken after the Russian seizure of the Crimea in 2014, Russia found itself in possession of engines for only two Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates and three Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates then under construction. Other ships of these classes were left with empty engineering spaces.

                                                                                Lead ship of the class Admiral Grigorovich below.

                                                                                Admiral_Grigorovich-class_frigate_project_11356_Russia_1.jpg

                                                                                Russia’s solution to this predicament has been to delay both frigate lines awaiting future indigenous turbine production, expected no sooner than 2018, and to sell existing Grigorovich hulls to India as part of a large arms deal, with the expectation that Ukraine will supply India with its gas turbines. Domestic frigate (and larger ship) production will stall while Russia tries to develop domestic gas turbines. In the meantime, the only new surface combatants at the Navy’s piers will be corvettes and lesser craft.

                                                                                Another problem—how to repair gas turbines traditionally overhauled in Ukraine—has been partially solved by the Russian firm Novik, located in Samara on the Volga River. Novik has completed maintenance and repair on a Neustrashimmy-class frigate. There may be a line of ships waiting for such overhauls, especially given the current, high operational tempo. Western sanctions following the Crimea seizure also have taken their toll, cutting off supplies of German MTU diesel engines for some corvettes and forcing a shift to less reliable domestic engines.

                                                                                The State Armament Program, announced in 2011, breathed new life into Russian shipbuilding. Valued at 20 trillion rubles at the time ($670 billion), the program allocated roughly one-quarter of its expenditure to military shipbuilding, but delays are likely to continue as the gas turbine and diesel propulsion issues are being solved. The Russian Navy’s near-term vision is sacrificing displacement and endurance to build smaller warships with families of advanced defensive and offensive systems. They are a philosophical break from specialization to smaller, multipurpose designs stressing flexibility and long-range offensive firepower. Russian frigates and corvettes either already feature these weapons or are under construction with them integrated into the design. These ships combine highly capable antiship and land-attack missiles fired from vertical-launch cells that can house all Kalibr (NATO designation SS-N-27/30) missile variants or Oniks missiles (NATO designation SS-N-26 Strobile).

                                                                                Larger displacement ships feature the Poliment-Redut surface-to-air missile (still in testing), while smaller ships will employ the short-range Pantsir-M variant. Close-in weapon systems have been upgraded, and many ships come with Paket-NK for the antisubmarine/antitorpedo roles. Now in development is the Tsirkon family of hypersonic missiles, planned for deployment on the modernized Petr Velikiy and Admiral Nakhimov and other future ships.

                                                                                Thus, the smaller warships joining the Russian fleet can conduct strikes across Europe, or range hostile ships at great distances. Although their individual magazines may be limited, these ships are easily massed. A typical Russian corvette displacing roughly 1,000 tons is armed with 100-mm and 30-mm guns, eight vertical-launch cells, and advanced electronic warfare and sensor packages.

                                                                                There are interesting additions to the Russian fleet of oceanographic research ships that regularly conduct “research” near Western underwater infrastructure and communication cables. The 5,200-ton Yantar oceanographic research ship was completed in 2013 and is reported to be equipped with two deep submergence vehicles. The Vishnaya-class 3,470-ton intelligence collector Viktor Leonov visited Cuba in 2015, just as U.S.-Cuban relations were undergoing major changes. Plans to construct armed icebreakers with antiship missiles may produce a unique, hybrid ship class. Meanwhile, Russia has not expanded naval sealift—instead reflagging commercial ships as needed.

                                                                                Yantar research ship below.

                                                                                Although reinvigorated, and relatively well-funded at this time, Russia’s Navy will retain one foot in its Soviet past at least through the 2020s. Its transformative vision is not without merit, but it is threatened by delays, outdated shipyards, shortages of engines, and other problems. The abundance of new ship designs demonstrates the Russian Navy continues to suffer from the Soviet disease of distributed “classality,” the inability to produce more than a few warships of any given type before moving on to another design, leading to a diverse and difficult-to-maintain force.

                                                                                Despite its limitations, the Russian Navy has a viable vision for its future—not as the major blue water fleet that was Admiral Gorshkov’s Cold War goal—but as a force that can show the flag in distant waters and support Russian political-military interests in bordering seas.

                                                                                Reprinted with permission from the U.S. Naval Institute. Copywrite U.S. Naval Institute.

                                                                                Toward Smaller Ships and Professional Sailors

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                This article appeared in the December 2016 edition of the Proceedings magazine which I co-authored with Norman Polmar.  Norman is a long time writer and analyst for the U.S. Navy, in particular on the subject of Russian submarines.  This is part 1 of a series on the Russian Navy.

                                                                                A quarter century after the end of the Cold War the old Soviet Navy is steadily disappearing from view and a very different Russian fleet is starting to take its place. Once a challenge on the high seas to the U.S. Navy, today Russia’s surface combatant force is becoming a “green water” force. As Russia steadily retires old Soviet ships, its young replacements are smaller, multipurpose, and with new capabilities. Yet Russia’s vision for a new fleet also is in trouble, beset by construction problems, delays, corruption, and lost years caused by a dependency on gas turbines from Ukraine. Only in submarine construction is there a bright picture, but here, too, there are important questions.

                                                                                In terms of capital ships, today the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) has one aircraft carrier (the Admiral Kuznetsov— currently at sea off the coast of Syria), the sole survivor of an ambitious carrier program initiated in the 1960s. Similarly, only one of the four nuclear-propelled battle cruisers of the Kirov class currently is in service (the Petr Velikiy), although a second (the Admiral Nakhimov) is undergoing major modernization costing more than $2 billion. These ships are legacies, now intended for showing the flag and status projection, demonstrating Russia still is a great power on blue waters.

                                                                                The Kuznetsov continues to suffer engineering problems, evidenced by plumes of black smoke recently seen coming from her stacks. After her current deployment to the Mediterranean, she will begin a multi-year overhaul and modernization that leaves Russia without an aircraft carrier ready for sea. Of the three Slava-class missile cruisers, typically two are available at any time while one is in long-term overhaul. Hence the Moskva and Varyag of that class have taken shifts commanding Russia’s naval squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean, leaving the Pacific Fleet without a proper cruiser-type flagship. The third ship of the class under Russian colors, the Marshal Ustinov, is scheduled to leave the Zvyozdochka Shipyard in Severodvinsk in early 2017 and may go to the Pacific Fleet.

                                                                                Admiral Kuznetsov strike group near Norway on its way down to the Eastern Med, November 2016

                                                                                3641704_original

                                                                                Beyond these “capital ships,” the Russian surface fleet has a small assortment of destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, and auxiliary ships. This situation persists despite the Russian leadership’s disproportionate attention and affection for the navy, especially given that the country is a major—and historically dominant—Eurasian land power. This belief in the importance of naval power dates to the time of Peter the Great (tsar of Russia from 1682 to 1725). Today President Vladimir Putin sees his navy as a means of projecting great power status and garnering attention of world leaders.

                                                                                Meanwhile the Russian General Staff believes the RFN has an important role in securing maritime approaches and the vulnerable littorals on the country’s periphery, and in providing new strike options with land-attack cruise missiles. Even Russia’s dated fleet of amphibious ships and landing craft trains to shift troops around the nation’s vast borders and practices landings, as recently as during exercises in Crimea in September 2016. The Alligator and Ropucha classes of landing ships have been integral to the “Syrian Express,” Russia’s supply line from the Black Sea to support the Assad regime and to provide the logistics train for the Russian ground and air intervention in Syria.

                                                                                During the campaign in Syria, a new generation of Russian Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles, launched from small corvettes, frigates, and diesel-electric submarines, have made their “combat” debut. These ships and submarines are multipurpose platforms, tied more to specific families of weapon systems such as Kalibr and P-800 Oniks (NATO designation SSN-26 Strobile) strike missiles, along with the Poliment-Redut air defense system, which is still in development.

                                                                                Buyan-M class corvette firing Kalibr-nk land attack cruise missiles in 2016

                                                                                Following the seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, the Russian government proceeded with plans to resurrect the largely moribund Black Sea Fleet. Thus this dying naval command has been revived with an influx of new corvettes, submarines, naval infantry, aviation, and coastal defense forces. Together with the Caspian Sea Flotilla, the Black Sea Fleet has had a discernible impact on the Syrian campaign, providing missile attacks as well as local air defense off the port of Tartus.

                                                                                The recent announcement that Russian troops and aviation units will be “permanently” based in Syria further enhances the significance of Tartus and the navy’s logistic support. Meanwhile, from his Crimea headquarters, the Black Sea Fleet commander can confidently project control over most of the Black Sea. With the arrival of a new series of diesel-electric submarines this fleet will increasingly make its presence felt in the Eastern Mediterranean.

                                                                                The men and (a few) women who sail on board Russian navy ships and submarines are increasingly professionals. Gone are the three-year conscripts who formed the enlisted force on board Russian ships. Today the “Red Fleet” is manned primarily by career officers and warrants (the equivalent of senior petty officers in Western navies), and “contract” enlisted men. The few women who serve on board ships are assigned to civilian-manned auxiliary ships (akin to the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command); other women serve in billets of the shore establishment and headquarters staffs.

                                                                                The pay, service conditions, and benefits for naval personnel exponentially have improved since the launch of military reforms in late 2008. Indeed, the most important qualitative improvement across the fleet is the new generation of better trained and better-paid naval personnel. A regular regimen of exercises, drills, and snap checks keep this smaller force at a much higher state of operational readiness than its predecessors.

                                                                                Where is the Russian navy heading? Russia’s shipyards are building submarines, corvettes, and frigates because those are the ships they can produce. These new surface ships—and submarines—are sufficient for controlling the waters of Russia’s periphery. Construction of cruisers, destroyers, and large frigates is at a standstill at this time, primarily because in the past the Russian navy’s gas turbine engines were supplied by Ukraine. While Russian factories are now developing naval gas turbine engines, existing ship designs will require major modifications for their installation.

                                                                                Launch of Admiral Essen, a project 11356 frigate, in Kaliningrad.  This ship is now on active service with the Black Sea Fleet.

                                                                                Significant electronic and navigation gear provided by Western firms is no longer available because of sanctions imposed by Western governments after the Russian takeover of Crimea. The breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 left several key shipyards in newly independent Ukraine and other countries. Of particular importance was the carrier-building facility at Nikolayev in the Ukraine. Significantly, all four submarine construction yards and their suppliers remained within Russian territory.

                                                                                The current Russian navy, a mix of legacy Soviet vessels and new smaller ship classes, is ill suited for long-range operations, and there appears to be no planning for them—at this time. Most of the new surface ships have short endurance and are not designed for long-range operations. Large Soviet platforms, like the nuclear cruiser Petr Velikiy, can still undertake impressive voyages, such as the deployment to South Africa and the Caribbean in 2008. The principal missions of Russia’s surface forces, however, are to prevent the U.S. Navy from approaching Russia’s borders, defend strategic missile submarine bastions, provide alternative land-attack options for the increasingly joint military force, and support Russian “overseas interests” in adjacent areas, at this time in the Middle East.

                                                                                The Russian navy faces limitations in the short term, and it is difficult to foresee what the distant future will hold. The Russian economy shrank in 2015 and will likely stagnate in the near future under continued low oil prices and its long running structural inadequacies. Russia does, on the other hand, retain key shipyards and highly competent surface ship and submarine design bureaus. Given time and funding, the ingredients exist to grow the fleet into a more capable force. Russia’s naval traditions, and the historic interest of its leaders in the maritime domain suggest the St. Andrew’s flag will continue to fly over Russia’s regional seas, and, possibly in the future, the distant seas.

                                                                                Reprinted with permission from the U.S. Naval Institute. Copywrite U.S. Naval Institute.

                                                                                 

                                                                                 

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                                                                                Author: Michael Kofman

                                                                                I study the Russian armed forces, combat operations, military thought, doctrine, strategy, along with broader security issues in the former Soviet space

                                                                                Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

                                                                                Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                                                Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

                                                                                —————————————————————————————————————————————–

                                                                                The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

                                                                                Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

                                                                                The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

                                                                                can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

                                                                                And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

                                                                                 

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                                                                                Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

                                                                                There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

                                                                                VDV praciting loading

                                                                                Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

                                                                                Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

                                                                                airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

                                                                                Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

                                                                                Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

                                                                                These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

                                                                                The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

                                                                                T62 vdv.jpg
                                                                                VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

                                                                                Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

                                                                                But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

                                                                                Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system

                                                                                Michael Kofman6 Comments

                                                                                I’ve recently put out an article on Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system in the well known Russian journal The New Times, under the title “ЧТО ВСЕ-ТАКИ ПУТИН ПОДАРИЛ РОССИЯНАМ НА НОВЫЙ ГОД,” but for those interested, please find the unedited English version below, which hopefully covers the subject in some depth.

                                                                                Earlier in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced at his annual address to the federal assembly that a Russian hypersonic boost-glide system, named Avangard, would start entering serial production. Subsequently on December 26th, 2018 Russian officials claimed that they had successfully conducted a test from the Dombarovsky missile site, to the Kura test range on Kamchatka, some 3,760 miles away. Russia’s president proudly announced that the system as a wonderful ‘New Year’s gift’ to Russia. According to Putin’s statement, the hypersonic glide vehicle is able to conduct intensive maneuvers at speeds in excess of Mach 20, which would render it “invulnerable” to any existing or prospective missile defenses. In this article I will briefly explore the logic behind Russia’s hypersonic boost glide program, recent claims of technological accomplishment, and the strategic implications of deploying such weapon systems.

                                                                                Despite rather questionable public statements about the technical characteristics of this weapon system, a number of which appear inconsistent, it is clear that Russian military science has made considerable advancements along one of the most sophisticated axis of weapons research. While claims pertaining to the readiness of this system to enter serial production, and operational service, are probably exaggerated, the more important questions are conceptual. More than likely Russia will be able to deploy a hypersonic boost glide system in the 2020s, perhaps alongside other hypersonic weapons projects, but the promise of this technology was always at the tactical-operational level of war, not strategic. This was never considered a ‘game changer’ as a system for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. If anything, Russia has invested a substantial amount of money, and years of research, in overdoing its strengths. Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of ‘Russian national achievement’ for domestic audiences, it’s unclear if this weapon system truly answers Russia’s strategic challenges in the coming decades. The question is not whether it works, or when it will work, but does it even matter?

                                                                                Hypersonic boost glide weapons function by using a multi-stage ballistic missile as the boost phase, throwing a vehicle into near earth orbit, which then descends and begins gliding at hypersonic speeds along the edge of the atmosphere. As the vehicle descends back to earth, it pulls upwards, and begins skimming the atmosphere in a ‘glide’ phase, before diving downwards onto its target at the terminal phase. Russia has spent years developing this technology under a project referenced as Object 4202, which married a series of  experimental hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Yu-71, with a liquid fueled ICBM УР-100УНТТХ (NATO designation SS-19 mod 2 Stiletto). This system builds on the Soviet Union’s extensive research into hypersonic weapons programs , including work on a hypersonic-boost aircraft named «Спираль», a modified S-200V surface-to-air missile under the project name Холод, and hypersonic cruise missile programs, such as Kh-80 and Kh-90 GELA (гиперзвуковой экспериментальный летательный аппарат).

                                                                                kh-90 gela
                                                                                Kh-90 GELA
                                                                                kholod
                                                                                Kholod
                                                                                spiral
                                                                                Spiral

                                                                                Although claimed successes in testing may have come as a surprise in 2018, in truth Russian officials have been announcing tests of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle, using the УР-100УНТТХ missile, as far back as the strategic nuclear forces exercise in 2004. Hence, this particular system has been in publicly acknowledged development for at least 14 years, and the glide vehicle itself for quite a few years beforehand. The booster, УР-100 (SS-19), is a 105 ton liquid fueled silo-based missile, which together with the boost glide vehicle payload proved too long for a standard silo. Hence this system is being tested in a modified R-36M2 silo (SS-18 Satan), and although it is being developed with the УР-100, it is meant for the much heavier liquid fueled missile currently in testing, RS-28 Sarmat. While the question of boost method may seem a technicality, the boosting mechanism is actually quite deterministic of the strategic role this weapon can play, as I will discuss a bit later in this article.

                                                                                However, the principal challenges with this system have little to do with the decades established technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or boosting objects into near earth orbit. Hypersonic boost glide vehicles, if successful, represent a major breakthrough in material sciences, as the object must be able to withstand incredibly high temperatures with the payload and guidance system intact. Although impossible to verify, Russian announcements can often be categorized as ‘true lies,’ impressive sounding figures that have some factual basis, but are inevitably inaccurate. The proposition that the vehicle can reach mach 27 is likely true only during the brief return phase, when it is falling back to earth like a rock from near earth orbit, prior to beginning its hypersonic glide at the edges of the atmosphere. The vehicle itself will have considerably different speeds during the pull-up, glide, and dive to target phase, while having to endure incredible temperatures.

                                                                                Below are a few graphical illustrations available on the web

                                                                                explainer 1explainer 2explainer 3

                                                                                In U.S. testing of an analogous system in 2011, Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2), the vehicle was able to sustain glide at mach 20 speeds for three minutes, enduring a temperature of 3500 Fahrenheit. These figures track with Russian statements on temperatures experienced, but the actual speeds and altitudes at which the Russian vehicle is able to glide, and whether the systems actually survive this experience, remain a mystery. Although Russia’s defense sector seems to have made progress on this weapon system, claims that it is ready for serial production, or operational deployment in the near future, should be treated with educated skepticism. Ironically, the most significant potential breakthrough is in material sciences, not in building a seemingly scary strategic weapon.

                                                                                Yet the rationale for Avangard seems less than straightforward when compared to other Russian hypersonic weapons programs, including the Tsirkon 3M22 scramjet hypersonic cruise missile, and the Kinzhal Kh-47M2 aeroballistic missile. Those are operational depth systems able to deliver meaningful conventional or nuclear payloads to shape the military balance in a theater of military operations. They can offset U.S. conventional superiority, and pose genuine challenges in conventional warfare. What does Avangard do for Russia that existing silo-based, road-mobile, air-launched, and submarine launched missiles cannot?

                                                                                supposed image of the vehicle (draped on the right)

                                                                                The Avangard system is best seen as one element in an expensive Russian strategy to develop technological hedges for a security environment perhaps 20-30 years from now where the United States might deploy a cost effective missile defense system, making a percentage of Russia’s nuclear deterrent vulnerable to interception. To be clear, there is no missile defense system now, or on the horizon, able to intercept Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Modern ICBMs can come with multiple reentry vehicles and numerous penetration aids or false targets, creating a complex ‘threat cloud’ that would make interception an improbable business. Nonetheless, ever since the Bush administration chose in 2002 to exit the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russian leadership has been concerned that the United States could eventually devalue the deterrence provided by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

                                                                                Russia’s General Staff worries that a vast arsenal of long range conventional cruise missiles, paired with a semi-viable missile defense, would pose major challenges for their calculations to ensure the ability of Russian nuclear forces to deliver ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tailored’ damage in the coming decades. The 1972 ABM Treaty was not just a cornerstone of Cold War arms control, but fundamental to Russian military thinking on strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability at the strategic level. Ever since June 1941, Soviet, and subsequently Russian, military thought has been wracked by the possibility of a disarming first strike, and the need to position Russian forces along a strategy of ‘counter-surprise.’

                                                                                However, unlike other expensive strategic projects, such as the Poseidon nuclear powered torpedo, Avangard does not contribute to a survivable second strike. Thus there are a few ways to interpret the actual purpose of this weapon. The first is as a retaliatory-meeting strike system to attack high-value targets, i.e. civilian targets with political or economic significance, which will provide some insurance for a counter value strike. The second is that it is a first strike weapon against hard to penetrate targets. Since Avangard is silo based, designed for heavier liquid fueled ICBMs, in the event of strategic attack the boosting missile would not be survivable. It must be fired either first, or in a “launch under attack” scenario, when Russia has confirmed a U.S. launch, but the missiles have not yet impacted.

                                                                                Avangard may be designed to give Russia’s RVSN the ability to penetrate hard targets, getting around missile defenses, and leveraging greater accuracy to take out well-hardened facilities. That said, from a nuclear warfighting standpoint, this makes Avangard a somewhat specialized, but expensive strategic nuclear weapon. Given how few of these systems Russia is likely to be able to afford, the weapon may offer some targeting advantages, but at a high price relative to the benefits. Another possibility is that this is not a system to get around future missile defenses, but a first strike system to be used specifically against missile defenses, clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Even if more accurate and survivable in flight, Avangard is a questionable investment when compared to the numerous road-mobile ICBM systems Russia fields today, including Topol-M and Rs-24 Yars (but then the logic for Russia’s SSBN program is also somewhat circumspect).

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                                                                                Perhaps in the future, Avangard will be deployed on a road-mobile launcher, but as conceived, this system adds little to Russia’s existing large strategic nuclear arsenal. An expensive insurance policy that in no way alters the strategic nuclear balance either today or tomorrow, which is why the reaction in Washington has been so muted. If anything, the United States should thank Russia for investing money in such super weapons, instead of buying large quantities of conventional precision guided munitions.

                                                                                Moscow has sought to leverage Avangard and similar novel systems to sell the notion of a qualitative arms race to Washington, D.C., hoping to establish a bilateral agenda for summits. Yet while the world is genuinely witnessing a renewed period of nuclear modernization, with qualitatively new or novel weapon systems in development, there is no arms race in progress. The major nuclear powers of today are pursuing distinctly divergent strategies, concepts, and requirements behind their nuclear weapons programs, rather than racing which each other for superiority. This is why Avangard, if completed and deployed, is unlikely to alter strategic military balance or elicit any meaningful response from Washington, D.C.

                                                                                Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future?

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                Following the November 25th Kerch Strait naval skirmish, in which Russia seized three Ukrainian boats,  Ukrainian leadership has issued warnings of a Russian buildup near Ukraine’s borders. These began in early December and have led to a media echo chamber of concerns that a Russian attack on Ukraine is imminent, in part bolstered by press releases from ISW. Actual evidence of Russian preparations for offensive operations, force movements indicating an unexpected buildup, or an imminent attack, is hard to come by. In this somewhat longer post I want to explore the existing evidence, what little there is, and examine a few conflict scenarios that may be within the realm of possibility in coming months.

                                                                                Unfortunately this simmering conflict is subject to frequent false alarms, while actual points of escalation are rarely predicted, as was the case on November 25th. It is relatively easy to take a week’s worth of Russian troop movements, equipment deployments, drills, and MoD announcements, compile them together into a bullet point list of nefarious activities, and then declare them ‘data points’ indicating preparations for an invasion. As of today it seems Ukraine will not be extending the 30 day state of martial law, which casts some doubt on the urgency and immediacy of the anticipated Russian threat as presented earlier this month by Ukrainian authorities.

                                                                                The more problematic element in all of this has been senior official Russian statements, which suggest a change in Moscow’s stance on dealing with Ukraine is afoot. Sergey Lavrov, Maria Zakharova, and Sergey Naryshkin, have issued statements expecting a possible Ukrainian ‘provocation’ and or ‘attack’ which could be interpreted as indications and warnings of Moscow preparing the information space, i.e. setting expectations of renewed violence in the coming weeks. However, they may also be a poor Russian attempt at getting Washington, D.C. to restrain Ukraine, or otherwise influence Ukrainian decision making to Russian benefit.

                                                                                The Russian narrative offers cause for concern, because it is a form of signaling not dissimilar from official statements in the run up to the Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008. That said, it is likely some officials in Moscow believed Ukraine would try to use martial law as a cover for a military operation in the Donbas, especially given their experience with Saakashvili in 2008. Although real evidence is scant, I’ll try to unpack the different stories, and the likelihood of an upcoming Russian military operation against Ukraine.

                                                                                Bottom line up front: Almost every year there is a sizable artillery duel that takes place after the holiday truce (clashes likely to resume between orthodox Christmas on January 7 and perhaps the old new year on January 14th), and so a notable escalation in violence is likely in January, but there is no evidence of Russian preparations for a major assault in Ukraine, certainly not in Crimea.  It is possible, but highly improbable. Most of the information available reflects planned modernization, expected force structure changes, and troop movements on the Russian side not indicative of unusual activity or preparations for an assault. However, as covered years ago on this blog, the long term force posture and structure changes to create three divisions along Ukraine’s borders, return earlier displaced brigades, and a focus on modernizing equipment in the Southern MD, mean that capacity and capability is there to engage in a high intensity conventional conflict with Ukraine at any time. Ukrainian leadership has used evidence from these long term trends to create the sense of an imminent tactical threat, but that is not the case, and they likely know it.

                                                                                Expectations of an attack are based on three disparate sets of information, if we can charitably call them that, which are seemingly being woven together by various outlets, blogs, and sites like ISW who warn of Russian preparations for an imminent attack. The first is an alleged increase in Russian hardware in the Rostov region of the Southern Military District. The second is a series of disparate troop movements in Crimea, which in and of themselves do not speak to anything, but some believe are indications of a Russian operation against Ukraine’s Kherson region, presumably to seize the Crimea-Dnepr fresh water canal. The third involves statements by Russia’s MFA, Sergey Naryshkin, and others, that indicate Russian preparations for a conflict in the near future.

                                                                                Issue #1 The Russian tank build up in the east and frightening Google photos of lots of tanks

                                                                                skynews-petro-poroshenko-putin_4504080.jpg
                                                                                Poroshenko on Sky News earlier this month with google satellite imagery

                                                                                 

                                                                                Ukraine’s chief of general staff, Victor Muzhneko, stated that there is an increase in Russian tanks near the Ukrainian border, having grown from 93 to 250 within two weeks from mid-September. This information was spread by a Ukrainian run English-language blog run by Dylan Malyasov, which is a defense news amalgamator. The problem is that these are mostly T-62 variants (M/MV), which have long been retired from the Russian military, and are not in service with Russian trained separatist forces either. This tank last saw service during the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, and was considered obsolete decades ago. There is no Russian unit that fields T-62 tanks today, or T-64 tanks for that matter. The Russian armed forces use this tank for target practice during major military exercises, as was the case in recently held Vostok 2018.

                                                                                Separatist forces use T-64BV and T-72B1 variants, which are different main battle tanks, but can perform the same missions and are comparable in their performance characteristics. The T-62 is a completely different design, using different caliber ammunition, sights, fire control, and so on – so it is not possible for someone trained on a T-72 to just jump into this tank and ‘invade Ukraine.’ At this point the same can be said of T-64BVs being supplied to the two separatist corps, doubtfully anyone in line Russian units is current and certified to operate either T-62s, or T-64s. Russian forces use more modern T-72BA or B3 variants almost exclusively, with select units fielding T-80Us or T-80BVM.

                                                                                Here is a quick slide of T-72B3 use by Russian forces in Ukraine 2014, T-64BV manned by separatists, and a T-62M

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                                                                                Below we can see the alleged tank build up near Ukraine’s borders. Note the rest of the vehicle park at the base, and the contingent, remains the same after the arrival of these tanks, which suggests that they are here for storage and not a force addition.

                                                                                08162018
                                                                                August 16 – clearing for tanks
                                                                                09232018
                                                                                September 23 most of the tanks have arrived
                                                                                09302018
                                                                                September 30 – about 250 tanks there

                                                                                The main force currently being supplied with refurbished Russian T-62M tanks is the Syrian Army, particularly the 5th Corps. These tanks are coming out of Russian reserve storehouses with T-62s and BMP infantry fighting vehicles. During Vostok 2018 there was news of T-62s being activated and shipped east, but in reality several batches of these vehicles were loaded and shipped West in October. Ukraine’s alleged tank build up is almost certainly a series of old T-62s taken out of the Central Tank Reserve Base in Ulan Ude, which were tracked through social media (you can get a more detailed story on the T-62 shipment from DFR Lab) as arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, which is where Muzhenko’s photos are from. Subsequently these tanks tend to show up at the port of Novorossiysk for shipment to Syria via the ‘Syrian Express.’

                                                                                Storage base in Ulan-Ude, before September and after September of this year. A number of tanks have moved from the lot, indicating that some of the vehicles likely came from this base.

                                                                                T-62M tanks heading west from Central Military District and same ones arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, some are likely destined for Syria.

                                                                                The recently arrived tanks near Ukraine’s borders are most likely being stored in Rostov region near the port for shipment, or may be used in training, but the story that Russia is planning to invade Ukraine with ancient tanks that they themselves don’t use and don’t train on stretches the imagination beyond the realm of the possible. It is equally possible that these tanks are there to establish a new reserve structure. Russia has been lacking mobilization force structure, and at best has developed a territorial battalion type reserve system for infrastructure defense. Operational reserve capacity comes out of active units which force generate units from active servicemen rather than mobilize reservists. Therefore one possible explanation is that these older vehicles are designed to park equipment for some nascent reserve force structure.

                                                                                What’s frustrating is that Ukraine’s military leadership doubtlessly knows all of this, which makes it hard to understand why Muzhenko would use google earth satellite images of old T-62 tanks to push this story in the media. Any military analyst who studies the Russian armed forces could likely tell you this information. Yet Petro Poroshenko went on Sky News with these very same images of Russian tanks, as though they were legitimate evidence of Russian preparations for an invasion.

                                                                                My personal interpretation of the Ukrainian claims is that this is an information campaign to justify and defend Poroshenko’s controversial decision to institute martial law in advance of Presidential elections, where his chances of winning are quite tenuous. This is a cynical, but optimistic view, because the alternative suggests that Ukraine’s armed forces don’t know much about the Russian military, and use dated google earth images to hunt down old T-62 tanks that are neither here or there to anything. Ukrainian force posture doesn’t suggest that they themselves expect a Russian offensive either, and the temporary state of martial law has ended as scheduled, so this seems to be mostly a large information wave with little substance to substantiate it.

                                                                                However, the Russian Rostov region is seeing a steady build up of forces as part of the formation of the 150th division in the reestablished 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern MD). This will prove a decade long process. Other units that have been announced as far back as early 2015, include the 144th MR Division and 3rd MR Division in 20th Combined Arms Army (Western MD), some shifting of brigades, and steady addition or maneuver regiments to only partially filled divisions in 1st Tank Guards Army headquartered in Moscow. The 144th Division is somewhat lagging here in formation. The 150th division is a 2×2 motor rifle and tank regiment configuration (+2 supporting regiments), which is almost filled now in its maneuver regiments. Supposedly the last motor rifle regiment is being formed as of this month. There are also interesting force structure changes afoot in the Russian VDV, creating much larger air mobile formations, which were partially covered during experiments in Vostok-2018 exercises.

                                                                                Issue #2 Russian build up in Crimea for an invasion of Kherson

                                                                                image of the dried up canal.jpeg
                                                                                The dried up canal on the Russian side of the Crimean border

                                                                                There is another concern out there, based on sighting of Russian troop movements near the Crimean border with Kherson, that Russia might conduct an offensive operation from Crimea. At least this is ISW’s thesis on the basis of a few troop trucks, some APCs, and artillery being moved towards the border – which is not at all uncommon. Basically, we have a story of an overturned Russian truck as part of a military convoy on the way to the border, with a field kitchen. What’s naturally missing from this equation is a concentration of armor, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, large volumes of ammunition, etc. moved about on flatbed trucks, i.e. there is no evidence of the sort of hardware one would expect in support of an offensive operation or the formation of battalion tactical groups near Ukraine’s borders in Crimea. The Army Corps in Crimea has a dearth of maneuver elements, so units would have to cross into the peninsula via bridge from the rest of the Southern Military District (presumably 58th Army), concentrate, and deploy – which nobody is seeing happen. More than likely Russian troop movements are indicators of preparations for an artillery duel – exchanges of indirect fire that typically escalate in January/February.

                                                                                Partly responsible for the confusion are two planned force additions to Crimea. First we have the formation of the 171st independent air assault battalion in Crimea, which was announced December 2, 2017. This battalion is technically part of the 7th VDV Air assault division, but will create a permanently based unit in Crimea with air mobility, and add to the ‘elite infantry’ stationed there which can serve as a rapid reaction force. However, VDV units have been rotating through Crimea for years now, so this is less of a force increase and more institutionalizing that which has already been taking place.

                                                                                171th VDV Regiment
                                                                                171st Independent Battalion receiving its honorary title, establishing it in Crimea

                                                                                The second tidbit of information regards the deployment of a 4th S-400 battalion to Dzhankoi in Crimea, which likely completes the rearmament of the 18th and 12th air defense regiments based there (31st air defense division within the 4th Air and Air Defense Army of the Southern Military District). The first S-400 battalion was deployed January 2017 in Feodosia, the second January 2018 in Sevastopol, and a third in September 2018 in Yevpatoria. The S-400 replaces the older S-300 systems deployed to Crimea, and is part of a general wave of modernization which prioritized the Southern Military District. Alongside S-400 deployments one can find Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters, and Su-34 bombers steadily replacing Su-24s and older Su-27s in the Russian Aerospace Forces and naval aviation units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

                                                                                S-400 in Crimea.jpg
                                                                                The 2nd Russian S-400 battalion set deployed to Crimea early this year

                                                                                There is cause for concern that long term Russia may need to resolve the fresh water crisis in Crimea, but no way to know how this situation will play out in the coming year. In May 2014 Ukraine blocked off the water supply from the Crimea-Dnepr canal that links the Dnepr river to the peninsula. Although Russia was able to quickly build an ‘energy bridge’ to supply power, and Kerch strait bridge officially opened May 2018 to commercial traffic, the water problem remains a potential cause of conflict (Jane’s here briefly summarizes the issue: Ukraine supplied 86% of Crimea’s water, and this summer there was an acute water shortage in about 20% of the peninsula). The fresh water issue is problematic, but I’ve found it to be overly spun as the next “land bridge to Crimea” narrative. The only sort of offensive military operation that makes sense is a thrust to the Dnepr river, which seizes the entire canal, and the southern half of Ukraine’s Kherson region. There is no way to take part of the canal since it is easily blocked at any point south of the river itself. In scope, this is about a 65-70km push, which is equivalent to depth of territory seized in the Donbas region. Kherson may be relatively easy to cut off, but it would require a substantial number of forces to effect this kind of operation and earn Russia an entire new host of problems.

                                                                                Kherson map.JPG
                                                                                Basic map with the path of the Dnepr-Crimea canal indicated
                                                                                Kherson vector
                                                                                ~65km from the Crimean border to the Dnepr river to get to the starting point of the canal (beyond which it cannot be blocked)

                                                                                Taking Kherson, like taking most any other Ukrainian region, is well within the realm of Russian military capability, but it would mean inheriting a new region which is also dependent on other parts of Ukraine. One of the obvious challenges Russia has faced in taking pieces of Ukraine is that it may seem easy to to dismember a country on a map, but in reality a state is full of integrated pieces that depend on each other for electricity, water, road networks, trade, supply of food, etc. Resolving the fresh water problem in Crimea by taking another region that would itself bring new supply challenges, and while it could probably be done relatively quickly, it would also require a substantial force build up and subsequent deployment. There are no ‘separatist’ or other volunteer battalions ready to take over internal security, man block posts, and create an entirely new line of control with Ukrainian forces. Also, there is the small matter than absent a ‘Kherson People’s Republic’ movement, there are no proxy forces behind which Russia can mask its invasion, and so this would have to be an overt, outright, and bloody business from the very start.

                                                                                Russia could build up forces in Crimea relatively quickly, combining an air mobile airborne operation with a ground assault, but there would be indications and warnings. Unlike in February-March 2014, the West has a lot of technical and human resources now focused on the Russian problem set. Ground force movements, airborne unit shifts, forward deployment of several battalion tactical groups in Crimea, etc. These are regularly recorded by people, spotters, social media, and traditional news. Right now there is no evidence of such troop movements, though one should not discount a military solution to the water issue in 2019, but the entire scenario remains in the realm of low probability events.

                                                                                Issue #3 Russian warnings and threats

                                                                                Finally, Russian press statements by Lavrov, Naryshkin, Maria Zakharova are perhaps the most alarming, since they indicate a readiness of Russian forces to see through an escalation with Ukraine in the coming weeks or months. This of course brings us into the realm of political analysis and out of the world of military analysis. These warnings indicate the expectation of a conflict, with Russia positioning Ukraine as a the provocateur, something that’s become rote in Russian political statements. The messaging is probably not meant for domestic audiences, or Ukrainian audiences, but for the West, which Russian elites believe can heavily influence Ukrainian decision making. As such, they represent a pattern of thinking reminiscent of the run up to the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, reflecting the Russian perception that they can threaten the potential risk of escalation in order to get the United States to lean on what Moscow sees as Washington’s client state.

                                                                                Russians do see Poroshenko as a provocateur, expecting him to “pull something” in the run up to the election, and engage in military posturing. Like many policymakers in the West, they are subscribers to diversionary war theory, which has little empirical basis, but is very much in vogue with political decision makers. Moscow thinks that Poroshenko needs Western attention on Ukraine, and the cheapest way Ukraine can achieve that is with a narrative that draws attention to the ongoing ‘Russian threat.’ Hence warnings of imminent danger tend to crop up every fall around November-December time. Putting aside the likelihood that Russia itself will execute some of the more dire plans discussed above, there is little incentive for Russia to launch any attack during the election as it would only benefit Poroshenko’s cause, in every scenario. That doesn’t mean it wont happen, because bounded rationality leads to outcomes akin to November 25th, i.e. one should not ignore the likely outcome of a chain of events that results in a conflict spiral between these two actors, but there is no sign that Russia intends to intervene in Ukrainian politics via overt military means.

                                                                                There is a strong possibility of miscalculation, with January 2019 being different than previous artillery duels and skirmishes that have followed the last major operation in February-March 2015 (Battle of Debaltseve). Ukrainian forces have been slowly gaining ground in the ‘grey zone’ that exists between the two sides respective positions along the line of control in the Donbas. These steady gains are often referenced as the ‘creeping offensive’ to retake lost territory, leading to artillery duels with Russian backed separatists. Separatist units are organized and supported with logistics, technical capabilities like EW, air defense, and other equipment, by a contingent of Russian regulars in Ukraine stationed further behind the line of control. The daily exchanges of indirect fire often flare up after the holiday truce in January, particularly when one side decides to creep into the no man’s land between them, and shift the battle lines.

                                                                                Russian controlled separatists have also played this game with Ukrainian forces for several years now, making small shifts in the line over the years. It’s what keeps this a hot war rather than a frozen conflict. However, there is a sense that Russia is spoiling for a fight – just one person’s opinion. Russian public statements are designed to paint them as the reasonable party seeking to deter potential Ukrainian adventurism, but in truth, it feels like Moscow is looking to bloody Ukraine at the first available opportunity.

                                                                                It could be vengeance for Ukraine gaining autocephaly, splitting from the Russian orthodox church, or it could be that Moscow wants to show that it is unconstrained and feels free to use the military toolkit. The November 25th naval skirmish with the Russian FSB border guard service demonstrated that when pressed to make decisions in the moment, the Russian leadership turned what could have been a minor incident into a serious clash, overt, heavy handed, with disproportionate use of force. This is at best personal inference, but it is unlikely that Russia is planning an offensive operation to seize Kherson. It is more probable that Moscow is spoiling for a fight with Ukraine, with the intent of handing Ukraine and by proxy, the United States, a small but politically consequential military defeat.

                                                                                 

                                                                                 

                                                                                The Kerch strait naval skirmish

                                                                                Michael Kofman7 Comments

                                                                                After a few requests I’ve decided to do a quick take on the skirmish outside the Kerch strait between Russian border guards and the Ukrainian navy which has flooded the news.

                                                                                On November 25th Ukraine’s Navy attempted to execute a planned transfer of two small armored artillery boats (Gryuza-M) and a tugboat from Odessa to Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov (through the Kerch strait). There are already two armored boats there, which were transferred inland, and a supporting ‘command ship’ was towed by the Ukrainian Navy earlier this fall through the strait. That transfer went unmolested though not without some publicity, and quite likely Ukrainians expected the same scenario – a grant of innocent passage an uncomfortably close escort by Russian patrol ships through the strait.

                                                                                Ukrainian Navy’s first foray to establish a naval base inside the Sea of Azov, towing the command ship in.

                                                                                towing command ship

                                                                                On approach they twice radioed the Russian FSB Border Guard of their intention, but did not receive a response confirming passage. Upon arriving at the strait they were told the waterway was closed for security reasons, though no international notice of closure was filed by Russia, i.e. it was closed just for Ukraine’s small trio of boats. Then Russia’s coast guard ordered them to cut engines. A series of maneuvers ensued outside the strait.

                                                                                One of Russia’s larger patrol ships, the Don, struck Ukraine’s tugboat (which actually appeared to cut engines and sit still)

                                                                                Don ramming.jpg

                                                                                Then he struck his flanking partner, the Rubin-class patrol ship Izumrud. Russia’s border guard service didn’t upload any videos of this one, but we will have to imagine what it looked like on the basis of the hull damage.

                                                                                Someone hit him really high, about the height of the Don patrol ship

                                                                                original

                                                                                Another shot

                                                                                Izumrud

                                                                                Russia blocked the bridge passage with a cargo ship. At first media got confusing reports that Ukrainian ships were let through, but actually it was a Russian minesweeper leaving the Sea of Azov. Then a pair of Ka-52 helicopters and two Su-25s appeared over the bridge to provide support.

                                                                                blocked strait.jpg

                                                                                After waiting for a boarding party of special forces (type unclear), Russian vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships, and a brief firefight ensued. Russians claim this was in territorial waters, Ukrainians claim it was not. Part of the contest may be rooted in whether or not you consider Crimea to be Russian, because a number of legal considerations stem from that position. Ultimately this was settled via 30mm automatic cannon. Russian patrol ship Izumrud opened fire with its AK-630 on the small armored boat Berdyansk, hitting it with 30mm high explosive rounds judging by the battle damage. The rest of the ships may have surrendered without a fight, and were taken back to Kerch port.

                                                                                Holes in Berdyansk. Armor casing didn’t seem to hold the HE

                                                                                damaged Berdyansk.jpg

                                                                                Ships parked at Kerch

                                                                                parked Ukrainian ships at Kerch.jpg

                                                                                Some thoughts –

                                                                                The Sea of Azov is a shared territorial water governed by a bilateral 2003 agreement and international treaties. Ukraine is entitled to innocent passage for military ships through the strait and does not have to present itself for Russian permission. However, since Russia annexed Crimea and built the bridge (officially opened in May) it has been asserting itself as de facto sovereign over the entirety of the strait, and imposing an informal inspection regime over maritime traffic. This has strangled commercial traffic to Ukraine’s port of Mariupol, and the bridge itself is too short for certain types of ships. In practice that bridge means that Russia can physically block whoever it wants from sailing into the Sea of Azov, and there’s not much Ukraine can do about it (equally skeptical on NATO’s options).

                                                                                Ukraine likely sought to contest Russian efforts to impose a new status quo, establishing sovereignty over the strait and steadily clinching its grip over the Sea of Azov. Moscow wanted a public demonstration of the true balance of power. The clash on November 25th was brewing for some time – Russia’s Navy transferred ships from the Caspian Flotilla over the summer to the Sea of Azov, and Ukraine’s Navy was slowly doing the same via inland routes.

                                                                                That said, this incident is the result of Russian adhocracy at its best, from the improvised decision making, to questionable seamanship, salty language on comms, and a lot of ‘who is where and doing what now?’ discussions. It strikes me as a poorly coordinated effort more than some brilliant trap laid for the Ukrainian Navy. Russian forces responded quickly, but they were reacting to the Ukrainian naval group – trying to make it appear a Ukrainian provocation and then improvising from there. One could argue otherwise, but then it begs the question why Russian special forces, helicopters, and aircraft were not already in the air and ready given they could have spent over a day tracking Ukrainian ships in transit.

                                                                                Subsequently Ukraine’s government has imposed a partial state of martial law (30 days), for 10 provinces. I’m personally skeptical of the military utility or wisdom of Ukraine’s decision on imposing martial law, and side with those who think this is more political than anything else, but that’s another matter altogether. Meanwhile Russia is likely to trade the crews back after using them for PR. According to some blogs there were SBU counter-intelligence officers aboard the ships, which Moscow might hold to trade for its own intelligence personnel down the line, i.e. they will be convicted in some show trial and held for barter.

                                                                                12/3/2018 small update – the two small armored artillery boats are now gone from Kerch while the tugboat remains

                                                                                Admiral Kuznetsov’s bad luck strikes again – or how Russia may have lost its largest dry dock in the north

                                                                                Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                                                On the night of October 29th, Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only remaining aircraft carrier nearly sank together with the dry dock it was inhabiting while undergoing overhaul and modernization in Roslyakovo (Murmansk region). Although Kuznetsov survived, with some degree of damage (extent unclear), Russia’s largest floating dry dock PD-50 is now completely submerged and likely to result in a total loss. The story is likely to become infamous in the annals of Russia’s notorious shipbuilding and ship repair industry, piling on to a spate of bad news regarding engine production for project 22800 missile corvettes, and delays in modernization timelines.

                                                                                Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s most unlucky ship. The vessel has a reputation for killing carrier aviation, breaking down, lethal accidents on board, and major spills. There is something uncanny about this particular ship’s ability to wreak disaster. In this brief blog entry I will discuss what happened last night in Murmansk, and how Russia lost its largest dry dock in the north, which will undoubtedly result in delays for the overhaul and modernization of the Northern Fleet’s principal surface and submarine combatants.

                                                                                PD-50 sinking rapidly next to the smaller dry dock PD-82

                                                                                PD-50 sinking.jpg

                                                                                Kuznetsov was undergoing overhaul and modernization inside dry dock PD-50 at shipyard #82, owned by Rosneft. This is Russia’s largest dry dock, able to lift 80,000 tons, at 330 x 88 meters (working space 300m x 79m). It is one of the largest if not the largest dry dock in the world, and the only one of its kind in the Russian north, supporting the Northern Fleet. PD-50 was originally built by Sweden for the USSR (transferred in 1980), and often serves as the overhaul or repair shipyard for the Russian Northern Fleet – the dry dock regularly hosts several surface combatants and nuclear powered submarines at the same time.

                                                                                PD-50 on a good day

                                                                                PD-50 dry dock

                                                                                According to the prevailing media narrative, Kuznetsov was being readied for launch when the dry dock lost power from shore, causing it to lose stability, list, and eventually sink. Supposedly wet snow and sleet led to a buildup of ice on the transmission power lines which created problems across Murmansk. There may have been a large power surge, resulting in the emergency shutoff of the pumps maintaining ballast on board PD-50. A different story holds that the power lines were severed resulting in an outage. Either way, the dry dock lost electricity and began to sink while holding the Kuznetsov.

                                                                                Ilya Kramnik, a long time reporter on the Russian navy at Izvestiya wrote that according to his sources there was no plan to bring the Kuznetsov out of dock that night, and in fact it was a struggle to keep the ship from going down with PD-50. Of course the dry dock should have had its own independent electricity supply via four on board diesel power generators (the sort of thing that would have prevented it from sinking), but in the interest of cost savings and ‘efficiency’ the shipyard saw fit to reduce the crew responsible for power generation and not buy fuel for the generators. The rest of this sordid tale almost writes itself. PD-50 was entirely dependent on Murmansk’s power grid that night and when the power went out it began sinking.

                                                                                Kuznetsov’s crew was busily trying to save the ship from flooding – the ship was not fully sealed and ready to leave to the dock at the time of the incident. As PD-50 listed heavily, one of the dock’s 50 ton cranes fell onto Kuznetsov’s deck, leaving a hole several meters wide. The carrier was ultimately saved and towed away to shipyard #35, while the dock sank entirely, with perhaps one crewman lost and three injured (as of this morning).

                                                                                That looks like it may be the crane

                                                                                Crane.jpg

                                                                                A more recent photo shows the 50 ton crane now comfortably resting on the flight deck

                                                                                Carrier now with 50T crane for air wing

                                                                                Kuznetsov’s modernization will invariably be delayed. The only other option in Russia’s north is Sevmash shipyard, which is currently occupied by the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov (Kirov-class cruiser), and supposedly not wide enough at the entrance for Kuznetsov. There is an alternative large dry dock in Russia’s far east, PD-41, which services the Pacific Fleet and was originally built by Japan. PD-41 has similar characteristics to PD-50 and may prove Kuznetsov’s only possible alternative once the ship is ready to make the journey.

                                                                                As of now, the Northern Fleet only has smaller dry docks available which can lift 30,000 tons. That’s still big enough for Kirov-class and Slava-class cruisers, or Oscar II submarines, but PD-50 could potentially hold two large vessels at a time. Russia’s Northern Fleet lost an important asset, which could have knock on effects on ship modernization and overhaul.

                                                                                This is PD-50 now

                                                                                PD-50 gone

                                                                                The Kuznetsov survives, though the carrier is largely a white elephant with no real mission besides sustaining Russia’s fledgling carrier aviation, and projecting status, i.e. it’s primary mission is to exist. Meanwhile, the ship’s track record of bringing bad luck continues unbroken.

                                                                                Assessing Vostok-2018

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                I’d like to close out coverage of Vostok 2018 with a brief summary and analysis of the exercise, which was written for Oxford’s CCW Russia Brief, Issue 3. I strongly recommend the issue briefs from Oxford’s changing character of war program, which feature some of the best experts on the Russian armed forces in the field.

                                                                                Russia’s annual strategic exercises offer an important window into the evolution of the Russian armed forces, their ability to mobilize, deploy, and command large groupings of forces, together with the latest capabilities. The recently held Vostok-2018 (September 11-17), which as the name suggests focused on the Russian Eastern Military District, offered an important deviation from the typically held command-staff strategic exercise which the Russian General Staff organises every September. In a standard exercise, an operational-strategic command (OSK) takes in forces from other districts and fields them in a particular strategic direction, organizing a hypothetical fight together with the General Staff in the theatre of military operations (TVD). But in 2018, Vostok was changed into strategic manoeuvers. Under this framework two military districts, Central and Eastern, divided into opposing forces to conduct manoeuvers in different strategic directions. China’s official involvement in the annual exercises, which is a first, made the event politically significant in Sino-Russian relations, and a mutually agreed upon political signal send by both sides to international observers.

                                                                                Unlike previous such exercises, Vostok-2010 and 2014, this event represents more of an “in-progress report” for the Russian armed forces. When he was first appointed Chief of General Staff in late 2012, Valery Gerasimov was dismayed with the Russian armed forces inability to move across the country and effectively engage in drills or training events at ranges distant from their home garrisons. The recently reformed military had become a permanent standing force, but it had little experience or credibility in being able to deploy to Russia’s borders in the event of conflict and successfully engage an adversary. The high tempo of snap readiness checks, drills, joint exercises, together with modernization investments under the State Armament Program, were meant to turn the Russian armed forces into a combat credible force, able to effectively deter large scale conventional conflict. Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than the Russian Far East, a vast region that is sparsely populated and lacks much transportation infrastructure.

                                                                                Vostok-2018 was also as an opportunity for political signalling, featuring a large review of forces and photo opportunities similar to that of Zapad-1981. Russian pronouncements that the exercise would feature 297,000 soldiers – which would have been fully a third of the entire Russian military – was meant to underscore the state’s resilience and undiminished military potential in the face of political and economic pressure from the United States.

                                                                                In reality, the exercise was rather smaller, probably not exceeding 50,000 participants (this is a guesstimate, use at your own risk) in the actual exercises, with most of the major events taking place at the Tsugol training range. The official numbers given likely represent the total forces on paper from the Central and Eastern Military Districts: often the Russian General Staff will count an entire brigade or division as having participated even when their contribution is only one unit. A large number of units were raised on alert on August 20th, in advance of the exercise, but few had any connection to the actual events. Official statements by Russian commanders also suggest that the exercise was much smaller in reality: Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), stated that 7,000 troops participated at Tsugol from his district. Together with aviation and airborne units sent, it is unlikely that the CMD’s involvement exceeded 15,000-20,000 soldiers.

                                                                                The reason for dramatically inflated figures for every Vostok exercise is straightforward: Moscow is unconcerned that announcing fantastical figures would engender a security dilemma in the region. Moreover, political agreements governing military exercises in Europe such as the Vienna Document have no jurisdiction east of the Ural mountains. As such, the Russian leadership can count unit participation however it likes, without stoking NATO fears. At the same time, including China in the exercise was a prudent measure to alleviate any inherent suspicions Beijing might have that these strategic manoeuvers were aimed at them, or a manifestation of Russian security apprehensions. Since most of the exercise events took place in Zabaykalsky Krai, a land-locked region bordering China and Mongolia, this was an important precaution. Moscow’s effort at engaging the Chinese military is quite clever, intended to foster greater partnership, engendering stronger military ties, while at the same time demonstrating to their strategic partners the capability of the Russian armed forces in an effort to bolster coercive credibility.

                                                                                Vostok featured elements of both contact and non-contact warfare, from a series of attack, defence and flanking manoeuvers by battalion tactical groups, to blunting massed aerospace attacks, and effecting precision strikes against critical infrastructure at operational depths. Going into the exercise Valery Gerasimov said he wanted to see non-standard solutions practiced, code for the Chief of General Staff not wishing to see Russian units arrive at ranges to execute pre-rehearsed manoeuvers, i.e. put on a five-day bit of military theatre for him and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu. It remains unclear whether or not he got what he wanted, but Shoigu indicated this type of exercise might be held every five years, pegged to implementation of the State Armament Program, the implication being that strategic manoeuvers would be used as a form of in-process review and reflection on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

                                                                                Although every strategic exercise is designed to be a stress test for the Russian armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, Vostok had four principal areas of focus: logistics, mobilization, command and control, and tactical innovation. Emphasis was placed on the logistics, combat service support, and combat engineer components of the Russian armed forces. Command and control of forces in combined arms manoeuver, along with integration with other services remains a prominent feature, as does experimentation with the force structure itself. The Russian military continues to work on integrating recon-strike and recon-fire contours, connecting targeting in real time from drones, soldiers or aircraft, with artillery fires at the tactical level or strike assets distributed among the services. There was also a mobilization component aimed at taking in reservists to help fill out combat service support units and integrating civilian authorities into the exercise under the model that ‘everyone fights’.

                                                                                Vostok was spread across five combined arms ranges, four air and air defence ranges, and several coastal regions in the Russian Far East. Ground force exercises featured large attacks with artillery and MLRS systems with targeting and battle damage assessments done via drone systems. River fording, bridging, masking of units with smoke and aerosol were all parts of the exercise to simulate the logistical difficulty of getting to the battlefield while under fire. Engineers also setup false targets, inflatable dummy units, practicing various forms of deception on the battlefield. The strategic nuclear component of the exercise involved flights by Tu-95MS bombers, which cut through the U.S. air defence identification zone, earning a free F-22 fighter escort before returning to fire cruise missiles at target ranges in Russia.

                                                                                Efforts at innovation could be seen in the attempt by the airborne forces to create a new type of air assault detachment, together with an airmobile reserve based on heavy transport helicopters and light vehicles. Colonel General Andrei Serduykov, commander of Russia’s airborne forces, was trying new things this year by assembling battalions from three independent air assault brigades to practice large scale heli-borne attacks, some involved as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two large transport Mi-26 helicopters in the action. The Russian airborne also conducted a sizable parachute drop, using 25 transports to deliver 700 soldiers and 51 BMD infantry fighting vehicles, while specialized light utility units were brought in as a ready reserve for the action. Russia’s Northern Fleet similarly brought a new force mix, including naval infantry and specialized units from its Arctic brigade, some of which conducted a raid in depth across as much as 270km of terrain.

                                                                                China’s participation included some 3,200 soldiers mounted on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs and self-propelled artillery, together with 6 aircraft and 24 helicopters. Interactions between Russian and Chinese forces at the tactical level, assuming any serious collaboration even took place, seemed of lower import than the utility of this event as a form of political signalling. China’s Minister of Defence, Wei Fenghe, highlighted the importance of Sino-Russian cooperation at the operational and strategic level, while Shoigu announced that they had agreed to hold exercises regularly in the future. In a subsequent interview, Shoigu referred to the Chinese participants as allies. While it is difficult to interpret Vostok, or any other exercise, as a proof of a budding Sino-Russian entente, it is clear the two countries seek to demonstrate that they do not see each other as a threat.

                                                                                While Western policymakers typically describe alliance formation as some sort of state-level dating, where relationships are formed based on trust, common values, similar political systems and so on, in reality this has little semblance to the history of how powers actually form alliances. Alliance formation behaviour takes place as a form of balancing behaviour in response to threats, therefore the only logical catalyst for a Sino-Russian entente is the threat posed by the United States, and the extent to which the two countries see their respective challenges as worth the risk and liability of closer cooperation. Having identified both countries as great power competitors in the National Defense Strategy, and practical measures to intensify the confrontation in economic and military domains, Washington has taken important steps to further enhance cooperation between its disparate adversaries.

                                                                                Vostok-2018 strategic manoeuvers illustrate that while much progress remains to be made in improving the capability and capacity of the Russian armed forces, the military as a whole is increasingly greater than the sum of its parts, and certainly much improved from its relatively raw state in 2012-2013. Meanwhile Russian policy has become rather more deft in managing their ‘strategic partnership’ with China, seeking to leverage military events as part of a boarder effort to slowly and incrementally pull the latter into a balancing entente against the United States.

                                                                                 

                                                                                Vostok 2018 Day 7 (September 17)

                                                                                Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                                                                Vostok 2018 – conclusion of strategic maneuvers

                                                                                Russian forces concluded the exercise and began making preparations for the trip back to their respective bases. Vostok 2018 was designed to test the readiness of Russia’s armed forces and supporting civilian infrastructure to move units over large distances, coordination between ground forces and the Navy. It was also another command-staff exercise where officers could gain experience in combined arms maneuver and joint operations in conjunction with other services. Emphasis was placed on quickly forming groupings of forces in the TVD (theater of military operations), moving units East, setting up communications and logistics, etc.

                                                                                This will be a brief post, as there’s not much to report on, but the announcements made by Russian generals and press on troops returning were of interest. They revealed the likely numbers behind the exercise as quite smaller. Once the event is over I intend to do a brief recap of what we saw that was of interest. Special thanks to colleagues Kate Baughman and Jeff Edmonds who helped put some of the information together behind this coverage of Vostok 2018.

                                                                                Motor rifle units getting ready to head back

                                                                                time to go home.jpg

                                                                                Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu announced that ‘strategic maneuvers,’ or a similar such exercise, might be held every five years. He linked  it to the five-year implementation of the State Armament Program. The connection is somewhat difficult to understand, since there’s no visible linkage to the SAP (GPV 2018-2027). It may be some internal benchmark being established for performance of new equipment, or simply an idea being pitched to do ‘strategic maneuvers’ every five years. Shoigu also suggested that the MoD would release a performance assessment from the exercise sometime in October.

                                                                                VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian and Chinese aviation has begun returning to their home airbases. Russian forces list  of aircraft used includes Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Il-76, An-12, An-26, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25, Mig-31BM + Ka-52, Mi-24, Mi-26, Mi-8 helicopter variants. Chinese forces brought six JH-7A, and an assortment of helicopters including Mi-171, Z-9, Z-19.

                                                                                Central MD – General-Lieutenant Alexander Lapin, commander of Central MD, gave out medals to 50 officers for their performance during Vostok. During the ceremony he announced that Central MD successfully moved 7,000 troops to Tsugol range for the exercise. Given the exercise consisted of Central and Eastern MD, if Central only contributed about 7,000 in ground forces (this is two brigades or one division’s worth of soldiers), it raises questions as to who brought the other 293,000 to this event – or to put another way, Vostok was clearly several times smaller in scope than advertised.

                                                                                Here is a small table showing some of the fantastical official figures reported by Russia’s MoD for different exercises over the years. Note Zapad is always tiny because of Vienna Document filing requirements, and Vostok is always outrageously large.

                                                                                exercise table

                                                                                 

                                                                                Other news include a communications brigade belonging to 2nd CAA returning home from Tsugol training range. This unit, consisting of ~1000 soldiers, was responsible for providing encrypted communications during the exercise. The 2nd CAA also fielded about 2000 motor riflemen, with T-72B3 tanks, BMP-2s, BM-21, and other equipment – also coming back from Tsugol.

                                                                                Note: Southern MD, not to be outdone, is planning to hold an entire series of 30 battalion tactical trainings (BTU) – which seems to be something Col General Alexander Dvornikov is instituting. Exercises will last through October 31st, emphasizing combined arms maneuver, and inter service coordination. Supposedly 45,000 troops will be involved in these drills, the goal of which will be to test all of the BTGs that Southern MD can field. Gen Dvornkikov, who heads Southern MD, has emphasized recon-strike + recon fire contours, and ‘lessons from Syria’ throughout comments and quotes on events taking place in Southern MD (and he’s got comments for almost every press release).

                                                                                Eastern MD – A battalion tactical group of motor riflemen from the 41st CAA, based near Keremovo Oblast, is heading home. This unit had 1000 soldiers and ~300 pieces of equipment, including BTR-82A APCs and T-72B3 tanks. Again, a BTG or two from 41st CAA sounds about right in terms of participation.

                                                                                BTR-82As.jpg

                                                                                Northern Fleet – A surface action group led by Udaloy-class Vice-Admiral Kulakov conducted another amphibious landing exercise near the port Egvekinot on Chukotka. The Arctic brigade detachment they had unloaded earlier, which had conducted a land march to the port, served as an opposing force for Russian naval infantry. Recall the Arctic units made a 270km raid inland and had met up with the fleet at a different point on the Pacific coast. Two LSTs, together with Ka-27 helicopters, unloaded several units of naval infantry on BTR-80s onto the beach. The naval infantry and Arctic brigade units fought each other, simulating amphibious assault and coastal defense. Those unfamiliar with this popular destination for amphibious landings can inspect the map below.

                                                                                Egvekinot.JPG

                                                                                naval infantry 2.JPG

                                                                                Naval infantry Chukotka 2.JPG

                                                                                Vostok 2018 Days 5-6 (September 15-16)

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                Vostok 2018 Days 5 and 6

                                                                                The weekend was relatively quiet. Comparably few activities took place as the forces involved were either taking a break, or perhaps there was a media blackout compared to the information flowing about the first several days. For a brief period the MoD main website was down, which was unusual. However, other news sources which typically cover the exercises reflected a dearth of information for September 15-16. I’ve decided to group the events of both days into one post here. The main exercises over the weekend included another series of bombing raids by Russian aerospace forces, a motor rifle battalion assault at Tsugol, complex river crossing exercises supported by engineer and CBRN troops, and two naval exercises held by the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

                                                                                VKS Aerospace Forces – Russian Tu-22M3s conducted another series of air raids at a training range in Zabaikal, practicing bombing runs against various targets simulating an enemy air base. It reads like this was another unguided bombing exercise, dropping FAB-500s and 250s. The precision guided munitions tend to be reserved for Syria, so they tend not to waste them on exercises. Ten air crews were involved in the event, though unclear if they all had their own individual platforms, i.e. 10 bombers, or were rotated through a smaller number of aircraft.

                                                                                Tu-22M3.JPG

                                                                                Meanwhile Russian Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters took on the role of incoming enemy fighters. They approached the integrated air defenses setup by Eastern MD, and not did not respond to ground control requests for identification. Mig-31BM and Su-35s fighters were scrambled to intercept, simulating air combat at different ranges, including short range dog fighting. The Su-30SMs were defeated by Eastern MD’s air superiority fighters.

                                                                                Eastern MD – There was another motor rifle and armored assault at Tsugol, with T-62s setup as targets representing the opposing force. Several companies of T-72B1 tanks, in conjunction with BMP-2s conducted an attack across the range.

                                                                                Motor rifle and armored assault.JPG

                                                                                Meanwhile Russian military police units, mounted on Typhoon vehicles, detected and captured  a group of infiltrators who sought to gain access to the training range.

                                                                                MPs.JPG

                                                                                CBRN units setup smoke and aerosol cover for a river crossing exercise, where T-72 tanks forded the river with snorkels, while other vehicles were transported via specialized amphibious carriers. Engineer and sapper units established a pontoon bridge for tanks and BMPs to drive over. The exercise seems based around a motor rifle battalion, with helicopter support, effecting a river crossing both via bridge and in shallow places with its own means.

                                                                                Units positioned preparing to cross.JPG

                                                                                pontoon bridge.JPG

                                                                                Other exercises of note: Russia’s Ministry of Emergencies held a joint exercise with Chinese counterparts, simulating a ship collision at a bridge being constructed across the Amur River. The exercise consisted of a Chinese passenger ship colliding with a Russian ship working on the bridge. Both sides worked together to put out a fire on the Chinese ship, evacuate passengers, and rescue others from the water. Russian Be-200 firefighting aircraft and Mi-8s  belonging to the Ministry were involved, with about 300 people all together engaged in this exercise. I found the event interesting simply because it reflects another level of cooperation between Russian and Chinese ministries along the border outside of the military dimension.

                                                                                The Baltic Fleet has also been busy, though their activities doubtfully have anything to do with Vostok 2018. About 25 ships, 30 aircraft, helicopters, drones, and 50 pieces of equipment were involved in conducting an amphibious landing at Khmelevka. Russian Su-24 + Su-30SM fixed wing aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters conducted a strike against enemy positions, so that naval infantry units could then land and seize the beach. Ships involved included LSTs Aleksandr Shabalin, Korolev, Minsk, three smaller landing boats from project 21820, and support by three project 20380 corvettes (Stereguschiy). The landing force consisted of about 30 BTR-82A, which is consistent with what about 3 LSTs can carry, though at the same time they also air lifted several naval infantry units behind enemy lines – presumably via Ka-27 helicopters which is typically how these forces effect an amphibious assault.

                                                                                Northern Fleet – The Northern Fleet ran an anti-submarine warfare exercise, with its principal combatant Vice Admiral Kulakov (Udaloy-class) leading the submarine hunt. Their scenario involved using different systems to hunt for the submarine, such as onboard sonar and the ship’s Ka-27PL helicopter. Kulakov practiced torpedo and depth charge attacks, along with evading torpedo attacks fired by the opposing submarine.

                                                                                Ka-27 deploying dipping sonar

                                                                                dipping sonar.JPG

                                                                                Pacific Fleet – Naval Infantry conducted an assault to enable a larger amphibious force to land near the Klerk training range on Primoriye. This is an interesting exercise in that they were working together VKS Aerospace Forces, who supported their attack, along with ships from the Pacific Fleet, combat aviation, artillery, sappers, and air defense units. Supposedly the next phase of this exercise will involve an air assault brigade of VDV Airborne conducting a similar type of attack, though it seems things are winding down. The Eastern MD is already looking to an upcoming joint exercise with Mongolian troops under a different title.

                                                                                Some additional pictures of note:

                                                                                CBRN units treating tanks

                                                                                treating tanks.JPG

                                                                                Tank sanitation checkpoint

                                                                                sanitizing T-72s.JPG

                                                                                T-72 snorkeling

                                                                                Loch Ness T-72.JPG

                                                                                 

                                                                                Vostok 2018 Day 4 (September 14)

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                Vostok Day 4

                                                                                Most of the exercises are taking place at Tsugol and Telemba, but there was word today of various live fire events from a few of the other ranges. Elements of 5th CAA are at Bikinskiy, and the air force is doing most of its bombing runs at Mukhor-Kondui. More word from the two fleets, the Northern Fleet is exercising in the Bering Sea, while the Pacific Fleet has launched a surface action group together with support ships and a number of smaller vessels. Less news from the airborne on this day, but some interesting simulations among air defense forces, CBRN troops, and engineer units. Across the ranges where most of the forces are staged the day was taken up by artillery and MLRS fires, together with combat maneuvers by motor rifle battalions.

                                                                                VKS Aerospace Forces – At Tusgol, Russia employed A-50U (AWACS system) in conjunction with Mig-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-30SMs conducting combat air patrols and simulating intercepts. Meanwhile at Mukhor-Kondui, another  range with targets for the air force, Russia’s air force conducted several air strikes with mostly unguided munitions. Including about 30 aircraft consisting of Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-24M, and Su-25s. Their target was a column of enemy armor and artillery on the march. Coordinates and targeting relayed by Su-24MP.

                                                                                Su-25s about to fire unguided rockets (Mukhor-Kondui)

                                                                                Su-25s.JPG

                                                                                Followed by bombing passes from Su-30SM and Su-24 bombers

                                                                                Su-30sm.JPG

                                                                                Some word on the earlier air strike with cruise missiles, IZ reported it as 4xTu-95MS and 6xTu-22M3 participating. The Tu-95MS flight in the first two days of the exercise clearly cut through the Alaska air identification zone for the United States, as F-22s were sent up to greet them. The need for air refueling during this flight now makes sense since they seemingly made a large lap before firing missiles at the target range.

                                                                                F-22 and Tu-95MS.JPG

                                                                                VDV Airborne – Seems they conducted an airborne drop of one battalion, together with a heliborne assault with soldiers repelling. I honestly can’t say if this took place on the 14th, or if the photos are from the 13th. Part of the problem is some nice people seem to have taken down the Russian MoD website making it a bit difficult to compare announcements and images from the two days.

                                                                                airborne repelling.jpg

                                                                                Eastern MD – CBRN troops simulated an emergency chemical cleanup whereby several railcars carrying dangerous/toxic chemicals spilled their load, presumably onto the roadway and the surrounding area. Supposedly about 1,500 CBRN troops, and 300 pieces of equipment are taking part in the exercises, using RHM-6 chemical detector systems, and RPM-2 radiological detectors. Engineer units also simulated a natural and/or man-made disaster, testing their ability to manage flooding, evacuation of the local population, dealing with unexploded ordnance, etc. About 350 soldiers listed for this one, with 80 pieces of equipment including excavators, cranes, floating transports, etc.

                                                                                At Telemba range, Col Tikhonov, commander of 76th Air Defense division, highlighted the use of air defense targets designed to simulate small radar profiles, i.e. low observation aircraft and cruise missiles. Not only did they use the typical dummy missiles, and conventional targets, but they wanted to replicate a large scale aerospace attack with cruise missiles. The addition of targets with small radar cross sections seems new  compared to previous exercises.

                                                                                At Tsugol there was a sizable artillery and MLRS live fire exercise, different types of self-propelled and towed artillery involved, together with BM-21 and BM-27 MLRS.

                                                                                2s3 firing.jpg

                                                                                Tsugol BM-27 firing.JPG

                                                                                At Bikinskyi range, in Khabarovsk, a motor rifle unit of the 5th CAA stopped an advancing opposing force. Air defense units assigned to them, including ZSU-23-4 shilka, and Igla manpads, were fired to simulate defending against enemy air power. Artillery units with BM-21 Grad were similarly engaged in supporting the defending motor rifle formation. All together at this range they are listing 200 pieces of equipment, and 1700 troops. The number suggests that this is a battalion tactical group, with short range air defense and MLRS units assigned to it.

                                                                                Elements of 5th CAA

                                                                                5th CAA.JPG

                                                                                This is rather small by the way, and I suspect at the end of all the announcements, if we add up all the troops listed as participating at the individual ranges over the period of these eight days, we’re going to have a hard time coming up not only with 300,000 but probably with anything approaching 50,000-70,000. Recalling we have 5 combined arms ranges, 4 air defense ranges, and two gulfs as the overall area of the exercise.

                                                                                tanks at Tsugol.jpg

                                                                                As an aside, there are several exercises, annual certification checks, and live fire drills going on in other military districts. At the same time, the Southern MD is hosting a sizable exercise with about 5,000 troops, including air defense, artillery, missile, and air force units. About 500 pieces of artillery, MLRS, listed, including BM-21, BM-27, BM-30, Tulpan 240mm mortar, Iskander-M, and several ships participating. About 20 fixed and rotary wing aviation involved in this exercise. Black Sea Fleet coastal defense forces (ground forces part of its army corps) held several smaller exercises of their own, simulating defense against diversionary forces attacking its bases. Dvornikov is placing emphasis on working out the recon-strike contour, command and control across his district for employing long range firepower, i.e. cruise missiles and the like at operational ranges. It seems he’s trying to bring experience from the Syrian war to the district.

                                                                                Pacific Fleet – Several ships from the fleet escorted a Russian squadron near the Sea of Okhotsk. Varyag (Slava-class guided missile cruiser), together with Bystruy (Sov destroyer), two  Udaloy class large anti-submarine warfare ships and other smaller vessels served as escorts to Irtysh, a hospital ship, and several LSTs. The SAG seems to consist of 2x Udaloy, 1x Sov, and 1xSlava-class with a few support ships and LSTs. The exercise involved changing formation, arraying the surface action group for air defense, signaling, C2, and anti-submarine warfare. Ka-27 helicopters carried onboard the larger combatants also participated in the exercise. All together about 15-20 ships from the Pacific Fleet are listed for this exercise. I say 15-20 because Russian MoD announcements can’t agree whether it was 15 or 20, depending on which one you read.

                                                                                Pacific SAG

                                                                                Pacific Fleet.JPG

                                                                                Northern Fleet – Elements of the Northern Fleet’s specialized Arctic brigade, which were dropped off two days ago on Chukotka, marched from their landing point to the Pacific coastline, i.e. they drove 270km on their articulated DT-10P vehicles over the course of two days. Along the way they practiced raiding enemy formations, some live fire drills, etc. This is an interesting exercise, noting that the small surface action group sent by the Northern Fleet has been traveling since August 8th, conducting multiple landings with both naval infantry and the arctic brigade detachment. The rest of the surface action group spent this day in the Bering Sea, practicing search and rescue operations. Their mission was to aid a ship in distress along the northern sea route. Kulakov (Udaloy-class) conducted search operations with its Ka-27 onboard helicopter, which then practiced evacuating individuals from the supposed vessel, together with a rescue party launched from the ship on small high speed boats. Meanwhile their large tug, Pamir, and the diesel-electric ice breaker Ilya Muromets, practiced firefighting at sea.

                                                                                Kulakov launching Ka-27

                                                                                Kulakov

                                                                                Ilya Muromets firefighting together with the large ocean going tug

                                                                                firefighting.JPG

                                                                                I would note that today the Russian MoD website appears to be down, and I would bet a good deal of money that it is likely due to a DDOS attack.

                                                                                Some additional photos of note:

                                                                                Russian and PLA forces coordinating something

                                                                                lost in translation

                                                                                The display signs at Tsugol – this seems to be the Chinese contingent section

                                                                                best friends forever.jpg

                                                                                Vostok 2018 – Day 3 (September 13)

                                                                                Michael Kofman2 Comments

                                                                                Russian and Chinese leadership at Tsygol range opened up Phase 2 of the exercise with a large review of forces. The optics were clearly meant to rekindle the images of Zapad-1981, with numerous vehicles and infantry arrayed in parade formation on the grounds of the range. Indeed the display was quite large, and it seemed clear by the number of Chinese tanks, SPA, wheeled and other vehicles that probably about 3,000 troops and several hundred pieces of equipment did actually come to join Russia in these strategic maneuvers. Judging by the reporting, it is likely most of the drills during Vostok are taking place at Tsygol and Telemba, i.e. it’s quite difficult to picture Vostok being all that large as an exercise. Right now, going off of fairly little (but still a lot more honest than 300,000), around 50,000 seems a much more reasonable number of participants.

                                                                                DigitalGlobe had good satellite photos of some of the parade grounds at the range and exercises for a different perspective.

                                                                                satellite

                                                                                Of course Putin came to look through binoculars, because it wouldn’t be a strategic exercise otherwise. Note unlike in Zapad, where Putin and Lukashenko were not together in the same command center, we can see the Chinese counterparts sitting further along the table.

                                                                                Putin came.JPG

                                                                                More photos can be found on BMPD. But here’s s sample of some of the gear Chinese brought with them.

                                                                                Chinese tanks.jpg

                                                                                Chinese forces.jpg

                                                                                As this is the opening of Phase 2, most of the activity was characterized by VDV air assaults, VKS bombing missions, combined arms artillery and motor rifle unit actions. Strong emphasis on employment of drones, integrated C2, and more ‘jointness’ so to speak between ground, airborne, and VKS forces. VDV seems to be conducted several force structure and air assault experiments, including with new light high mobility vehicles, creating a air mobile reserve, etc. Ground units are mostly doing what they do best, lots of artillery and MLRS fire, armored assault, etc.

                                                                                Vostok 2018 military exercise in Transbaikal Territory, Russia

                                                                                VDV Airborne – More than 700 soldiers and 51 vehicles (BMD-2) made a parachutte jump at Tsygol range. At the Belaya airfield near Irkutsk, a detachment of the Ulan-Ude air assault brigade loaded 25 Il-76MD transports. They were then air lifted ~1000km towards Zabaikal where they conducted a jump at 600 meters. The scenario was air assault and seizure of an enemy airfield. All together about 6000 VDV  and 900 pieces of equipment are taking part in Vostok, in earlier posts I mentioned these are units from 3 independent air assault brigades, and two additional special detachments.

                                                                                VDV Ulan Ude assault brigade.JPG

                                                                                As part of the scenario unfolding at Tsygol range, an air mobile battalion belonging to the 31st independent air assault brigade conducted an air assault on an enemy command center, with air support.  About 40 helicopters of Mi-8AMTSh were used (supposed capacity 26 soldiers), two Mi-26 helicopters, and more than 10 Mi-24 helicopters in support. They are billing this exercise as an experiment of a ‘new type’ of air assault detachment. There was also a mobile reserve in support of this assault, composed of light wheeled high mobility vehicles (pickups). Mi-26s delivered 8 of these light pickups, together with 4 armored Rys light vehicles equipped with Kornet ATGMs and Kord heavy machine guns.

                                                                                airborne ATVs.JPG

                                                                                VKS Aerospace Forces – About 40 bombers and strike fixed wing aircraft were used in an attack on opposing ground forces, key infrastructure, and staged reserves. Units involved fielded Tu-22M3, Su-34, Su-24, and Su-25SM strike aircraft. Air cover provided by Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters. Strikes were coordinated via ground based C2 system Strelets, and Orlan-10 drones.

                                                                                Tu-22M3.JPG

                                                                                Eastern MD – Other activities of note: CBRN units used smoke and aerosol covers on more than 60 sq km, covering moving units and critical infrastructure – equipment used includes TDA-3K smoke machines, and RP3-8x aerosols. Anti-tank units belonging to a battalion tactical group of motor rifle and artillery units simulated strikes against enemy armor and fortified positions with 130mm Shturm-S ATGMs and Konkurs-M. Sapper units plan to use not only UR-77 Meteorit, BMP-3M, but also Uran-6 and Uran-9 UGVs for demining.

                                                                                Tsygol Range – Seven artillery battalions created a rolling artillery barrage ahead of an advance, covering a line of ~3000 meters. A motor rifle battalion advanced, and there are photos of host of T-72B1 tanks engaged in a live fire exercise as part of this maneuver. They employed more than 150 pieces of artillery, including 2s3, 2s1, 2s19, Giatsint, and Pion. Meanwhile Iskander-M units fired two cruise missiles at critically important targets, at the same time a large artillery and MLRS barrage hit the opposing force. All together they employed 2 Iskander TELs, 52 MLRS systems, and 72 tube artillery. Targeting for the strike conducted via an air based system called Klever, with Su-24MP recon aviation, and Orlan-10 drones – they used live video feed for battle damage assessment. In one scenario, Russian and Chinese artillery units simultaneously attacked enemy forward command posts. Russian BM-27 Uragan were employed together with Chinese Type-81 MLRS.

                                                                                Motor rifle bttn.JPG

                                                                                Artillery units will also practice employing precision guided munitions called Krasnopol, these will be fired by MSTA-S and 2s3 Akatsiya, Granat-4 short range drones are to be used for targeting. Krasnopol is a 152mm semi-active laser guided munition which can be used by most self-propelled and towed artillery.

                                                                                life fire.jpg

                                                                                Of course a detachment of Terminator BMPT, heavy tank support vehicles will make another debut at Tsygol, undoubtedly in the hope that someone will buy them. They were first  featured in Zapad 2017 in desert camo paint, undoubtedly marketed towards a certain set of countries that like to buy equipment in such colors.

                                                                                Interesting photos emerged of drone companies, fielding both Orlan-10s, but also counter drone hand held weapons, that are worth noting.

                                                                                drone company.JPG

                                                                                counter drone gun.jpg

                                                                                Not much from the two fleets today, except that the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean is still there, and recently concluded a first time joint exercise with Russian VKS. A sizable grouping of ships and a few submarines remains there.

                                                                                Some additional photos of note:

                                                                                Parachute jump skeptic

                                                                                in airborne now.JPG

                                                                                Of course you can’t assault an enemy airbase without taking a photo first

                                                                                can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo.JPG

                                                                                And a time honored tradition emerging from modern exercises, people pointing at screens:

                                                                                pointing at screens.jpg

                                                                                 

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                                                                                #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Haroon Meer – 44CON

                                                                                Haroon Meer

                                                                                Haroon Meer Pic Twitter: @haroonmeer
                                                                                Website: thinkst.com

                                                                                Haroon Meer is the founder of Thinkst, the company behind Canary (https://canary.tools). Haroon has contributed to several books on information security and has published a number of papers on various topics related to the field. Over the past decade (and a half) he has delivered research, talks, and keynotes at conferences around the world. 

                                                                                Haroon has presented at:

                                                                                • 44CON 2016: Light at the end of the tunnel. (Hope for team Defence) (Keynote Talk)
                                                                                • 44CON 2013: A talk about (info-sec) talks
                                                                                • 44CON 2011: Penetration Testing Considered Harmful
                                                                                #####EOF##### WordPress.com Apps - Desktop Apps

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                                                                                #####EOF##### News – Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP

                                                                                VIP News

                                                                                Updates and features about our platform, services, and partners, as well as stories and events from across the enterprise WordPress community.

                                                                                A group of women from ONA's Women Leadership Academy posing in front of a brick wall.

                                                                                March 2019 VIP Roundup

                                                                                The WordPress team recently celebrated another major milestone with the release of WordPress 5.1, alongside news that the platform now […]

                                                                                Read more

                                                                                Freedom to innovate: VIP at Change Forum 2019

                                                                                Product managers gathered in London to share lessons learned about audience engagement and growth whilst leading product teams.

                                                                                Read more
                                                                                Thirteen orange lego people nestled in the snow holding a black sign that reads 'VIP Launch'

                                                                                February VIP Roundup

                                                                                After a brief stint away for the holidays, 2019 is off with a bang (or, a shake, for the VIP […]

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                                                                                Human Made’s approach to Gutenberg? Don’t repeat yourself.

                                                                                Libby Barker, a Senior Project Manager, and K. Adam White, a Senior Developer, both from Human Made, spoke about their […]

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                                                                                Bringing AMP and Gutenberg Readiness to Setka

                                                                                By Ryan Sholin on
                                                                                Posted in Case Studies, Community, Events & Training, News, PresentationsTagged ,

                                                                                How the Setka Editor team built AMP compatibility into their custom post design tool

                                                                                At our latest enterprise WordPress meetup in New York on November 13, Katya Bazilevskaya, Cofounder and CEO at Setka, talked about building the Setka Editor to be Gutenberg-ready and AMP-ready. The Setka Editor is a powerful tool for building beautiful longform stories out of building blocks, all optimized for mobile with full Google AMP integration.

                                                                                The Setka team transformed WordPress galleries, javascript libraries, and even animations into AMP-ready HTML elements, speeding up mobile load times and giving users a lightning-fast experience.

                                                                                Modern CSS approaches available in AMP help cut down on time to First Meaningful Paint, and Setka users are seeing the difference.

                                                                                Watch Katya’s talk:

                                                                                BigWP is our enterprise WordPress meetup series, that brings together developers, business leads, and product people who work with high-scale WordPress applications every day. To be the first to find out about the next enterprise WordPress event in New York, join the meetup group. You’ll find groups for other cities there as well.

                                                                                Find all of the talks in the November’s BigWP playlist.

                                                                                WordPress.com VIP Invests in The News Project

                                                                                By Nick Gernert on
                                                                                Posted in News

                                                                                At WordPress.com VIP, we’ve worked closely with journalists since the very beginning of our service. From our earliest clients, news organizations were an integral part of WordPress’s growth from an open-source blogging platform to a technology that now powers more than 32% of all sites on the web.

                                                                                Since that time, VIP has grown into an enterprise publishing platform that now boasts a customer list including some of the biggest news organizations in the world — CBS, Time.com, and News Corp., to name a few — to global brands like Microsoft, Airbnb, Capgemini, and Capital One.

                                                                                But in this difficult business climate for news organizations, we want to double down on our commitment to journalism and a free (and sustainable) press. Today VIP is announcing that it has made a significant investment in The News Project, a new WordPress-based platform founded by Merrill Brown, the veteran digital news executive who helped launch MSNBC.com.

                                                                                In addition to VIP’s financial investment, The News Project will be powered by VIP’s platform, with a goal of serving medium-sized digital news organizations around the world. You can read more about TNP’s vision here.

                                                                                Along with VIP’s existing platform for large publishers and brands, Automattic’s funding of the new Newspack initiative with Google and other partners (announced yesterday), our own in-house media properties Longreads and The Atavist (bringing the best narrative storytelling to WordPress), and even the individual work of reporters like 12-year-old Hilde Lysiak, we are deeply committed to the sustainability of news organizations, large and small, around the world.  

                                                                                We’re thrilled to work with Merrill and his team on this shared vision. For more information, go to thenewsproject.net.

                                                                                Push Notifications at Scale at the New York Post

                                                                                By Ryan Sholin on
                                                                                Posted in Case Studies, Community, Events & Training, News, PresentationsTagged

                                                                                How The New York Post uses WordPress to manage push notifications for a busy newsroom

                                                                                Remy Stern, Chief Digital Officer at the New York Post, our hosts at BigWP NYC on November 13, led off the presentations with an explanation on how they use WordPress.com VIP to send thousands and thousands of push notifications, email alerts, and to control their breaking news alerts on the web, too.

                                                                                Why use WordPress to manage notifications? It’s the central tool for workflow in their newsroom, and reduces the risk of errors by keeping things in one familiar system with a consistent user experience. As a bonus, that helps things move quickly.

                                                                                “Speed really matters when you’re sending out breaking news push notifications.”

                                                                                Maropost, Urban Airship, and even Apple News are all in the notifications mix for the New York Post, all managed from inside their WordPress admin.

                                                                                Watch Remy’s talk in full:

                                                                                BigWP is our enterprise WordPress meetup series, that brings together developers, business leads, and product people who work with high-scale WordPress applications every day. To be the first to find out about the next enterprise WordPress event in New York, join the meetup group. You’ll find groups for other cities there as well.

                                                                                Find all of the talks in the November BigWP playlist.

                                                                                Client Spotlight: Kurator at News Corp Australia

                                                                                By Dave Coustan on
                                                                                Posted in News, Publisher Spotlight

                                                                                Peek behind the scenes with the WordPress team at News Corp Australia

                                                                                We have had the pleasure of working with News Corp Australia (NCA) since early 2015. Today they host 21 sites with us, including market leaders News.com.au, Foxsports.com.au, and TheAustralian.com.au.

                                                                                For NCA, WordPress represents one important application among others, within a complex and powerful systems architecture that predated their migration. They run their own massive content database and API (CAPI) and also use Méthode for print publishing. The smart ways they have integrated their existing components into WordPress as they migrated their flagship publications to it are a testament to their development vision and execution. They also point to one of WordPress’ great strengths. Its flexibility allows enterprise organizations with existing infrastructure to adapt and evolve with WordPress over time, rather than requiring a complete systems overhaul and mass migration all at once.

                                                                                News Corp Australia Site Production Platform WordPress team
                                                                                The SPP team at News Corp Australia

                                                                                Kurator Lite is one of those powerful custom-built tools that NCA uses to bring external resources to authors and editors working in WordPress. After catching a glimpse of Kurator Lite in action, I chatted with Juan Zapata, head of the WordPress group, the Site Production Platform (SPP) team at News Corp Australia, to hear more about its history, how it works, and what’s in the pipeline for the SPP team.

                                                                                You shared a really cool video that shows how an author or editor in WordPress at News Corp Australia can use Kurator Lite to work with all these different assets and content from all over the company. It looks like a really impressive piece of workflow. Tell me about its history.

                                                                                Juan Zapata: Before we moved on to WordPress VIP we had two different platforms running. One was called FatWire, which was Oracle-based, for print and digital. The other one is Méthode, for print editions of newspapers. There was a disconnect between digital and print in which a user had to create the categories in both systems to be able to have them running correctly. This gap drove the company to create something to bridge the two.

                                                                                That’s where the need for Kurator came about, a tool that manages whole sections of content in both. It’s a tool to help editorial tell the story a bit more easily and share it within these 2 worlds. After Kurator the team built Kurator Lite, which is that small panel you see in the video. That allows you to see the sections or the categories that you can assign to multiple stories. Then they embedded that thing into FatWire. And the same functionality was embedded into Méthode.

                                                                                What year was that?

                                                                                I started at News Corp Australia in 2015, and I think that project started in 2013.

                                                                                How many publications and asset sources does Kurator search?

                                                                                Kurator is basically an interface on our database, which is called CAPI, for Content API. At this stage, it has six million stories, last time I heard, like a month ago. The stories are syndicated across multiple sites, so it is basically a massive search on our database.

                                                                                Really massive. So there was Kurator and you had versions of it implemented in these two CMS systems, FatWire and Méthode. Tell me about the WordPress implementation.

                                                                                We decided, ‘okay, editors already know how to use this tool. Editors already are familiar with these interfaces. Let’s also embed it into WordPress, where they are managing digital publications.’ That’s the video that you saw in which you can basically find stories, search by section, drag and drop those assets from an external database, which is not within WordPress. Then WordPress will grab them and import them to be displayed and curated.

                                                                                How recently was that embed for WordPress made available? When did the team finish that?

                                                                                That needed to be done ASAP as we implemented WordPress…It went live at the end of 2015, so it had to be ready by that time because they need to be able to manage stories or curate stories within WordPress. They need to be able to search the stories that are not in WordPress to be able to import them and organize them and display that within the WordPress template. That had to go straight out.

                                                                                The News Corp Australia Content API has over 6 million stories

                                                                                How does it work? Can you walk me through some of the ways that an editor or an author would use it as they’re creating a story?

                                                                                We tried to keep it as simple as possible. There are two ways of interacting with this thing. One of them is to rank or put collections into WordPress. Within WordPress, we created a custom post type that is a collection of items, of stories, of promos or whatever you want in there. It’s a collection of posts, basically.

                                                                                You can go and open an interface for Kurator in your right panel. Then you search for whatever story you want. You drag it and drop it. You drop it into your container of the collection in that case. Then you can rank your collection in any place or your story in any part of the collection. It can be in the first location of that collection.

                                                                                Then that collection is rendered in the website, for example, in the front page. It will be like the main stories in there. They can drop main stories in there directly, so they manage that concept of collections in there for that one. One way of doing it is through ranking stories into collections. You can open your Kurator panel, drag and drop, and pull your story directly in there.

                                                                                The other way authors use Kurator Lite is, when you’re creating a story, basically you have your WordPress story in there. You create your title, your body. Within News Corp, we have the concept of containers. Container One is…if I translate that into WordPress, that will be your thumbnail image or your picture image. When you open the article page at the top you’ll see your featured image.

                                                                                We have extended that functionality a little bit. What you can drop in there is multiple images and even videos. To keep it simple you just open your Kurator window on the right side, and then search for the image and then drop it into Container One. We have also extended this capability to the body of the article using this as oEmbeds elements.

                                                                                Finally, we have something that is called Container Two right at the bottom, which is a container for related articles, things that you may be interested in that are related to these articles that you’re creating. The same functionality works there. You drag and drop and put it into that container. We tried to keep it as easy as possible as it helps to manually curate content.

                                                                                The drag and drop looks really nice in the video. How does that work?

                                                                                It took us a while to develop because the Kurator panel is an iframe. What we have to do is behind the scenes when you click on a drag event, it extends or puts a div that extends across the whole visible area of your editor. When you drag out of your iframe (visually as you are still within it), it starts sending post messages to that parent window, telling it, “Look, I’m in this position of that massive element.” Then it will be able to identify what to highlight behind the scenes.

                                                                                Because there was no easy way of offering drag and dropping functionality between two iframes, we came with this approach. It’s all done through post messages going back and forth. Once you drop it, it sends another post message saying, “I drop it in this location.” Then we’ll add it and trigger the whole thing that is happening there.

                                                                                It’s not the best implementation today because nowadays there are various different tools available that we can implement it with. There is now a way that we have figured out of integrating directly into WordPress, instead of using an iframe, but we tried to keep it as close as possible as it was implemented in the previous system because it was a known interaction and a business requirement. We knew what we were going to do in there at the time, basically, instead of going and trying different stuff with WordPress. But now we know a way of integrating more directly with WordPress, which will come later on.

                                                                                What else does the full Kurator application do? What features are you most proud of?

                                                                                Kurator does section management. If we translate that into WordPress terms, that will be category management. You can create categories in there. It does very good as it displays syndication rules in a very natural way. Kurator does not syndicate per se, but it has the rules of syndication. You can create a section within Kurator, and that section will say, “Okay, when somebody selects this specific section, I have to put it in this website in this category, in this other website in this category, in this website in this category.” It will tell CAPI, “You have to publish this information into all these sites.”

                                                                                That’s one of the fantastic features that Kurator has in there, section management and syndication management.

                                                                                The other one, of course, is Kurator Lite, which is for searching assets. That’s the part that’s integrated into WordPress.

                                                                                The other one is legal kill. The whole concept of legally killing an asset is to remove it from any website as soon as possible for legal reasons. You say, “I want to legal kill this item,” but the problem is that the asset has been syndicated to multiple sites. You cannot say, “Yeah, it’s deleted from all the sites,” until you get confirmation from all the sites. To accomplish this Kurator verifies all the sites that it has been syndicated to and starts pulling information from there to see if everything was successful depending on the information that it has. It stays there until it finishes. If there is an error, it will notify people about it. It’s a very robust platform built in Node.js with AngularJS. It’s very interesting. It’s completely separate to WordPress, completely separate to CAPI. It’s its own beast.

                                                                                How much of a team supports Kurator?

                                                                                It’s three people. It’s a very small team. It was built long ago, and the core of it hasn’t needed to be touched since then. They built it as a plugin system – one plugin is search. Another plugin is the legal kill functionality. Another plugin is the section management piece. That core thing, they haven’t touched it since they built it. That’s how well they built it. It was a very good engineering task that they did in there for that one. Yeah. At this stage, it’s three people maintaining it.

                                                                                Tell me about the SPP team, what does your team do and how do you work?

                                                                                Within the company, we are the core team that powers WordPress and the teams that all the other product teams developed. We are responsible for ingesting content from our content API, CAPI into WordPress, getting that synced correctly in WordPress, Developing and maintaining our own editor and supporting theme developers with extra plugins within other functions of the team.

                                                                                We are 4 WordPress PHP developers, 2 testers, and 1 automation tester, who is also a developer.

                                                                                We actually have 52 different plugins that allow us to do a lot of stuff in our system within WordPress. To name some we have CAPI sync which controls the translation and ingestion of content to WordPress, Authoring which allows editors to create content within WordPress with all the different containers and integrations, Kurator integration, CHP integration which is our archive of images not hosted within WordPress, Legal Kill, Draft Post, Expire Post, Site Migration, I can go on…The list is massive.

                                                                                What’s coming up on the SPP roadmap?

                                                                                One big one is, we removed the previous liveblogging functionality that we were using, which was with a third party. We are bringing it into WordPress using VIP’s Liveblog plugin. We have been rolling that out this last month. Now we’re rolling out AMP support for live blogging which I’m really keen and looking forward to getting it out. Also, we are working on migrating to VIP Go to which our plugins need a bit of massaging but nothing that worries me.

                                                                                That’s great. What kinds of use cases around News Corp is live blogging used for mostly? Is it sports? Is it entertainment?

                                                                                Almost everything. Sports is the main one that you will see in there, but they have rolling stories around every morning that says, “Things that you need to know today.” Think of it like a live coverage story. They’re just churning stories in there into the Liveblog, and that appears in your homepage saying, “Things that you need to know today. This happened, or this happened yesterday.” They change that every 10 minutes, every 15 minutes. It’s like a live blogging functionality, but they use it in that part of the site. That’s used every day.

                                                                                Political applications as well, they use it. Catastrophic events, like fires. Anything that needs a live blog, but basically the two main ones are sports, and then daily things that are happening in the city.

                                                                                To learn more about our work with News Corp Australia, check out this case study. 

                                                                                November Enterprise WordPress Roundup

                                                                                By Rachel Zick on
                                                                                Posted in Monthly Roundup, News

                                                                                At the risk of early December overshadowing an exciting November, we have to lead off with the biggest headline from the WordPress community in years. Just last week we all celebrated the completion of months of design, development, and refinement: the release of WordPress 5.0 featuring the new block editor! And add to that the release of AMP for WordPress version 1.0, as well as an open source theme based on Big Bite’s new platform for Amnesty International, all in just the past several days. There was a whole lot of November before that, including a BigWP event in New York and launches for Indian Express, Thrive Global, Boston Herald, National University, and SheKnows. Read on and we’ll bring you up to speed with notes from across the enterprise WordPress community.

                                                                                 

                                                                                Matt Mullenweg discussed the release and next phases of WordPress 5.0 in his annual State of the Word address at WordCamp US. (Photo by Val Vesa.)

                                                                                WordPress 5.0 Arrives

                                                                                • The future of WordPress is here!  Congratulations to the core team and all of the colleagues, partners, and community members who made the WordPress 5.0 release a reality. VIP clients, check the Lobby for all the details on deployment at VIP and next steps.
                                                                                • Project lead Matt Mullenweg’s State of the Word (full video) at WordCamp US outlined the next phases of the Gutenberg project, including customization outside the post/page, collaborative editing, workflows, and multilingual innovations.
                                                                                • Our own Simon Dickson runs down highlights from the State of the Word as relates to the enterprise WordPress community.
                                                                                • Jeffrey Paul, core contributor and team lead at XWP, composed this WordPress 5.0 Field Guide to help you navigate the ins and outs of the new release. 
                                                                                Hand holding cube with the letter A
                                                                                First annual Automattic Design Award winners were announced at WordCamp US last week (photo by finalist Ahmad Awais).

                                                                                News and Releases

                                                                                • Nashville welcomed WordCamp US, the largest WordCamp in North America, last week. Check out WCUS on Twitter for conference photos, session takeaways, and lively post-event chatter.
                                                                                • Also at WordCamp US, Automattic announced the winners for the first-ever Automattic Design Award! See the full list on the award website. 
                                                                                • BigWP NYC brought our friends at the New York Post, Setka, 10up, and Human Made together along with a packed house. Topics included integrating plugins with AMP, decoupled WordPress architecture for the enterprise, and more. Stay tuned for videos from the talks, coming soon. 
                                                                                • When PMC acquired Rolling Stone, they turned to XWP and VIP to bring the beloved brand’s digital experience up to date. The Make WordPress Marketing team just published XWP’s case study documenting the collaboration. 
                                                                                • Congrats to the AMP project on the release of version 1.0 of the official AMP Plugin for WordPress.
                                                                                • rtCamp worked with the Indian Express team to revamp their flagship website on VIP. Their Gutenberg Fields Middleware plugin, which makes it easier to create custom Gutenberg blocks, is now compatible with WordPress 5.0. And more than a dozen rtCampers attended WordCamp Ahmedabad as proud sponsors and volunteers.
                                                                                • K. Adam shared some techniques Human Made are using to bring familiar React-ecosystem developer conveniences to their Gutenberg work.
                                                                                • 10up teamed up with StoryCorps for a poignant Google Doodle tribute honoring Veteran’s Day in the US. 
                                                                                • Alley wrote about applying scrum techniques beyond the development team. 
                                                                                • Big Bite took their latest work building a new block editor-ready platform for Amnesty International one step further. Their new open source theme makes some of those tools available for any organization to use. 
                                                                                • Hello partnered with Coral Robots to tackle the $2B robot industry. CEO and Creative Director David Lai published a piece about the lack of Asian American mentors in the design agency world. 
                                                                                • Inpsyde is offering an Advent calendar of helpful blog posts to celebrate the season. Here’s the first post of several in the series.
                                                                                • Trew Knowledge relaunched Hip2Save on VIP, giving them a refreshed interface and new community features.
                                                                                • XWP released the BigCommerce for WordPress plugin and shared their take on why tech companies should invest in WordPress.  
                                                                                • Rasmus Lerdorf, inventor of PHP, turned 50 on November 22.

                                                                                Platform Notes

                                                                                • As mentioned above, WordPress 5.0 has been released! VIP clients, you will experience no immediate change to your publishing experience. Check out the Lobby for notes on next steps and working with the Gutenberg plugin as the project moves on to next phases. 
                                                                                • Domains have come to the VIP Dashboard. Currently a simple list of domains mapped to your environment, VIP has big plans for its future functionality.
                                                                                • VIP CLI was updated to 1.2.1:
                                                                                  •  We now display a preview for vip sync which details the backup date/time being synced and the search/replace to be performed.
                                                                                  • We now display the primary domain, instead of the *.go-vip.co domain in and vip app list.
                                                                                  • More details here.
                                                                                • Jetpack was updated to 6.8.1 (Lobby post for VIP clients).
                                                                                • VIP MU plugins updates include: 
                                                                                  • The Query Monitor update from 3.0 to 3.1.1 includes lots of changes such as a logger, accessibility fixes, and bug fixes. This release also introduces a Dark Mode.
                                                                                  • Fixes and optimizations for purging file URLs from our cache. 

                                                                                Spotlight

                                                                                The Dekode team in their Oslo office

                                                                                Dekode, based in Oslo, Norway, is the leading enterprise WordPress agency in the Nordics. They blend design, development, and strategy work to build cost-effective, self-sustaining solutions for enterprise clients like Tidal, Facebook, and the Norwegian government. Read more about what they’re building in our latest partner profile.

                                                                                Upcoming Events

                                                                                • The Inland Press Association’s Mega Conference is slated for February 25-27 in Las Vegas. Topics span digital subscriptions, newsroom transformation, advertising sales, audience monetization and more.
                                                                                • MWC Barcelona (formerly Mobile World Congress) is the largest mobile event in the world, bringing together the latest innovations and leading-edge technology from more than 2,400 leading companies. It’s happening February 25 – 28, and it’s not too late to grab a pass! 
                                                                                • Speaker applications are open until January 7 for the first-ever WordCamp Nordic coming to Helsinki March 7-9.  
                                                                                • Fancy a warmer clime? Join IRE and NICAR in Newport Beach, CA on March 7-9 for their annual conference devoted to data journalism. 

                                                                                State of the Word 2018 and Enterprise WordPress

                                                                                By Simon Dickson on
                                                                                Posted in News

                                                                                Last week saw the release of WordPress 5.0, the project’s first major update in a little over a year. It’s most notable for the addition of the new Gutenberg editor component, which introduces blocks as the new mental model for WordPress content management.

                                                                                In his 2018 State Of The Word speech, project lead Matt Mullenweg told attendees at WordCamp US that the pace of change would remain high. Gutenberg, he explained, was only the start of a process to address some fundamental problems in the software’s overall user experience.

                                                                                Here’s our selection of key highlights for VIP clients and the enterprise WordPress community.

                                                                                WordPress is all-in on blocks

                                                                                Blocks have been designed to be predictable and tactile. They can cope with the full range of functionality expected of any WordPress site: they can be simple, like a text block, or as rich as an entire e-commerce interface.

                                                                                They reflect the reality of HTML structure, making it (finally!) possible to meet user expectations on things like copy-and-paste from applications like word processors. But as developers we’re able to simplify their presentation, make their function readily apparent to users, and make them reusable across the interface.

                                                                                Already we’ve seen an explosion of creativity within the community. Creators of well-established plugins have made early efforts to adapt their interfaces to exploit the potential of blocks: Matt specifically highlighted the popular Yoast SEO and AMP plugins, which provide feedback on a block-by-block basis. And new plugins are being created, bringing structured content into the editor area without the clumsy use of shortcodes.

                                                                                We’re also seeing the growth of libraries, toolkits and tutorials, making it easier than ever for developers to surface complex functionality or embed external services within the authoring experience. It won’t take long for users to expect to find a block for every purpose.

                                                                                Matt Mullenweg, State Of The Word 2018

                                                                                Blocks will break out of the text box

                                                                                Matt confirmed that the next challenge for Gutenberg is to take the same block concept beyond post content. He showed examples of how blocks might replace what we currently know as ‘widgets’ and ‘menus’. Configuration would take place within the WordPress admin area, in the Customizer – or perhaps even inline, on the front end.

                                                                                Development of phase two will take place, as before, in plugin form – giving developers plenty of visibility into the process, and plenty of time for experimentation and testing.

                                                                                Key enterprise functionality ahead

                                                                                Matt also shared his thinking for the third and fourth phases of the Gutenberg initiative, both with particular appeal to large scale professional content publishers.

                                                                                Phase three is set to focus on collaboration and workflows. It is likely to include content locking based on blocks, rather than pages as now. This will be especially valuable to newsrooms working on breaking stories: we know many of our clients already have elaborate workarounds to allow journalists to work on different parts of the same article simultaneously.

                                                                                Matt admitted: “One of the reasons that copy-and-paste from Google Docs to Gutenberg is so good, is that when I’m writing a post that I’m going to collaborate on, Google Docs is better for that. But if we can integrate these workflows directly into WordPress, we can integrate them with user systems, we can integrate them with revisions, and we can allow them to be fully extensible in a way that a SaaS service will never, ever be.”

                                                                                Phase four will finally bring an official way for WordPress to support multilingual publishing. Numerous proven approaches already exist, of course. But the lack of a canonical solution within WordPress core is often cited as a weakness, and existing solutions often cannot guarantee to be compatible with other plugins and services.

                                                                                Both these phases, proposed for 2020 and beyond, are likely to have implications for existing solutions, including plugins created and recommended by VIP. We’re excited to contribute our experience in these areas to the core initiatives, and encourage all of our clients to get involved as well. Feedback and participation from VIP clients provided the core team with critical insights during phase one, and those insights become even more pertinent as the team takes on the next areas of focus.

                                                                                Enterprise takeaways in brief

                                                                                • The next phases of the Gutenberg project will continue to take place in plugin form. This will allow enterprise teams to test and adopt new functionality gradually as it comes out, and evaluate it in the context of existing workflows and customizations.
                                                                                • Phase two will focus on admin elements outside of pages and posts, further simplifying and streamlining the experience for users.
                                                                                • Phase three will focus on collaboration and workflows, which will be particularly useful for busy newsrooms as well as brand and product teams.
                                                                                • The fourth phase will take on multilingual publishing, bringing a canonical solution into core.

                                                                                There are lots of ways for you to participate in the project! Whether directly through the many points of entry outlined on Make.WordPress.org, by sharing a private demonstration and feedback session with us at your offices, or simply by testing and working with the new features as they are developed, you can play a critical role in the project’s success.

                                                                                Photos courtesy of: Brian Peat, Jen Hooks, Val Vesa. Thank you!

                                                                                Ready to get started?

                                                                                Drop us a note.

                                                                                No matter where you are in the planning process, we’re happy to help, and we’re actual humans here on the other side of the form. 👋 We’re here to discuss your challenges and plans, evaluate your existing resources or a potential partner, or even make some initial recommendations. And, of course, we’re here to help any time you’re in the market for some robust WordPress awesomeness.

                                                                                #####EOF##### Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future? – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                                Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future?

                                                                                Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                Following the November 25th Kerch Strait naval skirmish, in which Russia seized three Ukrainian boats,  Ukrainian leadership has issued warnings of a Russian buildup near Ukraine’s borders. These began in early December and have led to a media echo chamber of concerns that a Russian attack on Ukraine is imminent, in part bolstered by press releases from ISW. Actual evidence of Russian preparations for offensive operations, force movements indicating an unexpected buildup, or an imminent attack, is hard to come by. In this somewhat longer post I want to explore the existing evidence, what little there is, and examine a few conflict scenarios that may be within the realm of possibility in coming months.

                                                                                Unfortunately this simmering conflict is subject to frequent false alarms, while actual points of escalation are rarely predicted, as was the case on November 25th. It is relatively easy to take a week’s worth of Russian troop movements, equipment deployments, drills, and MoD announcements, compile them together into a bullet point list of nefarious activities, and then declare them ‘data points’ indicating preparations for an invasion. As of today it seems Ukraine will not be extending the 30 day state of martial law, which casts some doubt on the urgency and immediacy of the anticipated Russian threat as presented earlier this month by Ukrainian authorities.

                                                                                The more problematic element in all of this has been senior official Russian statements, which suggest a change in Moscow’s stance on dealing with Ukraine is afoot. Sergey Lavrov, Maria Zakharova, and Sergey Naryshkin, have issued statements expecting a possible Ukrainian ‘provocation’ and or ‘attack’ which could be interpreted as indications and warnings of Moscow preparing the information space, i.e. setting expectations of renewed violence in the coming weeks. However, they may also be a poor Russian attempt at getting Washington, D.C. to restrain Ukraine, or otherwise influence Ukrainian decision making to Russian benefit.

                                                                                The Russian narrative offers cause for concern, because it is a form of signaling not dissimilar from official statements in the run up to the Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008. That said, it is likely some officials in Moscow believed Ukraine would try to use martial law as a cover for a military operation in the Donbas, especially given their experience with Saakashvili in 2008. Although real evidence is scant, I’ll try to unpack the different stories, and the likelihood of an upcoming Russian military operation against Ukraine.

                                                                                Bottom line up front: Almost every year there is a sizable artillery duel that takes place after the holiday truce (clashes likely to resume between orthodox Christmas on January 7 and perhaps the old new year on January 14th), and so a notable escalation in violence is likely in January, but there is no evidence of Russian preparations for a major assault in Ukraine, certainly not in Crimea.  It is possible, but highly improbable. Most of the information available reflects planned modernization, expected force structure changes, and troop movements on the Russian side not indicative of unusual activity or preparations for an assault. However, as covered years ago on this blog, the long term force posture and structure changes to create three divisions along Ukraine’s borders, return earlier displaced brigades, and a focus on modernizing equipment in the Southern MD, mean that capacity and capability is there to engage in a high intensity conventional conflict with Ukraine at any time. Ukrainian leadership has used evidence from these long term trends to create the sense of an imminent tactical threat, but that is not the case, and they likely know it.

                                                                                Expectations of an attack are based on three disparate sets of information, if we can charitably call them that, which are seemingly being woven together by various outlets, blogs, and sites like ISW who warn of Russian preparations for an imminent attack. The first is an alleged increase in Russian hardware in the Rostov region of the Southern Military District. The second is a series of disparate troop movements in Crimea, which in and of themselves do not speak to anything, but some believe are indications of a Russian operation against Ukraine’s Kherson region, presumably to seize the Crimea-Dnepr fresh water canal. The third involves statements by Russia’s MFA, Sergey Naryshkin, and others, that indicate Russian preparations for a conflict in the near future.

                                                                                Issue #1 The Russian tank build up in the east and frightening Google photos of lots of tanks

                                                                                skynews-petro-poroshenko-putin_4504080.jpg
                                                                                Poroshenko on Sky News earlier this month with google satellite imagery

                                                                                 

                                                                                Ukraine’s chief of general staff, Victor Muzhneko, stated that there is an increase in Russian tanks near the Ukrainian border, having grown from 93 to 250 within two weeks from mid-September. This information was spread by a Ukrainian run English-language blog run by Dylan Malyasov, which is a defense news amalgamator. The problem is that these are mostly T-62 variants (M/MV), which have long been retired from the Russian military, and are not in service with Russian trained separatist forces either. This tank last saw service during the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, and was considered obsolete decades ago. There is no Russian unit that fields T-62 tanks today, or T-64 tanks for that matter. The Russian armed forces use this tank for target practice during major military exercises, as was the case in recently held Vostok 2018.

                                                                                Separatist forces use T-64BV and T-72B1 variants, which are different main battle tanks, but can perform the same missions and are comparable in their performance characteristics. The T-62 is a completely different design, using different caliber ammunition, sights, fire control, and so on – so it is not possible for someone trained on a T-72 to just jump into this tank and ‘invade Ukraine.’ At this point the same can be said of T-64BVs being supplied to the two separatist corps, doubtfully anyone in line Russian units is current and certified to operate either T-62s, or T-64s. Russian forces use more modern T-72BA or B3 variants almost exclusively, with select units fielding T-80Us or T-80BVM.

                                                                                Here is a quick slide of T-72B3 use by Russian forces in Ukraine 2014, T-64BV manned by separatists, and a T-62M

                                                                                This slideshow requires JavaScript.

                                                                                Below we can see the alleged tank build up near Ukraine’s borders. Note the rest of the vehicle park at the base, and the contingent, remains the same after the arrival of these tanks, which suggests that they are here for storage and not a force addition.

                                                                                08162018
                                                                                August 16 – clearing for tanks
                                                                                09232018
                                                                                September 23 most of the tanks have arrived
                                                                                09302018
                                                                                September 30 – about 250 tanks there

                                                                                The main force currently being supplied with refurbished Russian T-62M tanks is the Syrian Army, particularly the 5th Corps. These tanks are coming out of Russian reserve storehouses with T-62s and BMP infantry fighting vehicles. During Vostok 2018 there was news of T-62s being activated and shipped east, but in reality several batches of these vehicles were loaded and shipped West in October. Ukraine’s alleged tank build up is almost certainly a series of old T-62s taken out of the Central Tank Reserve Base in Ulan Ude, which were tracked through social media (you can get a more detailed story on the T-62 shipment from DFR Lab) as arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, which is where Muzhenko’s photos are from. Subsequently these tanks tend to show up at the port of Novorossiysk for shipment to Syria via the ‘Syrian Express.’

                                                                                Storage base in Ulan-Ude, before September and after September of this year. A number of tanks have moved from the lot, indicating that some of the vehicles likely came from this base.

                                                                                T-62M tanks heading west from Central Military District and same ones arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, some are likely destined for Syria.

                                                                                The recently arrived tanks near Ukraine’s borders are most likely being stored in Rostov region near the port for shipment, or may be used in training, but the story that Russia is planning to invade Ukraine with ancient tanks that they themselves don’t use and don’t train on stretches the imagination beyond the realm of the possible. It is equally possible that these tanks are there to establish a new reserve structure. Russia has been lacking mobilization force structure, and at best has developed a territorial battalion type reserve system for infrastructure defense. Operational reserve capacity comes out of active units which force generate units from active servicemen rather than mobilize reservists. Therefore one possible explanation is that these older vehicles are designed to park equipment for some nascent reserve force structure.

                                                                                What’s frustrating is that Ukraine’s military leadership doubtlessly knows all of this, which makes it hard to understand why Muzhenko would use google earth satellite images of old T-62 tanks to push this story in the media. Any military analyst who studies the Russian armed forces could likely tell you this information. Yet Petro Poroshenko went on Sky News with these very same images of Russian tanks, as though they were legitimate evidence of Russian preparations for an invasion.

                                                                                My personal interpretation of the Ukrainian claims is that this is an information campaign to justify and defend Poroshenko’s controversial decision to institute martial law in advance of Presidential elections, where his chances of winning are quite tenuous. This is a cynical, but optimistic view, because the alternative suggests that Ukraine’s armed forces don’t know much about the Russian military, and use dated google earth images to hunt down old T-62 tanks that are neither here or there to anything. Ukrainian force posture doesn’t suggest that they themselves expect a Russian offensive either, and the temporary state of martial law has ended as scheduled, so this seems to be mostly a large information wave with little substance to substantiate it.

                                                                                However, the Russian Rostov region is seeing a steady build up of forces as part of the formation of the 150th division in the reestablished 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern MD). This will prove a decade long process. Other units that have been announced as far back as early 2015, include the 144th MR Division and 3rd MR Division in 20th Combined Arms Army (Western MD), some shifting of brigades, and steady addition or maneuver regiments to only partially filled divisions in 1st Tank Guards Army headquartered in Moscow. The 144th Division is somewhat lagging here in formation. The 150th division is a 2×2 motor rifle and tank regiment configuration (+2 supporting regiments), which is almost filled now in its maneuver regiments. Supposedly the last motor rifle regiment is being formed as of this month. There are also interesting force structure changes afoot in the Russian VDV, creating much larger air mobile formations, which were partially covered during experiments in Vostok-2018 exercises.

                                                                                Issue #2 Russian build up in Crimea for an invasion of Kherson

                                                                                image of the dried up canal.jpeg
                                                                                The dried up canal on the Russian side of the Crimean border

                                                                                There is another concern out there, based on sighting of Russian troop movements near the Crimean border with Kherson, that Russia might conduct an offensive operation from Crimea. At least this is ISW’s thesis on the basis of a few troop trucks, some APCs, and artillery being moved towards the border – which is not at all uncommon. Basically, we have a story of an overturned Russian truck as part of a military convoy on the way to the border, with a field kitchen. What’s naturally missing from this equation is a concentration of armor, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, large volumes of ammunition, etc. moved about on flatbed trucks, i.e. there is no evidence of the sort of hardware one would expect in support of an offensive operation or the formation of battalion tactical groups near Ukraine’s borders in Crimea. The Army Corps in Crimea has a dearth of maneuver elements, so units would have to cross into the peninsula via bridge from the rest of the Southern Military District (presumably 58th Army), concentrate, and deploy – which nobody is seeing happen. More than likely Russian troop movements are indicators of preparations for an artillery duel – exchanges of indirect fire that typically escalate in January/February.

                                                                                Partly responsible for the confusion are two planned force additions to Crimea. First we have the formation of the 171st independent air assault battalion in Crimea, which was announced December 2, 2017. This battalion is technically part of the 7th VDV Air assault division, but will create a permanently based unit in Crimea with air mobility, and add to the ‘elite infantry’ stationed there which can serve as a rapid reaction force. However, VDV units have been rotating through Crimea for years now, so this is less of a force increase and more institutionalizing that which has already been taking place.

                                                                                171th VDV Regiment
                                                                                171st Independent Battalion receiving its honorary title, establishing it in Crimea

                                                                                The second tidbit of information regards the deployment of a 4th S-400 battalion to Dzhankoi in Crimea, which likely completes the rearmament of the 18th and 12th air defense regiments based there (31st air defense division within the 4th Air and Air Defense Army of the Southern Military District). The first S-400 battalion was deployed January 2017 in Feodosia, the second January 2018 in Sevastopol, and a third in September 2018 in Yevpatoria. The S-400 replaces the older S-300 systems deployed to Crimea, and is part of a general wave of modernization which prioritized the Southern Military District. Alongside S-400 deployments one can find Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters, and Su-34 bombers steadily replacing Su-24s and older Su-27s in the Russian Aerospace Forces and naval aviation units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

                                                                                S-400 in Crimea.jpg
                                                                                The 2nd Russian S-400 battalion set deployed to Crimea early this year

                                                                                There is cause for concern that long term Russia may need to resolve the fresh water crisis in Crimea, but no way to know how this situation will play out in the coming year. In May 2014 Ukraine blocked off the water supply from the Crimea-Dnepr canal that links the Dnepr river to the peninsula. Although Russia was able to quickly build an ‘energy bridge’ to supply power, and Kerch strait bridge officially opened May 2018 to commercial traffic, the water problem remains a potential cause of conflict (Jane’s here briefly summarizes the issue: Ukraine supplied 86% of Crimea’s water, and this summer there was an acute water shortage in about 20% of the peninsula). The fresh water issue is problematic, but I’ve found it to be overly spun as the next “land bridge to Crimea” narrative. The only sort of offensive military operation that makes sense is a thrust to the Dnepr river, which seizes the entire canal, and the southern half of Ukraine’s Kherson region. There is no way to take part of the canal since it is easily blocked at any point south of the river itself. In scope, this is about a 65-70km push, which is equivalent to depth of territory seized in the Donbas region. Kherson may be relatively easy to cut off, but it would require a substantial number of forces to effect this kind of operation and earn Russia an entire new host of problems.

                                                                                Kherson map.JPG
                                                                                Basic map with the path of the Dnepr-Crimea canal indicated
                                                                                Kherson vector
                                                                                ~65km from the Crimean border to the Dnepr river to get to the starting point of the canal (beyond which it cannot be blocked)

                                                                                Taking Kherson, like taking most any other Ukrainian region, is well within the realm of Russian military capability, but it would mean inheriting a new region which is also dependent on other parts of Ukraine. One of the obvious challenges Russia has faced in taking pieces of Ukraine is that it may seem easy to to dismember a country on a map, but in reality a state is full of integrated pieces that depend on each other for electricity, water, road networks, trade, supply of food, etc. Resolving the fresh water problem in Crimea by taking another region that would itself bring new supply challenges, and while it could probably be done relatively quickly, it would also require a substantial force build up and subsequent deployment. There are no ‘separatist’ or other volunteer battalions ready to take over internal security, man block posts, and create an entirely new line of control with Ukrainian forces. Also, there is the small matter than absent a ‘Kherson People’s Republic’ movement, there are no proxy forces behind which Russia can mask its invasion, and so this would have to be an overt, outright, and bloody business from the very start.

                                                                                Russia could build up forces in Crimea relatively quickly, combining an air mobile airborne operation with a ground assault, but there would be indications and warnings. Unlike in February-March 2014, the West has a lot of technical and human resources now focused on the Russian problem set. Ground force movements, airborne unit shifts, forward deployment of several battalion tactical groups in Crimea, etc. These are regularly recorded by people, spotters, social media, and traditional news. Right now there is no evidence of such troop movements, though one should not discount a military solution to the water issue in 2019, but the entire scenario remains in the realm of low probability events.

                                                                                Issue #3 Russian warnings and threats

                                                                                Finally, Russian press statements by Lavrov, Naryshkin, Maria Zakharova are perhaps the most alarming, since they indicate a readiness of Russian forces to see through an escalation with Ukraine in the coming weeks or months. This of course brings us into the realm of political analysis and out of the world of military analysis. These warnings indicate the expectation of a conflict, with Russia positioning Ukraine as a the provocateur, something that’s become rote in Russian political statements. The messaging is probably not meant for domestic audiences, or Ukrainian audiences, but for the West, which Russian elites believe can heavily influence Ukrainian decision making. As such, they represent a pattern of thinking reminiscent of the run up to the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, reflecting the Russian perception that they can threaten the potential risk of escalation in order to get the United States to lean on what Moscow sees as Washington’s client state.

                                                                                Russians do see Poroshenko as a provocateur, expecting him to “pull something” in the run up to the election, and engage in military posturing. Like many policymakers in the West, they are subscribers to diversionary war theory, which has little empirical basis, but is very much in vogue with political decision makers. Moscow thinks that Poroshenko needs Western attention on Ukraine, and the cheapest way Ukraine can achieve that is with a narrative that draws attention to the ongoing ‘Russian threat.’ Hence warnings of imminent danger tend to crop up every fall around November-December time. Putting aside the likelihood that Russia itself will execute some of the more dire plans discussed above, there is little incentive for Russia to launch any attack during the election as it would only benefit Poroshenko’s cause, in every scenario. That doesn’t mean it wont happen, because bounded rationality leads to outcomes akin to November 25th, i.e. one should not ignore the likely outcome of a chain of events that results in a conflict spiral between these two actors, but there is no sign that Russia intends to intervene in Ukrainian politics via overt military means.

                                                                                There is a strong possibility of miscalculation, with January 2019 being different than previous artillery duels and skirmishes that have followed the last major operation in February-March 2015 (Battle of Debaltseve). Ukrainian forces have been slowly gaining ground in the ‘grey zone’ that exists between the two sides respective positions along the line of control in the Donbas. These steady gains are often referenced as the ‘creeping offensive’ to retake lost territory, leading to artillery duels with Russian backed separatists. Separatist units are organized and supported with logistics, technical capabilities like EW, air defense, and other equipment, by a contingent of Russian regulars in Ukraine stationed further behind the line of control. The daily exchanges of indirect fire often flare up after the holiday truce in January, particularly when one side decides to creep into the no man’s land between them, and shift the battle lines.

                                                                                Russian controlled separatists have also played this game with Ukrainian forces for several years now, making small shifts in the line over the years. It’s what keeps this a hot war rather than a frozen conflict. However, there is a sense that Russia is spoiling for a fight – just one person’s opinion. Russian public statements are designed to paint them as the reasonable party seeking to deter potential Ukrainian adventurism, but in truth, it feels like Moscow is looking to bloody Ukraine at the first available opportunity.

                                                                                It could be vengeance for Ukraine gaining autocephaly, splitting from the Russian orthodox church, or it could be that Moscow wants to show that it is unconstrained and feels free to use the military toolkit. The November 25th naval skirmish with the Russian FSB border guard service demonstrated that when pressed to make decisions in the moment, the Russian leadership turned what could have been a minor incident into a serious clash, overt, heavy handed, with disproportionate use of force. This is at best personal inference, but it is unlikely that Russia is planning an offensive operation to seize Kherson. It is more probable that Moscow is spoiling for a fight with Ukraine, with the intent of handing Ukraine and by proxy, the United States, a small but politically consequential military defeat.

                                                                                 

                                                                                 

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                                                                                  #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Topic Tag: humor | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                                  #####EOF##### WordPress.com vs WordPress.org Hosting Options

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                                                                                  I looked into what other bloggers whom I admired were using, and the Cadillac of platforms is WordPress.com, hands down. The themes are breathtaking — even the free ones! — and all of the supporting infrastructure and information is top shelf.
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                                                                                  #####EOF##### Didier Stevens – 44CON

                                                                                  Didier Stevens

                                                                                  Didier Stevens Twitter: @DidierStevens
                                                                                  Website: didierstevens.com
                                                                                  Didier Stevens (Microsoft MVP, SANS ISC Handler, Wireshark Certified Network Analyst, CISSP, GSSP-C, GCIA, GREM, MCSD .NET, MCSE/Security, MCITP Windows Server 2008, RHCT, CCNP Security, OSWP) is a Senior Security Analyst (NVISO https://www.nviso.be). You can find his open source security tools on his IT security related blog at https://blog.DidierStevens.com.

                                                                                  Didier has presented at:

                                                                                  • 44CON 2017: A Hands On Introduction To Software Defined Radio
                                                                                  • 44CON LONDON 2015 (workshop): Analyzing Malicious Office Documents
                                                                                  • 44CON 2014 (workshop): Advanced Excel Hacking

                                                                                   
                                                                                  #####EOF##### Katie Moussouris – 44CON

                                                                                  Katie Moussouris

                                                                                  default Twitter: @k8em0
                                                                                  Katie Moussouris is the Chief Policy Officer of HackerOne. Ms. Moussouris oversees the company’s philosophy and approach to vulnerability disclosure, advises customers and researchers, and works toward the public good to legitimize and promote security research to help make the Internet safer for everyone.

                                                                                  Katie Moussouris’ Microsoft work encompassed industry-leading initiatives such as Microsoft’s bounty programs (www.microsoft.com/bountyprograms), BlueHat content chair, security researcher outreach, Vulnerability Disclosure Policies, and MSVR (Microsoft Vulnerability Research). She also currently serves as a subject matter expert for the US National Body of the International Standards Organization (ISO), in vulnerability disclosure (29147), secure development (27034), penetration testing as it applies to Common Criteria (20004-2) and Vulnerability Handling Processes (30111).

                                                                                  Ms. Moussouris was one of the Artists Formerly Known as @stake, and has performed dozens of software penetration tests, security code audits, and design reviews for major companies.

                                                                                  Katie has presented at:

                                                                                  • 44CON 2014: Bug Bounties – Relationship Advice for the Hunters & the Hunted
                                                                                  #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Literaturblog von Nomadenseele

                                                                                  Die Montagsfrage #30 – Welches humoristische Werk gehört in den Schrank eines jeden Lesers?

                                                                                  01 Montag Apr 2019

                                                                                  Posted by in Monatagsfrage

                                                                                  ≈ 2 Kommentare

                                                                                  Mit freundlicher Genehmigung von Lauter & Leise.

                                                                                  Die Montagsfrage #30 – Welches humoristische Werk gehört in den Schrank eines jeden Lesers? fragt Lauter & Leiser zum 1. April.

                                                                                  Ich kenne nicht allzuviele lustige Bücher, aber Tom Sharpes *Ein dicker Hund* ist mir in sehr guter Erinnerung geblieben.

                                                                                  Taschenbuch: 316 Seiten
                                                                                  Verlag: Goldmann Verlag (1998)
                                                                                  Sprache: Deutsch
                                                                                  ISBN-10: 3442440947
                                                                                  ISBN-13: 978-3442440948
                                                                                  Verpackungsabmessungen: 18,1 x 11,4 x 2,7 cm


                                                                                  Der junge Adlige Timothy Bright ist nicht, wie sein Name vielleicht vermuten läßt, besonders helle. Er wird von seinem Vater dazu erzogen und durch Klüngel dazu ermächtigt, in London den großen Finanzier bei einer Bank zu spielen und schafft es schließlich, das gesamte Vermögen der Familie zu vernichten. Dazu wird er noch für üble Machenschaften der Unterwelt mißbraucht und landet auf äußert schmerzhaften Umwegen auf einem Landsitz, auf dem bald der Wahnsinn ausbricht.

                                                                                  Sharpe hat durchaus Brachialhumor geschrieben, und ich verstehe, wenn jemand ihn nicht mag. Aber ich habe ihn in guter Erinnerung. Obwohl ich seine Henry-Romane nicht so mag, fand ich auch *Henry haut ab* (Rezi) ganz gut.

                                                                                  Vorherige Beiträge

                                                                                    #####EOF##### Vinny's Profile | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                                    Member Since: June 6, 2014 (5 years)

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                                                                                    #####EOF##### #####EOF##### CSS Cheat Sheets to Eliminate the Mystery of Web Design
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                                                                                    CSS Cheat Sheets to Eliminate the Mystery of Web Design

                                                                                    Imagine this: a WordPress.com site owner likes their theme, but wishes they could change some things — perhaps a larger header to display their logo, or a specific font color for their blog post titles.

                                                                                    Sometimes, what should be a simple web search can be frustrating, often leaving site owners with more questions. HTML? CSS? CSS cheat sheets? What does all of it mean, and how does it relate back to their site?

                                                                                    What CSS looks like

                                                                                    For starters, HTML provides instructions for where things go on a page, and CSS gives direction for what things look like on that page.

                                                                                    When you look at a CSS cheat sheet for the first time, it may feel as if you’re just looking at a random document. Most CSS cheat sheets feature different series of symbols and letters.

                                                                                    Here’s a video that explains exactly what you’re seeing:

                                                                                    The video makes it seem simple enough; however, for non-coders, creating an entire CSS document can be difficult. This is especially true when you’re trying to figure out the right terms to type for the selectors, properties, and values.

                                                                                    All you have to do is look up the element you want to style, follow the format of Selector {property:value} shown in the video, and you’re done.

                                                                                    Two great CSS cheat sheets

                                                                                    Here are some of the best CSS cheat sheets that can help make your website stand out from other sites that may be using the same theme.

                                                                                    This CSS infographic by Genautica gives you the properties, values, and options for each, along with a definition of each so that you know exactly what you’re styling and how.

                                                                                    The Ultimate CSS Cheat Sheet by On Blast Blog is a PDF that gives you CSS selectors, properties, and values divided up by the types of things you’d want to style.

                                                                                    Where your CSS goes

                                                                                    Once you have your CSS written out to match what you want the different elements of your website to look like, it’s time to insert that code into your website. If you have a WordPress.com Premium or Business plan, you have the ability to add custom CSS.

                                                                                    If you want the CSS to apply to just one page, you can paste it into your back-end HTML (or text editor) for that particular page. Bring up the HTML view of the WordPress.com editor and paste it in.

                                                                                    HTML editor

                                                                                    If you want to apply the CSS you’ve written to your entire website — like if you want all H1s and H2s to look the same no matter what page they’re on — you can paste it into your website’s overall customization.

                                                                                    To access this, go to Appearance > Customize > CSS.

                                                                                    Easy tweaks and updates

                                                                                    Updating your CSS once makes it easier in the future.

                                                                                    If you want to change more than the basics like font and color, here’s a more in-depth tutorial on adding custom CSS on WordPress.com sites.


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                                                                                    #####EOF##### #####EOF##### The White House Showcase | WordPress.org

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                                                                                    #####EOF##### Two Step Authentication — Support — WordPress.com

                                                                                    Support

                                                                                    Configuration

                                                                                    Security »Two Step Authentication

                                                                                    Similar to Two Factor Authentication, or 2FA, Two Step Authentication adds another layer of security to your WordPress.com account.

                                                                                    What is Two Step Authentication?
                                                                                    Setup with an Authenticator App
                                                                                    Setup with SMS Codes
                                                                                    Logging In
                                                                                    Backup Codes
                                                                                    Application-Specific Passwords
                                                                                    Disabling Two Step Authentication
                                                                                    Moving to a New Device
                                                                                    If You Lose Your Device

                                                                                    Your WordPress.com site is your home on the internet, and you want to keep that home safe. Hopefully, you’ve already chosen a unique and hard-to-crack password for your account. To add another layer of home security, you can enable Two Step Authentication, also known as Two-Factor Authentication.

                                                                                    What is Two Step Authentication?

                                                                                    Two step authentication is a method of securing accounts requiring that you not only know something (a password) to log in but also that you possess something (your mobile device). The benefit of this approach to security is that even if someone guesses your password, they need to have also stolen your possession in order to break into your account.

                                                                                    At WordPress.com, we offer two step authentication via mobile device. We first verify your mobile device by sending a code via one of a couple of methods. Once you’ve verified your device, any time you log in with your password, we send a new code to your device, which you must input before logging in. It adds a small extra step to the login process but makes your account much more secure.

                                                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                    Setup with an Authenticator App

                                                                                    To set up two step authentication via an authenticator application like Google Authenticator, Authy, or Duo on your device, you’ll need to start in a desktop browser.

                                                                                    First, go to your Two-Step Authentication settings page at WordPress.com.

                                                                                    Or, you can reach Settings by clicking on your Gravatar image from the WordPress.com home page:

                                                                                    gravatar

                                                                                    Next, click the “Security” link in the navigation on the left-hand side of the screen:

                                                                                    security-sidebar

                                                                                    Then, click on Two-Step Authentication and then Get Started.

                                                                                    get-started

                                                                                    Here you’ll be prompted to select your country and to provide your mobile phone number (without country code and spaces or dashes). After doing so, click Verify Via App.

                                                                                    Next, scan the QR code presented with your authenticator app. A six-digit number will appear in the authenticator app. Enter it in the blank provided and click Enable.

                                                                                    verify-code-app

                                                                                    Lastly, you’ll be prompted to print backup codes. Don’t skip this step, as it’ll be your only way to log back into your account without staff assistance should your device go missing!

                                                                                    Please Note: If your web browser is set to block pop-up windows, you may need to temporarily disable this feature as it will prevent the window with your backup codes from opening.

                                                                                    Click All Finished.

                                                                                    At this point, your site is enabled for two-step authentication. A follow-up step allows you to confirm that your backup codes work by entering one of the printed codes.

                                                                                    backup-codes-not-verified

                                                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                    Setup with SMS Codes

                                                                                    If you’re unable to set up two step authentication using an authenticator app, you can also set it up to work via SMS messages. To do so, set up your phone number as described above, but then click Verify via SMS.

                                                                                    verify-code-sms

                                                                                    Within a few moments, you should receive a text message that includes a 7-digit number. Enter this number in the blank provided and click Enable.

                                                                                    From this point forward, you can print and verify backup codes as documented above. Your account is now protected by two step authentication.

                                                                                    Smartphone apps that block automated calls might also block our messages.

                                                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                    Logging In

                                                                                    The login process varies slightly from the usual process once you have two step authentication enabled. Regardless of whether you used the Google Authenticator method or the SMS method to enable two step authentication, you’ll start by logging in as usual with your username and password.

                                                                                    2fa-login-1

                                                                                    Next, you’ll be prompted to enter the verification code that was sent to your device.

                                                                                    2fa-login-sms

                                                                                    If you’re using SMS for two step authentication, we’ll send you a text message with a six-digit number. If you set up two step authentication with the Google Authenticator app, open the Google Authenticator app on your device and provide the six-digit number listed for the account. Once you’ve entered the code, you’ll be logged in and ready to blog.

                                                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                    Backup Codes

                                                                                    We don’t want you to lose access to your WordPress.com account—you’ll still need to be able to log in if it’s is lost, stolen, you’re locked out for any reason, or your device needs to be wiped clean (which will delete Google Authenticator). To make sure you’re never locked out of your blog, you can generate a set of ten, one-time-use backup codes. We recommend that you print the backup codes out and keep them in a secure place like a wallet or document safe. (Don’t save them on your computer. They’d be accessible to anyone using your machine.) Generating backup codes is essential and must be done. If you ever need to use a backup code, just log in like you normally would, and when asked about the login code enter the backup code instead.

                                                                                    At the end of the setup process for  Two Step Authorization, you’ll be given the option to generate backup codes:

                                                                                    backup-codes

                                                                                    Just click “Generate Backup Codes,” print the screen containing the codes—don’t save it—and then close the screen.

                                                                                    If you lose your list of backups or it’s compromised, you can generate a new set of codes. For added security, this will disable any previously-generated codes.

                                                                                    You can only generate the backup codes from a desktop browser. For example, Safari on iOS will not display the backup codes. Additionally, if your web browser is set to block pop-up windows, you will need to temporarily disable this feature as it will prevent the window with your backup codes from opening.

                                                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                    Application-Specific Passwords

                                                                                    There may be some apps that connect to your WordPress.com account that don’t yet fully support Two Step Authentication; the most common are the WordPress mobile apps or Jabber apps used to subscribe to WordPress.com blogs. For these apps, you can generate unique passwords for each application (e.g., you can have a different password on your phone and your tablet). You can then disable individual passwords and lock applications out of your account to prevent others from accessing your sites.

                                                                                    To generate application-specific passwords, head back to Two-Step Authentication and then down to “Application Passwords”:

                                                                                    application-password-prompt

                                                                                    Give the application a name—you’re the only one who will see this name, so call it whatever you’d like—and click “Generate Password.” WordPress.com will create a unique 16-character password that you can copy and paste the next time you log in to your account on that device. The application will remember this password, so you don’t need to.

                                                                                    Your Security page will maintain a list of all the applications for which you’ve generated passwords. If any of your devices are lost or stolen, or you simply wish to revoke access for a particular application, you can visit this page at any time and click “X” to disable the password and prevent the app from accessing your account:

                                                                                    application-password-add-new

                                                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                    Disabling Two Step Authentication

                                                                                    We don’t recommend disabling Two Step Authentication, as it’s much less secure, even if you believe your password is very strong. But if you insist, you can disable the feature by going to your Two-Step Authentication page.

                                                                                    The page will show that the feature is enabled, and you can click the Disable Two-Step Authentication button. This will prompt you to enter a code to confirm that you still have access to the device you originally used to set two step authentication up. If you’re using an authenticator app, open it and provide the code it lists. If you’re using SMS, you’ll be sent a code to use. (This code is different from the code you used to log in to your account. You can also use one of your backup codes for this step.)

                                                                                    Click Disable after entering the code and your account will no longer be protected by Two Step Authentication.

                                                                                    disable-prompt

                                                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                    Moving to a New Device

                                                                                    If you are planning on switching to a new device, and you have enabled Two Step Authentication, you will want to take the following steps to avoid being accidentally locked out of your user account.

                                                                                    If you are using an authenticator app to generate verification codes:

                                                                                    1. Print a set of backup codes for your user account by following the steps here. DO NOT SKIP THIS STEP.
                                                                                    2. On your new device, install the authenticator app.
                                                                                    3. Disable the Two Step Authentication link with your old device by following the steps here.
                                                                                    4. Set up your user account to link to your new device by following the steps here.
                                                                                    5. If you are prompted to enter your verification code, use a code from your list of backup codes. Backup codes are one-time use only.
                                                                                    6. You can now uninstall the authenticator app from your old device.

                                                                                    If you are using the WordPress.com mobile app to manage and publish to your blog:

                                                                                    1. Create a new application-specific password by following the steps here.
                                                                                    2. Enter your new application password when using this app on your new device.

                                                                                    If you are using SMS to receive authentication codes, you will not need to update your settings unless you are also changing to a new phone number. In that case, you will want to set up a new recovery number prior to disconnecting your old SMS number by following the steps here.

                                                                                    ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                    If You Lose Your Device

                                                                                    If you lose your device, accidentally remove the authenticator app, or are otherwise locked out of your account, the only way to get back in to your account is by using a Backup Code.

                                                                                    To use a backup code, fill in your login details like you normally would. When asked about the login code enter the backup code instead. Remember: backup codes are only valid for one time each so be careful when using them.

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                                                                                    #####EOF##### News & Announcements – WordPress.org

                                                                                    Minimum PHP Version update

                                                                                    Posted April 1, 2019 by Aaron Jorbin. Filed under Development.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.2 is targeted for release at the end of this month, and with it comes an update to the minimum required version of PHP. WordPress will now require a minimum of PHP 5.6.20.

                                                                                    Beginning in WordPress 5.1, users running PHP versions below 5.6 have had a notification in their dashboard that includes information to help them update PHP. Since then, the WordPress stats have shown an increase in users on more recent versions of PHP.

                                                                                    Screenshot of the "PHP Update Required" widget from the WordPress dashboard. Contains information about detecting an insecure version of PHP, how it affects your site, and a link for information on upgrading.
                                                                                    The dashboard widget users see if running an outdated version of PHP

                                                                                    Why You Should Update PHP

                                                                                    If your site is running on an unsupported version of PHP, the WordPress updater will not offer WordPress 5.2 to your site. If you attempt to update WordPress manually, that update will fail. To continue using the latest features of WordPress you must update to a newer version of PHP.

                                                                                    When updating to a new version of PHP, WordPress encourages updating to its recommended version, PHP 7.3. The PHP internals team has done a great job making its most recent version the fastest version of PHP yet. This means that updating will improve the speed of your site, both for you and your visitors.

                                                                                    This performance increase also means fewer servers are needed to host websites. Updating PHP isn’t just good for your site, it also means less energy is needed for the 1-in-3 sites that use WordPress, so it’s good for the planet.

                                                                                    How to Update PHP

                                                                                    If you need help updating to a new version of PHP, detailed documentation is available. This includes sample communication to send to your host for them to assist you. Many hosting companies have published information on how to update PHP that is specific for them.

                                                                                    5.6 now, but soon 7+

                                                                                    This is the first increase in PHP required version for WordPress since 2010, but may not be the only increase in 2019. The WordPress core team will monitor the adoption of the most recent versions of PHP with an eye towards making PHP 7+ the minimum version towards the end of the year.

                                                                                    Update PHP today, so you can update WordPress tomorrow!

                                                                                    The Month in WordPress: March 2019

                                                                                    Posted by Hugh Lashbrooke. Filed under Month in WordPress.

                                                                                    WordPress reached a significant milestone this month. With some exciting developments in Core, an interesting new proposal, and the return of a valuable global event, March was certainly an interesting time.

                                                                                    WordPress Now Powers One-Third of the Web

                                                                                    WordPress’ market share has been steadily increasing, and as of halfway through this month, it powers over one-third of the top 10 million sites on the web (according to W3Techs, which tracks usage statistics for all major web platforms).

                                                                                    This growth of WordPress is only made possible by the large team of volunteers working to build the project and community. If you would like to get involved in building the future of WordPress, then check out the Make network for a contributor team that fits your skill set.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.2 is on the Way

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1.1 was released this month, with 14 fixes and enhancements, and the Core team is now focusing on the next major release, version 5.2. This release will include some great new features, along with the latest updates to the block editor.

                                                                                    One of the most anticipated new features is the improved fatal error detection – this was removed from v5.1 shortly before release so that it could be improved and made more secure for this release. Along with that, PHP 5.6 is going to become the minimum required PHP version for WordPress, a significant step towards a more modern web and updated coding standards.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.2 is now in beta and you can test it by installing the Beta Tester plugin on any WordPress site.

                                                                                    Want to get involved in building WordPress Core? Follow the Core team blog and join the #core channel in the Making WordPress Slack group.

                                                                                    Proposal for a Central Block Directory

                                                                                    With blocks becoming the new way to manage content in WordPress, more and more types of blocks are being developed to cater for different use cases and content types. In an effort to make it easier for content creators to find these block types, there is a proposal for a new type of plugin and a directory to handle it.

                                                                                    The proposal outlines a new type of WordPress plugin that provides blocks and nothing else, named Single Block Plugins. The primary benefit would be to provide content creators with individual pieces of functionality and new types of blocks without the need to search for and install new plugins.

                                                                                    The Single Block Plugins would be hosted in a separate Block Directory section of the Plugin Directory and they would initially be JavaScript-based. Each plugin will register a single block, and they will be searchable and installable from within the editor itself. This puts blocks at the publishers’ fingertips — you no longer have to leave the editor to find them.

                                                                                    Want to get involved in shaping this new type of plugin? Join in the conversation on the proposal post, follow the Meta team blog, and join the #meta channel in the Making WordPress Slack group.

                                                                                    Global WordPress Translation Day is Back

                                                                                    On 11 May 2019, the fourth Global WordPress Translation Day will take place. This is a 24-hour global event dedicated to the translation of all things WordPress, from core to themes, plugins to marketing.

                                                                                    Over the course of 24 hours, WordPress communities will meet to translate WordPress into their local languages and watch talks and sessions broadcast on wptranslationday.org. During the last Global WordPress Translation Day, 71 local events took place in 29 countries, and even more communities are expected to take part this time.

                                                                                    Want to get involved in the Global WordPress Translation Day? Find out how to organize a local event, apply to be a speaker, follow the updates on the Polyglots team blog, and join the #polyglots channel in the Making WordPress Slack group.

                                                                                    Gutenberg Development Continues

                                                                                    With the block editor in WordPress Core, the team has been able to focus on adding some frequently requested features. Version 5.3 of Gutenberg,  released this month, includes a new block manager modal, the ability to nest different elements in the cover block, and some UI tweaks to improve the hover state of blocks.

                                                                                    Want to get involved in developing Gutenberg? Check out the GitHub repository and join the #core-editor channel in the Making WordPress Slack group.

                                                                                    Further Reading:

                                                                                    Have a story that we should include in the next “Month in WordPress” post? Please submit it here.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.2 Beta 1

                                                                                    Posted March 27, 2019 by Josepha. Filed under Development, Releases.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.2 Beta 1 is now available!

                                                                                    This software is still in development, so we don’t recommend you run it on a production site. Consider setting up a test site to play with the new version.

                                                                                    You can test the WordPress 5.2 Beta two ways:

                                                                                    WordPress 5.2 is slated for release on April 30, and we need your help to get there. Here are some of the big items to test so we can find as many bugs as possible in the coming weeks.

                                                                                    Block Editor

                                                                                    The block editor has received significant performance improvements since WordPress 5.1, shaving 35% off the load time for massive posts, and cutting the keypress time (how responsive it feels when you’re typing) in half!

                                                                                    Accessibility continues to improve, too. The block editor now supports your browser’s reduced motion settings. The post URL slug has better labelling and help text. The focus styling for keyboard navigating through landmarks is clearer and more consistent. There are a variety of new speak messages, and existing messages have been tweaked for more useful screen-reader behaviour.

                                                                                    We’ve added several new blocks:

                                                                                    • An RSS block
                                                                                    • An Amazon Kindle embed block
                                                                                    • A Search block
                                                                                    • A Calendar block
                                                                                    • A Tag Cloud block

                                                                                    To help you keep track of these blocks, and only show the ones you need, there’s a new block management tool to switch blocks on and off.

                                                                                    Block Management Modal

                                                                                    We’re constantly working on existing blocks, too. There are hundreds of bug fixes and improvements in the block editor, you can read more about them in the Gutenberg plugin releases: 4.9, 5.0, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.

                                                                                    The WordPress Mobile Apps

                                                                                    The block editor isn’t just for websites, either. The WordPress mobile apps now include an experimental version of a built-in block editor. This is still under development, but you can try it out now!

                                                                                    The block editor is coming to the mobile apps

                                                                                    Site Health Check

                                                                                    Site Health Check is an ongoing project aimed at improving the stability and performance of the entire WordPress ecosystem.

                                                                                    The first phase of this project (originally scoped for WordPress 5.1) is now included in WordPress 5.2. For the first time, WordPress will catch and pause the problem code, so you can log in to your Dashboard and see what the problem is (#44458). Before, you’d have to FTP in to your files or get in touch with your host.

                                                                                    The Improved Fatal Error Protection

                                                                                    In addition, we’re adding a new Health Check tool to your Dashboard. Visit the Tools menu and click on Health Check to get information that can help improve the speed and security of your site.

                                                                                    PHP Version Bump

                                                                                    With this release, WordPress will increase its minimum supported PHP version to 5.6. To help you check if you’re prepared for this change, WordPress 5.2 will show you a warning and help you upgrade your version of PHP, if necessary.

                                                                                    For Developers

                                                                                    • Plugins can now specify the minimum version of PHP that they support, so you can safely modernise your development practices without risking breaking your users’ sites. (#40934)
                                                                                    • We’ve added the sodium_compat library, which provides backwards compatibility for the Sodium-based cryptography library added in PHP 7.2. (#45806)
                                                                                    • There’s a new release of Dashicons, the WordPress Dashboard icon font. There are 25 new icons for you to use! (#41074)
                                                                                    • You can now pass a label to get_search_form(), improving accessibility. (#42057)

                                                                                    There have been 130 tickets closed in WordPress 5.2 so far, with numerous small bug fixes and improvements to help smooth your WordPress experience.

                                                                                    Keep your eyes on the Make WordPress Core blog for developer notes (which are assigned the dev-notes tag) in the coming weeks detailing other changes in 5.2 that you should be aware of.

                                                                                    How to Help

                                                                                    Do you speak a language other than English? Help us translate WordPress into more than 100 languages!

                                                                                    If you think you’ve found a bug, you can post to the Alpha/Beta area in the support forums. We’d love to hear from you! If you’re comfortable writing a reproducible bug report, file one on WordPress Trac, where you can also find a list of known bugs.

                                                                                    With each new release,
                                                                                    bearing multiple betas;
                                                                                    We fix, then we fly.

                                                                                    One-third of the web!

                                                                                    Posted March 15, 2019 by Joost de Valk. Filed under General.

                                                                                    WordPress now powers over 1/3rd of the top 10 million sites on the web according to W3Techs. Our market share has been growing steadily over the last few years, going from 29.9% just one year ago to 33.4% now. We are, of course, quite proud of these numbers!

                                                                                    The path here has been very exciting. In 2005, we were celebrating 50,000 downloads. Six years later, in January 2011, WordPress was powering 13.1% of websites. And now, early in 2019, we are powering 33.4% of sites. Our latest release has already been downloaded close to 14 million times, and it was only released on the 21st of February.

                                                                                    Graph showing the growth of WordPress market share relative to other CMS's like Joomla, Drupal and others. Starting at just over 10% in January 2011 to 33.4% now.
                                                                                    WordPress market share on the rise over the last 8 years. Image source: W3Techs.

                                                                                    Over the years WordPress has become the CMS of choice for more and more people and companies. As various businesses use WordPress, the variety of WordPress sites grows. Large enterprise businesses all the way down to small local businesses: all of them use WordPress to power their site. We love seeing that and we strive to continuously make WordPress better for all of you.

                                                                                    We’d like to thank everyone who works on WordPress, which is built and maintained by a huge community of volunteers that has grown alongside the CMS. This incredible community makes it possible for WordPress to keep growing while still also remaining free. And of course, we’d like to thank all of you using WordPress for using it and trusting in it. To all of you: let’s celebrate!

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1.1 Security and Maintenance Release

                                                                                    Posted March 12, 2019 by Luke Carbis. Filed under Releases, Security.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1.1 is now available! This security and maintenance release introduces 14 fixes and enhancements, including changes designed to help hosts prepare users for the minimum PHP version bump coming in 5.2.

                                                                                    This release also includes a pair of security fixes that handle how comments are filtered and then stored in the database. With a maliciously crafted comment, a WordPress post was vulnerable to cross-site scripting.

                                                                                    WordPress versions 5.1 and earlier are affected by these bugs, which are fixed in version 5.1.1. Updated versions of WordPress 5.0 and earlier are also available for any users who have not yet updated to 5.1.

                                                                                    Props to Simon Scannell of RIPS Technologies who discovered this flaw independent of some work that was being done by members of the core security team. Thank you to all of the reporters for privately disclosing the vulnerabilities, which gave us time to fix them before WordPress sites could be attacked.

                                                                                    Other highlights of this release include:

                                                                                    • Hosts can now offer a button for their users to update PHP.
                                                                                    • The recommended PHP version used by the “Update PHP” notice can now be filtered.
                                                                                    • Several minor bug fixes.

                                                                                    You can browse the full list of changes on Trac.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1.1 was a short-cycle maintenance release. Version 5.1.2 is expected to follow a similar two week release cadence.

                                                                                    You can download WordPress 5.1.1 or visit Dashboard → Updates and click Update Now. Sites that support automatic background updates have already started to update automatically.

                                                                                    In addition to the security researcher mentioned above, thank you to everyone who contributed to WordPress 5.1.1:

                                                                                    Aaron Jorbin, Alex Concha, Andrea Fercia, Andy Fragen, Anton Vanyukov, Ben Bidner, bulletdigital, David Binovec, Dion Hulse, Felix Arntz, Garrett Hyder, Gary Pendergast, Ian Dunn, Jake Spurlock, Jb Audras, Jeremy Felt, Johan Falk, Jonathan Desrosiers, Luke Carbis, Mike Schroder, Milan Dinić, Mukesh Panchal, Paul Biron, Peter Wilson, Sergey Biryukov, and Weston Ruter.

                                                                                    The Month in WordPress: February 2019

                                                                                    Posted March 1, 2019 by Hugh Lashbrooke. Filed under Month in WordPress.

                                                                                    A new version of WordPress, significant security enhancements, important discussions, and much more – read on to find out what has been going on in the WordPress community for the month of February.

                                                                                    Release of WordPress 5.1

                                                                                    Near the end of the month, WordPress 5.1 was released, featuring significant stability and performance enhancements as well as the first of the Site Health mechanisms that are in active development. Most prominent is the new warning for sites running long-outdated versions of PHP.

                                                                                    You can check out the Field Guide for this release for a detailed look at all the new features and improvements. The next release is already in development with plans to improve the Site Health features, PHP compatibility, and a number of other things.

                                                                                    Want to get involved in testing or building WordPress Core? You can install the WordPress Beta Tester plugin, follow the Core team blog, and join the #core channel in the Making WordPress Slack group.

                                                                                    Gutenberg Development Continues

                                                                                    The block editor that is now a part of WordPress core started out as a project named Gutenberg with the lofty goal of creating a whole new site-building experience for all WordPress users. The first phase of Gutenberg resulted in the block editor that was included in WordPress 5.0, but development didn’t stop there – phase 2 of the project is well underway.

                                                                                    This month, one of the initial goals for this phase was reached with all of the core WordPress widgets being converted to blocks – this will go a long way to allowing full sites to be built using blocks, rather than simply post or page content.

                                                                                    Want to get involved in developing Gutenberg? Check out the GitHub repository and join the #core-editor channel in the Making WordPress Slack group.

                                                                                    Block Editor Comes to the Mobile Apps

                                                                                    As Gutenberg development continues, the Mobile team has been working hard to integrate the new block editor into the WordPress mobile apps. Near the end of February, the team shipped a complete integration in the beta versions of the apps – this a significant milestone and a big step towards unifying the mobile and desktop editing experiences.

                                                                                    Both the iOS and Android apps are open for beta testers, so if you would like to experience the block editor on mobile today, then join the beta program.

                                                                                    Want to get involved in developing the WordPress mobile apps? Follow the Mobile team blog, and join the #mobile channel in the Making WordPress Slack group.

                                                                                    WordPress Triage Team Announced

                                                                                    One of the goals for 2019 that Matt Mullenweg (@matt) announced in his State of the Word address last year was to form a team who would work to manage the ever-increasing number of tickets in Trac, the bug tracker that WordPress Core employs.

                                                                                    This team, known as the Triage Team, has been announced. Their work will involve coordinating with component maintainers, release leads, project leadership, contributors, and other WordPress related projects with issue trackers outside of Trac to ensure that everyone is empowered to focus on contributing.

                                                                                    The team was formed based on nominations of volunteers to take part and will be led by Jonathan Desrosiers (@desrosj). The other members of the team are Chris Christoff (@chriscct7), Tammie Lister (@karmatosed), Sergey Biryukov (@sergey), and Sheri Bigelow (@designsimply) – all of whom have a strong track record of contributing to WordPress, have exhibited good triaging practices, and are overall good community members.

                                                                                    Further Reading:

                                                                                    Have a story that we should include in the next “Month in WordPress” post? Please submit it here.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1 “Betty”

                                                                                    Posted February 21, 2019 by Matt Mullenweg. Filed under Releases.

                                                                                    A Little Better Every Day

                                                                                    Version 5.1 of WordPress, named “Betty” in honour of acclaimed jazz vocalist Betty Carter, is available for download or update in your WordPress dashboard.

                                                                                    Following WordPress 5.0 — a major release which introduced the new block editor — 5.1 focuses on polish, in particular by improving the overall performance of the editor. In addition, this release paves the way for a better, faster, and more secure WordPress with some essential tools for site administrators and developers.

                                                                                    Site Health

                                                                                    With security and speed in mind, this release introduces WordPress’s first Site Health features. WordPress will start showing notices to administrators of sites that run long-outdated versions of PHP, which is the programming language that powers WordPress.

                                                                                    When you install new plugins, WordPress’s Site Health features will check them against the version of PHP you’re running. If the plugin requires a version that won’t work with your site, WordPress will keep you from installing that plugin.

                                                                                    Editor Performance

                                                                                    Introduced in WordPress 5.0, the new block editor continues to improve. Most significantly, WordPress 5.1 includes solid performance improvements within the editor. The editor should feel a little quicker to start, and typing should feel smoother.

                                                                                    Expect more performance improvements in the next couple of releases.

                                                                                    Developer Happiness

                                                                                    Multisite Metadata

                                                                                    5.1 introduces a new database table to store metadata associated with sites and allows for the storage of arbitrary site data relevant in a multisite / network context.

                                                                                    Cron API

                                                                                    The Cron API has been updated with new functions to assist with returning data and includes new filters for modifying cron storage. Other changes in behavior affect cron spawning on servers running FastCGI and PHP-FPM versions 7.0.16 and above.

                                                                                    New JS Build Processes

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1 features a new JavaScript build option, following the large reorganisation of code that started in the 5.0 release.

                                                                                    Other Developer Goodness

                                                                                    Miscellaneous improvements include:

                                                                                    • Updates to values for the WP_DEBUG_LOG constant
                                                                                    • New test config file constant in the test suite, new plugin action hooks
                                                                                    • Short-circuit filters for wp_unique_post_slug(), WP_User_Query, and count_users()
                                                                                    • A new human_readable_duration function
                                                                                    • Improved taxonomy metabox sanitization
                                                                                    • Limited LIKE support for meta keys when using WP_Meta_Query
                                                                                    • A new “doing it wrong” notice when registering REST API endpoints

                                                                                    …and more!

                                                                                    The Squad

                                                                                    This release was led by Matt Mullenweg, along with Gary Pendergast as Senior Code Reshuffler and Poet. They received wonderful assistance from the following 561 contributors for this release, 231 of whom were making their first ever contribution! Pull up some Betty Carter on your music service of choice, and check out some of their profiles:

                                                                                    0x6f0, 1265578519, 1naveengiri, 360zen, aardrian, Aaron Jorbin, Abdullah Ramzan, Abhay Vishwakarma, Abhijit Rakas, Achal Jain, achbed, Adam Silverstein, Ajit Bohra, Alain Schlesser, aldavigdis, alejandroxlopez, Alex, Alex Concha, Alex Shiels, Alexander Botteram, Alexandru Vornicescu, alexgso, allancole, Allen Snook, Alvaro Gois dos Santos, Ana Cirujano, Anantajit JG, Andrea Fercia, Andrea Gandino, Andrea Middleton, andrei0x309, andreiglingeanu, Andrew Duthie, Andrew Lima, Andrew Nacin, Andrew Nevins, Andrew Ozz, Andrey Savchenko, Andrés Maneiro, Andy Fragen, Andy Meerwaldt, Angelika Reisiger, Antal Tettinger, antipole, Anton Timmermans, Anton Vanyukov, Antonio Villegas, antonioeatgoat, Anwer AR, Arun, Ashar Irfan, ashokrd2013, Aumio, Ayesh Karunaratne, Ayub Adiputra, Barry Ceelen, Behzod Saidov, Ben Byrne, benhuberman, Benoit Chantre, benvaassen, Bhargav Mehta, bikecrazyy, Birgir Erlendsson, BjornW, Blair jersyer, Blobfolio, bobbingwide, boblinthorst, Boone Gorges, Boro Sitnikovski, Brad Parbs, Bradley Taylor, bramheijmink, Brandon Kraft, Brandon Payton, Brent Swisher, Brian Richards, bridgetwillard, Brooke., bruceallen, bulletdigital, Burhan Nasir, Bytes.co, Caleb Burks, Calin Don, campusboy, carolinegeven, ccismaru, chasewg, Chetan Prajapati, Chouby, ChriCo, chriscct7, Christopher Spires, claudiu, Clifford Paulick, Code Clinic, codegrau, coleh, conner_bw, Corey McKrill, croce, Csaba (LittleBigThings), Cyrus Collier, Daniel Bachhuber, Daniel James, Daniel Koskinen, Daniel Richards, Daniele Scasciafratte, danimalbrown, Danny Cooper, Danny de Haan, Darko A7, Darren Ethier, Dave Pullig, David A. Kennedy, David Anderson, David Binovec, David Cramer, David Herrera, David Lingren, David Shanske, David Stone, dekervit, Denis Yanchevskiy, Dennis Snell, designsimply, dfangstrom, Dhanendran, Dharmesh Patel, Dhaval kasavala, Dhruvin, DiedeExterkate, Dilip Bheda, dingo-d, Dion Hulse, dipeshkakadiya, Dominik Schilling, Donncha O Caoimh, dontstealmyfish, Drew Jaynes, Drivingralle, dschalk, dsifford, dyrer, eamax, eArtboard, edo888, ElectricFeet, Ella Van Durpe, Emil Dotsev, Eric Andrew Lewis, Eric Daams, Erich Munz, Erick Hitter, ericmeyer, etoledom, Evan Solomon, Faisal Alvi, Felipe Elia, Felix Arntz, Fernando Claussen, flipkeijzer, Florian TIAR, FPCSJames, Frank Klein, fuchsws, fullyint, Gabriel Maldonado, Gareth, Garrett Hyder, Gary Jones, Gennady Kovshenin, Gerhard Potgieter, Girish Panchal, GM_Alex, gnif, graymouser, greg, Grzegorz Ziółkowski, Guido, GutenDev ✍㊙, Hafiz Rahman, Hai@LiteSpeed⚡, Hans-Christiaan Braun, Hardeep Asrani, Hardik Amipara, Harsh Patel, haruharuharuby, Heather Burns, Helen Hou-Sandi, Henry Wright, Herre Groen, Hitendra Chopda, Ian Belanger, Ian Dunn, ibantxillo, Ignacio Cruz Moreno, Igor, Igor Benic, imath, ionvv, Irene Strikkers, isabel104, ishitaka, Ivan Mudrik, J.D. Grimes, Jack Reichert, Jacob Peattie, Jake Spurlock, James Nylen, janak Kaneriya, janalwin, Janki Moradiya, janthiel, Jason Caldwell, javorszky, Jaydip Rami, Jayman Pandya, Jb Audras, Jeff Farthing, Jeffrey de Wit, Jeffrey Paul, Jennifer M. Dodd, Jenny, Jeremey, Jeremy Felt, Jeremy Herve, Jeremy Pry, Jeremy Scott, Jesper V Nielsen, Jesse Friedman, Jimmy Comack, Jip Moors, Jiri Hon, JJJ, joanrho, Job, Joe Bailey-Roberts, Joe Dolson, Joe Hoyle, Joe McGill, Joel James ❤️, Joen Asmussen, Johan Falk, John Blackbourn, John Godley, johnalarcon, johnpgreen, johnschulz, Jonathan Champ, Jonathan Desrosiers, joneiseman, Jonny Harris, Joost de Valk, Jorge Costa, Joseph Scott, JoshuaWold, Joy, jpurdy647, jrdelarosa, jryancard, Juhi Patel, Julia Amosova, juliemoynat, Juliette Reinders Folmer, Junaid Ahmed, Justin Sainton, Justin Sternberg, Justin Tadlock, K.Adam White, kapteinbluf, keesiemeijer, Kelly Dwan, kelvink, khaihong, Kiran Potphode, Kite, Kjell Reigstad, kkarpieszuk, kmeze, Knut Sparhell, konainm, Konstantin Obenland, Konstantinos Xenos, kristastevens, krutidugade, laghee, Laken Hafner, Lance Willett, laurelfulford, lbenicio, Leander Iversen, leemon, lenasterg, lisannekluitmans, lizkarkoski, Luca Grandicelli, LucasRolff, luciano-croce, Luke Carbis, Luminus, Mário Valney, maartenleenders, macbookandrew, Maja Benke, Mako, mallorydxw-old, Manuel Augustin, manuel_84, Marc Nilius, marcelo2605, Marco Martins, marco.marsala, Marcus Kazmierczak, marcwieland95, Marius L. J., mariusvw, Mariyan Belchev, Mark Jaquith, Mathieu Sarrasin, mathieuhays, Matt Cromwell, Matt Gibbs, Matt Martz, Matthew Boynes, Matthew Riley MacPherson, mattyrob, mcmwebsol, Mel Choyce, mensmaximus, mermel, metalandcoffee, Micah Wood, Michael Nelson, Michiel Heijmans, Migrated to @sebastienserre, Miguel Fonseca, Miguel Torres, mihaiiceyro, mihdan, Mike Gillihan, Mike Jolley, Mike Schroder, Milan Dinić, Milan Ivanovic, Milana Cap, Milind More, mirkoschubert, Monika Rao, Monique Dubbelman, moto hachi ( mt8.biz ), mrmadhat, Muhammad Kashif, Mukesh Panchal, MultiformeIngegno, munyagu, MyThemeShop, mzorz, nadim0988, nandorsky, Naoki Ohashi, Naoko Takano, nataliashitova, Nate Allen, Nathan Johnson, ndavison, Ned Zimmerman, Nextendweb, Nick Diego, Nick Halsey, Nick Momrik, Nick the Geek, Nicolas Figueira, Nicolas GUILLAUME, Nicolle Helgers, Nidhi Jain, Niels Lange, Nikhil Chavan, Nilambar Sharma, Noam Eppel, notnownikki, odyssey, Omar Reiss, Omkar Bhagat, Ov3rfly, Paal Joachim Romdahl, palmiak, panchen, parbaugh, Parham Ghaffarian, Pascal Birchler, Pascal Casier, Paul Bearne, Paul Biron, Paul Paradise, Paul Schreiber, Perdaan, Peter Putzer, Peter Wilson, Petter Walbø Johnsgård, Pierre Saïkali, Pieter Daalder, Piyush Patel, poena, Pramod Jodhani, Prashant Baldha, Pratik, Pratik K. Yadav, precies, Presskopp, Presslabs, PressTigers, programmin, Punit Patel, Purnendu Dash, Qucheng, Rachel Baker, Rachel Cherry, Rachel Peter, Rafsun Chowdhury, Rahul Prajapati, Raja Mohammed, Ramanan, Rami Yushuvaev, Ramiz Manked, ramonopoly, RavanH, redcastor, remyvv, rensw90, rhetorical, Riad Benguella, Rian Rietveld, Richard Tape, Ricky Lee Whittemore, Rinku Y, Rishi Shah, Robbie, robdxw, Robert Anderson, Robin Cornett, Robin van der Vliet, Ryan McCue, Ryan Paul, Ryan Welcher, ryotsun, Sébastien SERRE, Saša, sagarnasit, Sami Ahmed Siddiqui, Sami Keijonen, Samuel Wood (Otto), sarah semark, Sayed Taqui, Scott Lee, Scott Reilly, Sean Hayes, Sebastian Kurzynoswki, Sebastian Pisula, Sergey Biryukov, Shamim Hasan, Shane Eckert, Sharaz Shahid, Shashwat Mittal, Shawn Hooper, sherwood, Shital Marakana, Shiva Poudel, Simon Prosser, sjardo, skoldin, slilley, slushman, Sonja Leix, sonjanyc, Soren Wrede, spartank, spyderbytes, Stanimir Stoyanov, Stanko Metodiev, stazdotio, Stephen Edgar, Stephen Harris, stevenlinx, Storm Rockwell, Stoyan Kostadinov, strategio, Subrata Sarkar, Sultan Nasir Uddin, swift, Takahashi Fumiki, Takayuki Miyauchi, Tammie Lister, Taylor Lovett, teddytime, Terri Ann, terwdan, tharsheblows, ThemeZee, Thomas Patrick Levy, Thomas Vitale, thomaswm, Thorsten Frommen, Thrijith Thankachan, Tiago Hillebrandt, tigertech, Tim Havinga, Tim Hengeveld, Timmy Crawford, Timothy Jacobs, titodevera, Tkama, Tobias Zimpel, Tom J Nowell, TomHarrigan, Tommy Ferry, tonybogdanov, Tor-Bjorn Fjellner, TorontoDigits, Toshihiro Kanai, Towhidul Islam, transl8or, Ulrich, upadalavipul, Usman Khalid, Utsav tilava, uttam007, Vaishali Panchal, Valérie Galassi, valchovski, vishaldodiya, vnsavage, voneff, vortfu, warmlaundry, wbrubaker, Weston Ruter, Will Kwon, William Earnhardt, williampatton, wpzinc, xhezairi, Yahil Madakiya, Yoav Farhi, Yui, YuriV, Zane Matthew, and zebulan.

                                                                                    Finally, thanks to all the community translators who worked on WordPress 5.1. Their efforts bring WordPress 5.1 fully translated to 34 languages at release time, with more on the way.

                                                                                    If you want to follow along or help out, check out Make WordPress and our core development blog.

                                                                                    Thanks for choosing WordPress!

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1 RC2

                                                                                    Posted February 19, 2019 by Gary Pendergast. Filed under Development, Releases.

                                                                                    The second release candidate for WordPress 5.1 is now available!

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1 will be released on Thursday, February 21, but we need your help to get there—if you haven’t tried 5.1 yet, now is the time!

                                                                                    There are two ways to test the WordPress 5.1 release candidate: try the WordPress Beta Tester plugin (you’ll want to select the “bleeding edge nightlies” option), or you can download the release candidate here (zip).

                                                                                    For details about what to expect in WordPress 5.1, please see the first release candidate post.

                                                                                    This release includes the final About page design. It also contains fixes for:

                                                                                    • New WordPress installs not setting the database table prefix correctly (#46220).
                                                                                    • A HTTP error occurring when opening browser developer tools (#46218).
                                                                                    • The legacy media dialog having incorrect pagination link styling (#41858).
                                                                                    • The comment form not appearing when clicking “Reply” on comments loaded via Ajax (#46260).

                                                                                    Plugin and Theme Developers

                                                                                    Please test your plugins and themes against WordPress 5.1 and update the Tested up to version in the readme to 5.1. If you find compatibility problems, please be sure to post to the support forums so we can figure those out before the final release.

                                                                                    The WordPress 5.1 Field Guide has also been published, which goes into the details of the major changes.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1 Field Guide

                                                                                    How to Help

                                                                                    Do you speak a language other than English? Help us translate WordPress into more than 100 languages!

                                                                                    If you think you’ve found a bug, you can post to the Alpha/Beta area in the support forums. We’d love to hear from you! If you’re comfortable writing a reproducible bug report, file one on WordPress Trac, where you can also find a list of known bugs.

                                                                                    WordPress Five Point One:
                                                                                    It’s so slick, shiny, and new.
                                                                                    Lands in a few days!

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1 Release Candidate

                                                                                    Posted February 8, 2019 by Gary Pendergast. Filed under Development, Releases.

                                                                                    The first release candidate for WordPress 5.1 is now available!

                                                                                    This is an important milestone, as the release date for WordPress 5.1 draws near. “Release Candidate” means that the new version is ready for release, but with millions of users and thousands of plugins and themes, it’s possible something was missed. WordPress 5.1 is scheduled to be released on Thursday, February 21, but we need your help to get there—if you haven’t tried 5.1 yet, now is the time!

                                                                                    There are two ways to test the WordPress 5.1 release candidate: try the WordPress Beta Tester plugin (you’ll want to select the “bleeding edge nightlies” option), or you can download the release candidate here (zip).

                                                                                    What’s in WordPress 5.1?

                                                                                    Inspired by Archie Bell & The Drells, WordPress’s theme for 2019 is to “tighten up”, and WordPress 5.1 focussed on exactly that.

                                                                                    With security and speed in mind, this release introduces WordPress’s first Site Health features. WordPress will start showing notices to administrators of sites that run long-outdated versions of PHP, which is the programming language that powers WordPress.

                                                                                    Furthermore, when installing new plugins, WordPress’s Site Health features will check whether a plugin requires a version of PHP incompatible with your site. If so, WordPress will prevent you from installing that plugin.

                                                                                    The new block editor has kept improving since its introduction in WordPress 5.0. Most significantly, WordPress 5.1 includes solid performance improvements within the editor. The editor should feel a little quicker to start, and typing should feel smoother. There are more features and performance improvements planned in upcoming WordPress releases, you can check them out in the Gutenberg plugin.

                                                                                    Plugin and Theme Developers

                                                                                    Please test your plugins and themes against WordPress 5.1 and update the Tested up to version in the readme to 5.1. If you find compatibility problems, please be sure to post to the support forums so we can figure those out before the final release.

                                                                                    The WordPress 5.1 Field Guide has also been published, which goes into the details of the major changes.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1 Field Guide

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                                                                                    Do you speak a language other than English? Help us translate WordPress into more than 100 languages! This release also marks the hard string freeze point of the 5.1 release schedule.

                                                                                    If you think you’ve found a bug, you can post to the Alpha/Beta area in the support forums. We’d love to hear from you! If you’re comfortable writing a reproducible bug report, file one on WordPress Trac, where you can also find a list of known bugs.

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                                                                                    The Month in WordPress: January 2019

                                                                                    Posted February 4, 2019 by Hugh Lashbrooke. Filed under Month in WordPress.

                                                                                    The momentum from December’s WordPress 5.0 release was maintained through January with some big announcements and significant updates. Read on to find out what happened in the WordPress project last month.

                                                                                    WordPress Leadership Grows

                                                                                    In a milestone announcement this month, WordPress project lead, Matt Mullenweg (@matt), named two individuals who are coming on board to expand the leadership team of the project.

                                                                                    As Executive Director, Josepha Haden (@chanthaboune) will oversee all the contribution teams across the project. As Marketing & Communications Lead, Joost de Valk (@joostdevalk) will lead the Marketing team and generally oversee improvements to WordPress.org.

                                                                                    Both Josepha and Joost have contributed to the WordPress project for many years and will certainly have a much larger impact going forward in their new roles.

                                                                                    WordPress 5.1 Development Continues

                                                                                    Immediately after the 5.0 release of WordPress, work started on version 5.1 with some highly anticipated new features coming out in the first beta release. Since then, the second and third betas have been made available.

                                                                                    One of the core updates in this release — a feature to improve the way in which WordPress handles PHP errors — has been pushed back to version 5.2 due to unforeseen issues that would have caused significant delays to the 5.1 release.

                                                                                    Want to get involved in testing or building WordPress Core? You can install the WordPress Beta Tester plugin, follow the Core team blog, and join the #core channel in the Making WordPress Slack group.

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                                                                                      #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Donbas – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                                      Tag: Donbas

                                                                                      Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future?

                                                                                      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                      Following the November 25th Kerch Strait naval skirmish, in which Russia seized three Ukrainian boats,  Ukrainian leadership has issued warnings of a Russian buildup near Ukraine’s borders. These began in early December and have led to a media echo chamber of concerns that a Russian attack on Ukraine is imminent, in part bolstered by press releases from ISW. Actual evidence of Russian preparations for offensive operations, force movements indicating an unexpected buildup, or an imminent attack, is hard to come by. In this somewhat longer post I want to explore the existing evidence, what little there is, and examine a few conflict scenarios that may be within the realm of possibility in coming months.

                                                                                      Unfortunately this simmering conflict is subject to frequent false alarms, while actual points of escalation are rarely predicted, as was the case on November 25th. It is relatively easy to take a week’s worth of Russian troop movements, equipment deployments, drills, and MoD announcements, compile them together into a bullet point list of nefarious activities, and then declare them ‘data points’ indicating preparations for an invasion. As of today it seems Ukraine will not be extending the 30 day state of martial law, which casts some doubt on the urgency and immediacy of the anticipated Russian threat as presented earlier this month by Ukrainian authorities.

                                                                                      The more problematic element in all of this has been senior official Russian statements, which suggest a change in Moscow’s stance on dealing with Ukraine is afoot. Sergey Lavrov, Maria Zakharova, and Sergey Naryshkin, have issued statements expecting a possible Ukrainian ‘provocation’ and or ‘attack’ which could be interpreted as indications and warnings of Moscow preparing the information space, i.e. setting expectations of renewed violence in the coming weeks. However, they may also be a poor Russian attempt at getting Washington, D.C. to restrain Ukraine, or otherwise influence Ukrainian decision making to Russian benefit.

                                                                                      The Russian narrative offers cause for concern, because it is a form of signaling not dissimilar from official statements in the run up to the Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008. That said, it is likely some officials in Moscow believed Ukraine would try to use martial law as a cover for a military operation in the Donbas, especially given their experience with Saakashvili in 2008. Although real evidence is scant, I’ll try to unpack the different stories, and the likelihood of an upcoming Russian military operation against Ukraine.

                                                                                      Bottom line up front: Almost every year there is a sizable artillery duel that takes place after the holiday truce (clashes likely to resume between orthodox Christmas on January 7 and perhaps the old new year on January 14th), and so a notable escalation in violence is likely in January, but there is no evidence of Russian preparations for a major assault in Ukraine, certainly not in Crimea.  It is possible, but highly improbable. Most of the information available reflects planned modernization, expected force structure changes, and troop movements on the Russian side not indicative of unusual activity or preparations for an assault. However, as covered years ago on this blog, the long term force posture and structure changes to create three divisions along Ukraine’s borders, return earlier displaced brigades, and a focus on modernizing equipment in the Southern MD, mean that capacity and capability is there to engage in a high intensity conventional conflict with Ukraine at any time. Ukrainian leadership has used evidence from these long term trends to create the sense of an imminent tactical threat, but that is not the case, and they likely know it.

                                                                                      Expectations of an attack are based on three disparate sets of information, if we can charitably call them that, which are seemingly being woven together by various outlets, blogs, and sites like ISW who warn of Russian preparations for an imminent attack. The first is an alleged increase in Russian hardware in the Rostov region of the Southern Military District. The second is a series of disparate troop movements in Crimea, which in and of themselves do not speak to anything, but some believe are indications of a Russian operation against Ukraine’s Kherson region, presumably to seize the Crimea-Dnepr fresh water canal. The third involves statements by Russia’s MFA, Sergey Naryshkin, and others, that indicate Russian preparations for a conflict in the near future.

                                                                                      Issue #1 The Russian tank build up in the east and frightening Google photos of lots of tanks

                                                                                      skynews-petro-poroshenko-putin_4504080.jpg
                                                                                      Poroshenko on Sky News earlier this month with google satellite imagery

                                                                                       

                                                                                      Ukraine’s chief of general staff, Victor Muzhneko, stated that there is an increase in Russian tanks near the Ukrainian border, having grown from 93 to 250 within two weeks from mid-September. This information was spread by a Ukrainian run English-language blog run by Dylan Malyasov, which is a defense news amalgamator. The problem is that these are mostly T-62 variants (M/MV), which have long been retired from the Russian military, and are not in service with Russian trained separatist forces either. This tank last saw service during the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, and was considered obsolete decades ago. There is no Russian unit that fields T-62 tanks today, or T-64 tanks for that matter. The Russian armed forces use this tank for target practice during major military exercises, as was the case in recently held Vostok 2018.

                                                                                      Separatist forces use T-64BV and T-72B1 variants, which are different main battle tanks, but can perform the same missions and are comparable in their performance characteristics. The T-62 is a completely different design, using different caliber ammunition, sights, fire control, and so on – so it is not possible for someone trained on a T-72 to just jump into this tank and ‘invade Ukraine.’ At this point the same can be said of T-64BVs being supplied to the two separatist corps, doubtfully anyone in line Russian units is current and certified to operate either T-62s, or T-64s. Russian forces use more modern T-72BA or B3 variants almost exclusively, with select units fielding T-80Us or T-80BVM.

                                                                                      Here is a quick slide of T-72B3 use by Russian forces in Ukraine 2014, T-64BV manned by separatists, and a T-62M

                                                                                      This slideshow requires JavaScript.

                                                                                      Below we can see the alleged tank build up near Ukraine’s borders. Note the rest of the vehicle park at the base, and the contingent, remains the same after the arrival of these tanks, which suggests that they are here for storage and not a force addition.

                                                                                      08162018
                                                                                      August 16 – clearing for tanks
                                                                                      09232018
                                                                                      September 23 most of the tanks have arrived
                                                                                      09302018
                                                                                      September 30 – about 250 tanks there

                                                                                      The main force currently being supplied with refurbished Russian T-62M tanks is the Syrian Army, particularly the 5th Corps. These tanks are coming out of Russian reserve storehouses with T-62s and BMP infantry fighting vehicles. During Vostok 2018 there was news of T-62s being activated and shipped east, but in reality several batches of these vehicles were loaded and shipped West in October. Ukraine’s alleged tank build up is almost certainly a series of old T-62s taken out of the Central Tank Reserve Base in Ulan Ude, which were tracked through social media (you can get a more detailed story on the T-62 shipment from DFR Lab) as arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, which is where Muzhenko’s photos are from. Subsequently these tanks tend to show up at the port of Novorossiysk for shipment to Syria via the ‘Syrian Express.’

                                                                                      Storage base in Ulan-Ude, before September and after September of this year. A number of tanks have moved from the lot, indicating that some of the vehicles likely came from this base.

                                                                                      T-62M tanks heading west from Central Military District and same ones arriving at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, some are likely destined for Syria.

                                                                                      The recently arrived tanks near Ukraine’s borders are most likely being stored in Rostov region near the port for shipment, or may be used in training, but the story that Russia is planning to invade Ukraine with ancient tanks that they themselves don’t use and don’t train on stretches the imagination beyond the realm of the possible. It is equally possible that these tanks are there to establish a new reserve structure. Russia has been lacking mobilization force structure, and at best has developed a territorial battalion type reserve system for infrastructure defense. Operational reserve capacity comes out of active units which force generate units from active servicemen rather than mobilize reservists. Therefore one possible explanation is that these older vehicles are designed to park equipment for some nascent reserve force structure.

                                                                                      What’s frustrating is that Ukraine’s military leadership doubtlessly knows all of this, which makes it hard to understand why Muzhenko would use google earth satellite images of old T-62 tanks to push this story in the media. Any military analyst who studies the Russian armed forces could likely tell you this information. Yet Petro Poroshenko went on Sky News with these very same images of Russian tanks, as though they were legitimate evidence of Russian preparations for an invasion.

                                                                                      My personal interpretation of the Ukrainian claims is that this is an information campaign to justify and defend Poroshenko’s controversial decision to institute martial law in advance of Presidential elections, where his chances of winning are quite tenuous. This is a cynical, but optimistic view, because the alternative suggests that Ukraine’s armed forces don’t know much about the Russian military, and use dated google earth images to hunt down old T-62 tanks that are neither here or there to anything. Ukrainian force posture doesn’t suggest that they themselves expect a Russian offensive either, and the temporary state of martial law has ended as scheduled, so this seems to be mostly a large information wave with little substance to substantiate it.

                                                                                      However, the Russian Rostov region is seeing a steady build up of forces as part of the formation of the 150th division in the reestablished 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern MD). This will prove a decade long process. Other units that have been announced as far back as early 2015, include the 144th MR Division and 3rd MR Division in 20th Combined Arms Army (Western MD), some shifting of brigades, and steady addition or maneuver regiments to only partially filled divisions in 1st Tank Guards Army headquartered in Moscow. The 144th Division is somewhat lagging here in formation. The 150th division is a 2×2 motor rifle and tank regiment configuration (+2 supporting regiments), which is almost filled now in its maneuver regiments. Supposedly the last motor rifle regiment is being formed as of this month. There are also interesting force structure changes afoot in the Russian VDV, creating much larger air mobile formations, which were partially covered during experiments in Vostok-2018 exercises.

                                                                                      Issue #2 Russian build up in Crimea for an invasion of Kherson

                                                                                      image of the dried up canal.jpeg
                                                                                      The dried up canal on the Russian side of the Crimean border

                                                                                      There is another concern out there, based on sighting of Russian troop movements near the Crimean border with Kherson, that Russia might conduct an offensive operation from Crimea. At least this is ISW’s thesis on the basis of a few troop trucks, some APCs, and artillery being moved towards the border – which is not at all uncommon. Basically, we have a story of an overturned Russian truck as part of a military convoy on the way to the border, with a field kitchen. What’s naturally missing from this equation is a concentration of armor, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, large volumes of ammunition, etc. moved about on flatbed trucks, i.e. there is no evidence of the sort of hardware one would expect in support of an offensive operation or the formation of battalion tactical groups near Ukraine’s borders in Crimea. The Army Corps in Crimea has a dearth of maneuver elements, so units would have to cross into the peninsula via bridge from the rest of the Southern Military District (presumably 58th Army), concentrate, and deploy – which nobody is seeing happen. More than likely Russian troop movements are indicators of preparations for an artillery duel – exchanges of indirect fire that typically escalate in January/February.

                                                                                      Partly responsible for the confusion are two planned force additions to Crimea. First we have the formation of the 171st independent air assault battalion in Crimea, which was announced December 2, 2017. This battalion is technically part of the 7th VDV Air assault division, but will create a permanently based unit in Crimea with air mobility, and add to the ‘elite infantry’ stationed there which can serve as a rapid reaction force. However, VDV units have been rotating through Crimea for years now, so this is less of a force increase and more institutionalizing that which has already been taking place.

                                                                                      171th VDV Regiment
                                                                                      171st Independent Battalion receiving its honorary title, establishing it in Crimea

                                                                                      The second tidbit of information regards the deployment of a 4th S-400 battalion to Dzhankoi in Crimea, which likely completes the rearmament of the 18th and 12th air defense regiments based there (31st air defense division within the 4th Air and Air Defense Army of the Southern Military District). The first S-400 battalion was deployed January 2017 in Feodosia, the second January 2018 in Sevastopol, and a third in September 2018 in Yevpatoria. The S-400 replaces the older S-300 systems deployed to Crimea, and is part of a general wave of modernization which prioritized the Southern Military District. Alongside S-400 deployments one can find Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters, and Su-34 bombers steadily replacing Su-24s and older Su-27s in the Russian Aerospace Forces and naval aviation units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

                                                                                      S-400 in Crimea.jpg
                                                                                      The 2nd Russian S-400 battalion set deployed to Crimea early this year

                                                                                      There is cause for concern that long term Russia may need to resolve the fresh water crisis in Crimea, but no way to know how this situation will play out in the coming year. In May 2014 Ukraine blocked off the water supply from the Crimea-Dnepr canal that links the Dnepr river to the peninsula. Although Russia was able to quickly build an ‘energy bridge’ to supply power, and Kerch strait bridge officially opened May 2018 to commercial traffic, the water problem remains a potential cause of conflict (Jane’s here briefly summarizes the issue: Ukraine supplied 86% of Crimea’s water, and this summer there was an acute water shortage in about 20% of the peninsula). The fresh water issue is problematic, but I’ve found it to be overly spun as the next “land bridge to Crimea” narrative. The only sort of offensive military operation that makes sense is a thrust to the Dnepr river, which seizes the entire canal, and the southern half of Ukraine’s Kherson region. There is no way to take part of the canal since it is easily blocked at any point south of the river itself. In scope, this is about a 65-70km push, which is equivalent to depth of territory seized in the Donbas region. Kherson may be relatively easy to cut off, but it would require a substantial number of forces to effect this kind of operation and earn Russia an entire new host of problems.

                                                                                      Kherson map.JPG
                                                                                      Basic map with the path of the Dnepr-Crimea canal indicated
                                                                                      Kherson vector
                                                                                      ~65km from the Crimean border to the Dnepr river to get to the starting point of the canal (beyond which it cannot be blocked)

                                                                                      Taking Kherson, like taking most any other Ukrainian region, is well within the realm of Russian military capability, but it would mean inheriting a new region which is also dependent on other parts of Ukraine. One of the obvious challenges Russia has faced in taking pieces of Ukraine is that it may seem easy to to dismember a country on a map, but in reality a state is full of integrated pieces that depend on each other for electricity, water, road networks, trade, supply of food, etc. Resolving the fresh water problem in Crimea by taking another region that would itself bring new supply challenges, and while it could probably be done relatively quickly, it would also require a substantial force build up and subsequent deployment. There are no ‘separatist’ or other volunteer battalions ready to take over internal security, man block posts, and create an entirely new line of control with Ukrainian forces. Also, there is the small matter than absent a ‘Kherson People’s Republic’ movement, there are no proxy forces behind which Russia can mask its invasion, and so this would have to be an overt, outright, and bloody business from the very start.

                                                                                      Russia could build up forces in Crimea relatively quickly, combining an air mobile airborne operation with a ground assault, but there would be indications and warnings. Unlike in February-March 2014, the West has a lot of technical and human resources now focused on the Russian problem set. Ground force movements, airborne unit shifts, forward deployment of several battalion tactical groups in Crimea, etc. These are regularly recorded by people, spotters, social media, and traditional news. Right now there is no evidence of such troop movements, though one should not discount a military solution to the water issue in 2019, but the entire scenario remains in the realm of low probability events.

                                                                                      Issue #3 Russian warnings and threats

                                                                                      Finally, Russian press statements by Lavrov, Naryshkin, Maria Zakharova are perhaps the most alarming, since they indicate a readiness of Russian forces to see through an escalation with Ukraine in the coming weeks or months. This of course brings us into the realm of political analysis and out of the world of military analysis. These warnings indicate the expectation of a conflict, with Russia positioning Ukraine as a the provocateur, something that’s become rote in Russian political statements. The messaging is probably not meant for domestic audiences, or Ukrainian audiences, but for the West, which Russian elites believe can heavily influence Ukrainian decision making. As such, they represent a pattern of thinking reminiscent of the run up to the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, reflecting the Russian perception that they can threaten the potential risk of escalation in order to get the United States to lean on what Moscow sees as Washington’s client state.

                                                                                      Russians do see Poroshenko as a provocateur, expecting him to “pull something” in the run up to the election, and engage in military posturing. Like many policymakers in the West, they are subscribers to diversionary war theory, which has little empirical basis, but is very much in vogue with political decision makers. Moscow thinks that Poroshenko needs Western attention on Ukraine, and the cheapest way Ukraine can achieve that is with a narrative that draws attention to the ongoing ‘Russian threat.’ Hence warnings of imminent danger tend to crop up every fall around November-December time. Putting aside the likelihood that Russia itself will execute some of the more dire plans discussed above, there is little incentive for Russia to launch any attack during the election as it would only benefit Poroshenko’s cause, in every scenario. That doesn’t mean it wont happen, because bounded rationality leads to outcomes akin to November 25th, i.e. one should not ignore the likely outcome of a chain of events that results in a conflict spiral between these two actors, but there is no sign that Russia intends to intervene in Ukrainian politics via overt military means.

                                                                                      There is a strong possibility of miscalculation, with January 2019 being different than previous artillery duels and skirmishes that have followed the last major operation in February-March 2015 (Battle of Debaltseve). Ukrainian forces have been slowly gaining ground in the ‘grey zone’ that exists between the two sides respective positions along the line of control in the Donbas. These steady gains are often referenced as the ‘creeping offensive’ to retake lost territory, leading to artillery duels with Russian backed separatists. Separatist units are organized and supported with logistics, technical capabilities like EW, air defense, and other equipment, by a contingent of Russian regulars in Ukraine stationed further behind the line of control. The daily exchanges of indirect fire often flare up after the holiday truce in January, particularly when one side decides to creep into the no man’s land between them, and shift the battle lines.

                                                                                      Russian controlled separatists have also played this game with Ukrainian forces for several years now, making small shifts in the line over the years. It’s what keeps this a hot war rather than a frozen conflict. However, there is a sense that Russia is spoiling for a fight – just one person’s opinion. Russian public statements are designed to paint them as the reasonable party seeking to deter potential Ukrainian adventurism, but in truth, it feels like Moscow is looking to bloody Ukraine at the first available opportunity.

                                                                                      It could be vengeance for Ukraine gaining autocephaly, splitting from the Russian orthodox church, or it could be that Moscow wants to show that it is unconstrained and feels free to use the military toolkit. The November 25th naval skirmish with the Russian FSB border guard service demonstrated that when pressed to make decisions in the moment, the Russian leadership turned what could have been a minor incident into a serious clash, overt, heavy handed, with disproportionate use of force. This is at best personal inference, but it is unlikely that Russia is planning an offensive operation to seize Kherson. It is more probable that Moscow is spoiling for a fight with Ukraine, with the intent of handing Ukraine and by proxy, the United States, a small but politically consequential military defeat.

                                                                                       

                                                                                       

                                                                                      Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine

                                                                                      Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                                                                      RAND Corporation has published a report for which I was the lead author and principal investigator back in the summer of 2015. The project included contributions from several other researchers. This work has spent a long time in the making since much of the research was done in 2015.  I hope the report will expand existing knowledge on what happened in early months of the conflict in Ukraine, both during the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of conflict in the Donbas. You can find the full report on RAND’s website here.

                                                                                      Abstract and Key Findings from the report’s cover page below

                                                                                      This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February–March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February–late May 2014). It examines Russia’s approach, draws inferences from Moscow’s intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere.

                                                                                      These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia’s operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia’s operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances — political, historical, geographical, and military — that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia’s military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented — and perhaps ill-conceived — effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation.

                                                                                      This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia’s armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere.

                                                                                      Key Findings

                                                                                      Russia’s Operation to Annex Crimea Represented Decisive and Competent Use of Military Force in Pursuit of Political Ends

                                                                                      • Russia was able to seize the territory of a neighboring state with speed and mobility.
                                                                                      • The political maneuvering on the peninsula during the invasion suggests that it may have been launched without a predetermined political outcome in mind.
                                                                                      • Russia likely sought to seize Crimea, and then evaluated its political options depending in part on how the intervention was received at home and abroad.

                                                                                      Russia’s Operations in Crimea Benefited from a Series of Highly Favorable Circumstances That Makes It Difficult to Replicate

                                                                                      • These included political, historical, geographical, linguistic, and military advantages in the region that have only partial analogues elsewhere in the former Soviet republics.
                                                                                      • The confined geography of the peninsula, the proximity of Crimea to Russia, and its existence as a separate political unit within Ukraine gave Russia leverage.
                                                                                      • Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was nearby, with legitimate transit routes that could be leveraged for a covert operation.

                                                                                      Russian Leaders Are Likely to Consider Eastern Ukraine to Be a Strategic Success but an Unsuccessful Operation

                                                                                      • Russia’s efforts in Eastern Ukraine proved to be a series of improvisations in response to resistance and friction when the initial political warfare effort foundered.
                                                                                      • The lessons of Eastern Ukraine are rather mixed, demonstrating the limits of low-cost asymmetrical approaches even against a relatively weak and vulnerable state.
                                                                                      • Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation.
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                                                                                        Dr. Kaeli Swift studies the intelligence and behavior of crows. On her blog, Corvid Research, she’s fostered a community of people from all over the world, joined by their shared fascination for these birds.
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                                                                                        Photo by Jacob Gaposchkin
                                                                                        WordPress.com
                                                                                        by WordPress.com Staff
                                                                                      8. What We Want to Do Is Have a Table Where Everybody Is Invited

                                                                                        Hajj Flemings, founder of Rebrand Cities, aims to get thousands of small businesses online. Here, he shares insights he’s collected while talking to business owners across the U.S.
                                                                                        Business
                                                                                        WordPress.com
                                                                                        by WordPress.com
                                                                                      9. If You Want Change to Happen, You Have to Do It Yourself

                                                                                        From Gillian Whitcombe at The Sewcialists: “Sewing is amazing because it’s really creative and really logical at the same time. It’s not like, ‘Why don’t I fit into this size?’ You know your body inside and out; it’s really empowering that way.”
                                                                                        Crafts
                                                                                        WordPress.com
                                                                                      10. I’ve Always Seen Myself as a Bridge, Connecting People, Knowledge, and Ideas

                                                                                        Faisal Saeed Al Mutar of Ideas Beyond Borders on making more resources available in Arabic: “I had this belief about the importance of removing barriers. . . . The motto of our translation project is ‘making the inaccessible accessible.’”
                                                                                        Culture
                                                                                        WordPress.com
                                                                                      11. I’m Not the Hero. I’m Just a Piece of This Puzzle.

                                                                                        “I thought, why can’t I just go on the internet and buy coffee from farmers?” In this interview with co-founder Thaleon Tremain, learn how Pachamama Coffee connects growers directly with customers in the U.S.
                                                                                        Business
                                                                                        WordPress.com
                                                                                      12. #AnythingIsPossible: Readers Respond

                                                                                        We asked readers: “what would you do if you could do anything?” Here are some of your responses.
                                                                                        Inspiration
                                                                                        Feature
                                                                                        by
                                                                                      13. I Inspire Women to Keep Wearing — and Doing — What They Love

                                                                                        “When I was pregnant with my fourth child, Maely, I just wanted to keep wearing my jeans.” Holly Kjar discusses the product she created for pregnant women, the Maeband, and the growth of her business and online community.
                                                                                        Business
                                                                                        WordPress.com
                                                                                      14. My Goal Since the Beginning Was to Individualize the Victims

                                                                                        “By colorizing their photographs, they become less abstract. They are no longer just representing something old, a historical event that happened so many years ago.” For the Faces of Auschwitz project, photo colorist Marina Amaral transforms photos of Holocaust victims.
                                                                                        Education
                                                                                        WordPress.com
                                                                                      15. I Didn’t Realize that I Could Be a Voice for a Population of People

                                                                                        “All I’ve wanted from the beginning is just to put a human face on poverty that is not the one that we think of…” Stephanie Land, who wrote a memoir on working as a maid and being a single mother, first found an audience on her blog.
                                                                                        Authors
                                                                                        WordPress.com
                                                                                      #####EOF##### Admin and Action Bars — Support — WordPress.com

                                                                                      Support

                                                                                      General, Tools

                                                                                      Admin and Action Bars

                                                                                      Table of Contents

                                                                                      Admin Bar
                                                                                      My Site(s)
                                                                                      Switch Site
                                                                                      Reader
                                                                                      Write, Profile & Notifications
                                                                                      Action Bar
                                                                                      Not Logged-in Visitors
                                                                                      Logged-in Visitors
                                                                                      Action Bar on Your Site

                                                                                      You may have noticed a gray, blue or black bar that appears at the top of your pages when logged into your WordPress.com account. This bar is called the Admin Bar and it is an easy-to-access toolbar with a few shortcuts to some central WordPress.com dashboard pages.

                                                                                      In the bottom right of your, or another, WordPress.com site you will also see the Action Bar. This bar provides different shortcuts based on what page you’re on, and if you’re logged into your account.

                                                                                      Admin Bar

                                                                                      When you visit any WordPress.com site while logged into your account you will see a thinner, black version of the Admin Bar. This version has the same functionality as the Admin Bar you see from within your account.

                                                                                      This toolbar may not be altered on removed, except on sites with a Business Plan.

                                                                                      ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                      My Site(s)

                                                                                      My Sites and Reader

                                                                                      My Site will take you to the main menu for editing and managing your site. By default, the first page you will see is your Stats page. All of the tools you need to create site pages, posts, edit existing content, and manage your settings will be in a menu under My Site.

                                                                                      ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                      Switch Site

                                                                                      If you have more than one site, you’ll see My Sites instead of My Site in your Admin bar. You can switch to another site you own or manage from My Sites.

                                                                                      My Sites Switch Site
                                                                                      1. Click on My Sites.
                                                                                      2. Click Switch Site.
                                                                                      3. Select the site you want to edit from the list

                                                                                      ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                      Reader

                                                                                      The Reader button takes you to the WordPress.com Reader where you can see the latest posts from any sites that you follow, browse topics (tags), or peruse Discover.

                                                                                      ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                      Write, Profile & Notifications

                                                                                      On the right-hand side of your Admin Bar is Write, Profile (or Me), and Notifications.

                                                                                      New Post My Profile My Notifications

                                                                                      The Write button simply takes you to the New Post Editor.

                                                                                      The Profile link (which shows your Gravatar if you have one) takes you to the Me section of your account. From this section you can manage your account profile, account settings, purchases and more.

                                                                                      Clicking on Notifications will open a dropdown that displays your latest notifications, including recent likes and comments.

                                                                                      ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                      Action Bar

                                                                                      The Action Bar appears at the bottom right of your site. When expanded through the three dots in the Action Bar, various shortcuts appear.

                                                                                      This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is action-bar.png

                                                                                      ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                      Not Logged-in Visitors

                                                                                      Visitors who are not logged in to WordPress.com will see:

                                                                                      Action Bar - Logged Out

                                                                                      Note that the Action Bar will not show the Follow option on sites that have a Static Homepage or less than two Blog Posts.

                                                                                      ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                      Logged-in Visitors

                                                                                      Visitors who are logged in to WordPress.com will see:

                                                                                      Action Bar - Logged In WP

                                                                                      ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                      Action Bar on Your Site

                                                                                      If you look at any of your own sites, you will see:

                                                                                      Action Bar - Signed In Owner
                                                                                      • Get help setting up your theme
                                                                                      • Copy shortlink
                                                                                      • View post in Reader
                                                                                      • Manage subscriptions
                                                                                      • Collapse this bar

                                                                                      And, the normal Follow button is replaced with Customize, Edit and Stats.

                                                                                      You can hide the Action Bar from your site if it has a WordPress.com Premium or WordPress.com Business plan, by using Custom CSS code.

                                                                                      Versatile plans and pricing

                                                                                      • Free

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                                                                                        Best for small businesses

                                                                                      Choose a plan
                                                                                      Still confused?

                                                                                      Contact support.

                                                                                      Not quite what you're looking for?

                                                                                      Get Help
                                                                                      #####EOF##### WordPress.com Plans and Pricing – Get Started for Free Today!

                                                                                      Choose the perfect WordPress.com plan for your website.

                                                                                      Start your website for free today or upgrade your plan to access powerful features.
                                                                                      Blogs and Personal Sites Business Sites and Online Stores

                                                                                      Blogger

                                                                                      $3

                                                                                      per month, billed yearly

                                                                                      Best for Bloggers Brand your blog with a custom .blog domain name, and remove all WordPress.com advertising. Receive additional storage space and email support.

                                                                                      Start with Blogger

                                                                                      • Free .blog Domain for One Year
                                                                                      • Jetpack Essential Features
                                                                                      • Email Support
                                                                                      • Dozens of Free Themes
                                                                                      • Basic Design Customization
                                                                                      • 6GB Storage Space
                                                                                      • Remove WordPress.com Ads

                                                                                      Start with Blogger

                                                                                      Personal

                                                                                      $5

                                                                                      per month, billed yearly

                                                                                      Best for Personal Use Boost your website with a custom domain name, and remove all WordPress.com advertising. Get access to high‑quality email and live chat support.

                                                                                      Start with Personal

                                                                                      • Free Domain for One Year
                                                                                      • Jetpack Essential Features
                                                                                      • Email & Live Chat Support
                                                                                      • Dozens of Free Themes
                                                                                      • Basic Design Customization
                                                                                      • 6GB Storage Space
                                                                                      • Remove WordPress.com Ads

                                                                                      Start with Personal

                                                                                      Premium

                                                                                      $8

                                                                                      per month, billed yearly

                                                                                      Best for Freelancers Build a unique website with advanced design tools, CSS editing, lots of space for audio and video, and the ability to monetize your site with ads.

                                                                                      Start with Premium

                                                                                      • Free Domain for One Year
                                                                                      • Jetpack Essential Features
                                                                                      • Email & Live Chat Support
                                                                                      • Unlimited Premium Themes
                                                                                      • Advanced Design Customization
                                                                                      • 13GB Storage Space
                                                                                      • Remove WordPress.com Ads
                                                                                      • Advanced Social Media
                                                                                      • Simple Payments
                                                                                      • Site Monetization
                                                                                      • VideoPress Support

                                                                                      Start with Premium

                                                                                      Business

                                                                                      $25

                                                                                      per month, billed yearly

                                                                                      Best for Small Businesses Power your business website with unlimited premium and business theme templates, Google Analytics support, unlimited storage, and the ability to remove WordPress.com branding.

                                                                                      Start with Business

                                                                                      • Free Domain for One Year
                                                                                      • Jetpack Essential Features
                                                                                      • Email & Live Chat Support
                                                                                      • Unlimited Premium Themes
                                                                                      • Advanced Design Customization
                                                                                      • Unlimited Storage Space
                                                                                      • Remove WordPress.com Ads
                                                                                      • Advanced Social Media
                                                                                      • Simple Payments
                                                                                      • Site Monetization
                                                                                      • VideoPress Support
                                                                                      • Get Personalized Help
                                                                                      • SEO Tools
                                                                                      • Upload Plugins
                                                                                      • Install Themes
                                                                                      • Google Analytics Integration
                                                                                      • Remove WordPress.com Branding

                                                                                      Start with Business

                                                                                      eCommerce

                                                                                      $45

                                                                                      per month, billed yearly

                                                                                      Best for Online Stores Sell products or services with this powerful, all‑in‑one online store experience. This plan includes premium integrations and is extendable, so it’ll grow with you as your business grows.

                                                                                      Start with eCommerce

                                                                                      • Free Domain for One Year
                                                                                      • Jetpack Essential Features
                                                                                      • Email & Live Chat Support
                                                                                      • Unlimited Premium Themes
                                                                                      • Advanced Design Customization
                                                                                      • Unlimited Storage Space
                                                                                      • Remove WordPress.com Ads
                                                                                      • Advanced Social Media
                                                                                      • Simple Payments
                                                                                      • Site Monetization
                                                                                      • VideoPress Support
                                                                                      • Get Personalized Help
                                                                                      • SEO Tools
                                                                                      • Upload Plugins
                                                                                      • Install Themes
                                                                                      • Google Analytics Integration
                                                                                      • Remove WordPress.com Branding
                                                                                      • Accept Payments in 60+ Countries
                                                                                      • Integrations with Top Shipping Carriers
                                                                                      • Unlimited Products or Services
                                                                                      • eCommerce Marketing Tools
                                                                                      • Premium Customizable Starter Themes

                                                                                      Start with eCommerce

                                                                                      WordPress.com Free

                                                                                      A free WordPress.com site includes a WordPress.com subdomain, community support, dozens of free themes, basic design customization, and more. Start with Free ›

                                                                                      People love WordPress.com logo.

                                                                                      WordPress.com works really well with Google for a great SEO ranking. I can also embed YouTube videos, Google Maps, and other content easily and without any coding ability.
                                                                                      Quintin Lake
                                                                                      theperimeter.uk
                                                                                      It’s been a great privilege and a life-changing experience. I’m grateful to WordPress.com for providing an affordable and user-friendly platform for individuals to launch projects and be heard in this way.
                                                                                      Ann Morgan
                                                                                      ayearofreadingtheworld.com
                                                                                      WordPress.com icon.
                                                                                      Join the platform you won’t outgrow.
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                                                                                      Create your site
                                                                                      #####EOF##### Forum: CSS Customization | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                                      en WordPress.com Forums › CSS Customization

                                                                                      CSS Customization

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                                                                                      #####EOF##### Streamlining Publishing and Operations with Grupo Abril – Enterprise WordPress hosting, support, and consulting – WordPress VIP
                                                                                      Case Study

                                                                                      Streamlining Publishing and Operations with Grupo Abril

                                                                                      In 2016, leading Latin American media group Grupo Abril engaged WordPress.com VIP to help drive its digital transformation by consolidating multiple legacy CMS platforms into WordPress and overhauling development and deployment workflow for 50+ publications.

                                                                                      Through the partnership with WordPress.com VIP, in addition to establishing a secure, stable, and flexible common platform to build upon for years to come, Abril achieved the following:

                                                                                       

                                                                                      • Empowered editorial team to get more done independently, reducing reliance on IT staff  
                                                                                      • Sped up hiring and training thanks to the size of the WordPress media ecosystem
                                                                                      • Standardized all of its sites, implementing a “develop once and use for all brands” strategy
                                                                                      • Simplified and streamlined ad inventory
                                                                                      • Improved efficiency and productivity of its IT teams
                                                                                      • Freed up its deployment pipeline from gridlock in maintenance and security updates
                                                                                      • Simplified code review
                                                                                      • Reduced and optimized the work required to support its advertising deals
                                                                                      • Increased launch agility and the ability to service its smaller brands
                                                                                      • Shifted staffing patterns to bring on more high value front-end resources
                                                                                      • Significantly reduced CapEx and OpEx compared to previous years
                                                                                      Members of the VIP team at Abril HQ for a regular on-site collaborative session

                                                                                      Taming the Sprawl of Organic Growth

                                                                                      Grupo Abril, based in São Paolo, Brazil, is one of the largest media companies in Latin America. Among its magazine brands are Veja, the leading weekly publication in Brazil, business and financial news magazine Exame, and the Brazilian editions of Elle, Cosmopolitan, and InStyle. Other divisions include broadcast TV and educational publications. In 2015, Abril sought to streamline the IT sprawl that had arisen from the organic growth and development of its dozens of media brands, under one platform. This is a challenge that many major media companies with diverse portfolios of brands continue to face today.

                                                                                      Abril’s brands were spread out across several content management systems, including a custom Ruby On Rails system hosted in-house, another hosted via Amazon Web Services, and a Drupal-based system supported by Acquia. Each system had its own dedicated IT support in addition to the centralized IT group.

                                                                                      Since we began working with them in 2015, Abril has migrated over 25 of its sites to WordPress.com VIP. As part of the work, we trained Abril’s highly skilled development team who had limited experience with WordPress at this scale, and brought them up to speed on WordPress development techniques, best practices, and security and performance.

                                                                                      In addition to hosting and supporting Abril’s sites and providing training for developers and editorial staff, WordPress.com VIP manages ongoing security and performance reviews, and serves as an end-to-end consultant for all of Abril’s content publishing development. This has opened up their pipeline, and freed the organization up to focus its resources where they can have the most valuable impact – editorial and front-end work.

                                                                                      Read about what goes in to our annual onsite visits with the Abril team.

                                                                                      “We have enormously improved our efficiency since we don't need additional teams or third parties to support code review or infrastructure. And because we need almost no back end development resources in-house, it’s almost all front end, today we have a smaller development team. We can focus on what matters, which is producing content and generating value. We don’t have to care about servers and backups for example, ...all of that is covered with VIP.”

                                                                                      — Ricardo Schultz, CIO

                                                                                      Based on the company’s internal analysis, their previous system faced three major challenges.

                                                                                      Unleashing Efficiency

                                                                                      First, the lack of standardization was itself the source of inefficiencies up and down the organization. “When we needed to make any change, implement a project or try to address a business need, it was chaos. We had to try to align  numerous teams, systems and schedules to make it happen,” explained Schultz.  This led to unnecessary duplicated effort and layers of complexity.

                                                                                      Establishing a common platform and theme set on WordPress has drastically reduced the amount of work and resources required to support advertising campaigns. In addition to narrowing and simplifying the work required on ad units, new site templates can now be sold, designed, and launched quickly, which makes everybody happy.

                                                                                      Rediscovering Agility

                                                                                      Second, the company’s multiple platforms and resource groups hindered its agility. Responding to opportunities, needs, and market changes quickly was extremely difficult. Central IT resources were tied up supporting the security, maintenance, and uptime needs of each of the platforms. That left precious little bandwidth for feature updates, new site launches, and enhancements. Two sets of code review processes, one internal and one external, caused slow and overlapping loops. Creating a new template or launching a new site often took many months when it should have only taken weeks. Further, every time a new technology entered the market, it necessitated a new custom development project for each platform, which ensured Abril’s brands would be slow to reach parity with faster-moving rivals.

                                                                                      Abril has made major improvements in agility since standardizing with WordPress.com VIP. New feature and site launches can now be deployed with just a few days notice. Company resources are no longer tied up in staying up to date with third-party API’s like Facebook Instant Articles and Google AMP, and Abril is now first to market with updates any time those services change. Maintenance and security releases no longer hinder the pipeline of site launches and updates.

                                                                                       

                                                                                      Shared Benefits Across the Portfolio of Brands

                                                                                      Third, the pressure on central IT and uneven resources across brands led to prioritization conflicts and inefficiencies. While the highest circulation brands were able to get their needs met ahead of other priorities, some smaller and niche publications struggled to get any attention at all. Because of the logjam, some hadn’t had a site update in ten years and as a result had no mobile optimized version of their site.

                                                                                      Now, all of Abril’s brands benefit from shared technology updates. Everything is under a single theme, and even though the larger brands drive the priority and development, every other brand gets the benefit of the features built by the big ones, like Veja and Exame. The smaller brands also get access to all of that.

                                                                                      Ready to get started?

                                                                                      Drop us a note.

                                                                                      No matter where you are in the planning process, we’re happy to help, and we’re actual humans here on the other side of the form. 👋 We’re here to discuss your challenges and plans, evaluate your existing resources or a potential partner, or even make some initial recommendations. And, of course, we’re here to help any time you’re in the market for some robust WordPress awesomeness.

                                                                                      #####EOF##### Innsbrucker Prosafestival 2019 | 17. Innsbrucker Prosafestival – Donnerstag 4. April bis Samstag 6. April 2019

                                                                                      17. Innsbrucker Prosafestival: Donnerstag 4. April bis Samstag 6. April 2019

                                                                                      2019-02-21 Orgatreffen

                                                                                      Mit 17 hat man noch Träume, sang Peggy March. Wir singen nicht, wir lesen und unsere Träume realisieren wir seit 17 Jahren. Das Innsbrucker Prosa Festival ist kein Problemteenager, es ist eine Erfolgsgeschichte, die vom Verein 8ungKultur ermöglicht wird. Das heißt: Auch diese Jahr dürfen wir Ihnen 12 Autorinnen und Autoren aus dem gesamten deutschen Sprachraum (und darüber hinaus) präsentieren, die aus den unterschiedlichsten Gründen in der gegenwärtigen Literaturlandschaft herausragend sind. Drei Tage, drei Orte, drei Moderatoren, 12 Autorinnen und Autoren. Das reimt sich noch immer und ist wie immer gut, wird aber noch besser durch Sie, durch Ihr Dabeisein.

                                                                                      Der Auftakt findet am Donnerstag, den 4. April in der neuen Stadtbibliothek (Amraserstraße 2) statt. Am Freitag, den 5. April ist die Wagner’sche Buchhandlung (Museumstraße 4) Gastgeber und am Samstag, den 6. April 2018 besiegeln wir den Dreitage-Literatur-Staffellauf im brux – Freies Theater Innsbruck (Wilhelm-Greil-Straße 23) mit Musik von DJ Martin Fritz sowie Tanz und Ekstase von allen Beteiligten.

                                                                                      Robert Renk, Markus Köhle und Martin Fritz moderieren, führen einleitende Gespräche mit den Autorinnen und Autoren, beschenken diese textmotiviert und haben wie immer einen schillernden Querschnitt der aktuell schreibenden Zunft eingeladen. Carmen Sulzenbacher sorgt für die Organisation und Betreuung aller.

                                                                                      Lesen ist nicht nur Abenteuer im Kopf, es ist auch wohltuendes Gehirn-Jogging. Vorgelesen zu bekommen, ist ein Kurzurlaub ohne Kofferpacken. Also packen Sie Ihre Sachen, kommen Sie zu uns, gönnen Sie sich diesen Trip in angesagte und abgefahrene literarische Welten und nehmen Sie danach als Souvenir und gerne das eine oder andere Buch als Urlaubsnachlese mit nach Hause.

                                                                                      Lassen Sie sich geladenen Autorinnen und Autoren entführen ins Hause Hobbs, in unmöblierte Nächte und in den Ausnahmezustand, folgen Sie uns nach Jesolo, Usedom und Altaussee. Kurz und gut: Betrachten Sie uns als Ihr flüchtiges Zuhause und fühlen Sie sich bei uns wohl.

                                                                                      Ihr LiteratUrlaubs-Team Robert Renk, Markus Köhle, Martin Fritz & Carmen Sulzenbacher

                                                                                      Donnerstag, 4. April 2019 20:00 in der Stadtbibliothek Innsbruck

                                                                                      Jaroslav Rudiš
                                                                                      Tanja Raich
                                                                                      Markus Ramseier
                                                                                      Markus Bundi

                                                                                      Freitag, 5. April 2019 20:00 in der Wagner’schen Buchhandlung

                                                                                      Judith Schalansky
                                                                                      Verena Roßbacher
                                                                                      Barbara Frischmuth
                                                                                      Martina Clavadetscher

                                                                                      Samstag, 6. April 2019 20:00 im brux – Freies Theater Innsbruck

                                                                                      Rolf Hermann
                                                                                      Barbara Zemann
                                                                                      Martin Peichl
                                                                                      Anna Herzig

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                                                                                      #####EOF##### Topic Tag: other | WordPress.com Forums

                                                                                      Need help? Check out our Support site, then

                                                                                      #####EOF##### Jerry Gamblin – 44CON

                                                                                      Jerry Gamblin

                                                                                      Jerry Gamblin pic Twitter: @jgamblin

                                                                                      Website: www.jerrygamblin.com
                                                                                      Jerry Gamblin’s passion for security was ignited in 1989 when he hacked Oregon Trail to give himself the highest score in the history in world on his 3rd grade teachers Apple IIe.

                                                                                      As a (mostly) grown up security evangelist and analyst, he has been featured on numerous blogs, podcasts and has spoken at security conferences around the world on keeping companies secure.

                                                                                      When he’s not helping companies be more secure, you can find him taking his son to swim lessons or learning how to solder.

                                                                                      You can read his latest thoughts at jerrygamblin.com

                                                                                      Jerry has presented at:

                                                                                      https://vimeo.com/109380782
                                                                                      #####EOF##### Create a Paywall With WordPress.com
                                                                                      Go Own Your Passion. Boost Your Business.

                                                                                      Create a Paywall With WordPress.com

                                                                                      Are you ready to create and monetize premium content on your site? If so, you should think about using a paywall. It’s one of the most popular ways to monetize your site. Here’s an introduction to what paywalls are, why businesses and entrepreneurs use them, and how you can set up a paywall with WordPress.com.

                                                                                      What is a paywall, and why do businesses use them?

                                                                                      A paywall is a feature that requires website visitors to pay a fee in order to access content. You may have noticed it while browsing specific news websites, where you’re typically allowed to view a specific number of articles each month for free. You’re then invited to pay a subscription fee if you’d like to access additional articles. Other businesses put premium content behind a paywall, like an in-depth article on a topic that they know is of special interest to their audience, or a members-only podcast.

                                                                                      As advertising revenue declines, many businesses and entrepreneurs have used paywalls to create revenue streams that keep their companies profitable. A paywall is a great way to monetize website content, reserving special content for your most dedicated fans while still making a certain amount of your regular content available to casual visitors, who may decide that they want to become subscribers after getting a taste of what you have to offer.

                                                                                      How to create a paywall with WordPress.com

                                                                                      You’ll need a WordPress.com Business plan to create a paywall on your website. First, think about how you want your paywall to work. Do you want to go with a pay per view model, charging by the article? This may be a good option if you don’t publish a lot of content. Another option is the subscription model, in which you charge a monthly or annual price for unlimited access to the content on your site. You could also take a metered approach where you offer both free and premium content — charging only for the latter.

                                                                                      Now it’s time to select a WordPress.com plugin. A WordPress.com Business plan allows you to install thousands of plugins that extend the functionality of your site, including ones that help you create a paywall. Here’s how to add a plugin for that purpose:

                                                                                      1. Go to My Site → Plugins
                                                                                      2. Find the search bar at the top right hand corner of your screen.
                                                                                      3. From there, you can search for paywall plugins by functionality by typing “paywall” in the search field or entering the name of a specific paywall plugin that you’ve heard about.
                                                                                      4. Choose the plugin that looks best for your site’s needs. Many are free to install, while some may require a fee. Check to make sure that the plugin is compatible with your WordPress.com plan (this should be indicated on the bottom right corner).
                                                                                      5. Once you’ve selected the paywall plugin you’d like to use, click Install Now.

                                                                                      Install plugin example

                                                                                      If you need help, WordPress.com Happiness Engineers can provide general troubleshooting related to third-party plugins. More advanced support may be available from the plugin’s author, too — see the plugin’s documentation for details.

                                                                                      Monetize your website with a paywall

                                                                                      With a paywall, you can turn your content into income and reap a greater financial reward from all of your hard work. You can also give your most devoted followers special access to exclusive content that keeps them excited and engaged. If you’re looking for ways to earn more revenue from your site, a paywall may be the answer.


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                                                                                      #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Topic: Import | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                                      en WordPress.com Forums › Support

                                                                                      Import

                                                                                      • Author
                                                                                        Posts
                                                                                      • #3290843

                                                                                        daftojenta
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        After importing an .xml backup, the import page said “Your file has been successfully uploaded. We will begin processing your import right away.” That was over a day ago, with no progress since then. Last time I did an import it was much quicker; should I worry the process is stalled? How should I best proceed? Thanks in advance.

                                                                                        The blog I need help with is 

                                                                                        Daft2jenta.home.blog

                                                                                        The blog I need help with is daf2jenta.home.blog.

                                                                                        #3290932

                                                                                        gemmacevans
                                                                                        Staff

                                                                                        Hi daftojenta,

                                                                                        There appears to have been an issue with the import starting on daf2jenta.home.blog, so I’ve reset the importer ready for you to try again:

                                                                                        https://en.support.wordpress.com/import/import-from-medium/

                                                                                        I noticed you mentioned an .xml file but a .zip file is generated for Medium exports (unless it’s a Medium “publication”) — did you mean to use the importer for this particular service?

                                                                                        Let me know how you get on.

                                                                                        #3291199

                                                                                        daftojenta
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Stil not working. Not medium. WordPress file.

                                                                                        #3291202

                                                                                        daftojenta
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Getting 413 error code.

                                                                                        #3291257

                                                                                        supernovia
                                                                                        Staff

                                                                                        @daftojenta, are you using the instructions here?

                                                                                        https://transferto.wordpress.com/self-hosted-wordpress-org/

                                                                                        I noticed the files you’ve been using are .txt, and for a WordPress import we’d expect a WXR XML file.

                                                                                        #3291265

                                                                                        daftojenta
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        After importing an .xml backup, the import page said “Your file has been successfully uploaded. We will begin processing your import right away.” That was over a day ago, with no progress since then. Last time I did an import it was much quicker.

                                                                                        I getting 413 error. What is that mean?

                                                                                        #3291269

                                                                                        daftojenta
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        I’ve already got to load another blog so I know how to do it. but i get error message 413. what does that mean? may the file be too large? What do I do then? I’ve been doing this for days now

                                                                                        #3291385

                                                                                        fstat
                                                                                        Staff

                                                                                        Hi there,

                                                                                        Can you please try to import that file from the classic dashboard and let us know how it goes?

                                                                                        https://daf2jentahome.wordpress.com/wp-admin/admin.php?import=wordpress

                                                                                        #3291463

                                                                                        daftojenta
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Stil not worling.. What is code 413 mean???

                                                                                        #3291809

                                                                                        daftojenta
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        I have tried for many hours and it does not work. I’ve done it before with another blog. what does that error message mean ??? 413 error code??

                                                                                        #3291867

                                                                                        supernovia
                                                                                        Staff

                                                                                        I still only see text files, so something seems off.

                                                                                        Also 413 means you’re using something that’s too large.

                                                                                        Please confirm the full filename of the file you are trying to upload, and tell us how large the file is.

                                                                                        #3291901

                                                                                        daftojenta
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        I got it fixed using a youtube video. I split the file and then it worked right away

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                                                                                      Alex Chapman

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                                                                                      Alex is a senior consultant for Context Information Security in the UK, where he is heavily involved in security research, including vulnerability discovery, exploitation, bespoke protocol analysis and binary reverse engineering. He has been credited in security advisories for a number of major software products for vendors such as Citrix, Google, Mozilla and VMware, and has presented at security conferences around the world.

                                                                                      His new found interest involves hacking embedded devices, extracting firmware from unknown micro-controllers, and pointing out security flaws which have no place in modern day software.

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                                                                                      • 44CON 2014: Hacking an Internet Enabled Lagomorph
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                                                                                      No Starch Press has long had a reputation for publishing unique books on technology, with a focus on open source, security, hacking, programming, alternative operating systems, LEGO®, science, and math.

                                                                                      We’re always looking for people to write great books for us. If you have a book in mind that you’d like us to consider, let us know. You can email Bill Pollock at bill@nostarch.com.

                                                                                       

                                                                                      #####EOF##### Syria – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                                      Tag: Syria

                                                                                      U.S. Strikes and Russian PMC Casualties in Syria – Fact vs Fiction

                                                                                      Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                                                      It’s become common knowledge that a U.S. strike took out an advancing column of Syrian forces on February 7th in defense of SDF positions east of Deir ez-Zor, and more likely to protect U.S. SOF embedded with them. Since then the story of Russian casualties among supporting PMCs (mercenaries belonging to private military companies) has proliferated across the internet and newspaper articles, with many of the facts and figures inaccurate. I’ve seen 100 dead, 200 dead, 600 dead, dozens, hundreds, scores of dead, and so on and so forth. Unfortunately Russian casualties, troops participating in military exercises, or similar such events have a large “applied internet multiplier” whereby they increase several fold depending on the source. By current figures many of those involved in the fighting February 7-8 were killed at least twice, if not multiple times.

                                                                                      Due to a lack of credible information serious newspapers are citing some Russian businessman, a Syrian commander, and all sorts of other conflicting sources. The contradictory stories are reminiscent of Akira Kurosawa’s famous film Rashomon, where every character has their own often self-serving narrative about the same event. After a journalist called this morning to inquire whether it is true that U.S. airpower took out 20% of Russian ground forces in Syria it seems time for something sensible to be written on the matter. I’m updating this a bit as better information comes out.

                                                                                      Based on the information available at the time I wrote that actual casualties among PMCs in this episode are likely somewhere on the order of 13-15 dead and a relatively equal number wounded. Initial reporting seemed closer to a dozen than dozens. The casualties  from this strike are spread between a Syrian unit known as ISIS Hunters (~20 KIA) and the bulk among SAA units which seemed to include some percentage of local fighters from the area (these numbers might be around 40 or more). There was word of a Syrian brigadier killed as well along with the SAA soldiers. More than likely this was an unit from Syria’s 5th Assault Corps supported by PMCs. The 13-15 PMC casualties are also not all necessarily Russian, but thus far all the confirmed dead are. A good number seem to be Cossacks, and many are fighters who previously were part of separatist formations in the Donbas, either directly on behalf of DNR or under contract as mercs.

                                                                                      I am very biased towards conservative assessments based on the information that can be confirmed, and makes sense, i.e. I prefer starting low and working my way up. In this case it seems that the less probable event was true, the number of Wagner mercenaries killed was much higher than I initially thought.

                                                                                      On Feb 16 I updated the count after more information and some additions from fighting February 10th. The better number increasingly looked like ~40 dead and 70 wounded as in MK article. I’m more inclined towards MK numbers in this graphic than any of the other figures, but it is still too low an estimate. Those are figures for combined casualties, referencing 3 companies of Wagner involved in support of Syrian forces. Of these the number of PMCs killed and wounded is probably more than a dozen but doubtfully exceeds 30-40 (or so I thought). Today the more realistic number is somewhere between 100-200 killed in that engagement.

                                                                                      MK article here: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/02/13/pogibli-40-raneny-72-istochnik-v-chvk-vagnera-utochnil-poteri.html

                                                                                      A good source comparison chart to figure out where all these numbers are coming from can be found here: https://chervonec-001.livejournal.com/2227259.html

                                                                                      This is a photo of ISIS Hunters holding a funeral following the strike

                                                                                      ISIS Hunters funeral

                                                                                      The KIA count may go up depending on the fate of the wounded. There is a general assumption based on the evidence that the few PMCs killed belong to Wagner ChVK, as Wagner is the principal mercenary group fighting in support of SAA in Syria. As is often the case, facts point to a much less exciting and sensational story behind the headlines.

                                                                                      According to DoD statements, and those by SecDef Mattis, the attacking force approximated ‘300 pro-regime forces’ in a surprise push towards SDF positions on February 7. Thus, the fantastic figures of hundreds dead, including Igor Girkin’s 644, can be safely thrown out the window. Somewhere on the order of 200 dead is also improbable unless the numbers for those attacking were much higher than being reported by the American side. The U.S. would have to kill literally everyone involved, and that seems quite a reach for typical rules of engagement. But it seems the numbers were somewhere 100-200 after all, that is the reporting from Russia and numerous sources suggest the U.S. intentionally under reported Russian PMC casualties in this fight. Either that, or the additional fighters died from poor morale after seeing the strike.

                                                                                      Later on, DoD statements elaborated that the attack came evening of Feb 7th, and it included a ‘dismounted battalion sized element’ which was turned back. So this is somewhere on the order of 300-500 attacking but they only had contact with a part of the force. The difference in the numbers between Mattis’ initial 300 and LTG Harrigan’s battalion is in the leading half of the battalion, which dismounted (200-300), that U.S. forces struck and most of the casualties were among this element.

                                                                                      Since LTG Harrigan indicated the attack was not unexpected, and they observed the buildup for some time (https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1441080/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-lieutenant-general-harrigian-via-teleco/), it explains better how so many assets were involved in beating back the assault – MQ-9, F-15E, F-22, even B-52 and AC-130. B-52 in particular would take some time to arrive on station. This suggests the U.S. knew the attack was coming, and they told the Russians they knew, and the action went forward anyway.

                                                                                      This episode appears to have taken place around Al-Tabiyeh east of Deir ez-Zor. Syrian forces began an attack on SDF positions, with armor and artillery. Then U.S. forces made contact with Russian MoD to deconflict, and after being told there were no Russian soldiers there, which by all accounts there were not, they struck the advancing units. So, initially I thought total casualties were probably less than 100 with a approximately 40 SAA, 20 ISIS Hunters, and 13-15 PMC split (although unclear if SAA losses include ISIS Hunters losses in which case it might even more conservative). Now looking back, that was grossly conservative. Somewhere between 100-200 were killed, many of them Wagner fighters, that is more than the 42-70 estimate from the MK story.

                                                                                      The exact reason for why this episode took place is naturally unclear, but it may be connected to the overall friction between Syrian forces wanting to seize energy infrastructure, gas and oil, from SDF forces. The latter took it from ISIS, and of course need the resources, just as the Syrian regime needs the money to sustain a rump state. There are also Russian interests there looming in the background, among people interested in contracts handling Syrian energy extraction post-conflict, and hoping that PMCs can secure potential energy cash cows. This episode may be due to poor coordination, deliberate probing, or as often happens in war – a confluence of events yields compound risk as mistakes and misjudgments stack.

                                                                                      From higher altitude, the U.S. has a strategy to maintain presence in Syria via SDF, and Russia has a strategy to make the regime as viable as possible financially, while pushing U.S. proxies further east. Astride the war between Turkey and Kurds playing out in Afrin, the war between Israel and U.S. vs Iranian presence in the south, this is technically Syria’s war #3 which involves Russian forces backing SAA to retake more of Idlib and gain ground east of Deir ez-Zor.

                                                                                      P.S. Behind this tale is another looming story about some Syrian T-72 that was taken out by a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone in defense of SDF positions and embedded U.S. advisers (internet can’t decide if its Russian or Soviet made). Actually on the video available it first looked more like a T-90, supplied by Russia to Syria’s 5th Assault Corps. There is an object right of the gun that looks like a Shtora system than IR illuminator from T-72BA – but this was not the case. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/13/us-mq-9-reaper-takes-out-russian-t-72-tank-syria.html (I got this photo from the same article)

                                                                                      Looking at it some more later the V barrier on the front seems to point to T-72M, which is the more probable answer. This is is from Feb 10 fighting.

                                                                                      DoD video shows a U.S Air Force Reaper strike on a Russia-made T-72 tank. (Screen shot of DoD video)

                                                                                      We stand by to find out from the internet whether this particular tank was filled with hundreds of Russian PMCs or personally driven by Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.

                                                                                      Figures compiled from a few news sources like Novaya Gazeta, Meduza, etc. some blog sources that are ‘pro-Russian’ but fairly well informed on the situation in Syria, work put out by CIT, other journalists/experts currently working the issue)

                                                                                      https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/02/13/75496-oshibka-ili-predatelstvo

                                                                                      https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/02/12/139439-cit-uznala-imena-pogibshih-v-sirii-boytsov-chvk-vagnera

                                                                                      MK might have the best sources: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/02/13/pogibli-40-raneny-72-istochnik-v-chvk-vagnera-utochnil-poteri.html

                                                                                      Oryx probably took number of dead and did standard 3x wounded multiplier, which makes sense.

                                                                                       

                                                                                      What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?

                                                                                      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                      Reposting an article that just came out on the Russian campaign in Syria, co-authored with my good colleague and friend, Matthew Rojansky, who directs the Kennan Institute. This piece was published in the Military Review, Army University Press. Below we delve into the origins of Russia’s intervention in Syria, the course of the campaign, Russian strategy, and assess Moscow achieved its political objectives.

                                                                                      —————————————————————————————————————————————–

                                                                                      The war in Syria has ground on for more than half a decade. Hundreds of thousands have died, entire cities and towns have been destroyed, and billions of dollars in infrastructure have been decimated. Millions of refugees have flooded into neighboring Middle Eastern states that can ill afford to house them, while others have sought safety as far away as Europe and North America, exacerbating divisive battles over immigration, jobs, and cultural identity in Western democracies.

                                                                                      Syria has tested every world leader individually and collectively, and has laid bare the failure of international institutions to deal effectively with the problems those institutions were designed to manage and prevent. Despite a prolonged commitment of U.S. military and diplomatic resources to the conflict, a peaceful settlement remains remote, and the bloody-handed Assad regime remains firmly in control of population centers along the Mediterranean coast. The impending battlefield defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in the desert interior of Syria and Iraq is qualified by the fact that its fighters have joined and inspired more elusive terror cells outside the region.

                                                                                      Meanwhile, the Russian-led coalition, including Syrian forces, Iran, and numerous allied militias, appears to be closing in on its own military and political objectives. The Syrian conflict will likely enter a new phase in 2018, as both IS and the Syrian opposition cease to be relevant forces, and the two coalitions seek to negotiate a postconflict settlement. While it is far from assured that any settlement acceptable to the principle domestic and international players can be struck, for now the main outcome of this war is that President Bashar al-Assad will stay, but the Syria that existed before the war is gone.

                                                                                      Russia has only been directly involved in this conflict since September 2015, but its intervention has radically changed the war’s outcome. The natural question is whether Russia has, in fact, won a victory. The answer to that question depends first on what Moscow intended to achieve—in other words, how did and does Russia define victory in Syria, what are its continuing interests there, and have those interests been secured or advanced?

                                                                                      While the Russian campaign might be judged a qualified success from the standpoint of the Kremlin’s own objectives, Russia’s actual performance in both military and political terms bears closer examination. How did the Russians achieve their successes, both on the battlefield and on the wider diplomatic and political stage? Finally, armed with a better awareness of how Russia’s Syria campaign measured up in terms of Russian objectives and capabilities, what lessons should Americans take away for future U.S. engagement in Syria, the Middle East, and beyond?

                                                                                      Origins of the Russian Intervention

                                                                                      That American and Russian military power came to meet on the ground and in the skies over Syria in 2015 is a kind of historical accident. The country was hardly the centerpiece of either state’s global strategy, or even their respective regional policies.

                                                                                      Russian-Syrian relations draw on a Cold War legacy, since Moscow first began to support Syria after the 1956 Suez Crisis. However, Syria did not become a true client state of the Soviet Union until 1971.The Soviet Union gained a well situated naval base in Tartus, on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, to support its Fifth Eskadra—an operational naval squadron—along with intelligence-gathering facilities ashore.

                                                                                      Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Soviet fleets departed the Mediterranean, and the importance of Syrian bases rapidly declined. Moscow had far less cash available to sustain its patronage network of client states; relations with Syria became decidedly transactional, as Russia sought payment for continued arms sales. Russian ships continued exploiting the port of Tartus as a minor resupply point, but with little military significance. Tartus was, in any case, ill equipped for Russian ships to dock, and for a lengthy period, there was little Russian naval activity to even merit its use. That changed in the wake of the 2015 Russian intervention. The expanded Tartus port is now much more capable of supporting operations and resupplying the Russian Mediterranean squadron, which was stood up in 2013 for the purpose of supporting Syria.

                                                                                      In general, Russia did not seek bases in Syria; it had to establish them and expand existing infrastructure to save the Syrian regime. Buoyed by perceived success, and looking to stay, in 2017 Russia signed a forty-nine-year lease on Tartus, which is still in the process of being upgraded into a serviceable naval base. What the Syrian relationship truly offered for post-Soviet Russia was a position in the Middle East, which helped confer great power status in international politics. A confluence of events led to what would become Moscow’s most significant military foray beyond the immediate post-Soviet space in over a quarter century.

                                                                                      Although Russia had lingering interests in Syria, the changing context of U.S.-Russia relations beginning in 2011 was a more influential factor in how Moscow would come to view this conflict. Russia’s response to the U.S.-led intervention in Libya in that year was categorically negative, and Moscow sought to draw a line in the sand in Syria, opposing U.S. use of force to advance what it viewed as a “regime change” agenda. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov applied the Libya logic to Syria directly in May 2011, when he said, “The calculation is that foreign players will get imbued with this problem and will not only condemn the violence there, but subsequently repeat the Libyan scenario, including the use of force.”1

                                                                                      The cornerstone of Russian policy in Syria became preventing the United States from carrying out a Libya-like intervention to overthrow Assad. Lavrov warned, “Some leaders of the coalition forces, and later the NATO secretary-general, called the Libyan operation a ‘model’ for the future. As for Russia, we will not allow anything like this to happen again in the future.”2 The fear of yet another U.S. military intervention, this time much closer to Russia itself, and targeting its only remaining client in the Middle East, was seemingly vindicated when President Barack Obama called for Assad to step aside.3 Russia was determined to check U.S. interventionism, initially by supplying the Syrian regime with arms and equipment, and by blocking efforts to pressure the regime in the UN Security Council.

                                                                                      Equally important was the firm belief among Russian elites that Assad’s downfall would result in IS and al-Qaida affiliates taking over the country, spelling disaster for the region and creating a potential superhighway for Sunni extremists into Turkey and the Caucasus. This concern was somewhat vindicated as the ongoing civil war combined with the displacement of civilians due to the rise of IS resulted in a massive refugee flow into Turkey, neighboring countries, and central Europe, causing uncertainty and threatening regional stability (see figure 1). Unlike distant Libya, a complete implosion of Syria was not only too close for Russia’s comfort, but thousands of Russian citizens and thousands more Russian-speakers from the wider region had already joined militant extremist groups fighting there.4 Moscow feared that in the event of an IS victory, some of those fighters would enter Russia and join insurgencies in the North Caucasus or plot attacks against the Russian heartland. Accordingly, some Russians described entering the fray in Syria as launching a preventive war against terrorism.

                                                                                      Figure 1. Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe

                                                                                      Figure 1. Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe (Graphic courtesy of the BBC.; latest figures up to 3 March 2016. Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

                                                                                      Russian interests and objectives in the Syrian intervention also stem from the collapse in Russia-West ties following Moscow’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014. In this sense, U.S. and European sanctions and diplomatic pressure catalyzed the Russian decision to intervene in Syria. Rather than giving in to Western pressure and offering concessions on Ukraine, Moscow looked to Syria to broaden the confrontation on terms more favorable to itself. Eventually, Russia hoped its Syrian intervention could force Washington and its European allies to abandon Ukraine-related sanctions and diplomatic isolation in the interests of achieving a negotiated settlement with Russia over Syria.

                                                                                      Russian domestic political considerations were also a factor, though their role should not be overstated. Russia’s military dealt Ukraine a blow at the battle of Debaltseve in February 2015, leading to the second Minsk ceasefire agreement, which appeared to be a political victory for Moscow. The agreement quickly broke down, however, and Western sanctions remained in full effect, taxing the Russian economy at a time of persistently low energy prices. Struggling to stabilize the economic situation at home, and with policy in Ukraine increasingly adrift, there was little prospect for Russian leadership to gain further victories either at home or in Russia’s near abroad. Although Moscow hardly saw entering a bloody civil war in the Middle East as a path to easy gains, Russia’s tolerance for the risks attendant on intervention grew dramatically in the face of these domestic and international pressures.

                                                                                      A limited Syrian intervention, calibrated to reduce political risk at home, became the less perilous proposition. By mid-2015, Moscow had few alternatives to use of force if it hoped to shore up the Assad regime, its ally in Damascus. In April, the situation for Assad’s forces was dire. Al-Qaida’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, had assembled a coalition of fighters into the “Army of Conquest,” which drove back regime forces in the northwest and threatened major population centers further south. At the same time, IS was pushing westward, and had captured the historic city of Palmyra. Assad’s forces were being squeezed, and they were falling back on almost all fronts. That summer, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, together with senior Syrian officials, made several trips to Moscow in an effort to coordinate a military intervention.5 By August that year, there were clear indicators that Russia was preparing to intervene, and when Russian tactical aviation began arriving at Hmeimim Air Base in September 2015, the die was cast. Figure 2 depicts the approximate Syrian situation in terms of territorial control exercised by particiapnts in the conflict near the outset of Russian operations initiated in support of the Assad regime.

                                                                                      Framing the Russian Intervention

                                                                                      Although hemmed in by tactical necessities, Moscow’s entry into the Syrian fray was also strategically ambitious. A successful intervention could offer victory on three fronts: preventing U.S.-backed regime change in Syria, breaking out of political isolation and forcing Washington to deal with Russia as an equal, and demonstrating at home that Russia is a great power on the main stage of international politics. Moscow hoped Syria would offer a new and more favorable front, where the United States could be outmaneuvered in the broader confrontation, which up to 2015 centered almost entirely on Russian actions in Ukraine.

                                                                                      Figure 2. Syrian Civil War: Territorial Control Map as of November 2015

                                                                                      Figure 2. Syrian Civil War: Territorial Control Map as of November 2015 (Graphic by edmaps.com; Twitter, edmaps.com; © 2017 Cristian Ionita)

                                                                                      Once military operations began, as is often the case with military campaigns, the intervention would take on additional objectives, reflecting secondary or tertiary vested interests. “Ambition creep” is a common illness afflicting most great powers when they deploy military forces. Russia may not have come to Syria with hopes of regaining power and status in the Middle East at the top of its agenda, but regional aspirations grew with each success on the battlefield. As a consequence, Russia has become a potential powerbroker, and perhaps a balancer against U.S. influence, even if it did not embark on the Syrian campaign with those goals in mind.

                                                                                      Whatever Russian expectations of success may have been—and there are indications that the Syrian leadership misled Moscow early on as to the true state of its forces (historically not an uncommon practice for Damascus)—Moscow pursued a campaign with both political and military objectives in fairly close alignment. These efforts were mutually reinforcing, but a path to victory had to overcome steep challenges.

                                                                                      On the ground, Russian forces had to find a way to quickly and dramatically alter the balance in Assad’s favor by destroying the opposition’s capacity to continue the fight, while working under severe resource constraints. In parallel, Russia had to change the calculus and policy of its principal opponents in this conflict, including Turkey, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, while entering into arrangements with other potential actors in the region. Otherwise, military gains would quickly disappear in the sand, and a political victory would be elusive. Russia also needed a political process running concurrently to lock in military gains on the ground, since as Mao Zedong wrote, political power would “grow from the barrel of a gun.”

                                                                                      Relations with allies like Iran, cobelligerents in the form of local militias, or potential spoilers such as Israel had to be carefully managed. The compound risk of conflicting political incentives and operational objectives among these parties made for a complex battle space. The risks of escalation to direct conflict between the intervening powers were considerable, as underscored by Syria’s use of chemical weapons in March 2017, resulting in a prompt retaliatory U.S. cruise missile strike, or the Turkish shoot down of a Russian Su-24M2 in November 2016. Russia led the coalition, but never controlled it; thus, it had to be comfortable with uncertainty and the associated risk of having the likes of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah on its team.

                                                                                      Syrian soldiers who have defected to join the Free Syrian Army secure a street 27 January 2012 in Saqba

                                                                                      Syrian soldiers who have defected to join the Free Syrian Army secure a street 27 January 2012 in Saqba, just east of Damascus, Syria. The diverse groups loosely associated under the Free Syrian Army designation became the initial primary targets of Russian operations in Syria since they most directly and immediately threatened the authority of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. (Photo courtesy of Freedom House, Flickr)

                                                                                      Success for Russia entailed securing a commitment from the other parties to pursue a political settlement largely on its terms. This meant convincing Saudi Arabia and Turkey that their respective proxies had no chance of victory in the war, and pushing the United States to abandon its policy favoring regime change. Over time, Moscow achieved success on both the military and political fronts, coercing adversaries and negotiating changes to their positions one by one, though the pathway to this outcome was hardly a smooth or straightforward one. Russia’s success is not unqualified, but at the time of this writing, it appears that if the campaign in Syria is not a victory for Russia, it is certainly a defeat for those who opposed the Russian-led coalition.

                                                                                      Russian Strategy in Syria

                                                                                      To achieve this success, Russia had to secure some leverage in Syria, which in turn rested on being able to destroy the Syrian opposition and compel opponents to change their policies, forcing them and their proxies in the conflict to the negotiating table on terms favorable to Russia’s coalition. Moscow also sought the opportunity to reframe itself as a positive force in the battle against terrorism, and press the United States into military cooperation. Russian leaders hoped this would ultimately fracture Western cohesion on punitive measures imposed over Ukraine, and grant Russian President Vladimir Putin recognition as a prominent player in international affairs.

                                                                                      These were the desired ends, yet the Russian strategy was not deliberate. If anything, Russia pursued an “emergent,” or “lean,” strategy. This was an approach characterized by the “fail fast, fail cheap” ethos of startup business, with iterative adjustments to the operation. The centerpiece of this strategy was flexibility, with a preference for adaptation over more structured strategy. In emergent strategy, success begets success, while failure is never final or disqualifying. Several vectors are pursued simultaneously, and at times, they may even appear to be contradictory. Resources are added in favor of the approach that shows the most progress, while others are discarded without regard to “sunk costs.”6

                                                                                      Militant Islamist fighters parade 30 June 2014 in the streets of northern Raqqa Province, Syria

                                                                                      Militant Islamist fighters parade 30 June 2014 in the streets of northern Raqqa Province, Syria, to celebrate their declaration of an Islamic “caliphate” after the group captured territory in neighbouring Iraq. The Islamic State (IS) posted pictures similar to this one online of people waving black flags from cars and holding guns in the air, and Russian forces, after supporting Assad’s defeat of Free Syrian Army forces holding the northern city of Aleppo, turned their primary attention to defeating IS. (Photo by Reuters stringer)

                                                                                      To be successful in implementing a lean strategy, leadership must be agile, politically unconstrained, and uncommitted to any particular approach in the battle space, i.e. willing to improvise and adjust course. In Russia’s case, it actually helped being an authoritarian system, and having relatively few allies or other geopolitical constraints on decision-making. But Russia also had few other options. Given resource constraints and high uncertainty, including poor information about the reality on the ground from its allies, Russia was not in a position to pursue a more deliberate strategy. That limitation ultimately played to Russia’s advantage relative to other powers, which expended considerably more blood and treasure via structured and deliberate, but ultimately less successful approaches in the region. Russia’s lean strategy worked, because when flawed assumptions were proven wrong in the conflict, it could quickly pivot and adapt.

                                                                                      Still, the limitations of the Russian armed forces imposed hard constraints on Russia’s overall operation. The Russian military had almost no experience with expeditionary operations after withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1989, Syria itself had limited capacity to host a major military footprint, Russia’s long-range supply and support capabilities were weak, and the Russian military was in the midst of major reforms and modernization. Coordinating with Iran and its associated Shia militias like Hezbollah was an added complexity on an already crowded battlefield, while Russian commanders had a generally low opinion of Syrian forces’ combat performance. In short, it was far from clear how the forces Russia could deploy would make the impact needed to turn the conflict around. Early on, outside observers doubted the prospects for Russia’s intervention, especially given recent Western experiences in expeditionary operations in the Middle East.

                                                                                      The campaign Russia envisioned would be based on a small footprint to keep its exposure low, reducing the chances of being steadily dragged into a conflict where local actors increasingly gain leverage over a stronger international benefactor. Russian leadership instead sought room to maneuver, retaining flexibility and the option of quick withdrawal should things go badly. In the early days of Russia’s intervention, physical constraints limited its presence. Tartus was not a real naval base, Hmeimim Air Base lacked apron space for a large contingent of Russian aircraft, other Syrian bases were exposed, surrounded, or ill equipped, and Russian logistical support would have limited throughput.

                                                                                      In short, reality helped dictate a more conservative and ultimately smarter approach to the battle space. It was not Moscow’s skill or experience, but the absence of abundance and limited options that made the Russian armed forces savvier in how they approached the conflict. That said, even after expanding the Syrian air base and making major investments in the naval facility, Russia’s General Staff continued to calibrate presence down to the bare minimum necessary. By 2017, it became clear that despite increased local capacity to host Russian forces, and improved infrastructure, Moscow was reluctant to use it. The opportunity to expand the means applied to this conflict was there, but Russia did not want it, judging that Syria would not be won with a means-based approach, the all too familiar “more is more” school of thought.

                                                                                      The Russian strategy was about Syrian, Iranian, and Shia militias doing the fighting and Russian forces providing support, not the other way around. Syria continued to reveal the general Russian preference to use local forces first, mercenaries and other Russian proxies second, and its own forces last, only for decisive effect on the battlefield. Russian military power would pulse, peaking when necessary in support of offensives and withdrawing when judged unneeded.

                                                                                      Russian Combat Operations in Syria

                                                                                      When Russian forces first arrived in Syria in September 2015, they inherently introduced a new dynamic, compelling what became a dialogue on “deconfliction” arrangements with the United States. Several Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters were shown on the runway at Hmeimim Air Base as Su-24M2 bombers began to deploy. Leveraging an upcoming UN Security Council General Assembly summit, Moscow pressed for a high-level bilateral meeting between Putin and Obama—a break from what had been more than a year of U.S.-imposed diplomatic “isolation” of Russia in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

                                                                                      A Russian Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft drops a KAB-500S, a 560 kg satellite-guided bomb

                                                                                      A Russian Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft drops a KAB-500S, a 560 kg satellite-guided bomb, on an enemy position 9 October 2015 in the Aleppo or Racca region of Syria. (Photo courtesy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)

                                                                                      Though the Obama administration rankled at the appearance that it had been coerced into restoring military dialogue, the risk of a military incident between the two big nuclear powers in the skies over Syria trumped other considerations.7 In a ninety-minute discussion, the two sides agreed to continue efforts to “deconflict” operations. Within days, Russia had achieved its first political gains from the intervention, which had yet to conduct a single sortie.

                                                                                      Still, it was clear that there was no agreement on the political way forward in Syria, and early Russian targeting in the air campaign, which launched on 30 September 2015, revealed that Russia’s air wing would focus on the “moderate” Syrian opposition under the rubric of a counterterrorism fight. Moscow’s rules of engagement were relatively simple: there was little to no distinction between the various nongovernment armed groups in Syria, as all except for Kurds and pro-regime militias would be considered “terrorists.” Putin declared at the UN assembly, “We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its armed forces, who are valiantly fighting terrorism face to face. We should finally acknowledge that no one but President Assad’s armed forces and Kurdish militias are truly fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria.”8

                                                                                      This was not just a matter of convenience for the sake of establishing a free-fire zone. Indeed, from Russia’s perspective, there was no such thing as a “moderate” opposition in Syria, and the entire term was a misguided Western invention aimed at legitimizing extremists opposed to Assad. The Russian political strategy at home and abroad was to frame the conflict as binary—only Assad’s regime had legitimacy, and all others were de facto terrorist groups of varying stripes allied with IS or Jabhat al-Nusra.9 Over time, Russia would also seek to create a systemic opposition, cobbling together forces that would be amenable to sharing power with the Assad regime.

                                                                                      Taking advantage of the momentum in 2015, Russia set up an intelligence sharing and coordination center in Baghdad, which included Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Israel. The center’s purpose was to deconflict Russian air operations with neighboring countries. Moscow also hoped to create the public sense that it was leading a coalition of countries in a counterterrorism effort no less legitimate than the U.S.-led coalition against IS. Russia’s leadership sought to parlay this posture and the U.S.-Russian deconfliction dialogue into more formal recognition of U.S.-Russia cooperation in Syria. Indeed, Moscow repeatedly asked for Washington’s acknowledgement of the Russian-led coalition as a legitimate partner in the Syrian war, which would have amounted to a recognition of Russia as Washington’s geopolitical “equal,” at least in this context.

                                                                                      Initial Russian combat operations were intended to change the momentum on the battlefield, providing a substantial morale boost to the Syrian forces and allied militias. Russia also hoped the United States would cede the battle space, at least by default, by focusing on its own combat operations against IS in Northern Iraq, and Kurdish allies in Syria. This would mean a rapid abandonment of the moderate opposition and other proxies seeking Assad’s overthrow, who would be powerless to deal with Russian airpower and increasingly isolated on the battlefield. In many respects, this goal was accomplished, as Russia and the United States established a de facto division of labor in Syria and complementary campaigns.

                                                                                      The first Russian deployment to Syria consisted of thirty-three aircraft and seventeen helicopters. These included twelve Su-24M2 bombers, twelve Su-25SM/UB attack aircraft, four Su-34 bombers, four Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters and one Il-20M1 reconnaissance plane. The helicopter contingent consisted of twelve Mi-24P attack helicopters and five Mi-8AMTSh transports.10 Later in 2015, this number would grow with four more Su-34 bombers and four additional Su-35S air superiority fighters. Mi-35M attack helicopters and Mi-8 transports arrived in the following months. A Mediterranean squadron led by the Black Sea Fleet would support the operations from the sea, though the Russian navy mostly concerned itself with providing logistical supplies to the intervention via landing ship tanks in what was dubbed the “Syrian Express.” In order to supplement limited transport capacity at sea, and equipment brought in by air via Ruslan An-124 cargo planes, Russia purchased eight Turkish cargo vessels and pressed four of them into service.

                                                                                      Initial Russian objectives focused on regaining access to key roads, linking infrastructure, breaking isolated Syrian bases out of encirclement, and softening up opposing forces by destroying as much hardware as possible—much of it captured earlier from the Syrian Army. Although in the early months Russia had supposedly only helped Syria regain control of 2 percent of its territory, by February 2016, it was clear the air campaign was having an effect in shaping the battlefield, and with it, the political fortunes of the Syrian opposition. The opposition’s momentum stunted, Syrian morale began to recover.

                                                                                      A screenshot of a YouTube video shows cruise missiles being launched 17 November 2015 from a Russian fleet in the Caspian Sea

                                                                                      A screenshot of a YouTube video shows cruise missiles being launched 17 November 2015 from a Russian fleet in the Caspian Sea. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reported launching eighteen cruise missiles in the salvo, hitting seven terrorist targets in Syria. (Screenshot of RT YouTube video)

                                                                                      Territorial control in Syria was always elusive, as local leaders would sign up with whoever was winning. Thus, “control” could swing rapidly towards the side that had the clear momentum, and Russian forces oversaw numerous “ceasefire agreements” between Syrian forces and village leaders. In reality, Assad’s forces had control over much of the population of Syria, while large tracts of opposition or extremist held territory were depopulated from the fighting. Thus, it would take less than two years for the Russian-led coalition to make the leap from gaining only 2 percent of territory to appearing to be the victor in the conflict.

                                                                                      Russian aircrews flew sorties at a high rate, averaging perhaps forty to fifty per day, but spiking to one hundred during peak combat times, such as January 2016. Two crews per airframe were needed to sustain the intensity of operations, along with a small village of defense contractors to support the newer platforms being fielded in Syria. Russian airpower in Syria never exceeded thirty-to-fifty combat aircraft and sixteen-to-forty helicopters of various types, a deployment many times smaller than the combat aviation group the Soviet Union fielded in Afghanistan.11 The rate of mechanical failure or combat loss was also magnitudes less than previous Russian or Soviet air operations.

                                                                                      During the conflict, Russian aerospace forces would be supported by around 3,000 ground troops, with perhaps 1,500 based at Hmeimim alone. These would include Naval Infantry from the 810th brigade based in Crimea, elements from the 7th Airborne Assault Division, armored companies fielding T-90A tanks, MSTA-B towed artillery, and a host of air defense units including Buk-M2, Pantsir-S1 and S-400 units. Sophisticated electronic warfare equipment was deployed as well, alongside Russia’s Special Operations Command. After the capture of Palmyra in the spring and of Aleppo in the fall of 2016, Russia also introduced demining units and specialized military police units from the North Caucasus.

                                                                                      Russia’s special operations command featured prominently throughout the conflict, conducting diversionary operations, targeted killings, and reconnaissance. Another two thousand or so private military contractors (PMCs), the largest of which is known as Wagner Group, bolstered Syrian forces and absorbed most of the casualties on the battlefield. With Russian air power in support, veterans-turned-PMCs made a difference amidst the poorly trained militias, taking the risk for $4,000–$5,000 per month.

                                                                                      On the whole, Moscow sought to keep its presence small. The initial force did not field long-range air defenses or dedicated air superiority fighters; rather, their arrival was prompted by an unexpected incident with Turkey, when Russia’s Su-24M2 was shot down by a Turkish F-16 in November of 2015. The Russian bomber had been attacking Turkmen militias in Syria, and had strayed through Turkish airspace. Indeed, Russia’s air force repeatedly violated Turkish airspace in an effort to coerce Turkey to change its policy in Syria and reach a modus vivendi with the Russian-led coalition. The crisis between Russia and Turkey was arguably the most dangerous moment of the entire intervention, and likely the closest a NATO country had been to military conflict with Russia in decades.

                                                                                      A Syrian man carries his two girls to safety 7 September 2015 across the rubble caused by a barrel bomb attack on the rebel-held neighborhood of al-Kalasa

                                                                                      A Syrian man carries his two girls to safety 7 September 2015 across the rubble caused by a barrel bomb attack on the rebel-held neighborhood of al-Kalasa in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo. Once Syria’s economic powerhouse, Aleppo was ravaged by fighting after the rebels seized the eastern part of the city in 2012, confining government forces to the west. As a result of widespread civilian deaths due to such bombings, Russia and Syria received global condemnation for air attacks against Aleppo and other urban targets. (Photo by Karam al-Masri, Agence France-Presse)

                                                                                      The Russian reaction to the incident was to impose harsh economic and political sanctions on Turkey, while showing on the battlefield that Turkish-backed forces had little hope of achieving victory over Assad. By the summer of 2016, Ankara gave in, issuing a quasi-apology in order to restore normal relations with Moscow. One by one, Russia would seek to change the positions of the major parties backing anti-Assad forces in Syria. First, Moscow pushed Washington to concede that a policy of regime change was not only unrealistic, but that its support for the Syrian opposition had no chance of success, all the while dangling the prospect of a ceasefire and humanitarian relief for civilians in the conflict. The United States did inch towards tacit acceptance of the Russian intervention, and of Assad’s de facto victory over the radicals as well as the U.S.-backed opposition.

                                                                                      Russian ambitions were also well served by competition among U.S. allies in the region, who frequently and vocally disagreed with Washington’s approach. Turkey was more hostile towards Kurdish fighters in Syria than towards Assad or IS, yet the Kurds were Washington’s chief ally against IS on the ground. Washington also had no interest in supporting Sunni extremist groups favored by the Saudis and other Arab states, nor were extremists seen as a viable alternative to the bloody Syrian regime. Eventually, after crushing Turkish-backed proxies in Syria, Russia got the cooperation it sought with Ankara. Saudi Arabia, too, began to show flexibility, and in October 2017, the Saudi king visited Russia for the first time in recognition of Moscow’s growing significance in the Middle East.

                                                                                      Russia also saw Syria as a testing ground for new weapons and platforms, giving as much of its military an opportunity to participate in the conflict as possible. This included rotating countless crews through the theater of operations, giving ships and bombers the opportunity to fire cruise missiles, and fielding a small ground force as well. After a period of military reforms from 2008 to 2012 and a large modernization program begun in 2011, Moscow wanted to bloody its air force in conflict.

                                                                                      Syria has had a profound impact on the Russian armed forces, as countless officers have been rotated through the campaign on three month stints to gain combat experience. According to Russia’s Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, the commanders of military districts, combined arms armies, air force and air defense armies along with many of the divisional commanders have gained experience in Syria.12 Promotions in 2017 further advanced those who served in Syria. The experience will shape Russian military thinking and personnel decisions for years to come.

                                                                                      Russian military engineers clear approach routes of mines 2 April 2016 in the ancient city of Palmyra, Syria

                                                                                      Russian military engineers clear approach routes of mines 2 April 2016 in the ancient city of Palmyra, Syria. Russia deployed few ground troops to Syria in order to keep the Russian “footprint” small. Instead, it relied on Syrian army forces, Shiite militias, and Iranian “volunteeers” to serve as the primary ground forces for combined operations primarily planned by the Russians. (Photo by Valery Sharifulin, TASS)

                                                                                      Alongside these training objectives, Russia also used combat operations in Syria as a technology demonstration for arms sales abroad, showing off the latest generation of Russian tech alongside older Soviet workhorses that did most of the fighting.

                                                                                      Starting with an initial strike on 7 October 2015, over the course of the conflict, Russian ships and submarines fired numerous Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, Russia’s long-range aviation joined the fray in November 2015, and since then, Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers have flown a substantial number of sorties deploying Kh-555 and newer Kh-101 air launched cruise missiles against targets in Syria.13 The Tu-22M3 medium bomber force supplemented combat sorties from Hmeimim Air Base, though these aircraft exclusively dropped FAB unguided bombs from medium to high altitude. Later Moscow would also field Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems, Bastion-P antiship missiles, and other advanced weapons in an effort to demonstrate their capability.

                                                                                      Although the precision-guided weapons involved in the conflict represented a tiny portion of the actual mixture of weapons used, perhaps less than 5 percent, Russia demonstrated the capacity to employ long-range guided weapons from various platforms. Syria showcased both the advances Russian airpower forces had made since their dismal performance in the Russia–Georgia War of 2008 as well as the remaining limitations of Russia’s armed forces. Much of the bombing was done by older Su-24M2 and Su-25SM aircraft, and almost all of it with unguided area-of-effect munitions. With the exception of systems on the Su-34, which was used to employ the KAB-500S satellite-guided bomb, among other precision weapons, Russian fixed-wing aircraft as a whole lacked targeting pods to effectively employ precision-guided munitions.14

                                                                                      Russian naval aviation was not impressive. The carrier strike-group sortie to Syria ferried by Russia’s vintage Kuznetsov heavy-aviation-carrying cruiser in 2016 was a publicity disaster, losing a Su-33 and Mig-29K to equipment failures. Otherwise, remarkably few Russian aircraft were lost, with most of the casualties among helicopter crews. Russian technicians kept both old- and newer-generation aircraft in the sky, with only one Su-24M2 lost to technical failure.

                                                                                      Russian air strikes were certainly effective, but incredibly costly in civilian casualties and collateral damage inflicted, some of which appeared intentional. Much of the ordinance used was for area of effect, and much too large in payload for targets in Syria. The Russian Aerospace Forces as a whole are still confined to an early 1990s form of fighting (though still a generational leap from where they were in 2008), but relying almost entirely on unguided weapons and, more importantly, lacking in the ISR assets necessary to conduct information-driven combat operations. Russia’s Aerospace Forces also lack the means to engage small moving targets with guided precision, relying on unguided weapons and munitions that are truly overkill.15 Just as the Soviet Union before it, the Russian military is a brutal mauler in close quarters, but continues to struggle in finding and seeing its target.

                                                                                      Russian military engineers clear approach routes of mines 2 April 2016 in the ancient city of Palmyra, Syria

                                                                                      Citizens of Aleppo display portraits of fallen Russian servicemen killed while fighting in Syria during a 22 December 2017 parade in Aleppo, Syria. The Syrians were expressing appreciation for the Russian Federation’s contributions during the first anniversary celebration of the capture of Aleppo. (Photo courtesy of the Russian Embassy’s Twitter account, @EmbassyofRussia)

                                                                                      Russia made heavy use of drones to supplement its manned air campaign, conducting battle damage assessment and reconnaissance. Russian drones are rumored to have flown more sorties than manned aviation over Syria. The best Russian drones were licensed production variants of Israeli models—a product of Russian-Israeli defense cooperation. Despite substantial spending on development, Russia still has no armed unmanned aircraft systems, and thus lacks a real time recon-strike option for its drone platforms. Syria highlighted the need for Russian armed forces to invest further in the development of unmanned strike systems, and develop a larger repertoire of guided weapons for the Aerospace Forces, particularly for tactical employment.

                                                                                      Those limitations aside, Moscow did use the Syrian campaign effectively as part of a broader diplomatic and political engagement with the United States, demonstrating capability and resolve to use long-range guided weapons, many of which have nuclear-tipped variants. Syria did much for Russian coercive credibility, painting a clear picture about the resurgent capability and capacity of its armed forces to impose costs on NATO in a conventional conflict and its ability to reach out at long ranges to hold much of Europe at risk, if need be. Long-range strikes by strategic bombers, ships, and submarines should not be viewed simply as combat tests to gain experience; they were also intended as strategic messaging to boost Russian credibility writ large.

                                                                                      Not Home by Christmas

                                                                                      Upon entering the conflict, Russian armed forces quickly discovered that the intervention would take considerably more time than initially expected or desired. Syria’s army had degenerated into armed militias that were formally unified under the Assad banner but that no longer represented a coherent fighting force. Russian leadership was aghast at the large amount of Syrian and Iraqi hardware captured by the opposition and various militant groups while the Assad regime held barely 10 percent of territory. Some Syrian units were still capable of action, but Russian officers would have to embed across these units to conduct military operations and start rebuilding the Syrian army’s fighting potential.

                                                                                      Despite an influx of Iranian and Hezbollah troops in October 2015, it was clear that the warring sides were all leveraging proxies on a battlefield with a low density of forces. Their combat effectiveness was poor, and Syrian forces would continually call in Russian air strikes, make small gains, and retreat at the first sight of counteroffensives by well-motivated Jabhat al-Nusra or other fighting groups.

                                                                                      Over time Russia would train up lower ranking Syrian officers, and establish the 5th Volunteer Assault Corps, led by Russian commanders and equipped with more advanced Russian equipment. The 5th has been Syria’s primary assault force for the past year. Combining Syrian fighters, PMCs, and Russian leadership to put together offenses has yielded battlefield victories at minimal cost.

                                                                                      Russian operational objectives were suited to its strategy: make decisive gains where possible, fragment the Syrian opposition, and seek to parlay victories in Syria into broader political objectives with the United States. To this end, the Russian General Staff sought to avoid exhaustive battles over population centers, especially given that Syrian forces lacked the manpower to hold anything they took. Such an approach would, and eventually did, result in having to retake the same terrain multiple times, as in the case of Palmyra. Russia also genuinely wanted to turn the fight eastward towards IS in an effort to glue together its effort at cooperation with the United States. Syria and Iran were not interested, instead seeking near total victory over the opposition and the recapture of all the major population centers in the west.

                                                                                      While Russia retained the image of a powerbroker and leader of the coalition, in reality, it did not have buy-in for such a strategy from its allies and cobelligerents; nor could Moscow compel them. In this regard, Russia suffered from the same deficit as the United States. Both were outside powers intervening in Syria without the necessary influence over local and regional allies to broker big deals. These differences came to the fore in March 2016, when Russia declared its withdrawal from Syria while turning the attention of its forces to Palmyra. In fact, Moscow had no intention of withdrawing, simply deleveraging and settling in for a longer fight, while Assad was focused on retaking Aleppo.

                                                                                      With its March declaration, Russia sought to recast the intervention in Syria as a sustainable longer-term security presence in support of a political settlement, rather than combat per se. The idea was to normalize Russian operations in the eyes of Russia’s domestic audience and to declare victory in some form. Medals were handed out and a small contingent was rotated back home, but meanwhile, Russia prepared to turn the Syrian campaign into smaller “campaigns” to avoid the perception that the intervention could take years. The first segment was concluded with the Russian capture of Palmyra in March 2016. Syrian and Iranian forces then turned towards Aleppo, a battle that ultimately scuttled Russian attempts to negotiate a joint integration group with the United States. The second cut was made in January of 2017, after the seizure of Aleppo, and a third “victory” has been set at the closing of 2017 as Syrian forces capture Deir ez-Zor and IS appears on the verge of defeat.

                                                                                      igure 3. Syrian Civil War: Territorial Control Map as of November 2017

                                                                                      Figure 3. Syrian Civil War: Territorial Control Map as of November 2017(Graphic by edmaps.com; Twitter, @edmapscom; © 2017 Cristian Ionita)

                                                                                      This latest declaration of victory, ahead of the March 2018 presidential election, is fraught with risk since Russian forces are not just staying but further expanding the infrastructure at Tartus and Hmeimim. As Gerasimov said in a recent interview, “we’re not going anywhere.” Not long thereafter, a mortar attack on 31 December damaged several planes and killed a number of Russian soldiers at the airbase. The strike was followed by a drone attack from militant groups against both bases on 6 January. Both were a stark reminder that triumphalism is somewhat premature, and Russian forces in theater remain at risk. Figure 3 depicts the approximate Syrian situation as of November 2017 in terms of territorial control exercised by participants in the conflict near the official close of Russian operations initiated in support of the Assad regime. (See figure 1 for a comparison to the situation at the beginning of the campaign.)

                                                                                      Postconflict Settlement and Beyond

                                                                                      Now that the bulk of Syrian territory and population centers have been wrested from the hands of anti-regime opposition groups, Russia can turn its full attention toward the postconflict settlement. It is true that Assad has committed to retake “every inch” of Syrian territory, and that even if Russia does not support this ambition, it will have little choice but to back continued regime efforts to secure energy and water resources in the country’s north and south. However, the main focus of both the Russian military and political action will be around the diplomatic settlement and supportive conditions on the ground.

                                                                                      Most importantly, Russia has apparently gained Washington’s acceptance of its role as a key broker in Syria’s future. In their November summit meeting in Vietnam, Presidents Trump and Putin confirmed not only continuing U.S. and Russian deconfliction dialogue and support for “de-escalation zones,” a largely Russian initiative, but also underscored the centrality of the political process for negotiating a postconflict future for Syria. That process is shaping up in line with Russia’s main strategic interests.

                                                                                      First, Russia has broken the monopoly of the Geneva process, and of U.S. diplomatic leadership. It has successfully integrated both the Astana-based negotiations it launched in 2016 to the formal UN-backed international process, and has regularly convened meetings of various opposition groups in an attempt to foster the emergence of a common opposition grouping, which will be amenable to compromise with the Assad regime. Moscow’s progress on the political front is fitful, but at this writing it appears to be the only plausible path forward.

                                                                                      Second, Russia has managed to maintain productive ties with each of the other key regional players, ranging from Saudi Arabia on one end of the spectrum to Iran on the other. In fact, despite continuing disagreement with Saudi Arabia over the composition of the “legitimate” Syrian opposition to be represented at Geneva, and with Turkey over the role of the Kurdish self-defense forces, Russian diplomacy (backed by military force) has won recognition from both, a fact that is especially welcome in Moscow in the run-up to Russia’s March 2018 presidential election. Iran has proven a thorny ally for Russia; however, the relationship between the two countries remains largely stable, since the Iranians expect to be able to maintain their de facto dominance on the ground in much of Syria, solidifying their corridor of power from Iraq to Lebanon.

                                                                                      Finally, Russia will retain its ally in Damascus, because for the foreseeable future, the Assad regime appears back in control. In fact, Assad’s stock has risen so much since the Russian intervention two years ago that he is largely able to set the terms of his participation in the Geneva process. The opposition can howl in protest, but the regime has simply refused to engage in negotiations if the question of its own departure is on the agenda.

                                                                                      This is also clearly a victory for Russia, since Moscow has capitalized on its victories to secure long-term leases on its military facilities at Hmeimim and Tartus, as well as to position Russian firms to play potentially prominent and lucrative roles in Syrian reconstruction, especially in the energy and energy transit sectors. Russia not only needs these bases to continue supporting Syrian forces, but the conflict is now part of a larger bid for becoming a power broker in the Middle East, and a balancing option for those seeking to hedge against U.S. influence.

                                                                                      The main area in which Russia’s Syria campaign fell clearly short of initial objectives was in the effort to broaden the platform for diplomatic engagement with Europe and the United States in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and associated Western sanctions. Although Moscow did break through the Obama administration’s attempted isolation policy by forcing Washington to conduct deconfliction talks, those talks have not expanded into the full-fledged Russia-U.S. cooperation for which the Kremlin had hoped. Moreover, there has been zero willingness from Western capitals to think of Syria and Ukraine in quid pro quo terms. As much as Westerners may lament the death toll and flood of refugees from the Syrian civil war, the Ukraine conflict is simply much closer to home, and European governments have held firm in their support for sanctions tied to fulfillment of the Minsk agreements, while the United States has actually ratcheted sanctions dramatically upward in the wake of Russia’s apparent attempts to meddle in the 2016 U.S. election.

                                                                                      In sum, Russia appears to have won at least a partial victory in Syria, and done so with impressive efficiency, flexibility, and coordination between military and political action. On the one hand, Russia’s embrace of the Assad regime and its Iranian allies, its relative indifference to civilian casualties, and its blanket hostility to anti-regime opposition groups are fundamentally at odds with widely held U.S. views on Syria. On the other hand, Russia’s “lean” strategy, adaptable tactics, and coordination of military and diplomatic initiatives offer important lessons for the conduct of any military intervention in as complex and volatile an environment as the Middle East. More than a decade and a half into the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, with ongoing fighting in Libya and Yemen, and countless other tinderboxes that could ignite wider regional conflict threatening U.S. interests, Washington should pay close attention to the Russian intervention and how Moscow achieved its objectives in Syria.

                                                                                      Michael Kofman is a senior research scientist at CNA Corporation, where he serves as director of the Russia Studies Program. He is also a Global Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C., and a nonresident Fellow at the Modern War Institute, West Point. Previously he served as program manager at National Defense University. His research focuses on security issues in Russia and the former Soviet Union, specializing in defense and military analysis. He holds a BA from Northeastern University and an MA from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

                                                                                      Matthew Rojansky is director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He holds an AB from Harvard College and a JD from Stanford Law School. Previously, he was deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He also served as an embassy policy specialist at the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine, and as a visiting scholar in the Research Division at the NATO Defense College.

                                                                                      Notes

                                                                                      1. Sergei Lavrov and Russian Media, “On Syria and Libya,” Monthly Review (website), 17 May 2011, accessed 15 December 2017, https://mronline.org/2011/05/17/on-syria-and-libya/. The text is an excerpt from “Transcript of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview to Russian Media Following Attendance at Arctic Council Meeting, Nuuk, May 12, 2011,” published on the Russian Foreign Ministry website on 13 May 2011.
                                                                                      2. “Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at Joint Press Conference with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah Al Nahyan,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (website), 1 November 2011, accessed 10 January 2018, http://www.mid.ru/en/vistupleniya_ministra/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/186758.
                                                                                      3. Macon Phillips, “President Obama: The Future of Syria Must Be Determined by Its People, but President Bashar al-Assad Is Standing in Their Way,” White House Press Office (website), accessed 19 December 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be-determined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad.
                                                                                      4. Vladimir Frolov, “Signing In is Easier than Quitting,” Vedomosti (website), 29 September 2016, accessed 19 December 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/amp/a00ffd6a64/opinion/articles/2016/09/29/658952-voiti-legche-viiti.
                                                                                      5. “Iran Quds Chief Visited Russia despite U.N. Travel Ban: Iran Official,” Reuters, 7 August 2015, accessed 19 December 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-iran-soleimani-idUSKCN0QC1KM20150807; Michael Kofman, “A Tale of Two Campaigns: U.S. and Russian Military Operations in Syria,” Pathways to Peace and Security1, no. 52 (2017): 163–70.
                                                                                      6. Michael Kofman, “The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy,” War on the Rocks (website), 17 January 2017, accessed 19 December 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/the-moscow-school-of-hard-knocks-key-pillars-of-russian-strategy/.
                                                                                      7. Teresa Welsh, “Obama, Putin Meet in New York,” S. News & World Report(website), 28 September 2015, accessed 19 December 2017, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/28/obama-putin-meet-in-new-york.
                                                                                      8. Washington PostStaff, “Read Putin’s U.N. General Assembly speech,” Washington Post (website), 28 September 2015, accessed 19 December 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/?utm_term=.48d2be2b7823.
                                                                                      9. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Moscow’s War in the Air: Russia Sends a Message in Syria,” The National Interest(website), 1 October 2015, accessed 19 December 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/moscows-war-the-air-russia-sends-message-syria-13983.
                                                                                      10. Ruslan Pukhov, “Russian Military, Diplomatic and Humanitarian Assistance” in Syrian Frontier, ed. M. U. Shepovalenko, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2016), 105–107, accessed 9 January 2018, http://cast.ru/upload/iblock/686/6864bf9d4485b9cd83cc3614575e646a.pdf.
                                                                                      11. Ruslan Pukhov, “The War that Russia Won,” Izvestia (website), 13 October 2017, accessed 10 January 2018, https://iz.ru/652856/ruslan-pukhov/voina-kotoruiu-rossiia-vyigrala.
                                                                                      12. Valery Gerasimov, “We Broke the Back of Terrorists,” interview by Victor Baranets, Komsomolskaya Pravda (website), 26 December 2017, accessed 10 January 2018, https://www.kp.ru/daily/26775/3808693/.
                                                                                      13. The initial employment of long-range aviation was in response to the terrorist bombing of Russia’s MetroJet flight out of Egypt.
                                                                                      14. Pukhov, “The War that Russia Won.”
                                                                                      15. Ruslan Pukhov, “Polygon Budushego,” Russia in Global Affairs (website), 8 March 2016, accessed 10 January 2018, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Poligon-buduschego-18032.

                                                                                       

                                                                                      U.S. Cruise Missile Strikes in Syria – Brief Analysis

                                                                                      Michael Kofman13 Comments

                                                                                      I’m going to skip the policy analysis and work on the facts of this strike and the Russian response. The al-Shayrat airbase was chosen because according to U.S. sources on April 4th a Syrian Su-22 deployed some kind of munition with chemical weapons.  On April 6th two U.S. destroyers fired 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the base, although technically it was 61 since one failed to launch and had to be replaced, while another missile ditched into the sea (60 planned – 1 launch fail, + 1 replacement, -1 malfunction resulting in sudden conversion into torpedo). The official story is that 59 hit targets.

                                                                                      What did the missiles hit? This base hosted two squadrons of Su-22M3/M4 bombers and one squadron of Mig-23ML/MLD fighters. For those who don’t know, these are legacy aircraft from the Soviet Union, long retired in Russia. If memory serves Su-22s were taken out of service in the Russian air force back in 1998, but are still flying in Poland.  These squadrons were distributed in three different parts of the airbase, and it looks like the missiles hit two out of three sectors. As a consequence they got 5 Su-22M3s, 1 Su-22M4, and 3 Mig-23ML fighters for a total of 9 aircraft destroyed (Pentagon claimed 20, but so far we can only count 9, then subsequently in a recent press release the Pentagon changed the story to 20% of Syrian air power destroyed.) The squadron of Su-22s located in the northwest of the base seems largely untouched, which is why one of the planes was shown on video launching from the base within the same day.

                                                                                      Photo of Syrian Air Base with markings for the three squadrons (found on BMPD)

                                                                                      Additionally the missiles took out a SA-6 radar site (Kub), some ground equipment, and what was first described as a M-600 missile launcher (Iranian produced SRBM). Bunkers, fuel, ammunition and general stores were also hit. Although there were early rumors on twitter suggesting that there were visible containers of chemical weapons, these proved to be nonsense, and were actually generic containers for cluster munitions and other types of ordnance (twitter experts best experts). The runway was left untouched since it is quite long, simple to repair, and plugging cruise missiles into runways is not the most efficient use of the weapon.

                                                                                      What wasn’t there? Su-24Ms that Russia had recently handed over to Syria, which are much more capable than the aging Su-22 bombers, and actual Russian aircraft. Back in April 2016 this base was being used as a forward operating strip for Russian attack helicopters during an earlier phase in the campaign. Supposedly some Russian personnel were at this facility, but that story increasingly sounds like a guesstimate.

                                                                                      Destroyed Mig-23ML

                                                                                      Russian air defense

                                                                                      The short answer is that their air defenses were meant to defend Russian forces, not Syrian assets, and probably not armed to take on a 60 cruise missile salvo anyway. The primary Russian fear was that a country like Turkey or someone else might hit concentrated Russian assets in Latakia. From their positions these air defenses probably had little to no chance of hitting cruise missiles meant for a different airbase, and the U.S. likely routed the strike package in such a way so as to make it impossible.

                                                                                      There is an often spotted S-400 system at Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia, together with Pantsir-S1 short range air defense and medium range point defense Buk systems (not many photos of the Buk but supposedly its there). The common depiction of the S-400s capabilities is also pretty inaccurate.  For one, it does not have a 400km range missile (the 40N6). That long range missile has never been seen in operation, nor a new canister for it, which suggests it’s still not ready for prime time. So the actual maximum range is 250km, which still makes it a great system, but cuts down on the imaginary 400km firing ring. Furthermore the system is at the airbase, and there is a mountain range running north to south just east of Latakia, so naturally the radar is going to have a hard time seeing most of eastern Syria – and the Russians have admitted as much in their own press.

                                                                                      S-400 at al-Hmeimim Airbase

                                                                                      Last year Russia deployed a S-300v4 to Tartus (often confused for S-300VM or Antey-2500). This system is designed for intercepting missiles and large aircraft at long ranges. Unlike the S-400, which does not have a 400km range missile, this one actually does though it’s not designed for cruise missile interception. However, unlike the S-400 which is regularly seen in pictures and satellite imagery, the S-300v4 remains elusive, either because nobody is looking at Tartus or because it’s moving about.  Either way it was doubtfully well placed to do anything about this strike.

                                                                                      In either case, these systems and their attending short range brethren might do well if cruise missiles were fired at them or close to them, but not at some other facility, especially if they hug the ground and use terrain masking. It’s possible Russian electronic warfare systems might have affected the guidance system, but these would have to have powerful ranges and why give away many of the system’s technical capabilities on behalf of the Syrians? Hence Russian air defenses, despite being painted as a giant red circle in news coverage are actually quite limited in what they can do against cruise missiles fired from an unknown point, headed on an unknown trajectory and towards a target they’re not intended to defend.

                                                                                      Update: posted flight path of cruise missile strike from Russia’s Izvestia – not vouching at all for veracity, but good map showing how the strike package may have been directed specifically away from air defenses. I would not use this as a hard source on the flight path.

                                                                                      No automatic alt text available.

                                                                                      Closing out with a Fateh-110/M600 missile launcher at the airbase that’s seen better days. There is some debate on whether its really a Pantsir-S1. Syrian mod Fateh looks very similar in chassis to the Pantsir-S1, but on Pantsir jacks are behind 2nd wheels set whereas Fateh 1st, and the destroyed vehicle’s jacks are clearly behind the first axle.

                                                                                      C84KgDBWsAE0rYj

                                                                                      Thanks to coverage from diana_mihailova and BMPD blogs, also easiest place to get access to damage photos.

                                                                                      Russian Special Forces

                                                                                      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                      Below is a Q&A I did with the Cipher Brief that outlines much of what we know about the Russian special operations community.  The rest is on their website. 

                                                                                      The Cipher Brief: How are Russian special operations organized within the military?

                                                                                      Michael Kofman: The best way to parse through a myriad of Russian special designation units is to break them into three categories: elite infantry primarily for reconnaissance in ground, airborne, and naval services (Spetsnaz GRU), special purpose units belonging to intelligence agencies (Alpha and Vympel), and the Special Operations Command (SSO or KSSO). The last one is of particular note as a recent development and arguably the most interesting of all, since it represents a Russian special forces capability that featured prominently in Crimea and Syria.

                                                                                      Spetsnaz GRU are sometimes shorthanded as Russian special operations forces, but this is a common misnomer. Spetsnaz are elite infantry intended to support conventional unit formations. These units consist of eight Spetsnaz brigades, one Spetsnaz regiment (25th), four naval infantry Spetz units, and the 45th VDV (Airborne) brigade with a total complement of 9,000-10,500.  Currently the Russian armed forces are integrating Spetsnaz units into brigades and divisions, adding a company to each reconnaissance battalion. These units are almost invariably under the purview of the main intelligence directorate for Russia’s General Staff, the GRU.

                                                                                      Meanwhile the FSB, Russia’s domestic intelligence service, fields two specialized units for counterterrorism and defending strategic infrastructure at home, named Alpha and Vympel respectively. Less mentioned is the FSB’s Directorate S (Smerch), a special reconnaissance outfit founded on the basis of the FSB’s economic counter-intelligence unit, and likely larger than Alpha or Vympel.

                                                                                      The rest of the discussion focuses on KSSO.

                                                                                      A COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO RUSSIA’S USE OF FORCE: MEASURE TWICE, INVADE ONCE

                                                                                      Michael Kofman3 Comments

                                                                                      My latest article examining Russian use of force, published on War on the Rocks.

                                                                                      —————————————————————–

                                                                                      In the 20th century, the Soviet military’s penchant for area of effect artillery and armored firepower had earned it the reputation of a large hammer always in search of nails.  This popularized impression stuck with Russia long after the Soviet Union’s demise, but today’s Kremlin employs military power in a much more nuanced manner to pursue its objectives.  In recent conflicts, Russia has demonstrated a keen understanding of how to apply this instrument of national power to achieve desired political ends, doling out force in prescribed doses in the quest for decisive leverage.  Although Russian military power remains a blunt force instrument, the state wields it more like a rapier, demonstrating discretion and timing.

                                                                                      In a previous article on the key pillars of Russian strategy, I argued that Moscow favors an emergent strategy based on “fail fast and fail cheap” approaches. The Russian military itself has a long way to go in terms of modernization, but conversely, America’s political leadership needs to reexamine how great powers, with far fewer resources, use the so-called “big stick” to get the job done.  The unipolar world order appears to be rapidly melting, while great powers are back on the agenda.  When it comes to use of force by peer rivals contesting America’s interests, it is only going to get harder from here on out.

                                                                                      The United States may not wish to emulate Russian approaches, but American strategists should certainly study then.  Those who fail to learn from the experience of others must inevitably gain it at personal cost.  As Mark Twain  is said to have remarked, “The man who does not read has no advantage over the man who cannot read.”  To take another step along the journey of understanding Russian strategy, I explore how Russia changes facts on the ground, compels its adversaries, and achieves much of this on the cheap.  The goal is to examine Russian use of force and draw lessons for an era when American use of power must become judicious, timely, and better married to something that resembles political objectives.

                                                                                      Read the rest here.

                                                                                      The Russian Navy’s Great Mediterranean Show of Force

                                                                                      Michael Kofman1 Comment

                                                                                      My latest on the Russian flotilla sailing to the Eastern Med in The National Interest.  A more technical brief to follow in next post.

                                                                                      News has been rippling across Western media of a Russian naval squadron headed by the country’s only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, slowly making its way towards Syria.  Originally announced on July 11th, the combat tour to Syria has been long in the works, together with a host of other Russian naval activities unfolding simultaneously this month.  The Russian squadron has been lurching along at a steady pace as part of a tour de force around NATO countries and towards the Eastern Mediterranean.  At the time of this writing, the ships were passing through the English Channel. While the military objectives of this mission are not entirely insignificant, Russia’s chief purpose is status projection, leveraging its navy to demonstrate that it is a great power.

                                                                                      The squadron will first irk Russia’s already apprehensive Western neighbors and then make its presence felt in the Middle East.  Yet this latest bit of political theater and military showmanship is not without risk.  Kuznetsov’s fortunes will determine whether this becomes a demonstration of Russia’s power projection, or an unintended embarrassment, leaving the impression that Moscow is only imitating great power status.  The carrier is notoriously unreliable, while many of its fellow ships are also Soviet inheritances—capable but aging.

                                                                                      Russia seeks to intimate that it is one of the few countries able to project military power to distant shores and present the image of having some parity with the United States.  Both images will play well with a domestic audience.  Behind the scenes, a two year battle over the future of the State Armament Program is also unfolding in Moscow, with military services fighting over a defense procurement budget on the ebb.  Despite being a vast Eurasian land power, Russian leaders going back to Peter the Great have a history of lavishing disproportionate attention to the navy, believing that in the international system one must be able to show prowess on the high seas to be recognized as one of the great players in the system.

                                                                                      Vladimir Putin has not deviated from this traditional mindset, only exemplified it.  He has at times quoted Alexander III’s famous line that Russia has only two dependable allies: “its army and its navy.”  A commentary on geopolitics more so than military matters, but it still holds true to this day.  Russia’s navy has taken on considerable risk in a bid to convey to national leadership that it is an invaluable instrument for global status ambitions and national inspiration.

                                                                                      Though often a point of fixation, the Russian carrier Kuznetsov—or perhaps more accurately the originally Soviet-built ‘heavy aviation cruiser’—is also accompanied by the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great. This flagship of the Russian Navy packs an arsenal of anti-ship missiles, air defenses and combat capabilities worthy of its prominent name.  Kuznetsov’s mission is in part to make a combat debut in Syria, having sailed several times to the region, but never having fought.  This is a public relations mission at heart, but also an important training event for Russia’s tiny naval aviation component.

                                                                                      The military aspects of the operation should not be overlooked.  Russia’s carrier is often disparaged as a floating lemon, and such criticisms are fair, but the West has an unhealthy track record of underestimating Russian military capabilities for the sake of disparaging them.  Unlike previous tours, which were largely for show, this time the ship will likely conduct combat operations, and it’s not traveling alone either.

                                                                                      The Kuznetsov set sail on October 15th from Severomorsk for the Syrian coast together with Peter the Great, two Udaloy-class destroyers, a tanker ship and a large tugboat.  Little noticed is that on the same day a squadron from Russia’s Pacific Fleet departed Vladivostok on the other side of the world.  The second grouping consists of two destroyers (Udaloy and Sovremenny class), together with a large tanker and tug, headed for the Indian Ocean.  It’s possible that this task force may choose to rally with the Kuznetsov in the Eastern Mediterranean, or perhaps standby on call in nearby waters.

                                                                                      A host of other naval movements are playing out simultaneously.  One of Russia’s newly completed Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates is transferring from the Baltic to the Black Sea Fleet, and may join the group off Syria to fire land attack cruise missiles.  It’s possible one of the Northern Fleet’s nuclear-powered submarines has joined this tour as well.  The Russian Navy’s comparative strength, its submarine force, is unlikely to have been left completely without a role in this affair.

                                                                                      Two large corvettes from the Baltic Fleet have ventured out of port, either to escort the carrier or join it for exercises on its voyage south.  Already on October 18th, the carrier began flight-training operations in the Norwegian Sea, shadowed by the British and Norwegian militaries.  Traveling slowly, the Russian Navy will probably make several exercise stops as a pointed show of force to NATO along the way.  Although planned well in advance, the first part of this tour will undoubtedly answer some of the ‘deterrence messaging’ by the United States 6th Fleet and NATO ships routinely visiting the Baltic and Black Sea.

                                                                                      More at TNI.

                                                                                      THE MISADVENTURES OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN SYRIA: COMPLETE STRATEGY IMPLOSION EDITION

                                                                                      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                      Below is my latest piece on War on the Rocks, analyzing the Russian intervention in Syria and the collapse of the ceasefire.

                                                                                      The current situation in Syria is the civil war’s most dangerous and arguably tragic phase. Months of U.S.-Russian efforts to arrange a nationwide ceasefire in Syria and set up a military coordination agreement have collapsed spectacularly, leading to venomous recriminations as a Russian-backed coalition renewed its assault on Aleppo. The tone of official rhetoric — Ambassador Samantha Power called the renewed bombing campaign “barbarism” — together with a suspension of military contacts raises the risk of a military clash that much further. Meanwhile, interventionist circles in the West have renewed their cries for the United States to use force, while Russia signaled that such a move would lead to uncertain consequences and possible military conflict, reminding the United States to “think carefully” before hitting any Syrian regime forces. If this is not the greatest foreign policy train wreck of 2016, it will certainly do until that calamity arrives.

                                                                                      On October 3, the United States suspended its attempts to implement a ceasefire with Russia and scrapped the proposal for a joint military coordination body. Russian President Vladimir Putin retaliated by shelving a 2000 deal on disposal of weapons-grade plutonium and canceling a bilateral agreement on research cooperation between nuclear sectors. The two countries have since cemented an escalatory cycle of tit-for-tat blows, as U.S. intelligence agencies publicly blamed Russia for its hacking of the Democratic National Committee to interfere with U.S. elections. The prevailing impression in policy and media circles is that Russia has abandoned efforts at peace, instead making a bid for military victory on the ground. Increasingly, many in Washington are certain that Russia strung the United States along in negotiations to help Syrian forces recapture Aleppo in the closing days of the Obama administration. References to the Cold War abound as tensions increase.

                                                                                      These well-structured narratives are built upon grains of truth, but they miss more than they capture. Important facts get in the way of this story. Since the first day Russian planes took flight over Syria in September 2015, analysis in Washington too often flailed between declaring the Russian intervention a hopeless quagmire and decrying that Russia is winning at everything. These depictions suffer from being wedded to merely tactical snapshots. They bend whichever way the wind is blowing that day in Syria. At times, we have been treated to contradictory strategic assessments based on the same battle.

                                                                                      In late August, Reuters told us that fighting in Aleppo exposed the “limits of Russian airpower,” and a few days later The New York Times explained how Syrian forces made their gains in that siege thanks to Russian help. This results in great stories but poor analysis. I offer a different perspective on why the ceasefire collapsed and what it tells us about the Russian intervention. Essentially, Russia got caught selling something they did not have — Assad’s agreement to a ceasefire before the Syrian Arab Army subdued Aleppo — and U.S. Secretary of State Kerry accidentally trapped them by conceding to a grand deal sooner than Moscow expected.

                                                                                      There’s Something Wrong with This Story

                                                                                      Setting aside popular misunderstandings in Washington, many experts and analysts in Moscow also do not seem to understand why the ceasefire collapsed. That is what makes the current situation so dangerous: It was actually unplanned on the Russian end. “Unplanned” may be the defining characteristic of U.S. policy on Syria, but it has not been similarly true of the Russian approach. Since September 19, when the ceasefire was visibly on life support, experts and intelligence officials have opined that Moscow’s strategy is to seize Aleppo in the coming months and present the next U.S. administration with a fait accompli. They are working the problem backwards from what happened in the last two weeks.

                                                                                      Russia may not have expected for the ceasefire to last — and most in the West did not either — but this entire episode is not a Kremlin-managed scheme.  To start, there is little evidence of Russian preparation to support Syrian forces in their campaign to seize Aleppo. There was no Russian military buildup in Syria to better enable an attack on the city or a large-scale expansion of the air wing based at  Hmeimim Airbase. While Russia’s air force has been flying more sorties over the city, its presence in-country is arguably lower than it was during heavier fighting last winter. Following the March announcement by Putin that Russia was “withdrawing” from Syria, there was a visible reduction in both fixed- and rotary-wing aviation deployed. Russia’s newspapers reported that Russia was sending aircraft back to Syria, including the 12 Su-25 ground attack aircraft that were previously withdrawn. Yet, at the peak of this deadly air campaign against Aleppo, we have satellite footage from IHS Jane’s showing that they have not arrived back in Syria.

                                                                                      Russia’s attempt to use Iran’s Hamadan airbase back in August, which would have greatly increased the payload its Tu-22M3 bombers could carry into battle, failed embarrassingly in a public spat with Tehran. Because they thought the arrangement should be kept secret, Iran’s leadership bristled at Russian attempts to turn cooperation into a public relations opportunity, claiming Moscow “betrayed trust.” There is also no visible increase in Russian ground forces present in Syria to suggest that a “final solution” to Aleppo had been in the works all these months, while Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov kept Secretary of State John Kerry distracted with notions of peace. If there is a Russian strategy to make timely gains with Aleppo as the primary operational objective, the Russian military does not seem to have been informed.

                                                                                      Typically, militaries build up assets in theater for an offensive operation beforehand, but in this case, we cannot discern a substantial increase of Russian support to Syrian and Iranian forces even after the ceasefire’s collapse. Instead, Russia had been busy with its annual strategic exercises in September that simulated amphibious landings in Crimea, and much of the country’s national attention had turned to the situation in Ukraine.  Russia has engaged in a dizzying number of troop movements, multinational exercises, wargames, and military events in August and September, many centered around contingencies in Ukraine or with NATO but none resulting in additional combat capabilities transferred to the campaign in Syria.

                                                                                      Following fiery exchanges between Russian and Western officials, Moscow has become noticeably wary of a possible U.S. lurch toward considering military intervention. The calls to do something grow louder in U.S. policy circles. America’s penchant to meet such calls by lobbing cruise missiles as a low-risk form of military action is well known. To ready for such a development, the Russian General Staff sent an S-300V4 air defense system, along with several missile corvettes from the Black Sea Fleet, hoping to deter any inclinations the United States may have toward a campaign of strikes against Syrian forces. This complements the S-400 system that is already in theater. Moscow’s generals, such as Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov, are not leaving much room for doubt as to what these systems are for: “Any missile or air strikes on the territory controlled by the Syrian government will create a clear threat to Russian servicemen.” Although Russia continues to block for Syria, the bloody battle for Aleppo and this subsequent political maelstrom does not appear to be the product of a deliberate strategy.

                                                                                      If the Kremlin wished to take advantage of the Obama administration’s closing days to consolidate some sort of gains in Syria, then why was Lavrov permitted to spend so much time negotiating the intricate technical details of a ceasefire agreement going back to mid-July when Kerry first flew to Moscow with a proposal to establish a joint military coordinating body? What was the point of agonizing delays in announcing a deal, delving into the minutiae of who is positioned where around Castello Road? This is a Rube Goldberg theory of Russian scheming in Syria, and one that does not make much sense if Moscow simply sought a military solution in the last months of the administration.

                                                                                      Instead, what we have is a case of policy capture and, as I explain below, a reasonably well-thought out Russian political strategy unraveling at the hands of its allies. In September, the contradictions inherent in Russia’s approach and the divergent interests of its allies finally came home to roost. We may assign blame to Russia, but what is happening right now in Syria is Russian-led in name only.

                                                                                      Please click on this link to read the rest of the article.  No paywall I promise.

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                                                                                      Tag: Northern Fleet

                                                                                      Submarine Operations of Russia’s Northern Fleet 2016 (press release)

                                                                                      Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                      Below is a condensed translation of a press release from the Commander of the Northern Fleet timed for March 19th, submariner day in the Russian armed forces. This release contains quite a few useful public figures, which anyone working on submarines knows is a distinct rarity. I also reorganized the text, grouping the data in a manner that makes more logical sense, while deleting a lot of extraneous information (the typical this is great, and that is also great, etc).

                                                                                      According to  Vice-Admiral Nikolay Evmenov (CDR NF):

                                                                                      The Northern Fleet has long abandoned the use of conscripts to crew its submarines, pay has markedly improved, together with the perceived prestige of service.  The net result is a boost in fleet performance and professionalism, with fewer breakdowns or accidents, etc. Staffing level for current submarines is at 97%-100%. Nuclear submarines currently under construction already have crews formed for them, including those planned to be accepted into service 885 Kazan (Yasen-class) and 955 Knyaz Vladimir (Borei-class).

                                                                                      Submarine crews continue to undergo training and further advance their qualifications in between deployments, this was the case for 12 crews in 2016 and is expected to increase to 15 crews in 2017.  Improvements to existing training centers were made in 2016 for points Delta, Kama, GKP-67, and Bars. These facilities are for training in ship handling, navigation, torpedo employment, etc.

                                                                                      The Arctic represents the primary zone of responsibility for the Northern Fleet, and therefore training is oriented around the special conditions and circumstances of operating in sub-polar regions. In 2016 two SSBNs conducted training in the conduct of operations beneath the polar ice cap. Equally notable is that in 2015 the Borei-class SSBN, Yuri Dologorukiy, conducted her first voyage and training exercise for that submarine class in the Arctic.

                                                                                      654005490

                                                                                      The training tempo continues to intensify year on year. In 2015 the fleet’s submarines conducted 70 deployments, for a total of 1050 days, having traveled 176,000 nautical miles. Then in 2016 the same number of crews made 75 deployments traveling 184,000 miles. According to the Northern Fleet commander’s official statistics, the average time at sea per crew has been 40 days, for a total of 350 exercises and training missions. In 2017 they plan for 400.

                                                                                      I would note these figures are oddly round and probably represent some statistical creativity, as all such releases do, but they give us a sense of Russian submarine operations in the country’s largest fleet.

                                                                                      In 2016 the Northern Fleet’s submarines conducted more than 30 combat exercises involving torpedo or missile test firing. The best SSBN for the year was K-51 Verkhoturye (Delta IV), best SSGN in cruise missile tests K-119 Voronezh (Oscar II), and best in torpedo practice K-480 Panther (Akula I).  In total, more than 50 submariners received government awards, and more than 800 marks of distinction.

                                                                                      The diesel-submarine grouping within the fleet, consisting of Kilo-class submarines, spent roughly 280 days at sea, for a much smaller total of 28,000 miles in training.  Submarines B-808 Yaroslav, B-471 Magnitogorsk, B-177 Lipetsk, completed 15 exercises with high qualifying marks. Each of them put on more than 3,000 nm in training.  Apparently the crew of B-471 got an award in combat exercises while operating on a different Kilo, the Vladikavkaz. Crews of the new diesel submarine squadron being deployed in the Black Sea (improved Kilo project  636.3) also had undergone training in the Northern Fleet. Best crew among the diesel squadron overall in 2016 was that of B-471 Magnitogorsk.

                                                                                      kilo-class_subs

                                                                                      Along with receiving new submarines, the Northern  Fleet is also modernizing the base infrastructure for submarine forces, and building new housing for submarine crews. This includes a plan for 8 new buildings for a total of 492 apartments, which when built will resolve all the issues of housing for submarine crews (implies there are probably still some issues in terms of housing for the sailors). Piers in Gadzhiyevo are receiving new equipment intended for the newest Borei-class SSBNs, meanwhile construction is in progress for additional weapons storage.

                                                                                      On the whole this is an interesting round up, and in terms of statistics gives us an impression of measurements they feel comfortable releasing. The data is public, and one can work through the figures to see increases in activity/operations, particularly if they do a similar release next year. No doubt a good deal of the numbers released are ‘true lies’ – stat padding, and there is only good news here, but it’s still quite helpful of the Northern Fleet’s Commander to offer up this information. Since the Pacific Fleet was left out of this press release, we can only hope that their commander decides to do one of his own, offering more information.

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                                                                                      #####EOF##### Ernest Lee – 44CON

                                                                                      Ernest Lee

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                                                                                      Ernest is a security analyst in the Stroz Friedberg Security Science practice in London. Prior to joining Stroz Friedberg Ernest studied an MSc in Mathematical Modelling and Scientific Computing at the University of Oxford.Ernest has presented at:
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                                                                                      #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Matt Erasmus – 44CON

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                                                                                      Matt has presented at:
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                                                                                      #####EOF##### Topic: Justify button in paragraph block is not working | WordPress.com Forums

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                                                                                      Justify button in paragraph block is not working

                                                                                      • Author
                                                                                        Posts
                                                                                      • #3291657

                                                                                        radtrad
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        I liked to see the evolution of the paragraph block, especially with the addition of the buttons to underline and justify, but the latter is not working.

                                                                                        #3291672

                                                                                        vinnykaur
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Hi there,

                                                                                        Could you please share your website’s URL and the post that you tried it on?
                                                                                        I just tried the justify alignment and it works fine for me.

                                                                                        #3291674

                                                                                        radtrad
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Do you tried in the paragraph block?

                                                                                        #3291678

                                                                                        vinnykaur
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Yes, I did. Linking a screenshot(https://prnt.sc/n71lsx)
                                                                                        Hope this is what you talking about!

                                                                                        #3291681

                                                                                        radtrad
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Yes, it is. It is nor working in my test site for Gutenberg.

                                                                                        #3291683

                                                                                        vinnykaur
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        What is the issue that you are getting?
                                                                                        Also, if you can share your website’s URL it would be great!

                                                                                        #3291685

                                                                                        radtrad
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Now I see that it is working when I publish the text, but not inside the text editor (visual mode).

                                                                                        #3291726

                                                                                        radtrad
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        I think it is a simples bug…

                                                                                        #3291917

                                                                                        vinnykaur
                                                                                        Member

                                                                                        Well, it works for me in the visual mode as well. I guess there might be some issue with your browser or something.
                                                                                        You can always preview and check though, to make sure it works all right. :)

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                                                                                      #####EOF##### Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                                      Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

                                                                                      Michael Kofman4 Comments

                                                                                      Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting articles you’re going to find on the Russian armed forces, by some of the best experts in the field. If you follow the Russian military then you should try and make time for their articles and issue briefs.

                                                                                      —————————————————————————————————————————————–

                                                                                      The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

                                                                                      Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two).

                                                                                      The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink. Serdyukov is a well-known figure in Russian military circles. An airborne officer by training, he had seen combat experience in the Chechen wars. As deputy commander and chief of staff of the Southern Military District in 2013, he helped organize the operation to seize Crimea. Serdyukov has also been sanctioned by Ukraine, allegedly for commanding forces in the Donbas 2014-2015. Subsequently promoted to command the VDV in 2016, Serdyukov was seriously injured outside Murmansk in a motor vehicle accident. He was on the way personally to observe Airborne operations, together with several staff members, as part of the wider Zapad 2017 strategic command staff exercise. Having recovered, the VDV commander announced his intention to remodel the force, stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

                                                                                      can't assault an enemy airbase without a photo

                                                                                      And, indeed, not all is well with Russia’s airborne forces. Two problems stand out. The first reflects a degree of conceptual confusion. The USSR had two concepts for the VDV: one arm was strategic, composed of parachute divisions, while the other was air assault. In theory, the parachute units answered to the General Staff, while air assault units were subordinate to the military districts and supported their advance on the battlefield. Air assault units would seize key terrain or strike enemy reserves not far from the line of contact with the ground forces. But in practice the VDV always had a third role. Early in the 1960s, and subsequently during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, deployed Airborne units were armed with heavy equipment in the role of motor rifle units, receiving tanks and artillery. Basically, they were used as elite mounted infantry. These ad hoc changes are similar to the processes shaping the current VDV, though after some improvisation, it increasingly seems that Russia’s General Staff is starting to impose an actual vision (even if – caveat emptor – General Staff visions tend to change every few years, together with Russian force structures).

                                                                                       

                                                                                      This slideshow requires JavaScript.

                                                                                      Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

                                                                                      There are other problems. Optimistically, Russia’s military transport aviation (VTA) is at best able to deliver between one and two regiments in a sortie. The aviation park of Il-76 heavy transports is simply not big enough for serious airborne operations, and certainly not in a contested environment. Given that Russia’s VDV trains to force generate as battalion tactical groups, more than likely the maximum air lift capacity is for two or three such formations. In practice, this means that Russia has one of the world’s largest airborne forces (approx 45,000 strong), but without the air lift to use them in their designated role. Indeed, according to Russian defense journalist Ilya Kramnik if Russia wanted to deliver its airborne in the initial period of war it would have to increase the air transportation park four-fold. This is simply impossible given the current rate of Il-76MD-90 modernization and aircraft production. At best the VTA is likely to tread water on the number of currently available aircraft in the strategic airlift role.

                                                                                      VDV praciting loading

                                                                                      Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations. Parachute divisions will still train to perform the more strategic air assault mission. At Vostok-2018, 700 soldiers and 50 vehicles were air dropped at Tsugol range, employing roughly 25 Il-76MD transports. While airborne divisions still train for the airborne assault via Il-76, tactical and operational mobility may increasingly come from helicopter based operations and raids behind enemy lines in support of ground forces.

                                                                                      Serdyukov announced that experiments during Vostok 2018 strategic manoeuvres (September 11-18) determined the future tactics and overall force development. Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. On the second day of the exercise, VDV units aboard 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two Mi-26 helicopters, practiced three types of air assault: low altitude parachute, repelling, and dismount. Gunship support included eight Ka-52 and fourteen Mi-24 helicopters. The much larger Mi-26 helicopters delivered Tigr light utility vehicles, and recon ATVs, serving as an air mobile reserve for the operation. This is a distinctly large helicopter assault formation, intended to deploy a reinforced VDV battalion, with gunship support, and light reserves.

                                                                                      airborne repellingairborne ATVshelicopter units

                                                                                      Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV would also become much more suitable to expeditionary operations where there is a low barrier to entry, and good prospects for elite infantry to make a difference.

                                                                                      Availability may be the driving force behind this force structure redesign. While VTA is in the doldrums, Russia is much richer in helicopters. The Russian armed forces substantially increased their helicopter park during the first State Armament Program (2011-2020), establishing three brigades and six regiments. Russian experts like Anton Lavrov suggest that over 600 helicopters (they were buying about 130/year since 2011) may have been purchased for the armed forces and various ministries through 2017. Each combined arms army is being assigned a supporting helicopter regiment, while every military district will house an independent helicopter brigade. Though the rotary wing park is also not without some problems, given there are no mid-range options between the venerable Mi-8 variants and the giant Mi-26. Nonetheless, Russia bought far more helicopters than 4th generation aircraft, and is steadily filling out new army aviation regiments and brigades.

                                                                                      These changes are primarily, but not solely, intended for the VDV. Land force brigades and divisions will also develop company or platoon size detachments that are certified for air mobile operations – at least in the Southern Military District, if Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov has his way (Serdyukov is not the only one with a vision for helicopter assets). Some of these changes may bring nostalgia for the 1980s, when heliborne VDV units were assigned to support operational manoeuvre groups, and select Soviet army detachments were air mobile. In 2002, the army handed over its helicopters to the air force, which then got rolled into the aerospace forces in 2015. They similarly gave up air assault brigades to the VDV, making that exclusively the VDV’s business. Now the army looks to reclaim air mobility, and seems likely to compete for the same helicopter assets that the VDV will need to realize this new concept of operations. The implication for NATO, used to Russian forces getting places via rail, or driving there, is that Western forces will increasingly have to think at the tactical and operational level about a segment of Russian forces becoming air mobile in the initial period of war.

                                                                                      The introduction of tanks into Russian air assault units represents a countervailing trend, sacrificing mobility for firepower. In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total. Tanks have been introduced on and off to the VDV throughout the Soviet period, as they have to the Naval Infantry (which is also getting tanks back). It seems almost a matter of tradition that the VDV receives tanks after combat experience demonstrates the need for them to employ heavier firepower in a ‘motor rifle’ role, they are subsequently removed, only to be reintroduced later.

                                                                                      T62 vdv.jpg
                                                                                      VDV with tanks in Afghanistan

                                                                                      Generally, the VDV continues to do well in terms of equipment. It has fared well in both State Armament Programmes (2011-2020 & 2018-2027), perhaps as a consolation prize for not receiving an expanded force structure. The former trend continues, while the latter seems finally about to change. In 2015, the head of the VDV at the time, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, sought to restore all four divisions to their former three regiment size. This did not happen, since money was prioritized for procuring capabilities and creating new army formations. Nonetheless, as of late 2018, the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov is slated to receive a third regiment. Meanwhile an independent air assault battalion has already been established in Crimea, the 171st, structurally part of the 7th Air Assault Division. The VDV also received a combat service support battalion in Orehovo. Hence Russia’s airborne has not only gained upgrades in firepower, but it is growing in size as well, and working on new operational concepts for how to make the combat arm relevant in modern conflicts.

                                                                                      But if size and materiel is one measure, what about quality? According to Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV now has 30,000 servicemen and sergeants under contract service, which represents 70% of the force. His goal is to focus the VDV on being able to generate entirely contract staffed battalion tactical groups with an overall contract level for the force of 80%. During the tumult of the military reforms, 2008-2012, the VDV was de facto the only reasonably well staffed force available for handling local conflicts. This is no longer the case, and Russia’s airborne must compete for a future role alongside increasingly better equipped and larger ground forces. Although it is once again being saddled with a ‘motor rifle lite’ role, the General Staff is still positioning the VDV as a high readiness reaction force, and an air mobile component that offers the Russian military new options at operational depths.

                                                                                      4 thoughts on “Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces”

                                                                                      1. Thank you for your articles. I’ve spent a few hours enjoying your material about Vostok 2018 and the VDV. Your analysis is balanced, well-informed and free of pro and anti Russia hysteria common through most of the open source Russian watcher community.

                                                                                        Denis Mokrushin (twower blog) has tracked announcements from the Russian MoD about kontraktnik numbers over the last few years. He notes that it seems they have hit a wall at just under 400,000 contract soldiers. At the same time, the number of draftees seems to be declining slightly even though Russia has passed the worst of its demographic black hole. How are they staffing these new units? Also, can you comment on the recent announcement that the land forces are staffing 1 of 3 BTGs with draftees and keeping them away from front line combat?

                                                                                        Like

                                                                                        Reply

                                                                                        • There is not a demographic problem but a choice on where to spend money. Contracts are simply a question of money, if they wanted more contractors they could have them. However, with 3-5% spending sequester they have to make choices between force size, readiness, and capability.

                                                                                          Draftees are declining to plan, since they want to get to a sustainable number somewhere around 220-230k. The short answer is that they will create tiered formations at 100-90-80% staffing and have to eat the manpower that way. Golts is wrong on this, predicting some return to cadre formations. Large divisions do not need 100% staffing and can be setup under mobilization model to take people in during period of threat. So I think the short answer to this question is mobilization.

                                                                                          USSR had a great system for mobilization, and not so great system of command and control. The Russian military now has a great system for command and control, but largely destroyed Soviet mobilization model – no operational reserve, etc. This was always one of the unfinished pieces from the mil reforms.

                                                                                          As I understand it, a brigade is only supposed to force generate 2 BTGs anyway, and the rest is its reserve. This announcement does not tell us much and I’m skeptical of official statistics, although it is useful to see that they think of the force in BTG counts and are structuring it less on number of brigades/divisions but mostly on the basis of force generation potential (unlike NATO which focuses on defense spending and excel spreadsheets that wont fight). The conscripts are there to be recruited as contractors at the end of their year. However we don’t know in a 6 regiment division how many battalions are supposed to be contract vs conscript, though we can glean that Russians don’t intend to send conscripts to fight in the initial period of war.

                                                                                          Liked by 1 person

                                                                                          Reply

                                                                                          • Thank you for that. How many soldiers does a BTG have? Around 1,000? If so, then 2 BTGs generated from each brigade is not that much larger than a Soviet regiment. Although, a BTG is likely much better trained and equipped than a regiment. How did they come up with the idea of a BTG in the first place?

                                                                                            Like

                                                                                          • 800-1200 depending, some can go up to 1500. A brigade is realistically a super sized regiment, since it has 3 maneuver battalions at its core. A BTG is exactly as good as its components are, it is a task organized formation or kampfgruppen. Most of the discussion on contractors and conscripts is rather strained by some strange notions about basic military organization and warfighting functions.

                                                                                            Liked by 1 person

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                                                                                        Famous Blogs

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                                                                                        • MashableMashable covers entertainment, technology, gadgets, and the web with a focus on social media.

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                                                                                        #####EOF##### Assessing Vostok-2018 – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                                        Assessing Vostok-2018

                                                                                        Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                        I’d like to close out coverage of Vostok 2018 with a brief summary and analysis of the exercise, which was written for Oxford’s CCW Russia Brief, Issue 3. I strongly recommend the issue briefs from Oxford’s changing character of war program, which feature some of the best experts on the Russian armed forces in the field.

                                                                                        Russia’s annual strategic exercises offer an important window into the evolution of the Russian armed forces, their ability to mobilize, deploy, and command large groupings of forces, together with the latest capabilities. The recently held Vostok-2018 (September 11-17), which as the name suggests focused on the Russian Eastern Military District, offered an important deviation from the typically held command-staff strategic exercise which the Russian General Staff organises every September. In a standard exercise, an operational-strategic command (OSK) takes in forces from other districts and fields them in a particular strategic direction, organizing a hypothetical fight together with the General Staff in the theatre of military operations (TVD). But in 2018, Vostok was changed into strategic manoeuvers. Under this framework two military districts, Central and Eastern, divided into opposing forces to conduct manoeuvers in different strategic directions. China’s official involvement in the annual exercises, which is a first, made the event politically significant in Sino-Russian relations, and a mutually agreed upon political signal send by both sides to international observers.

                                                                                        Unlike previous such exercises, Vostok-2010 and 2014, this event represents more of an “in-progress report” for the Russian armed forces. When he was first appointed Chief of General Staff in late 2012, Valery Gerasimov was dismayed with the Russian armed forces inability to move across the country and effectively engage in drills or training events at ranges distant from their home garrisons. The recently reformed military had become a permanent standing force, but it had little experience or credibility in being able to deploy to Russia’s borders in the event of conflict and successfully engage an adversary. The high tempo of snap readiness checks, drills, joint exercises, together with modernization investments under the State Armament Program, were meant to turn the Russian armed forces into a combat credible force, able to effectively deter large scale conventional conflict. Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than the Russian Far East, a vast region that is sparsely populated and lacks much transportation infrastructure.

                                                                                        Vostok-2018 was also as an opportunity for political signalling, featuring a large review of forces and photo opportunities similar to that of Zapad-1981. Russian pronouncements that the exercise would feature 297,000 soldiers – which would have been fully a third of the entire Russian military – was meant to underscore the state’s resilience and undiminished military potential in the face of political and economic pressure from the United States.

                                                                                        In reality, the exercise was rather smaller, probably not exceeding 50,000 participants (this is a guesstimate, use at your own risk) in the actual exercises, with most of the major events taking place at the Tsugol training range. The official numbers given likely represent the total forces on paper from the Central and Eastern Military Districts: often the Russian General Staff will count an entire brigade or division as having participated even when their contribution is only one unit. A large number of units were raised on alert on August 20th, in advance of the exercise, but few had any connection to the actual events. Official statements by Russian commanders also suggest that the exercise was much smaller in reality: Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), stated that 7,000 troops participated at Tsugol from his district. Together with aviation and airborne units sent, it is unlikely that the CMD’s involvement exceeded 15,000-20,000 soldiers.

                                                                                        The reason for dramatically inflated figures for every Vostok exercise is straightforward: Moscow is unconcerned that announcing fantastical figures would engender a security dilemma in the region. Moreover, political agreements governing military exercises in Europe such as the Vienna Document have no jurisdiction east of the Ural mountains. As such, the Russian leadership can count unit participation however it likes, without stoking NATO fears. At the same time, including China in the exercise was a prudent measure to alleviate any inherent suspicions Beijing might have that these strategic manoeuvers were aimed at them, or a manifestation of Russian security apprehensions. Since most of the exercise events took place in Zabaykalsky Krai, a land-locked region bordering China and Mongolia, this was an important precaution. Moscow’s effort at engaging the Chinese military is quite clever, intended to foster greater partnership, engendering stronger military ties, while at the same time demonstrating to their strategic partners the capability of the Russian armed forces in an effort to bolster coercive credibility.

                                                                                        Vostok featured elements of both contact and non-contact warfare, from a series of attack, defence and flanking manoeuvers by battalion tactical groups, to blunting massed aerospace attacks, and effecting precision strikes against critical infrastructure at operational depths. Going into the exercise Valery Gerasimov said he wanted to see non-standard solutions practiced, code for the Chief of General Staff not wishing to see Russian units arrive at ranges to execute pre-rehearsed manoeuvers, i.e. put on a five-day bit of military theatre for him and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu. It remains unclear whether or not he got what he wanted, but Shoigu indicated this type of exercise might be held every five years, pegged to implementation of the State Armament Program, the implication being that strategic manoeuvers would be used as a form of in-process review and reflection on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

                                                                                        Although every strategic exercise is designed to be a stress test for the Russian armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, Vostok had four principal areas of focus: logistics, mobilization, command and control, and tactical innovation. Emphasis was placed on the logistics, combat service support, and combat engineer components of the Russian armed forces. Command and control of forces in combined arms manoeuver, along with integration with other services remains a prominent feature, as does experimentation with the force structure itself. The Russian military continues to work on integrating recon-strike and recon-fire contours, connecting targeting in real time from drones, soldiers or aircraft, with artillery fires at the tactical level or strike assets distributed among the services. There was also a mobilization component aimed at taking in reservists to help fill out combat service support units and integrating civilian authorities into the exercise under the model that ‘everyone fights’.

                                                                                        Vostok was spread across five combined arms ranges, four air and air defence ranges, and several coastal regions in the Russian Far East. Ground force exercises featured large attacks with artillery and MLRS systems with targeting and battle damage assessments done via drone systems. River fording, bridging, masking of units with smoke and aerosol were all parts of the exercise to simulate the logistical difficulty of getting to the battlefield while under fire. Engineers also setup false targets, inflatable dummy units, practicing various forms of deception on the battlefield. The strategic nuclear component of the exercise involved flights by Tu-95MS bombers, which cut through the U.S. air defence identification zone, earning a free F-22 fighter escort before returning to fire cruise missiles at target ranges in Russia.

                                                                                        Efforts at innovation could be seen in the attempt by the airborne forces to create a new type of air assault detachment, together with an airmobile reserve based on heavy transport helicopters and light vehicles. Colonel General Andrei Serduykov, commander of Russia’s airborne forces, was trying new things this year by assembling battalions from three independent air assault brigades to practice large scale heli-borne attacks, some involved as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two large transport Mi-26 helicopters in the action. The Russian airborne also conducted a sizable parachute drop, using 25 transports to deliver 700 soldiers and 51 BMD infantry fighting vehicles, while specialized light utility units were brought in as a ready reserve for the action. Russia’s Northern Fleet similarly brought a new force mix, including naval infantry and specialized units from its Arctic brigade, some of which conducted a raid in depth across as much as 270km of terrain.

                                                                                        China’s participation included some 3,200 soldiers mounted on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs and self-propelled artillery, together with 6 aircraft and 24 helicopters. Interactions between Russian and Chinese forces at the tactical level, assuming any serious collaboration even took place, seemed of lower import than the utility of this event as a form of political signalling. China’s Minister of Defence, Wei Fenghe, highlighted the importance of Sino-Russian cooperation at the operational and strategic level, while Shoigu announced that they had agreed to hold exercises regularly in the future. In a subsequent interview, Shoigu referred to the Chinese participants as allies. While it is difficult to interpret Vostok, or any other exercise, as a proof of a budding Sino-Russian entente, it is clear the two countries seek to demonstrate that they do not see each other as a threat.

                                                                                        While Western policymakers typically describe alliance formation as some sort of state-level dating, where relationships are formed based on trust, common values, similar political systems and so on, in reality this has little semblance to the history of how powers actually form alliances. Alliance formation behaviour takes place as a form of balancing behaviour in response to threats, therefore the only logical catalyst for a Sino-Russian entente is the threat posed by the United States, and the extent to which the two countries see their respective challenges as worth the risk and liability of closer cooperation. Having identified both countries as great power competitors in the National Defense Strategy, and practical measures to intensify the confrontation in economic and military domains, Washington has taken important steps to further enhance cooperation between its disparate adversaries.

                                                                                        Vostok-2018 strategic manoeuvers illustrate that while much progress remains to be made in improving the capability and capacity of the Russian armed forces, the military as a whole is increasingly greater than the sum of its parts, and certainly much improved from its relatively raw state in 2012-2013. Meanwhile Russian policy has become rather more deft in managing their ‘strategic partnership’ with China, seeking to leverage military events as part of a boarder effort to slowly and incrementally pull the latter into a balancing entente against the United States.

                                                                                         

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                                                                                          #####EOF##### WordPress Developer Resources | Official WordPress Developer Resources
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                                                                                          #####EOF##### Publicize — Support — WordPress.com

                                                                                          Support

                                                                                          Social Tools

                                                                                          Publicize

                                                                                          This guide provides instructions for how to connect your WordPress.com site to various social networking services. Once connected to a service, you can share your posts with that service automatically.

                                                                                          To connect your site to your social networks, go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard. You’ll see various services in the Publicize section: Facebook, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn, Tumblr, and Eventbrite. To connect to a service, click the Connect button and follow the prompts.

                                                                                          Need more information or having trouble with connecting to a particular service? Read on.

                                                                                          Note: Starting August 1, 2018, Facebook is making a change to their platform: third-party tools can no longer automatically share posts to Facebook Profiles. This includes Publicize. If you’ve connected a Facebook Profile to your site, then Publicize will no longer be able to share your new posts to Facebook automatically. Sharing to Facebook Pages will continue to work as before.

                                                                                          If you’d like to share your concerns with Facebook, head to their Help Community.

                                                                                          Using Publicize

                                                                                          Once you’ve approved a connection to any of these services, you’ll see a Publicize section in the Publish box on your post writing screen each time you write a new post.

                                                                                          Publicize box

                                                                                          When you publish your post as usual, you’ll see it show up on the services you’ve enabled. If you want to opt out of any of the Publicize services for a specific post, uncheck the boxes next to the Publicize connections you’d like to disable.

                                                                                          You can also customize the message that introduces your post on your services:

                                                                                          customize Publicize message

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Sharing your content again

                                                                                          If you want to share your content again, head to your existing posts in My Sites → Blog Posts and look for the post you want to promote again.
                                                                                          Under every post in your post list is a Share button. When you click it, a sharing menu will appear.

                                                                                          This feature is active for WordPress.com Premium plan and Business plan users.

                                                                                          zrzut-ekranu-2017-02-14-o-16-27-30

                                                                                          The default message will be your post title, but you can customize it to add a more personal touch.

                                                                                          By selecting among your connected Publicize accounts, you can craft your message to specific networks and audiences and use different wording for each one.

                                                                                          If you’re trying to share a post from another author on your site, make sure that the Publicize connections are global and valid for all users on the site. If they’re not, you will only be able to share again the posts of which you’re the author.

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Setting up Publicize

                                                                                          To set up Publicize on your WordPress.com site, go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard.

                                                                                          My Site - Sharing

                                                                                          In the Publicize section, you’ll see a list of services to which you can share your posts. Click Connect next to the service you’d like to enable.

                                                                                          Publicize connections

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Facebook Pages

                                                                                          Note: Starting August 1, 2018, Facebook is making a change to their platform: third-party tools can no longer automatically share posts to Facebook Profiles. This includes Publicize. If you’ve connected a Facebook Profile to your site, then Publicize will no longer be able to share your new posts to Facebook automatically, and you won’t be able to make a new connection to a Facebook Profile. Sharing to Facebook Pages will continue to work as before.

                                                                                          If you’d like to share your concerns with Facebook, head to their Help Community.

                                                                                          On the My Site → Sharing page, click the Connect button next to Facebook. A message will ask you to authorize the connection between your WordPress.com site and your Facebook account, providing access to your public profile and friend list.

                                                                                          Log in with Facebook

                                                                                          Click the Continue as… button, and Facebook will then ask you to allow WordPress.com to post publicly on your behalf.

                                                                                          Permission for WordPress to post

                                                                                          On this page you can also set whether posts created by Publicize should be visible to the Public, i.e. anyone on Facebook, only to your Friends, or only you. Select the option you want, and click the Okay button to allow this, too.

                                                                                          Finally, you’ll be prompted to allow WordPress.com to manage your pages. Click Okay for this as well.

                                                                                          Permission to manage pages

                                                                                          You’ll be taken back to the Sharing page on WordPress.com and will see a success message. Here you can choose to which of the pages in your account you want to connect. Note: You can connect only one Facebook page per WordPress.com account per site.

                                                                                          Select Facebook page

                                                                                          After clicking Connect, click the arrow next to the Disconnect button, and you will see the option to make this connection available to all users of the site. This means that when another user creates a post, it will also publicize to this Facebook Page.

                                                                                          Facebook connection options

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Google+ Profiles and Pages

                                                                                          Warning: Google+ is going to be shut down by Google in early March, 2019. As a result, we will begin removing this functionality starting in December 2018.

                                                                                          On the My Site → Sharing page, click the Connect button next to Google+. You’ll be taken to Google where you’ll be asked to approve your selected connection between your WordPress.com site and your Google+ account. Click Allow.

                                                                                          Info to Google

                                                                                          On the next screen, you’ll see a message asking you to confirm the account you’d like to authorize. Click Connect.

                                                                                          Confirm Google+ connection

                                                                                          You’ll see a message indicating you’ve successfully connected. In the dialog box, you have the option to connect to a different account. You can also check the box to make this connection available to all site admins. This means that when another user creates a post, it will also publicize to this Google+ profile or page.

                                                                                          Note: All posts shared by Publicize to a Google+ Profile or Page will be public. While it was previously possible to change the visibility of your posts, Google+ no longer offers this option.

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Twitter

                                                                                          Watch the video below for a quick overview of how it works, and read below for more examples and settings.

                                                                                          On the My Site → Sharing page, click the Connect button next to Twitter. You’ll be taken to Twitter where you’ll be asked to approve the connection between your WordPress.com site and your Twitter account. Click Authorize app.

                                                                                          Authorize Twitter

                                                                                          After, confirm the account you’d like to authorize, then click Connect.

                                                                                          Authorize Twitter account

                                                                                          You’ll see a message indicating you’ve successfully connected. In the dialog box, you have the option to connect to a different account. You can also check the box to make this connection available to all site admins. This means that when another user creates a post, it will also publicize to this Twitter profile.

                                                                                          Twitter connection settings

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          LinkedIn

                                                                                          On the My Site → Sharing page, click the Connect button next to LinkedIn. You’ll be taken to LinkedIn where you’ll be asked to approve the connection between your WordPress.com site and your LinkedIn account. Click Allow Access.

                                                                                          Screen Shot 2014-02-14 at 2.21.35 PM

                                                                                          After, confirm the account you’d like to authorize, then click Connect. You’ll see a message indicating you’ve successfully connected. In the dialog box, you have the option to connect to a different account. You can also check the box to make this connection available to all site admins. This means that when another user creates a post, it will also publicize to this LinkedIn profile.

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Tumblr

                                                                                          On the My Site → Sharing page, click the Connect button next to Tumblr. You’ll be taken to Tumblr where you’ll be asked to approve the connection between your WordPress.com site and your Tumblr account. Click Allow.

                                                                                          Allow Tumblr access

                                                                                          If you have more than one Tumblr site, you’ll be prompted to choose which one to connect:

                                                                                          Select Tumblr account to connect

                                                                                          After you confirm the account you’d like to authorize, you’ll see a message indicating you’ve successfully connected. In the dialog box, you have the option to connect to a different account. You can also check the box to make this connection available to all site admins. This means that when another user creates a post, it will also publicize to this Tumblr account.

                                                                                          Tumblr connection settings

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Images in Publicize

                                                                                          Facebook Publicize typically selects images that are at least 480 x 480 pixels in the following order:

                                                                                          1. Featured image
                                                                                          2. The first image of a Slideshow within the post
                                                                                          3. The first image of a Gallery within the post
                                                                                          4. An image attached to the post and inserted
                                                                                          5. Any other image in the post (not attached but perhaps linked)

                                                                                          Twitter requires you to first validate your site to use Twitter Cards in order to share images through Publicize. You do this by submitting a post to their Card Validator. This will need to be done for each Card Type by submitting a post example for each. For example if your post has a gallery, Twitter will share it as a Gallery Card, this Card Type would need to be validated.

                                                                                          Tumblr Publicize will display an image if your post is an image post format or if there is an image embedded within the first 256 characters of the post.

                                                                                          Note that these social services sometimes change things on their end and display a different image than expected. In general, however, it should work as described. To exert the most control over which image is shown, set a featured image for each post.

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Additional Information

                                                                                          Multiple connections to the same account: You can connect multiple social service accounts from the same WordPress.com account. This means you can connect five Twitter accounts, for example, and your posts will publish to all of them. If you are a blog administrator, you can also “share” any connection, so that all your authors can publicize to the same account without each author having to set up their own connection separately. Plus, other WordPress.com Administrators, Editors, or Authors on the blog can also have their own Publicize connections in addition to yours. Please note that you can only connect a personal Facebook account once. It is not possible to simultaneously connect to both a personal Facebook account and a Facebook page created by that account.

                                                                                          Setting Up Non-Administrator Users: The above steps are described for Administrator, Editor, or Author user roles. If you’re an Contributor for a blog, you cannot use Publicize. Only Administrators can share their connections with other users.

                                                                                          A note about Terms of Service: Sharing your post to another online service, via Publicize, may subject your shared content that other service’s terms of use. Many other online services have terms of use or content guidelines that differ from our WordPress.com Terms of Service. Often, these terms give the service rights in user published content that are greater than the rights we (Automattic) have in content published to WordPress.com.

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Reconnecting Services

                                                                                          Sometimes the connection between one of your social networking services and WordPress.com might get disconnected. Not to worry, the following steps should get you up and running again quickly:

                                                                                          Reconnecting Facebook

                                                                                          1. Log into your WordPress.com site. Go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard and click Disconnect next to the link to the Facebook profile or page you wish to disconnect.
                                                                                          2. Reload the page and confirm the link now says Connect, but don’t click that link yet.
                                                                                          3. Log into your Facebook account. Then go to your Facebook Account Settings →Business Integrations page by clicking this Business Integration Settings link.
                                                                                          4. Remove the WordPress.com app by checking the box next to it and click Remove. (If there is no WordPress.com row, don’t worry, just skip this step). If you see a popup asking for confirmation, click the “Remove” button.
                                                                                          5. Do not check the box to delete content created by WordPress.com. This will remove all previously publicized posts and there is no way to recover them.
                                                                                          6. Log back into your WordPress.com site. Go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard and follow these steps to reconnect.

                                                                                          Reconnecting Google+ and Photos from Google

                                                                                          1. Log into your WordPress.com site. Go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard and click Disconnect next to the link to the Google+ profile or page you wish to disconnect.
                                                                                          2. Reload the page and confirm the link now says Connect, but don’t click that link yet.
                                                                                          3. Log into your Google+ account. Then go to your Google+ Settings page by clicking this Settings link.
                                                                                          4. Click Sign-in & Security on the left-hand side of the page.
                                                                                          5. Scroll down to the Apps with account access section and click the Manage Apps link.
                                                                                          6. Under Third-party apps, select the WordPress logo and then click Remove Access button.
                                                                                          7. Log back into your WordPress.com site. Go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard and follow these steps to reconnect.

                                                                                          Reconnecting Twitter

                                                                                          1. Log into your WordPress.com site. Go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard and click Disconnect next to the link to the Twitter account you wish to disconnect.
                                                                                          2. Reload the page and confirm the link now says Connect.
                                                                                          3. Clear your browser’s cookies (this clears some cookies that Twitter sets which are often part of the problem).
                                                                                          4. Log back into your WordPress.com site. Go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard and follow these steps to reconnect.

                                                                                          Reconnecting LinkedIn

                                                                                          1. Log into your WordPress.com site. Go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard and click Disconnect next to the link to the LinkedIn account you wish to disconnect.
                                                                                          2. Reload the page and confirm the link now says Connect.
                                                                                          3. Clear your browser’s cookies (this clears some cookies that LinkedIn sets which are likely part of the problem).
                                                                                          4. Log back into your WordPress.com site. Go to My Site → Sharing in your dashboard and follow these steps to reconnect.

                                                                                          ↑ Table of Contents ↑

                                                                                          Common Reasons Why a Post Failed to Publicize

                                                                                          • If you schedule a post, it will not be publicized until it is actually published.
                                                                                          • Saving a post as a draft will not publicize it.
                                                                                          • Static pages will not be publicized.
                                                                                          • If you have trouble with your posts not being sent to a specific service, disconnecting/reconnecting will often help fix it. See the instructions above for how reconnect for each different Publicize service. After connecting/reconnecting the services, you need to publish a new post to test if Publicize is reconnected.

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                                                                                          #####EOF##### MWR Infosecurity – 44CON

                                                                                          MWR Infosecurity

                                                                                          mwr-logoEstablished in 2003, MWR InfoSecurity is a research-led information security consultancy. MWR consults with clients around the world, providing specialist advice and services on all areas of security, from mobile through to supercomputers. As a company we invest heavily in knowledge sharing and we are proud to be a part of an event that provides a platform for discussion on the latest thinking and research in the InfoSec arena.

                                                                                          This year MWR is delighted to be sponsoring the evening parties on the 44CON Bus! We will also be setting up numerous challenges on the day and we would like to invite you to have a go at solving the challenges to win some prizes.

                                                                                          #####EOF##### #####EOF##### Jessica Barker – 44CON

                                                                                          Jessica Barker

                                                                                          default
                                                                                          Dr Jessica Barker is an independent cyber security consultant, focusing on the impact of our changing relationship with networked information. Jessica’s expertise is in the ‘human’ side of cyber security, and her particular specialisms cover governance, strategy and policy, risk and resilience, and learning and development. Running her own company, which advises organisations how they can keep their information safe while getting the most out of it, Jessica works with a variety of organisations and is known for her ability to engage everyone from the most senior level of the civil service and FTSE100 companies to creative workers in digital agencies.In her free time, Jessica is passionate about encouraging young people, particularly young women and girls, to become more engaged with cyber security. She is keen to make cyber security a more engaging and accessible subject to all, and as such makes regular media appearances to discuss current cyber security issues, most recently on Sky News, The One Show, BBC Breakfast, Cybercrimes with Ben Hammersley and Radio 4’s Today programme, and has been published in The Sunday Times.

                                                                                          Jessica has presented at:
                                                                                          #####EOF##### Assessing Vostok-2018 – Russia Military Analysis

                                                                                          Assessing Vostok-2018

                                                                                          Michael KofmanLeave a comment

                                                                                          I’d like to close out coverage of Vostok 2018 with a brief summary and analysis of the exercise, which was written for Oxford’s CCW Russia Brief, Issue 3. I strongly recommend the issue briefs from Oxford’s changing character of war program, which feature some of the best experts on the Russian armed forces in the field.

                                                                                          Russia’s annual strategic exercises offer an important window into the evolution of the Russian armed forces, their ability to mobilize, deploy, and command large groupings of forces, together with the latest capabilities. The recently held Vostok-2018 (September 11-17), which as the name suggests focused on the Russian Eastern Military District, offered an important deviation from the typically held command-staff strategic exercise which the Russian General Staff organises every September. In a standard exercise, an operational-strategic command (OSK) takes in forces from other districts and fields them in a particular strategic direction, organizing a hypothetical fight together with the General Staff in the theatre of military operations (TVD). But in 2018, Vostok was changed into strategic manoeuvers. Under this framework two military districts, Central and Eastern, divided into opposing forces to conduct manoeuvers in different strategic directions. China’s official involvement in the annual exercises, which is a first, made the event politically significant in Sino-Russian relations, and a mutually agreed upon political signal send by both sides to international observers.

                                                                                          Unlike previous such exercises, Vostok-2010 and 2014, this event represents more of an “in-progress report” for the Russian armed forces. When he was first appointed Chief of General Staff in late 2012, Valery Gerasimov was dismayed with the Russian armed forces inability to move across the country and effectively engage in drills or training events at ranges distant from their home garrisons. The recently reformed military had become a permanent standing force, but it had little experience or credibility in being able to deploy to Russia’s borders in the event of conflict and successfully engage an adversary. The high tempo of snap readiness checks, drills, joint exercises, together with modernization investments under the State Armament Program, were meant to turn the Russian armed forces into a combat credible force, able to effectively deter large scale conventional conflict. Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than the Russian Far East, a vast region that is sparsely populated and lacks much transportation infrastructure.

                                                                                          Vostok-2018 was also as an opportunity for political signalling, featuring a large review of forces and photo opportunities similar to that of Zapad-1981. Russian pronouncements that the exercise would feature 297,000 soldiers – which would have been fully a third of the entire Russian military – was meant to underscore the state’s resilience and undiminished military potential in the face of political and economic pressure from the United States.

                                                                                          In reality, the exercise was rather smaller, probably not exceeding 50,000 participants (this is a guesstimate, use at your own risk) in the actual exercises, with most of the major events taking place at the Tsugol training range. The official numbers given likely represent the total forces on paper from the Central and Eastern Military Districts: often the Russian General Staff will count an entire brigade or division as having participated even when their contribution is only one unit. A large number of units were raised on alert on August 20th, in advance of the exercise, but few had any connection to the actual events. Official statements by Russian commanders also suggest that the exercise was much smaller in reality: Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), stated that 7,000 troops participated at Tsugol from his district. Together with aviation and airborne units sent, it is unlikely that the CMD’s involvement exceeded 15,000-20,000 soldiers.

                                                                                          The reason for dramatically inflated figures for every Vostok exercise is straightforward: Moscow is unconcerned that announcing fantastical figures would engender a security dilemma in the region. Moreover, political agreements governing military exercises in Europe such as the Vienna Document have no jurisdiction east of the Ural mountains. As such, the Russian leadership can count unit participation however it likes, without stoking NATO fears. At the same time, including China in the exercise was a prudent measure to alleviate any inherent suspicions Beijing might have that these strategic manoeuvers were aimed at them, or a manifestation of Russian security apprehensions. Since most of the exercise events took place in Zabaykalsky Krai, a land-locked region bordering China and Mongolia, this was an important precaution. Moscow’s effort at engaging the Chinese military is quite clever, intended to foster greater partnership, engendering stronger military ties, while at the same time demonstrating to their strategic partners the capability of the Russian armed forces in an effort to bolster coercive credibility.

                                                                                          Vostok featured elements of both contact and non-contact warfare, from a series of attack, defence and flanking manoeuvers by battalion tactical groups, to blunting massed aerospace attacks, and effecting precision strikes against critical infrastructure at operational depths. Going into the exercise Valery Gerasimov said he wanted to see non-standard solutions practiced, code for the Chief of General Staff not wishing to see Russian units arrive at ranges to execute pre-rehearsed manoeuvers, i.e. put on a five-day bit of military theatre for him and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu. It remains unclear whether or not he got what he wanted, but Shoigu indicated this type of exercise might be held every five years, pegged to implementation of the State Armament Program, the implication being that strategic manoeuvers would be used as a form of in-process review and reflection on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

                                                                                          Although every strategic exercise is designed to be a stress test for the Russian armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, Vostok had four principal areas of focus: logistics, mobilization, command and control, and tactical innovation. Emphasis was placed on the logistics, combat service support, and combat engineer components of the Russian armed forces. Command and control of forces in combined arms manoeuver, along with integration with other services remains a prominent feature, as does experimentation with the force structure itself. The Russian military continues to work on integrating recon-strike and recon-fire contours, connecting targeting in real time from drones, soldiers or aircraft, with artillery fires at the tactical level or strike assets distributed among the services. There was also a mobilization component aimed at taking in reservists to help fill out combat service support units and integrating civilian authorities into the exercise under the model that ‘everyone fights’.

                                                                                          Vostok was spread across five combined arms ranges, four air and air defence ranges, and several coastal regions in the Russian Far East. Ground force exercises featured large attacks with artillery and MLRS systems with targeting and battle damage assessments done via drone systems. River fording, bridging, masking of units with smoke and aerosol were all parts of the exercise to simulate the logistical difficulty of getting to the battlefield while under fire. Engineers also setup false targets, inflatable dummy units, practicing various forms of deception on the battlefield. The strategic nuclear component of the exercise involved flights by Tu-95MS bombers, which cut through the U.S. air defence identification zone, earning a free F-22 fighter escort before returning to fire cruise missiles at target ranges in Russia.

                                                                                          Efforts at innovation could be seen in the attempt by the airborne forces to create a new type of air assault detachment, together with an airmobile reserve based on heavy transport helicopters and light vehicles. Colonel General Andrei Serduykov, commander of Russia’s airborne forces, was trying new things this year by assembling battalions from three independent air assault brigades to practice large scale heli-borne attacks, some involved as many as 45 Mi-8 helicopters and two large transport Mi-26 helicopters in the action. The Russian airborne also conducted a sizable parachute drop, using 25 transports to deliver 700 soldiers and 51 BMD infantry fighting vehicles, while specialized light utility units were brought in as a ready reserve for the action. Russia’s Northern Fleet similarly brought a new force mix, including naval infantry and specialized units from its Arctic brigade, some of which conducted a raid in depth across as much as 270km of terrain.

                                                                                          China’s participation included some 3,200 soldiers mounted on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs and self-propelled artillery, together with 6 aircraft and 24 helicopters. Interactions between Russian and Chinese forces at the tactical level, assuming any serious collaboration even took place, seemed of lower import than the utility of this event as a form of political signalling. China’s Minister of Defence, Wei Fenghe, highlighted the importance of Sino-Russian cooperation at the operational and strategic level, while Shoigu announced that they had agreed to hold exercises regularly in the future. In a subsequent interview, Shoigu referred to the Chinese participants as allies. While it is difficult to interpret Vostok, or any other exercise, as a proof of a budding Sino-Russian entente, it is clear the two countries seek to demonstrate that they do not see each other as a threat.

                                                                                          While Western policymakers typically describe alliance formation as some sort of state-level dating, where relationships are formed based on trust, common values, similar political systems and so on, in reality this has little semblance to the history of how powers actually form alliances. Alliance formation behaviour takes place as a form of balancing behaviour in response to threats, therefore the only logical catalyst for a Sino-Russian entente is the threat posed by the United States, and the extent to which the two countries see their respective challenges as worth the risk and liability of closer cooperation. Having identified both countries as great power competitors in the National Defense Strategy, and practical measures to intensify the confrontation in economic and military domains, Washington has taken important steps to further enhance cooperation between its disparate adversaries.

                                                                                          Vostok-2018 strategic manoeuvers illustrate that while much progress remains to be made in improving the capability and capacity of the Russian armed forces, the military as a whole is increasingly greater than the sum of its parts, and certainly much improved from its relatively raw state in 2012-2013. Meanwhile Russian policy has become rather more deft in managing their ‘strategic partnership’ with China, seeking to leverage military events as part of a boarder effort to slowly and incrementally pull the latter into a balancing entente against the United States.

                                                                                           

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